Matter.
Much as has been written on matter by ancient and modern philosophers, the last word about its constitution has not yet been said. The old school of metaphysicians, in spite of its high intellectual attainments, could not unravel this perplexing subject, because it had not a sufficient knowledge of natural facts. The modern scientist, on the other hand, in spite of his vast knowledge of facts, can never reach the ultimate consequences implied in them, because he is too little acquainted with the old principles of philosophical speculation. For, as all the questions connected with the constitution of matter are of a metaphysical character, purely experimental science cannot answer them; it can only supply materials to the philosopher for their solution. In the study of natural philosophy observation picks up the spontaneous revelations of nature, experiment verifies and controls the results of observation by compelling nature to act under definite conditions, and speculation discovers the relations intervening between effects and effects, as also between effects and causes, thus paving the way to the determination of the nature of causes from the nature of their effects.
We are of opinion that the scientific materials gathered from observation and experiment since the discovery of universal attraction are quite sufficient for the purpose of determining the constitution of matter; and we presume that, under the guidance of positive science, we may safely engage in a full philosophical investigation of this interesting subject. We are not ignorant that the treatment of this great question has always presented, and still presents, many difficulties and dangers, against which proper precautions are to be taken. Sometimes the phenomena on which our reasonings must be based are so complex that it might be doubted whether they reveal more than they mask the truths which we aspire to discover. Again, we [pg 578] are very easily misled by the outward appearance of things, and blinded in a measure by deep-rooted prejudices of our infancy, which, besides being shared by all classes of persons, have in their favor the almost irrefragable sanction of the popular language. Moreover, many conflicting hypotheses have been advanced by philosophers of different schools in their attempt at solving the questions concerning the nature of material things; and thus the subject of our discussion comes before us with an accompaniment of many elaborate theories, old and new, which it becomes our duty to subject to a careful criticism, lest they overcloud the intellect and obstruct our vision of truth. Fortunately, however, as we shall see in the sequel, only three of those theories can be considered to have a real claim to the attention of the modern philosopher, and each of them, by proper management, can be made to yield a fair portion of truth.
We propose to commence with the consideration of those natural facts from which the true nature and the essential constitution of material substance can be most easily ascertained. We shall then determine accurately the essence of matter, examine its constituents in particular, and point out their necessary relations, according to the scholastic method. And, lastly, we shall inquire what, in the light of modern science, must be the philosophical theory of the generation and corruption of material compounds.
I.
Existence of matter.
The first foundation of what we shall say hereafter is that matter, or material substance, really exists. By “matter” we mean a being which is the proper subject of local motion, or Ens mobile, as the ancient philosophers define it. Hence, if there is local motion, there is matter. And since local motion is undeniable, the existence of matter is equally undeniable.
It is all very well for the idealist to say that we perceive nothing but phenomena. Local movement, of course, is only a phenomenon; but evidently such a phenomenon would be impossible, if nothing existed which could receive local motion. But that which can receive local motion we call matter. And therefore what we call matter is something real in the world.
Origin of matter.
Democritus, Epicurus, and other pagan philosophers taught that matter is eternal and uncreated. This old error has been utterly dispelled by the light of Christian philosophy; yet it has been lately revived, and is studiously propagated in our own days by a set of infidel scribblers, who pretend, in the name of science, to do away with what they call the obsolete notion of a Creator. It may therefore be useful to say here a few words about the contingency and the creation of matter. We have already shown, in an article on the extrinsic principles of being,[128] that the changeableness of a thing is a sufficient proof of its coming out of nothing, inasmuch as nothingness is the true extrinsic principle of passivity and potentiality. As matter is evidently passive and potential, it directly follows that matter has come out of nothing.
