Germany and the Lusitania
By Charles W. Eliot
President Emeritus of Harvard University.
That the sinking of the Lusitania was an act which outraged not only the existing conventions of the civilized world but the moral feelings of present civilized society is the view put forth in his letter to THE NEW YORK TIMES, appearing May 15, 1915, by one of the most distinguished commentators on the war. Dr. Eliot counsels that America's part is to resist such a no-faith policy while keeping its neutral status.
Cambridge, Mass., May 13, 1915.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
The sinking of a great merchant vessel, carrying 2,500 noncombatant men, women, and children, without giving them any chance to save their lives, was in violation of long-standing conventions among civilized nations, concerning the conduct of naval warfare. The pre-existing conventions gave to a German vessel of war the right to destroy the Lusitania and her cargo, if it were impossible to carry her into port as a prize; but not to drown her passengers and crew. The pre-existing conventions or agreements were, however, entered into by the civilized nations when captures at sea were made by war vessels competent to take a prize into some port, or to take off the passengers and crew of the captured vessel.
The German Government now alleges that submarines are today the only vessels it can employ effectively for attack on British commerce in the declared war zone about the British Isles, since the rest of the German Navy cannot keep the seas in face of the superior British Navy. Germany further alleges that the present British blockade of German ports is conducted in a new way—that is, by vessels which patrol the German coast at a greater distance from the actual harbors than was formerly the international practice; and hence, that Germany is justified in conducting her attack on British commerce in a novel way also. In short, Germany argues that her military necessities compel her to sink enemy commercial vessels without regard to the lives of passengers and crews, in spite of the fact that she was party to international agreements that no such act should be committed.
The lesson which the sinking of the Lusitania teaches is, therefore, this: Germany thinks it right to disregard on grounds of military necessity existing international conventions with regard to naval warfare, precisely as she disregarded the agreed-upon neutrality of Belgium on the ground of military necessity. As in the case of Belgium she had decided many years beforehand to violate the international neutrality agreement, and had made all her plans for reaching Paris in a few weeks by passing through Belgium, so on the sea she had decided months ago that the necessity of interfering as much as possible with British commerce and industries warrants her total disregard of the existing rules of naval warfare, and has deliberately contrived the sinking of merchant vessels without regard to the lives of the people on board.
Again, when Germany thought it necessary on her quick march toward Paris not only to crush the Belgian Army but to terrify the noncombatant population of Belgium into complete submission by bombarding and burning cities, towns, and villages, by plundering and shooting noncombatants, by imposing heavy fines and ransoms, and by holding noncombatants as hostages for the peaceable behavior of all Belgian citizens, she disregarded all the conventions made by the civilized nations within seventy years for mitigating the horrors of war, and justified her action on the ground that it was a military necessity, since in no other way could she immediately secure the safety of her communications as she rushed on Paris. The civilized world had supposed that each nation would make war only on the public forces and resources of its antagonist; but last August Germany made ferocious war on noncombatants and private property.
The sinking of the Lusitania is another demonstration that the present German Government will not abide by any international contracts, treaties, or agreements, if they, at a given moment, would interfere with any military or naval course of action which the Government deems necessary.
These demonstrated policies and purposes of the German Empire raise the fundamental question—how is the civilization of the white race to be carried forward? How are the real welfare of that race and the happiness of the individuals that compose it to be hereafter furthered? Since the revolutions in England, America, and France, it has been supposed that civilization was to be advanced by international agreements or treaties, by the co-operation of the civilized nations in the gradual improvement of these agreements, and by the increasing practical effect given to them by nations acting in co-operation; but now comes the German Empire with its military force, immense in numbers and efficient beyond all former experience through the intelligent use for destructive purposes of the new powers attained by applied science, saying not only in words, but in terrible acts: "We shall not abide by any international contracts or agreements into which we may have previously entered, if at the passing moment they interfere or conflict with the most advantageous immediate use of our military and naval force." If this doctrine shall now prevail in Europe, the foundations of modern civilization and of all friendly and beneficial commerce the world over will be undermined.
The sinking of the Lusitania, therefore, makes perfectly clear the nature of the problem with which the three Allies in Europe are now struggling. They are resisting with all the weapons of war a nation which declares that its promises are good only till it is, in its own judgment, under the military necessity of breaking them.
The neutral nations are looking on at this tremendous conflict between good-faith nations and no-faith nations with intense anxiety and sorrow, but no longer in any doubt as to the nature of the issue. The sinking of the Lusitania has removed every doubt; because that was a deliberate act in full sight of the world, and of a nature not to be obscured or confused by conflicting testimonies or questions about possible exaggeration of outrages or about official responsibility for them. The sinking of the Lusitania was an act which outraged not only the existing conventions of the civilized world in regard to naval warfare, but the moral feelings of present civilized society.
