Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, as I suggested earlier, the next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland and with it the resulting initiation of aggressive war in Poland in September 1939. This is covered by Paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text.
Here again the careful and meticulous record-keeping of the Adjutant Schmundt has provided us with a document in his own handwriting, which lets the cat out of the bag. That may be a troublesome colloquialism to translate. I do not know. The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the Führer’s study in the New Reich Chancellery. The Defendant Göring was present.
[The Defendant Frick interrupted at this point and said: “This year is surely not correct.” This statement in German was not translated.]
MR. ALDERMAN: I think one of the defendants indicated I had referred to the wrong year. My notes show 23 May 1939. That is shown by the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the document to which you are referring?
MR. ALDERMAN: That is Document. L-79. As I said, the Defendant Göring was present. The Defendant Raeder was present. The Defendant Keitel was present. The subject of the meeting was, I quote: “Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future Aims.” This document is of historical importance, second not even to the political will and testament of the Führer, recorded by Adjutant Hossbach.
The original of this document when captured, found its way through the complicated channels across the Atlantic to the United States. There, it was found by members of the staff of the American Prosecution, by them taken to London, and thence to Nuremberg. The “L” on the identifying number indicates that it is one of the documents which was assembled in London and brought here from there. We think the document is of unquestioned validity. Its authenticity and its accuracy, as a record of what transpired at the meeting of 23 May 1939, stands admitted by the Defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations. As I say, the number is Document L-79 in our numbered series. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-27.
This document also is of such great importance historically and as bearing on the issues now presented to the Tribunal, that I feel obliged to read most of it. At the top:
“Top Secret (Geheime Reichssache). To be transmitted by officer only.
“Minutes of a conference on 23 May 1939. Place: The Führer’s study, New Reich Chancellery. Adjutant on duty: Lieutenant Colonel (G. S.) Schmundt.
“Present: The Führer, Field Marshal Göring, Grand Admiral Raeder, Colonel General Von Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, Colonel General Milch, General (of Artillery) Halder, General Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel (G. S.) Jeschonnek, Colonel (G. S.) Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel (G. S.) Schmundt, Captain Engel (Army), Lieutenant Commander Albrecht, Captain V. Below (Army).
“Subject: Indoctrination on the Political Situation and Future Aims.
“The Führer defined as the purpose of the conference:
“1. Analysis of the situation;
“2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from that situation;
“3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks;
“4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from those consequences. Secrecy is the first essential for success.
“The Führer’s observations are given in accordance with their meaning. Our present situation must be considered from two points of view: 1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939; 2) the permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.
“In the period 1933-39, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.
“Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.
“Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.
“This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘encroachments’. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.
“A mass of 80 million people has solved the problems of ideals. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.
“Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.
“We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.
“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.
“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:
“The national political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions.”—I suppose they were those in the concentration camps.—“Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.
“The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
“The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.
“There is no other possibility for Europe.
“Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember: blockade.
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than in peace.
“The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labor.
“The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.
“Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.
“It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude of Poland.
“The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.
“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity”.—That, if the Court please, is underscored in the original German text.—
“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.
“Therefore, the Führer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).
“If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.
“Fundamentally, therefore: Conflict with Poland, beginning with an attack on Poland, will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.
“The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.
“Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first, for various reasons, her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.
“Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.
“If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.
“What will this struggle be like?”—Underscored in the German original.—
“England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr Basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr Basin will determine the duration of our resistance.
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally to force them into cooperation.
“Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.
“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.
“The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.
“The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.
“Question: Short or long war?
“Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10 to 15 years’ duration.
“History has always shown that people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914 the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (for example Ruhr Basin). England has similar weaknesses.
“England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.
“England is the driving force against Germany.”—which translated literally means: “England is the motor driving against Germany.” I suppose that is the French “force motrice.”
“Her strength lies in the following:
“1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance, and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and the bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.
“2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.
“3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.
“England’s weakness:
“If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had been begun in the morning, the British Fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war.”—that war, I take it—“It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the Fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.
“The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the Fleet’s protection.
“If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the Fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.
“There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the Government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.
“Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:
“1. Disclosure coming from a large circle of military experts concerned;
“2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise;
“3. Human failings;
“4. Weather conditions.
“The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.
“This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.
“1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.
“2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the continent for England are eliminated.
“The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.
“England can then be blockaded from western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.
“Consequences:
“England will not be able to fight on the continent; daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines; time will not be on England’s side; Germany will not bleed to death on land.
“Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:
“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.
“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter measures.
