Afternoon Session
M. GERTHOFFER: I had the honor, this morning, of relating to you how the occupiers were able to exact great quantities of the means of payment from Norway. We shall now see, from the first data which have been given us, the use to which the occupiers put these means of payment.
The Germans seized, as in the other occupied countries, considerable private property on some pretext or other—property belonging to Jews, Freemasons, or Scout associations. It has been impossible, so far, to make a very exact evaluation of this spoliation. We can therefore only give some indication from memory. According to the report of the Norwegian Government, submitted under Document Number RF-121, in 1941 the Germans seized all the radio sets. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any evidence to support the facts you are stating now?
M. GERTHOFFER: This is based on information contained in the report of the Norwegian Government which I have submitted under Document Number RF-121.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
M. GERTHOFFER: According to that report, in 1941 the Germans seized almost all the radio sets belonging to private individuals. The value of these radio sets is approximately 120 million kroner. The Germans imposed heavy fines on the Norwegian communities under the most varied pretexts, notably Allied bombing raids and acts of sabotage.
In the report presented under Document Number RF-121 the Norwegian Government gives two or three examples of these collective fines: on 4 March 1941, after a raid on Lofoten, the population of the small community of Ostvagoy had to pay 100,000 kroner. Communities also had to support German families and families of “Quislings.”
On 25 September 1942, after a British raid on Oslo, one hundred citizens were obliged to pay 3,500,000 kroner. In January 1941 Trondheim, Stavanger, and Vest-Opland had to pay 60,000, 50,000, and 100,000 kroner, respectively. In September 1941 the municipality of Stavanger was obliged to pay 2 million kroner for an alleged sabotage of telegraph lines. In August 1941 Rogaland had to pay 500,000 kroner, and Aalesund had to pay 100,000 kroner.
It can thus be stated in principle that, by various procedures which differed hardly from those employed in other countries, the Germans during the occupation of Norway not only exhausted all the financial resources of that country but placed it considerably in debt.
It has not been possible to furnish a detailed account of German extortions, whether made after requisitions, followed or not by indemnities, or by purchase, apparently conducted by mutual agreement fictitiously settled with those very means of payment extorted from Norway.
In the report which I have submitted under Document Number RF-121, the Norwegian Government tabulated the damages and losses suffered by its country. I shall give a summary of this table to the Tribunal.
The Norwegian Government estimates that the damages suffered by industry and commerce amount to a total of 440 million kroner, of which the Germans have paid, fictitiously of course, only 7 million kroner; merchant vessels to the value of 1,733 million kroner, for which Germany has made no settlement; damage to ports and installations amounts to 74 million kroner, for which Germany has settled fictitiously only to the extent of 1 million kroner; for railroads, canals, airports, and their installations, the spoliation represents the sum of 947 million, for which Germany has fictitiously paid 490 million kroner; roads and bridges, 199 million kroner, for which the settlement amounts to 67 million; spoliation of agriculture reached 242 million kroner, of which only 46 million have been settled; personal property, 239 million, of which nothing has been settled; various requisitions, not included in the preceding categories, amount to 1,566 million kroner, for which the occupier, fictitiously, has settled up to the amount of 1,154 million kroner. The Norwegian Government estimates that the years of man-labor applied to the German war effort represent a sum of 226 million kroner. It estimates, on the other hand, that the years of man-labor lost to the national economy by deportation to Germany and forced labor by the order of Germany amounts to 3,122 million kroner. Forced payments to German institutions amount to 11,054 million kroner, for which Germany has made no settlement whatsoever. The grand total, according to the Norwegian Government, is 21,086 million kroner, which represents 4,700 million dollars.
Norway suffered particularly during the German occupation. Indeed, though her resources are considerable, notably timber from the forests, minerals such as nickel, wolfram, molybdenum, zinc, copper, and aluminum, nevertheless Norway must import indispensable food products for feeding her population.
As the Germans had absolute control over maritime traffic, nothing could come into Norway without their consent. They could therefore, by pressure, as they had to do in France by means of the line of demarcation between the two zones, impose their demands more easily. The rations, as fixed by the occupiers, were insufficient to insure the subsistence of the Norwegian population. The continued undernourishment over a period of years resulted in very serious consequences: Disease multiplied, mortality likewise increased, and the future of the population has been jeopardized by the physical deficiencies of its younger element.
These are the few observations which I had to make on the subject of Norway. I shall, if the Tribunal will permit, now deal with the part which relates to the Netherlands.
Economic pillage of the Netherlands.
In invading the Netherlands in contravention of all the principles of the law of nations, the Germans installed themselves in a country abundantly provided with the most varied wealth, in a country in which the inhabitants were the best nourished of Europe and which, in proportion to the population, was one of the wealthiest in the world. The gold reserve of Holland exceeded the amount of bills in circulation. Four years later when the Allies liberated that country, they found the population afflicted by a veritable famine; and apart from the destruction resulting from military operations, a country almost entirely ruined by the spoliation of the occupation.
The dishonest intentions of Germany appear in a secret report by Seyss-Inquart on his governorship. This report, dating from 29 May to 19 July 1940, was discovered by the United States Army. It has been registered under the number Document 997-PS, and I submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-122. These are the chief extracts from this report:
“It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a large number of economic and also police measures had to be taken, the first ones of which were for the purpose of reducing the consumption of the population in order to obtain supplies for the Reich, on the one hand, and to secure a just distribution of the remaining supplies, on the other hand. With regard to the task assigned, endeavors had to be made for all these measures to bear the signature of Dutchmen. The Reich Commissioner therefore authorized the Secretaries General to take all the necessary measures through legal channels.
“In fact, to date, nearly all orders concerning the seizure of supplies and their distribution to the population and all decrees regarding restrictions on the moulding of public opinion have been issued. But agreements concerning the transport of extraordinarily large supplies to the Reich have also been made, all of which bear the signatures of the Dutch Secretaries General or the competent economic leaders, so that all of these measures have the character of being voluntary. It should be mentioned in this connection that the Secretaries General were told in the first conference that loyal co-operation was expected of them, but that they were entitled to resign if something should be ordered which they felt they could not endorse. Up to date none of the Secretaries General have made use of this privilege, so that one may reasonably conclude that they have complied with all requests of their own free will.
“The seizure and distribution of food supplies and textiles have been almost completed. At least all the appropriate orders have been issued and are being executed.
“A series of instructions concerning the reorientation of agriculture have been issued and are being executed. The essential point is to use the available fodder in such a way that as large a stock as possible of horned cattle, about 80 percent, will be carried over into the next farming season, at the expense of the disproportionately high stock of chickens and hogs. Rules and restrictions have been introduced in the organization of traffic, and the rationing of gasoline was applied on the same lines as in the Reich.
