The magazine of history with notes and queries, Vol. II, No. 4, October 1905

by Various

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

A PAGE OF HISTORY CORRECTED

III

HALLECK AND POPE

The fourth letter[13] contains a sentence which almost takes one’s breath. It is bunglingly constructed—a thing unusual in Pope’s communications. He had received a letter from Halleck, dated November 7, intimating that the Secretary of War would order a court of inquiry, and he answers, conveying the following:

“The overt act at Alexandria, during the engagement near Centreville, can be fully substantiated by letters from many officers since I have been here [St. Paul], it is quite certain [Now mark!] that my defeat was predetermined, [Now mark again!] and I think you must now be conscious of it.”

Pope does not even intimate who predetermined that “overt act,” although he intimates rather clearly that Halleck is conscious of the facts. It is difficult to see, however, how either McClellan, Porter or Griffin could “predetermine” either a victory or a defeat at that time.

On the 25th day of November, 1862, the very day set by General Pope, Major-General Halleck ordered a general court-martial for the trial of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and on that same day he made his official report of the battle in which he certified to Pope’s efficiency, as the latter had demanded in those uncanny letters. And on the 5th day of December, Major-General Pope declared under oath:

“This is all I have yet done”: i. e., “in my official reports of the operations of the army, to set forth all the facts as they transpired on the field. I have not preferred charges against him. I have merely set forth facts in my official reports,” etc.

The “Official Records” referred to show that he “set forth” certain facts [or fancies] in his private letters to Halleck, which, by some mysterious influence have found their way into print, and suggest that an explanation is in order to reconcile his sworn testimony with the fact that he was urging General Halleck to action, by military court, and even threatening him in case he should neglect such action.

He says: “No man knows better than yourself the constancy, the energy, and the zeal with which I endeavored to carry out your programme in Virginia. Your own letters and dispatches, from beginning to end, are sufficient evidence of this fact, and also of the fact that I not only committed no mistake, but that every act and movement met with your heartiest concurrence.”

[Note.—This statement is fully corroborated by the “Official Records.” It is as certain as anything can be that Halleck formulated the plan and that Pope executed it. If he appeared to be making mistakes, he was obeying orders, and Halleck should be chargeable.]

Pope continues: “Your own declarations to me up to the last hour I remained in Washington bore testimony that I had shown every quality to command success.”...

“Having, at your own urgent request [Mark that well! and what follows also. This paragraph shows that Halleck himself was the instigator of the charges against Porter], and from a sense of duty [!] laid before the Government, the conduct of McClellan, Porter and Griffin, and substantiated the facts stated by their own written documents, I am not disposed to push the matter further, unless the silence of the Government [this means Halleck, as has been shown Halleck was the only objector to the gratification of Pope’s wishes], in the midst of the unscrupulous slander and misrepresentation purposely put in circulation against me and the restoration of these officers, without trial, to their commands, coupled with my banishment to a distant and unimportant department, render it necessary as an act of justice to myself.”

How keenly Pope feels his disgrace, having been used as a tool and then flung aside, is shown clearly. He continues:

“As I have already said, I challenge and seek examination of my campaign in Virginia in all its details, and unless the Government by some high mark of public confidence, such as they have given to me in private, relieves me from the atrocious injury done to my character as a soldier ... justice to myself and to all connected with me demands that I should urge the court of inquiry.... This investigation, under the circumstances above stated, I shall assuredly urge in every way. If it cannot be accomplished by military courts, it will undoubtedly be the subject of the inquiry in Congress.”

Then follows a darkly ominous hint: “It is especially hard, in view of my relations with you [Note that!] that I should be compelled even to ask at your hands the justice which it is your duty to assure to every officer of the army.... I tell you frankly that by the time Congress meets such influences as can not be resisted will be brought to bear on this subject.... I prefer greatly that you should do me this justice of your own accord.”[14]

Altogether this letter is a rare specimen of the chiaroscuro in the art epistolary; it tells of Halleck’s acts of injustice which Pope will right by every means in his power. At times it breathes hatred and vengeance, and closes with such a loving assurance as this:

“I write you this letter with mixed feelings. Personal friendship and interest in your welfare, I think, predominate. I am not so blinded as not to know that it gave you pain to allow such scandal against me and to take such action as you thought the peculiar circumstances required. Much as I differ with you on the subject, I am not ready to blame you or to feel bitterly.”

