Morning Session
LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, before picking up our line of proof against the Defendant Schacht, I would like to supply a point of information.
Yesterday the President of the Tribunal inquired with respect to Document Number EC-457, Exhibit Number USA-619. The question raised by the Tribunal was with respect to the words “in retirement” in the letterhead used by Schacht in writing to Hitler in 1932. This is the letter in which Schacht expressed his belief in the truth of the Nazi movement and in which he said that Hitler could always count upon him as a reliable assistant.
The letterhead has printed upon it “The President of the Reichsbank” and after that phrase there is typed the letters “a. D.”, and I understand that those letters are an abbreviation for a German phrase meaning “in retirement” and that it is customary, or it was customary, in Germany for retired officials to continue to use their titles with the letters “a. D.”
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
LT. BRYSON: Yesterday we had just about completed our proof with respect to the contribution of the Defendant Schacht to the preparation for war, and I wish to submit one more document on this point. This is Document Number EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626. It consists of a statement by George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I will quote therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the fourth paragraph:
“It was his”—Schacht’s—“financial ability that enabled the Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war machine which was necessary for its objectives in Europe and later throughout the world.
“The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary, while at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht’s resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably, without this complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler and the Nazis to develop an armed force sufficient to permit Germany to launch an aggressive war.”
We turn now. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Lieutenant Bryson, I am not sure that that gives a full or quite fair interpretation of the document. Don’t you think perhaps you ought to read the paragraph before?
LT. BRYSON: The preceding paragraph, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: “Dr. Schacht always attempted to play both sides of the fence. He told me, and I know he told both other American representatives in Berlin and various British representatives, that he disapproved of practically everything that the Nazis were doing. I recall on several occasions his saying, after the Nazi Party came into power, that if the Nazis were not stopped, they were going to ruin Germany and the rest of the world with it. I recall distinctly that he emphasized to me that the Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war.”
If the Court please, I would like to read also from the last paragraph:
“In my opinion Schacht was in no sense a captive of the Nazis. He was not compelled to devote his time and his capacities to their interest. His situation was such that he would most likely have been able either to work on much less restrained scale or to abstain from activity entirely. He continued to lend his services to the Nazi Government out of opportunism.”
We turn now to the third part of our case against Schacht. The evidence is clear that he willingly contributed his efforts to the Nazi conspiracy, knowing full well its aggressive designs. The Tribunal will recall our proof that Schacht was converted to the Nazi philosophy in 1931 and helped Hitler come to power in 1933. We will now prove, first, that Schacht personally favored aggression and, second, that in any event he knew Hitler’s aggressive intentions.
There is ample evidence to justify the conclusion that Schacht rearmed Germany in order to see fulfilled his strong belief in aggressive expansion as an instrument of German national policy. Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. He spoke against the Treaty of Versailles at Stuttgart as early as 1927. I offer in evidence Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of excerpts from speeches by Schacht. I quote from the top of Page 2: “The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its economic but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong.”
It is common knowledge that he strongly favored acquisition of colonial territory by Germany. However, he also favored acquisition of contiguous territory in Europe. On 16 April 1929 at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a later stage?
LT. BRYSON: At a later stage, if you please, Sir, in connection with another point.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
LT. BRYSON: On 16 April 1929, at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said:
“Germany can as a whole pay only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession and if, besides, somewhere on the earth, colonial territory will be made available to Germany.”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you quoting from?
LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-628 (Document 3726-PS), consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 24 August 1945. You will find it in the document book at the back, labelled “Interrogation of 24 August”. At the top of the first page of the interrogation this statement was quoted to Schacht, and his reply contains an admission of having made the statement. In his reply he said:
“That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to pay after this war will be proved in the future.”
I wish to point out that this is the very territory which was the subject of the armed aggression in September 1939.
In 1935 Schacht stated flatly that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. I offer in evidence Document EC-450, designated as Exhibit Number USA-629. This document consists of an affidavit of S. R. Fuller, Jr., together with a transcript of his conversation with Schacht at the American Embassy in Berlin on 23 September 1935. I wish to read from Page 6 of the document where there appears a statement by Schacht in the lower half of the page.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the conversation?
LT. BRYSON: The conversation occurred on 23 September 1935. The page number of this document is at the bottom, and I quote from Page 6:
“Schacht: ‘Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through negotiation, if possible; but if not, we shall take them.’ ”
In July 1936, when the rearmament program was well under way, Schacht again publicly spoke of the Versailles Treaty. This time his language contained an explicit threat of war. I refer the Tribunal again to Document EC-415, which I have previously introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of speeches by Schacht. I wish to read from the paragraph beginning in the middle of the first page:
“But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the peoples’ mind. That is because, deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the peoples’ conscience. The spirit of Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war; and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning.”
Later in the same year Schacht publicly advocated the doctrine of Lebensraum for the German people. I quote again from Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, being an excerpt from Schacht’s speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, on the second page, the last paragraph:
“Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice.”
In January 1937 Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies, at least by inference threatened a breach of the peace in demanding a colonial cession. I offer in evidence Document L-111, being Exhibit Number USA-630, and consisting of excerpts from a report under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State. I wish to read therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the second paragraph:
“He”—meaning Schacht—“stated the following:
“That the present condition of the German people was intolerable, desperate, and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would: (1) Guarantee European peace, (2) secure present European international boundaries, (3) reduce armaments, (4) establish a new form of a workable league of nations, and (5) abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population, a source for foodstuffs, fats, and raw materials.”
