Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Colonel Amen will represent the United States this morning.
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I propose to call as the first witness for the Prosecution, Major General Erwin Lahousen.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to state that the evidence of the witness whom you propose to call must be strictly confined to the count with which the United States are dealing, Count One.
COL. AMEN: May I have a moment to discuss that with the Chief Counsel of the United States?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, so far as I know the Prosecution . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Would you state for whom you appear? Do you appear for the Defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: Yes. As far as I know, an agreement was reached between the Prosecution and the Defense, to the effect that whenever possible, questions to be brought up in the proceedings on the following day should be announced beforehand. The obvious purpose of this very reasonable understanding was to enable Defense Counsel to discuss forthcoming questions with their clients, and thus to assure a rapid and even progress of the Trial.
I was not informed that the witness Lahousen was to be called by the Prosecution today, nor was I told on what questions he was to be heard.
It was particularly important to know this, because today, I believe, the witness Lahousen was not to be heard on questions connected with the Prosecution’s case as presented during the past days.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the contrary of what I said. What I said was that the witness was to be confined to evidence relating to Count One, which is the Count that has been solely discussed up to the present date.
DR. NELTE: Do you mean, Mr. President, that in order to enable the Defense to cross-examine the witness, there will be a recess after the interrogation by the Prosecution during which Counsel may discuss the questions with their clients? The witness Lahousen, as far as I recall, has never until now been mentioned by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to hear Counsel for the United States upon the agreement which counsel for the Defendant Keitel alleges, namely, an agreement that what was to be discussed on the following day should be communicated to defendants’ counsel beforehand.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of no agreement to inform defendants’ counsel of any witness, nor of his testimony; nor would I want to make such. There are security reasons involved in disclosing to Defense Counsel the names of witnesses, which I don’t need to enlarge upon, I am quite sure.
We did advise them that they would be given information as to the documentary matters, and I think that has been kept.
As to witnesses, however, a matter of policy arises. These witnesses are not always prisoners. They have to be treated in somewhat different fashion than prisoners; and the protection of their security is a very important consideration where we are trying this case, in the very hotbed of the Nazi organization with which some of Defense Counsel were identified.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Justice Jackson, that that is sufficient. If you tell the Tribunal that there was no such agreement, the Tribunal will, of course, accept that.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I know of nothing of that character, relating to witnesses. That does apply to documents.
We find it very difficult to know just the meaning of the ruling which the Court has just announced. Count One of the Indictment is a conspiracy count, covering the entire substantive part of the Indictment. There are problems, of course, of overlapping, which I had supposed had been worked out between the prosecutors until this morning. It is impossible, trying a conspiracy case, to keep from mentioning the fact that the act, which was the object of the conspiracy, was performed. In fact, that is a part of the evidence of the conspiracy.
I know I don’t need to enlarge upon the wide scope of evidence in a conspiracy case. I think, perhaps, the best way to do is to swear the witness, and that the other prosecutors, if they feel their field is being trespassed upon, or the judges, if they feel that we are exceeding, raise the objection specifically; because I don’t know how we can separate, particularly on a moment’s notice, Count One from the other Counts.
We have tried our best to work out an arrangement that would be fair, as between ourselves and the other prosecutors, but we find it impossible always to please everybody.
With the greatest deference to the ruling of the Court, I would like to suggest that we proceed. I don’t know just what the bounds of the ruling might be, but I think the only way we can find out is to proceed, and have specific objections to the specific things which anyone feels have been transgressed; and in doing that, I want to say that we do it with the greatest respect to the ruling, but that we may find ourselves in conflict with it, because of the difficulty of any boundary on the subject.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer?
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I must return to the matter raised by Doctor Nelte, namely his statement that before the beginning of the Trial the Defense and the Prosecution reached an agreement to the effect that the next day’s program should always be made known to the Defense on the previous day. Such an agreement was actually reached, and I cannot understand why the Prosecution was not informed of it. We considered the possibility and then reached this agreement in a conference with Doctor Kempner, who was acting as our liaison man. I should like further to point out the following:
The Prosecution stated that for security reasons the Defense could not be furnished with the names of witnesses to be called during the next day’s proceedings. The press however received, as early as yesterday, information on the witnesses to be called today. We heard of this through representatives of the press this morning and, as far as I know, the information also appeared in today’s papers. I cannot understand, therefore, why it was withheld from us, and why we were told that for security reasons, it could not be communicated to us. I think this amounts to a mistrust of the Defense’s discretion that is quite unjustified. It is, furthermore, incorrect that we are now receiving documents in good time; they still reach us belatedly. For instance, a document which is to be dealt with in court today was put on our desks only this morning, moreover, in a language which many of the defending counsel cannot understand, since they do not have complete mastery of English.