Then follows that warning: “I impress upon you the necessity for your own sake of considering carefully the suggestions I have presented,” and closes with the assurance, “I shall not again address you a letter on such a subject.”

This assurance was not fulfilled. Indeed, Pope wrote several letters on the subject, as will appear. Queer letters were they, to be written by a major-general commanding a department, to his superior, the general-in-chief, to whom he administers the medicine à la cheval de trait.

To summarize: Pope makes these charges against Halleck.

(1) That the plan of campaign was Halleck’s.[15]

(2) That Pope was but an instrument in the hands of the general-in-chief.[16]

(3) That Pope faithfully executed Halleck’s plans.[17]

(4) That the latter fully approved every act of the former, thereby making himself responsible, so far as Pope was concerned, for the final result.[18]

Here a pause. These charges are fully substantiated by letters and telegrams passing between Halleck and Pope, which appear in parts II and III, of Vol. XII, of the Official Records. Pope was regularly advising Halleck of his movements, and Halleck was as regularly approving the same. And as late as August 26, 11:45 A. M., Halleck wired Pope: “Not the slightest dissatisfaction has been felt in regard to your operations on the Rappahannock,” etc.

Returning to the charges:

(5) That Pope had made the charges against Generals McClellan, Porter and Griffin “at Halleck’s own urgent request.”[19] Halleck was the real instigator.

(6) That Halleck had not assigned him [Pope] to command of the western department, which, as Pope says, “would at once have freed me [Pope] from the odium and abuse which have so shamefully and unjustly been heaped upon me by the papers and people,” etc.[20]

(7) That he found himself banished to the frontier.[21]

(8) That his character and reputation as a soldier had been deeply and irretrievably injured.[22]

(9) That the Government refused to allow him to publish the facts[23] and

(10) That General-in-Chief Halleck declined to acknowledge his services publicly.

All through the letters are insinuations and charges against McClellan, Porter and Griffin. And he makes categorical demand in these words:

“I said, and say now, that one of three things I was entitled to; any one of them would have satisfied me. The dictates of the commonest justice gave me the right to expect one of them at least:

1st. That the court of inquiry be at once held and the blame be fixed where it belongs. It is now too late for that, as the delay has already made the worst impression against me that is possible.

2d. That the Government should acknowledge publicly, as it had done privately, my services in Virginia, or

3d. That in case neither of these things could be done, then that the Government bestow upon me some mark of public confidence, as its opinion of my ability warranted.

None of these things have been done,” etc.

He continues: “You know me well enough I think, to understand that I will never submit if I can help it. The court of inquiry, which you inform me has been ordered, will amount to nothing for several reasons. It is too late, so far as I am concerned. Its proceedings, I presume, will be secret, as in Harper’s Ferry business. The principal witnesses are here with me, and I myself should be present. The Mississippi River closes by the 25th of November [Note that date!]; frequently sooner than that. It is then next to impossible to get away from this place. A journey through the snow of 200 miles is required to communicate with any railroad.”[24]

And on the very day which Pope had named, November 25, 1862, General-in-Chief Halleck issued his order for the court-martial of Fitz-John Porter, and issued his report certifying to the efficiency of General Pope, thus avoiding the court of inquiry which Pope had threatened to demand.

Such a court, if honestly conducted, would have laid bare the truth, and shown to the world that Halleck himself had prevented the reinforcements from reaching Pope, caused the defeat of Second Bull Run, imperiled the national capital, and opened the door of Maryland to Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee.

This conclusion is supported both by Halleck’s official report and by his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. In the former, he says: “Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days earlier, the rebel army could have been easily defeated and, perhaps, destroyed.” His testimony before that committee, on March 11, 1863.[25]

“Question. To what do you attribute the disastrous result of General Pope’s campaign?

Answer. I think our troops were not sufficiently concentrated so as to be all brought into action on the field of battle; and there was great delay in getting reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac to General Pope’s assistance.

Question. To what is that delay attributable?

