Afternoon Session
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, when the Court adjourned I had just come to the point at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th of May 1940 when the Germans invaded these three small countries without any warning—a violation which, the Prosecution submits, it is clear from the documents had been planned and decided upon months before.
My Lord, before I close this part of the case, may I refer to three documents in conclusion. My Lord, the invasion having taken place at 4:30 in the morning in each of the three countries, the German Ambassadors called upon representatives of the three governments some hours later and handed in a document which was similar in each case and which is described as a memorandum or an ultimatum. My Lord, an account of what happened in Belgium is set out in our Document TC-58, which is about five documents from the end of the bundle. It is headed, “Extract from Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened 1939-1940,” and I hand in an original copy, certified by the Belgian Government, which is Exhibit GB-111.
My Lord, might I read short extracts? I read the third paragraph:
“From 4:30 a.m. information was received which left no shadow of doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the east. At 5 o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands’ airdromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle station.”
My Lord, then I think I can go to two paragraphs lower down:
“At 8:30 a.m. the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak”—that is the Belgian Minister—“stopped him: ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just attacked our country. This is the second time in 25 years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by her on October 13th 1937 and renewed spontaneously at the beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany for which there is no justification whatever will deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished.’ ”
Then I think I shall omit the next paragraph: “The Ambassador read the note . . . .” And in the last paragraph:
“In the middle of this communication M. Spaak, who had by his side the Secretary-General, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document,’ he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had just made.”
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read what the Ambassador read.
MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry. I was thinking of the next document I was going to read. I read the last paragraph on the first page:
“The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought:
“ ‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to make the following declaration:
“ ‘In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the Reich are compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose the Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the greatest size so that resistance of any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantee Belgium’s European and colonial territory as well as her dynasty on condition that no resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of her country and the loss of her independence. It is, therefore, in the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to cease all resistance and that the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military Command.’ ”
My Lord, the so-called ultimatum handed in some hours after the invasion had started is Document TC-57, which is the last document but three in the bundle. It is the document I handed in and it becomes Exhibit GB-112. My Lord, it is a long document and I will read to the Tribunal such parts as the Tribunal thinks advisable:
“The Reich Government”—it begins—“have for a long time had no doubts as to what was the chief aim of British and French war policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other countries and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.
“The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last minute action which upset this project. Germany has furnished documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.
“Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the retreat . . . from Norway was still going on, the English Prime Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before their own people and before the world, and partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.
“In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another purpose. It was nothing but a diversion maneuver in grand style to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government have long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr.
“Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being, of course, understood that these two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.
“Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, do you think it is necessary to read this in full?
MR. ROBERTS: No, I don’t. I was going to summarize these charges. If your Lordship would be good enough to look at the bottom of the first page, you will see the so-called ultimatum complaining of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and Netherlands press; and then, My Lord, in the second paragraph over the page there is an allegation of the attempts of the British Intelligence to bring a revolution in Germany with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands.
Then, My Lord, in Paragraph 3 reference is made to military preparation of the two countries; and in Paragraph 4 it is pointed out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian-German frontier.
A complaint is made in regard to Holland in Paragraph 5 that British aircraft have flown over the Netherlands’ country.
There are, My Lord, other charges made against the neutrality of these two countries although no instances are given. I don’t think I need refer to anything on Page 3 of the document.
Page 4, My Lord—I would like, if I might, to read the middle paragraph:
“In this struggle for existence, forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government are not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the other Netherlands into German territory.”
And, My Lord, I just emphasize this sentence and then I read no further:
“They have, therefore, now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich.”
My Lord, it is unnecessary, in my submission, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. The world now knows that for months preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This document is saying the orders to do so have now been issued.
My Lord, a similar document, similar in terms altogether was handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; My Lord, TC-60—that will be GB-113, which is the last document but one in the bundle. My Lord, that is a memorandum to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands.
My Lord, I only desire to emphasize the second paragraph of TC-60:
“In defense against the imminent attack the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries . . . .”
My Lord, the last document, TC-59, which I formerly put in, that is GB-111.