But since unbelievers are not philosophers, though they call themselves so, and may not be able to realize the value of an argument based on metaphysical grounds, [pg 579] and since we hear them repeat without end that science—their degraded science—has done away with the old dream of creation, we deem it expedient to appeal to science itself, and bring forward from it a clear proof of the fact of creation. This proof is to be found in the very constitution of the primitive molecules of bodies, as Prof. Clerk-Maxwell has recently shown in a very remarkable lecture on molecules.[129] His scientific argument is contained in the following passage:
“The molecule, though indestructible, is not a hard, rigid body, but is capable of internal movements, and, when these are excited, it emits rays, the wave-length of which is a measure for the time of vibration of a molecule. By means of the spectroscope the wave-length of different kinds of light may be compared to within one ten-thousandth part. In this way it has been ascertained not only that molecules taken from every specimen of hydrogen in our laboratories have the same set of periods of vibration, but that light having the same set of periods of vibration is emitted from the sun and from the fixed stars. We are thus assured that molecules of the same nature as those of our hydrogen exist in those distant regions, or at least did exist when the light by which we see them was emitted.... Light, which is to us the sole evidence of the existence of these distant worlds, tells us also that each of them is built of molecules of the same kind as those which we find on earth. A molecule of hydrogen, for example, whether in Sirius or Arcturus, executes its vibrations in precisely the same time. Each molecule, therefore, throughout the universe, bears impressed on it the stamp of a metric system as distinctly as does the metre of the Archives of Paris or the double royal cubit of the temple of Karnac. No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the similarity of molecules; for evolution necessarily implies continuous change, and the molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction. None of the processes of nature, since the time when nature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact equality of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. Thus we have been led, along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at which science must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the internal mechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than from investigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracing back the history of matter science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, that it has not been made by any of the processes we call natural. Science is incompetent to reason upon the creation of matter itself out of nothing.[130] We have reached the [pg 580] utmost limit of our thinking faculties when we have admitted that, because matter cannot be eternal and self-existent, it must have been created. That matter, as such, should have certain fundamental properties, that it should exist in space and be capable of motion, that its motion should be persistent, and so on, are truths which may, for anything we know, be of the kind which metaphysicians call necessary. We may use our knowledge of such truths for purposes of deduction, but we have no data for speculating as to their origin. But that there should be exactly so much matter and no more in every molecule of hydrogen is a fact of a very different order.... Natural causes, as we know, are at work, which tend to modify, if they do not at length destroy, all the arrangements and dimensions of the earth, and of the whole solar system. But though, in the course of ages, catastrophes have occurred, and may yet occur, in the heavens; though ancient systems may be dissolved, and new systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which those systems are built, the foundation-stones of the material universe, remain unbroken and unworn. They continue to this day as they were created, perfect in number and measure and weight, and from the ineffaceable characters impressed on them we may learn that those aspirations after accuracy in measurement, truth in statement, and justice in action, which we reckon among our noblest attributes as men, are ours because they are essential constituents of the image of Him who, in the beginning, created not only the heaven and the earth, but the materials of which heaven and earth consist.”
Such is the verdict of true science as interpreted by the eminent English mathematician and natural philosopher. The whole is so instructive and interesting that we think we have no need of apologizing for the length of the quotation.
Essential properties of matter.
The constituents of things are revealed to us by their properties. For, as every being acts according as it is in act, and suffers according as it is in potency, from the activity and the passivity with which a being is endowed we can easily find out the special nature of the act and of the potency which constitute its metaphysical essence. Hence, if we wish to ascertain the essential constitution of material substance, we must first ascertain and thoroughly understand the properties which are common to all material substances, and without which no material substance can be conceived. In doing this we must guard against confounding, as many scientists do, the essential properties of matter with the general properties of bodies. Extension, impenetrability, divisibility, porosity, etc., are general properties of bodies; but it does not follow that they are essential properties of material substance as such, as they may arise from accidental composition. Those properties alone are essential which are altogether primitive, unchangeable, and involved in the principles of the substance; and such properties, as we shall see, are, so far as material substance is concerned, the three following: active power to produce local motion, passivity for receiving local motion, and inertia. These three properties correspond to the three constituents of material substance.
There are philosophers who deny [pg 581] that material things have any active power. They know that matter is inert, and they cannot see how activity can be reconciled with inertia. There are others, on the contrary, who, for a similar reason, being unable to deny the activity of bodies, deny their inertia. From what we are going to say it will be manifest that these philosophers have never known exactly what is meant in natural science by the inertia of matter.
Other writers, especially those of the old school, while admitting the three essential properties of matter which we have just mentioned, contend that material substance has a fourth important and connatural, if not essential, property—viz., continuous extension—without which, they say, nothing material can be conceived. They further teach, and would fain have us believe, that all material substance is endowed with extension and resistance; and many of them think that extension and resistance constitute the essence of matter. This last opinion is very common among philosophical writers, and deserves the most careful examination, as it bears very heavily on an essential point of the controversy in which we have to engage.
Let us see, then, first, what we have to think regarding the activity, the passivity, and the inertia of matter; and, when we have done with these, we shall take up the question of material continuity, of which we hope to give a full analysis and a satisfactory solution.
Activity, passivity, and inertia.
The special character by which the phenomena of the material world are recognized consists in their being brought about by local motion. For it is a well-known fact that in things purely material no change takes place but through local movements; so that we cannot even conceive a change in the material world without a displacement of matter. Hence all the actions of matter upon matter tend to produce local movement, or to modify it; and all passion of the matter acted on is a reception of movement.
That all material substances possess activity, passivity, and inertia is quite certain on experimental grounds. No conclusion is better established in science than that all the particles of matter act on one another according to a fixed law, and receive from one another their determination to move from place to place, while they are incapable of setting themselves in movement or modifying the movement received from without. Now, it is clear that they cannot act without being active, nor receive the action without being passive, nor be incapable of modifying their own state without being inert.
This shows that activity and inertia do not exclude one another. A particle of matter is said to be active inasmuch as it has the power of causing the movement of any other particle; and is said to be inert inasmuch as it has no power of giving movement to itself. It is plain that these two things are very far from being contradictory. Those philosophers, therefore, who have apprehended an irreconcilable opposition between the two, must have attached to the term “inertia” a meaning quite different from that recognized by physical science.
