SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY
AND PRESENT CONDITION OF TRIPOLI, WITH SOME ACCOUNTS OF THE OTHER BARBARY STATES.
NO. X.—(Continued.)
To return to Algiers. The Dey having as he conceived, effectually closed every avenue to reconciliation with France, actively prepared to resist the attack which he had every reason to believe would soon be made on him. The fortifications of his capital had been much enlarged and strengthened since the bombardment by Lord Exmouth in 1816; the arsenal was well provided with naval stores and munitions of every description; the treasury was filled with specie, men were not wanting, and provisions could be procured in abundance from the interior. In this condition, he had no reason to dread an attack from a naval force, nor the consequences of a blockade however rigorously maintained. Against internal commotions he also felt himself secure. From the commencement of his reign, he had steadily though cautiously pursued the plan in which so many of his predecessors had failed, of preventing the enrolment of foreigners, and supplying their places by native troops; in this he had so far succeeded, that the number of the former in 1827 was less than seven thousand, while he had more than sixteen thousand Moorish soldiers, regularly disciplined and attached to his system, by the strongest ties of interest. When the whole military force of the country, consisted of a few foreigners, any one of whom might be raised to the highest offices of the State at the will of the remainder, it is not surprising that dissatisfaction and turbulence should have constantly prevailed; for under such circumstances the election of a new chief only caused a change in the ranks of the malcontents, without diminishing their numbers or their violence. That the alteration made by Hussein would contribute vastly to ensure the stability of his power, it is unnecessary to demonstrate; it had been often attempted by his predecessors and it is only extraordinary that it had not been effected long before.
Having secured this important object, Hussein no longer took pains to conceal his views with regard to rendering the Sovereignty hereditary in his family; he had no son, but his eldest daughter was married to Ibrahim, whom he raised to the office of Aga or Commander of the troops and Minister of War, and who appears to have been his intended successor; that officer having no children, his nephew was married to the Dey's youngest daughter, who was for that purpose divorced from her husband. It was also probably in furtherance of the same ends, that Hussein maintained a degree of state unusual in Algiers, manifesting in his intercourse with the ministers and officers, that he was a Prince, and not the mere chief of the Janizaries. In order to insure his personal safety he seldom appeared in public, but remained within the walls of the Casauba, surrounded by a chosen guard of Moors, sufficiently strong to defend that fortress against any attack which could be expected.
The French appeared by no means disposed to drive Hussein to extremities; their squadron generally consisted of two frigates, and four or five smaller vessels, which hovered before the entrance to the bay, but offered little or no impediment to the passage of vessels either outwards or inwards. Within a few days after the declaration of war, several Algerine cruisers quitted the harbor, and committed great ravages upon the unprotected commerce of France, sending their prizes into various ports of Barbary, and even of Spain. The prisoners were generally spared and brought to Algiers, in consequence of the Dey's humane or politic proclamation, that he would give for each living Frenchman twice as much as for his head alone. The inactivity and want of skill thus displayed by the blockading squadron, at length encouraged Hussein to bolder attempts. By great exertions, he had been enabled at the end of September 1827, to have ready a frigate, two corvettes, two brigs and six schooners in addition to the vessels at sea; this force however not being sufficient either in size or in weight of metal, to authorize a regular engagement with the heavy ships of the French, his plan was to surprise some one of them at a distance from the others, and endeavor to carry her by boarding. With this intention, which was kept secret until the moment for carrying it into execution, a number of soldiers accustomed to the sea having on the morning of the 4th of October, been suddenly embarked in the vessels, they set sail immediately and bore down upon the nearest French ship. The movement was immediately perceived by the rest of the squadron, and a general action, or at least a general discharge of guns on both sides ensued; this having continued for some hours, without any notable damage to either party, the Algerine Commander found that it was impossible to board any of the French vessels as they had the weather gauge of him, and in consequence he returned with his whole force into port. This action is duly noticed in the French papers; the commander of the squadron in his despatch, compliments his officers highly for the success of their efforts in preventing the Algerine flotilla from getting out of the harbor, and assures the Minister of Marine, that nothing but the heaviness of the sea prevented his destroying the greater part of them.
In the following spring, (1828) an offer was made by Admiral Collet to renew the negotiations for peace; and after some difficulties, Captain Bézart who commanded one of the French brigs, was allowed to enter Algiers and communicate with the Sardinian Consul on the subject. He subsequently had a conference with the Algerine Minister of Foreign Affairs, the results of which induced the Admiral to despatch him to Paris, in order to receive the instructions of their Government.