My Lord, that is the dignified protest of the Belgian Government against the crime which was committed against her. My Lord, those are the facts supporting the charges of the violation of treaties and assurances against these three countries and supporting the allegation of the making of an aggressive war against them. My Lord, in the respectful submission of the Prosecution here the story is a very plain, a very simple one, a story of perfidy, dishonor, and shame.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, it is my task to present the evidence on the wars of aggression and wars in breach of treaties against Greece and Yugoslavia. The evidence which I shall put in to the Tribunal has been prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Lieutenant Colonel Krucker.
The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place in the early hours of the morning of the 6th of April 1941, constituted direct breaches of the Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Those breaches are charged, respectively, at Paragraphs I and XIII of Appendix C of the Indictment. Both have already been put in by my learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who also explained the obligation of the German Government to the Governments of Yugoslavia and Greece under those pacts.
In the case of Yugoslavia the invasion further constituted a breach of an express assurance by the Nazis, which is charged at Paragraph XXVI of Appendix C. This assurance was originally given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on the 28th of April 1938 but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on the 6th of October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag, and it is in respect of this last occasion that the assurance is specifically pleaded in the Indictment.
May I ask the Tribunal to turn now to the first document in the document book, which is Book Number 5. The first document is 2719-PS, which is part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-58. This is the text of the German Foreign Office release on the 28th of April 1938, and I would read the beginning and then the last paragraph but one on the page:
“Berlin, the 28th of April 1938. The State Secretary of the German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives.
“As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as final and inviolable. On this point the following special declarations have been made . . . .”
And then to the last paragraph:
“3. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on the 3rd of April of that year the Führer and Chancellor stated that in regard to the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them.”
Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book, TC-92, and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a speech made by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the extract in full:
“The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural, and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’ present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time, on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.
“In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which—and of this I am convinced—in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work.”
As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already decided upon the European war. I think I am right in saying it was a week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known as the Schmundt note, to which the Tribunal has been referred more than once. The reference to “nerve-racked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months.
Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Paragraph XXVI as the assurance breached; it is the next document in the bundle, TC-43—German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of October 1939. It is part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-80. This is an extract from the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik:
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her.”
Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and under the assurances which I have read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know, been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of August 1939.
We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77. That document has already been put in as GB-48; and the passages to which I would draw Your Lordship’s attention already have been quoted, I think, by my learned friend, the Attorney General. Those passages are on Page 2 in the last paragraph from “Generally speaking . . .” until “. . . neutral of this kind,” and then again on Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted by the Attorney General and emphasized particularly by Colonel Griffith-Jones at the foot of Page 7 on the second day of the meeting, the words beginning “In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners . . .” to “. . . Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the West.”
Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might sum up the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as a whole, it shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only 2 months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade the Italians to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany commences hostilities against Poland, as Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano, while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war.
Despite all the persuasion which Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy maintained her position and did not enter the war when the Germans invaded Poland, while the Germans themselves were not yet ready to strike in the Balkans. It was just for this reason that on the 6th of October through Hitler’s speech they repeated the assurance they had given in April 1938. It is, of course, a matter of history that after the defeat of the Allied armies in May and June 1940 the Italian Government declared war on France and that subsequently at 3 o’clock in the morning of the 28th October 1940 the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government with a 3 hours’ ultimatum upon the expiry of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece.
If I may quote to the Tribunal the words in which His Majesty’s Minister reported that event, “The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: You have referred to a document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not in any of my documents. It is merely carrying the story to the next document:
“The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding place in Greek history, and whatever the future may bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war, and his courage in resisting without demur the Italian ultimatum when delivered in the small hours of that October morning will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated, and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.”
I turn now to the next document in the bundle. That is 2762-PS, a letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which I put in as GB-115. Although not dated, I think it is clear from the contents that it was written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece. It has been quoted in full by the Attorney General, but I think it would assist the Tribunal if I read just the last two paragraphs of the extract:
“Yugoslavia must become disinterested if possible, however, from our point of view interested in co-operating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans.