Balmes remarks, in his Fundamental Philosophy,[131] that there is nothing perfectly still either on earth or in the heavens; and for this reason he expresses the opinion [pg 582] that all bodies have a constant tendency to move. And as he cannot see how such a tendency can be reconciled with the inertia of matter, he comes to the conclusion that bodies are not inert. But it is scarcely necessary to remark that the constant tendency to move which we observe in bodies is the result of universal attraction, and not of a self-acting power inhering in the matter of which the bodies consist; and therefore such a tendency does not in the least interfere with the inertia of matter. A simple reference to the laws of motion suffices to convince the most superficial student that such is the case.
Malebranche goes to the other extreme. He supposes that bodies have no activity of any kind, and that accordingly all the phenomena we witness in the physical world are produced by God alone. This theory, as every one will acknowledge, is supremely extravagant and unphilosophical. It leads to idealism and to pantheism. To idealism, because, if bodies do not act, there is no reason why they should exist; as nothing can be admitted to exist throughout creation which has no aptitude to manifest in its own reality a reflex of the Creator's perfections. And since manifestation is action, no created being can be destitute of active power. This argument drawn from the end of creation may be supplemented by another drawn from the impossibility of our knowing the existence of bodies if they do not act. For, if bodies do not act on our senses, we cannot refer to bodies for the causality of our sensations; and thus the only link by which we have the means of connecting our subjective impressions with exterior objects will be destroyed.
Hence, if bodies are not active, there is no reason why they should be admitted to exist, and we are accordingly condemned to an absurd idealism. Nor can we escape pantheism. For, if the impressions we receive from outside are caused by God alone, we cannot but conclude that whatever we see outside of us has no other objectivity than that of the divine substance itself appearing under different forms. Now, this is a pantheistic doctrine. Therefore the theory which denies the activity of bodies leads to pantheism. We will say nothing more about this preposterous doctrine and its absurd consequences. Plain common sense, without need of further argument, condemns whatever calls in question the reality and objectivity of our knowledge concerning the exterior world.
But, while we admit with all the physicists, and indeed with all mankind, that material substance is competent, through its natural activity, to cause local motion, we must guard against the opinion of the materialists, who pretend that the active power of matter is also competent, under certain conditions and through certain combinations, to produce thought. Nothing, perhaps, can be more inconsistent with reason than this assumption. Were matter not inert, the hypothesis might deserve examination; but an inert thinking substance is such an enormity that it cannot, even hypothetically, be entertained. The thinking faculty evidently implies self-acting power, whereas inertia evidently excludes it; and therefore, so long as we keep in mind that matter is inert, we cannot, without evident inconsistency, extend the range of its activity to immanent operations, but must confine it to the extrinsic [pg 583] production of local motion. Let us here remark that, of all the arguments usually employed in psychology against the materialistic hypothesis, this one drawn from the inertia of matter is the most valuable as it is the most simple and incontrovertible.
The inertia of matter is so universally admitted that it is hardly necessary to say a word about it. No fact, indeed, is more certain in science than that matter, when at rest, cannot but remain so until it receive from without a determination to move; and likewise that, when determined to move with any velocity and in any direction, it cannot but move with that velocity and in that direction until it receive some other determination from without. This incapability of changing its own state constitutes, as we have already stated, the inertia of matter, and is the very foundation of mechanical science.
As to the natural passivity of material substance, we need only say that it consists in its capability of receiving, when it is acted on, any accidental determination to move in any direction and with any velocity. That matter has this passivity is an obvious experimental truth; and that matter has no other passivity except this one we shall prove in another place.
Meanwhile, it is evident from the preceding considerations that all matter is active, passive, and inert. The principle of activity, in every being, is its essential act, and the principle of passivity its essential term, which is a real passive potency;[132] hence the activity and the passivity of matter are a necessary result of the essential constitution of material substance, and are therefore essential properties of the same. The inertia of matter is also a necessary result of the essential constitution of material substance; for the only reason why an element of matter cannot give motion to itself is to be found in the mutual relation of its essential principles, which is of such a nature that the principle of passivity cannot be influenced by any exertion of the active principle, of which it is the intrinsic term. Now, this relation, for which we shall fully account hereafter, belongs to the essence of the substance as truly and as necessarily as the essential principles themselves. Hence the inertia of matter is an essential property of matter no less than its activity and passivity.
Action at a distance.
The activity of material substance is a very interesting subject of investigation; its nature, its mode of working, the law of its exertion, and the conditions on which the production of its effects depends, give rise to many important questions, which, owing to philosophical discords, have not yet received a satisfactory solution. The first of these questions is: Does material substance act at a distance, or does it require, as a condition sine qua non for acting, a mathematical contact of its matter with the matter acted upon?