As I have already submitted this complaint to the Prosecution in writing, may I ask the Tribunal to reach a decision in this matter as soon as possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is quite correct that the name of the witness who is to be used today was given to the press. The question of our policy as to giving witnesses’ names was submitted to me last night after Court recessed, because we had not been using witnesses heretofore; and I then stated to Colonel Storey that witnesses’ names must not be given to the Defense Counsel for security reasons.
He communicated that, I believe, to Doctor Dix. I found that later it had been given to the press. They, of course, have had adequate information therefore as to this witness. However, I am speaking about the policy. We cannot be under an obligation to inform these counsel of the names of witnesses who will be called, who are here in Nuremberg, but not in prison; the situation does not permit that. Neither can we furnish transcripts of testimony or that sort of thing of witnesses in advance.
Now we want to give the Defense Counsel everything that, in the fair conduct of the Trial, they ought to have. They are now receiving much more than any citizen of the United States gets on trial in the courts of the United States, in some respects, as to advance information and copies and help and service, and I do think that to ask us to disclose to them in advance either the names or substance of testimony—oftentimes the substance would disclose the witness—would not be proper. It was stated yesterday that we would take up a witness today.
THE PRESIDENT: We have already heard two of the counsel on behalf of the Defense. Have you anything to add which is different to what they have said?
DR. DIX: Yes, I believe I can explain a misunderstanding and clarify the whole problem.
Mr. President, as far as I am informed—I do not know what was discussed in my absence—the situation is this:
Though discussions took place, no agreement was reached between the Prosecution and the Defense. There is, as Your Lordship knows, only a decision of the Tribunal regarding documents; that decision is known and I need not repeat. As far as witnesses are concerned I think I may assume that we are all agreed that the desire of the Defense to know the names of witnesses ahead of time is justified.
The Tribunal must decide to what extent security reasons interfere with this desire, which is in itself justified. That is a matter which the Defense cannot determine. I think I understand Mr. Justice Jackson correctly in saying that if the press is being told what witnesses will appear on the next day, then it is a matter of course that the same information should be given to Defense Counsel at the same time. This was only a series of unhappy circumstances, which can be overcome by mutual understanding and good will.
As I said, I do not know what was agreed upon before I was present here. I cannot therefore contradict my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, in this matter. I think it possible, however, that the misunderstanding arose as a result of the decision of the Court to have documents submitted to us 48 hours in advance and to have the film shown to us beforehand, a decision which led my colleague to the conclusion—and I consider it a justified conclusion—that all matters of this sort were to be submitted to us in advance. We do not, of course, expect to be informed of the contents of the witness’ testimony.
After this elucidation I should like to state my request that in the future we be informed as soon as possible which witness is to be called; and I should also like to ask that the security considerations be guided by the knowledge that the Defense as a body is reliable, determined and capable of assisting the Court in reaching its verdict by submitting to the discipline of the proceedings. I ask, therefore, that the cases in which the security officer believes that he should not communicate the name of the witness beforehand, should be reduced to an absolute minimum.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the submissions which have been made to them on behalf of Defense Counsel with reference to what shall or what shall not be communicated to them. With reference to the witness whom the United States desire to call, they will now be permitted to call him. With reference to what I said about confining his evidence to the first count, the Tribunal thinks that the best course would be for the other prosecutors to have the opportunity now to ask any questions which they think right, and that they may have the opportunity, if they wish, of calling the witness later upon their own counts.
As to cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, that will be allowed to them in the most convenient way possible, so that if they wish to have an opportunity of communicating with their clients before they cross-examine, they may have the opportunity of doing so. Now we will continue.
COL. AMEN: May we have General Lahousen brought before the Tribunal? What is your name?
ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): Erwin Lahousen.
COL. AMEN: Will you please spell it?
LAHOUSEN: L-a-h-o-u-s-e-n.
COL. AMEN: Will you say this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think the witness had better sit down?