The French government probably received with satisfaction, the account that the Algerines were disposed to treat for peace. The Martignac Ministry which had just come into power, were employing every means to secure the tottering throne of Charles the Tenth against the efforts of the Liberal party, and they were anxious for the adjustment of a dispute, which occasioned an enormous addition to the budget of expenses without any return whatever. Dignity, or rather the fear of wounding the vanity of the nation, however forbade their seeming to make any advances after the Dey's insulting rejection of the demands first proposed to him. Great care was therefore taken to avoid any appearance of direct communication with the Algerine government; but the Admiral was instructed unofficially to hint, that if the Dey would send an ambassador to Paris, the differences between the two countries might be accommodated.
With these instructions Bézart returned to the African coast. During his absence Admiral Collet worn down with disease had retired to Toulon where he shortly after died; Admiral Botherel de la Bretonniere who succeeded to the command, on learning the views of the Ministers, instantly wrote a letter to the Dey in the sense enjoined by them, and despatched the Captain with it to Algiers. He arrived there on the 11th of September 1828, but when it was known that he only bore a communication from the Admiral, he was not suffered to proceed farther than the landing place on the mole, where he was required to await the answer. A Barbary Prince of a more pliable character than Hussein, might probably have gratified the French Ministers by sending an Ambassador to Paris, who would have figured in the pages of the Moniteur as a supplicant for peace; but the Dey was made of stubborn stuff. He had expected a direct communication from the French government, and was indignant at being addressed instead, by one of its officers not even an authorized agent; moreover the letter contained a proposition that he should take a humiliating step, without any assurance that it would be attended with favorable results. Seeing at once through the whole manœuvre of the French government, his reply was a peremptory order to Bézart instantly to quit Algiers.
A few days after, the same proposition was conveyed more distinctly to the Dey through the Sardinian Consul, with an assurance on the part of the Admiral, that his Government no longer expected apology or reparation, but wished merely to place affairs between the two nations on their former footing. Hussein however remained firm in his refusal to make any advances, only telling the Consul, that after Peace had been signed at Algiers, he might perhaps to please the Ministers, send them an Ambassador. The French Government finding its recommendations thus treated, authorized the Sardinian Consul to inform the Dey, that no farther overtures would be made by it towards reconciliation, and that measures would be soon taken to obtain complete satisfaction for the injury committed against France. Hussein coolly answered, that he had men and ammunition in abundance, and that he preferred the fortune of war to making or seeming to make any apology.
The destruction of three Algerine feluccas of six guns each, was the next event worthy of note in the history of the war. These vessels were returning from a successful cruise and endeavoring to enter the harbor of Algiers on the 1st of October 1828, when they were discovered and chased into the adjacent Bay of Sidi Ferruch. The prize was soon recaptured; the other vessels took refuge close to the shore, under a small and ruinous battery mounting twelve guns, where they were attacked by the whole of the blockading squadron. After the first fire, the feluccas and the battery were abandoned; boats were then sent by the Admiral to destroy the vessels, which having been effected the fire was continued on the battery until it was nearly demolished. The loss on the side of the Algerines is believed to have been very small; the French had six men killed and seventeen wounded, by the bursting of a gun on board the Admiral's ship the Provence. This trifling affair was made the subject of a special report by the Minister of the Marine to the King of France, which may be found at length in the Moniteur of the 17th of October; it was so far important, as it enabled His Majesty to say in his Address to the Legislative Chambers in January following, that—"most striking examples had already taught the Algerines, that it was neither easy nor safe to brave the vigilance of his ships."
Another attempt on the part of the French to teach the Algerines prudence, was not attended with equal success; for on the 19th of June 1829, twenty-four of their men, who had landed in pursuit of the crew of a stranded Algerine vessel, were surrounded by Arabs and put to death. The heads of these unfortunate men were carried to Algiers, where the Dey paid for them according to the tariff established; they were however on the application of the Sardinian Consul immediately delivered to him for burial.