“Unfortunately I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore any threatening move towards Yugoslavia would be useless since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian General Staff. Therefore Yugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.”
You may think the reference in the first two lines to his thoughts—having been with Mussolini for the last 14 days—probably indicates that it was written in about the middle of November, shortly after the Italian attack.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Italian attack?
COL. PHILLIMORE: 28th October 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
COL. PHILLIMORE: As the Tribunal will see from the succeeding document, it was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. This letter shows that it was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to co-operate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude toward the liquidation of the other Balkan states.
I pass now to the next document in the bundle, 444-PS, which becomes Exhibit GB-116. It is a top-secret directive issued from the Führer’s headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by the Defendant Jodl, and dated the 12th of November 1940. I will read the first two lines and then pass to Paragraph 4 on the third page:
“Directive Number 18. The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines . . .”
Omitting the serious dealings with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, I will read Paragraph 4 on the third page:
“Balkans . . . The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German Air Force units against targets in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Romanian oil area.
“In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for moving these forces into position.
“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Romania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the southeast Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria in accordance with the intended ground operations.”
I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next document in the bundle, 1541-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit GB-117, is the directive issued for the actual attack on Greece. Before reading it, it might be convenient if I summarized the position of the Italian invading forces at that time as this is one of the factors mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put it very shortly. I again use the words in which His Majesty’s Minister reported:
“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Taranto and in the western desert have done much to maintain it.
“With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient traditions of their country and that they, like their distant forefathers, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom.”
In fact the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly this directive was issued on 13 December 1940; it is top-secret Directive Number 20 for the Operation Marita. The distribution included, of course, the Commander of the Navy, that would, of course, be the Defendant Raeder; one to the Commander of the Air Force, which would be the Defendant Göring; one to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; and one to the Command Staff, which I take it, would be the Defendant Jodl. I shall read the first two paragraphs and then summarize the next two, if I may:
“The result in the battles of Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front—which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Romanian oil fields—be foiled.
“My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in southern Romania within the next months (b) after the setting in of favorable weather—probably in March—to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of Bulgaria and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.”
The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and Paragraph 4 deals with the Operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:
“The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all the necessary measures by the High Command. The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Romania will be reported step by step by the High Command of the Armed Forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Romania. Consultations with the Romanians or the Bulgarians which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.”
I think I need not trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next document, 448-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-118, is again a top-secret directive carrying the plan a little further; it deals with decidedly different aspects, the direct support of the Italian forces in Albania. I read, if I may, the first short paragraph and then the paragraph at the foot of the page.
“The situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations demands German assistance for strategical, political, and psychological reasons due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.”
And in Paragraph 3 after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania the directive sets out what the duties of the German forces will be:
“a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case should new crises arise there.
“b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:
“To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation.
“To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s army.”
That directive was signed by Hitler and, as can be seen on the original which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl. Here again, of course, a copy went to the Defendant Raeder, and I take it that the copy sent to foreign intelligence would probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop.
I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which becomes Exhibit GB-119. This records a conference which took place on the 19th and 20th of January between the Defendant Keitel and the Italian General Guzzoni and which was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at which the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present.
I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the Italians, but if you would pass to Page 3 of the document, there is a paragraph there in the speech, which the Führer made, which is perhaps just worth reading—the speech by the Führer on the 20th of January 1941, in the middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech was made after the conference with the Italians and then shows who was present.
On the German side I would call your attention to the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff. That is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl; and on the Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then three generals. It is the last paragraph that I would wish to read:
“The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose:
“a. An operation against Greece;
“b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;
“c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Romania.
“Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces; altogether, therefore, very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.
“Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.”
I pass to the next document, 1746-PS, which I offer as GB-120. That document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians on the 8th of February. The second part and the third part deal with later events, and I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate time. I would read the first and the last paragraphs on the first page of this document:
“Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German High Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war.”
And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being concerted with the Bulgarians—Paragraph 3:
“The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned.
