Afternoon Session
MAJOR FARR: In the course of its development from a group of strong-arm bodyguards, some two hundred in number, to a complex organization participating in every field of Nazi endeavor, the SS found room for its members in high places; and persons in high places found for themselves a position in the SS.
Of the defendants charged in the Indictment, seven were very high ranking officers in the SS. They are the Defendants Ribbentrop, Hess, Kaltenbrunner, Bormann, Sauckel, Neurath, and Seyss-Inquart. The vital part that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner played in the SS, in the SD, and in the entire Security Police will be shown by evidence to be presented after the case on the Gestapo has gone in. With respect to the other six defendants whom I have named, I desire to call the Tribunal’s attention now to the fact of their membership in the SS. That fact is rather a matter of judicial notice than proof. Evidence of the fact is to be found in two official publications which I shall now offer the Court.
The first is this black book—the membership list of the SS as of December 1, 1936. This book contains a list of members of the SS arranged according to rank. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-474 (Document Number USA-474). Turning to Page 8 of this book, line 2, we find the following: The name “Hess, Rudolf” followed by the notation, “By authority of the Führer the right to wear the uniform of an SS Obergruppenführer.” I now offer the 1937 edition of the same membership list as Exhibit Number USA-475 (Document Number USA-475). Turning to Page 10, line 50, we find the name “Bormann, Martin”; and in line with his name on the opposite page under the column headed “Gruppenführer,” the following date: 30 January 1937.
In the same edition on Page 12, line 56, appears the name “von Neurath, Constantin,” and on the opposite page under the column headed “Gruppenführer,” the date “18 September 1937.” The other publication to which I refer is Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag for the fourth voting period, a manual edited by E. Kienast, Ministerial Director of the German Reichstag. This is an official handbook containing biographical data as to members of the Reichstag. It is Document Number 2381-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-476. On Page 349 the following appears: “von Ribbentrop, Joachim, Reichsminister des Auswärtigen, SS Obergruppenführer.” On Page 360 the following appears: “Sauckel, Fritz, Gauleiter und Reichsstatthalter in Thüringen, SS Obergruppenführer.” On Page 389 the following appears: “Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, Dr. iur., Reichsminister, SS Obergruppenführer.”
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that book?
MAJOR FARR: This book covers the fourth voting period, beginning on 10 April 1938 and covering the period up to 30 January 1947—that is, the voting period covers that course of years. The edition, I think, was in 1943. I might point out that the rank of the defendants mentioned in the 1936 and 1937 editions of the membership list of the SS may not be the final rank they held. They were Gruppenführer at that time, but they were members of the SS, as shown by the book.
It is our contention that the SS, as defined in Appendix B, Page 36 of the Indictment, was an unlawful organization. As an organization founded on the principle that persons of “German blood” were a “master race” it exemplified a basic Nazi doctrine. It served as one of the means through which the conspirators acquired control of the German Government. The operations of the SD and of the SS Totenkopf Verbände in concentration camps were means used by the conspirators to secure their regime and terrorize their opponents, as alleged in Count One. In the Nazi program of Jewish extermination, all branches of the SS were involved from the very beginning. Through the Allgemeine SS as a para-military organization, the SS Verfügungstruppe and SS Totenkopf Verbände as professional combat forces, and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle as a Fifth Column agency, the SS participated in preparations for aggressive war and, through its militarized units, in the waging of aggressive war in the West and in the East, as set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. In the course of such war all components of the SS had a part in the War Crimes and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment: the murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations in occupied territory, the murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, and the Germanization of occupied territories.
The evidence has shown that the SS was a single enterprise—a unified organization. Some of its functions were, of course performed by one branch or department or office, some by another. No single branch or department participated in every phase of its activity, but every branch and department and office was necessary to the functioning of the whole. The situation is much the same as in the case of the individual defendants at the bar. Not all participated in every act of the conspiracy; but all, we contend, performed a contributing part in the whole criminal scheme.
The evidence has also shown that the SS was not only an organization of volunteers but that applicants had to meet the strictest standards of selection. It was not easy to become an SS member. That was true of all branches of the SS. We clearly recognize, of course, that during the course of the war, as the demands for manpower increased and the losses of the Waffen-SS grew heavier and heavier, there were occasions when some men drafted for compulsory military service were assigned to units of the Waffen-SS rather than to the Wehrmacht. Those instances were relatively few. Evidence of the recruiting standards of the Waffen-SS in 1943, which I quoted yesterday, has shown that the membership in that branch was as essentially voluntary and highly selective as in the other branches. Doubtless some of the members of the SS, or of other organizations alleged to be unlawful in the Indictment, might desire to show that their participation in the organization was a small or innocuous one, that compelling reasons drove them to apply for membership, that they were not fully conscious of its aims or that they were not mentally responsible when they became members. Such facts might or might not be relevant, if such a person were on trial. But in any event this is not the forum to try out such matters.