“Restriction of the right to give notice at work, as well as to cancel leases, has been issued in order to curb the liberal and capitalistic habits of the Dutch employers and to avoid unrest. In the same way the terms for repayment of debts have been extended under certain circumstances. . . .
“. . . the ordinance concerning registration and control of enemy property, as well as confiscation of the property of persons who show hostility to the Reich and to Germans, were issued in the name of the Reich Commissioner. On the basis of this ordinance an administrator has already been appointed for the property of the royal family.
“Stocks of raw materials have been seized and, with the consent of the General Field Marshal, distributed in such a way that the Dutch have enough raw materials to maintain their economy for half a year, so that they receive the same allocation quotas as obtain in the Reich. The same principle of equal treatment is being used in the supply of food, et cetera. This enabled us to secure considerable supplies of raw materials for the Reich, as for instance 70,000 tons of industrial fats, which is about half the amount which the Reich is lacking. Legislation concerning exchange has been introduced on the same pattern as in the Reich.
“Finally we succeeded in causing the Dutch Government to supply all the amounts which the Reich and the German administration in the Netherlands need, so that these expenses do not burden the Reich budget in any way.
“Sums of guilders have been made available to redeem the occupation marks to the amount of about 36 million; an additional 100 million for the purposes of the occupation army, especially for extension of the airports; 50 million for the purchase of raw materials to be shipped to the Reich, so far as they are not booty; and amounts to guarantee the unrestricted transfer of the savings of the Dutch workers brought into the Reich, to their families, et cetera. Finally, the rate of exchange of the occupation marks, set at first by the Army High Command in the proportion of 1 guilder to 1.50 Reichsmark, has been reduced to the correct proportion of 1 guilder to 1.33 Reichsmark.
“Above all, however, it was possible to obtain the consent of the President of the Bank of The Netherlands, Trip, to a measure suggested by Commissioner General Fischböck and approved by the General Field Marshal, namely the unrestricted mutual obligation of accepting each other’s currency. That means that the Bank of The Netherlands is bound to accept any amount of Reichsmark offered to it by the Reich Bank and in return to supply Dutch guilders at the rate of 1.33, that is, 1 Reichsmark equals 75 cents. The Reich Bank alone has control in these matters, not the Bank of The Netherlands, which will be notified only of individual transactions.
“This ruling goes far beyond all pertinent rulings hitherto made with the political economies of neighboring countries, including the Protectorate, and actually represents the first step towards a currency union. In consideration of the significance of the agreement, which already affects the independence of the Dutch State, it is of special weight that the President of the Bank, Trip, who is very well-known in western banking and financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above sense.”
As you will see from the explanations which I shall have the honor of submitting to you, it was chiefly in the Netherlands that the Germans used all their ingenuity in extorting the means of payment. This spoliation will form the subject of the first chapter.
We shall then examine the use made by the occupiers of these means of payment. In a second chapter we shall discuss the black market; in a third, we shall consider the acquisition made in a manner only outwardly regular; a fourth chapter will be devoted to various kinds of spoliation. Finally, we shall touch upon the chief consequences to the Netherlands of this economic pillage.
Chapter 1, German seizure of means of payment.
A.) Indemnity for occupation costs.
I have already had the privilege, Gentlemen, of explaining under what conditions and within what limit, by virtue of the Hague Convention, the occupying power may raise contributions in money for the maintenance of its army of occupation.
I shall confine myself to reminding the Tribunal that these costs which are charged to the occupied countries can include only the costs of billeting, feeding, and possibly of paying those soldiers strictly necessary for the occupation of territories.
The Germans knowingly ignored these principles by imposing upon the Netherlands the payment of an indemnity for the maintenance of their troops which was far out of proportion to the needs of the latter.
According to information furnished by the Netherlands Government, which is contained in three reports (the reports of Trip, Hirschfeld, and the Minister of Finance) which I submit as Document Number RF-123, the following sums were exacted on the pretext of being indemnity for the maintenance of occupation troops: 1940 (7 months), 477 million guilders; 1941, 1,124 million guilders; 1942, 1,181 million guilders; 1943, 1,328 million guilders; 1944, 1,757 million guilders; 1945 (4 months only), 489 million guilders. That makes a total of 6,356 million guilders.
A sum as considerable as this constitutes a veritable war tribute raised on the pretext of the maintenance of an army of occupation. Germany thus fraudulently circumvented the regulations of the Hague Convention to seize a considerable amount of means of payment.
B.) Clearing.
In 1931 Germany, faced with economic and financial difficulties, declared a general moratorium on her previous commitments. Nevertheless, in order to be able to continue her foreign commercial operations, she had concluded with most of the other countries, notably with the Netherlands, agreements making possible the settling of commercial debts and, to a certain extent, of financial debts, on the basis of the exchange system called “clearing.”
Before the war there existed on the Netherlands “clearing” an excess of imports from Germany. But after the first months of occupation there was, on the contrary, a considerable excess of exports to Germany, whereas the receipts coming from that country dropped perceptibly.
From the month of June 1940 onward the Germans exacted from the Dutch declarations of foreign currency, gold, precious metals, securities, and foreign credits, as can be seen from the Ordinance of 24 June 1940, submitted as Document Number RF-95. Moreover, the Dutch could, by virtue of the same ordinance, be obliged to sell their stocks to the Bank of The Netherlands.
The German Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, forced the Bank of The Netherlands to make advances in guilders to maintain equilibrium in clearing, since Germany could furnish no equivalent in merchandise. On the other hand, it was decided that the clearing system should be utilized for the delivery of merchandise as well as for the payment of any debts.
In fact the Germans could buy merchandise and transferable securities in Holland without furnishing any equivalent. The credits in marks of the Dutch sellers were blocked in the Bank of The Netherlands which, on its part, had been obliged to make an equivalent advance on the clearing exchange.
To attempt to limit the fall of the Dutch account on the clearing exchange, and to avoid the transfer by this means of guilders or of transferable stock into Germany, on 8 October 1940, the Secretary General of Netherlands Finance imposed a large tax on the marks that were blocked on the clearing exchange.
However, under date of 31 March 1941, the credit of the Netherlands exceeded 400 million guilders, which in fact had been advanced by the Netherlands Government. At this point the occupiers demanded:
1) That a sum of 300 million guilders be withdrawn from the balance of 400 million and deposited in the German Treasury under the heading of “Military Occupation Costs Incurred ‘Outside’ The Netherlands,” and this was independent of payments already made by that country for the occupation costs.