Philosophers and scientists have often examined this grave subject, but their opinions are still divided. Those philosophers who form their physical views from the scholastic system, commonly hold that a true material contact is an indispensable condition for the action of matter upon matter, and think it to be an evident truth. But physicists, “with few exceptions,” as Prof. Faraday remarks, admit that all action of matter upon matter is [pg 584] an actio in distans, and he himself supports the same doctrine, although suggesting that it should be expressed in somewhat different terms. We propose to show that this latter solution is the only one consistent with the principles both of science and of philosophy. And as the opposite view owes its origin, and in a great measure its plausibility, to the known theory of kinetic forces as deduced from the impact of bodies, we shall argue from the same theory in support of our conclusion.
Here is our argument. When a body impinges upon another body, if any communication of movement is made by a true and immediate contact of matter with matter, its duration must be limited to that indivisible instant of time in which the distance between the struggling particles of matter becomes = 0. But in an indivisible instant of time no finite velocity can be communicated. And therefore no real movement can be caused in the impact of bodies by a true and immediate contact of matter with matter.
We think that this argument admits of no reply. Its major proposition is the statement of an obvious geometric truth. Nor can it be gainsaid by assuming that the duration of the action can be prolonged; for the action, in the opinion of those against whom we now are arguing, is supposed to require true material contact; and it is plain that two particles of matter coming into contact cannot remain in contact for any length of time, however inappreciable, unless in the very first instant of their meeting their velocities have become equal; it being evident that two particles of matter animated by different velocities cannot preserve for any length of time the same relation in space. To assume, therefore, that the contact can be prolonged, is to assume that from the very first instant of the collision the unequal velocities of the struggling particles have been equalized, or, in other terms, that the velocity imparted has been communicated in the very first instant of the impact. But if so, then the assumption of a prolonged contact, as a means of communicating the velocity, is altogether useless, and involves an evident contradiction. It is therefore necessary to concede that, if the velocity is communicated by a true and immediate contact of matter with matter, the communication must be made in an indivisible instant of time.
The minor proposition of our syllogism is equally evident. For it is one of the fundamental axioms of mechanics that actions, all other things being equal, are proportional to their respective duration; whence it is plain that an action of which the duration is infinitesimal cannot produce more than an infinitesimal effect. And therefore no finite velocity can be produced by true material contact.
Against this argument four objections may be advanced: First, that although in the contact of one point with another point no finite velocity can be communicated, yet in the case of a multitude of material points coming into collision the effect might be appreciable. Secondly, that a particle of matter may be carried straight away by another particle which impinges upon it with sufficient velocity. Thirdly, that a distinction is to be made between continuous and instantaneous actions, and that, although a continuous action produces an effect proportional to its [pg 585] duration, as in the case of universal attraction, yet instantaneous actions, as in the case of impact, may not necessarily follow the same law. Lastly, that even admitting the impossibility of producing finite velocity in an infinitesimal unit of time, yet finite velocity might still be communicated in an infinitesimal unit of time without any new production, as modern scientists assume.
To the first objection we answer that, if each material point cannot, in the instant of the contact, acquire more than an infinitesimal velocity, the whole multitude will have only an infinitesimal velocity; and thus no movement will ensue.
To the second we answer that a particle cannot be carried straight away unless it receives a communication of finite velocity; and such a communication, as we have already shown, cannot be made in the instant of the contact.
The third objection we answer by denying that there is any rigorously instantaneous action. When physicists speak of “instantaneous” actions, they mean actions having a finite duration, which, however, is so short that it cannot be appreciated or measured by our means of observation. And therefore what is called an “instantaneous” action is nothing but a continuous action of a short duration. Now, a difference of duration is not a difference in kind; and accordingly, if actions are proportional to their duration when their duration is longer, they are no less so when their duration is shorter.
The last objection takes for granted that there can be a communication of velocity without production of velocity; which amounts to saying that the velocity of the impinging body is transmitted identically to the body impinged upon. This is, however, a mere delusion. The velocity acquired by the body impinged upon has no previous existence in the impinging body; and accordingly its communication implies its real production, as we have proved in one of our past articles.[133]
The actio in distans can also be proved from the very nature of material activity. It is generally admitted that the active power of matter is either attractive or repulsive; for all men of science agree that the movements of the material world are brought about by attractions and repulsions. Now, attraction and repulsion do not imply a material contact between the agent and the patient, but, on the contrary, exclude it; and therefore all the movements of the material world are due to actions at a distance. That attraction excludes material contact is quite evident, for attraction produces movement by causing the approach of one body to another; and it is evident that no approach will be possible if the bodies are already in immediate contact. It is therefore an essential condition for the possibility of attraction that the agent be not in immediate contact with the patient. And as for repulsion, it is known that it serves to keep the molecules of a body distant from one another, and consequently it is exercised at molecular distances. This is especially evident in the case of elastic fluids. For repulsion obtains among the molecules of such fluids, whether the said molecules be pressed nearer or let further apart. And therefore repulsion, too, is exercised without material contact.
