Morning Session
MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this morning’s session on account of illness.
M. FAURE: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd would like to give some explanations.
MR. DODD: May it please the Court, with reference to the prospective witness Pfaffenberger, over the weekend it occurred to us, after talking with him, that perhaps if Defense Counsel had an opportunity to talk to him we might save some time for the Court. Accordingly we made this Witness available to Dr. Kauffmann for conversation and interview; he has talked with him as long as he has pleased, and has notified us that in view of this conversation he does not care to cross-examine him, and as well other Counsel for the Defense have no desire to cross-examine him.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness Pfaffenberger can be released?
MR. DODD: That is what we would like to do, at the order of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. FAURE: Gentlemen, during the last session I reached the end of the first period of the German occupation of Denmark. In connection with that first period I should like still to mention a circumstance which is established by the Danish report, Document Number RF-901, second memorandum, Page 4. I quote:
“When the German aggression against Russia took place on 22 June 1941”—that is the third book of the report—“one of the most serious encroachments was made on the political liberties which the Germans had promised to respect. They forcibly obliged the government to intern the Communists, the total number of which was 300.”
The explanations which I gave in the previous session related to the improper interference on the part of the first instrument of German usurpation, the diplomatic representation.
The second instrument of German interference was, as might be expected, the local National Socialist Party of Fritz Clausen, about which I spoke previously. The Germans hoped that in the favorable circumstances of the occupation, and thanks to the support they would bring to it, this party might develop enormously. But their calculations were completely wrong. In effect, in March 1943 elections took place in Denmark; and these elections resulted in the total defeat of the Nazi Party. This party obtained only a proportion which represented 2.5 percent of the votes, and it obtained only 3 seats out of 149 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. I point out to the Tribunal that in some copies of my brief there is a printing mistake and that 25 percent is indicated instead of 2.5 percent, which is the correct figure and which shows what very little success the Clausen party had at the elections.
The conduct of the Germans in Denmark showed a notable change in the period following the month of August 1943. The first reason for this change was clearly the failure of the plan which consisted in seizing power in a legal manner, thanks to the aid of the Clausen party. On the other hand, about the same time, the Germans were equally disappointed in another direction. They had sought, as has been shown in my brief on economic questions, to mobilize Danish economy for the benefit of their war effort. But the Danish population, which had refused political nazification, did not wish to lend itself to economic nazification either. And so the Danish industries and the Danish workmen offered passive resistance, and by a legitimate reaction against the irregular undertakings of the occupying power they organized a sabotage program. There were strikes accompanied by various incidents. Faced with this double failure, the Germans decided to modify their tactics.
In this connection we read in the government report, Page 6 of the second memorandum, the following sentence:
“As a result of these events, the Plenipotentiary of the German Reich, Dr. Best, was on 24 August 1943, called to Berlin, from whence he returned with claims in the nature of an ultimatum addressed to the Danish Government.”
I should now like to submit the text of this ultimatum, which is also to be found in the official Danish report. This is Appendix Number 2 of this report. The ultimatum is dated Copenhagen, 28 August 1943. At the end of the first three books there are several loose sheets which are the appendices. I now come to the second appendix—on Saturday I read the first appendix—which is the second sheet and it has also been copied in my brief:
“Claims of the Reich Government:
“The Danish Government must immediately declare the entire country in a state of military emergency.
“The state of military emergency must include the following measures:
“1. Prohibition of public gatherings of more than five persons.
“2. Prohibition of all strikes and of any aid given to strikers.
“3. Prohibition of all meetings in closed premises or in the open air; prohibition to be in the streets between 2030 hours and 0530 hours; closing of restaurants at 1930 hours. By 1 September 1943 all firearms and explosives to be handed over.
“4. Prohibition to hamper in any way whatsoever Danish nationals because of their collaboration or the collaboration of their relatives with the German authorities, or because of their relations with the Germans.
“5. Establishment of a press censorship with German collaboration.
“6. Establishment of courts-martial to judge acts contravening the measures taken to maintain order and security.
“Infringement of the measures mentioned above will be punished by the most severe penalties which can be imposed in conformity with the law in force concerning the power of the Government to take measures to maintain calm, order, and security. The death penalty must be introduced without delay for acts of sabotage and for any aid given in committing these acts, for attacks against the German forces, for possession after 1 September 1943 of firearms and explosives.
“The Reich Government expects to receive today before. 1600 hours the acceptance by the Danish Government of the above-mentioned demands.”
The Danish Government, mindful of its dignity, courageously refused to yield to that ultimatum, although it found itself under the material constraint of the military occupation. Direct encroachments upon the sovereignty then started. The Germans themselves took the measures which they had not succeeded in getting the national government to accept. They declared a state of military emergency; they took hostages; they attacked without warning, which is contrary to the laws of war; and at a time when—let me recall it—a state of war did not exist, they attacked the Danish Army and Navy and disarmed and imprisoned their forces. They pronounced death sentences and deported a certain number of persons considered to be Communists and whose internment, as I pointed out, they had previously required. From 29 August 1943, the King, the Government, and the Parliament ceased to exercise their functions. The administration continued under the direction of high officials who in urgent cases took measures called, “Emergency Laws.” During this same period there existed three German authorities in Denmark:
First, the Plenipotentiary, who was still Dr. Best; second, the military authority under the orders of General Hannecken, replaced subsequently by General Lindemann; and third, the German police.