2) By a decision of the Reich Commissioner, under date of 31 March 1941, reported in the Verordnungsblatt in France, Number 14, which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-124, payment operations with the Reich were no longer to pass through the clearing exchange but to be operated directly from bank to bank, which would create direct credits of the Netherlands banks on the German banks at the imposed exchange of 100 Reichsmark for 75.36 guilders.
3) By a decree of the same date, 31 March 1941, which I submit as Document Number RF-125, the tax on blocked marks, created on 8 October 1940 by the Netherlands authorities, was abolished.
Faced with this situation, particularly dangerous to the Netherlands treasury, Mr. Trip resigned his position as Secretary General for Finance and President of The Netherlands Bank.
The Reich Commissioner replaced him with Rost von Tonningen, a notorious collaborator who complied with all the demands of the occupying power.
As the private banks were unwilling to keep credits in marks at a rate very disadvantageous to the real parity of 100 Reichsmark to 75.36 guilders, they transferred their credits in marks to the Bank of The Netherlands. The credit account of the Institute of Exports to Germany, through operations with that country, rose considerably; while the credit balance as of 1 April 1941 amounted to 235 million guilders, it was to rise by 1 May 1945, to 4,488 million guilders.
According to information given by the Netherlands Government, this credit was accounted for by purchases of all kinds of merchandise made by the Germans in Holland, of transferable stock or other valuable papers, by payment of services imposed upon Dutch enterprises, the wages of workers deported to Germany, and the liquidation debts incurred by the occupiers.
Apart from these two methods—indemnities for the occupation troops and clearing—the Germans procured resources for themselves in another way—by imposing collective fines, and this in violation of the provisions of Article 50 of the Hague Convention.
In the course of the occupation, under every pretext, the Germans imposed, by way of reprisal or intimidation, considerable fines upon the municipalities. These fines had to be paid by the inhabitants, with the exception of persons of German nationality, members of pro-Nazi associations (NSB, Waffen-SS, NSKK, Society for Technical Aid Services of the Dutch-German cultural community), and persons working for the Germans. According to information which has been obtained up to the present, of only 62 municipalities the total fines thus imposed amounted to a minimum of 20,243,024 guilders. This is based on testimony of the Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-126.
From the same testimony, in the archives forgotten by the Germans at The Hague, there have been discovered two copies of letters relative to these collective fines. According to the first of these copies, which is a letter of 8 March 1941, collective fines amounting to 18 million guilders had been raised at the beginning of the year 1941. From the second, we learn that Hitler had given the order to employ this sum for National Socialist propaganda in the Netherlands. I quote:
“Reich Commissioner, The Hague, 1808, 8 March 1941.
“To Liaison Headquarters, Berlin, 1720 hours; to be submitted immediately to Reichsleiter M. Bormann.
“A sum of 18.5 million guilders representing contributions exacted as reprisals from some Dutch cities, will arrive in the next few days. The Reich Commissioner is inquiring whether the Führer has earmarked this sum for a special purpose or if it is to be used in the same way as the Führer has previously ordered in the case of confiscated enemy property. At that time the Führer stipulated that these sums should be spent in the Netherlands for the needs of the community under the proper political considerations.
“Heil Hitler!”—Signed—“Schmidt, Münster, Commissioner General.”
This, then, is the translation of the answer, Document Number RF-126:
“Obersalzberg, 19 March 1941, 1000; Number 4.
“Reichsleiter M. Bormann. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: One moment! Some of the copies which you have just submitted to us don’t seem to be accurate and the passage which you have just been reading is omitted from some of them.
[Another copy of the document was presented to the President.]
I now have another copy of the document from which you have read. The two copies which have been handed up are not identical.
M. GERTHOFFER: The document has possibly been improperly numbered. There are two documents, Number RF-126, which should have been indicated as RF-126(1), and RF-126(2). The representative of the Government of The Netherlands certifies the accuracy of the translation of the first copy; and in the second RF-126 document the same representative of the Netherlands Government certifies the existence of the copy of the answer from the headquarters of the Führer.
THE PRESIDENT: The first document is the one you have just read out. The second document begins with the words, “J’ai soumis aujourd’hui.” Is that the second document to which you are referring?
M. GERTHOFFER: It is the second document.
THE PRESIDENT: Could we see the originals? They are two different documents, are they? But they both begin in exactly the same way.
M. GERTHOFFER: The two documents have been submitted by the Netherlands Government. The representative of the Government of The Netherlands who has delivered them certifies that these two documents were found in the Netherlands among German papers.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
M. GERTHOFFER: The Dutch Government was obliged to make important payments into the German account; and in the reports submitted as Document Number RF-123, it is clearly stated that:
1) The Germans required that a sum of 300 million guilders, which was written to the credit of the Bank of The Netherlands, be used for the needs of their army of occupation outside the Netherlands and that a sum of 76 million guilders in gold be deposited for the same use. The total which the Netherlands had to pay under this pretext, namely, the maintenance of armies of occupation in other countries, was 376 million guilders.
2) From June 1941 on, the Netherlands was obliged to pay, as a contribution to the expenses of the war against Russia, a monthly sum of 37 million guilders, of which a part was payable in gold. The total of the sum that Germany raised under this heading is 1,696 million guilders.
3) The Bank of The Netherlands was obliged to undertake the redemption of Reichskreditkasse notes to the sum of 133 million guilders.
4) The costs of the civilian German government in Holland were charged to that country and amounted to 173 million guilders.
5) The Dutch Treasury was, moreover, obliged to pay 414 million guilders to the Reich account, covering divers expenses, such as wages of Dutch workers deported to Germany, the costs of evacuation of certain regions, costs of the demolition of fortifications, so-called costs for guarding railroads, funds placed at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner, and for various industries utilized by the Germans.
6) The Germans in July 1940 seized 816 bars of gold bullion belonging to the Bank of The Netherlands, which were in the wreck of a Dutch ship sunk at Rotterdam, which represented, including costs of recovery, 21 million guilders.
7) The Government of The Netherlands was obliged to bear annual expenses of 1,713 million guilders to assure the financing of new administrative services imposed on Holland by the occupying power.
In this way, Holland lost 8,565 million guilders. Altogether, including the raising of the gold from a ship sunk in the Meuse, the payments actually made to Germany amount to 11,380 million guilders. If these costs are added to the costs of occupation and clearing, the total of the financial charges imposed on Holland during the occupation amounts to the sum of 22,224 million guilders.
These operations had serious consequences for the economy of the Netherlands. Indeed, the gold supply, which on 1 April 1940 amounted to 1,236 million guilders, had, by 1 April 1945, fallen to 932 million guilders, owing to German levies.