The Government of France was by this time convinced of the futility of the measures which had been for two years pursued with regard to Algiers. The blockade had produced none of the results which were anticipated; it had been maintained at an annual expense of more than seven millions of francs, and although the number of persons killed in action was small, yet many had fallen victims to the diseases occasioned by the climate; in return the Dey appeared less inclined than ever to agree to satisfactory terms of peace, and the commerce of France in the Mediterranean had been severely injured by his cruisers. The opposition had also taken advantage of the circumstances, and the Ministry were frequently denounced in the Legislature and in the public journals of Paris, for their vacillating and dishonoring conduct in the affair.
Unable to resist these demonstrations of their own inefficiency, the French Ministry prepared for more decisive operations, by assembling troops in the Southern Departments of the Kingdom and collecting vessels for their transportation. Before employing these extreme measures however, they were induced to make one more attempt at negotiation; the circumstances which led them thus to recede from the determination expressed in the previous year, are reported to have been the following.
The Dey had several times expressed to the Sardinian Consul, his admiration of the form and sailings of a brig called the Alerte belonging to the blockading squadron; something in his manner at length induced the Consul to inform M. de la Bretonniere, that possibly His Highness might be inclined to negotiate for peace, in the manner desired by the French Government, if it were understood that the brig would be presented to him after the signature of the treaty. The Admiral eagerly accepted this overture as he considered it, and authorized the Consul to say in general terms, that he had no doubt the Government of France would willingly accede to the Dey's wishes in this particular, if an arrangement of the difficulties between the two countries could be effected. Hussein's reply was encouraging, and the Admiral in consequence sailed for France to receive in person the instructions of his Government. He found the Ministers anxious to have the affair peaceably adjusted; they were ready to treat with the Dey provided it could be made to appear that he had himself proposed the negotiation, and were willing to promise the brig in return for the mission of an Algerine Ambassador to Paris. The Admiral was accordingly instructed to assure the Dey, that if he would comply with this formality, peace would be immediately signed and the brig would be presented to him; but in order that no proofs might exist of the advances made by the French Ministry, the whole negotiation at Algiers was to be conducted verbally, through an interpreter chosen for the purpose from the School of Oriental Languages at Paris.
With these instructions, and accompanied by M. Bianchi the interpreter, M. de la Bretonniere returned to the Bay of Algiers. The Sardinian Consul, who undertook to arrange the preliminaries of the negotiation proposed to the Dey that it should be conducted in conferences between His Highness and the French interpreter, who had arrived at Algiers for the purpose on the 23d of July. This, Hussein immediately refused to allow, and the Admiral was thrown into the very dilemma which he wished to avoid; that is to say he was obliged to write a letter, or to abandon the attempt at negotiation. In order to avoid this difficulty a letter was written in the Turkish language, proposing in very general terms the renewal of former relations between the two Governments, but saying nothing either about the Ambassador or the brig. Hussein in reply expressed his satisfaction at the offer which had been made by the French Admiral, whom he invited to come on shore and confer personally with himself on the subject. M. de la Bretonniere accepted this invitation, and accordingly entered the harbor on the 30th of September 1829, in his flag ship the Provence of eighty guns, accompanied by the brig which had been the proximate cause of the negotiation. He landed on the following morning, and had a long conference with the Dey, of which the particulars have not transpired. On the 3d of August they had another conference, which lasted but a short time; on this occasion it is said the Admiral insisted on the mission of an ambassador as an act of reparation to France, at which the Dey became so enraged, that he ordered him immediately to leave Algiers; certain it is that the conference was suddenly broken up, and the parties separated, each in a state of high excitement. M. de la Bretonniere immediately embarked, and sailed with his ships out of the harbor; on passing by the Mole the Provence received a shot from the fort, and although the flag of truce was displayed at her mast head, the firing was continued until she was beyond their reach. The ship is said to have received eighty balls; her port holes were however kept closed, for had she returned the fire, it is probable that she would have been sunk. That this flagrant violation of good faith was the result of the Dey's orders, no one in Algiers at the time for a moment doubted; Hussein however pretended that it arose from a mistake, and that he had only ordered a gun to be fired in case the ship should approach too near to the batteries, as a signal for her to keep off. He moreover dismissed from office the Minister of Marine, on whom the responsibility of the act rested; in so doing however, he only advanced one of his own ends, for the vacancy was immediately filled by the appointment of his son-in-law Ibrahim Kara-Dengirzli, the nephew of the Aga Ibrahim.