Some modern physicists try to do away with repulsion, and explain the pressure exercised by a gas against the vessel in which it is confined by saying that the gaseous molecules are continually flying about in all directions, and continually impinging on the interior surface of the recipient, where their excursions are intercepted, and that this continuous series of impacts constitutes what we call the pressure of the gas on the vessel.
But this new theory cannot bear one moment's examination. It is wholly gratuitous; it disregards mechanical principles by admitting that the movement of the molecules can go on unabated in spite of repeated impacts, and it assumes that the momentum of a moving molecule is its active power; which is utterly false, as we will show later.
Other physicists have tried to get rid of attraction, also, by assuming that those effects which we ascribe to attraction are to be attributed to ethereal pressure. This hypothesis has no better foundation than the preceding one, and is equally untenable for many reasons which we shall explain hereafter.
The actio in distans can also be directly proved by the consideration of statical forces. We know that the action which tends to communicate movement in a given direction cannot be frustrated or neutralized, except by an action of the same intensity applied in an opposite direction. It is evident, on the other hand, that, if the first requires an immediate contact of matter with matter, the second also must be subject to the same condition. Now, this latter is altogether independent of such a condition. Accordingly, the former also—that is, the action which tends to communicate the movement—is independent of a true material contact.
The minor proposition of this syllogism may be proved as follows: Let a small cube of hard steel be placed on a smooth, horizontal plate of cast-iron lying on a table. The cube will remain at rest on the plate, notwithstanding the action of gravity upon it, because, while the cube tends to fall and presses the plate, the action of the plate frustrates that tendency, and keeps the equilibrium. Now, the cube and the plate do not immediately touch one another with their matter; for we know that they can be brought nearer than they are. We may place, for instance, a second cube on the top of the first, and thus increase the pressure on the plate, and cause the plate itself to react with an increased intensity. But it is obvious that neither of the two actions can become intenser, unless the cube is brought nearer to the plate; for the resistance of the plate cannot be modified, unless some of the previous conditions be altered; and since the two surfaces have remained the same, no other condition can be conceived to be changed except their relative distance. It is therefore a change, and in fact a diminution, of the distance between the cube and the plate that entails the change of the action. Whence we see that, even in the case of the so-called physical contact, bodies do not touch one another with their matter. This shows that physical contact does not exclude distance; and therefore, when we say that two bodies touch one another, the fact we express is that the two bodies are so near to one another that they cannot approach nearer [pg 587]without their molecular arrangement being disturbed by their mutual actions. Therefore the hypothesis that a true material contact of matter with matter is needed for causing or for hindering movement is irreconcilable with fact.
As a further development of this proof, we may add that one of the necessary conditions for the equilibrium of the cube on the plate is, that the action of the plate have a direction opposite to the action of the cube. Now, no direction whatever can be conceived but between two distinct, and therefore distant, points. Accordingly, there cannot be the least doubt that all the points belonging to the surface of the plate are really distant from those of the neighboring surface of the cube. Whence we conclude again that their mutual action is exercised at a distance.
Other proofs of the same truth might be drawn, if necessary, from other considerations. Faraday, from the phenomena of electric conduction, was led to the conclusion that each atom of matter, though occupying a mere point in space, has a sphere of action extending throughout the whole solar system.[134] Boscovich,[135] from the law of continuity, demonstrates that movement is not communicated through material contact. And mechanical writers generally consider all dynamical forces—that is, all accelerating or retarding actions—as functions of distances; which shows that all motive actions depend on distance, not only for their direction, but also for their intensity. We have no need of developing these proofs, as we think that the preceding arguments are abundantly sufficient to convince all intelligent readers of the truth of our conclusion, viz.:
1. That distance is a necessary condition of the action of matter upon matter;
2. That the contact between the agent and the object acted on is not material, but virtual, inasmuch as it is by its active power (virtus), and not by its matter, that the agent reaches the matter of the object acted upon;
3. Hence that any material substance, which is anywhere by reason of its matter, has within itself a power prepared to act where the substance itself is not present by its matter.
As the actio in distans shocks vulgar prejudices, and has therefore many decided adversaries, it is plain that we must be ready to meet a great number of objections. For the present we respectfully invite those who consider the action at a distance as an obvious impossibility to examine carefully the arguments by which we have established the impossibility of the action by material contact. As to their own reasons for a contrary opinion, we hope to answer them satisfactorily as soon as we have done with the explanation of a few other preliminaries.
Power and velocity.
The question which now presents itself is the following: Is velocity the active power of material substance? This question has some importance in the present state of science, on account of the confusion generally made by physical writers between powers, forces, actions, and movements. We answer that, although active power and velocity are now generally considered as synonymous, they are quite different things. Here are our reasons:
In the first place, it is philosophically [pg 588] evident that the result of an action and the principle of the action cannot be of the same nature. But velocity is certainly the result of an action, whilst the active power is the principle of the action. And therefore velocity and active power cannot be of the same nature. But surely, if velocity has not the nature of an active power, it is not an active power, as every one must admit.