In December 1937 Ambassador Dodd noted in his diary that Schacht would be willing to risk war for the sake of new territory in Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd’s diary.
THE PRESIDENT: The proposal contained in Document L-111 was for cession of colonies, was it not?
LT. BRYSON: It was, Sir.
I turn now to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd’s diary. The entire diary has previously been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-58. I quote some notes on a conversation with Schacht on 21 December 1937, beginning near the bottom of the second page of Document EC-461, in the last paragraph:
“Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks; that is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler’s dictatorship, he, like most other eminent Germans, wishes annexation without war if possible; with war if the United States will keep hands off.”
THE PRESIDENT: There is another passage in that book, that diary. I am not sure; it probably is not the same date, but it is on the first page of the exhibit, I think—the third paragraph.
LT. BRYSON: The third paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it at a different time?
LT. BRYSON: It is a different time, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: September the 19th of what year?
LT. BRYSON: We will check that in the complete volume here, and I think in a minute I will be able to supply the date. In the meantime would you like me to read it, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you had better read it.
LT. BRYSON: “He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is absolutely committed to war; and the people, too, are ready and willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the dangers and are opposed. He concluded, ‘But we shall postpone it 10 years. Then it may be we can avoid war.’ ”
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you should read the next paragraph, too.
LT. BRYSON: “I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some 2 weeks ago and said, ‘I agree with you about commercial and financial matters in the main. But why do you not, when you speak before the public, tell the German people they must abandon a war attitude?’ He replied, ‘I dare not say that. I can speak only on my special subjects.’ ”
THE PRESIDENT: And the next one.
LT. BRYSON: And the next one:
“How, then, can German people ever learn the real dangers of war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used his influence with Hitler—‘a very great man’, he interjected—to prevent war. I said, ‘The German papers printed what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our countries, but not a word about the terrible effects and barbarism of war.’ He acknowledged that and talked very disapprovingly of the Propaganda Ministry which suppresses everything it dislikes. He added, as I was leaving ‘You know a party comes into office by propaganda and then cannot disavow it or stop it.’ ”
The date of his conversation was in September 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that those years are not stated in the document. It is rather misleading as it is.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, the exhibit which is in evidence will show the dates.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not blaming you; but it is misleading, because it looks like September the 19th and December the 21st, and as there were 3 years’ interval between, it makes a difference. That is right, isn’t it?
LT. BRYSON: Yes, that is right. I am sorry the excerpt simply shows the page numbers from the exhibit, and not the dates.
Schacht admittedly strained all the resources of Germany to build up a Wehrmacht which would provide Hitler with an instrument of realization of his desire for Lebensraum. In this connection I offer in evidence Document Number EC-369, Exhibit Number USA-631, consisting of a memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate, signed by Schacht, to Hitler, dated 7 January 1939. I wish to read the last paragraph of the first page:
“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It—the Reichsbank—therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility of financing the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible.”
It is clear that the “successful foreign policy” which Schacht thus attributed to rearmament included the Austrian and Czechoslovakian acquisitions. I offer in evidence Document EC-297(a), Exhibit Number USA-632, being a speech of Schacht’s in Vienna after the Anschluss in March 1938. I quote from the third page and the second full paragraph:
“Thank God, these things could not after all hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought. He bolstered it with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and finally gave the external form to the internal union between Germany and Austria.”
With respect to the Sudetenland I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-611, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-622, being a speech by Schacht; EC-611—but I will not read it, Sir—being a speech by Schacht on 29 November 1938, shortly after the Munich settlement. I have earlier read the pertinent remark attributing Hitler’s success at that conference to the rearmament made possible by Schacht’s financial and economic measures.
This line of proof shows that Schacht entertained an aggressive philosophy with respect to territorial expansion and justifies the conclusion that he allied himself with Hitler because of their common viewpoint.
We turn now to prove that, whether or not Schacht wanted war, he at least knew Hitler planned military aggression for which he was creating the means. He had numerous discussions with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. He knew that Hitler was intent upon expansion to the east, which would mean war, and that Hitler felt he must present the German people with a military victory. I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-633 (Document 3727-PS), consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 13 October 1945, and I read from the second page at the end of the second question:
“Q: ‘What was there in what he’ ”—meaning Hitler—“ ‘said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?’
“A: ‘That is in Mein Kampf. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in Mein Kampf.’
“Q: ‘In other words, as a man who read it, you understood that Hitler’s expansion policy was directed to the east?’
“A: ‘To the east.’
“Q: ‘And you thought that it would be better to try to divert Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial policy instead?’
“A: ‘Quite.’ ”
I also offer in evidence Document EC-458, Exhibit Number USA-634, consisting of an affidavit of Major Edmund Tilley under date of 21 November 1945, with respect to an interview of Schacht on 9 July 1945. I read the second paragraph:
“During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. Schacht stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that in order to make his hold and government secure, the Führer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory.”
As early as 1934, Schacht stated his belief that the Nazis would bring war to Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-451, which I have already submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-626, consisting of an affidavit under date of 15 November 1945 by Messersmith, American Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I wish to read from the first page, third paragraph, last sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: You have read it already.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, there is a little more there which we have not read, which I should like to read.
THE PRESIDENT: You read the whole paragraph. At our invitation you read from the third paragraph down to the bottom of the page.
LT. BRYSON: I should like to read the first sentence of the fourth paragraph on Page 1.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
LT. BRYSON: “While making these protestations he nevertheless showed by his acts that he was thoroughly an instrument of the whole Nazi program and ambitions and that he was lending all his extraordinary knowledge and resourcefulness toward the accomplishment of that program.”