The paper money in circulation, on the contrary, had risen from 1,127 million guilders on 1 April 1940, to 5,468 million guilders on 1 April 1945.
When the Germans occupied the Netherlands, a great portion of the gold of the Bank of The Netherlands had been sent abroad.
However, the Germans, under various pretexts, seized all the gold that was found in the vaults of the bank. I recall that, under the heading of indemnity for occupation, they collected 75 million gold guilders; and for the forced contribution of the Netherlands in the war against Russia, they demanded about 14.4 million gold guilders.
Rost von Tonningen, Secretary General of Finance and President of the Bank of The Netherlands, appointed by the Germans, wrote on 18 December 1943 to the Reich Commissioner that there had not been any gold in Holland since the preceding March. The copy of this letter is submitted as Document Number RF-127.
A document discovered by the United States Army, listed under Number ECR-174, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-128, consists of a report of the Commissioner of the Bank of The Netherlands of 12 June 1941. It, too, states that the gold reserve of the Bank of The Netherlands amounted, on 12 June 1941, to 1,021.8 million guilders, of which only 134.6 million guilders were in Holland, the rest being either in England, South Africa, or the United States. The same report specifies that all the gold in Holland had been removed.
Not only did the Germans seize the gold of the Bank of The Netherlands, but they also made requisitions of the gold and other means of foreign payment in the possession of the population. The occupying power obliged private individuals to deposit gold which was in their possession with the Bank of The Netherlands, after which this gold was requisitioned and handed over to the Reichsbank. A sum of approximately 71.3 million guilders was paid in this way to the public in exchange for the requisitioned gold.
In the same way also the Germans bought from the public various foreign stocks to a sum of 13,224,000 guilders, and Swedish Government securities to a sum of 4,623,000 guilders.
With important financial means which they had at their disposal, the Germans proceeded to make large purchases in Holland. Such purchases, made with funds extorted from the Netherlands, cannot be considered as having been made in exchange for a real equivalent, but realized only by fictitious payments.
The Germans, in addition to numerous cases of requisitions which were followed by no kind of settlement, proceeded to illicit purchases on the black market and purchases outwardly regular. They thus procured a quantity of things of all kinds, leaving to the population only a minimum of products insufficient to insure their vital needs.
In the second chapter of this presentation we shall examine the illicit purchases on the black market; and in a third chapter, the purchases that were carried out in seemingly regular ways.
Chapter 2, the black market.
As in all other occupied countries, in Holland the Germans seized considerable quantities of merchandise on the black market, in violation of the legislation on rationing which they themselves had imposed.
It has not been possible, in view of the clandestine nature of the operations, to determine even approximately the quantities of all kinds of objects which the Germans seized by this dishonest means. However, the secret report of the German Colonel Veltjens, which I had the honor of submitting this morning under Exhibit Number RF-112 (Document Number PS-1765) gives us for a period of 5 months, from July to the end of November, some indications of the scope of the German purchases. I quote a passage from the Veltjens report:
“In the Netherlands, since the beginning of the action, the following purchases were made and paid for by ordinary bank remittances: Non-ferrous metals, 6,706,744 Reichsmark; textiles, 55,285,568 Reichsmark; wool, 753,878 Reichsmark; leather, skins, and hides, 4,723,130 Reichsmark; casks, 254,982 Reichsmark; furniture, 272,990 Reichsmark; food and comestibles, 590,859 Reichsmark; chemical and cosmetic products, 152,191 Reichsmark; various iron and steel wares, 3,792,166 Reichsmark; rags, 543,416 Reichsmark; motor oil, 52,284 Reichsmark; uncut diamonds, 25,064 Reichsmark; sundries, 531,890 Reichsmark. Total: 73,685,162 Reichsmark.”
These purchases were paid for by checks on the banks. A large quantity of other merchandise, the amount of which it has not been possible to determine, was paid for by cash with guilders coming from the so-called occupation indemnity.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
M. GERTHOFFER: In Chapter 3, which deals with the economic plundering of the Netherlands, we will treat the question of purchases of apparent regularity from information provided for us by the Government of The Netherlands.
Industrial production.
From testimony given by the representative of the Dutch Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-129, it is clear that the Germans utilized to their own profit the greater part of the industrial potential of the Netherlands; all important stocks which were in the factories were thus absorbed. The value of these stocks was not less than 800 million guilders. Moreover, the occupants proceeded to the removal of a large amount of machinery. In certain cases these requisitions were not even followed by fictitious settlements. It has not yet been possible to establish a balance sheet of these spoliations, which often included all the machinery of an industry.
As an example, we may indicate that on a requisition order of 4 March 1943, coming from the Reich Commissioner, all the machinery and technical equipment, including the drawings and blueprints of all the workshops and accessories of the blast furnaces of an important factory, were removed without any indemnity and transported to the vicinity of Brunswick for the Hermann Göring Works. This is shown in the document I submit as Document Number RF-130.
The Germans had set up in all the occupied countries a certain number of organizations charged specially with the pillaging of machines. They had given them the name of Machine Pool Office. These organizations, which were under the armament inspection, received demands from German industry for means of production and had to fulfill these demands by requisitions on the occupied countries.
Moreover, groups of technicians were charged with locating, dismantling, and transporting the machinery to Germany. The organization of these official groups of pillagers can be learned from German documents which are to be brought to your attention when the special case of Belgium will be outlined to you.
We learn from the report of 1 March 1944, addressed to the military commandant, that the Machine Pool Office of The Hague could satisfy only a small proportion of the demands. Thus, under date of 1 January 1944, these demands totalled 677 million Reichsmark, whereas in the month of January only 61 million marks worth of machinery had been delivered as against the new demands of 87 million which made a total demand for machinery of 703 million Reichsmark at the end of January 1944. This is shown in a document submitted as Document Number RF-131.
Before leaving the Netherlands the Germans effected large-scale destruction with a strategic aim, so they said, but above all with the desire to do damage. When they demolished factories, they removed beforehand and transported to Germany the machinery which they could dismantle, as well as the raw materials. They acted in this manner particularly with respect to the Phillips factories in Eindhoven, Hilversum, and Bussum; the oil dumps of Amsterdam and Pernes; the armament factories of Breda, Tilburg, Berg-op-Zoom, and Dordrecht. These facts are dealt with in the report of the economic officer attached to the German military commander in Holland, under date of 9 October 1944, which I submit as Document Number RF-132.
The same report gives some information on the organization of German looters specialized in the removal of machinery. I give here some extracts:
“The Phillips Works at Eindhoven was the first and the most important military objective to be dealt with.”