“The representatives of the two general staffs consider it suitable to inform their governments that it will be advisable of necessity to take secrecy and surprise into consideration when the Three Power Treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to assure the success of the military operations.”
I pass then to the next document, C-59. I offer that as Exhibit GB-121. It is a further top-secret directive of the 19th of February. I need not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the date for the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the Danube is to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed on the 2d of March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of February at the latest.
It is perhaps worth noting that on the original which I have put in, the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant Keitel.
It is perhaps just worth setting out the position of Bulgaria at this moment. Bulgaria adhered to the Three Power Pact on the 1st of March . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
COL. PHILLIMORE: In 1941, and on the same day the entry of German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and the directives to which I have referred the Tribunal.
The landing of British troops in Greece on the 3rd of March in accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His Majesty’s Government may have accelerated the movement of the German forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time.
I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which I put in as GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy, but the original which I have put in shows that both the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were present at the interview with Hitler which this extract records. It is a short extract from a report by the Defendant Raeder on an interview with Hitler in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German intention.
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement.
“Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.”
The above document . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at 1600 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows, it is submitted, that the Nazi conspirators in accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinterested had made every preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better of their Italian allies.
They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia towards which their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting victim. On the 25th of March 1941 in accordance with this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetković and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markovic to the Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on the 25th of March. On this occasion the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance, which are set out in the next document in the bundle, 2450-PS, which I put in as GB-123. If I might read from half-way down the page:
“Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.
“At the same time when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the Governments of the Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following identical notes:
“ ‘Mr. Prime Minister:
“ ‘In the name of the German Government and at their behest I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:
“ ‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirm their determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’ ”
That letter was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, who you will remember, was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. In fact it was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade Yugoslavia and 2 days after the letter was written that they issued the necessary order.
If I might read the second letter:
“Mr. Prime Minister:
“With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection with the entry of Yugoslavia into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet”—Reichsregierung—“that in the agreement between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government the Governments of the Axis Powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory.”
The position at this stage, the 25th of March 1941, was therefore, that German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter to Mussolini, “become disinterested” in the cleaning-up of the Greek question.
The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact appears very clearly from the next document in the bundle, 2765-PS, which I put in as GB-124. It is an extract from the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might just read the first paragraph:
“The Führer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed military action against Greece, for if one considers that for 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an extremely foolhardy venture.”
Again it is a matter of history that on the night of the 26th of March, when the two Yugoslav Ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic and his colleagues effected their removal by a coup d’état; and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March ready to defend, if need be, her independence. The Yugoslav people had found themselves.
The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on.
I ask the Tribunal to turn back to 1746-PS, which I put in as GB-120, to the second part on Page 3 of the document consisting of a record of a conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia dated 27th of March 1941.
It shows that those present included the Führer; the Reich Marshal, that is of course, the Defendant Göring; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab, that is the Defendant Jodl. Then over the page—“later on the following persons were added.” I call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that those who came in later included the Defendant Ribbentrop.
If I might read the part of Hitler’s statement set out on Page 4:
“The Führer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the coup d’état. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-Germans.”
I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:
“The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country’s attitude towards us. For if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.”
And then the next paragraph to which I would particularly draw the Tribunal’s attention:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.
“It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Romania’s main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian Ministers have already been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed to the Duce.
“Politically it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In this way Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
“This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest time.”
Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that third paragraph—2 days after the pact had been signed and the assurances given—because there has been a coup d’état and it is just possible that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia is decided upon without any question of taking the trouble to ascertain the views of the new government.
Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of the document, which I would like to read:
“5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in attacks by waves . . . .”
I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this bombing was done when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 o’clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th.
THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April?
COL. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April.
Then again still in the same document, the last part of it, Part V at Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by the Defendant Jodl and I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, Page 6:
“In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.”
I read that because the plan is issued from the office of the Defendant Jodl.
Now passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I put that in as Exhibit GB-125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the 27th of March recorded in 1746-PS, Part II. It is worth reading the first paragraph:
“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.”
I pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in evidence as GB-126. It is an original telegram containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of the course decided on and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce is given his orders. If I might read the first five paragraphs:
“Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from it.
