II. THE AUTHORITY OF MORAL COMMANDS.
Professor Höffding emphasises "the fact that there is not merely one single ethical problem but many"—a fact which cannot be denied, for there are, indeed, innumerable problems of an ethical nature. However, we must bear in mind that all the ethical problems are closely interconnected. The better we understand them, the more shall we recognise that all together form one great system of problems, and that one problem lies at the bottom of all. This one basic problem I have called the ethical problem.
The solution of the basic problem of ethics will not involve the ready solution of all the rest, but we can be sure that it will throw light upon any question that is of an ethical nature.
Professor Höffding recognises the importance of system in ethics. He says:
"The systematism of ethical science is still so little advanced that it is necessary to draw out a general outline before we pass on to any single feature. The value of systematism is namely this, that we are immediately enabled to see the connection of the single questions with one another as well as their distinctive peculiarity."
It appears almost unfair toward the present state of ethical science when Professor Höffding adds:
"In ethics we are not yet so far advanced."
If we were not, we should do our best to advance so as to recognise the unity of all ethical problems. We must first recognise the ethical problem, before we can with any hope of success approach the many, which are dependent upon the one.
Which is the one basic problem of ethics?
We read in Matthew, xxi. 23:
"And when Jesus was come into the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came unto him as he was teaching and said, By what authority doest thou these things? and who gave thee this authority?"
This question is legitimate and all our ethical conceptions must necessarily depend upon the answer which we accept as satisfactory. The basic problem of ethics is the foundation of ethics, it is the justification of the ethical prescripts, it is the discovery of the authority upon which ethical rules are based. If there were no power that enforces a certain line of conduct, ethics in my opinion would have no right of existence; and if any one preaches certain commands, he is bound to give satisfactory reasons why we must obey his commands.
Professor Höffding says that ethics "starts from its own assumptions" (p. 111). Ethics should not start from any assumptions.
If we are to come to a mutual understanding we must drop all subjectivism, we must not study ethics from special points of view, from the principles or standards of any individual or group of individuals. There is not the slightest use of a person making himself any "highest and only aim" which, it may be true, "from his point of view can never be refuted." So long as ethics starts from assumptions or principles, it will be no science; for truly, as Professor Höffding says in excuse of the inability to prove principles, "The difficulty always occurs in the enunciation of a principle that a direct demonstration of its validity cannot be given."
The requirement of ethics is to arrive at statements of fact. Let us build upon facts and we shall stand upon solid ground.
Ethics in order to be scientific must be based upon the objective and unalterable order of things, upon the ascertainable data of experience, upon the laws of nature.
Professor Höffding says:
"Religious ethics is founded on authority. Its contents are the revealed commands of authority; the feeling which impels us to pass ethical judgments is the fear or reverence or love with which men are filled in the presence of divine authority."
Scientific ethics can in this respect not be different from religious ethics, for it is also based upon authority. A scientific ethicist has to proceed like any other naturalist; he must observe the course of events and attempt to discover the laws in accordance with which the events take place. These laws are no less unalterable than any other natural laws, and we may appropriately call them the natural laws of ethics. The moral commands of ethical teachers have been derived, either instinctively or with a clear scientific insight, from the natural laws of ethics. The authority of the natural laws of ethics has been decked out by different religious teachers with more or less mythological tinsel or wrapped in mystic darkness; for practical purposes it remained to some limited extent the same and will to some extent always remain the same, for we shall have to obey the moral law, be it from fear, or reverence, or love.
The unity of all the ethical problems will be preserved, however much they may be differentiated. Indeed Professor Höffding in his enumeration sufficiently indicates their interconnection. He speaks of (1) the motive principle of judgment, (2) the test-principle of judgment, and (3) of the motive to action. Whatever difference he makes between these three terms, it is obvious that whether and how far judgments, tests, or motives are sound will depend upon their agreement with the authority of the natural law of ethics. The pedagogic problem is also connected with the ethical problem because upon our solution of the latter will directly depend the aim and indirectly also the method of education. Such complex motives as "ambition or the instinct of acquisition" will become "the means of attaining to true ethical self-assertion" in the degree proportional to the elements they contain which will strengthen our efforts of setting us at one with the natural law of ethics.
To sum up: The natural law of ethics has to be derived from facts like all other natural laws. The natural law of ethics is the authority upon which all moral commands are based, and agreement with the natural law of ethics is the final criterion of ethics.