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, speaking for myself and for some other members of the Tribunal, we think it is a far better way to deal with a document, to deal with it, if possible, once and for all, and not to be coming back to it. It not only wastes time by the fact that the Tribunal have got to turn back and forth, back and forth, to the document; but you get a much fairer idea of the document if it is dealt with once and for all, although it may cover more than one subject. I say that although it may be impossible for you to do that now in consonance with the preparations that you have made; but those who follow you may be able to alter their course. If it is possible, when you get a document with a variety or a number of paragraphs in it which you want to quote, you should quote them all at the same time. Do you follow what I mean?
LT. BRYSON: I follow you, Your Honor. We have so organized our materials that we have directed our evidence to specific points, and since the points are separated, we had to separate our quotations.
THE PRESIDENT: I realize that it may be difficult for you.
LT. BRYSON: In September of 1934 Ambassador Dodd made a record in his diary of a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin. If the Court please, I will pass over this document, because in response to a question from the Tribunal, I read an excerpt from the document which covers the same point that I was about to direct myself toward.
I had just pointed out that Schacht has acknowledged to Ambassador Dodd in September 1934 his knowledge of the war purposes of the Nazi Party; and we had already shown that in 1935 Schacht had stated that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. He must then have known to what length Hitler was prepared to go.
After attending a meeting of the Reich ministers on 27 May 1936 in Berlin, Schacht must have known that Hitler was contemplating war. Your Honors may recall, as has been earlier shown, that at this meeting the Defendant Göring, who was very close to Hitler, stated that all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war and that waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, from which I will not read, as the quotation is already in evidence in Exhibit Number USA-123.
On 31 August 1936 the War Minister, Von Blomberg, sent to Schacht a copy of Von Blomberg’s letter to the Defendant Göring. I refer the Tribunal again to 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, and read from the middle of Page 19 of the document. The page numbers, if the Court please, on this document are found in the upper lefthand corner:
“According to an order of the Führer the setting up of all Air Force units is to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936, which at the time when the budget for 1936 was made were planned for later years only.”
This intensification of the air force program certainly revealed to Schacht the closeness to war which Hitler must have felt.
I also offer in evidence Document EC-416, Exhibit USA-635, consisting of minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936 which Schacht attended. I read the statement by Göring found at the top of Page 2 of this document:
“The Führer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Colonel General and the Reich War Minister which represents a general instruction for the execution of this task.
“It starts from the basic thought that the show-down with Russia is inevitable.”
Schacht thus knew that Hitler expected war with Russia. He also knew of Hitler’s ambitions towards the east. It must have been plain to him, therefore, that such a war would result from Russian opposition to German military expansion in that direction; that is, Schacht must have known that it would be a war of German aggression.
In January 1937, the Tribunal will recall, Schacht stated to Ambassador Davies in Berlin that he had “been authorized by his government” to submit certain proposals to France and England which, in fact, amounted to a bid for colonies under threat of war. If Schacht was acting under instructions from Hitler, he was necessarily familiar with Hitler’s aggressive intentions at that time.
In November of 1937 Schacht knew Hitler was determined to acquire Austria and at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia and that Hitler also had designs on the Polish Corridor. I refer the Tribunal to Document L-151, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-70, this being a letter containing a memorandum of a conversation between Schacht and Ambassador Bullitt, dated 23 November 1937. I quote the last paragraph on Page 2:
“Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his”—Schacht’s—“opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.”
To digress for just a moment, Schacht here was really speaking for himself as well as for Hitler. We have seen from his speech of 29 March 1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was even working hard for its achievement. In this connection I refer the Tribunal to Pages 506 and 507 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 373) for evidence of Schacht’s having subsidized the Nazis’ preliminary agitation in Austria.
In addition to the foregoing direct evidence, the Tribunal is asked to take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler’s intention. Schacht was a close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the Cabinet during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the Republican Government in Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this period the Reich’s debt tripled under the stress of mounting armaments, the expenditures from 750,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1932 to 11,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1937, and 14,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1938. During the entire period 35,000,000,000 Reichsmarks were spent on armaments. It was a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany’s repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in preparation for war.
Certainly, in this setting Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road toward armed aggression.
We turn now to our last line of proof with respect to Schacht’s loss of power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937, Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. At that time he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank.
Our evidence will show: (a) This change in position was no more than a clash between two power-seeking personalities, Göring and Schacht, in which Göring, being closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy differences were concerned only with the method of rearming; and (c) Schacht’s loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist armed aggression.
There was an issue of policy between Göring and Schacht, but it was concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of rearmament material during the transitory period until Germany should be ready to strike. Göring was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. Hitler supported Göring; and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly resenting Göring’s intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out.
I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, containing notes of a conversation between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page 21 of the document, from which I quote:
“President Schacht called me to him at 1300 hours today and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War: Schacht returned from the Führer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the economic program planned by the Führer.
“The Führer wants to speak at the Party convention about economic policy and wants to emphasize there that we now want to get free from foreign countries with all our energy by production in Germany.
“Schacht requests urgently that the Reich Minister of War warn the Führer from this step.”
And three paragraphs farther down:
“If we now shout out abroad our decision to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period.”
Nevertheless, Hitler announced the Four Year Plan of self-sufficiency a few days later in Nuremberg, and against Schacht’s wishes Göring was named Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan.
At this point I refer the Tribunal again to the interrogation of Schacht on 16 October 1945, being Exhibit Number USA-636; and I wish to read beginning near the bottom of Page 9 of the document:
“Q: ‘And the Four Year Plan came in when?’