Indeed, the German police were installed in Denmark a few days after the crisis of which I have just spoken to you. The SS Standartenführer, Colonel Dr. Mildner, arrived in September as Chief of the German Security; and on 1 November there arrived in Denmark as the Supreme Chief of the Police, the Obergruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Police, Günther Pancke, of whom I shall have occasion to speak again. General of Police Günther Pancke had under his authority Dr. Mildner, whose name I mentioned at first and who was replaced on 5 January 1944 by SS Standartenführer Bovensiepen.
The Tribunal will find in the Danish Government’s report, on which I base this information, a chart showing the German officials in Denmark. This chart is to be found in the second memorandum, Page 2. It is interesting, although we are not concerned here with individual cases, insofar as it shows the organization of the German network in this country. During the whole period which I am speaking about now, of the three German authorities already mentioned, the police played the most important role and was the principal organ of usurpation of sovereignty by the Germans. For that reason we might consider that while Norway and Holland represent cases of civil administration and Belgium and France represent cases of military administration, Denmark represents the typical case of police administration. At the same time we must never forget that these different types of administration in all these occupied countries were always interdependent. The seizure of authority by the German police in Denmark during the period from September 1943 until the liberation was responsible for an extraordinary number of crimes. Unlike other administrations, the police did not act under legal or statutory regulations, but it interfered very effectually in the life of the country by the exercise of orderly and systematic de facto law. I shall have the opportunity of treating certain aspects of this police administration in the fourth section of my brief. For the moment, within the scope of my subject, I should like simply to cite the facts which constitute direct and general violation of sovereignty. In this connection, I believe that it is indispensable that I inform the Tribunal of a quite exceptional event which took place on 19 September 1944. At that date the Germans suppressed the police—I mean the national police of Denmark—and totally abolished this same institution which is naturally indispensable and essential in all states.
I am going to read on this point what the government report says, second memorandum, that is to say, still the third book of the file, Page 29. I shall begin in the middle of the paragraph, after the first sentence. The extract is to be found in my brief. I quote:
“The fact that the Germans had not succeeded in exerting any influence among the Danish police or among their leaders or in the ranks, was partly the reason why the German military authorities at the end of the summer of 1944 began to fear the police. Pancke explained that General Hannecken himself was afraid that the police, numbering 8,000 to 10,000 well-trained men, might fall upon the Germans in the event of an invasion. In September 1944, believing that an invasion of Denmark was probable, Pancke and Hannecken planned the disarming of the police and the deportation of a part of it. Pancke submitted the plan to Himmler, who consented to it in writing, adding in the letter that the plan had been approved by Hitler. He had moreover discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner. The operation was carried out by Pancke and Bovensiepen, who had discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner and Müller of the RSHA, and the regular troops aided this operation with the consent of General Hannecken.
“At 11 o’clock in the morning of 19 September 1944 the Germans caused a false air-raid alarm to be given. Immediately afterwards, the police soldiers forcibly entered the police headquarters in Copenhagen as well as the police stations in the city. Some policemen were killed. They acted in the same way throughout the whole country. Most of the policemen on duty were captured. In Copenhagen and in the large cities of the country the prisoners were taken to Germany in ships, which Kaltenbrunner had sent for this purpose, or in box cars. As has already been said before, the treatment to which they were subjected in German concentration camps was horrible beyond description. In the small country towns the policemen were freed.
“At the same time Pancke decreed what he called a state of police emergency. The exact meaning of this expression has never been explained, and even the Germans do not seem to have understood what it meant. In practice, the result was that all police activities, ordinary as well as judicial, were suspended. Maintenance of order and public security was left to the inhabitants themselves.
“During the last 6 months of the occupation, the Danish nation found itself in the unheard-of situation, unknown in other civilized countries, of being deprived of its police force and the possibility to maintain order and public security. This state of affairs might have ended in complete chaos if the respect for the law and the discipline of the population, strengthened by the indignation at this act of violence, had not warded off the most serious consequences.”
Despite the bearing of the Danish population, the absence of the police during these last 6 months of the occupation naturally resulted in a recrudescence of all forms of criminality. You can get an idea of this if you consider—and that detail will suffice—that the premiums of insurance companies had to be raised to 480 percent—it says so in the report—whereas previously they were limited to half of the normal rate. We are justified in considering that the crimes committed under these conditions involved the responsibility of the German authorities who could not fail to foresee and who accepted this state of affairs. We see here further proof of the total indifference of the Germans to the consequences arising from decisions taken by them to suit their ends at the time.
Finally, I should like to conclude this section on Denmark by quoting to the Tribunal a passage from a document which I shall present as Exhibit Number RF-902. This document belongs to the American documentation under the Number 705-PS, but it has not yet been submitted, and I should like to read an extract, one quotation, which seems to me to be interesting. This is a report drawn up in Berlin on 12 January 1943, and concerns a meeting of the SS Committee of the Research Institute for Germanic Regions (Ausschuss der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für den Germanischen Raum). At this meeting there were present 14 personages of the SS. This report contains a special paragraph which concerns Denmark. Other paragraphs of the same document are of interest in connection with the section which will follow this. Therefore, in order to avoid having to refer to this document twice, I shall read the whole of the passages which I should like to submit as evidence. I start on Page 3 of the document, towards the end of the page.