A little farther on the writer continues:
“Before the invasion by the enemy we succeeded in destroying these important continental works for the manufacture of radio valves, lamps, and radio apparatus. This was done after Volunteer Commando 7”—Fwi.Kdo. 7—“had previously removed the most valuable metals and special machines.”
Farther on he writes:
“Already on 7 September a commando unit transported in trucks to the Reich most important non-ferrous metals (wolfram, manganese, copper) and very valuable apparatus from the Phillips Works. Volunteer Commando 7 continued to participate in the transfer of finished and semi-finished products as well as machines from the Phillips Works. Due to the enemy’s occupation of Eindhoven, the removal came to a stop. Then the clearing out of the branch factories of Phillips at Hilversum and Bussum took place. Here it was possible to remove completely all stocks of non-ferrous metal products, finished and semi-finished goods, machinery, and blueprints and designs necessary for production.
“At the same time removal commandos were detailed to the heads of the various provincial branch offices under the representative of the Reich Ministry of Armaments and War Production in the Netherlands.
“In agreement with the forementioned services and the competent civil offices, these commandos carried through the removal of important raw materials and products, as well as machinery. Through the unswerving and commendable zeal of officers, officials, Sonderführer, and enlisted men it was possible, during the month of September, to remove to the Reich considerable stocks of raw materials and products and to supply the troops with useful material. This action was initiated and directed in the western and southern districts of the Netherlands by the officer in charge of volunteers in the Netherlands.”
Then the writer ends, by saying:
“For the task of evacuation and for the preparation of the ARLZ measures within the area of 15th Army Command, a squad under the command of Captain Rieder was detached by Volunteer Commando 7 which also had to act as liaison with the quartermaster staff of the 15th Army Command. In this case, too, in close co-operation with the civil officers and Department IVa of 15th Army Command, good work was done by the removal of raw materials and scarce goods as well as machinery. These actions commenced only at the end of the month covered by this report.”
Requisition of raw materials.
Together with the removal of machinery the Government of The Netherlands gives us exact figures on the stocks of raw materials and manufactured articles. Apart from the stocks located in the factories, the Germans acquired considerable quantities of raw materials and manufactured articles amounting to not less than 1,000 million guilders. This evaluation does not include the destruction resulting from military operations, which ranges around 300 million guilders.
Agriculture.
The Germans proceeded to make requisitions and wholesale purchases of agricultural produce and livestock. A final estimate of these requisitions, amounting to a minimum of 300 million guilders, is as yet impossible. To give an idea of their magnitude we point out that at the end of the year of 1943 the Germans had seized 600,000 hogs, 275,000 cows, and 30,000 tons of preserved meats, as is given in the testimony of the representative of the Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-133.
In passing, we point out—although this question will be taken up again by my colleague in his presentation of war crimes against persons—that on 17 April 1944, without any apparent strategic reason, 20 hectares of cultivated lands were flooded at Wieringermeer.
Transport and communications.
The Germans made enormous requisitions of transport and communication material. It is not yet possible to draw up an exact inventory of them. Nevertheless, the information given by the Netherlands Government makes it possible to form an idea of the magnitude of these spoliations.
I submit as Document Number RF-134 information given by the representative of the Netherlands Government concerning transport and communication. This is a summary of it:
(a) Railways—of 890 locomotives, 490 were requisitioned; of 30,000 freight cars, 28,950 were requisitioned; of 1,750 passenger cars, 1,446 were requisitioned; of 300 electric trains, 215 were requisitioned; of 37 Diesel-engine trains, 36 were requisitioned. In general, the little material left by the Germans was badly damaged either by wear and tear, by military operations, or by sabotage. In addition to rolling stock, the Germans sent to the Reich considerable quantities of rails, signals, cranes, turntables, repair cars, et cetera.
(b) Tramways—the equipment was removed from The Hague and Rotterdam to German cities. Thus, for example, some 50 tramcars with motors and 42 trailers were sent to Bremen and Hamburg. A considerable amount of rails, cables, and other accessories were removed and transported to Germany. The motor buses of the tramway companies were likewise taken by the occupying power.
(c) The Germans seized the greater part of the motorcars, motorcycles, and about 1 million bicycles. They left the population only those machines which would not run.
(d) Navigation—the Germans seized a considerable number of barges and river boats, as well as a considerable part of the merchant fleet, totalling about 1.5 million tons.
(e) Postal equipment—the Germans seized a large quantity of telephone and telegraph apparatus, cables, and other accessories, which has not yet been computed; 600,000 radio sets were confiscated.
I now come to Chapter 49, miscellaneous spoliation.
Forced labor demanded by the occupier.
From information given by the Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-135, a great number of Dutch workers were obliged to work either in Holland or in Germany. About 550,000 were deported to the Reich, which represents a considerable number of hours of work lost to the national production of the Netherlands.
Plunder of the royal palaces.
The furniture, private archives, stable equipment and carriages, and wine cellars of the royal house were plundered by the Germans. In particular, the Palace of Noordeinde was completely looted of its contents, including furniture, linen, silverware, paintings, tapestries, art objects, and household utensils. A certain number of similar objects were removed from the Palace of Het Loo and were to be used in a convalescent home for German generals.
The archives of the royal family likewise were stolen. This is shown by a report given by the representative of the Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-136.
Pillage of the city of Arnhem.
Besides numerous cases of individual looting, which are not dealt with in this present statement, there was a systematically organized pillage of entire cities. In this manner the town of Arnhem was despoiled in October and November 1944. The Germans brought in miners from Essen who, under military orders, proceeded in specialized gangs to dismantle all the removable furniture and send it and objects of all kinds to Germany. This is shown in the testimony given by the representative of the Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-137.
The consequences of economic plundering in the Netherlands are considerable. We shall just mention that the enormous decrease of the national capital will result in production being below the needs of the country for many years yet to come. But the gravest consequence is that affecting the public health, which is irreparable.
The excessive rationing, over many years, of food, clothing, and fuel, ordered by the occupiers to increase the amount of spoliation, has brought about an enfeeblement of the population. The average calorie consumption by the inhabitant, which varied between 2,800 and 3,000, dropped in large proportions to about 1,800 calories, finally to fall even to 400 calories in April 1945.
Starting from the summer of 1944, the food situation became more and more serious. The Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, forbade the transport of foodstuffs between the western and northern zones of the country. This measure, which was not justified by any military operations, seems only to have been dictated by hatred for the population, only to persecute and intimidate them, to weaken and terrorize them.