The feeble and distracted Ministry which authorized this negotiation, had been dissolved ere the news of its result arrived in France; and those who succeeded to power in that country, though possessing energy and union of purpose, were for some time wholly occupied in preparing to confront the liberal party at the ensuing session of the Legislature. No decisive measures were therefore taken with regard to Algiers during the remainder of 1829; the blockade was indeed maintained, but with so little rigor as to be scarcely more than nominal; the Algerine cruisers were spread over the western part of the Mediterranean, and occasionally appeared before Marseilles, while the French Admiral with the greater part of his ships remained generally at Port Mahon.
Attempts were made at this period, to effect an adjustment of the differences, by the Governments of Great Britain and Turkey, which were the most interested in preventing any change in the political condition of the Barbary States. When the British Government received the news of Hussein's flagrant violation of good faith, in firing upon the French Admiral, the Pelorus sloop of war was despatched to Algiers, where her commander Captain Quin united with the British Consul Mr. St. John, in endeavoring to prevail upon the Dey to propose terms of peace. This effort proving vain, the Pelorus sailed to Constantinople, where it was agreed between the Ambassadors of France and England, that the Sultan should be requested to interpose; to this the Turkish Government readily assented, and Halil Effendi a venerable and respectable Turk, who had long known Hussein and been much esteemed by him, was ordered to proceed to Algiers, and to entreat or command the Dey no longer to provoke the vengeance of his powerful enemies. Halil arrived in the Pelorus on the 28th of November at Algiers, where he was received with great kindness and affection by the Dey and by all classes of the inhabitants. His arguments and entreaties soon produced effects, from which the mediators augured the most favorable consequences; for Hussein after some days of reflection and consultation with his Ministers, agreed to propose to M. de la Bretonniere the renewal of the negotiations, offering him every assurance of honorable treatment in case he should come to Algiers, and as an earnest of the sincerity of his intentions, promising the surrender of all the French prisoners. The Pelorus sailed with these proposals on the 10th of December for Mahon, where she was detained nearly three months in expectation of the Admiral's reply; at length M. de la Bretonniere declared, that as he was still bound by the first instructions from his Government, he could admit of negotiation on no other terms, than the mission of an Ambassador to Paris to bear the explanations of the Dey. With this answer Captain Quin returned to Algiers on the 1st of April 1830; but no arguments could induce Hussein to adopt the measure proposed: "God is Great!" said he, "Let the French come."
In the mean time the French Ministry had taken a most serious determination. The insult offered by the Dey in firing upon M. de la Bretonniere, was concealed from the public as completely as possible; no mention of it was made in the Moniteur, yet it finally became known, and the opposition press of Paris eagerly seized the opportunity, to vilify the hated Ministry of Polignac for delaying to avenge the insulted honor of France. In this condition of things it became absolutely necessary for the Government to take some decisive step towards a conclusion of the war, in order to relieve itself from a heavy and increasing burthen of popular odium on this account. To effect this purpose, two plans were proposed in the Ministerial Council. Count de Bourmont the bold and active chief of the War Department, was in favor of an expedition sent directly from France, against the capital city of the offending Sovereign. Prince Polignac the head of the Ministry, was doubtful of the propriety of risking such an attempt upon a place defended by nature, by art, and above all by the savage fanaticism of the surrounding population; he moreover conceived that even if Algiers were to fall into the hands of the French, it would be impossible for them to retain it, without a constant expenditure of force and treasure, for which no return could be reasonably expected. His plan was therefore to arm against the Algerines, an enemy professing the same faith with themselves, who in the event of success might be bound by his interests, to pursue a policy accordant with the wishes of France and of Europe in general.
The ideas of Polignac were adopted by the King, and the French Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to propose to the ambitious Pasha of Egypt, that he should undertake the conquest of Algiers, or even of all Barbary, in which France would under certain conditions aid him by the co-operation of its naval force. The Ambassador accordingly despatched M. Huder one of the officers of his Embassy to Cairo in order to submit this proposition to the Pasha; Mehemet Ali readily acceded to it, the projet of a Convention on the subject was drawn up, and the French agent arrived in Paris with it about the end of January 1830. The British Government had however by this time penetrated the secret of the negotiation, and ever jealous with regard to the occupation of the Barbary coast by any strong Power, its Ambassador at Paris was immediately instructed to protest against the plan. As the correspondence on this subject was never published, we have no means of knowing precisely the grounds of opposition taken by the British Ministry; they probably had reference only to the interests of the Sultan, which might be seriously affected by so great an addition to the force of his refractory Viceroy. Whatever may have been the influence of this opposition, the project of a co-operation with Mehemet Ali was abandoned, and it was determined that an expedition should with the least possible delay, be sent from France against Algiers.