“Norway. In Norway the Minister Fuglesang meanwhile has become the successor to the Minister Lunde, who has been killed in an accident. Despite the promises made by Quisling’s party, Norway may not be expected to furnish an important quota.
“Denmark. In Denmark the situation is extremely encouraging on account of the taking over of power by SS Gruppenführer Dr. Best. We may be convinced that the SS Gruppenführer Dr. Best will furnish a classical example of the ethnical policy of the Reich. The relations with the Party Leader Clausen have recently become difficult. Clausen agreed only to the project for the establishment of a Front Combatant Corps as a preliminary to the Germanic Schutzstaffel in Denmark, on the condition that members of this corps will be barred from membership to the Party. Negotiations about this urgently needed central organization of front combatants are going on. The monopoly of the Party is untenable; all rejuvenating elements must be mobilized although Clausen personally has to stand in the foreground but without his clique.
“Netherlands. In the Netherlands Mussert has in the meantime been proclaimed Führer of the Dutch people by the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart. This measure has produced an extremely disquieting effect in other Germanic countries, particularly in Flanders. The decisive role again falls to the General Commissioner whose principle of exploiting Mussert and then dropping him cannot be accepted under a Germanic Reich policy as approved by the SS.
“Flanders: In Flanders the development of the VNV (the Flemish National Movement) continues to be unfavorable. Even the shrewd policy of the new leader of the VNV, Dr. Elias, can no longer deceive us about this. Besides, he once expressed the opinion that Germany was prepared to make concessions in ethnological policy only when she was in bad straits.”
This information is quite characteristic. In the first place, it is firmly established that the Germanic regions should include Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Flanders. Naturally I speak only of the western countries. In the second place, we clearly see how the Germans used the Nazi-inspired local parties as an instrument for the usurpation of sovereignty. In the third place, we see it is quite true that the German diplomatic agents were also instruments for this policy of usurpation and completely exceeded their normal functions. In the fourth place, the document confirms the interdependence which existed between the different agents of German interference, which we stressed a short time ago and on which we cannot lay too much emphasis. The case of Dr. Best is a good example. Dr. Best was a minister with plenipotentiary powers; therefore, he was a diplomatic agent. We have seen that this same Dr. Best was previously an agent of the military administration in France, and we see by this document that besides his being a Plenipotentiary Minister he is a General in the SS, and in this capacity, so the document states, he seized power in Denmark. The information contained in the document concerning Norway and the Netherlands is a transition for the following part of this section, and I ask the Tribunal to take the file entitled, “Norway and the Netherlands.”
The institution of Reich Commissioner was applied in Norway and in the Netherlands, and in these two countries only; it constitutes a definite concept in the general plan of Germanization, in which these two countries occupy parallel positions. In both cases the establishment of the civil administration followed hard upon the military occupation of the country. The military men, therefore, did not have to take over the administration, and during the few days which preceded the appointment of the Reich Commissioner, they confined themselves to measures concerning order.
In Norway the decree of 24 April 1940 appointed Terboven as Reich Commissioner. This decree is signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendants Keitel and Frick. In Holland the decree of 18 May 1940 appointed the Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissioner. This decree is signed by the same persons as the preceding decree, and it bears in addition the signatures of Göring and Ribbentrop.
The decrees appointing the Reich-Commissioners also defined their functions as well as the division of the functions between the civil commissioner and the military authorities. I am not submitting these two decrees as documents since they are direct acts of German legislation. The decree concerning Norway provides in its first article:
“The Reich Commissioner has the task of safeguarding the interests of the Reich, and of exercising supreme power in the civil domain.”—The decree adds—“The Reich Commissioner is directly under me and receives from me directives and instructions.”
As far as the division of functions is concerned, I give the text of Article 4, “The Commander of the German troops in Norway exercises the rights of military sovereignty. His orders are carried out in the civil domain by the Reich Commissioner.”
This decree was published in the Official Gazette of German Decrees for 1940, Number 1. The same instructions are given in a similar decree of 18 May 1940 concerning the Netherlands. The establishment of Reich-Commissioners was accompanied at the beginning by some pronouncement intended to reassure the population. Terboven proclaimed that he intended to limit, as much as possible, the inconveniences and costs of the occupation. This is in a proclamation of 25 April 1940 which is in the Official Gazette, Page 2.
Likewise, after his appointment, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart addressed an appeal to the Dutch people. This is to be found in the Official Gazette for Holland for 1940, Page 2, and in it he expressed himself as follows—he starts off with a categorical phrase:
“I shall take all measures, including those of a legislative nature, which will be necessary for carrying out this mandate”—and he says also—“it is my will that the laws in force up to now shall remain in force and that the Dutch authorities shall be associated with the carrying out of government affairs and that the independence of justice be maintained.”
But these promises were not kept. It is evident that the Reich Commissioner was to become in Norway and in Holland the principal instrument for the usurpation of sovereignty. He was to act, however, in close relation with a second instrument of usurpation, the National Socialist organization in the country. This collaboration of the local Nazi Party with the German authority, represented by the Reich Commissioner, took perceptibly different forms in each of the two countries under consideration. Thus, the exercise of power by the Reich Commissioner presents in itself differences between Norway and Holland which were more apparent than real.
In both countries the local National Socialist Party existed before the war. It grew and was inspired by the German Nazi Party and had its place in the general plan of war preparations and the plan for Germanization. I should like to give some information concerning Norway.