“A: ‘It was announced in September ’36, on the Party Day.’
“Q: ‘Do you say that from the time that the Four Year Plan came in in September 1936, you were ready to rid yourself of your economic duty?’
“A: ‘No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Göring.’
“Q: ‘Yes, in what sense?’
“A: ‘That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my ministry.’
“Q: ‘As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you?’
“A: ‘I would not have ever appointed a man like Göring who didn’t understand a bit about all these things.’ ”
Schacht and Göring immediately became embroiled in a conflict of jurisdiction. On 26 November 1936 Göring issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production. I offer in evidence Document EC-243, Exhibit Number USA-637, consisting of a copy of this directive. It shows that Göring’s Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials pre-empted control over large economic areas previously in the hands of Schacht. As an example, I will quote from Paragraph V of the directive on Page 4 of the document:
“The planning and determination of objectives, as well as the control over the execution of the tasks which must be accomplished within the framework of the Four Year Plan, are the responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, which supersedes the authorities which have heretofore been in charge of these tasks.”
On 11 December 1936 Schacht found it necessary to order all supervisory offices in the Ministry of Economics to accept instructions from him alone. I offer in evidence Document EC-376, Exhibit Number USA-638, consisting of a circular letter from Schacht to all supervisory offices under date of 11 December 1936, and I quote from the second paragraph:
“The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from me alone. They must answer all official inquiries for any information of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials in order to give any information at any time to the fullest extent.”
And a little further down:
“. . . I herewith authorize the supervisory offices to take the necessary measures for themselves. In case doubts should result from requests of the above offices and these doubts cannot be cleared by oral negotiations with the experts of these offices, I should be informed immediately. I will then order in each case the necessary steps to be taken.”
The military sided with Schacht, who had rearmed them so well. I offer in evidence Document EC-420, Exhibit Number USA-639, consisting of a draft of a memorandum by the Military Economic Staff, dated 19 December 1936. I wish to read from Paragraph 1:
“(1) The direction of war economy in the civilian sector in case of war can be handled only by the person who in peacetime has borne the sole responsibility for the preparations for war.
“Upon recognizing this fact a year and a half ago Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy and an operations staff was attached to his office.”
And then Paragraph Number 2:
“(2) The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with the principle laid down in Number 1, Paragraph 1, if the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the Minister President General Göring’s command.”
In January 1937 the Military Weekly Gazette published an article warmly praising Schacht’s achievements in rearmament. Without reading it I offer in evidence Document EC-383, Exhibit Number USA-640, containing this article, a pertinent quotation from which already appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 296 (Volume II, Page 233).
Shortly thereafter Schacht attempted to force a show-down with Göring by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. I offer in evidence Document EC-244, Exhibit Number 641, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg, the Minister of War, to Hitler under date of February 22, 1937. I read the second paragraph of this letter as follows:
“The President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the time being, since in his opinion there exist discrepancies regarding the powers conferred upon him and those of Colonel General Göring. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed.”
Schacht obviously was using his importance to the war preparations as a lever.
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, does the Defendant Schacht admit in his interrogation that the reason for his giving up his office was the difference of opinion between him and the Defendant Göring?
LT. BRYSON: He does, Sir, and the Defendant Göring so states in his interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into the details of their quarrel?
LT. BRYSON: If the Court will be satisfied that this was the cause of Schacht’s resignation. . .
THE PRESIDENT: If they both say so. . .
LT. BRYSON: . . . and that the cause was not his unwillingness to go along with the aggressive intentions of the Nazis at that time, I shall be perfectly satisfied to confine our evidence to the interrogations of Schacht and Göring.
THE PRESIDENT: Does he suggest that in his interrogation?—that that might have been the reason?
LT. BRYSON: I will find out, Sir, but our case against Schacht is premised upon conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Schacht wants to set up such a case as that, you could apply to be heard in rebuttal.
LT. BRYSON: Well, we shall be satisfied then to eliminate a number of our items of evidence, including the controversy between Göring and Schacht, and satisfy ourselves with the interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, we are almost at the time of the break. Perhaps during the break we can arrange our evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): We agree that the question of the disagreement between the Defendants Göring and Schacht need not be discussed further at this time. But we shall come back to and deal in detail with the question as to how far these disagreements had any bearing on the plan for an aggressive war.
LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, we have eliminated part of our proof. I would simply like to put in a letter from Göring and an interrogation of Schacht which will finish up the question of the disagreement.
Under date of 5 August 1937 Schacht wrote a critical letter to Göring, who replied with a 24-page letter on 22 August 1937. Göring’s letter reviews their many differences in detail. I offer it as Document EC-493, Exhibit Number USA-642, and I wish to read simply one statement found in the middle of Page 13:
“In conclusion I should like to refer to remarks which you made in a paragraph of your letter entitled ‘The Four Year Plan’ about your general attitude toward my work in regard to the economic policy. I know and I am pleased that at the beginning of the Four Year Plan you promised me your most loyal support and co-operation and that you repeatedly renewed this promise even after the first differences of opinion had occurred and had been removed in exhaustive discussions. I deplore all the more having the impression recently, which is confirmed by your letter, that you are increasingly antagonistic toward my work in the Four Year Plan. This explains the fact that our collaboration has gradually become less close. . . .”
Schacht and Göring were reconciled by written agreement on 7 July 1937 but subsequently again fell into disagreement, and Hitler finally accepted Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister without Portfolio, and later Schacht’s resignation was extended to his position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Without reading it, I offer in evidence Document EC-494, Exhibit Number USA-643, as proof of this fact.