“(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front.
“(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.
“(3) I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole position.
“(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces.
“These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising.
“I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed.
“(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known . . . .”
Then he goes on to emphasize further the importance of secrecy.
I pass to R-95; the next document in the bundle, which I put in as Exhibit GB-127. It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney General. It is an operational order signed by General Von Brauchitsch which is merely passing to the armies the orders contained in Directive Number 25, which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in as Exhibit GB-125. I won’t trouble the Tribunal with reading it.
I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as GB-114. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this morning, the 6th of April, on which Hitler issued the proclamation from which this passage is an extract:
“From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theater of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes.
“The documents published today afford”—that refers to the German White Book which they published of all the documents leading up to the invasion—“The documents published today afford a glimpse of a practice which in accordance with very old British recipes is a constant attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British interests.
“In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that (2) we shall never as in the World War tolerate a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a given time, of being able to advance thence from the southeast into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south.”
Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal’s particular attention:
“In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that once took place between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and various nations allied to Germany.”
One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August of 1939 and the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a few days earlier.
I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as Exhibit USA-34. It is a record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November 1943. At Page 4 there is a short passage which sets out his views two and a half years later on the action taken in April 1941. I refer to Paragraph 11 on Page 4:
“What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the north was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Romanian oil area from that country.”
If I might summarize the story:
The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that the German forces might have an unsuspecting victim.
In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to secure her co-operation for the offensive against Greece or at least to ensure that she would abstain from any interference.
The coup d’état of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then decided that irrespective of whether or not his government had any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated.
It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia’s intentions when it would be so little trouble now that the German troops were deployed to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. Accordingly in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece simultaneously with the formality of handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin informing him that the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same reply as in the preceding October.
That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia. But as I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like, if the Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I can do it, I think, in 5 minutes.
It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which was used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis themselves but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.
The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a military operation before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th and to the Norwegian Minister between half past 4 and 5 on that morning.
The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than 5 o’clock, in most cases earlier in the small hours of the 10th of May, while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and explanations was not presented until afterwards.
In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already been bombed that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until 8.
The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of the 28th of October in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a 3-hour ultimatum to General Metaxas.
The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both began in the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler—a proclamation from which I read an extract—at 5 o’clock that Sunday morning some 2 hours before Belgrade was bombed.
In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 20 minutes past 5 that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory.
The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is in itself further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the state which has no respect for its own pledged word nor for the rights of any people but its own.
One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short adjournment? That’s what you were intending to do?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We’ll adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall take about 15 minutes to offer two further documents relating to the aggression against Austria.
These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book, supplement to Document Book N. Both documents are correspondence of the British Foreign Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy of our British colleagues.
First I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA-127. This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador Nevile Henderson at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It reads:
“My Lord:
“With reference to your telegram Number 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron Von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening.
“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron Von Neurath at the same time.”
The enclosure is the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
“Dear Reich Minister:
“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, inter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists and the readmission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.
“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent state in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.
“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.”
I now offer Document 3287-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-128. This consists of a transmittal from the British Embassy, Berlin, to the British Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath’s letter of response dated 12 March 1938. The letter is identified in the document with the letter “L”.
First the Defendant Von Neurath objected to the fact that the British Government were undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his letter:
“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that the Royal British Government have no right to assume the role of a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German Government never left any doubt with the Royal British Government that the formation of relations between Germany and Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern of the German people and that it did not affect a third power.”
Then in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events. I quote the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the English translation I start at the bottom of Page 1 of the letter:
“Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced on the evening of the 9th of March the surprising and arbitrary resolution decided on by himself to hold an election within a few days which, under the prevailing circumstances and especially according to the details provided for the execution of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically the predominant majority of the population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore a crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about this development. Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former Chancellor that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government urgently asking for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.
“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the attitude of the German Government as asserted in your letter could lead to some unforseeable reactions. A complete picture of the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise its influence contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of self-government of the German people.”
That ends the quotation.
