THE DEFENCE OF NEW YORK, 1776.
By Henry B. Carrington, U.S.A., LL.D.
[The siege of Boston gave to the Continental Army that instruction in military engineering, and that contact with a disciplined foe, which prepared it for the immediate operations at New York and in New Jersey. (See The Bay State Monthly, January, 1884, pages 37-44.)
The occupation and defence of New York and Brooklyn, so promptly made, was a strategic necessity, fully warranted by existing conditions, although temporary.]
It is not easy to reconcile the views which we take, in turn, through the eye and object lenses of a field-glass, so that the real subject of examination will not be distorted by too great nearness or remoteness.
If we bring back to this hour the events of one hundred years ago, it is certain that the small armies and the smaller appliances of force then in use will seem trifling, in contrast with those which have so recently wearied science and have tasked invention in the work and waste of war.
If we thrust them back to their proper place behind the memory of all living men, we only see a scattered people, poorly armed, but engaged in hopeful conflict with Great Britain, then mistress of the seas, proudly challenging the world to arms, and boldly vindicating her challenge.
In an effort to reproduce that period and so balance the opposing factors that the siege of Boston and the deliverance of Washington at Brooklyn and New York shall have fair co-relation and full bearing upon the resulting struggle for National Independence, there must be some exact standard for the test j and this will be found by grouping such data as illustrate the governing laws of military art.
It has never been claimed that the siege of Boston was not the legitimate result of British blunder and American pluck. In a previous paper, the siege itself has been presented as that opportunity and training-school exercise which projected its experience into the entire war, and assured final triumph. It has not been as generally accepted, as both philosophical and necessary, that the fortification and defence of Brooklyn became the wise and inevitable sequence to that siege.
Let us drop a century and handle the old records.
If Great Britain had not called continental auxiliaries to her aid in 1776, her disposable force for colonial service would have been less than half of the army of Washington.
Until the fortification of Brooklyn and New York had been well advanced, the British ministry had not been able to assign even fifteen thousand men for that service. General Clinton did, indeed, anchor at the New York Narrows, just when General Charles Lee reached that city for its defence, but did not risk a landing, and sailed for South Carolina, only to be repulsed.
The British Crown had no alternative but to seek foreign aid. The appeal to Catharine of Russia for twenty thousand men was met by the laconic response, "There are other ways of settling this dispute than by resort to arms." The Duke of Richmond prophetically declared, "The colonies themselves, after our example, will apply to strangers for assistance." The opposition to hiring foreign troops was so intense, that, for many weeks, there was no practical advance in preparations for a really effective blow at the rebels, while the rebellion itself was daily gaining head and spirit.
The British army, just before the battle of Long Island, including Hessians, Brunswickers, and Waldeckers, was but a little larger than that which the American Congress, as early as October 4, 1775, had officially assigned to the siege operations before Boston. That force was fixed at twenty-three thousand, three hundred and seventy-two men. General Howe landed about twenty thousand men. With the sick, the reserves on Staten Island, all officers and supernumeraries included, his entire force exhibited a paper strength of thirty-one thousand, six hundred and twenty-five men. It is true that General Howe claimed, after the battle of Long Island, that his entire force (Hessians included) was only twenty four thousand men, and that Washington opposed the advance of his division with twenty thousand men. The British muster rolls, as exhibited before the British Parliament, accord with the statement already made. The actual force of the American army at Brooklyn was not far from nine thousand men, instead of twenty thousand, and the effective force (New York included) was only about twenty thousand men. As the British regiments brought but six, instead of eight, companies to a battalion, there is evidence that Washington himself occasionally over-estimated the British force proper; but the foreign battalions realized their full force, and they were paid accordingly, upon their muster rolls. Nearly three fifths of General Howe's army was made up from continental mercenaries. These troops arrived in detachments, to supplement the army which otherwise would have been entirely unequal to the conquest of New York, if the city were fairly defended.