In the second place, the active power of creatures, be they material or immaterial, is the power by the exertion of which they manifest themselves and their natural perfection, thus leading us to the knowledge of the existence and the perfections of our Creator, such a knowledge being the end of creation. Active power is therefore not an accidental and changeable affection, but an essential, primitive, and permanent appurtenance of all created substances; nor does it come from interaction of creatures, but only from creation itself; so that we might well apply to it what S. Paul says of the power of kings and rulers: “There is no power except from God.” And accordingly velocity, which is an accidental and changeable affection of matter, cannot be the active power of the material substance.
In the third place, if velocity were the active principle of matter, matter would have no definite nature of its own. For “nature” is defined as the principle of motion; and material substance would be destitute of such a principle; for velocity, by which it is assumed that it would cause movement, has no part in the constitution of the substance itself. Hence we must conclude that either material substance has no definite nature of its own, or, if this cannot be admitted, the active power of matter is not its velocity.
In the fourth place, a mass of matter at rest acts on the body by which it is supported, and exercises a pressure against it; and therefore matter is active independently of actual movement; which conclusively shows that the active power of matter has nothing common with its velocity.
Lastly, velocity is an accidental mode; and nothing accidental possesses active power, as has been shown in one of our philosophical articles.[136]
Thus it appears that the active power of material substance is not its velocity. Those physicists who acknowledge no other powers but “masses multiplied by velocities” are therefore wholly mistaken. The product of a mass into its velocity does not represent an active power, and not even a dynamical force, but simply the quantity of an effect produced by a previous action. It is true that a mass animated by velocity can do work, which a mass at rest cannot do. But we have shown in the article just mentioned that such a work is done, not by velocity, but by the natural powers inherent in the body, the velocity being only a condition sine qua non. Nor does it matter that the work done by a body is a function of its velocity. This only proves that the greater the velocity of the body, the greater is the resistance required to exhaust it.
Sphere of action.—The next question is: Has matter a sphere of action? That is, Does a primitive element of matter act around itself with equal intensity on all other elements equally distant from it?
The answer must be affirmative.
And first, since the active principle of material substance is destined, as above stated, to produce local movement, it is evident that its action must proceed from a term marking a point in space, and reach other terms marking other similar points. Local movement, in fact, cannot be produced, unless the term acted on be determined by the agent to follow a certain direction; for the direction of the movement must be imparted by the agent which imparts the movement. Now, the direction of the movement, and of the action which causes it, cannot evidently be conceived without two distinct points, the one marked in space by the agent, the other by the patient. Hence the exertion of the active power of matter necessarily proceeds from a point in space to other points in space. Whether such points be rigorously unextended and mathematically indivisible we shall inquire in another article; our object at present is only to show the necessity of a local term from which the direction of the action has to proceed towards other local terms.
This being understood, we can now show that the point from which the action of a material element is directed is the centre of a sphere of activity, or, in other terms, that the primitive elements of matter act in a sphere of which they occupy the centre. This proposition implies that material elements not only act all around, or in every direction, but also that they act with equal intensity at equal distances. This we show in the following manner.
The earth, the planets, and the sun act in all directions, and the intensity of their respective actions, all other things being equal, depends on their distance from the bodies acted on; so that, all other things being equal, to equal distances equal actions correspond. That such actions really proceed from the earth, the planets, and the sun respectively there can be no doubt. For to no other sources can the actions be referred than to those bodies from which both their direction and their intensity proceed. Now, the action by which a planet is attracted is directed to the centre of the sun, and the action by which a satellite is retained in its orbit is directed to the centre of the planet to which it belongs. On the other hand, the intensity of all such actions varies only with the distance of the planet from the sun, and of the satellite from the planet. Whence we conclude that the actions which we attribute to these bodies are really their own.
Now, if such great bodies as the sun, the earth, and all the planets act thus in a sphere, it is manifest that every particle of matter in their mass acts in a sphere. For the action of the whole mass, being only a resultant of the particular actions of all the component elements, cannot but follow the nature of its components; and therefore, from the fact that the action of the whole mass is directed in a sphere, and has equal intensity at equal distances, we must conclude that all the component actions are similarly directed, and have equal intensities at equal distances. Hence every element of matter has a sphere of action, and acts all around itself with equal actions on all other elements equally distant from it.
This conclusion applies to all matter. For we have proved, on the one hand, that matter cannot act except at a distance, and, on [pg 590] the other, we can show by a general argument that the actions themselves must be equal at equal distances around each centre of activity. It is evident, in fact, that the actions of any material element on any other must be equal when the local relation between the elements is the same. But whatever be the position in space of the element acted on, its local relation to the other element remains the same whenever the distance between them is not altered; for so long as we consider two elements only, no other local relation can be conceived to exist between them than that of distance; and therefore a change of position in space which does not alter the distance of the two elements leaves them in the same relation with one another, however much it may alter their relation to other surrounding matter. Since, then, the elements which are arranged spherically around a given element are all equally distant from it, they are all equally related to it, and are all acted on in the same manner. And therefore all material element acts with equal intensity on all other elements equally distant from it.
