DR. SOUTH VERSUS GOLDSMITH, TALLEYRAND, ETC.
(Vol. vi., p. 575.)
This remarkable saying, like most good things of that kind, has been repeated by so many distinguished writers, that it is impossible to trace it to any one in particular, in the precise form in which it is now popularly received. I shall quote, in succession, all those who appear to have expressed it in words of the same, or a nearly similar, import, and then leave your readers to judge for themselves.
I cannot help thinking that the first place should be assigned to Jeremy Taylor, as he must have had the sentiment clearly in view in the following sentence:
"There is in mankind an universal contract implied in all their intercourses; and words being instituted to declare the mind, and for no other end, he that hears me speak hath a right in justice to be done him, that, as far as I can, what I speak be true; for else he by words does not know your mind, and then as good and better not speak at all."
Next we have David Lloyd, who in his State Worthies thus remarks of Sir Roger Ascham:
"None is more able for, yet none is more averse to, that circumlocution and contrivance wherewith some men shadow their main drift and purpose. Speech was made to open man to man, and not to hide him; to promote commerce, and not betray it."
Dr. South, Lloyd's cotemporary, but who survived him more than twenty years, expresses the sentiment in nearly the same words:
"In short, this seems to be the true inward judgment of all our politick sages, that speech was given to the ordinary sort of men, whereby to communicate their mind, but to wise men whereby to conceal it."
The next writer in whom this thought occurs is Butler, the author of Hudibras. In one of his prose essays on the "Modern Politician," he says:
"He (the modern politician) believes a man's words and his meanings should never agree together: for he that says what he thinks lays himself open to be expounded by the most ignorant; and he who does not make his words rather serve to conceal than discover the sense of his heart, deserves to have it pulled out, like a traitor's, and shown publicly to the rabble."
Young has the thought in the following couplet on the duplicity of courts:
"When Nature's end of language is declin'd,
And men talk only to conceal their mind."
From Young it passed to Voltaire, who in the dialogue entitled "Le Chapon et la Poularde," makes the former say of the treachery of men:
"Ils n'emploient les paroles que pour déguiser leurs pensées."
Goldsmith, about the same time, in his paper in The Bee, produces it in the well-known words:
"Men who know the world hold that the true use of speech is not so much to express our wants, as to conceal them."
Then comes Talleyrand, who is reported to have said:
"La parole n'a été donnée à l'homme que pour déguiser sa pensée."
The latest writer who adopts this remark without acknowledgment is, I believe, Lord Holland. In his Life of Lope de Vega he says of certain Spanish writers, promoters of the cultismo style:
"These authors do not avail themselves of the invention of letters for the purpose of conveying, but of concealing, their ideas."
From these passages (some of which have already appeared in Vol. i., p. 83) it will be seen that the germ of the thought occurs in Jeremy Taylor; that Lloyd and South improved upon it; that Butler, Young and Goldsmith repeated it; that Voltaire translated it into French; that Talleyrand echoed Voltaire's words; and that it has now become so familiar an expression, that any one may quote it, as Lord Holland has done, without being at the trouble of giving his authority.
If, from the search for the author, we turn to consider the saying itself, we shall find that its practical application extends not merely to every species of equivocation, mental reservation, and even falsehood; but comprises certain forms of speech, which are intended to convey the contrary of what they express. To this class of words the French have given the designation of contre-vérité; and, to my surprise, I find that they include therein the expression amende honorable. Upon this point the Grammaire des Grammaires, by Girault Duvivier, has these remarks:
"La contre-vérité a beaucoup de rapport avec l'ironie. Amende honorable, par exemple, est une contre-vérité, une vérité prise dans un sens opposé à celui de son énonciation; car, au lieu d'être honorable, elle est infamante, déshonorante."
I have some doubts as to whether this meaning of amende honorable be in accordance with our English notion of its import; and I shall be thankful to any of your readers who will help me to a solution. I always understood that the term honorable, in this expression, was to be taken in its literal sense, namely, that the person who made an open avowal of his fault, or tendered an apology for it, was acting, in that respect, in strict conformity with the rules of honour. It is possible that, at first, the amende honorable may have been designed as a "peine infamante;" but its modern acceptation would seem to admit of a more liberal construction.
There are other expressions, framed upon this "lucus a non lucendo" principle, which may fairly be classed among contre-vérités. The French say that a thing is à propos de bottes, when it is altogether inappropriate. We all use the formula of "your most obedient, humble servant," even when we intend anything but humility or obedience.
Henry H. Breen.
St. Lucia.