If, on the other hand, Washington had secured the force which he demanded from Congress, namely, fifty-eight thousand men, which was, indeed (but too tardily), authorized, he could have met General Howe upon terms of numerical equality, backed by breast-works, and have held New York with an equal force.
This estimate, by Washington himself, of the contingencies of the campaign, will have the greater significance when reference is made to the details of British preparations in England.
While Congress did, indeed, as early as June, assign thirteen thousand additional troops for the defence of New York, the peremptory detachment of ten battalions to Canada, in addition to previous details, persistently foiled every preparation to meet Howe with an adequate force. Regiments from Connecticut and from other colonies reported with a strength of only three hundred and sixty men. While the "paper strength" of the army was far beyond its effective force, even the "paper strength" was but one half of the force which the Commander-in-chief had the right to assume as at his disposal.
Other facts fall in line just here.
At no later period of the war did either commander have under his immediate control so large a nominal force as then. During but one year of the succeeding struggle did the entire British army, from Halifax to the West Indies inclusive (including foreign and provincial auxiliaries), exceed, by more than seven thousand men, the force which occupied both sides of the New York Narrows in 1776. The British Army at that time, without its foreign contingent, would have been as inferior to the force which had been ordered by Congress (and should have been available) as the depleted American army of 1781 would have been inferior to the British without the French contingent.
The largest continental force under arms, in any one year of the war, did not greatly exceed forty thousand men, and the largest British force, as late as 1781, including all arrivals, numbered, all told, but forty-two thousand and seventy-five men.
The annual British average, including provincials, ranged from thirty-three to thirty-eight thousand men. The physical agencies which Great Britain employed were;, therefore, far beneath the prestige of her accredited position among the nations; and the disparity between the contending forces was mainly in discipline and equipment, with the advantage to Great Britain in naval strength, until that was supplanted by that of France.
To free the question from a popular fallacy which treats oldtime operations as insignificant, in view of large modern armies and campaigns, it is pertinent to state, just here, that the issues of the battle-field for all time, up to the latest hour, have not been determined by the size of armies, or by improvements in weapons of war, except relatively, in proportion as civilized peoples fought those of less civilization; or where some precocity of race or invention more quickly matured the operations of the winning side.
If the maxims of Napoleon are but a terse restatement of those of Caesar, and the skill of Hannibal at Cannae still holds place as a model for the concave formation of a battle-line, so have all the decisive battles of history taken shape from the timely handling of men, in the exercise of that sound judgment which adapts means to ends, in every work of life. Thus it is that equally great battles, those in the highest sense great, have become memorial, although numbers did not impart value to the struggle; but they were the expression of that skill and wisdom which would have ensured success, if the opposing armies had been greater or less.
If a timely fog did aid the retreat of Washington from Brooklyn, in 1776, so did a petty stream, filled to the brim by a midnight shower, make altogether desperate, if it did not, alone, change, the fortunes of Napoleon at Waterloo.
If, also, the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, was conducted by few against few, as compared with modern armies, it is well to note the historical fact that, at the second siege, in 1861, the same ravine was used by General Poe (United States Engineers) to connect "parallels," and thereby save a "regular approach." Numbers did not change relations, but simply augmented the physical force employed and imperilled.
He who can seize the local, incidental, and seemingly immaterial elements which enter into all human plans, and convert them into determining factors, is to be honored; but the man who can so anticipate the possibilities and risks which lie ahead, that the world counts as a miracle, or, at least, as marvelous, that which is only the legitimate result of faith, courage, and skill, is truly great. Washington did it. His retreat from Long Island was deliberately planned before he had a conference with his subordinates; and the entire policy and conduct of his operations at and near New York will defy criticism. To hold the facts of the issue discussed, right under the light on that military science (that is, that mental philosophy which does not change with physical modes and appliances), is simply to bring out clearly the necessity for the occupation of New York and Brooklyn by Washington in 1776.