Not until about December 1944 was this inhuman measure lifted; but it was too late. Famine had already become general. The death rate in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Delft and Gouda increased considerably, rising from 198 to 260 percent. Diseases which had almost been eliminated from these regions reappeared. Such a situation will have irreparable consequences for the future of the population. These facts are given in two reports which I submit as Documents Numbers RF-139 and 140.
By ordering such severe rationing measures in order to get for themselves products which were indispensable to the existence of the Netherlands, which is contrary to all principles of international law, I may say that the German leaders committed one of their gravest crimes.
My statements concerning Holland are concluded. My colleague, M. Delpech, will now state the case for Belgium.
M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. President, Gentlemen, I have the honor of presenting to the Tribunal a statement on the economic plundering of Belgium.
As early as 1940 the National Socialist leaders intended to invade Belgium, Holland, and northern France. They knew that they should find there raw materials, equipment, and the factories which would enable them to increase their war potential.
As soon as Belgium had been occupied, the German military administration did its best to reap the maximum benefit. To this end the German leaders took a series of measures to block all existing resources and to seize all means of payment. Important supplies built up during the years 1936 to 1938 were the object of enormous requisitions. The machines and equipment of numerous enterprises were dismantled and sent to Germany, bringing about the closing down of numerous factories and in many sectors an enforced consolidation.
Given the highly industrial character of this country, the occupying authorities imposed, under threats of various kinds, a very heavy tribute upon Belgian industries. Nor was agriculture spared.
The third part of the French economic exposé deals with a study of all these measures. This will be the subject of four chapters.
Chapter 1 deals with the German seizure of the means of payment. The second chapter will be devoted to clandestine purchases and an account of the black market. Chapter 3 will deal with purchases of apparent regularity while the fourth chapter will concern impressment.
In a fifth chapter the acquisition of Belgian investments in foreign concerns will be presented to the Tribunal, before concluding and emphasizing the effect of the German intrusion on the public health. Finally, a few remarks will be presented concerning the conduct of the Germans after they had annexed the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Chapter 1, German seizure of means of payment.
To enslave the country from an economic point of view, the most simple procedure was to secure the possession of the greater part of the means of payment and to make impossible the export of currency and valuables of all kinds.
There is an ordinance of 17 June 1940 which forbids the export of currency and valuables of all kinds. This ordinance was published in the Verordnungsblatt for Belgium, Northern France, and Luxembourg and will hereafter be called by its usual abbreviated form VOBEL. This ordinance was published in VOBEL, Number 3, and was submitted under Document Number RF-99. In the VOBEL of the same day appeared a notice dated 9 May 1940, which regulated the issuing of Reichskreditkasse notes to provide the occupation troops with legal tender. By this means the Germans made possible the buying, without supplying any equivalent, all they desired in a country abounding with products of all kinds, without the inhabitants being able to protect their possessions against the invader.
The occupier used, in addition, three other methods for securing the greater part of the means of payment. These three methods were: The creation of an issuing bank, the imposition of war tribute under the pretext of maintaining occupation troops, and the working of a system of clearing to their profit alone. These measures will be fully dealt with in three sections which now follow.
Establishment of an issuing bank.
As soon as they arrived in Belgium the Germans established an office for supervising banks, which was entrusted at the same time with the control of the National Bank of Belgium. This was ordered on 14 June 1940—VOBEL, Number 2, which is submitted as Document Number RF-141.
At this time the directorate of the National Bank of Belgium was outside the occupied territories; but the amount of notes on hand would have been insufficient to insure normal circulation, as a great number of Belgians had fled before the invasion, taking with them a large quantity of paper money. These are, at least, the reasons which the Germans put forward for establishing an issuing bank by the ordinance of 27 June 1940, published in VOBEL, Numbers 4 and 5, which I submit as Document Number RF-142.
By virtue of this last ordinance, 27 June 1940, the new issuing bank with a capital of 150 million Belgian francs, 20 percent of which had been issued in coin, received the monopoly for issuing paper money in Belgian francs. As a matter of fact, the National Bank of Belgium no longer had the right to issue money. The cover of the issuing bank was not represented by a gold balance but: 1) by credits from discount operations and loans granted in conformity with Article 8 of the new statutes; 2) monies owed to the National Bank of Belgium, as well as coin which was in circulation for the account of the public treasury; 3) finally, the third means of cover—foreign currency and francs, particularly German money, including Reichskreditkasse notes as well as assets at the Reichsbank, at the Office of Compensation for the Reich, and the Reichskreditkasse.
The German Commissioner who had been appointed by a decree of 26 June 1940 became the controller of the issuing bank—decree of 26 June 1940, published in VOBEL, Number 3, Page 88, and submitted as Document Number RF-143.
After the return to Belgium of the directors of the National Bank, on 10 July 1940, an agreement between this bank and the new issuing bank was effected by the nomination of the head of the new issuing bank to the position of director of the National Bank of Belgium.
The issuing bank proceeded to put out a large amount of notes, so much so that on 8 May 1940 the currency in circulation amounted to 29,800 million Belgian francs. On 29 December 1943 it amounted to 83,200 million Belgian francs, and on 31 August 1944 it was 100,200 million Belgian francs, that is to say, an increase of 236 percent.
The issuing bank functioned; but not without certain difficulties, either with the military command, its own staff, or with the National Bank of Belgium. Actually, besides its function of issuing, the new bank had as a principal function operations relating to postal orders and to currency, as well as operations with German authorities, notably as concerned the occupation indemnity and, above all, clearing.
The National Bank of Belgium lost its right to issue paper money but resumed its traditional operations for private as well as state accounts, particularly transactions on the open market.
These data, Gentlemen, are corroborated by the final report of the German military administration in Belgium, ninth part, dealing with currency and finance. This final report of the German military administration in Belgium was discovered by the United States Army, and it is a document to which we shall refer many times. It is Document Number ECH-5 and is submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-144.
The ninth part, which is of interest here, was written by three chiefs of the administration section of Brussels: Wetter, Hofrichter, and Jost.
In spite of the establishment of the issuing bank, Reichskreditkasse notes were valid in Belgium until August 1942; but it was the National Bank of Belgium that was obliged to absorb these notes in September 1944, and on account of this, Belgian economy suffered a loss of 3,567 million Belgian francs. This number is given by Wetter in the foregoing report, Page 112, the excerpt of the report being submitted as Document Number RF-145.
Moreover, from information given by the Belgian Government, the issuing bank had in hand at the moment of liberation of the territory a sum totalling 644 million in Reichskreditkasse notes; and further, it had assets in a transfer account of 12 million Reichsmark on the books of the Reichskreditkasse, that is to say, a total loss of 656 million Belgian francs—the figure given in a report of the Belgian Government, which is submitted as Document Number RF-146.