The question before this Tribunal is simply this: whether the SS was or was not an unlawful organization. The evidence has finally shown what the aims and activities of the SS were. Some of those aims were stated in publications which I have quoted to the Court. The activities were so widespread and so notorious, covering so many fields of unlawful endeavor, that the illegality of the organization could not have been concealed. It was a notorious fact, and Himmler himself in 1936, in a quotation which I read to the Tribunal yesterday, admitted that when he said:
“I know that there are people in Germany now who become sick when they see these black coats. We know the reason and we do not expect to be loved by too many.”
It was, we submit, at all times the exclusive function and purpose of the SS to carry out the common objectives of the defendant conspirators. Its activities in carrying out those functions involved the commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter. By reason of its aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof, the SS should be declared a criminal organization in accordance with Article 9 of the Charter.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next presentation will be the Gestapo, and it will take just a few seconds to get the material here.
If the Tribunal please, we are now ready to proceed, if Your Honors are.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. STOREY: We first pass to the Tribunal document books marked “Exhibit AA.” Your Honors will notice they are in two volumes, and I will try at each time to refer to which volume. They are separated into the D documents, the L documents, the PS documents, et cetera.
The presentation of evidence on the criminality of the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) includes evidence on the criminality of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and of the Schutzstaffeln (SS), which has been discussed by Major Farr, because a great deal of the criminal acts were so inter-related. In the Indictment, as Your Honors know, the SD is included by special reference as a part of the SS, since it originated as a part of the SS and has always retained its character as a Party organization, as distinguished from the Gestapo which was a State organization. As will be shown by the evidence, however, the Gestapo and the SD were brought into very close working relationship, the SD serving primarily as the information-gathering agency and the Gestapo as the executive agency of the police system established by the Nazis for the purpose of combatting the political and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime.
In short, I think, we might think of the SD as the intelligence organization and the Gestapo the executive agency, the former a Party organization and the latter a State organization but merged together for all practical purposes.
The first subject: The Gestapo and SD were formed into a powerful, centralized, political police system that served Party, State, and Nazi leadership.
The Gestapo was first established in Prussia on the 26th of April 1933 by the Defendant Göring with the mission of carrying out the duties of the political police with, or in place of, the ordinary police authorities. The Gestapo was given the rank of a higher police authority and was subordinated only to the Minister of Interior, to whom was delegated the responsibility of determining its functional and territorial jurisdiction. That fact is established in the Preussische Gesetzsammlung of 26 April 1933, Page 122, and it is our Document 2104-PS.
Pursuant to this law and on the same date, the Minister of Interior issued a decree on the reorganization of the police which established a State Police Bureau in each governmental district of Prussia, subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau in Berlin; and I cite as authority the Ministerialblatt for the Internal Administration of Prussia, 1933, Page 503, and it is Document 2371-PS.
Concerning the formation of the Gestapo, the Defendant Göring said, in Aufbau einer Nation, of 1934, Page 88, which is our Document 2344-PS, and I quote from the English translation a short paragraph, of which Your Honors will take judicial notice, unless Your Honors want to turn to it in full:
“For weeks”—this is Göring talking—“I had been working personally on the reorganization, and at last I, alone and upon my own decision and my own reflections, created the office of the Secret State Police. This instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State has contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be talk of a Communist or Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia.”
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?
COL. STOREY: The date? 1934, Sir.
On November 30, 1933 Göring issued a decree for the Prussian State Ministry and the Reich Chancellor placing the Gestapo under his direct supervision as Chief. The Gestapo was thereby established as an independent branch of the Administration of the Interior responsible directly to Göring as Prussian Prime Minister. This decree gave the Gestapo jurisdiction over the political police matters of the general and interior administration and provided that the district, county, and local police authorities were subject to the directives of the Gestapo—and that cites the Prussian laws of 30 November 1933, Page 413, and Document 2105-PS.
In a speech delivered at a meeting of the Prussian State Council on 18 June 1934, which is published in Speeches and Essays of Hermann Göring, 1939, Page 102, our Document 3343-PS, Göring said, and I quote one paragraph:
“The creation of the Secret State Police was also a necessity. You may recognize the importance attributed by the new State to this instrument of state security from the fact that the Prime Minister, himself, has made himself head of this department of the administration just because it is the observation of all currents directed against the new State which is of fundamental importance.”
By a decree of 8 March 1934 the regional State Police offices were separated from their organizational connection with the District Government and established as independent authorities of the Gestapo. That cites the Preussische Gesetzsammlung of 8 March 1934, Page 143, our Document 2113-PS.
I now offer in evidence Document Number 1680-PS, Exhibit USA-477. This is an article entitled “10 Years of Security Police and the SD,” published in the German Police journal, the magazine of the Security Police and SD, of 1 February 1943. I quote one paragraph from this article on Page 2 of the English translation, Document 1680-PS, which is the third main paragraph:
“Parallel to that development in Prussia, the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler created in Bavaria the Bavarian Political Police and also suggested and directed the establishment of Political Police in the Länder other than Prussia. The unification of the Political Police of all the Länder took place in the spring of 1934 when Minister President Hermann Göring appointed Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had meanwhile been named Chief of the Political Police in all the Länder except Prussia, to the post of Deputy Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police.”
The Prussian law about the Secret State Police, dated 10 February 1936, then summed up the development hitherto, and determined the position and responsibilities of the Secret State Police in the executive regulations issued the same day.