Now in the light of the evidence which has already been presented to the Tribunal, this version of the events given by the Defendant Von Neurath is a hollow mockery of the truth.
We have learned, from the portions quoted from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit Number USA-72, Jodl’s diary, the entry for March 10, 1938, the fact that Von Neurath was taking over the duties of the Foreign Office while Ribbentrop was detained in London, that the Führer wished to send an ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet, that he had dispatched a letter to Mussolini of his reasons for taking action, and that army mobilization orders were given.
We have seen the true facts about the ultimatum from two different documents. I refer to 812-PS, Exhibit Number USA-61, report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Bürckel, dated 6 July 1939, which was transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on 22 August 1939. The portions reporting on the events of March 11 have already been read to the Tribunal.
I also refer to Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, the transcripts of Göring’s telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I have already read to the Tribunal.
These documents emphatically show and with unmistakable clarity, that the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the Austrian Government that they would send troops across the border if Schuschnigg did not resign and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were not appointed Chancellor.
These documents also show that the impetus of the famous telegram came from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Göring composed the telegram and Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but merely said “agreed.”
The transcript of Göring’s telephone call to Ribbentrop is indicated as Part W of that document. In it the formula was developed and recited for English consumption that there had been no ultimatum and that the German troops crossed the border in response only to the telegram.
And now in this document from which I have just read we find the same bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant Von Neurath. He was at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of which we have the Hossbach minutes, Exhibit USA-25. And so he knew very well the firmly held Nazi ideas with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia. And yet in the period after March 10, 1938 when he was handling the foreign affairs for this conspiracy and particularly after the invasion of Austria, he played out his part in making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr. Mastny regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27, Exhibit GB-21.
And we see him here still handling foreign affairs, although using the letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council as the exhibit shows, reciting this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian situation, a story also encountered by us in the transcript of the Göring-Ribbentrop telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims of what we call the conspiracy.
Now, if the Tribunal please, it might have been fitting and appropriate for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan and the attack on the United States on this December 7, 1945, the fourth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our plan was to proceed chronologically so that part of the case must wait its turn for the presentation next week.
We now come to the climax of this amazing story of wars of aggression, perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history, when Hitler’s intuition led him and his associates to launch an aggressive war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In my last appearance before the Tribunal I presented an account of the aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime our British colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formulation of the plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initiation of actual aggressive war. In addition they have laid before the Tribunal the story of the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression involving the planning and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece; and in doing so the British Prosecution has marshalled and presented to the Court various international treaties, agreements, and assurances, and the evidence establishing the breaching of those treaties and assurances.
I should like to present to the Tribunal now the account of the last but one of the defendants’ acts of aggression, the invasion of the U.S.S.R. The section of the Indictment in which this crime is charged is Count One, Section IV (F), Paragraph 6, German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the U.S.S.R. territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. The first sentence of this paragraph is the one with which we shall be concerned today. It reads:
“On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby beginning a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.”
The documents having a bearing on this phase of the case are contained in document book marked “P,” which we now hand to the Court.
First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a point of departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet Union, I should like to take the date 23 August 1939. On that date just a week before the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. which is referred to in this section of the Indictment which I have just quoted. This treaty, Document Number TC-25, will be introduced in evidence by our British colleagues, but it contains two articles which I should like to bring to the attention of the Tribunal. Article I provides as follows:
“The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.”
Article V provides that, should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration commissions.
It is well to keep these solemn pledges in mind during the course of the story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the German Government by the Defendant Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as somewhat of a surprise to the world since it appeared to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation for this about-face has been provided, however, by no less eminent a witness than the Defendant Ribbentrop himself in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely personal information. This report we now have. It is Number 1834-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-129, the original German document.
On Page 2 of the English translation, Ribbentrop tells Oshima the reason for the pact with the U.S.S.R. That is Page 2 of the German:
“Then when it came to war the Führer decided on a compromise with Russia—as a necessity for avoiding a two-front war.”