Answer. Partly, I think, to accidents, and partly to a want of energy in the troops, or their officers, in getting forward to General Pope’s assistance. I could not say that that was due to any particular individual. It may have resulted from the officers generally not feeling the absolute necessity of great haste in re-enforcing General Pope. The troops, after they started from the Peninsula, were considerably delayed by heavy storms that came on at that time.”

[Note.—General Halleck has not told that committee, what his own letters and telegrams conclusively prove, that the principal delay of those reinforcements was due to his own wilfully false telegrams to Generals McClellan, Burnside, and Porter, and that he also prevented General Franklin and the Sixth Army Corps from reaching Pope from Alexandria by refusing to provide transportation. The next question and answer fixes the blame directly upon Halleck himself]:

“Question. Had the Army of the Peninsula [i. e., the army under McClellan, which embraced both Porter’s and Franklin’s corps] been brought to co-operate with the Army of Virginia [under the command of Pope] with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so.”

And this is the opinion of all military critics who have pronounced judgment in the case. It is also certainly true that Halleck’s own orders and telegrams prove that he himself, and apparently purposely, prevented such co-operation, and it throws a peculiar significance on Pope’s charge in his letter to Halleck, dated November 20, 1862, before quoted, “It is quite certain that my defeat was predetermined, and I think you must now be conscious of it.”[26]

The consequences which followed the defeat of Pope were not immediately and fully appreciated at the time in the North, on account of the censorship of the press, nor do they seem to be so at this day. Orders were given to prepare for the evacuation of Washington; vessels were ordered to the arsenal to receive the munitions of war for shipment northward; one warship was anchored in the Potomac, ready to receive the President, the Cabinet and the more important archives of the Government: Secretary Stanton advised Mr. Hiram Barney, then Collector of the Port of New York, to leave Washington at once, as communication might be cut off before morning;[27] Stanton and Halleck assured President Lincoln that the Capital was lost.

Singularly enough the designs against Washington in the East were at the same time and in the same manner being duplicated against Cincinnati, then the “Queen City of the West.”

On August 30, while Pope was fighting the second Bull Run battle in Virginia, the Confederate Major-General, E. Kirby Smith, was fighting the battle of Richmond, Ky. In his report to General Braxton Bragg, Smith says:

“The enemy’s loss during the day is about 1400 killed and wounded, and 4000 prisoners. Our loss is about 500 killed and wounded. General Miller was killed, General Nelson wounded, and General Manson taken prisoner. The remnant of the Federal force in Kentucky is making its way, utterly demoralized and scattered, to the Ohio. General Marshall is in communication with me. Our column is moving upon Cincinnati.”

On September 2, Lexington was occupied by Kirby Smith’s infantry. He reports to General Cooper that the Union killed and wounded exceed 1000; “the prisoners amount to between 5000 and 6000; the loss—besides some twenty pieces of artillery, including that taken here (Lexington) and at Frankfort—9000 small arms and large quantities of supplies.” The Confederate cavalry, he reports, pursued the Union forces to within twelve miles of Louisville; and, he adds: “I have sent a small force to Frankfort, to take possession of the arsenal and public property there. I am pushing some forces in the direction of Cincinnati, in order to give the people of Kentucky time to organize. General Heth, with the advance, is at Cynthiana, with orders to threaten Covington.”

This invasion of Kentucky was due to Halleck, as was proved before the military court appointed “to inquire into and report upon the operations of the forces under command of Major-General Buell in the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and particularly in reference to General Buell suffering the State of Kentucky to be invaded by the rebel forces under General Bragg,” etc.

That court was in session from November 27, 1862, until May 6, 1863, with the gallant Major-General Lew Wallace presiding. Its opinion recited that Halleck had ordered General Buell to march against Chattanooga and take it, with the ulterior object of dislodging Kirby Smith and his rebel force from East Tennessee; that General Buell had force sufficient to accomplish the object if he could have marched promptly to Chattanooga; that the plan of operation prescribed by General Halleck compelled General Buell to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad from Corinth to Decatur, and put it in running order; that the road proved of comparatively little service; that the work forced such delays that a prompt march upon Chattanooga was impossible, while they made the rebel invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky possible. Our forces were driven northward to the Ohio, leaving the Memphis and Charleston railroad in excellent condition for the use of the Confederates. Strangely enough, Halleck’s orders to Buell had inured to the benefit of the Confederates in the West, in the same manner and along the same lines as his orders to McClellan and to Pope had inured to the benefit of the Confederates in the East.