The National Socialist Party was called “Nasjonal Samling.” It had as leader the famous Quisling. It was a perfect imitation of the German Nazi Party. I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-920, the text of the oath of fidelity subscribed to by members of this Nasjonal Samling Party. I quote:
“My pledge of allegiance: I promise on my honor:
“1. Unflinching allegiance and loyalty towards the National Socialist movement, its idea, and its Führer.”—This is the third page of the Document RF-920.
“2. To stand up energetically and fearlessly for the cause, always to offer reliability and loyal discipline at my work, and to do all I can in order to acquire the knowledge and abilities which my work for the Movement demands.
“3. To the best of my abilities to live in compliance with the National Socialist concept and to show solidarity, understanding, and good comradeship to all my companions.
“4. To obey any orders given by the Führer or by his appointed officials insofar as such orders are not in disagreement or do not violate the directions of the Führer.
“5. Never to reveal to unauthorized persons details of NS methods of work or anything detrimental to the Movement.
“6. At all times to make the utmost effort to contribute to the progress of the Movement, and to the achievement of its purpose, and to play the part in the fighting organization which I have undertaken to do under promise of fidelity, quite conscious that I should be guilty of an unworthy and vile act if I broke this promise.
“7. If circumstances should make it impossible for me to continue as a member of the fighting organization, I promise to withdraw in a loyal manner. I shall remain bound by the vow of secrecy which I made and I shall do nothing to harm the Movement.
“Our aim. The aim of the Nasjonal Samling is: A new state, a Norwegian and Nordic fellowship within the world community, organically constructed on the basis of work, with a strong and stable administration, a combination of common and private weal.”
This party therefore conforms completely to the Leadership Principle and while it shows a Norwegian facade, it is nothing but a facade. In fact on the very day of the invasion the Nazis imposed the establishment of an alleged Norwegian Government, presided over by Quisling. At that time the Norwegian Supreme Court appointed a board of officials who were to be invested, under the title of Administrative Council, with powers of higher administration. This Administrative Council constituted therefore, in the exceptional circumstances in which it was set up, a qualified authority for representing the legitimate sovereignty, at least in a conservative way. It functioned only for a short time. By September the Nazis found that it was not possible for them to obtain the participation or even passive acceptance of the Administrative Council and of the administrators. They themselves then appointed 13 commissioners, of whom 10 were selected among the members of the Quisling party. Quisling himself did not exercise any nominal function, but he remained the Führer of his party.
Finally, a third period began on 1 February 1942. At that date Quisling returned to power as Minister President, and the commissioners themselves assumed the title of ministers. This situation lasted until the liberation of Norway. Thus, except for a few months in 1940, the Germans completely usurped all sovereignty in Norway. This sovereignty was divided between their direct agent, the Reich Commissioner, and their indirect agents, first called State Councillors and then the Quisling Government, but always an emanation of National Socialism.
There is no doubt whatever that the independence of these organizations vis-à-vis the German authorities was absolutely nil. The fact that the second organization was called a government did not mean a strengthening of its autonomous authority. These were merely differences of form, the nature of which I shall point out to the Tribunal. I submit, in this connection, two documents, Documents RF-921 and RF-922. By comparing these two documents you will see that what I have just affirmed is correct. These two documents are instructions addressed by the Reich Commissioner to his offices concerned with legislative procedure.
Document Number RF-921 is dated 10 October 1940; that is the very beginning of the period of the State Councillors. I quote an extract from this document, “All the decrees of the State Councillors must be submitted to the Reich Commissioner before publication.” This is to be found in the second paragraph. It is the only point which I should like to bring out in this document. Therefore all the decrees of the higher Norwegian administration were under the control of the Reich Commissioner.
The second document, Document Number RF-922, is dated 8 April 1942. It relates to the period shortly after the establishment of the second Quisling Government. I start at the second sentence of this document:
“In view of the formation of the National Norwegian Government on 1 February 1942 the Reich Commissioner has decided that from now on this form of agreement”—a prior agreement in writing—“is no longer required. Nevertheless, this modification of formal legislative procedure does not mean that the Norwegian Government may proclaim laws and decrees without the knowledge of the competent department of the Reich Commissioner. His Excellency, the Reich Commissioner, expects every department chief to acquaint himself, by close contact with the competent Norwegian departments, with all legislative measures which are in preparation, and to find out in each case whether these measures concern German interests, and to assure himself, if necessary, that German interests will be taken into consideration.”
Thus, in the one case, there is a formal control with written authorization. In the other case there is a control by information among the different departments, but the principle is the same. The establishment of local authority under one form or under another form was merely a means of finding out the best way of deceiving public opinion. When the Germans put Quisling into the background, it was because they thought the State Councillors, being less well-known, might more easily deceive the public. When they returned Quisling, it was because the first maneuver had obviously failed and because they thought that perhaps the official establishment of an authority qualified as governmental would give the impression that the sovereignty of the country had not been abolished. One might, however, wonder what was the reason for these artifices and why the Nazis used them, instead of purely and simply annexing the country. There is a very important reason for that. It operates for Norway and it will operate for the Netherlands. The Nazis always preferred to maintain the fiction of an independent state and to gain a definite hold from within by using and developing the local Party. It is with this end in view that they granted the Party in Norway advantages of prestige; and if they did not act in an identical manner in Holland, their general conduct was, however, imbued with the same spirit.