“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.
“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army’s battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.
“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.
“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.
“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.
“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.
“This applies to gas, submarines, and air force. It would be true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no countermeasures.
“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.”
The rest of the document, if the Tribunal please, deals more in detail with military plans and preparations. I think it unnecessary to read further.
The document just read is the evidence which specifically supports the allegations in Paragraph 4 (a) of Section IV (F) of the Indictment, appearing on Page 9 of the printed English text, relating to the meeting of 23 May 1939. We think it leaves nothing unproved in those allegations.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps you ought to read the last page and the last five lines, because they refer in terms to one of the defendants.
MR. ALDERMAN: I didn’t read these, Mr. President, simply because I am convinced that they are mistranslated in the English. I will be glad to have them read in the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you are of that opinion.
MR. ALDERMAN: We could get it from the original German.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that the English translation is wrong?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better inform us then if it is wrong.
MR. ALDERMAN: Did you have reference to the last paragraph headed “Working principles”?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one after that.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Might I ask that the German interpreter read that, as it can be translated into the other languages. It is on Page 16 of the original.
BY THE INTERPRETER: “Page 16. Purpose:
“1. Study of the entire problem;
“2. Study of the events;
“3. Study of the means needed;
“4. Study of the necessary training.
“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with sober sceptic powers of understanding.
“Working principles:
“1. No one is to take part in this, who does not have to know of it.
“2. No one can find out more than he must know.
“3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.
“On Göring’s question, the Führer decided that:
a) The armed forces determine what shall be built;
b) In the shipbuilding program nothing is to be changed;
c) The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or 1944.”—Schmundt certified this text.
MR. ALDERMAN: Mr. President, the translation was closer than I had anticipated.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: We think, as I have just said, that this document leaves nothing unproved in those allegations in the Indictment. It demonstrates that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. It demonstrates the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. It demonstrates that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive expansion for food and “Lebensraum.”
In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the initiation of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939, just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland.
We have three of these documents, related and constituting a single group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other two I shall offer.
The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg, transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our Prosecution to see if it could find something better. Fortunately, we did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that day made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the afternoon, as indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By comparison of those two documents with the first document, we concluded that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches.
On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg the three Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the commanding generals bearing the title Commanders-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber).
I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the OKW at Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces), there were uncovered two speeches delivered by Hitler at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are Documents Numbers 798-PS and 1014-PS, in our series of documents.
In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal please, we have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, I offer the second document, 798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit USA-29, and the third document, 1014-PS, as Exhibit USA-30.
These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, and I shall not necessarily read the entire speech.
Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Führer speaks to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: “I have called you together. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place?
MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?
MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication “Obersalzberg” came from the first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this speech.
The place is not very significant; it is the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]:
“I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss military details.
“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring.”—I interpolate, I think he is there referring to the May document, which I have already read, L-79.—“But I thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in order to fight first against the West, but this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since the essential points have changed.
“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a conflict with the West.
“Poland wants access to the sea.
“The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment.
“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two personal constitutions”—I suppose he means “personalities”; that probably is an inapt translation—“my own personality, and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because of my political ability.”
I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of a war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending upon one man’s personality.
“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.
“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the Alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
“The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our internal unity.
“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive personalities are concerned: There is no outstanding personality in England or France.”—I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must have overlooked one in England, perhaps many.—
“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose—we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Göring can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action.”
I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he meant by no personalities—no masters having the authority that he had over his nation.
“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry between Italy, France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.
“The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved; conflict between England and Ireland, the South African Union became more independent, concessions had to be made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.
“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the Mediterranean.
“Further favorable factors for us are these:
“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.
“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal’s death Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady weak men.
“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 or 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.
“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini’s would change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.”—We skip two paragraphs.—
“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution. . . .”
A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to read, and then towards the end, four paragraphs from the bottom, I resume:
“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation.”—And then the last paragraph of one sentence—“Göring answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the Armed Forces will do their duty.”
I believe I have already offered Exhibit 30, which is a shorter note entitled: “Second Speech of the Führer on 22 August 1939.” Reading then from United States Exhibit 30, headed “Second Speech by the Führer on 22 August 1939:
“It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it, that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers. A struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to the heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918 the Nation fell down because the mental pre-requisites were not sufficient. Frederick the Great secured final success only through his mental power.
“Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.
“I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory.
“Have no pity. Brutal attitude. Eighty million people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest has the right. Greatest severity.
“Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.
“First aim: Advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of attrition.