On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the Gestapo was promulgated by Göring as Prussian Prime Minister—I refer to Document 2107-PS. This law provided that the Secret State Police had the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the State all tendencies inimical to the State and declared that orders and matters of the Secret State Police were not subject to the review of the administrative courts. That is the Prussian State law of that date cited on Pages 21-22 of the publication of the laws of 1936.
Also on that same date of 10 February 1936 a decree for the execution of the law was issued by Göring, as Prussian Prime Minister, and by Frick, as Minister of the Interior. This decree provided that the Gestapo had authority to enact measures valid in the entire area of the State and measures affecting that area—by the way, that is found in 2108-PS and is also a published law—that it was the centralized agency for collecting political intelligence in the field of political police, and that it administered the concentration camps. The Gestapo was given authority to make police investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon the Party as well as upon the State.
Later, on the 28th of August 1936, a circular of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police provided that as of 1 October 1936 the Political Police forces of the German provinces were to be called the “Geheime Staatspolizei.” That means the Secret State Police. The regional offices were still to be described as State Police. The translation of that law is in 2372-PS, Reichsministerialblatt of 1936, Number 44, Page 1344.
Later, on 20 September 1936, a circular of the Minister of Interior, Frick, commissioned the Gestapo Bureau in Berlin with the supervision of the duties of the Political Police commanders in all the states of Germany. That is Reichsministerialblatt 1936, Page 1343, our Document L-297.
The law regulating and relating to financial measures in connection with the police, of the 19th of March 1937, provided that the officials of the Gestapo were to be considered direct officials of the Reich and their salaries, in addition to the operational expenses of the whole State Police, were to be borne from 1 April 1937 by the Reich. That is shown in Document 2243-PS—which is a copy of the law of 19 March 1937—Page 325.
Thus, through the above laws and decrees, the Gestapo was established as a uniform political police system operating throughout the Reich and serving Party, State, and Nazi leadership.
In the course of the development of the SD, it came into increasingly close co-operation with the Gestapo and also with the Reichskriminalpolizei (the Criminal Police), known as Kripo, K-R-I-P-O, shown up there under Amt V. The SD was called upon to furnish information to various State authorities. On the 11th of November 1938 a decree of the Reich Minister of Interior declared the SD to be the intelligence organization for the State as well as the Party, that it had the particular duty of supporting the Secret State Police, and that it thereby became active on a national mission. These duties necessitated a closer co-operation between the SD and the authorities for the general and interior administration. That law is translated in 1638-PS.
The Tribunal has already received evidence concerning the decrees of 17 and 26 June 1936, under which Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police and by which Heydrich became the first Chief of the Security Police and SD. Even then Göring did not relinquish his position as Chief of the Prussian Gestapo. Thus, the decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police that was issued on the 28th of August 1936, which is our Document 2372-PS, was distributed “to the Prussian Minister President as Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police,” that is, to Göring.
On 27 September 1939, by order of Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central offices of the Gestapo and SD and also those of the Criminal Police were centralized in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD under the name of RSHA, which Your Honors have heard described by Major Farr. Under this order the personnel and administrative sections of each agency were co-ordinated in Amt I and II of the chart shown here of the RSHA. The operational sections of the SD became Amt III, shown in the box “Amt III,” except for foreign intelligence which was placed over in Number VI. The operational sections of the Gestapo became Amt IV, as shown on the chart, and the operational sections of the Kripo—that is, the Criminal Police—became Amt V, as shown on the chart.
Ohlendorf was named the Chief of Amt III, the SD inside Germany, Müller was named Chief of Amt IV, and Nebe was named Chief of Amt V, the Kripo.
On the 27th of September 1939 Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued a directive pursuant to the order of Himmler, in which he ordered that the designation and heading of RSHA be used exclusively in internal relations of the Reich Ministry of Interior, and the heading “The Chief of the Security Police and SD” in transactions with outside persons and offices. The directive provided that the Gestapo would continue to use the designation and heading “Secret State Police” according to the particular instructions.
This order is Document L-361, Exhibit USA-478, which we now offer in evidence; and I refer Your Honors to the first paragraph of L-361. That is found in the first volume. I just direct Your Honors’ attention to the date and to the subject, which is the amalgamation of the Zentralämter of the Sicherheitspolizei and of the SD, and the creation of the four sections, and then to the words:
“. . . will be joined to the RSHA in accordance with the following directives. This amalgamation carries with it no change in the position of these Ämter in the Party nor in the governmental administration.”
I might say here parenthetically, if the Tribunal please, that we like to think of the RSHA as being the so-called administrative office through which a great many of these organizations were administered and then a number of these organizations, including the Gestapo, maintaining their separate identity as operational organizations. I think a good illustration, if Your Honors will recall, is that during the war there may be a certain division or a certain air force which is administratively under a certain headquarters, but operationally, when they had an invasion, it may be under the general supervision of somebody else who was operating a task force. So the RSHA was really the administrative office of a great many of these alleged criminal organizations.
The Gestapo and SD were therefore organized functionally on the basis of the opponents to be combatted and the matters to be investigated.
