SIEGES.
It is not proposed to go into historical or other details of this branch of the subject, but to give in a condensed form some account of siege operations. According to the text books, the first thing to be done, if possible, in case of a regular siege, is to "invest" the fortress. This is done by surrounding it as quickly as possible with a continuous line of troops, who speedily intrench themselves and mount guns bearing outward on all lines of approach to the fortress, to prevent the enemy from sending in supplies or re-enforcements. As this line must be at considerable distance from the fort, it is usually quite long, and so is its name, for it is called the line of "Circumvallation." Inside of this line is then established a similar line facing toward the fort, to prevent sorties by the garrison. This line is called the line of "Countervallation," and should be as close to the fort as the range of its guns and the nature of the ground will permit. From this line the troops rush forward at night and open the trenches, beginning with what is called the first parallel, which should be so laid out as to envelop those parts of the fort which are to be made the special objects of attack. From this first parallel a number of zigzag trenches are started toward the fort and at proper intervals other parallels, batteries, and magazines are built; this method of approach being continued until the besieged fort is reached, or until such batteries can be brought to bear upon it as to breech the walls and allow the attacking troops to make an assault.
During these operations of course many precautions must be observed, both by the attacking and defending force, to annoy each other and to prevent surprise, and the work is mostly carried on under cover of the earth thrown from the trenches. These operations were supposed to occupy, under normal conditions, about forty-one days, or rather nights, as most of the work is done after dark, at the end of which time the fort should be reduced to such a condition that its commander, having exhausted all means of defense, would be justified in considering terms of surrender.
The Theoretical Journal of the siege prescribes just what is to be done each day by both attack and defense up to the final catastrophe, and this somewhat discouraging outlook for the defenders was forcibly illustrated by the late Captain Derby, better known by the reading public as "John Phœnix," who, when a cadet, was called upon by Professor Mahan to explain how he would defend a fort, mounting a certain number of guns and garrisoned by a certain number of men, if besieged by an army of another assumed strength in men and guns, replied:
"I would immediately evacuate the fort and then besiege it and capture it again in forty-one days."
Of course the fallacy of this reasoning was in the fact that the besieging army is generally supposed to be four or five times as large as the garrison of the fort; the primary object of forts being to enable a small force to hold a position, at least for a time, against a much larger force of the enemy.
Sieges have changed with the development of engines of war, from the rude and muscular efforts of personal prowess like that described in Ivanhoe, where the Black Knight cuts his way through the barriers with his battle axe, to such sieges as those at Vicksburg, Petersburg, and Plevna, where the individual counted for very little, and the results depended upon the combined efforts of large numbers of men and systematic siege operations. It should also be noticed that modern sieges are not necessarily hampered by the rules laid down in text books, but vary from them according to circumstances.
For example, many sieges have been carried to successful issues without completely investing or surrounding the fortress. This was the case at Petersburg, where General Lee was entirely free to move out, or receive supplies and re-enforcements up to the very last stages of the siege. In other cases, as at Fort Pulaski, Sumter, and Macon, the breeching batteries were established at very much greater distances than ever before attempted, and the preliminary siege operations were very much abbreviated and some of them omitted altogether. This is not an argument against having well defined rules and principles, but it shows that the engineer must be prepared to cut loose from old rules and customs whenever the changed state of circumstances requires different treatment.