This policy of the Germans in Norway is perfectly illustrated by the Norwegian law, or so-called Norwegian law, of 12 March 1942, (Norwegian Official Gazette, 1942, Page 215, which I offer in evidence as Document Number RF-923). I quote:
“Law concerning the Party and the State, 12 March 1942, Number 2.
“Paragraph 1. In Norway the Nasjonal Samling is the fundamental party of the State and closely linked with the State.
“Paragraph 2. The organization of the Party, its activity, and the duties of its members are laid down by the Führer of the Nasjonal Samling.
“Oslo, 12 March 1942”—signed—“Quisling, Minister President.”
On the other hand, the Nazis organized on a large scale the system of the duplication of functions which existed among the higher authorities. In fact, it is the transposition of the German system, which shows a constant parallelism between the state administration and the party organizations. Everywhere German Nazis were installed to second and supervise the Norwegian Nazis who had been put in official positions.
As this point is interesting from the point of view of seizure of sovereignty and of action taken in the administration, I think I may submit two documents, which are Documents RF-924 and RF-925. These are extracts of judicial interrogations by the Norwegian Court of two high German officials of the Reich Commission at Oslo. Document Number RF-924 refers to the interrogation of Georg Wilhelm Müller, interrogation dated 5 January 1946. Wilhelm Müller was the Ministerial Director in the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The information which he gives concerns more particularly the functioning of the propaganda service, but similar methods were used in a general way, as this statement admits. I quote Document RF-924:
“Question: ‘In 1941 nobody in your country thought that military difficulties would arise. At that time they certainly tried to mold the Norwegian people along Nationalist Socialist lines?’
“Answer: ‘They did this until the very end.’
“Question: ‘Which were the practical measures for achieving this National Socialist molding?’
“Answer: ‘They supported the NS Samling as far as possible; and they did it, in the first place, by strengthening the Party organization considerably.’ ”
I may point out that this translation into French is not first rate; it is, however, comprehensible.
“Question: ‘In what way was it strengthened?’
“Answer: ‘In each Fylke’—or province—‘picked German National Socialists were assigned to aid the Norwegian National Socialists.’
“Question: ‘Were there other practical measures?’
“Answer: ‘That was done in all domains, even in the field of propaganda, by the Einsatzstab propagandists placed at their disposal. This was also done in Oslo at the central offices of the NS Samling.’
“Question: ‘How did these propagandists work?’
“Answer: ‘They worked closely with similar Norwegian propagandists and made suggestions to them. Grebe did this by virtue of his double capacity as Chief of Propaganda in the Reichskommissariat and Chief of the Landesgruppe.’
“Question: ‘How was this done?’
“Answer: ‘These consultations and conferences were even arranged for the very top of the Party hierarchy. There was a man who was specially appointed for this; first Wegeler, then Neumann, then Schnurbusch, who had the task of strengthening National Socialist ideas within the NS Samling.’
“Question: ‘In the Einsatzstab there were experts from the different branches whose task it was to contact Norwegians and give them useful advice. In what domains?’
“Answer: ‘There were organizers, and above all instructors for the Hird, leaders of the SA and SS. Until he, himself, became leader of the Einsatzstab, we had at the head a press man, a propagandist, Herr Schnurbusch, an accountant, an expert on social welfare questions in the same way as in the NSV in Germany.’ ”
The Tribunal will notice in this document the name of Schnurbusch, as being that of the leader of the Einsatzstab, and of the organism for liaison with, and penetration into, the local Party. I am now going to quote an extract from the interrogation of Schnurbusch, which is found in Document Number RF-925.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting these documents in?
M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you say, for the purposes of the shorthand note, that you offer them in evidence?
M. FAURE: Will you excuse me? I should like to point out that I submit as evidence Document Number RF-925 as well as Document Number RF-924 of which I spoke just now.
This is from the interrogation of Heinrich Schnurbusch, leader of the liaison service in the Reich Commission on 8 January 1946 in Oslo:
“Question: ‘How did the German departments try to achieve this National Socialist conversion?’
I wish to point out to the Tribunal that I have passed over the first three questions as they are not of much interest.
“Answer: ‘We sought to strengthen this movement by the means which we were accustomed to apply in Germany for leading the masses. The Nasjonal Samling benefited by having at their disposal all the means of news service and propaganda. But we soon saw that the object could not be achieved. After 25 September 1940 the public mood in Norway changed suddenly when some State Councillors were appointed as NS State Councillors, for Quisling’s action in the days of April 1940 was considered treason by the Norwegian people.’
“Question: ‘In what way did you assist materially the NS Samling in this propaganda? In what way did you counsel the NS Samling?’
“Answer: ‘During the time I was in office, when a propaganda drive was made, it was always brought into line with the propaganda which the Germans made in Norway.’
“Question: ‘Did you issue any directives for the NS Samling?’
“Answer: ‘No. In my time the NS Samling worked independently in this respect, and partly even contrary to our advice. The NS Samling took the view that it understood better the Norwegian mentality, but it made many mistakes.’
“Question: ‘Was financial support given?’
“Answer: ‘Certainly, financial help was given, but I don’t know the exact amount.’ ”
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn for 10 minutes?
[A recess was taken.]