Occupation costs.
Let us now take the occupation costs. Article 49 of the Hague Convention stipulates that if the occupier makes a levy in money, it will be only for the needs of the army of occupation or for the administration of the territory. The occupier can, therefore, impose a tax for the maintenance of his army; but this must not exceed the effective force strictly necessary. On the other hand, the words “needs of the army of occupation” do not mean the expenses of armament and equipment but solely the costs of billeting, food, and normal pay, which excludes, in all cases, luxury expenses.
Moreover, Article 52 authorizes the occupying authority to exact, for the use of its army, requisitions in kind and in service on the express condition that they shall be proportionate to the resources of the country and that they should not involve the population with the obligation to take part in military operations against their own country. The same Article 52 stipulates, moreover, that levies in kind will be, as far as possible, paid in cash.
Consequently the Germans exacted a monthly indemnity of 1,000 million up to August 1941. On that date the indemnity was increased to 1,500 million per month. By the end of August 1944, the payments under that designation totaled 67,000 million Belgian francs. This number cannot be contested by the Defense, since in the report quoted, Pages 103 and following, the said Wetter wrote in June 1944 that the total sum of Belgian francs paid for the army of occupation was 64,181 million—the passage in the report is submitted as Document Number RF-147.
But this sum of 64,000 million was completely disproportionate to the needs of the occupying army. This is shown in the report of Wetter, in a passage which is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-148. On Page 245 of this report it is said that on 17 January 1941 the general who was Commander-in-Chief in Belgium had asked the High Command of the Army if the indemnity covered only the expenses of occupation. This point of view was not accepted by the commanding general, who, by order of 29 October 1941, specified that the indemnity of occupation was to be used not only for the needs of the occupying army but also for those of the operating armies. Moreover, on Page 11 of the original German text of the same report it is written—and I shall read to the Tribunal an excerpt which will be found in the document book under Document Number RF-149, the second paragraph:
“As the increase in the expenses of the Wehrmacht made it clear that it would be impossible to manage with this amount, the military administration demanded that the calculation of the occupation costs should be straightened out by deducting all expenses foreign to the occupation proper. This concerned especially the larger purchases of all kinds which the military services made in Belgium, such as horses, motor vehicles, equipment, all of which was designated for other territories and was written off as occupation costs.
“By a decision of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, dated 11 June 1941, the financing of other than true occupation costs was to be met by clearing. To comply with this decree, beginning in July 1941, the administration of the military commander ordered a monthly report to be rendered of all expenses other than those required for the occupation but which so far had been paid under the account of occupation costs, in order to have these expenses refunded through clearing. Thanks to this, large sums could be recovered and put into the account of occupation costs.”
Before concluding the examination of this point concerning war tribute, that tribute called occupation costs, it is necessary to point out that the Germans had already demanded, by the decree of 17 December 1940, submitted as Document Number RF-150, that the costs of billeting their troops should be charged to Belgium. Owing to this, the country had to meet expenses totalling 5,900 million francs, which went for billeting German troops, costs of installation, supplies, and furniture.
In his report Wetter writes on Page 104—the excerpt submitted as Document Number RF-147—that at the end of June 1944 the Belgian payments for billeting troops totalled 5,423 million francs.
Clearing.
We now come to the third part of German plundering—clearing. The issuing of Reichskreditkasse notes and the war tribute, called “occupation costs,” were not sufficient for Germany. Her leaders created a system of clearing which enabled them to procure, unduly, means of payment totalling 62,200 million Belgian francs.
As soon as they arrived in Belgium, by the decrees of 10 July, 2 August, and 5 December, 1940—which appear in the document book under the Numbers RF-151, RF-152, and RF-153—the Germans specified:
1) That all payments on debts of people resident in Belgium to their creditors in Germany had to be paid into an account called the “Deutsche Verrechnungskasse, Berlin.” This was an open account on the books of the National Bank of Belgium in Brussels, an account kept in belgas in spite of the prohibition on currency of 17 June 1940, the prohibition to which I have already referred concerning the blocking of means of payment in the country.
By the decision of 4 August 1940, it was moreover prescribed that the carrying out of clearing would henceforth no longer be entrusted to the National Bank of Belgium but to the issuing bank in Brussels, which, as I have already had the honor of pointing out, had been established by the occupying power and was under their absolute control.
2) The Germans laid down a second measure whereby all debtors resident in the Reich should pay their Belgian creditors by way of the open account at the issuing bank in Brussels, at the following rate of exchange; 100 belgas to 40 marks, that is to say, 1 mark for 12.50 Belgian francs.
These arrangements, moreover, were extended to the countries occupied by Germany with a view to facilitating their operations in those countries; they were even extended to certain neutral countries by various similar decrees appearing in the ordinance book.
The mission of the issuing bank in Brussels consisted, therefore, on the one hand, of receiving payments from all persons or agencies established in Belgium which had foreign engagements and, on the other hand, to pay those persons or agencies established in Belgium which had foreign credit.
In other words, every time an exporter delivered goods to an importer of another country which belonged to the clearing system, it was the issuing bank which settled the invoice and which entered as equivalent, in the ledgers, a corresponding credit at the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse in Berlin—the German Clearing Institute in Berlin. In the case of imports, the inverse procedure was followed.
In fact, under the German direction, this system functioned to the detriment of the Belgian community which, at the moment of the liberation, was creditor in clearing to the extent of 62,665 million Belgian francs. It was the National Bank of Belgium which had been forced to make advances to the issuing bank to balance the account of the German Clearing Institute.
A large number of operations made through clearing had no commercial character whatever but were purely and simply military and political expenses.
From information given by the Belgian Government, the clearing operations could be summarized in the following manner—and I take the figures from a report of the Belgian Government previously cited, which has been presented as Document Number RF-146: Of the total transactions, 93 percent were Belgium-German clearing operations; merchandise amounted to 93 percent, and services 91 percent.
If one considers the part taken respectively by merchandise, services, or capital, one obtains a very significant picture. The entire clearing transactions of Belgium with foreign countries totalled, on 2 September 1944, the sum of 61,636 million Belgian francs, of which 57,298 million were for Belgium-German operations, 4,000 million only with France, 1,000 million with the Netherlands, and 929 million with other countries.
It is only in the sector of goods and services that the want of equilibrium is apparent due in large measure to requisitions of property and services made by Germany for her own account. It is known that the so-called exports affected especially metals and metal products, machines, and textile products, nine-tenths of which were seized by the Reich, which made itself thereby guilty of real spoliation.