The mere statement of the British forces which were available in 1776 will show that if Washington knew, in advance, exactly what he had to meet, then he had a right to anticipate a successful resistance. As early as July, 1775, he demanded that the army should be enlisted "for the war." In a previous article, the policy of the Commander-in-chief and of General Greene was noticed, and the formulated proposition, then accepted by both, gave vitality and hope to the struggle. When the issue ripened at New York, and, swiftly as possible, the besieging force before Boston became the resisting force at New York, there was one man who understood the exact issue. The temper of the British press, and that of the British House of Commons, was fully appreciated by the American Commander-in-chief. He knew that General Gage had urged that "thirty thousand men, promptly sent to America, would be the quickest way to save blood and end the war." He also knew that when John Wesley predicted that "neither twenty, forty, nor sixty thousand men would suppress the rebellion," the British Cabinet had placed before Parliament a careful statement of the entire resources which were deemed available for military purposes abroad. As early as May, 1776, Washington was advised of the following facts:—
First, That the contracts at that time made with continental States, including that with Hesse and Brunswick, would place at British disposal a nominal strength of fifty-five thousand men.
Second, That, with all due allowance for deficiencies, the effective force, as claimed by the ministry, could not exceed, but might fall below, forty thousand men.
The debate in Parliament was so sharp, and the details of the proposed operations were so closely defined and analyzed, that Washington had full right to assume, as known, the strength of his adversary.
When, during May, 1776, the American Congress sent troops from New York to Canada, he sharply protested, thus: "This diversion of forces will endanger both enterprises; for Great Britain will attempt to capture New York as well as Canada, if they have the men." He did not believe that they would capture New York, if he could acquire and retain the force which he demanded.
The point to be made emphatic, is this: That, from the date of the call of Massachusetts, early in 1775, for thirty thousand men, up to the occupation of New York, the force which he had the right to assume as at his own disposal was equal to the contingencies of the conflict; and that, when he did occupy New York, and begin its exterior defences at Brooklyn, the British ministry had admitted its inability to send to America a force sufficiently strong to capture the city. The maximum force proposed was less than that which Congress could easily supply for resistance. In other words, Washington would not have to fight Great Britain, but a specific force; namely, all that Great Britain could spare for that service; so that the issue was not between the new Republic and England, but between the Republic and a single army, of known elements and numbers. In fact, the opinion that France had already made war upon England had so early gained credit, that Washington, while still in New York, was forced to issue an order correcting the rumor, and thus prevent undue confidence and its corresponding neglect to meet the demands of the crisis.
Thus far, it is clear that there was nothing extravagant in the American claim to independence; nor in the readiness of Washington to seize and hold New York; nor in his belief that the colonial resources were equal to the contest.
One other element is of determining value as to the necessity for his occupation and defence of Brooklyn Heights. New York was the only base from which Great Britain could operate against the colonies as an organized State. By Long Island Sound and the Hudson River, her right hand would hold New England under the guns of her warships, and by quick occupation of Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and their tributary streams, her left hand would cut off the South.
If the views of Lord Dartmouth had prevailed, in 1775, there would have been no siege of Boston; but New York would have had a garrison fully equal to its defence, while sparing troops for operations outside. But the prompt occupation of New York, as the headquarters of revolution, was a clear declaration to the world, and to the scattered people of the colonies, that a new nation was asserting life, and that its soil was free from a hostile garrison. The occupation of New York centralized, at the social, commercial, and natural capital of the Republic, all interests and resources, and gave to the struggle real force, inspiration, and dignity.
Just as the men at Bunker Hill fought so long as powder and ball held out, but could not have been led to assail, in open field, the veterans whom they did, in fact, so effectively resist; and, as very often, a patriotic band has bravely defended, when unequal to aggressive action,—so the possession, defence, and even the loss, of New York, as an incident of a campaign, were very different from an effort to wrest the city from the grasp of a British garrison, under cover of yawning broadsides.