Now, finally, I wish to refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of Schacht, under date of 16 October 1945, Document 3728-PS, Exhibit Number USA-636, and I wish to read from Page 12 of the document near the bottom:
“A: ‘It may amuse you if I tell you that the last conversation’ ”—this is Schacht speaking—“ ‘that I had with Göring on these topics was in November 1937, when Luther for 2 months had endeavored to unite Göring and myself and to induce me to co-operate further with Göring and maintain my position as Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Göring; and at the end of this talk Göring said, “But I must have the right to give orders to you.” Then I said, “Not to me, but to my successor.” I have never taken orders from Göring; and I would never have done it because he was a fool in economics, and I knew something about it, at least.’
“Q: ‘Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive personal business between you and Göring. That seems perfectly obvious.’
“A: ‘Certainly.’ ”
In all this abundant and consistent evidence there is not the slightest suggestion that Schacht’s withdrawal from these two posts represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. Indeed, Hitler was gratified that Schacht would still be active in the Government as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister without Portfolio. I offer in evidence Document L-104, Exhibit Number USA-644, consisting of a letter to the United States Secretary of State from Ambassador Dodd, under date of 29 November 1937, enclosing a translation of Hitler’s letter of 26 November 1937 to Schacht. I quote the last two sentences of Hitler’s letter, found on Page 2 of the document:
“If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorate you will make available for the German people and me for many years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your untiring energy. Delighted at the fact that in the future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I appoint you as of today a Reich Minister.”
Schacht did continue, obviously still in full agreement with Hitler’s aggressive purpose. He was still President of the Reichsbank at the time of the taking of Austria in March 1938. In fact, the Reichsbank took over the Austrian National Bank. On this point I refer the Tribunal to Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 254, and ask that judicial notice be taken thereof. Further, Schacht even participated in the planning of the absorption of Austria. In this connection I introduce into evidence Document EC-421, Exhibit Number USA-645, consisting of excerpts from minutes of a meeting of the staff of General Thomas on 11 March 1938 at 1500 hours. I quote therefrom as follows:
“Lieutenant Colonel Hünerm reads directive of the Führer of 11 March concerning the ‘Action Otto’ and informs us that ‘The Economy War Service Law’ has been put in force. He then reads Directives 1 and 2 and gives special orders to troops for crossing the Austrian borders. According to that, at Schacht’s suggestion, no requisitions should be made but everything ought to be paid for at the rate of 2 schillings to 1 Reichsmark.”
On the conversion of the Austrian schilling the Tribunal is asked also to take judicial notice of Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 405.
The Tribunal, of course, is already familiar with the public approval by Schacht of the Anschluss in his Vienna speech of 21 March 1938, and Your Honors will also recall Schacht’s pride in Hitler’s use of the rearmed Wehrmacht at Munich, as expressed in his speech of 29 November 1938. Both speeches were subsequent to his resignation in November 1937.
We come now to the removal of Schacht from the presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The reason for this development is quite clear. Schacht lost confidence in the credit capacity of the Reich and was paralyzed, with the fear of a financial collapse. He felt that the maximum level of production had been reached, so that an increase in banknote circulation would only cheapen money and bring on inflation. In this attitude he ceased to be useful to Hitler, who was about to strike and wished to tap every ounce of available Government credit for military purposes.
I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-369, which I have previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-631. This document is a memorandum from the Reichsbank directorate to Hitler, under date of 7 January 1939, in which Schacht reviews in detail his fears of inflation. The seriousness of the situation may be seen generally from the entire text. I wish to quote several of the more crucial statements, one from the last paragraph on Page 3, the second sentence:
“We are, however, faced with the fact that approximately 3 billion Reichsmark of such drafts cannot now be paid, though they will be due in 1939.”
I quote from the upper half of Page 4:
“Exclusive of the Reichsbank there are approximately 6 billion Reichsmark mefo drafts which can be discounted against cash payment at any time at the Reichsbank, which fact represents a continuous danger to the currency.”
And I quote finally from the concluding paragraph of the memorandum:
“We are convinced that the effects on the currency caused by the policy of the last 10 months can be mended and that the danger of inflation again can be eliminated by strict maintenance of a balanced budget. The Führer and Reich Chancellor himself has publicly rejected, again and again, an inflation as foolish and fruitless.
“We therefore ask for the following measures:
“(1) The Reich as well as all the other public offices must not incur expenditures or assume guaranties and obligations that cannot be covered by taxes or by those funds which can be raised through loans without disturbing the long-term investment market.
“(2) In order to carry out these measures effectively, full financial control over all public expenditures must be restored to the Reich Minister of Finance.
“(3) The price and wage control must be rendered effective. The existing mismanagement must be eliminated.
“(4) The use of the money and investment market must be at the sole discretion of the Reichsbank.”
It is clear that Schacht’s fear was genuine and is a complete explanation for his departure from the scene. He had good reason to be afraid. In fact, the Finance Minister had already recognized the situation in September 1938. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-419, Exhibit Number USA-621, which I have already submitted in evidence and which consists of a letter under date of 1 September 1938 from Krosigk to Hitler, in which Krosigk warns of an impending financial crisis. I quote from the bottom of Page 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not really cumulative of what you have already read?
LT. BRYSON: We will be glad to skip it, Sir. It is cumulative.
Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis, but he was afraid that he personally would be held responsible for it. I offer in evidence an affidavit of Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank and co-worker of Schacht, dated 8 November 1945, designated as Document EC-438, Exhibit Number USA-646, and I read therefrom, beginning at the bottom of the second page:
“When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more eager to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a long time the ‘Leitmotiv’ of Schacht’s conversation with the directors of the bank.”
In the end Schacht escaped by deliberately stimulating his dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank. I offer in evidence Document 3731-PS, Exhibit Number USA-647, consisting of excerpts from an interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945, and I wish to read several statements beginning at the very bottom of the second page:
“I asked Mr. Schacht to finance for the Reich for the ultimo of the month the sum of 100 or 200 millions. It was this quite customary procedure which we had used for years, and we used to give back this money after a couple of days. Schacht this time refused and said that he was not willing to finance a penny because he wanted, as he said, that it should be made clear to Hitler that the Reich was bankrupt. I tried to explain that this was not the proper ground to discuss the whole question of financing because the question of financing very small sums for a few days during ultimo never would bring Hitler to the conviction that the whole financing was impossible. As far as I remember now, it was Funk who told Hitler something about this conversation; then Hitler asked Schacht to call upon him. I do not know what they said but the result certainly was the dismissal of Schacht.”
THE PRESIDENT: Just give me the reference again to that document that you were reading from.
LT. BRYSON: This is the interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945. I wish to read further, continuing on Page 3:
“Q: ‘Now did Schacht ever say anything to you to the effect that he wanted to resign because he was in opposition to the continuance of the rearmament program?’
“A: ‘No, he never said it in this specific form, but in some conversations he certainly spoke about it several times in his own way when he had encounters with Göring . . . therefore I did not take these things very seriously.’
“Q: ‘Well, let me put it this way, and please think carefully about this. Did Schacht ever say that he wanted to resign because he realized that the extent of the rearmament program was such as to lead him to the conclusion that it was in preparation for war rather than for defense?’
“A: ‘No, he never did.’
“Q: ‘Was Schacht ever quoted to you to this effect by any of your colleagues or by anybody else?’
“A: ‘No.’
“Q: ‘Now, after Keitel took over the position of Chief of the Wehrmacht were there still meetings between Schacht and yourself with Keitel in place of Blomberg?’
“A: ‘Yes.’
“Q: ‘Did Schacht ever say anything at these meetings to indicate that except for the technical question of the financing through the Reichsbank directly he was opposed to a further program of rearmament or opposed to the budget of the Wehrmacht?’
“A: ‘No, I do not think he ever did.’ ”
The Defendant Göring has also confirmed this testimony. I refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of Göring under date of 17 October 1945, this being Document 3730-PS, Exhibit Number USA-648. I read from the interrogation of Göring on 17 October 1945, from the lower half of the third page:
“Q: ‘I want to ask you this specifically. Was Schacht dismissed from the Reichsbank by Hitler for refusing to participate any further in the rearmament program?'
“A: ‘No, because of his utterly impossible attitude in this matter regarding this advance, which had no connection with the rearmament program.’ ”
Hitler dismissed Schacht from the Reichsbank on 20 January 1939. Without reading, I offer in evidence Document EC-398, Exhibit Number USA-649, consisting merely of a brief note from Hitler to Schacht announcing his dismissal.
From all of the foregoing it is clear that Schacht’s dismissal in no sense reflected a parting of the ways with Hitler on account of proposed aggression. This fact may also be seen from Document EC-397, Exhibit Number USA-650, consisting of Hitler’s letter to Schacht under date of 19 January 1939, the text of which I wish to read:
“At the occasion of your recall from office as President of the Reichsbank Directorate I take the opportunity of expressing to you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you have rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister.”
In fact, Schacht continued as Minister without Portfolio until January 1943.
I wish to conclude by saying that the evidence shows: First, Schacht’s work was indispensable to Hitler’s rise to power and to the rearmament of Germany; second, Schacht personally was favorably disposed towards aggression and knew Hitler intended to and would break the peace; and, third, Schacht retired from the scene for reasons wholly unrelated to the imminence of illegal aggression.
As long as he remained in power, Schacht was working as eagerly for the preparation of aggressive war as any of his colleagues. He was beyond any doubt most effective and valuable in this connection. His assistance in the earlier phase of the conspiracy made their later crimes possible. His withdrawal from the scene reflected no moral feeling against the use of aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy. He personally struggled to retain his position. By the time he lost it he had already completed his task in the conspiracy, namely, to provide Hitler and his colleagues with the physical means and economic planning necessary to launch and maintain the aggression. We do not believe that, having prepared the Wehrmacht for assault upon the world, he should now be permitted to find refuge in his loss of power before the blow was struck.
This concludes our case against the Defendant Schacht, and Lieutenant Meltzer follows me with the presentation of the American case against the Defendant Funk.
LIEUTENANT (j. g.) BERNHARD D. MELTZER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, the documents bearing upon Defendant Funk’s responsibility have been assembled in a document book marked “HH,” which has been filed with the Tribunal and has also been made available to Defense Counsel. The same is true of the brief. The documents have been arranged in the book in the order of their presentation. Moreover, to facilitate reference, the pages of the document book have been numbered consecutively in red. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable collaboration of Mr. Sidney Jacoby, who sits to my right, in the selection and analysis of these documents.
We propose to submit evidence concerning five phases of Defendant Funk’s participation in the conspiracy:
First, his contribution to the Nazi seizure of power; second, his role in the Propaganda Ministry and in the related agencies and his responsibility for the activities of that ministry; third, his responsibility for the unrelenting elimination of Jews, first from the so-called cultural professions and then from the entire German economy; fourth, his collaboration in the paramount Nazi task to which all other tasks were subordinated—preparation for aggressive war; and finally, we propose to mention briefly the evidence concerning his active participation in the waging of aggressive war.