I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to this chart, which has already been identified, and I believe it is Exhibit USA-53. This chart—I am in error—that is the original identification number. This chart shows the main chain of command from Himmler, who was the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, to Kaltenbrunner, who was Chief of the Security Police and SD, and from Kaltenbrunner to the various field offices of the Gestapo and the SD.
We now formally offer in evidence this chart, Document L-219, as Exhibit USA-479. The chart itself is based upon the document, which is L-219. We have photostatic copies, and you probably want to refer to the one on the wall.
This chart, from which the one on the wall is taken, has been certified by Otto Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III of the RSHA, and by Walter Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, and has been officially identified by both of those former officials.
The chart shows that the principal flow of command in police matters came from Himmler as Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police directly to Kaltenbrunner, who was the Chief of the Security Police and SD and as such was also head of the RSHA, which is the administrative office to which I have referred.
Kaltenbrunner’s headquarters organization was composed of seven Ämter, plus a military office—the seven Ämter shown here.
Under Subsection D was Obersturmbannführer Rauff, who handled technical matters, including motor vehicles of the SIPO and the SD, to which we will refer later.
Amt III was the SD inside Germany and was charged with investigations into spheres of German national life. It was the internal intelligence organization of the police system and its interests extended into all areas occupied by Germany during the course of the war. In 1943 it contained four sections. I would like to mention them briefly. It shows their scope of authority. Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich. B dealt with national questions, including minorities, race, and health of the people. C dealt with culture, including science, education, religion, press, folk culture, and art; and D with economics, including food, commerce, industry, labor, colonial economics, and occupied regions.
Now Amt IV, with which we are dealing here, was the Gestapo and was charged with combatting opposition. In 1945, as identified by these two former officials, it contained six sections:
1. A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective service, including communism, Marxism, reaction and liberalism;
2. B dealt with political churches, sects, and Jews, including political Catholicism, political Protestantism, other churches, Freemasonry; and a special section, B-4, that had to do with Jewish affairs, matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the people and State, and dispossession of rights of German citizenship; the head of the office was Eichmann;
3. C dealt with protective custody;
4. D with regions under German domination;
5. E with security;
6. F with passport matters and alien police.
Now, Amt V, which will be referred to as the Kripo, was charged with combatting crime. For example, Subsection D was the criminological institute for the Sipo and handled matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and technical research.
Number VI was the SD outside of Germany and concerned primarily with foreign political intelligence. In 1944 the Abwehr, or military intelligence, was joined with Amt VI as the military Amt. Your Honors will recall that the Witness Lahousen was in the Abwehr. Amt VI maintained its own regional organization.
And finally, Amt VII handled ideological research among enemies such as Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism.
Within Germany there were regional offices of the SD, the Gestapo, and the Kripo, shown on the chart up at the right. The Gestapo and Kripo offices were often located in the same place and were always collectively referred to as the Sipo. You see that shady line around refers to the collective operation of the Gestapo and Kripo—Gestapo, the Secret Police; and Kripo, the Criminal Police. These regional offices all maintained their separate identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA—that is, under Kaltenbrunner—which had the jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, co-ordinated by Inspectors of the Security Police and SD, as shown at the top of the chart. The inspectors were also under the supervision of Higher SS and Police Leaders appointed for each Wehrkreis. The Higher SS and Police Leaders reported to Himmler and supervised not only the inspectors of the Security Police and SD but also the inspectors of the Order Police and various subdivisions of the SS.
In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and the SD known as Einsatz Groups, about which Your Honors will hear in a few minutes, operated with, and in the rear of, the army. These groups were officered by personnel of the Gestapo and the Kripo and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police and Waffen-SS. They functioned with various army groups. The Einsatz Groups—and, if Your Honors will recall, they are simply task force groups for special projects—were divided into “Einsatzkommandos,” “Sonderkommandos,” and “Teilkommandos,” all of which performed the functions of the Security Police and the SD with, or closely behind, the army.
After the occupied territories had been consolidated, these Einsatz Groups and their subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the Security Police and SD within the particular geographical location. These combined forces were placed under the Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD, and the offices were organized as a section similar to this RSHA headquarters. The Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD reported directly to Befehlshaber of the Security Police and SD, who in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD.
In the occupied countries the Higher SS and Police Leaders were more directly controlled by the Befehlshaber and the Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of the Security Police and SD, who exercised controlling authority.
The above chart and the remarks concerning it are based upon two documents which I now offer in evidence. They are Document L-219, which is the organization plan of the RSHA of 1 October 1943, and Document 2346-PS.
Now next, the primary mission of the Gestapo and the SD was to combat the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime and to keep Hitler and the Nazi leadership in power as specified in Count One of the Indictment. The tasks and methods of the Secret State Police were well described in an article which is translated in Document 1956-PS, Volume 2 of the document book, which is an article published in January 1936 in Das Archiv at Page 1342, which I now offer in evidence and quote from. It is on Page 1 of the English translation, 1956. I will first read the first paragraph and then the third and fourth paragraphs. That is in January 1936. Quoting:
“In order to refute the malicious rumors spread abroad, the Völkischer Beobachter of 22 January 1936 published an article on the origin, purpose, and duties of the Secret Police; extracts from this read as follows: . . .”
