THE IDEALS OF PEACE AND THE REALITIES OF WAR
WAR AND THE IDEALS OF PEACE. By Henry Rutgers Marshall, L. H. D., D. S. published by Duffield & Co. New York.
“War and the Ideals of Peace,” is rather an abstruse study of the mental and psychological processes which form human character and lead to human action. It is mainly a discussion of the validity of the contention that recurrent wars are inevitable because man is governed by the inexorable laws of nature, which compel him to contend for dominance. The author admits that man is by nature a fighting animal, but contends that he possesses also “creative spontaneity,” and may by his own efforts mould and shape ideals that will enable him to triumph over the natural bent of his disposition. Thus individuals may be led in the ways and thoughts of peace and mould the policy of nations to peace rather than war.
This is obviously true. It is shown in the history of nations, in the fact that through enlightened public sentiment many nations, especially during the past one hundred years, have been impelled to peace when there was temptation to war. The exceptions, when wars have occurred, have been due to the fact that enlightened public sentiment suffered a relapse or reversion and favored war. The antidote for war undoubtedly lies in developing the individual conscience, setting its creative spontaneity to work to formulate peace ideals—in short, to get the mass of men to think peace instead of war. Public sentiment is simply the superior weight of individual opinion, and if public sentiment is decisively for peace, the nation in which such public sentiment prevails will not go to war except to repel aggression.
This leads us to a point of disagreement with the author of the book in his practical application of his theories to the correct policy for this country to pursue. That we should stand at all times for the principles of peace no right-thinking man will deny. But that to realize these principles it is the duty of this nation to disarm without a simultaneous agreement of the other great nations to do likewise, we emphatically deny. Dr. Marshall says:
“We are a specially privileged people, free at present from enemies who might wish to attack us, and able to arm without too long delay should we see signs of growing danger of aggression. If we failed of alertness we might by a bare chance be caught unprepared by some enemy not now in sight, but it were surely better to take this small risk than to waste our energies in what is likely to be uncalled for preparation. Protected as we are by our broad ocean boundaries we have a unique opportunity to show to the world the benefits accruing to a state that does not spend a large proportion of its resources upon implements of the construction of implements of destruction and upon the training of large bodies of citizens to their employment. Did I, as an individual, find living at some distance from me a first class prize fighter, marvelously efficient, but at the time thoroughly exhausted, it would surely appear stupid for me to take my time and energies from the pursuits for which I seem fitted in order to devote myself to the attempt to become what could not at best be more than a second rate prizefighter, really because of fear that the first rate prizefighter might regain his strength and at some future time run amuck and do me injury.”
The present mode of fighting, as developed in the trenches of Belgium and France, which takes all the glamour and romance and glory out of war, and reduces it to a dismal contest of organization and machinery, requires, for its successful prosecution, preparation of forces and machinery which demands much time. The recruiting, organization, training and equipment of men to fight modern battles is also a work of considerable time. In the preparation of naval defense time is still a more essential factor. The ocean which separates us from Europe is no longer a barrier, but a highway. The transportation of men and arms and munitions is far easier and more expeditious by sea than by land. So the broad ocean is no longer our protection.
The analogy of the prizefighter and the private citizen misses the mark. The prizefighter is held in check by the local police force which all governments and municipalities must possess, no matter how peaceful their ideals. If there were an international police force capable of preserving the peace among nations, then it would not be necessary for a nation to arm, any more than it is now necessary for the private citizen to arm. But in the absence of such a protection it is necessary for each nation to look to its own protection.
In the absence of a world Court of Justice empowered by the stronger nations to settle international disputes, and armed with power to enforce its decrees, world peace can only be maintained by a proper adjustment of the balance of power. If all the great nations or groups of nations were about equally armed and equally prepared, the chance of wars would be minimized. The present conflagration in Europe and Asia is due largely to the fact that rival powers were nowhere nearly equally balanced. One power so amazingly surpassed the others in preparedness that conflicting forces could not be held in check. Had England and France been as prepared for war as Germany, and as efficiently organized, or had Germany been as negligent as England, the war could hardly have occurred. It would not have cost England a tithe of what she has already expended in this war to have been so well prepared as to have enabled her to absolutely hold the balance of power.
The argument that at the close of the present great war any of the belligerent nations will be too exhausted to attack us, will hardly hold water. The victor will have a great organized military establishment, with troops inured to war, and perhaps filled with the spirit of war. To such a power a rich, unarmed nation like ours might be an easy prey. At the conclusion of our civil war this country, although it had been for four years fighting an exhaustive war, was, from a military standpoint, stronger than it ever was before or ever has been since.
We may perhaps in time rely for peace on world ideals of peace, but until such ideals are of universal acceptance we cannot put our trust in them. We hope that our nation may, at the end of this war, be instrumental in organizing a world tribunal for Judicial Settlement, but in order to have weight in the world councils looking to that end, we shall have to speak with a strong voice. We shall have to be strong not only in ideals, but in real and potential force.