We turn now to the evidence showing that Defendant Funk actively promoted the conspirators’ accession to power and their consolidation of control over Germany. Soon after he joined the Nazi Party in 1931 Defendant Funk began to hold important positions, first within the Party itself and then within the Nazi Government. Funk’s positions have, in the main, been listed in Document Number 3533-PS, which is a statement signed by both Defendant Funk and his counsel. This document has been made available in the four working languages of these proceedings, and a copy in the appropriate language should be available in each of Your Honors’ document books. It is accordingly requested that this document, which is Exhibit Number USA-651, be received into evidence without the necessity of its being read in its entirety.
Your Honors will observe that there are some deletions and reservations after some of the items listed in Document Number 3533-PS. These were inserted by Defendant Funk. The words which he wished deleted are enclosed in parentheses. His comments are underscored and followed by asterisks.
We wished to avoid troubling the Tribunal with a detailed discussion of all these contested points. Accordingly, we collected in Document 3563-PS relevant excerpts from certain German publications. This document has also been made available in the four working languages. Moreover, we submit that the Tribunal can properly take judicial notice of the publications referred to in the document. However, in order to facilitate reference, we request that it be received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-652.
In connection with Item “b” on the top of Page 1 of Document Number 3533-PS—Your Honors will find that on Page 1 of the document—Your Honors will observe that Defendant Funk has in effect denied that he was Hitler’s personal economic adviser in the 1930’s. However, the excerpts from the four German publications set forth on Pages 1 and 2 of Document Number 3563-PS directly contradict this denial.
We submit that it will be clear from the documents just referred to that Defendant Funk, soon after he joined the Party, began to operate as one of the Nazi inner circle. Moreover, as a Party economic theorist during its critical days in 1932, he made a significant contribution to its drive for mass support by drafting its economic slogans. In this connection I would refer to Document 3505-PS, which is a biography entitled, in the English translation, Walter Funk—A Life for Economy. This biography was written by one Oestreich in German and published by the Central Publishing House of the Nazi Party. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-653. I wish to quote now from Page 1 of the translation of this document, the center of the page. The corresponding page of the German document is Page 81:
“In 1931 he”—that is, Funk—“became a member of the Reichstag. A document of his activity at the time is the ‘Economic Construction Program of the NSDAP’ which was formulated by him in the second half of the year 1932. It received the approval of Adolf Hitler and was declared binding for all Gau leaders, speakers on the subject, and Gau advisers on the subject and others of the Party.”
Thus Defendant Funk’s slogans became the economic gospel for the Party organizers and spellbinders.
Defendant Funk, however, was much more than one of the Nazi Party’s economic theorists; he was also involved in the highly practical work of soliciting campaign contributions for the Party. As liaison man between the Party and the large German industrialists he helped place the industrialists’ financial and political support behind Hitler. Defendant Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June 1945, admitted that he helped finance the highly critical campaign of 1932. I offer in evidence Document Number 2828-PS as Exhibit Number USA-654, and I quote from the bottom of Page 43. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Meltzer, isn’t this really all cumulative and detailed evidence to support what the Defendant Funk has already agreed with reference to his office? On Page 1 you have there the admission that he was a member of the Nazi Party, chief of the division of the Central Nazi Party, chairman of the committee of the Nazi Party on economic policy, and then it goes on from A to U with views of the various offices which he held and which he admits, he held. But surely to go into the details of those positions is unnecessary.
LT. MELTZER: If Your Honor pleases, the admission of the various positions listed do not, in our judgment, indicate in any way Defendant Funk’s participation in the fund-raising for the Nazi Party.
THE PRESIDENT: The fund-raising?
LT. MELTZER: The fund-raising. Now, it is a possible inference from those positions that he did engage in the solicitation of campaign contributions. However, it did seem to us relevant to mention most briefly direct evidence of that aspect of his activity.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you say there is nothing in these offices which covered the matter you are going to deal with; well and good.
LT. MELTZER: Defendant Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June 1945, admitted, as I said a minute ago, that he helped to finance this highly critical campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Lieutenant Meltzer, the heading that you have so conveniently given to us is that he contributed to the seizure of power. Well now, nearly every one of the headings A to U on Page 1, which he admits, is evidence that he contributed to seizure of power. Is it your object to propose that he also helped to raise funds? The contribution to the seizure of power is not in itself a crime; it is only a step.
LT. MELTZER: Very well, Your Honor. There is one aspect, however, of his activity in that regard which I should like to mention; that is, in connection with his fund-raising activities, he was present at a meeting in Berlin early in 1933.
I am referring to the document which records what went on in that meeting in order to point out that in the course of the meeting Hitler and Göring submitted an exposition of certain basic elements of the Nazi program. The reference to this meeting is found in Document 2828-PS, which Your Honors will find on Page 28 of the document book. I wish to quote the following question and answer:
“Q: ‘About 1933, we have been informed, certain industrialists attended a meeting in the home of Göring before the election in March. Do you know anything about this?’
“A: ‘I was at the meeting. Money was not demanded by Göring but by Schacht. Hitler left the room, then Schacht made a speech asking for money for the election. I was there as an impartial observer, since I was friendly with the industrialists.’ ”
The character and importance of Funk’s work with the large industrialists is emphasized in the biography of Funk, which I referred to earlier, and I will simply invite Your Honors’ attention to the relevant pages of that book, which are 83 and 84.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t understand why you read that passage. If you wanted to show that he was at the meeting, it would be merely sufficient to say that he was at the meeting. I don’t think those two sentences that you read help us in the very least.