Then skip to the third paragraph:
“The Secret State Police is an official instrument of the Criminal Police authorities, whose special task is the detection of crimes and offenses against the State, especially treason against Land or Reich. The task of the Secret State Police is to discover these crimes and offenses, to find the perpetrators, and to bring them to trial. The number of criminal proceedings continually pending in the People’s Court for treasonable acts against Land or Reich is the result of this work. The second important field of operations for the Secret State Police is the preventive combatting of all dangers threatening the State and its leaders. As, since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the State is forbidden, a Secret State Police as a preventive instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist Führer State. The opponents of National Socialism were not eliminated by the prohibition of their organizations and their newspapers, but have withdrawn to other forms of opposition to the state. Therefore the National Socialist State has to track down, to watch, and to render harmless the underground opponents fighting against it, in illegal organizations, in camouflaged associations, in the coalitions of well-meaning fellow-Germans, and even in the organizations of the Party and the State, before they have succeeded in actually executing any action against the interests of the State. This duty of fighting with every means this battle against the secret enemies of the State will be spared no Führer State, because enemy forces from their foreign headquarters always secure the services of some individuals in such a state and employ them in underground activity against the state.
“The preventive measures of the Secret State Police consist first of all in the close surveillance of all enemies of the State in the Reich territory. As the Secret State Police cannot, in addition to its important executive tasks, perform this surveillance of the enemies of the State to the extent necessary, there enters to supplement it, the Security Service of the Reichsführer of the SS set up by the Führer’s deputy as the political intelligence service of the Movement, putting thereby into the service of the security of the State a large part of the forces of the Movement mobilized by him.
“The Secret State Police takes the necessary police preventive measures against the enemies of the State on the basis of the results of observation. The most effective preventive measure is, without doubt, deprival of freedom, which is imposed in the form of ‘protective custody’ if it is feared that the free activity of the persons in question might endanger the security of the State in any way. The use of protective custody is so regulated by directives of the Minister of the Interior of the Reich and Prussia and by special arrest examination procedures of the Secret State Police that—as far as preventive action against the enemies of the State permits—ample guarantees against the abuse of protective custody are provided. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, haven’t we really got enough now as to the organization of the Gestapo and its objects?
COL. STOREY: I’ll omit the reading of the rest of this paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: I’m not sure that will satisfy me. What I was asking is haven’t we got enough about the organization of the Gestapo now?
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, I was through with the organization. I was just going into the question of this action of protective custody, for which the Gestapo was famous, and showing how they went into that field of activity and the authority for taking people into protective custody—alleged protective custody.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that has been proved more than once in the preceding evidence that we have heard.
COL. STOREY: There is one more law I would like to refer to, that is, it’s not subject to judicial review—unless that has been established. I do not know whether Major Farr did that, or not.
THE PRESIDENT: That they are not subject to judicial review?
COL. STOREY: Review, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you have told us that already this afternoon.
COL. STOREY: The citation is in the Reichsverwaltungsblatt of 1935, Page 577, which is Document 2347-PS. I would like, if Your Honors please, to refer to this quotation from that same law.
The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on the 2d of May 1935 held that the status of the Gestapo as a special Police authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, and the court said in that law that the only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within the Gestapo itself.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you told us that, apropos of the document of the 10th of February 1936, where you said the Secret State Police was not subject to review by any of the state courts.
COL. STOREY: I just did not want there to be any question about the authority. I refer Your Honors to Document 1852-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit USA-449, also stating that theory, and also Document 1723-PS. That is the decree, Your Honor, of February 1, 1938, which relates to the protective custody and the issuance of new regulations; and I would like to quote just one sentence from that law:
“In order to counter all attempts of the enemies of the people and of the State, protective custody may be ordered as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against persons who, through their attitude, endanger the life and security of the people and the State.”
And the Gestapo had the exclusive right to order protective custody and that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration camps.
Now I pass to another phase where the SD created an organization of agents and informers who operated through the various regional offices throughout the Reich and later in conjunction with the Gestapo and the Criminal Police throughout the occupied countries. The SD operated secretly. One of the things it did was secretly to mark ballots in order to discover the identity of persons who cast “No” and invalid votes in the referendum. I now offer in evidence Document R-142, second volume. I believe it is toward the end of the document book—R-142, Exhibit USA-481.
This document contains a letter from the branch office of the SD at Kochem to the SD at Koblenz. The letter is dated 7 May 1938 and refers to the plebiscite of 10 April 1938. It refers to a letter previously received from the Koblenz office and apparently is a reply to a request for information concerning the way in which people voted in the supposedly secret plebiscite. It is on Page 1 of Document R-142.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am told that that has been read before.
COL. STOREY: I did not know it had, if Your Honor pleases. We will just offer it without reading it then.
With reference to National Socialism and the contribution of the Sipo and the SD, I refer to an article of 7 September 1942, which is shown in 3344-PS. It is the first paragraph, Volume 2. It is the official journal. Quoting:
“Already before the taking over of power, the SD contributed its part to the success of the National Socialist revolution. Since the taking over of power, the Security Police and the SD have borne the responsibility for the inner security of the Reich and have paved the way for a powerful victory of National Socialism against all resistance.”