The truth of this proposition being very generally acknowledged by astronomers and physicists, we need not dwell on it any longer. We must, however, mention and solve two objections which have been advanced against it. The first is, that the cohesion of the molecules in a certain number of bodies is more energetic in some directions than in others; as in crystals, which are cleavable only in definite planes. This would tend to show that material elements do not always act in a sphere. The second objection is, that the action of the sun and of the planets, on which the demonstration of our proposition is grounded, can be denied. Some modern physicists, in fact, hold that what we persist in calling “universal attraction” is not attraction, but only an ethereal pressure exercised on the celestial bodies; and if this be the real case, the action of matter in a sphere will be out of the question.
In answer to the first objection, we say that elements of matter and molecules of bodies are not to be confounded. The molecule is capable of internal movements, as we have already remarked; and therefore every molecule consists of a number of primitive elements having a distinct and independent existence in space. Hence the action of a molecule is not a simple action, but is the resultant of the actions proceeding from those distinct elements; and it is plain that, if such elements are made to approach the centre of the molecule in one direction more than in another, the resultant of their actions will be greater in one direction than in another, and the neighboring molecules will adhere to each other more firmly in one direction than in another. This inequality of molecular actions does not, however, extend beyond the limits of molecular distances; for, when the distance is great (and we can call great those distances in comparison with which the diameter of a molecule is of no account), all the distinct centres of elementary action may be admitted to coincide with the centre of the molecule, and all their spheres to coalesce into one sphere. And thus at such greater distances all molecules, no less than all primitive elements, act in a sphere.
The second objection rests on the [pg 591] singular assumption that the universal ether, owing to the centrifugal force called into existence by the rotation of the celestial bodies, is reduced, around each of them, to a density directly proportional to the distance from the centre of the rotation. Hence they suppose that the ether which surrounds and presses the earth must be denser on the hemisphere where there is night than on that where there is day, because the former is more distant from the sun than the latter; and they infer that on the former hemisphere the pressure of the ether must be greater than on the latter; which brings them to the conclusion that the earth must move towards the sun with a velocity proportional to the difference between the two pressures. Such is the theory by which some modern thinkers tried to supplant universal attraction. We need not go far to show the utter absurdity of this rash conception, as the most common phenomena and the most elementary principles of mechanics supply us with abundant proofs of its falsity. Centrifugal force is necessarily perpendicular to the axis of the rotation, and is proportional to the radius of the circle described. Hence its intensity, which is a maximum on the equator of the revolving body, diminishes from the equator to the poles, where it becomes = 0. If, then, the ether surrounding the earth (or any other celestial body) acquires by centrifugal force a greater density at a greater distance from the earth, the effect must be greater at the equator than in any latitude from the equator to the poles, and bodies must accordingly have a greater weight, and fall with greater impetus, at the equator than in any latitude. Moreover, all bodies should fall in the direction of the pressure—that is, perpendicularly to the axis of rotation, and not perpendicularly to the horizon. Then, also, the pressure of the ether being proportional to the surface of the falling body, of two equal masses having different surfaces, the one whose surface is greater should fall with a greater impetus. Now, all this is contrary to fact.
The preceding remarks suffice to annihilate the theory. We might add that centrifugal forces are not active powers, as the theory assumes, but only components of the rotatory movement, and affections of the rotating matter. Hence, if the ether surrounding the earth does not rotate with it, its condensation through centrifugal force is a patent impossibility; while, if the ether rotates with the earth, its condensation through centrifugal force will again be impossible, inasmuch as its centrifugal force will be greater and greater in proportion as its distance from the earth is greater. It is rarefaction, not condensation, that would take place in this latter hypothesis. One word more. If the mere difference of the pressures exercised by the ether on the two hemispheres of a planet is sufficient to communicate to it a considerable centripetal velocity, as the theory asserts, how can we escape the conclusion that all progress of a planet in its orbit should have been checked long ago by the total pressure of the same ether on its advancing hemisphere?
It is strange indeed that a theory so preposterous in its assumptions and so absurd in its consequences can have found favor with scientific writers in the full light of this nineteenth century!
Antar And Zara; Or, “The Only True Lovers.” IV.
An Eastern Romance Narrated In Songs.
By Aubrey De Vere.
Part IV.
She Sang.
I.
It came: it reached me from afar:
I kissed the seal, the cords unwove;
Came wafted from the fields of war
On all the odorous airs of love.
Close hid I sang; close hid I sighed
In places where no echoes were,
Where dashed the streams through gorges wide,
And sprays leaned back on moistened air.
I sang a song, half sighs, yet proud,
And smothered by those downward rills,
A music proud, and yet not loud,
As when her babe a mother stills.
II.
