CONTENTS: - The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891 - 78

This is the first number of the International Journal of Ethics, which is intended to take the place of the Ethical Record. In the opening article, Professor Sidgwick affirms that the idea of a universal and complete harmony of the earthly interests of all human beings is "an optimistic illusion as to human relations, which in the present age of the world has nearly faded away." Nevertheless, "a very substantial gain would result if we could remove from men's minds all errors of judgment as to right and wrong, good and evil, even if we left other causes of bad conduct unchanged." What is practically wanted is improvement in moral insight, and the aim of the paper is to aid in the solution of certain intellectual difficulties which arise when we try to get a clear idea of duty. Warfare among modern nations "is normally not a mere conflict of interests, but also a conflict of opposing views of right and justice." Disputants may therefore be brought into harmony if they can be really and completely enlightened as to their true rights, as distinguished from their interests. The international law administered by arbitrators may be most useful "in removing minor occasions of controversy and in minimising the mischief resulting from graver conflicts," but it will not provide a settlement of all occasions of strife. Where the sphere of arbitration ends that of the moral method of attaining international peace begins; "if we must be judges in our own cause, we must endeavor to be just judges." The impartiality required is difficult, but "the judicial function—which, in a modern state under popular government, has become, in some degree, the business of every man"—might be performed with success, "if national consciences could be roused to feel the nobility and grapple practically and persistently with the difficulties of the task."

Professor Adler's article is devoted to an account of the Ethical Societies, which are described as being "consecrated to the knowledge of the Good, but not to any special theory of the Good." To adopt a philosophical formula as the basis of union would be to become a philosophical sect, which he declares is "the most contemptible of all sects, because the sectarian bias is most repugnant to the spirit of genuine philosophy." The accepted norms of moral behavior form the starting points of Ethical Societies and their basis of union. They build on the common stock of moral judgment, which may be called the common conscience. Ethics is both a science and an art. As a science it has to explain the facts of the moral life, and it is necessary to begin with the facts and to test theories by their fitness to account for them. It is "the prime duty of every one in his individual capacity to rise to the ever clearer apprehension of first principles," but for this very reason Ethical Societies in their collective capacity abstain from laying down any set of first principles as binding.

It is not quite clear how Professor Adler can declare that the Ethical Societies are consecrated to the knowledge of the good, and yet make so strong an opposition to their stating such knowledge in the exact terms of a philosophical formula. Philosophy is nothing but knowledge of the world systematised into a world-conception. It will hardly be sufficient to make the "common conscience" the corner stone of any society devoted to the elevation of morality. Not only would it be difficult to ascertain what that "common conscience" at present is, but, in addition, we can be assured that the "common conscience" is constantly changing.

Ethics as a science means philosophical ethics; and Professor Adler's ethics is, in fact, the expression of a philosophy. Yet in spite of the advanced position of the Ethical Societies, which have discarded all religious views and ceremonial practices, we find that their leader still stands upon the ground of a dualistic extra-naturalism. Professor Adler says:

"There is a reality other than that of the senses, and the ultimate reality in things is, in a sense, transcending our comprehension, akin to the moral nature of men. But how shall we acquaint ourselves with this Supersensible. The ladder of science does not reach so far."

It is true that there are realities other than that of the senses; take as a most simple instance mathematical points and lines. But there is no reality which theoretically considered can not become an object of science. The statement that there are facts to which the ladder of science does not reach, is tantamount to a declaration of supernaturalism and dualism. Professor Adler has discarded the terminology of the old dogmatism, but he has not discarded its basic error. Instead of developing the old faith into a monistic religion, he throws away religion as a basis of ethics, but preserves carefully that element in it which is hostile to science and philosophy.

The Law of Relativity is a very important contribution by Professor Höffding to the Science of Ethics. After stating that the moral law, if it is to be truly universal, must "only judge the general direction of the tendency of the will," he affirms that the individual relativity of ethics, or its personal equation, is a factor which enters into the ethical question, "when different individuals with like ethical principles and in like circumstances, but with different dispositions and capacities have to be considered." The individual is always a part of society, and the life of society is no other than that contained in its members, the ideal being "reached only when the individual's efforts in the cause of society also serve the free and harmonious development of his own faculties and impulses." In an ideal State only that would be demanded of each individual which lay within his range and power. Self-control, as a negative virtue, is a psychological impossibility. It is necessary to take note whether there is room for other inclinations that could absorb the store of energy. The struggle of self-control lasts until the new application of energy gains complete ascendancy. The happiest man is where morality has become organic and "there is an agreement between the task arising from the general principles and the particular circumstances, and the capacities and desires of the individual." Professor Höffding objects to the views of the Italian criminal-psychological school that atavism is a sign of social imperfection, that it "does not justify placing society and the criminal over against each other as absolute right and absolute wrong." He concludes that it is at least an open question whether there are any human beings "in whom no sympathy for the moral law can be awakened, however much the law may be individualised."

The arguments of Professor Clark on The Ethics of Land Tenure are summed up in the following passage: "If a state originally owned its land, in the fullest sense of the term, it had the right of voluntary alienation which is inherent in such ownership. Increments of value, present and future, are its property; in alienating them it gives away its own. If the attainment of its ends requires that they be transferred to others, the title of the grantees is valid. To deny to the state the privilege of alienation is to essentially abridge its natural rights; it is to make its ownership of the land incomplete." In relation to what is incorrectly termed "unearned increments," it is remarked, "if the essence of property is regarded, and not its form, the increments of value attaching to land are not unearned by their proprietors. In an active market land has its fair price, and this is based partly on the future increments themselves." The loss arising from a confiscation of land-value would fall "not merely on millions who have titles in fee simple, but on all who have made loans on land as security…. To every one it would come in the shape of a seizure by the state of property invested in accordance with its own positive invitation."

The communication of moral ideas, and not ideas about morality, which are the abstract or scientific renderings of moral ideas, is considered by Mr. Bosanquet as the proper function of an Ethical Society. The fault of the present time is distraction, and "one great cause of this distraction is the notion of a general duty to do good, or something other than and apart from doing one's work well and intelligently." The only certain way of communicating moral ideas is contagion, and the most useful teacher of morality is "not so much a man of abstract theory as a man of reasonable experience."

Ethics may be of service to philosophy, says Mr. Salter, in opening up the realm of "what ought to be," beyond the realm of "what is and happens." Moral ideas belong to the realm of unverifiable ideas, which are believed in because of "their own intrinsic attractiveness and authority." Ethics tells us of the law according to which men should act, the law of justice and brotherhood; we may conclude "that whatever may be the actual forces in the world at any time, justice and love are rightfully supreme over them all, and that these are so interwoven with the order of things that nothing out of harmony with them can long stand." It is "the imperishable glory of transcendentalism in our country that in the decay and disintegration of the ancient creed," it sounded the high-note "that the soul can in some sense know the object of its worship; that it need not feed on hearsay, and tradition, and arguments, but can have vision." (Philadelphia: International Journal of Ethics, 1602 Chestnut St.)

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. September, 1890. No. 177.