In connection with the criminal responsibility of the SD and the Gestapo, it will be considered with respect to certain War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity which were in the principal part committed by the centralized political police system. The development, organization, and tasks have been considered before. In some instances the crimes were committed in co-operation or in conjunction with other groups or organizations.
Now in order to look into the strength of these various organizations, I have some figures here that I would like to quote to Your Honors. The Sipo and SD were composed of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD. The Gestapo was the largest, and it has a membership of about 40,000 to 50,000 in 1934 and 1935. That is an error; it is 1943 to 1945. It was the political force of the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say the date was wrong?
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, the date was wrong, it is ’43 to ’45, if Your Honor pleases; 40 to 50 thousand.
THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): Where are you reading from?
COL. STOREY: It is Document 3033-PS, and it is an affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, one of the former officials I referred to a moment ago.
I believe, if Your Honor pleases, to get it in the record, I will read that whole affidavit. It is Document 3033-PS, Exhibit USA-488. I have the English translation here:
“The Sipo and SD was composed of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD. In 1943-45 the Gestapo had a membership of about 40,000 to 50,000, the Kripo had a membership of about 15,000, and the SD had a membership of about 3,000. In common usage and even in orders and decrees the term ‘SD’ was used as an abbreviation for the term ‘Sipo and SD.’ In most cases actual executive action was carried out by personnel of the Gestapo in place of the SD or the Kripo. In occupied territories, members of the Gestapo frequently wore SS uniforms with SD insignia. New members of the Gestapo and the SD were taken on a voluntary basis.”
And then “subscribed and sworn to on the 21st of November 1945 before Lieutenant Harris.”
I think I ought to say here, if Your Honors please, that it is our information that a great many of the members of the Gestapo were also members of the SS. We have heard various estimates of the amount but have no direct authority. Some authorities say as much as 75 percent, but still we have no direct evidence on that.
I now offer in evidence Document 2751-PS, which is Exhibit USA-482. It is an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, dated November 20, 1945. This affidavit particularly refers to the actual occurrences in connection with the Polish border incident. I believe it was referred to by the Witness Lahousen when he was on the stand:
“I, Alfred Helmut Naujocks, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
“1. I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944 and a member of the SD from its creation in 1934 to January 1941. I served as a member of the Waffen-SS from February 1941 until the middle of 1942. Later I served in the Economics Department of the Military Administration of Belgium from September 1942 to September 1944. I surrendered to the Allies on 19 October 1944.
“2. On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich said: ‘Actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for the foreign press, as well as for German propaganda purposes.’ I was directed to go to Gleiwitz with five or six SD men and wait there until I received a code word from Heydrich indicating that the attack should take place. My instructions were to seize the radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German, who would be put at my disposal, to broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state that the time had come for the conflict between the Germans and the Poles and that the Poles should get together and strike down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich also told me at this time that he expected an attack on Poland by Germany in a few days.
“3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then I requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but was told to stay in Gleiwitz. Between the 25th and 31st of August I went to see Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo, who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Müller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops . . . . Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Müller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the assault members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.
“4. Müller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was ‘Canned Goods.’
“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon on the 31st of August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o’clock that evening. Heydrich said, ‘In order to carry out this attack, report to Müller for “Canned Goods.” ’ I did this and gave Müller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.
“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots, and left.”
And then “sworn to and subscribed to before Lieutenant Martin”.
The Gestapo and the SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of thousands of civilians of occupied countries, as a part of the Nazi program to exterminate political and racial undesirables, by the so-called Einsatz Groups. Your Honors will recall evidence concerning the activities of these Einsatz Groups or Einsatzkommandos. I now refer to Document R-102.
If Your Honors please, I understand Major Farr introduced this document this morning; but I want to refer to just one brief statement, which he did not include, concerning the SD and the Einsatz Groups and Security Police. It is on Page 4 of R-102. Quoting:
“During the period covered by this report the stations of the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD have changed only in the northern sector.”
THE PRESIDENT: What was the document?
COL. STOREY: R-102, which was already introduced in evidence by Major Farr, and it is in Volume 2 toward the end of the book. There are two reports submitted by the chief of the Einsatz Group A available. The first report is Document L-180, which has already been received as Exhibit USA-276.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, would you not pass quite so quickly from one document to another?
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, pardon me, Sir. L-180, and I want to quote from Page 13. It is on Page 5 of the English translation. It is the beginning of the first paragraph, near the bottom of the page. Quoting:
“In view of the extension of the area of operations and of the great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the co-operation of the reliable population in the fight against felons, that is, mainly the Jews and Communists.”
And also in that same document, Page 30 of the original, Page 8 of the English translation, quoting:
“From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish problem in Ostland could not be solved by pogroms alone.”
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that this has been read already.
COL. STOREY: I had it checked, and we did not catch that, Your Honor. I will pass on then.