COL. AMEN: I think he should be allowed to sit down, particularly since he has a heart condition which may be aggravated.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you may sit down.
COL. AMEN: Where were you born?
LAHOUSEN: I was born in Vienna.
COL. AMEN: On what date?
LAHOUSEN: On 25 October 1897.
COL. AMEN: What has been your occupation?
LAHOUSEN: I was a professional soldier.
COL. AMEN: Where were you trained?
LAHOUSEN: I was trained in Austria, in the Military Academy in Wiener-Neustadt.
COL. AMEN: Were you immediately commissioned as an officer?
LAHOUSEN: In 1915 I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the infantry.
COL. AMEN: Did you serve in the first World War?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, as second and first lieutenant in the infantry.
COL. AMEN: Were you promoted from time to time thereafter?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I was promoted under the normal regulations valid in Austria at the time.
COL. AMEN: By 1930 what rank had you attained?
LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I was a captain.
COL. AMEN: And commencing in 1930 did you take any additional training?
LAHOUSEN: In 1930 I entered the Austrian War School, which corresponds to the Military Academy in the German Army. There I received the training of an officer of the General Staff.
COL. AMEN: How long did this training last?
LAHOUSEN: This training lasted 3 years.
COL. AMEN: In 1933 to what regular army unit were you assigned?
LAHOUSEN: In 1933 I was serving in the Second Austrian Division, that was the Vienna Division.
COL. AMEN: What type of work did you do there?
LAHOUSEN: I was an intelligence officer; that branch of the service for which I was already destined at the end of my training.
COL. AMEN: Did you then receive a further promotion?
LAHOUSEN: I was promoted normally in accordance with the regulations valid in Austria, and roughly at the end of 1933 I became a major. About 1935 or the beginning of 1936 I was transferred to the General Staff, and in June, or at any rate, in the summer of 1936, I became a lieutenant colonel of the Austrian General Staff.
COL. AMEN: And were you assigned to the Intelligence Division at or about that time?
LAHOUSEN: I entered the Austrian Intelligence Division which corresponds technically to the Abwehr in the German Army. I must add that an Intelligence Division was only added to the Austrian Army about this time, i.e. 1936; before that year it did not exist. Since it was planned to re-establish within the framework of the Austrian Federal Army the military Intelligence Division which had ceased to exist after the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, I was trained to assist in organizing this division within the framework of the Austrian Army.
COL. AMEN: After being assigned to the Intelligence Division, how were your activities principally directed?
LAHOUSEN: My responsible chief, or more exactly, the responsible chief at that time, was Colonel of the General Staff Böhme. He was the division chief to whom I was subordinate, the Chief of the Intelligence Division, the man to whom I was responsible, from whom I received my orders and instructions; later on it was the Chief of the Austrian General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Can’t you shorten this, Colonel Amen? We really need not have all this detail.
COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. It is, however, I think important for the Tribunal to understand more of this information than you ordinarily would by virtue of the fact that he was taken over subsequently to a corresponding position in the German Army, which I did want the Tribunal to appreciate.
Now, will you state to the Tribunal what your principal activities were after being assigned to the Intelligence Division? What information were you interested in and seeking to obtain?
LAHOUSEN: May I repeat—I don’t know if I understood you correctly—I was a member of the Austrian Intelligence Division, and not of the German Abwehr.
COL. AMEN: After the Anschluss, what position did you assume?
LAHOUSEN: After the Anschluss I was automatically taken into the High Command of the German Armed Forces, where I did the same work. In that position I was then a member of the Abwehr and my chief was Admiral Canaris.
COL. AMEN: And what was the position of Admiral Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris was at that time Chief of the German Abwehr, the German Intelligence.
COL. AMEN: And will you explain briefly the responsibility of the principal departments of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: When, after the Anschluss in 1938, I entered the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were three Abwehr divisions, and the division called “Ausland,” and together they formed the organization known as “Ausland-Abwehr.” That was the set-up of the organization in my time. How it was composed before I became a member of it, I cannot say exactly.
COL. AMEN: And what were your duties?
LAHOUSEN: First, I automatically came into Abwehr Division I. That was the division concerned with collecting information. It was also called the Secret Information Service. I worked under a divisional chief, the then Colonel in the General Staff Pieckenbrock, whom I knew already from my Austrian past. I also knew Canaris from my time in Austria.