M. FAURE: I should like first of all to point out to the Tribunal that, with its permission, I shall examine this afternoon the Witness Van der Essen concerning whom a formal request has already been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure.
M. FAURE: This witness can then be called at the beginning of the afternoon session.
The observations which I have just presented had to do with Norway.
In the Netherlands, unlike what happened in Norway, the Nazis did not utilize the local Party as an official instrument of government. The governmental authority was completely in the hands of the Reich Commissioner who set up a sort of ministry, including four German General Commissioners, respectively competent for government and justice, public security, finance, and economic affairs, and special affairs. This organization was created by a decree of 3 June 1940 (Official Gazette for Holland, 1940, Number 5). I point out that, as the Dutch Official Gazette has already been submitted in evidence to the Tribunal, I shall not again submit each of these texts, which are a part of it. I shall, therefore, simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them and to consider them as proved.
The holders of the posts of General Commissioners were appointed by the decree of 5 June 1940.
The local authorities were represented at the higher level only by the Secretaries General of the Ministries, who were entirely under the authority of the Reich Commissioner and of the General Commissioners.
The decree of 29 May 1940, which is in the Dutch Official Gazette, 1940, Page 8, lays down in its first article:
“The Reich Commissioner will exercise the powers invested until now in the King and the Government. . . .”
And in Article 3:
“The Secretaries General of the Dutch ministries are responsible to the Reich Commissioner.”
If the Nazi Party did not constitute the Government, it nevertheless received the official blessing.
I shall quote to the Tribunal in this connection the decree of 30 January 1943, which likewise is in the Dutch Official Gazette, 1943, Page 63. I read the following passage:
“The representative of the political will of the Dutch people is the National Socialist movement of the Netherlands. I have, therefore, decreed that all the German offices under my orders, of the administration and those of the National Socialist movement, shall maintain close contact with the leader of the Movement in order to assure the co-ordination of the tasks in carrying out important administrative measures and particularly for all matters concerning personnel.”
The Tribunal knows already, for it is common knowledge, and insofar as it might be necessary through the witness who has already been heard, how outrageously untrue it was to claim that the Dutch National Socialist Party represented the political will of the people of this country.
Having commented on these two forms of utilization of the local party as agents of sovereignty, I should now like to point out to the Tribunal the main features of these usurpations which were committed by the Germans.
A first line of action is exemplified by the attempt to induce the occupied countries to participate in the war or, at the very least, to initiate recruitment for the German Army. In Norway the Nazis created the “SS Norge,” a formation which later was called the “Germanske SS Norge.” I submit as evidence Document Number RF-926, which is the decree of 21 July 1942, concerning the “Germanske SS Norge,” and I quote Paragraph 2 of this decree, which is a Quisling decree.
“2. ‘The Germanske SS Norge’ is a National Socialist order of soldiers which shall consist of men of Nordic blood and ideas. It is an independent subdivision of the Nasjonal Samling, directly under the NS Foerer (NS Leader) and responsible to him. It is, at the same time, a section of the ‘Stor-Germanske SS’ ”—the SS of Greater Germany—“and shall help to lead the Germanic peoples towards a new future and create the basis of a Germanic fellowship.”
We see again, by this example, that the interventions of the so-called Norwegian Government are perfectly obvious methods of Germanization. In order to facilitate the recruiting into this legion, the German or Norwegian Nazis did not hesitate to upset the civil legislation and to abolish the abiding principles of family rights by making a law which exempted minors from having to obtain the consent of their parents. This is a law of 1 February 1941, Norwegian Official Gazette, 1941, Page 153, which I submit in evidence as Document Number RF-927.
In the Netherlands the Germans were obliged to upset even more the national legislation in order to permit military recruitment. As they did not create a factitious government and as the legitimate government was still at war with the Reich, the volunteers came under Articles 101 and the following articles of the Dutch penal code, which punished those enlisted in the army of a foreign power at war with the Netherlands and likewise those who give aid to the enemy.
By reason of the de facto occupation of the country there was little chance of these penalties being effectively applied, but it is very curious and very revealing that the Reich Commissioner issued a decree of 25 July 1941, Dutch Official Gazette, 1941, Number 135. This decree states that the taking of Dutchmen for service in the German Army, the Waffen SS, or the Legion of Netherlands Volunteers does not bring them under the provisions of the penal texts mentioned above, and this decree is declared retroactive to 10 May 1940. It is therefore very convenient, when one commits a criminal act according to the general code, to be able to modify the law to suppress the crime in question.
Another decree of 25 July 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 548, stipulates that enrollment in the German Army will no longer involve loss of Dutch nationality.
Finally, a decree of 8 August 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 622, declares that the acquisition of German nationality no longer entails the loss of Dutch nationality except in cases of express renunciation. Although this last text seems to bring out a point of detail, it may be regarded as an initial attempt to create later a double Dutch and German nationality, which will fit into the general procedures for the advancement of the whole plan of Germanization.
In regard to these measures for military recruitment, I should like to state precisely the attitude of the Prosecution as a result of the examination and cross-examination of the witness, Vorrink, who was heard on Saturday. The Prosecution does not consider that the criminal character of this military recruitment is established only by the fact of having recruited persons by force or by pressure upon their will. This pressure and this constraint are an aggravating and characteristic aspect but not a necessary aspect of the criminal action which we reprehend. The fact of having recruited persons, even on a voluntary basis, in the occupied countries for service in the German Army, is considered by us as a crime. This crime is moreover punishable under the internal legislation of all these countries, whose legislation covers such acts as those committed in these countries, in accordance with the rules of law in matters of legislative competence.