Now, if Your Honor pleases, we will pass to Document 2273-PS next. I offer in evidence now just portions of Document 2273-PS, which is Exhibit USA-487. This document was captured by the U.S.S.R. and will be offered in detail by our Soviet colleagues later. But, with their consent, I want to introduce in evidence a chart which is identified by that document; and we have an enlargement which we would like to put on the board, passing to the Tribunal photostatic copies.
If Your Honor pleases, this chart is identified by the photostatic copy attached to the original report which will be dealt with in detail later. I want to quote just one statement from Page 2 of the English translation of that document. It is the third paragraph from the bottom on Page 2 of the English translation:
“The Estonian self-protection movement, formed as the Germans advanced, did begin to arrest Jews; but there were no spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and the SD were the Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work. Today there are no longer any Jews in Estonia.”
That document is a top-secret document by Einsatz Group A, which was a special projects group. This chart, of which the photostatic copy is attached to the original in the German translation on the wall, shows the progress of the extermination of the Jews in the area in which this Einsatzkommando group operated.
If Your Honors will refer to the top, next to Petersburg—or Leningrad as we know it—and down below, you will see the picture of a coffin; and that is described in the report as 3,600 having been killed.
Next, over at the left, is another coffin in one of the small Baltic states showing 963 in that area have been put in the coffin.
Then next, down near the capital of Riga, you will note that 35,238 were put away in the coffins; and it refers to the ghetto there as still having 2,500.
You come down to the next square or the next state showing 136,421 were put in their coffins; and then in the next area, near Minsk and just above Minsk, there were 41,828 put in their coffins.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure they were put in their coffins, the 136,000?
COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure that they were executed, the 136,000?—because there is no coffin there.
COL. STOREY: No, Sir—the bottom statement—here are the totals from the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: These photostatic copies are different from what you have got there. In the area which is marked 136,421 there is no coffin.
COL. STOREY: Well, I am sorry. The one that I have is a true and correct copy of theirs.
THE PRESIDENT: Mine has not got it and Mr. Biddle’s has not got it.
COL. STOREY [Turning to an assistant.] Will you hand this to the President, please?
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose the document itself will show it.
COL. STOREY: I will turn to the original and verify it. Let me have the original, please. Apparently there is a typographical error. If Your Honor pleases, here it is: 136,421, with the coffin.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Parker points out it is in the document itself, too.
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, it is in the document itself. There is an error on that.
The 128,000 at the bottom shows at that time there were 128,000 on hand, and the literal translation of the statement, as I understand, means, “still on hand in the Minsk area.”
I next refer to Document 1104-PS, Volume 2, Exhibit USA-483, which I now offer in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, did you tell us what the document was? There is nothing on the translation, is there, to show what the document is.
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, it is a report of the special-purpose Group A, a top-secret report—or the Einsatz group in other words—making a record of their activities in these areas, and this chart was attached showing the areas covered.
THE PRESIDENT: Special group of the Gestapo?
COL. STOREY: The special group that was organized of the Gestapo and the SD in that area. In other words, a Commando group.
As I mentioned, Your Honor, they organized these special Commando groups to work in and behind the armies as they consolidated their gains in occupied territories, and Your Honor will hear from other reports of these Einsatz groups as we go along in this presentation. In other words, “Einsatz” means “special action” or “action groups,” and they were organized to cover certain geographical areas behind the immediate front lines.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but they were groups, were they, of the Gestapo?
COL. STOREY: The Gestapo and the SD.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is part of the Gestapo.
COL. STOREY: There were some of the Kripo in it too.
Now the next document is 1104-PS, dated October 30, 1941. This document shows on that date the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General of Minsk, in which he severely criticized the actions of the Einsatzkommandos of the Sipo and the SD operating in his area for the murder of the Jewish population of that area, and I quote from the English translation, on Page 4 of that document, beginning at the first paragraph after the colon:
“On 27 October, in the morning at about 8 o’clock, a first lieutenant of the Police Battalion Number 11, from Kovno, Lithuania, appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the Security Police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk within 2 days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival a conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action 1 day. However, he refused this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere in all towns and that only 2 days were allotted for Sluzk. Within those 2 days the town of Sluzk had by all means to be cleared of Jews.”
That report was made to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories through Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, at Riga. Your Honors will recall that he was referred to in another presentation.
Now skipping over to Page 5, the first paragraph—I would like to quote it:
“For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out, to my deepest regret, that the latter almost bordered on sadism. The town itself during the action offered a picture of horror. With indescribable brutality on the part both of the German police officers and particularly of the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, and also with them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard, and in different streets the corpses of Jews who had been shot accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in the greatest anguish to free themselves from the encirclement. In addition to the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also artisans, were barbarously maltreated in sight of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also beaten with clubs and rifle butts. It was no longer a question of an action against the Jews. It looked much more like a revolution.”
And then I skip down to the next to the last paragraph on that same page, quoting:
“In conclusion, I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion looted in an unheard-of manner during the action and that not only in Jewish houses but equally in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use, such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, was taken away. According to statements of the troops, watches were torn off the arms of Jews openly on the street and rings pulled off their fingers in the most brutal manner. A disbursing officer reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said actually to have run about everywhere to obtain the money.”