The neutral nations and some of the belligerent nations feel another strong objection to the present German way of conducting war on land and sea, namely that it brutalizes the soldier and the sailor to an unprecedented degree. English French, and Russian soldiers on the one side can contend with German, Austrian and Turkish soldiers on the other with the utmost fierceness from trenches or in the open, use new and old weapons of destruction, and kill and wound each other with equal ardor and resolution, and yet not be brutalized or degraded in their moral nature, if they fight from love of country or with self-sacrificing loyalty to its spiritual ideals; but neither soldiers nor sailors can attack defenseless noncombatants, systematically destroy towns and villages, and put to death captured men, women, and children without falling in their moral nature before the brutes. That he obeyed orders will not save from moral ruin the soldier or sailor who does such deeds. He should have refused to obey such orders and taken the consequences. This is true even of the privates, but more emphatically of the officers. The white race has often been proud of the way in which its soldiers and sailors have fought in many causes—good, bad, and indifferent; because they fought bravely took defeat resolutely, and showed humanity after victory. The German method of conducting war omits chivalry, mercy, and humanity, and thereby degrades the German Nation and any other nation which sympathizes with it or supports its methods. It is no answer to the world's objection to the sinking of the Lusitania that Great Britain uses its navy to cut off from Germany food and needed supplies for its industries, for that is a recognized and effective method of warfare; whereas the sinking of an occasional merchant ship with its passengers and crew is a method of warfare nowhere effective, and almost universally condemned. If war, with its inevitable stratagems, ambuscades, and lies must continue to be the arbiter in international disputes, it is certainly desirable that such magnanimity in war as the conventions of the last century made possible should not be lost because of Germany's behavior in the present European convulsion. It is also desirable to reaffirm with all possible emphasis that fidelity to international agreements is the taproot of human progress.
On the supposition that the people of the United States have learned the lesson of the Lusitania, so far as an understanding of the issues at stake in this gigantic war is concerned, can they also get from it any guidance in regard to their own relation to the fateful struggle? Apparently, not yet. With practical unanimity the American people will henceforth heartily desire the success of the Allies, and the decisive defeat of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. With practical unanimity they will support whatever action the Administration at Washington shall decide to take in the immediate emergency; but at present they do not feel that they know whether they can best promote the defeat of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey by remaining neutral or by taking active part in the conflict. Unless a dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is brought about by Italy and Rumania or some other Balkan State entering the war on the side of the Allies, it now seems as if neither party would acknowledge defeat until exhausted or brought to a sudden moral collapse. Exhaustion in war can best be prevented by maintaining in activity the domestic industries and general productiveness of the nation involved in war and those of the neutral nations which are in position to feed it, and manufacture for it munitions, clothing, and the other supplies that war demands. While remaining strictly neutral, North and South America can be of great service to the Allies. To be sure, as a neutral the United States will be obliged to give some aid to Germany and her allies, such, for example, as harboring the interned commercial fleet of Germany; but this aid will be comparatively insignificant. The services which the American republics can thus render to the cause of liberty and civilization are probably more considerable than any they could render by direct contributions of military or naval force. Kept free from the drain of war, the republics will be better able to supply food, clothing, munitions, and money to the Allies both during the war and after the conclusion of peace.
On the whole, the wisest thing the neutral nations can do, which are remote from the theatres of war, and have no territorial advantages to seek at the coming of peace, is probably to defend vigorously and with the utmost sincerity and frankness all the existing rights of neutrals. By acting thus in the present case they will promote national righteousness and hinder national depravity, discourage, for the future, domination by any single great power in any part of the world, and help the cause of civilization by strengthening the just liberty and independence of many nations—large and small, and of different capacities and experiences—which may reasonably hope, if the Prussian terror can be abolished, to live together in peaceful co-operation for the common good.
Appeals for American Defense
Need of Further Protecting Neutral Rights Set Forth.
By GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.
Formerly United States Attorney General.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
The destruction of the Lusitania by the Germans, and the wanton killing of American men, women, and children, without warning, brings sharply before the American people the question of how long the present sexless policy of the conduct of our affairs is to be continued. Germany has apparently decided to run amuck with civilization. It is now for the American people to decide whether this nation has any virility left, or if it is content to sink to the level of China.
A very clear course, it seems to me, is open for us to pursue: We should cancel all diplomatic relations with a country which has declared war upon civilization, recall our Ambassador from Berlin, and hand Count Bernstorff his passports. Congress should be summoned in extra session, and an appropriation of at least $250,000,000 asked to put us in a condition to protect our rights as a neutral civilized power. At the same time we should invite all neutral nations of the world to join us in a council of civilization to agree upon the steps to be taken to protect the interests of all neutral powers and their citizens from such wanton acts of destruction of life and property as those which Germany has been committing and which have culminated in the destruction of the Lusitania and of so many of her passengers.
Until now the National Administration has been proceeding not only on the basis of "safety first," but of safety first, last, and all the time. The time has arrived when we must remember the truth of what Lowell so well expressed, that
'Tis man's perdition to be safe, when for the truth he ought to die.
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.
BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE.
[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 11, 1915.]
The army, navy, and coast defenses of the United States are declared to be inadequate in an open letter signed by Joseph H. Choate, Alton B. Parker, Henry L. Stimson, and S. Stanwood Menken, which was given out yesterday in support of the plans of the National Security League. This organization, which maintains offices at 31 Pine Street, has embarked on a national campaign for better war defenses, and its appeal for members and supporters is expressed by the catch-phrase, "a first defense army of 1,000,000 workers."