It is even relatively of small importance, except for knowing all the details, whether the recruiting of traitors was favored or not by particular pressure according to the situation in which these traitors found themselves.
I should like also to indicate in a more general way, that the Prosecution does not consider that the recruiting of traitors, either for service in the Army or in other activities, is for the Nazi leaders an extenuating circumstance or an exonerating one. On the contrary, it is one of the characteristics of their criminal activity; and the responsibility of the traitors in no way exempts them from responsibility. On the contrary, we hold against them this corruption which they attempted to spread in the occupied countries by appealing to those elements of weak morality which may be found in the population of a country and by instilling in the mind of each person the thought of possible immoral and criminal activity against his country.
This was a first line of action for German usurpation: namely, the enrollment of troops.
A second general line of action is identified with the whole of the measures designed to abolish civil liberties and to set up the Leadership Principle. I shall quote some of these measures by way of example.
In Norway, suppression of political parties, German decree of 25 September 1940, which is in the Official Gazette for 1940, Page 19; a decree forbidding all activity in favor of the legitimate dynasty, decree of 7 October 1940, in the Official Gazette for 1940, Page 10; the guarantees under the statutory rules for officials were suppressed, they could be transferred or dismissed for political reasons, German decree of 4 October 1940, Page 24. Finally, a Norwegian law of 18 September 1943, setting up a characteristic institution, that of departmental chief representing the Party, and responsible to the Minister President and to no other authority of the State (Document Number RF-928). He exercised in the department the supreme political control over all public authorities of the department.
All professions came under the system of compulsory membership with application of the Leadership Principle.
In Holland we likewise observe the suppression of elected bodies, decree of 11 August 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 637, which confirms the decree of 21 June 1940, Official Gazette for 1940, Page 54; the dissolution of political parties, decree of 4 July 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 583; creation of the Labor Front, decree of 30 April 1942, Official Gazette for 1942, Page 211; setting up of the Peasant Corporation, decree of 22 October 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 838.
I have given only a few examples of this principle; and to conclude I shall quote a decree of 12 August 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 34, which created a special judicial competence for all offenses and infringements committed against political peace and against political interests, or committed for political motives. In fact, the justices of the peace charged with exercising these oppressive powers were always chosen from among the members of the Nazi Party.
Finally a third line of action in this campaign of usurpation can be defined as a systematic campaign against the elite of the country and against its spiritual life. In fact it is always in this sphere that the Nazis met with the greatest resistance to their designs. They attacked the universities and teaching establishments.
In Holland a decree of 25 July 1941, Official Gazette for 1941, Page 559, gives the administration the right to close arbitrarily all private institutions. In the Netherlands the University of Leyden was closed on 11 November 1941.
By a decree of the Reich Commissioner of 10 May 1943, Official Gazette for 1943, Page 127, the students were forced to sign a declaration of loyalty drawn up in the following terms:
“The undersigned, ——, hereby solemnly declares on his word of honor that he will conscientiously conform to the laws, decrees, and other dispositions in force in Dutch occupied territory and will abstain from any act directed against the German Reich, the German Army, or the Dutch authorities, or engage in any activity which might imperil public order in the higher teaching institutions in view of the present circumstances and danger.”
In Norway rigorous measures were taken against the University of Oslo. I offer in evidence Document Number RF-933. I point out to the Tribunal that this is not in strict order and that Document Number RF-933 is the last in the document book.
This Document Number RF-933 is an article in the Deutsche Zeitung of 1 December 1943, reproduced in a Norwegian newspaper. It is entitled, “A Cleaning-Up Measure Necessary in Oslo; Purge in the Student World.” I shall read only a few paragraphs of this article. I begin with the second paragraph:
“The students of the University of Oslo”—will the Tribunal excuse me. I shall read also the first paragraph:
“By order of the Reich Commissioner Terboven, the SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Rediess made the following announcement to the students in the lecture room of the University of Oslo on Tuesday afternoon:
“The students of the University of Oslo have attempted to offer resistance to the German Army of occupation and to the Norwegian Government recognized by the Reich, since the occupation of Norway, that is, since 1940.”
I shall end the quotation here, and continue at Paragraph 5:
“In order to protect the interests of the occupying power and to assure maintenance of peace and order within this country, rigorous measures are indispensable. Therefore, by order of the Reich Commissioner, I have to make known to you the following:
“1. The students of the University of Oslo will be transferred to a special camp in Germany.
“2. The women students will be dismissed from the University and must return by the quickest means to their original place of residence, where they will immediately report to the police. Until further notice they are forbidden to leave these places without permission from the police.”
I break off the quotation here and continue at the last paragraph but one, on the second page of this Document Number RF-933:
“You ought to be thankful to the Reich Commissioner that other much more Draconian measures are not being applied. Moreover, thanks to this measure, most of you have been saved from forfeiting your life and wealth in the future.”
As concerns religious life, the Germans multiplied their harassing methods. By way of example, I offer in evidence Document Number RF-929, which I shall read:
“Oslo, 28 May 1941: To the Commanders of the Sipo and the SD in Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim, Tromosoe. Subject: Surveillance of Religious Services during the Whitsuntide Feasts. Incidents: none.