COL. AMEN: Admiral Canaris was your immediate superior?
LAHOUSEN: Admiral Canaris was my immediate superior.
COL. AMEN: From time to time did you act as his personal representative?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, in all cases and on all occasions when his actual deputy—namely, Colonel Pieckenbrock—was not present, or when Canaris, for one reason or another, considered it necessary or advisable to have me appear as his representative.
COL. AMEN: And in this capacity did you have any contact with Field Marshal Keitel?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did you also have contact with Jodl?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, occasionally, but to a much lesser extent.
COL. AMEN: And did you occasionally attend conferences at which Herr Hitler was also present?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I attended a few of the sessions or discussions at which Hitler was present and which he conducted.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether the leaders of the Abwehr were in sympathy with Hitler’s war program?
LAHOUSEN: I have to make clear in this connection that, at that time, we chiefs in the Abwehr were deeply influenced and captivated by the personality of Canaris, his inner bearing was perfectly clear and unequivocal to a small group of us.
COL. AMEN: And was there a particular group or groups in the Abwehr who worked against the Nazis?
LAHOUSEN: Within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr there were two groups which in their aims and actions were closely connected, but which, nevertheless, must somehow be kept apart.
COL. AMEN: And what were those two groups?
LAHOUSEN: Before I answer this question, I must briefly picture the personality of Canaris, who was the spiritual leader and focus of this group.
COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.
LAHOUSEN: Canaris was a pure intellect, an interesting, highly individual, and complicated personality, who hated violence as such and therefore hated and abominated war, Hitler, his system, and particularly his methods. In whatever way one may look on him, Canaris was a human being.
COL. AMEN: Now, will you refer back to the two groups of which you spoke and tell me about each of those two groups and their respective memberships?
LAHOUSEN: One might characterize the first of the groups as Canaris’ circle. It included the heads of the Amt Ausland-Abwehr:
Canaris himself as its spiritual leader; General Oster, Chief of the Central Division (the head of the Abwehr); my predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel Grosscurth, who had introduced me into the circle of Canaris in Vienna in 1938; the Chief of Abwehr Division I, Colonel Pieckenbrock, who was a close friend of Canaris; Pieckenbrock’s successor, Colonel Hansen, who was executed after July; my successor, Colonel Von Freytag Loringhoven, who committed suicide on 26 July 1944, before arrest; also, in a somewhat different way, what applies to all these persons, the Chief of Abwehr Division III, Colonel Von Bentivegni, and then various people in all these divisions, most of whom were executed or imprisoned in connection with the events of July 20, 1944.
I must also name here a man who did not belong to this group but who knew of the actions designed to prevent the execution or issuing of orders for murder and other atrocities, namely, Admiral Bürckner who was Chief of the Ausland Division at that time. Those, in the main, are the leaders of the first group called the Canaris circle.
The second and much smaller group was centered around General Oster as its spiritual leader. This group included members of the Ausland-Abwehr who, as early as 1938—I recognized this clearly by 1939-40 and later on—were actively concerned with schemes and plans designed to remove the originator of this catastrophe, Hitler, by force.
COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of the group to which you belonged; that is, Canaris’ inner circle?
LAHOUSEN: On its political motives or aims, I was not informed. I can only reiterate the thoughts and considerations which I, since I was one of Canaris’ most intimate confidants, knew well. His inner attitude, which influenced and moulded not only my own actions but also those of the other men whom I mentioned, can be described as follows:
We did not succeed in preventing this war of aggression. The war implies the end of Germany and of ourselves, a misfortune and a catastrophe of very great extent. However, a misfortune even greater than this catastrophe would be a triumph of this system. To prevent this by all possible means was the ultimate aim and purpose of our struggle.
The sense of what I have just said was often expressed by Canaris among the group of which I am speaking.
COL. AMEN: Now, did this group of which you and Canaris were members meet frequently?
LAHOUSEN: I must explain that his group or circle was not to be regarded as an organization in the technical sense, or as a sort of conspirators’ club. That would have been quite contradictory to Canaris’ nature. It was rather, a spiritual organization of men holding the same convictions, of men who had vision and knowledge—their official functions provided them with knowledge—of men who understood each other and acted, but each in his own way and in accordance with his own individuality.
This is also the reason for the differentiation of which I spoke earlier. The same demands were not made on each individual, but Canaris always approached the person whose attitude he knew from personal knowledge to be the most suitable to carry out a certain task.
COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations at these official meetings, at which Canaris expressed his views with respect to the use of force in Poland, for example?
LAHOUSEN: These and similar methods were repeatedly, I may say always, discussed in our circle and they were naturally repudiated by all of us.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall what Canaris said about the Polish war at the time of its commencement?
LAHOUSEN: I very clearly recall the hour at which Canaris entered, completely shattered, to tell us that the situation had after all become serious, although it had earlier appeared as if the matter might still be postponed. He told us then: “This is the end.”
COL. AMEN: Did you have conversations with Canaris and the other members of your group with respect to eliminating Nazis from your staff?
LAHOUSEN: While I was still in Vienna, before I took up my post in the OKW, I received instructions from Canaris not to bring any National Socialists with me to his department in Berlin. I was also instructed, whenever possible not to employ Party members or officers sympathizing with the Party in my division, especially in high positions. Thus the actual organization. . . .
COL. AMEN: Did Canaris keep a diary?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, Canaris kept a diary. He did so even before the beginning of the war—a diary to which I personally had to contribute and did contribute much.
COL. AMEN: Was it a part of your duties to make entries in that diary?
LAHOUSEN: No, it was not a part of my actual duties, but it naturally fell to me to write entries on the conferences which I attended with Canaris or as his representative.
COL. AMEN: And did you keep copies of the entries which you made in Canaris’ diary?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I kept copies, with Canaris’ knowledge and approval.
COL. AMEN: Do you have the original of some of those copies with you here today?
LAHOUSEN: I do not have them on me, but they are available here.
COL. AMEN: And you have refreshed your recollection in reference to those entries?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of Canaris in keeping such a diary?
LAHOUSEN: As a truthful answer to this question I must repeat what Canaris himself said to me on this subject:
“The purpose and intention of this diary is to portray to the German people and to the world, at some future date, the leaders who are now guiding the fate of their nation.”
COL. AMEN: Now, do you recall attending conferences with Canaris at the Führer’s headquarters, just prior to the fall of Warsaw?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris and I took part in discussions not in the Führer’s headquarters, but in the Führer’s special train, shortly before the fall of Warsaw.
COL. AMEN: And having refreshed your recollection from reference to the entries in Canaris’ diary, can you tell the Tribunal the date of those conferences?
LAHOUSEN: According to the notes and documents at my disposal it was on September 12, 1939.
COL. AMEN: Did each of these conferences take place on the same day?
LAHOUSEN: The discussions in the Führer’s train took place on the same day: September 12, 1939.
COL. AMEN: And was there more than one conference on that day? Were they split into several conferences?
LAHOUSEN: One cannot really call them conferences; they were discussions, conversations, of varying duration.
COL. AMEN: And who was present on this occasion?
LAHOUSEN: Present, regardless of location and time, were the following: Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop; Keitel, the Chief of the OKW; Jodl, head of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; Canaris; and myself.
COL. AMEN: Do you see Ribbentrop in this courtroom?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you indicate for the record where he is sitting?
LAHOUSEN: Over there. [Indicating.] In the first row, third from the left.
COL. AMEN: Do you also see Keitel in the courtroom?
LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is next to Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: Do you also see Jodl in the courtroom?
LAHOUSEN: Yes; he is in the second row, next to Herr Von Papen.
COL. AMEN: Now, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you please explain, in as much detail as possible, to the Tribunal, exactly what was said and what took place at this conference in the Führer’s train?
LAHOUSEN: First of all, Canaris had a short talk with Ribbentrop, in which the latter explained the general political aims with regard to Poland and in connection with the Ukrainian question. The Chief of the OKW took up the Ukrainian question in subsequent discussions which took place in his private carriage. These are recorded in the files which I immediately prepared on Canaris’ order. While we were still in the carriage of the Chief of the OKW, Canaris expressed his serious misgivings regarding the proposed bombardment of Warsaw, of which he knew. Canaris stressed the devastating repercussions which this bombardment would have in the foreign political field. The Chief of the OKW, Keitel, replied that these measures had been agreed upon directly by the Führer and Göring, and that he, Keitel, had had no influence on these decisions. I quote Keitel’s own words here—naturally only after re-reading my notes. Keitel said: “The Führer and Göring are in frequent telephone communication; sometimes I also hear something of what was said, but not always.”