Preparations for carrying this resolution into effect were immediately commenced in all the ports and arsenals in France, and they were prosecuted with a degree of vigor which excited the admiration of Europe. The various branches of the service were placed under the superintendence of the most experienced persons, apparently without reference to their known political inclinations; and all the resources of mechanical and medical, as well as military and naval science, were employed to add to the health and comforts of the soldiers and to give efficiency to their operations. Works relating to Northern Africa were examined with attention, and the records of preceding expeditions against Algiers were studied, in order to discover and provide against the circumstances which occasioned their failure. Toulon having been chosen as the place from which the armament was to sail, troops were collected in its vicinity, and prepared by peculiar exercises for the duties which they would be required to perform. Ships of war lying at the different naval establishments, were ordered to be fully equipped, and as soon as ready to be sent to the rendezvous, where a number of merchant vessels for the transportation of men and materials were bound by contract to assemble at the appointed time.
The object of these preparations after having been communicated in general terms to the Governments of the other great European nations, were publicly announced by the King in his address at the opening of the Legislative session on the 2d of March 1830. The reply made by the Chamber of Deputies, shewed clearly that the Ministry would find no favor with that body; this had been anticipated and the session was accordingly prorogued, with a view to the ulterior dissolution of the intractable Chamber. The Liberal Party having by this time taken the alarm, their journals which had been previously filled with invectives against the Ministers for their apathy under the insults of a Barbarian, now loudly condemned the objects of the expedition and prophesied that it would be fruitless. The violence of these denunciations induced the Ministry to insert an article in the Moniteur of April 20th, which although unofficial, was afterwards formally acknowledged to be the expression of the sentiments of the Government. This article was composed with much care, and although no one of its statements taken separately can be contradicted, yet their arrangement, the omissions of important circumstances and the studied obscurity of the language on certain points, renders the result of the whole the opposite of that which would arise from a candid exposition. General Alexandre de Laborde made an able reply in the Constitutionnel of the 26th of the same month; he fully demonstrated the unimportance of the African Concessions, the seizure of which was made the principal grounds of the difference, in the Ministerial declaration; he shewed that the bad faith of the Government and of its agents had given the Dey just cause of discontent, that the weakness and indecision of the late Ministry had provoked and encouraged his insults, and that the real end of the expedition then in preparation, was to subdue, not the barbarians of Africa, but the friends of true liberty in France. Motives of patriotism, and feeling for the honor of the country may indeed have influenced the Ministry in adopting this resolution; but there can be no doubt that its principal object was to sustain the despotic party in France, by reproducing in the people that admiration for military glory, which experience has shewn to be incompatible with respect for institutions founded on equality of rights.
To the announcement of its intentions with regard to Algiers, the French Ministry received the most satisfactory answers from many of the Powers of the European Continent. The British Government however, which had manifested its disapprobation of the plan for establishing the Egyptian authority in Barbary, was still more unwilling that France should possess a country, "which in the hands of a more civilized and enlightened Government, could not fail to exercise an important influence over the commerce and maritime interests of the Mediterranean Powers." The French Ambassador at London, when requested to explain more fully, replied by "the most positive assurances of the entirely disinterested views of the Cabinet of the Tuilleries;" and the British Ambassador at Paris on addressing the same demand to Prince Polignac, was informed "that a satisfactory answer would soon be given respecting the objects of the expedition, and the future destiny of the Regency of Algiers in case of success."
Accordingly on the 20th of March the French Ambassador at London communicated to Lord Aberdeen then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a letter from Prince Polignac, in which after enumerating the various grievances suffered by France from Algiers, and stating the conviction of his Government that treaties would be of no avail in preventing their recurrence, he declared that his Sovereign had resolved to seek redress by force, and at the same time to advance the interests of humanity, by abolishing piracy, Christian slavery and the payment of tribute to the Barbary Regencies; "and if," concludes the Prince, "in the approaching struggle, the Government now existing at Algiers should be dissolved, the King whose views in this question are entirely disinterested, will concert with his Allies respecting the new order of things, which should for the greatest advantage of the Christian world replace the system overthrown, and be most proper to secure the ends thus proposed by His Majesty." This letter was considered by the British Cabinet, as "scarcely affording that entire satisfaction which might be reasonably expected;" and its Ambassador at Paris was in consequence instructed to insist upon an official assurance from the French Government, that it "renounced all views of territorial possession or aggrandizement." The despatch containing this instruction was read to Prince Polignac, who repeated in general terms that "the expedition was not undertaken with a view to obtain territorial acquisitions," adding however that "he had no objection to give any assurance, which might be calculated to remove the uneasiness of the British Government."