“New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.
“Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.”
That ends the quotation. The Tribunal will recall that in fact the start was actually postponed until September 1.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, may I make a short statement on the two documents which have just been read. Both the documents which were read and also the third which was not read but to which reference was made, are not recognized by the Defense. I do not wish this objection to appear unjustified; may I therefore give this explanation:
Both the documents which were read contain a number of factual errors. They are not signed. Moreover, only one meeting took place, and that is the cause for the inaccuracy of these documents. No one present at that meeting was charged with taking down the events in the meeting stenographically, and since there are no signatures, it cannot be determined who wrote the documents and who is responsible for their reliability. The third document which was not read is, according to the photostatic copy in the Defense’s document room, simply typewritten. There is no indication of place or time of execution.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got nothing to do with the third document, because it has not been read.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document has nevertheless been published in the press and was apparently given to the press by the Prosecution. Consequently both the Defense and the defendants have a lively interest in giving a short explanation of the facts concerning these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is trying this case in accordance with the evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press, and the third document is not in evidence before us.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize that counsel wonder how these two documents which I have just read are in our hands. They come to us from an authentic source. They are German documents. They were found in the OKW files. If they aren’t correct records of what occurred, it surprises us that with the great thoroughness with which the Germans kept accurate records, they would have had these records that didn’t represent the truth in their OKW files.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal will of course hear what evidence the defendants choose to give with reference to the documents.
MR. ALDERMAN: It has occurred to me in that connection that if any of these defendants have in their possession what is a more correct transcription of the Führer’s words on this occasion, the Court should consider that. On the other question referred to by counsel, I feel somewhat guilty. It is quite true that, by a mechanical slip, the press got the first document, which we never at all intended them to have. I feel somewhat responsible. It happened to be included in the document books that were handed up to the Court on Friday, because we had only intended to refer to it and give it an identification mark and not to offer it. I had thought that no documents would be released to the press until they were actually offered in evidence. With as large an organization as we have, it is very difficult to police all those matters.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal would like to know how many of these documents are given to the press.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can’t answer that.
COL. STOREY: May it please the Tribunal, it is my understanding that as and when documents are introduced in evidence, then they are made available to the press.
THE PRESIDENT: In what numbers?
COL. STOREY: I think about 250 copies of each one, about 200 or 250 mimeographed copies.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the defendants’ counsel should have copies of these documents before any of them are handed to the press. I mean to say that in preference to gentlemen of the press the defendants’ counsel should have the documents.
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I understand that these gentlemen had the 10 documents on Saturday morning or Sunday morning. They had them for 24 hours, copies of the originals of these documents that have been read today, down in the Information Center.
THE PRESIDENT: I stated, in accordance with the provisional arrangement which was made, and which was made upon your representations, that 10 copies of the trial briefs and five copies of the volumes of documents should be given to the defendants’ counsel.
COL. STOREY: Sir, I had the receipts that they were deposited in the room.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am pointing out to you, Colonel Storey, is that if 250 copies of the documents can be given to the press, then the defendants’ counsel should not be limited to five copies.
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the 250 copies are the mimeographed copies in English when they are introduced in evidence. I hold in my hands, or in my briefcase here, a receipt that the document books and the briefs were delivered 24 hours in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: You don’t seem to understand what I am putting to you, which is this: That if you can afford to give 250 copies of the documents in English to the press, you can afford to give more than five copies to the defendants’ counsel—one each. Well, we do not need to discuss it further. In the future that will be done.
DR. DIX: May I say, then, that of every document in evidence each defense counsel will receive one copy; it will not be just one for several members of the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: The aggressive war having been initiated in September 1939, and Poland having been totally defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. Under the division of the case between the Four Chief Prosecutors, this aspect of the matter is left to presentation by the British Chief Prosecutor.
Another change that we have made in our plan, which I perhaps should mention, is that following the opening statement by the British Chief Prosecutor on Count Two, we expect to resume the detailed handling of the later phases of the aggressive war phase of the case. The British, instead of the Americans, will deal with the details of aggression against Poland. Then with this expansion of the war in Europe and then, as a joint part of the American case under Count One and the British case under Count Two, I shall take up the aggression against Russia and the Japanese aggression in detail. So that the remaining two subjects, with which I shall ultimately deal in more detail, and now by presentation of specifically significant documents, are the case of the attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 22nd of June 1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December 1941.
As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall at this point present two documents. The first of these two documents establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation “Case Green”, so in the case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name “Case Barbarossa.”
THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?
MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer’s headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is initialled by the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel. This secret order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of these nine copies. It is Document Number 446-PS in our numbered series.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-31.
If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to read the first page of that directive, the first page of the English translation. The paging may differ in the German original.
It is headed “The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces,” with a number of initials, the meaning of which I don’t know, except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK chiefs, which I suppose to be General Kommando chiefs:
“The Führer’s headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only through officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21, Case Barbarossa.
“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa.)
“For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.
“For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England, and especially the supply for them, must not be permitted to break down.
“Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.
“If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.
“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.
“The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:
“1. General Purpose:
“The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks, and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.
“In quick pursuit, a line is to be reached from where the Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
“In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.
“Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be prevented through powerful blows at the beginning of the operations.”
Another secret document, captured from the OKW files. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, perhaps that would be a convenient time to adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
MR. ALDERMAN: If it pleases the Tribunal, another secret document captured from the OKW files, we think establishes the motive for the attack on the Soviet Union. It also establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes against Humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a memorandum of 2 May 1941, concerning the result of a discussion on that day with the state secretaries concerning the Case Barbarossa. The document is initialled by a Major Von Gusovius, a member of the staff of General Thomas set up to handle the economic exploitations of the territory occupied by the Germans during the course of the aggression against Russia. The document is numbered 2718-PS in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-32.
I shall simply read the first two paragraphs of this document, including the introductory matter:
“Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files 1a. Second copy to General Schubert, May 2, 1941.”
“Memorandum about the result of today’s discussion with the state secretaries about Barbarossa.
“1. The War can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by Russia in the third year of war.
“2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things necessary for us.”
That document has already been commented on and quoted from in Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening statement. The staggering implications of that document are hard to realize. In the words of the document, the motive for the attack was that the war which the Nazi conspirators had launched in September 1939 “can only be continued if all Armed Forces are fed by Russia in the third year of the war.” Perhaps, there never was a more sinister sentence written than the sentence in this document which reads:
“There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things necessary for us.”
The result is known to all of us.
I turn now to the Nazi collaboration with Italy and Japan and the resulting attack on the United States on 7 December 1941. With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators, and in particular, the Defendant Ribbentrop, called upon the eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack in the rear. Our evidence will show that they incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they maintained their preference that the United States not be involved in the conflict, realizing the military implication of an entry of the United States into the war. However, their incitement did result in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured the Japanese that they would declare war on the United States should a United States-Japanese conflict break out. It was in reliance on those assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.
On the present discussion of this phase of the case, I shall offer only one document to prove this point. The document was captured from the files of the German Foreign Office. It consists of notes dated 4 April 1941, signed by “Schmidt,” regarding discussions between the Führer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop. The document is numbered 1881-PS in our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-33. In the original, it is in very large, typewritten form in German. I shall read what I deem to be the pertinent parts of this document, beginning with the four paragraphs; first reading the heading, the heading being:
“Notes regarding the discussion between the Führer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of State Meissner, in Berlin, on 4 April 1941.
“Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Führer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions.”—For the record, I am reading on what is page 6 of the German original.—
“Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the United States could be restrained, by diplomatic exertions, from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation,—that is, with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for 5 years or longer, and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific, and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.
“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Führer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army which were needed by the Japanese.
“The Führer promised this and pointed out that Germany, too, considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening, not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the Americans.
“In the further course of the discussion, the Führer pointed out that Germany, on her part, would immediately take the consequences if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved, whether with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action; their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.
“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Führer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan, many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.
“The Führer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself had been in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of Armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight, at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.
“Matsuoka replied that the United States, or rather their ruling politicians, had recently still attempted a last maneuver towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas, provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.
“The Führer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything, but that the United States had the hope that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
“The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
“Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Führer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he, Matsuoka, in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not utter in Japan a single word of all that he had expounded before the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things, and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he, as Foreign Minister, had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully, in the first place, the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
“Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.
“On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
“Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore, because he had reason to fear that by cabling, something might leak out. If necessary, he would send a courier.
“The Führer agreed and assured, after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.
“Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same for Japan.
“The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.
“Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. (Signed) Schmidt.”
This completes the presentation of what I have called the “handful of selected documents,” offered not as a detailed treatment of any of these wars of aggression, but merely to prove the deliberate planning, the deliberate premeditation with which each of these aggressions was carried out.
I turn to a more detailed and more or less chronological presentation of the various stages of the aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 27 November 1945 at 1000 hours.]