ATTAINMENT OF MAJORITY.
(Vol. viii., pp. 198. 250. 296.)
The misunderstanding which has arisen between Professor De Morgan and A. E. B. has proceeded, it appears, from the misapplication of the statement of the latter's authority (Arthur Hopton) to the question at issue. Where Hopton says that our lawyers count their day from sunrise to sunset, he, I am of opinion, merely refers to certain instances, such as distress for rent:
"A man cannot distrain for rent or rent-charge in the night (which, according to the author of The Mirror, is after sunset and before sunrising)."—Impey on Distress and Replevin, p. 49.
In common law, the day is now supposed among lawyers to be from six in the morning to seven at night for service of notices; in Chancery till eight at night. And a service after such times at night
would be counted as good only for the next day. In the case of Liffin v. Pitcher, 1 Dowl. N. S. 767., Justice Coleridge said, "I am in the habit of giving twenty-four hours to plead when I give one day." Thus it will be perceived that a lawyer's day is of different lengths.
With regard to the time at which a person arrives at majority, we have good authority in support of Professor De Morgan's statement:
"So that full age in male or female is twenty-one years, which age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary of a person's birth, who till that time is an infant, and so styled in law."—Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. i. p. 463.
There is no doubt also that the law rejects fractions of a day where it is possible:
"It is clear that the law rejecteth all fractions of days for the uncertainty, and commonly allows him that hath part of the day in law to have the whole day, unless where it, by fraction or relation, may be a prejudice to a third person."—Sir O. Bridgm. l.
And in respect to the present case it is quite clear. In the case of Reg. v. The Parish of St. Mary, Warwick, reported in the Jurist (vol. xvii. p. 551.), Lord Campbell said:
"In some cases the Court does not regard the fraction of a day. Where the question is on what day a person came of age, the fraction of the day on which he was born and on which he came of age is not considered."
And farther on he says:
"It is a general maxim that the law does not regard the fraction of a day."
Russell Gole.
I only treat misquotation as an offence in the old sense of the word; and courteously, but most positively, I deny the right of any one who quotes to omit, or to alter emphasis, without stating what he has done. That A. E. B. did misunderstand me, I was justified in inferring from his implication (p. 198. col. 2) that I made the day begin "a minute after midnight."
Arthur Hopton, whom A. E. B. quotes against me (but the quotation is from chapter xiv., not xiii.), is wrong in his law. The lawyers, from Coke down to our own time, give both days, the natural and artificial, as legal days. See Coke Littleton (Index, Day), the current commentators on Blackstone, and the usual law dictionaries.
Nevertheless, this discussion will serve the purpose. No one denies that the day of majority now begins at midnight: no one pretends to prove, by evidence of decisions, or opinion of writers on law, that it began otherwise in 1600. How then did Ben Jonson make it begin, as clearly A. E. B. shows he does, at six o'clock (meaning probably a certain sunrise)? Hopton throws out the natural day altogether in a work on chronology, and lays down the artificial day as the only one known to lawyers: it is not wonderful that Jonson should have fallen into the same mistake.
A. De Morgan.