For this assurance Lord Aberdeen waited for some time in vain; on the 21st of April the French Ambassador read to him a letter from the Prince containing a declaration sufficiently explicit and satisfactory; but he was not authorized to give a copy of it, and applications were again made to the French Government. Polignac whose only object was to gain time, evaded these applications by the liberal employment of petty artifices; at length on the 17th of May, when the expedition was about to sail, the French Ambassador delivered to Lord Aberdeen an official copy of a despatch addressed to him by his Government in the form of a circular to the different courts of Europe. In this circular the King of France declared to his Allies that his objects were to obtain redress for the injuries committed by Algiers, to secure the French possessions in Africa from future aggressions, and to receive indemnification for the expenses of the war, as well as to effect the abolition of piracy Christian slavery and the exaction of tribute; and that until these ends should be attained and sufficiently secured he would not lay down his arms nor recall his troops from Africa. In case the existing Government of Algiers should be overthrown, he would immediately concert with the other Powers as to the new order of things to be there established, for the greatest advantage of the Christian world; and as it was probable that they might soon be required to give their opinions on this subject, he invited each Government without delay to furnish its Representative in France with the proper instructions. "His majesty," says the French Minister in the despatch, "will appear at these deliberations, ready to furnish every additional explanation which may be desired, disposed to take into consideration the rights and interests of all, not bound by anterior engagements, at liberty to accept any proposition which may tend to assure the attainment of the result indicated, and free from all feelings of personal interest."
Not satisfied with such vague promises, the British Minister replied through the Ambassador at Paris, that although "no further suspicion could be entertained of any design on the part of the French Government to establish a military occupation of the Regency, or to accomplish such a change in the state of territorial possession on the shores of the Mediterranean, as should affect the interest of European Powers," yet "he could not avoid calling the attention of Prince Polignac to the peculiar situation of Algiers in its relation to the Ottoman Porte;" that although "many Governments of Europe had contracted engagements with that Regency as an independent State," and others "continued to regard the Barbary States as essentially dependant on the Turkish Empire," yet "the supremacy of the Sultan was allowed by all;" he therefore "submitted to the serious consideration of the Prince, what must be the effect of a precedent, which thus disposes of the rights of a third party, against whom no complaint whatever has been alleged." To this no reply was made, and the negotiation or rather the discussion ended.
The preceding statement of the correspondence between the French and British Governments, relative to the disposition to be made of Algiers in the event of its conquest, is drawn from the official letters which passed on the occasion; they were published in compliance with a call made by Lord Aberdeen in the House of Peers of Great Britain on the 3d of May 1833. From an examination of those documents, it appears that no engagement was entered into by the French Government to recall its troops from Algiers at any period; equally unfounded is the assertion made by the French historical writers, respecting the reply of Prince Polignac to the British Ambassador, that "France when insulted asked the aid of no power in avenging its honor, and would be accountable to none for the disposal of its conquests." It would be impossible to give a summary of the results of the negotiation more satisfactory, or drawn from a source entitled to greater consideration, than that presented by Lord Aberdeen when he called for the production of the Correspondence in the House of Lords; "no Convention was signed on the subject, nor was any express stipulation entered into for the evacuation of Algiers by the French force; but important engagements were contracted, which in reference to all the Powers interested in the commerce of the Mediterranean, and in the territorial arrangements of that part of the world, were calculated to allay apprehensions which might reasonably have existed respecting the occupation of Algiers by the French."
There were difficulties also within the Ministerial Council. The preparations for the expedition were nearly completed, before it was known who was to command it. Three Marshals and six Lieutenant Generals are said to have been successively proposed and rejected; at length the Moniteur of the 20th of April, the same which contained the defence of the objects of the expedition, announced that the King had appointed Count de Bourmont the Minister of War, to the command of the Army of Africa, as it was termed. The appointment to a station so responsible of a man who had betrayed every cause in which he engaged is said to have received the unwilling assent of the King; it was considered a fortunate circumstance by the Liberal Party, as it contributed to excite the indignation of the whole country, and to deprive the Government of the popularity, which it might otherwise have gained by the expedition.