Secondly, Canaris very urgently warned against the measures which had come to his knowledge, namely the proposed shootings and extermination measures directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy, and in fact all elements which could be regarded as leaders of a national resistance. Canaris said at that time—I am quoting his approximate words: “One day the world will also hold the Wehrmacht, under whose eyes these events occurred, responsible for such methods.”
The Chief of the OKW replied—and this is also based on my notes, which I re-read a few days ago—that these things had been decided upon by the Führer, and that the Führer, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had let it be known that, should the Armed Forces be unwilling to carry through these measures, or should they not agree with them, they would have to accept the presence at their side of the SS, the SIPO and similar units who would carry them through. A civilian official would then be appointed to function with each military commander. This, in outlines, was our discussion on the proposed shooting and extermination measures in Poland.
COL. AMEN: Was anything said about a so-called “political housecleaning”?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, the Chief of the OKW used an expression which was certainly derived from Hitler and which characterized these measures as “political housecleaning”. I recall this expression very clearly, even without the aid of my notes.
COL. AMEN: In order that the record may be perfectly clear, exactly what measures did Keitel say had already been agreed upon?
LAHOUSEN: According to the Chief of the OKW, the bombardment of Warsaw and the shooting of the categories of people which I mentioned before had been agreed upon already.
COL. AMEN: And what were they?
LAHOUSEN: Mainly the Polish intelligentsia, the nobility, the clergy, and, of course, the Jews.
COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said about possible cooperation with a Ukrainian group?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris was ordered by the Chief of the OKW, who stated that he was transmitting a directive which he had apparently received from Ribbentrop since he spoke of it in connection with the political plans of the Foreign Minister, to instigate in the Galician Ukraine an uprising aimed at the extermination of Jews and Poles.
COL. AMEN: At what point did Hitler and Jodl enter this meeting?
LAHOUSEN: Hitler and Jodl entered either after the discussions I have just described or towards the conclusion of the whole discussion of this subject, when Canaris had already begun his report on the situation in the West; that is, on the news which had meanwhile come in on the reaction of the French Army at the West Wall.
COL. AMEN: And what further discussions took place then?
LAHOUSEN: After this discussion in the private carriage of the Chief of the OKW, Canaris left the coach and had another short talk with Ribbentrop, who, returning to the subject of the Ukraine, told him once more that the uprising should be so staged that all farms and dwellings of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed.
COL. AMEN: Who said that?
LAHOUSEN: The Foreign Minister of that time, Ribbentrop, said that to Canaris. I was standing next to him.
COL. AMEN: Is there any slightest doubt in your mind about that?
LAHOUSEN: No. I have not the slightest doubt about that. I remember with particular clarity the somewhat new phrasing that “all farms and dwellings should go up in flames”. Previously there had only been talk of “liquidation” and “elimination.”
COL. AMEN: Was there any note in Canaris’ diary which helped to refresh your recollection on that point also?
LAHOUSEN: No.
COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was said on the subject of France?
LAHOUSEN: On the subject of France a discussion took place in the carriage of the Chief of the OKW, in which Canaris described the situation in the West on the basis of Abwehr reports, and said that in his opinion a great attack was being prepared by the French in the sector of Saarbrücken. Hitler, who had entered the room in the meantime, intervened, took charge of the discussion, rejected in a lively manner the opinion which Canaris had just expressed, and put forward arguments which, looking back now, I must recognize as factually correct.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether, in the course of this conference, Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?
LAHOUSEN: During the conversation, which was taking place in the private coach of the Chief of the OKW, Ribbentrop was not present.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall whether at any time in the course of the conferences Ribbentrop said anything about the Jews?
LAHOUSEN: I repeat, in this discussion, which took place in the coach, no.
COL. AMEN: For purposes of keeping the record straight, whenever you have referred to the Chief of the OKW, you were referring to Keitel?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Was the Wehrmacht ever asked to furnish any assistance for the Polish campaign?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did that undertaking have any special name?
LAHOUSEN: As is recorded in the diary of my division the name of this undertaking which took place just before the Polish campaign, was “Undertaking Himmler”.
COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the assistance required?
LAHOUSEN: The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr. A few days, or sometime before—I believe it was the middle of August—the precise date can be found in the diary of the division—Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II, were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment, such as identification cards and so on, for an Undertaking Himmler. This request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned.
COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated?
LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler, however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive uniforms from us.
COL. AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the Abwehr?
LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and one day some man from the SS or the SD—the name is given in the official war diary of the division—collected them.
COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how this Polish material was to be used?
LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that.
COL. AMEN: Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what in fact had happened?
LAHOUSEN: The actual course of events was the following: When the first Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of Polish units on German territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communiqué in his hand, and reading it aloud, observed that now we knew why our uniforms had been needed. On the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly General Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had occurred and what had happened—actually we could well imagine it, but we did not know how it was carried out—I cannot even today say exactly what happened.
COL. AMEN: Did you ever find out what happened to the men from the concentration camps who wore the Polish uniforms and created the incident?
LAHOUSEN: It is strange. This matter has always held my interest, and even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters with an SS Hauptsturmführer—he was a Viennese—in the hospital in which both of us were staying, and I asked him for details on what had taken place. The man—his name was Birckel—told me: “It is odd, that even our circles heard of this matter only very much later, and then only by intimation.” He added: “So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in that action were put out of the way, that is, killed.” That was the last I heard of this matter.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall attending a meeting in 1940 at which the name of Weygand was under discussion?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you happen to recall the particular month in which this discussion took place?
LAHOUSEN: The discussion took place in the winter of 1940, either in November or December, as far as I recall. I have recorded the precise date in my personal notes, with the knowledge and desire of Canaris.
COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, who was present?
LAHOUSEN: The three divisional chiefs and the Chief of the Ausland Division, Admiral Bürckner, were present nearly every day during the daily conference on the situation.
COL. AMEN: What were you told at this meeting by Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: In this discussion Canaris revealed to us that already for some considerable time Keitel had put pressure on him to arrange for the elimination of the French Marshal, Weygand; and that naturally I—that is my division—would be charged with the execution of this task.
COL. AMEN: When you say “elimination”, what do you mean?
LAHOUSEN: Killing.
COL. AMEN: What was Weygand doing at this time?
LAHOUSEN: Weygand was, so far as I recall, in North Africa at that time.
COL. AMEN: What was the reason given for attempting to kill Weygand?
LAHOUSEN: The reason given was the fear that Weygand together with the unconquered part of the French Army might form a center of resistance in North Africa. That, in the main, was the reason, as far as I remember today; it may be that there were other contributing factors.
COL. AMEN: After you were so informed by Canaris, what else was said at this meeting?
LAHOUSEN: This request which was first put to the military Abwehr so openly and in such an undisguised form by a representative of the Armed Forces, was decidedly and indignantly rejected by all those present. I, myself, as the person most involved, since my division was expected to carry out this task, indicated flatly before all present that I had not the slightest intention of executing this order. My division and my officers are prepared to fight but they are neither a murderers’ organization nor murderers.
COL. AMEN: What then did Canaris say?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris said: “Calm down. We’ll have a word together later,” or something to that effect.
COL. AMEN: Did you then talk it over later with Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: When the other gentlemen had left the room, I spoke with Canaris alone and he told me immediately: “It is quite obvious that this order will not only not be carried out, but it will not even be communicated to anybody else,” and that, in fact, happened.
COL. AMEN: Were you subsequently questioned as to whether you had carried out this order?
LAHOUSEN: On one occasion when Canaris was reporting to Keitel, and I was present, Keitel mentioned the subject to me, and asked me what had happened or what had been done in this matter up to now. The date of this incident was recorded in my notes, on Canaris’ suggestion and with his knowledge.
COL. AMEN: What reply did you make to Keitel?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot, of course, recall my precise words, but one thing is certain; I did not answer that I had no intention of carrying out this order. That I could not tell him, and did not tell him; otherwise, I would not be sitting here today. Probably, as in many similar cases, I replied that it was very difficult but everything possible would be done, or something of that sort. Naturally, I cannot recall my precise words.
COL. AMEN: Incidentally, are you the only one of this intimate Canaris group who is still alive today?
LAHOUSEN: I believe I am at least one of the very few. Possibly Pieckenbrock is still alive; perhaps Bentivegni, who, however, did not belong to the inner circle. Most of the others were liquidated as a result of the events on July 20.
COL. AMEN: I have another subject to take up now. In 1941 did you attend a conference at which General Reinecke was present?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Who was General Reinecke?