In view of the spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazis in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggression, it is not very surprising to find that they regarded it as they did all treaties and pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is evidenced by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was still in progress they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.
In a speech to Reichs- and Gauleiter at Munich in November 1943, which is set forth in our Document L-172 already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-34, the Defendant Jodl admitted—and I shall read from Page 7 of the English translation, which is at Page 15 of the original German text:
“Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and of late, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the Führer himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible.”
At the time this decision was made, however, the Western campaign was still in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiègne, and the campaign in the West with the exception of the war against Britain came to an end. The view that Germany’s key to political and economic domination lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor and in the acquisition of Lebensraum at her expense had long been basic in Nazi ideology. As we have seen, this idea had never been completely forgotten even while the war in the West was in progress. Now flushed with the recent success of their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union.
The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both desirable and practical. As early as August of 1940 General Thomas received a hint from the Defendant Göring that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the “Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt” of the OKW.
I should, perhaps, mention that this office is generally referred to in the German documents by the abbreviation Wi Rü.
General Thomas tells of receiving this information from Göring in his draft of a work entitled Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armament Economy, which he prepared during the summer of 1944. This book is our Document 2353-PS and has already been admitted into evidence as Exhibit USA-35. I am sorry, it was marked that for identification purposes. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-35.
On Pages 313 to 315 of this work Thomas discusses the Russo-German Trade Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early in 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at Page 315 he has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940. I read from Page 9 of the English translation:
“On August 14 the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt during a conference with Reich Marshal Göring, was informed that the Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until spring 1941. Later on we were to have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt to give priority to matters concerning Russian war economy.”
I shall refer to this statement again later when I discuss the preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected to be captured. At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which will show that in November of 1940 Göring informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the U.S.S.R.
Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet Union necessarily entailed even these many months in advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet Intelligence Service. Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for.
In an OKW directive signed by the Defendant Jodl and issued to the counter-intelligence service abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered. This directive is our Number 1229-PS and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-130, a photostat of the captured German document. This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared, and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive indicates by implication the extent of the preparations already under way, and I should like to read it to the Tribunal:
“The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.
“These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in the Government General, in the Eastern Provinces and in the Protectorate; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests—especially in the Balkans—with strong forces against Russian seizure.
“For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian Intelligence Service, the following directives apply:
“1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings, et cetera.
“2) The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of troops is in the southern part of the Government, in the Protectorate, and in Austria, and that the massing in the north is relatively unimportant.
“3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.
“4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets.
“5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, et cetera, it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won eastern territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.
“The Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons, et cetera, will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage.
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order of”—signed—“Jodl.”
Early in November of 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline of the Army’s operational plan. This order was contained in a top-secret directive from the Führer’s headquarters, Number 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl. It is Number 444-PS in our numbered series and is already in evidence as Exhibit Number GB-116.
The directive begins by saying:
“The preparatory measures of supreme headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines . . . .”
It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.—and I read now from Page 3, Paragraph Number 5 of the English translation:
“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.
“Instructions on this will follow as soon as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans have been submitted to, and approved by me.”
On the 5th of December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Führer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this conference with Hitler is contained in captured Document Number 1799-PS. This is a folder containing many documents all labeled annexes and all bearing on Fall Barbarossa, the plan against the U.S.S.R. This folder was discovered in the War Diary of the Wehrmachtführungsstab and was apparently an enclosure to that diary.
The report I am here referring to is Annex Number 1 and is dated December 1940.
I now offer in evidence Document Number 1799-PS as United States Exhibit Number 131. I should also like to read into the record a few sentences from the report of 5 December 1940 as they indicate the state of the planning for this act of aggression six and a half months before it occurred.
“Report to the Führer on 5 December 1940.
“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographical fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”
Then skipping:
“The Führer declares that he has agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following:
“The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from withdrawing on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and on the other hand the German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territory. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian Army and to prevent its regeneration. The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way as to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.”
Then, skipping again:
“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.”
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?
MR. ALDERMAN: Very convenient, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we shall not sit in open session tomorrow. We will sit again on Monday at 10 o’clock.