On the day when his nomination was published, Bourmont left Paris for Toulon, the affairs of his Department having been committed during his absence to Prince Polignac. He was followed by the Minister of the Marine, and soon after by the Duke d'Angouleme, who as grand Admiral of France came to review the armament before its departure.
Certainly never did the harbor of Toulon, nor any other harbor exhibit a more gallant spectacle.
The Army of Africa was composed of thirty-seven thousand six hundred and fifty men; the number of horses employed in the different branches of its service was three thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, and the artillery consisted of one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon. This force was arranged in three divisions, which were placed severally under the commands of Lieutenant Generals the Baron de Barthezène, Count de Loverdo, and the Duke d'Escars; the Chief Engineer was General Valazé and the artillery was directed by Count de la Hitte. The number of ships of war was one hundred and three, including eleven of the line, twenty-three frigates and seven steam ships; they were manned by twenty-seven thousand seamen, and carried more than three thousand guns. They were arranged in three squadrons; the Squadron of Battle commanded by Admiral Duperré, who conducted the naval operations of the expedition; the Squadron of Disembarkation by Admiral Rosamel, and the Squadron of Reserve by Captain Lemoine. Between four and five hundred merchant vessels were engaged for the transportation of horses, provisions and materials, and many others were allowed to accompany the fleet, laden with various articles which might be needed. Of the equipments and accompaniments of this force, it would be difficult to convey an adequate idea, without entering into details which might not prove generally interesting; suffice it to say that no expense was spared to render them complete, and that nothing was neglected, which could contribute to the attainment of the end proposed. Upon the whole, the armament was superior to any other which in modern times has crossed a sea; those led by Charles the Fifth against Tunis and Algiers, the famed Spanish Armada sent by Philip the Second for the invasion of England, and even the mighty expedition conducted by Napoleon to Egypt being each inferior to it in appointments, in naval force, and in the numerical amount of the persons engaged.
All things being in readiness the embarkation of the troops was commenced on the 11th of May, and having been conducted with the utmost order and precision, it was terminated in a week. On the 25th the wind being favorable the first squadron sailed out of the harbor; the second followed on the 26th, and the third on the 27th. They directed their course for Algiers; it was however arranged that in case of separation by storm or other unexpected occurrence, the place of rendezvous would be Palma the capital of the Island of Majorca.
Scarcely had the first squadron quitted Toulon, ere it was met by a Turkish frigate escorted by one of the ships of the squadron which was blockading Algiers. The Turkish frigate bore no less a personage than Tahir Pasha the Capudan Pasha or High Admiral of Turkey, who had been sent by the Sultan with full powers to arrange the differences between France and the Dey. He had sailed first to Algiers, where he intended to command Hussein to accept the terms required by the French, and in case of refusal to depose him and take possession of the place in the name of the Sultan; but the commander of the blockading squadron off that place had received orders to suffer no ship to enter the harbor, and Tahir finding it impossible to land, hastened to Toulon in hopes that his representations might prevent the sailing of the expedition. Well was it for the Pasha, that he was not permitted to enter Algiers, for Hussein who knew of his approach and of the objects of his visit, had prepared to have him strangled as soon as he landed.
The Turkish Ambassador on meeting the French fleet, boarded the Admiral's ship, and had a conference with Bourmont which of course proved ineffectual; he then continued his voyage to Toulon, where he was placed in quarantine immediately on his arrival. Thence he attempted to transmit his communications to the Government, but great care had been taken to prevent them from reaching their destination. The British Ambassador asked explanations from the French Minister as to the objects of his visit, and endeavored to procure a hearing for him; but Prince Polignac adroitly evaded the questions, by confessing with the greatest apparent frankness, that he was entirely ignorant for what purpose the Turkish Ambassador was sent. Tahir at length seeing that it was useless to remain longer, and have "his beard thus laughed at," went back to Constantinople.
Before the scene of the history is changed to Africa, it may be stated, that on the 15th of May, while all France was intent upon the preparations for the departure of the expedition, an ordinance appeared in the Moniteur dissolving the Chamber of Deputies. A few days after a partial change was made in the Ministerial Body by the introduction of persons still more opposed to liberal institutions than those whom they replaced, and still more odious to the nation at large. The French Ministry subsisted as thus organized until the 28th of July, when Charles the Tenth ceased to reign.