LAHOUSEN: General Reinecke was at that time Chief of the General Wehrmacht Department, which was part of the OKW.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall the approximate date of that meeting?
LAHOUSEN: It was roughly in the summer of 1941, shortly after the beginning of the Russian campaign; approximately in July.
COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection, will you state exactly who was present at that conference?
LAHOUSEN: At this conference, which is also recorded in the notes taken for Canaris, and in which I participated as his representative, the following were present:
General Reinecke as the presiding officer, Obergruppenführer Müller of the RSHA, Colonel Breuer representing the Prisoners of War Department, and I, as the representative of Canaris, of Ausland-Abwehr.
COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Müller was and why he was at this meeting?
LAHOUSEN: Müller was a division chief in the Reich Central Office of Security (RSHA), and took part in the session because he was responsible for putting into practice the measures for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, that is, responsible for carrying out the executions.
COL. AMEN: Will you explain who Colonel Breuer was and why he was there?
LAHOUSEN: Colonel Breuer was the representative of the Prisoners of War Department. I do not know of which organization this department was a part at that time. At any rate, he was responsible in the OKW for questions relating to prisoners of war.
COL. AMEN: What was the purpose of this conference?
LAHOUSEN: The purpose of this conference was to examine the orders issued for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, to comment on them, to explain and account for them on reasonable grounds.
COL. AMEN: Did you learn from the conversation at this conference what the substance of these orders under discussion was?
LAHOUSEN: These orders dealt with two groups of measures which were to be taken. Firstly, the killing of Russian commissars, and secondly, the killing of all those elements among the Russian prisoners of war who, under a special selection program of the SD, could be identified as thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives of the Bolshevist ideology.
COL. AMEN: Did you also learn from the conversation what the basis for these orders was?
LAHOUSEN: The basis for these orders was explained by General Reinecke in its outlines as follows:
The war between Germany and Russia is not a war between two states or two armies, but between two ideologies—namely, the National Socialist and the Bolshevist ideology. The Red Army soldier must not be looked upon as a soldier in the sense of the word applying to our western opponents, but as an ideological enemy. He must be regarded as the archenemy of National Socialism, and must be treated accordingly.
COL. AMEN: Did Canaris tell you why he was selecting you to go to this conference?
LAHOUSEN: Canaris gave me two or perhaps three reasons and motives for ordering me to this conference although he himself was in Berlin. Firstly, he wanted to avoid a meeting with Reinecke, for whom, as the prototype of the ever-compliant National Socialist general, he possessed strong personal dislike. Secondly, he told and directed me to attempt through factual argument—that is, through appeals to reason—to have this brutal and completely senseless order rescinded or at least mitigated in its effects as far as possible. He also selected me for tactical reasons since he, as department chief, could by no means be as outspoken as I, who, thanks to my subordinate position, could use much stronger language. Thirdly, he was well acquainted with my personal attitude, especially in this question, an attitude which I manifested wherever possible during my many journeys and trips to the front where I witnessed ill-treatment of prisoners of war. This is also clearly recorded in my notes.
COL. AMEN: Did Canaris and the other members of your group have a particular name for Reinecke?
LAHOUSEN: Not only among our group but also in other circles, he was known as the “little Keitel” or the “other Keitel”.
COL. AMEN: Prior to your going to this conference, did Canaris make any other comment on these orders?
LAHOUSEN: Even at the time when these orders were issued, Canaris expressed strong opposition to them in our circles—when I say our circles, I mean mainly the divisional chiefs—and had a protest made through the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. I no longer remember whether it was made in writing or whether Bürckner made it orally to Keitel directly; I think it was done in both ways. Bürckner should be well informed about this.
COL. AMEN: When you say “protested through Bürckner,” what do you mean?
LAHOUSEN: When I say Bürckner, I mean his division, or a group, or perhaps even a representative in his office, where questions of international law were dealt with by Count Moltke who, incidentally, also among the circle. . . .
COL. AMEN: Will you repeat that?
LAHOUSEN: This protest or this counter-argument on the question of the treatment of Russian prisoners of war was forwarded by Canaris through the Ausland Division, that is, through Bürckner. The Ausland Division included a section which dealt with questions of international law, and the competent authority in that section was Count Moltke who was a member of Oster’s inner circle, and who was executed after the 20th of July.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Until 2 o’clock.
[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]