Behold! for thee, and for thy love
I fain would make my spirit fair:
For this I strive; for this I strove:
My toil, though late, shall blossom bear.
Before thy face the plant shall rise,
In thy fair presence bloom and flower:
O love me! Thou art great and wise:—
Heart-greatness is the woman's dower.
Thou mad'st me as a warrior young
That yearns to flesh a maiden sword,
That burns for battle with the strong,
That pants to crush some rebel horde.
Rebels I count all things in me
That bear no impress of my King!
“Fair is a great king's jealousy;
His worth he knoweth”; thus I sing.
III.
I stood upon a rock what time
The moon rushed up above the plain:
The crags were white like frosty rime;
Her beams upon me fell like rain.
It was her harvest month of might:
The vales and villages were glad;
I cried—my palms against the light—
Like one with sudden pinions clad,
“Whom seek'st thou, O thou rising moon
That broad'nest like a warrior's shield?
Whom seest thou? Thou shalt see him soon,
My Warrior 'mid the tented field!
“He reaches now some gorge's mouth;
Upon his helmet thou shalt shine;—
Seest thou, O moon, from north to south,
Another loved one like to mine?”
IV.
No merchant from the isles of spice
Who stands in hushed hareem or hall
Who parts his goods, and names the price,
Was I, O friend! I gave thee all.
When from me I had all things cast
Except thy gifts, that hour I found
A gift I, too, might give at last—
The being thou had'st made and crowned!
I am not nothing since thy vow
Enriched my heart. That wealth is mine:
“Nothing” I call myself, that thou
May'st hear, O love! and call me thine.
V.
High on the hills I sat at dawn
Where cedar caverns, branching, breathe
Their darkness o'er the dewy lawn,
While slowly bloomed in heaven a wreath
Of eastern lilies. Soon the sun
Ascended o'er the far sea-tide
Smiting to glory billows dun
And clouds and trees; and loud I cried,
“Thou too shalt rise, my sun—thou too—
O'er darkling hearts in power shalt rise,
And flame on souls, and flash on dew
Of tears that dim expectant eyes.”
And every wind from vale and glen
Sang loud, “He, too, shall rise and shine!
A warrior he, a chief of men,
A prince with might; and he is thine.”
VI.
Men praised my words. Thy spirit dwells
Within me, strangely linked with mine:
At times my mind's remotest cells
Brighten with thoughts less mine than thine.
A gleam of thee on me they cast:
They wear thy look; they catch thy tone:
A kingdom in my breast thou hast:—
The words they praised were not mine own.
VII.
A chance was that—our meeting first?
At morn I read a quaint old book
That told of maiden palace-nursed
Who met a prince beside a brook.
“Beside our brook the lilies blow,”
I mused, “green-girt, and silver-tipped”;
And, dreaming of their bells of snow,
At eve adown the rocks I tripped.
Sudden I saw thee!—saw thee take
Toward me thy path! I turned, and fled:
So swiftly pushed I through the brake
My girdle dropped:—still on I sped.
Had I but guessed that past the dates
That hour the stranger youth made way,
I ne'er had left my maiden mates
Beside that brook, alone, to stray.
VIII.
Surely my thoughts, ere yet we met,
Even then were loyal to their lord;
The tides of all my being set
Towards thee with blind yet just accord.
When first I kenned, through showers aslant
The snowy Lebanonian line,
When first I heard the night-bird's chant,
Even then my beating heart was thine.
When minstrels sang the sacred strife,
And thus I wept, “The land made free
By warrior's sword is as a wife
Whose head is on her husband's knee,”
Then, too, I nursed this hope sublime:
My breast unconscious turned to thee:
Let no one say there lived a time
When thou wert nothing unto me!
IX.
How often, dimmed by grateful tears,
I see that convent near the snow
Wherein I lived those seven sweet years,
And seven times saw the lilies blow;
There sent to couch on pavements cold,
Fearless to suffer and to dare,
And reverence learn from nuns dark-stoled
Who live in penance and in prayer.
There, too, of love they sang—there, too—
Ah! not this love of maid and youth!
To that first love oh! keep me true,
Thou Who art Love at once and Truth!
Have I not heard of hearts that nursed
This human love, yet wronged their troth?
That first, great love they outraged first:—
Falsehood to that was death to both!
X.
Now glorious grows my Warrior's name:
The very babes his praises spread:
But late released, this morn they came
Around me, clamouring, “Give us bread!”
His light was on them! Freed by him,
A land redeemed I saw them tread!
I gazed on them with eyes tear-dim:
I blessed them, and I gave them bread.
“What man is this?” our ancients sought:
“This chief we know not can we trust?”
Thou gav'st them back, unbribed, unbought,
Their towers far off, their state august.
Thou gav'st to warriors proved of yore
Victory, by carnage undisgraced;
To matrons hearts unpierced by war;
To maids their nuptials high and chaste.
To others, these:—but what to me?
I speak it not: I know it well:
The fawn whose head is on my knee
As well as I that gift might tell!