As to the transfer of capital, during the first period of the occupation it was particularly intense. It concerned the forced realization of Belgian capital in foreign countries, as well as the forced cession to German groups of Belgian assets blocked in Germany. No effective compensation was given in exchange. The transfers made for services were principally for payments for Belgian labor in foreign countries.
The credit balance of these services on 2 September 1944 is as follows, in Belgian francs: Total clearing operations dealing with services, 20,016 million—that is to say, for payment of labor 73 percent of the total. For Germany alone, 18,227 million—that is, 72 percent of the total amount. For France only 1,621 million Belgian francs—that is to say, a very small part.
Not content with requisitioning workers for forced labor in Germany or in the occupied territories, the Germans compelled Belgium to bear the financial burden and imposed it either through the liquidation of the transferred savings in clearing or by the remittance of Belgian notes to the Directorate of the Reich Bank in Berlin for payment of workers in national currency.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to go into these clearing operations again? In each case of the various countries which have been dealt with, the same clearing operations have taken place, have they not? Then perhaps it is really unnecessary to do it over again for Belgium.
M. DELPECH: Very well, Your Honor. At all events, the Germans recognized the fact, and the figures taken from the report previously cited support the conclusions of our statement.
Before ending this chapter concerning German seizure of the means of payment, it is fitting that the attention of the Tribunal be brought to the order of 22 July 1940, by which the Germans fixed the rate of the Belgian franc at 8 Reichspfennig, that is to say 12.50 francs per mark; and in the forementioned report Wetter writes concerning this matter, on Pages 37 and 38, a passage which I ask the Tribunal’s permission to read and which is in the document book as Document Number RF-158.
“The de facto maintenance of the pre-war parity was moreover of considerable political importance because a large group of the population would have considered a sharp devaluation or a repeated change of parity as a maneuver of exploitation.”
The following observation in connection with this conception must be made: The occupiers had no need in Belgium to decree, with the view of promoting their economic exploitation, that the Belgian franc should have a lesser value when, as a matter of fact—contrary to what occurred in France—they had, at the moment they entered Belgium, instituted new currency over which they had the control.
Lastly, let us mention that Germany obliged the Vichy Government to deliver 221,730 kilos of gold amounting, at the 1939 value, to 9,500 million francs; but as France had returned this gold to the Bank of Belgium, this question will be treated under the economic exploitation of France.
Recapitulation.
To sum up, the means of payment seized by the army of occupation may be seen from the following figures:
Reichskreditkasse notes, 3,567 million; various bills and accounts on the books of the Reichskreditkasse, 656 million; war tribute under the pretext of occupation costs, 67,000 million; to which may be added the credit balance of clearing 62,665 million; total (in Belgian francs), 133,888 million.
The Germans thus seized no less than 130,000 million Belgian francs, which they used for outwardly regular purchases, for payment of their requisitions, and to make clandestine purchases on the black market. These so-called purchases and requisitions will be treated in the following chapters.
Chapter 2, clandestine purchases, black market.
As in all the other occupied territories, the Germans organized a black market in Belgium as early as October 1941.
According to a secret report on the black market, called “Final Report of the Control Office of the Military Commander in Belgium and in the North of France, Concerning the Legalized Emptying of the Black Market in Belgium and in the North of France,” a report covering the period from 13 March 1942 to 31 May 1943—Exhibit Number RF-159 (Document Number ECH-7) in the document book—the reasons given by the Germans for this organization of the black market are three in number:
1) To check competition on the black market between various German buyers; 2) to make the best use of the Belgian resources for the purposes of German war economy; 3) to do away with the pressure exercised on the general standard of prices and by this to avoid all danger of inflation which would result in endangering German currency itself.
This same report tells us, Pages 3 and following, that an actual administrative organization was set up by the Germans for carrying out this policy. The bookkeeping was done by the Clearing Institute of the Wehrmacht, which combined all the operations in its books. The direction of purchases was regulated by a central organization, the name of which changed as the years went by and which had a certain number of organizations subordinate to it, particularly a whole series of purchasing offices.
The central organization was set up in accordance with the decree of the military commander in Belgium, dated 20 February 1942. It was formed on the 13th of the following March; and as soon as it was created it received special directives from the delegate of the Reich Marshal, Defendant Göring. This delegate was Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens, of whom we spoke this morning.
This organization was only established to co-ordinate the legalization and direction of the black market, as had been determined upon, and planned following conferences between the Commissioner General and the Military Commander of Belgium with the Chief of the Armament Inspection. According to the terms of that agreement, which reinforced a declaration of 16 February 1942 emanating from the Reich Minister for Economics, the aim was to drain the black market and in accordance with directives, in a legal form, with the main idea of safeguarding the supply requirements of the German Reich.
This organization had its offices in Brussels. The purchases themselves were regulated by a certain number of specialized offices, the list of which is given on Page 5 of the forementioned report. These organisms received their orders from the Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft, which has already been mentioned at the beginning of the statement on the economic exploitation of Western Europe.
The role of Roges was very important in the organization of the black market. In effect it was four-fold:
1) The purchasing directives, once the authorization had been given by the central office in Brussels, were transmitted by Roges to the proper purchasing office.
2) The delivery of goods bought and marked for the Reich were made through Roges which took charge of their distribution in Germany. Pg578
3) Roges financed the operations.
4) It was Roges which was entrusted with paying the difference between the rate of purchase—generally very high because of the black market rate—and the fixed official rate of sale on the German domestic market. The difference was covered by an equalizing fund, supplied from the occupation costs account, to which the Reich Minister of Finance put sums at the disposal of Roges through the channel of the Ministry of Armament.
The forementioned report furnishes a complete series of interesting particulars on the functioning of the central organization itself. It is interesting to note that the central office in Brussels was instructed by order of the Military Commander in Belgium, dated 3 November 1942, to have a branch at Lille set up for the north of France. At the same time, the Brussels office was authorized to instruct its branch office at Lille. In the document book, under Document Number RF-160, a final report of the Lille office is mentioned. This report, drawn up on 20 May 1943, gives a whole series of interesting particulars on the functioning of this organization.
THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock now. M. Delpech, I think it would be the wish of the Tribunal, if it were possible, for you to omit any parts of this document which are on precisely the same principles with those which have already been submitted to us in connection with the other countries. If you could, I think that would be convenient for the Tribunal. Of course, if there are any essential differences in the treatment of Belgium then, no doubt, you would draw our attention to them.
M. DELPECH: Certainly, Your Honor.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 22 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, ‘Defense’ versus ‘Defence’. Unlike prior Blue Series volumes I and II, all French, German and eastern European names and terms include accents and umlauts: hence Führer and Göring, etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document's presentation and layout.
[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 5), by Various.]