"WILL" AND "SHALL."

(Vol. vii., p. 356.)

The difficulty as to the proper use of the auxiliaries shall and will, will be found to arise from the fact, that while these particles respectively convey a different idea in the first person singular and plural, from that which they imply in the second and third persons singular and plural, the distinction has been lost sight of in the amalgamation of both; as if they were interchangeable, in one tense, according to the old grammatical formula I shall or will. With a view of giving my own views on the subject, and attempting to supply what appears to me a grammatical deficiency, I shall proceed to make a few remarks; from which I trust your Hong Kong correspondent W. T. M. may be able to form "a clear and definite rule," and students of English assisted in their attempts to overcome this formidable conversational "shibboleth."

The fact is simply thus:—Will is volitive in the first persons singular and plural; and simply declarative or promissory in the second and third persons singular and plural. Shall, on the other hand, is declaratory or promissory in the first person singular and plural; volitive in the second and third singular and plural. Thus, the so-called future is properly divisible into two tenses: the first implying influence or volition; the second (or future proper) intention or promise. Thus:

1. 2.
I will go. I shall go.
Thou shalt go. Thou wilt go.
He shall go. He will go.
We will go. We shall go.
You shall go. You will go.
They shall go. They will go.

When the above is thoroughly comprehended by the pupil, it will be only necessary to impress upon his mind (as a concise rule) the necessity of making use of a different auxiliary in speaking of the future actions of others, when he wishes to convey the same idea respecting such actions which he has done, or should do, in speaking of his own, and vice versâ. Thus:

I will go, and you shall accompany me.

(i. e. it is my wish to go, and also that you shall accompany me.)

I shall go, and you will accompany me.

(i. e. it is my intention to go; and believe, or know, that it is your intention to accompany me.)

The philosophical reason for this distinction will be evident, when we reflect upon the various ideas produced in the mind by the expression of either volition or mere intention (in so far as the latter is distinguishable from active will) with regard to our own future actions, and the same terms with reference to the future actions of others. It will be seen that a mere intention in the first person, becomes influence when it extends to the second and third; we know nothing, à priori (as it were) of the intentions of others, except in so far as we may have the power of determining them. When I say "I shall go" (j'irai), I merely express an intention or promise to go; but if I continue "You and they shall go," I convey the idea that my intention or promise is operative on you and them; and the terms which I thus use become unintentionally influential or expressive of an extension of my volition to the actions of others. Again, the terms which I use to signify volition, with reference to my own actions, are but declaratory or promissory when I speak of your actions, or those of others. I am conscious of my own wish to go; but my wish not influencing you, I do, by continuing the use of the same auxiliary, but express my belief or knowledge that your wish is, or will be, coincident with my own. When I say "I will go" (je veux aller), I express a desire to go; but if I add, "You and they will go," I simply promise on behalf of you and them, or express my belief or knowledge that you and they will also desire to go.

It is not unworthy of note, that the nice balance between shall and will is much impaired by the constant use of the ellipse, "I'll, you'll," &c.; and that volition and intention are, to a great extent, co-existent and inseparable in the first person: the metaphysical reasons for this do not here require explanation.

I am conscious that I have not elucidated this apparently simple, but really complex question, in so clear and concise a manner as I could have wished; but, feeling convinced that my principle at least is sound, I leave it, for better consideration, in the hands of your correspondent.

William Bates.

Birmingham.

Brightland's rule is,—

"In the first person simply shall foretells;

In will a threat or else a promise dwells:

Shall in the second and the third does threat;

Will simply then foretells the coming feat."

(See T. K. Arnold's Eng. Gram. for Classical Schools, 3rd edit., p. 41.; Mitford, Harmony of Language; and note 5. in Rev. R. Twopeny's Dissertations on the Old and New Testament.)

The inconsistency in the use of shall and will is best explained by a doctrine of Mr. Hare's (J. C. H.), the usus ethicus of the future. (See Cambridge Philological Museum, vol. ii. p. 203., where the subject is mentioned incidentally, and in illustration; and Latham's English Language, 2nd edit., p. 498., where Mr. Hare's hypothesis is given at length. Indeed, from Latham and T. K. Arnold my Note has been framed.)

F. S., B. A.

Lee.