[From the Official Bulletin des Armées, Dec. 6, 1914.]
The Bulletin des Armées, the newspaper published by the French Government for the soldiers at the front, in the issue of Dec. 6, 1914, contains an article bearing the title, "Four Months of War," which is a summary account of the events that have taken place since the outbreak of hostilities. This document estimates as fifty-two army corps and ten cavalry divisions the military forces which Germany hurled against France. In a chapter entitled "Our Reverses in August," it sums up the events that preceded the battle of the Marne, as presented below.
OUR concentration had to be flexible enough to enable us to bring our chief effort to bear upon the spot where the enemy would prove most active. The violation of Belgium made us acquainted with the intentions of the German staff—the great conflict would take place in the north.
As we were obliged, before engaging in it, to wait for the coming into line of the English army, which was to take place only on Aug. 20, we at once took measures to retain the greatest possible number of German troops in Alsace and in Lorraine.
In Alsace, our first attack, which was badly conducted, took us to Mülhausen, but we could not hold the city (Aug. 7.)
A second attack, led by General Pau, brought us back there. On Aug. 20 we held the road to Colmar through the Vosges and the plain. The enemy had sustained great losses.
But from that time the unfortunate events in Lorraine and Belgium forced us to limit the field of operations in Alsace as well as the intensity of our efforts (Aug. 20.)
In Lorraine our offensive had first been brilliantly successful. On Aug. 19 we had reached Sarrebourg, Les Etangs, Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Château-Salins.
But on the 20th the enemy, strongly intrenched on thoroughly fortified territory, resumed the offensive.
On the 22d, 23d, and 24th we were compelled to fall back on Grand-Courenne de Nancy and south of Lunéville.
On the 25th simultaneous counterattacks from the armies of Gens. Dubail and Castelnau greatly strengthened our positions.
But seven or eight German army corps and four divisions of cavalry had overcome the magnificent resistance of Liége. Every one knows of the conditions under which the French took the offensive in Belgium with the armies of Gens. Ruffey and Langle de Cary.
As soon as the English Army was ready in the region of Mons we took the offensive in Belgian Luxemburg with the armies of Gens. Ruffey and Langle de Cary. This offensive was at once checked, with great losses on our side.
Here again the ground had been strongly fortified by the enemy. There was also, in some of our army corps, a failure to transmit and carry out orders (Aug. 21-23.)
On the left of these two armies and in conjunction with the English army Gen. Lanrezac's army, anxious for its right wing, then fell back (Aug. 24) on the line that stretches between Beaumont and Givet.
On the 25th and 26th the English army, kept in check at Landrecies and Le Cateau, withdrew toward the Marne.
These days were marked by bloody contests. The enemy lost heavily, but constantly gained ground.
At that time we either had to hold the ground under the perilous conditions resulting from the retreat of our left wing or else retreat along the whole front until it were possible to resume the offensive under favorable conditions.
The Commander in Chief decided upon the latter alternative.
The first object to attain was withdrawing in good order while weakening and delaying the enemy by constant attacks. Several of these attacks were brilliantly conducted, especially those of Lanrezac's army at Saint-Quentin and Guise, of Langle's army on the Meuse, and of Ruffey's army further east. They were supported from Nancy to the Vosges by Castelnau's and Dubail's armies. In order to prepare for the offensive a new army had been formed, that of Gen. Maunoury. It was to be concentrated in the last days of August in the vicinity of Amiens.
But the advance of the enemy, by stages of forty-five kilometers a day, was so swift that Gen. Joffre, in order to realize his plan for the offensive, had to order the retreat to be continued.
The army should withdraw to the Aube, and as far as the Seine if necessary; everything should be subordinated to preparing a successful offensive.
On Sept. 5 the conditions which the General in Chief sought to realize were fulfilled—our left wing (Maunoury's army, the English Army, the army of Lanrezac which was now d'Espéray's army) was no longer in danger of being cut off.
On the contrary, the German right, (Gen. von Kluck,) marching to the south toward Meaux and Coulommiers, was exposing its right wing to Maunoury's army.
On the evening of the 5th the General in Chief ordered a general advance, adding: "The hour has come to advance at any cost and to die rather than fall back."