LT. MELTZER: If the Tribunal please, those two sentences do not refer to the meeting. Those two sentences refer to the biography which sums up the Defendant Funk’s general contribution to the Nazi accession to power and I thought it might be of interest to the Tribunal to see the attitude of a German writer on this aspect of the defendant’s career.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me you referred to the meeting.
LT. MELTZER: I was referring Your Honors to Pages 32 and 33 of the document book, and to clarify this point may I read briefly from the biography:
“No less important than Funk’s accomplishments in the programmatic field in the years 1931 and 1932 was his activity at that time as the Führer’s liaison man to the leading men of the German industry, trade, commerce, and finance. On the basis of his past work his personal relations to the German economic leaders were broad and far-reaching. He was now able to enlist them in the service of Adolf Hitler and not only to answer their questions authoritatively but to convince them and win their backing for the Party. At that time that was terribly important work; every success achieved meant a moral, political, and economic strengthening of the vitality of the Party and contributed toward destroying the prejudice that National Socialism is merely a party of class hatred and class struggle.”
THE PRESIDENT: Again, I don’t see that that has helped the Tribunal in the least.
LT. MELTZER: After Funk had helped Hitler become Chancellor, as Press Chief of the German Government, he participated in the early Cabinet meetings, in the course of which the conspirators planned the strategy by which they would secure the passage of the Presidential Emergency Decree, which was passed on 24 March 1933. Funk’s presence at these meetings is revealed by Document 2962-PS which has already been received in evidence and by Document Number 2963-PS, offered as Exhibit Number USA-656. Your Honors will recall that this decree marked the real seizure of political power in Germany.
Soon after this the Defendant Funk assumed an important role in the Ministry of Propaganda. The record shows that the Ministry became one of the most important and vicious of Nazi institutions and that propaganda was fundamental to the achievement of the Nazi program within Germany and outside of Germany. We do not propose to review those matters to you but rather to present evidence showing, as we have said, that the Defendant Funk took a significant part in the propaganda operations.
The Ministry was established on 13 March 1933, with Goebbels as Chief and Defendant Funk as undersecretary, second in command.
As undersecretary Defendant Funk was not only Goebbels’ chief aide but was also the organizer of the large and complex propaganda machine. I wish to offer in evidence Document Number 3501-PS, which will be found on Page 47 of your document book as Exhibit Number USA-657. This document is an affidavit signed on 19 December 1945 by Max Amann, who held the position of Reich Leader of the Press and President of the Reich Press Chamber. I should like to read the second sentence of the first paragraph and the entire second paragraph:
“In carrying out my duties and responsibilities I became familiar with the operation and the organization of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment. Funk was the soul of the Ministry, and without him Goebbels could not have built it up. Goebbels once stated to me that Funk was his ‘most efficient man.’ Funk exercised comprehensive control over all of the media of expression in Germany; over the press, the theater, radio, and music. As Press Chief of the Government and later as undersecretary of the Ministry, Funk held daily meetings with the Führer and a daily press conference in the course of which he issued the directives governing the materials to be published by the German press.”
In addition to his position as undersecretary, Funk had many other important jobs in the Propaganda Ministry and in its subordinate agencies. These positions have already been listed in Document 3533-PS. I wish, however, to refer in particular to Funk’s position as vice-president of the Reich Chamber of Culture. This position was, of course, related to his functions in the Propaganda Ministry.
In his dual capacity he directly promoted two vital and related Nazi policies. The first was the regimentation of all creative activities in the interests of Nazi political and military objectives. The second was the complete elimination of Jews and dissidents from the so-called cultural professions. A full discussion of the methods by which these policies were effectuated has been included in the brief which was submitted as part of Document Book E. Accordingly, we will not go into that matter now unless the Tribunal wishes us.
In view of the Defendant Funk’s major role in the Propaganda Ministry, it is natural to find Nazi writers stressing his responsibility for the Nazi perversion of culture. In this connection, I will simply invite the Tribunal’s attention to Pages 94 and 95 of Oestreich’s biography, which has already been referred to.
After Defendant Funk left the Ministry of Propaganda and became Minister of Economics in 1938, he continued to advance the anti-Jewish program. For example, on 14 June 1938 he signed a decree providing for the registration of Jewish enterprises. This decree, which became the foundation for the ruthless economic persecution which followed, is found in the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1938, Part I, Page 627. It is requested that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this reference to the Reichsgesetzblatt and all subsequent references. May I add that the brief on Defendant Funk gives the document numbers of translations of decrees and other German publications of which the Tribunal will be requested to take judicial notice.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
LT. MELTZER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we do so, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I see that one of the counsel, Colonel Phillimore, I think, is proposing to call certain witnesses. The Tribunal would like to know who those witnesses are and what subject their evidence is going to deal with.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would the Tribunal like to know now? I would like to let them know, if it is convenient.
THE PRESIDENT: If you could, it would be convenient now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The first witness is Korvettenkapitän Moehle, who was a captain on Defendant Dönitz’ staff; and he will prove the passing on the Dönitz order of 17 September 1942. I think that is the main point that he deals with. I think he deals also with the destruction of some rescue ships, but that is the main point.
The second witness is Lieutenant Heisig. He will deal primarily with lectures of the Defendant Dönitz in which he advocated the destruction of the crews of merchant ships. That is the general effect of the evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.