Both Washington and Cincinnati were imperiled at the same time, and by the same officer, General-in-Chief Halleck, and in the same way—by a succession of steps that appear to have been carefully planned.

Now, mark what follows.

On March 1, 1872, the House of Representatives called upon the Secretary of War for a copy of the proceedings of that military court; and on April 13 the Secretary reported to the House, “that a careful and exhaustive search among all the records and files in this Department fails to discover what disposition was made of the proceedings of the Commission,” etc.

But though the records of those proceedings which fix the blame for that campaign upon Major-General Halleck were lost or stolen from the archives of the War Department, Benn Pitman, the phonographic reporter of the court, had possession of a report of those proceedings. And, by Act of Congress, approved by President Grant on June 5, 1872, the Secretary of War was “directed to employ at once Benn Pitman to make a full and complete transcript of the phonographic notes taken by him during the said investigation, and to put the same on file among the records of the War Department, and to furnish a copy of the same to Congress.”

The report of those proceedings may now be found in “Official Records,” Series I, Vol. XVI, Part I, pp. 6 to 726, inclusive. The most melancholy part of the story lies in the fact that Porter, who certainly helped to save Washington from falling into Lee’s hands, had his life blasted by Halleck, and died without knowledge that Halleck, not Pope, was really guilty of the disaster which so nearly resulted in the abandonment of the Capital to the Confederates, and while Halleck was directing affairs in the West in such a manner as to imperil Cincinnati.

The remarkable co-operation between Pope and Buell for the surrender of those cities, and which was attempted by Halleck, does not look like a concatenation of accidental circumstances. This is accentuated by the charge against Halleck’s loyalty to the Republic which was made by the gallant Wallace after he had presided over that Buell military court. He was a careful man; and, being a good lawyer, he understood the laws and effect of evidence. Porter, who prevented the surrender of Washington, and Buell, who saved Cincinnati, were both punished. It looks as if they had interfered with Halleck’s plan of a general surrender.

L’ENVOI

In January, 1899, the writer commenced to unravel the mystery surrounding the battle of Harper’s Ferry, which culminated in the surrender of that post September 15, 1862. He was a member of that garrison, and he knew that history had not truthfully recorded the defense, some chronicles reading that “Harper’s Ferry fell without a struggle,” others that “there was no defense”; in the main, historians were a unit.

Such reports are wholly false. The defense of that post was stubborn and prolonged, lasting from September 11, when the Confederates showed themselves in Pleasant Valley, until the 15th, when the garrison was subjected to one of the fiercest bombardments of the Civil War. Never was hope abandoned until the last shell was expended, though the little garrison of 12,500 men was besieged by what was practically the whole of Lee’s army. Starting on a new line of research, and abandoning the path beaten by others, he found many battles lost in the same manner, and the responsibility shifted from the shoulders of the guilty and carefully loaded upon those of the innocent, and all by the use of the same means, a false report by General-in-Chief Halleck, and a bogus trial by a military court.

Conspicuous among these was the battle of Second Bull Run, followed by the trial of Fitz-John Porter. That battle was certainly lost by Halleck, as shown by documents over that general’s own signature. And Pope knew it, and charged that it was premeditated. To avoid the odium which some papers were attaching to his name, the latter applied the whip and spur to the former, who, under threat of exposure, ordered the court-martial of the innocent and gallant Major-General Fitz-John Porter. The battle of Harper’s Ferry followed; the result was the same; lost by Halleck; responsibility lifted from his shoulders, and carefully divided between General McClellan (for not relieving the post) and Colonel Dixon S. Mills (for not defending it). After that came Fredericksburg, with similar results; lost by Halleck; responsibility lifted from his shoulders, and divided between Burnside and Franklin.

Study the plans adopted in one instance; the plans adopted in the others become manifest. The losing of the battles to the Union arms was accomplished by carefully prepared plans, and reduced to an exact science.

R. N. Arpe.

New York City.