History is replete with facts to show how hopefully men will seek to regain lost positions, when an original capture would have been deemed utterly hopeless. Poland wellnigh regained a smothered nationality through an inspiration, which never could have been evoked, in a plan to seize from the Russian domain a grand estate, upon which to establish an original Poland.
To have held but to have lost New York, would simply show the defects of the defence, and the margin wanting in ability to retain, while no less suggesting how, in turn, it might be regained, at the right time, by adequate means and methods. The occupation and defence of Brooklyn Heights was the chief element of value in this direction. It not only combined the general protection of the city and post, in connection with the works upon Governor's Island, but to have neglected either would have admitted an inability to retain either.
British troops at Brooklyn would command New York. American troops at Brooklyn presented the young nation in the attitude of guarding the outer doorway of its freshly-asserted independence. It put the British to the defensive, and compelled them to risk the landing of a large army, after a protracted ocean voyage, before they could gain a footing and measure strength with the colonists. It does not lessen our estimate of the skill of Washington to know that Congress failed to supply adequate forces; but he made wise estimates, and had reason to expect a prompt response to his requisitions.
That episode at Breed's Hill, which tested the value of even a light cover for keen sharpshooters, had so warned Howe of the courage of his enemy that the garrison of Bunker Hill had never worried Putnam's little redoubt across the Charlestown Isthmus; neither had the troops at Boston ever assailed, with success, the thin circumvallation which protected the besiegers.
At Brooklyn, Washington established ranges for firing-parties, so that the rifle could be intelligently and effectively used, as the British might, in turn, approach the danger line. All these preparations, although impaired by the illness and absence of General Greene, had been so well devised, that even after General Howe gained the rear of Sullivan and Stirling and captured both, he halted before the entrenchments and resorted to regular approaches rather than venture an assault.
If that portion of the proper garrison of New York which had been sent to Canada, to waste from disease and fill six thousand graves, had been available at New York, they might have made of Jamaica Ridge and Prospect Hill a British Golgotha before the lines of Brooklyn.
If we conceive of an invasion of New York to-day, other than by some devastating fleet, we can at once see that the whole outline of defence as proposed by Washington, until he ordered the retreat, was characteristic of his wisdom and his settled purpose to resist a landing, fight at every ridge, yield only to compulsion, enure his men to face fire, and "make every British advance as costly as possible to the enemy."
The summary is briefly this: There was an universal revolt of the colonies, and a fixed purpose to achieve and maintain independence. There was, at the same time, in England, not only a vigorous opposition to the use of force, but a clearly-defined exhibit of the maximum military resources which its authorities could call into exercise. Imminent European complications were already bristling for battle, both by land and sea, and Great Britain was without a continental ally or friend. As the British resources were thus definitely defined, so was the military policy distinctly stated; namely, to make, as the first objective, the recovery of New York, and its acceptance as the permanent base for prosecution of the war. The first blow was designed to be a fatal blow. It was for Washington to take the offensive. He did so, and by the occupation of New York and Brooklyn put himself in the attitude of resisting invasion, rather than as attempting the expulsion of a rightful British garrison from the British capital of its American colonies.
Not only did the metal of such men as he commanded stand fire on the seventeenth of June, 1775, at Breed's Hill, but when he followed up the expulsion of the garrison of Boston by the equally aggressive demonstrations at New York, he gave assurance of the thoroughness of his purpose to achieve independence, and thereby inspired confidence at home and abroad. The failure to realize a competent field force for the issue with Howe, and the circumstances of the retreat and evacuation, do not impair the statement that, in view of his knowledge of British resources and those of America, the occupation and defence of Brooklyn and New York was a military necessity, warranted by existing conditions, and not impaired by his disappointment in not securing a sufficient force to meet his enemy upon terms of equality and victory. It increases our admiration of that strategic forethought which habitually inspired him to maintain an aggressive attitude, until the surrender at Yorktown consummated his plans, and verified his wisdom and his faith.