There is another paragraph, with reference to the number of copies, on the third page of the translation, to which I would like to call Your Honors’ attention—the last paragraph on Page 3 of the translation, quoting:
“I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of that sort. To have buried alive seriously wounded people, who then worked their way out of their graves again, is such extreme beastliness that this incident as such must be reported to the Führer and the Reich Marshal.
“The civil administration of White Ruthenia makes every effort to win the population over to Germany, in accordance with the instructions of the Führer. These efforts cannot be brought into harmony with the methods described here.”—Signed by the Commissioner General for White Ruthenia.
And then, on the 11th of November 1941, he forwards it on to the Reich Minister for occupied countries, in Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was that at that time?
COL. STOREY: The Reich Minister, I believe—at that time at least—for the eastern occupied countries was the Defendant Rosenberg. I think that is correct. On the same date, by separate letter, the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the eastern countries that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the Reich Credit Institute for the disposal of the Reich Commissioner.
On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, who was the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. That is shown on the first page of Document Number 1104-PS.
The activities of the Einsatz groups continued throughout 1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of extermination was, to a large extent, changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany.
I next refer to Document 3012-PS, which has heretofore been introduced as Exhibit USA-190. This is a letter from the headquarters of one of the Commando groups, a section known as Einsatz Group C, dated 19 March 1943. This letter summarizes the real activities and methods of the Gestapo and SD, and I should like to refer to additional portions to those previously quoted, on Page 2 of Document 3012-PS; and I believe I will read the first page, beginning with the first paragraph:
“It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service”—SD—“to discover all enemies of the Reich, and fight against them in the interest of security, especially the security of the Army in the zone of operations. Besides the annihilation of active, avowed opponents, all other elements who by virtue of their convictions or their past might under favorable conditions actively appear as enemies are to be eliminated through preventive measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Führer, with all required severity. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of partisan bands. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the ‘Barbarossa’ decrees.”—The Tribunal will recall the famous “Barbarossa” code-name decrees that were issued in connection with the invasion of Russia—“I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:
“1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians who were streaming back in confusion, were openly opposing us.
“2. The strong expeditions by partisan bands, coming chiefly from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other partisan groups formed from the population were appearing like mushrooms in all districts. The procurement of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been inexcusable if we had observed this whole activity without taking measures against it. It is obvious that all such measures are accompanied by severity.
“I want to take up the significant points of these severe measures:
“1) The shooting of Hungarian Jews; 2) the shooting of agriculturalists; 3) the shooting of children; 4) the burning to the ground of villages; 5)”—the shooting, quoting—“while trying to escape, of Security Service (SD) prisoners.
“Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the suitability of the measures executed and expressed his appreciation for the drastic steps taken. In consideration of the current political situation, especially in the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police are to be subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to place at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily.”
If Your Honor pleases, I believe the numbers have been quoted before by Mr. Dodd. I refer on the next page to the first order, in 1 and 2—Subparagraphs:
“1. Special treatment is to be kept to a minimum.
“2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists, and so on, is to take place only by roster for the time being, without arrests. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the Communist Party. Likewise members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were active in leading positions.”
The next subparagraphs have been read into evidence, 3 and 4, in a previous presentation.
“5. The reporting of partisan bands as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. I point out, however, that all drives against those bands are to take place only with my approval.
“6. The prisons are to be kept empty as a rule. We must be aware of the fact that the Slavs interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly, right away. If we restrict our harsh Security Police measures through the above orders for the time being, it is done only for the following reason: the most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. There are therefore no written certificates of political reliability or the like to be furnished.”—Signed—“Christensen, SS Sturmbannführer and Commanding Officer.”
I understood that Your Honor wanted to adjourn at 4 o’clock, and I believe that I can introduce one more statement. It was the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD that operated the infamous death vans. Previously, Document 501-PS, which was received as Exhibit USA-288, referred to this operation. The letter from Becker, which is a part of this exhibit, was addressed to Obersturmbannführer Rauff at Berlin. We now refer to Document L-185. I simply refer to Document 501-PS as a reference to the death vans. Document L-185, Exhibit USA-484, is the one I now offer in evidence, Page 7 of the English translation—L-185. It will be observed that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA in charge of technical matters was Obersturmbannführer Rauff. Mr. Harris advises me that the only point to be proved by that is that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA, who made this report on technical matters, was the Obersturmbannführer Rauff; and then he refers in the same connection to Document 2348-PS, which is Exhibit USA-485. The previous one was to identify Rauff, and then to offer his affidavit which is 2348-PS, second volume. Reading from the beginning of the affidavit—it was made on 19 October 1945 in Ancona, Italy—quoting:
“I hereby acknowledge the attached letter, written by Dr. Becker . . . on the 16 May 1942 and received by me on the 29 May 1942, as a genuine letter. I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side of this letter a statement to the effect that it was genuine. I do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot give an approximate figure. The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located, I believe, in Berlin. Some other firms built these vans also. Insofar as I am aware, these vans operated only in Russia. Insofar as I can state, these vans were probably operating in 1941; and it is my personal opinion that they were operating up to the termination of the war.”
If Your Honor pleases, I do not believe that we will have time to go into the next exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the Tribunal will now adjourn, until Wednesday, the 2d of January.