The letter of Messrs. Choate, Parker, Stimson, and Menken contains most of the arguments put forth by the league in asking public support and enrollment. Its text follows:
Careful investigation by our committees who have looked into the question of national defense brings to light the following conditions of affairs:
According to official Government reports, there are barely 30,000 mobile troops in continental United States. These are distributed among fifty-two widely scattered posts, which would make it impossible to mobilize quickly at any given point. Even this small force is short of officers, ammunition, and equipment. Furthermore, it has no organized reserve.
Our National Guard, with negligible exceptions, is far below its paper strength in men, equipment, and efficiency.
Our coast defenses are inadequate, our fortifications insufficiently manned and without adequate organized reserves.
Our navy is neither adequate nor prepared for war. This, our first line of defense, is inadequately manned, short of ammunition, and has no organized reserve of trained men. Our submarine flotilla exists chiefly upon paper. Fast scout cruisers, battle cruisers, aeroplanes, mine layers, supply ships, and transports are lacking. Target practice has been neglected or altogether omitted.
In view of this condition of affairs, and since there is no assurance that the United States will not again become involved in war, "and since a peaceful policy even when supported by treaties, is not a sufficient guarantee against war, of which the subjugation of Belgium and the present coercion of China by a foreign power are noteworthy examples; and the United States cannot safely intrust the maintenance of its institutions and nationality to the mere negations of peace, and since we are not adequately prepared to maintain our national policies, and since the present defenseless condition of the nation is due to the failure of Congress not only to follow the carefully considered plans of our naval and military advisers, but also to provide any reasonable measure for gradually putting such plans into practice, it is manifest that until a workable plan for a world alliance has been evolved and agreed to by the principal nations, with proper guarantee of good faith, the United States must undertake adequate military preparations for its defense."
In the meantime the National Security League feels impelled to call public attention to our deplorable condition of unpreparedness. At the same time the league issues an appeal for public support in behalf of the following program for better national defense:
1. Legislation correcting present wasteful methods of military appropriations and disbursement.
2. Adoption of a definite military policy.
3. A stronger, better balanced navy.
4. An effective mobile army.
5. Larger and better equipped National Guard.
6. The creation of an organized reserve for each branch of our military service.
All those interested in the work of the league are invited to send their names and contributions to the National Security League, 31 Pine Street, New York City.
[The letter is addressed to "present and former members of the Cabinet, to members of Congress, to Governors of our States and Territories, to Mayors of all American cities, to Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade, to merchants' associations, to colleges and universities, to university clubs and alumni associations, to all patriotic organizations, to all women's clubs, and to all American citizens."
"Until a satisfactory plan of disarmament has been worked out and agreed upon by the nations of the world," says a statement, "the United States must be adequately prepared to defend itself against invasion. A military equipment sufficient for this purpose can be had without recourse to militarism. The league was formed as a preparation not for war, but against war.">[
BY THE NAVY LEAGUE.
[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 12, 1915.]
The Navy League of the United States, of which General Horace Porter is President and which includes in its membership Herbert L. Satterlee, George von L. Meyer, Beekman Winthrop, J. Pierpont Morgan, Governor Emmet O'Neal of Alabama, Senator James D. Phelan of California, Cardinal Gibbons, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Edward T. Stotesbury, Benjamin Ide Wheeler, Joseph H. Choate, George B. Cortelyou, C. Oliver Iselin, Seth Low, Myron T. Herrick, Alton B. Parker, and scores of other men prominent in the public and business life of the country, through its Executive Committee adopted a resolution yesterday calling upon President Wilson to call Congress in extra session to authorize a bond issue of $500,000,000, which sum, it is stated, is "needed to provide this country with adequate means of naval defense."
RAYMOND POINCARÉ—
President of the French Republic Since Feb. 18, 1913— (Photo from P.S. Rogers.)
THE RIGHT HON. H.H. ASQUITH—
Prime Minister of Great Britain and Ireland— (Photo from Brown Bros.)
The resolution, which was adopted at a session at which members of the Executive Committee consulted by long-distance telephone, some of them being in Washington and others in New York at the Union League Club, read:
"In view of the crisis in our foreign relations, we, as representatives of the Navy League of the United States, express our emphatic belief that Congress should be immediately assembled and that measures should be taken at once to strengthen our national defense. Our most pacific country should, because of its supreme love of peace, possess preponderant naval strength and adequate military strength. A large bond issue of, if necessary, $500,000,000 should be authorized at once. These bonds would be rapidly absorbed by the American people for such a purpose. Equipped with a mighty fleet, American life and American rights would be scrupulously respected by all belligerents. In such case there would be no thought of our entering into war.
"GENERAL HORACE PORTER, President;
"ROBERT M. THOMPSON, Chairman Executive Committee;
"CHARLES A. FOWLER,
"PERRY BELMONT,
"JOHN C. O'LAUGHLIN,
"FRANK J. SYMES."