“It is requested that you watch the religious services and send in a report here on the result.
“BDS”—commander—“of the Sipo and the SD. Oslo. Signature: (illegible) SS Hauptsturmführer.”
Now here is the report following this order to watch the church services. I offer this report in evidence as Document Number RF-930. I shall read this document, which is very short.
“Trondheim, 5 June 1941.
“The surveillance of religious services during the Whitsuntide Feasts showed no new essential points. Domprobst Fjellbu adheres to his provocative preaching, but so cleverly that he is able to excuse every phrase as applied to religious subjects and void of any political meaning.”
The rest of the letter is partly burned.
Finally I should like, in order not to dwell on this matter too long, to quote two examples which show, on the one hand, the constant immorality of the German methods and, on the other hand, the justified protests to which they gave rise on the part of the most qualified authorities. The first example concerns the Netherlands.
The Dutch magistrates were roused to righteous indignation by the German practice of arbitrary detentions in concentration camps. They found the opportunity of making known their disapproval in a manner which came within the normal exercise of their juridical functions. Thus, in connection with a particular case, the Court of Appeal at Leeuwarden rendered a decision of which I wish to read an extract to the Tribunal. This is submitted as Document Number RF-931. I shall read to you an extract from this document:
“Whereas the Court cannot declare itself in agreement in the matter of the penalty inflicted upon the accused by the Chief Judge and his presentation of motives, the Court is of the opinion that this penalty should be determined as follows:
“Whereas as regards the penalty to be inflicted:
“The Court desires to take into account the fact that for some time various penalties of detention inflicted by the Dutch Judge upon delinquents of masculine sex, contrary to legal principles and contrary to the intention of the Legislator and of the Judge, have been executed, or are being executed in camps in a manner which aggravates the penalty to a degree such as it was impossible for the Judge to foresee or even to suppose when determining the degree of the punishment.
“Whereas the Court, taking into account the possibility of this manner of executing the penalty to be inflicted at present, will abstain, for conscience sake, from condemning the suspect to a period of detention in conformity, in this case, with the gravity of the offense committed by the defendant, because the latter would be exposed to the possibility of an execution of the penalty as indicated here above.
“Whereas the Court, on the strength of this consideration, will confine itself to condemning the suspect to a penalty of detention to be determined hereafter, after deducting the time spent by him in preventive detention, and the duration of which is such that the penalty at the moment of the pronouncing of the penalty will have almost entirely expired during the period of preventive detention.”
This example is especially interesting, because I now have to indicate that as a result of this decision of the Court of Appeal, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart dismissed the President of the Court by a decree of the 9th of April 1943, which is likewise submitted in evidence under the same document number, RF-931. These two documents constitute a whole.
“By virtue of paragraph 3 of my decree,”—et cetera—“I dismiss from his office as Counsellor of the Court of Appeal at Leeuwarden, such dismissal to take effect immediately, Doctor of Law F.F. Viehoff.”—Signed—“Seyss-Inquart.”
The second example which I give in conclusion will now be taken from Norway. It is a solemn protest made by the Norwegian bishops. The special occasion which called forth this protest is the following: The Minister for Police had issued a decree, dated 13 December 1940, by which he arrogated to himself the right to suppress the obligation of professional secrecy for priests and provided that priests who refused to break the secrecy of the confession would be subjected to imprisonment by his orders.
On 15 January 1941, the Norwegian bishops addressed themselves to the Ministry of Public Education and Religious Affairs, and handed to it a memorandum. In this memorandum they made known their protests against this extraordinary demand by the police and at the same time they protested against other abuses; violent acts committed by Nazi organizations, and illegal acts in judicial matters. This protest of the Norwegian bishops is transcribed in a pastoral letter addressed to their parishes in February 1941. I submit it as Document Number RF-932. I should like to quote an extract from this document on Page 9, top of the page:
“The decree of the Ministry of Police, dated 13 December 1940, just published, gravely affects the mission of the priests. According to this decree, the obligation of professional secrecy for priests and ministers may be suppressed by the Ministry of Police.
“Our obligation to maintain professional secrecy is not only established by law, but has always been a fundamental condition for the work of the Church and of the priests in the exercise of their care of souls and in receiving the confession of persons in distress. It is an unalterable condition for the work of the Church, that a person may have absolute and unlimited confidence in the priest who is unreservedly bound by his obligation to keep professional secrecy, as it has been formulated in the Norwegian legislation and in the regulations of the Church at all times and in all Christian countries.
“To abolish this Magna Charta of the conscience is to strike at the very heart of the work of the Church, which is all the more serious because Paragraph 5 of the decree stipulates that the Ministry of Police may imprison the priest in question, in order to force a statement without the case having been submitted to a tribunal.”
Yet all this was happening during the first year of the occupation. Already the highest spiritual authorities of Norway found themselves in the position of having not only to protest against a particularly intolerable act, but also to enunciate a judgment upon the whole of the methods of the occupation, which judgment appears on Page 16 of the pastoral letter, and which I shall read to the Tribunal (last paragraph):
“For this reason the bishops of the Church have placed before the Ministry some of the acts and official proclamations about the government of society during these latter times, acts and proclamations which the Church finds in contradiction with the Commandments of God and which give the impression of revolutionary conditions prevailing in the country, instead of a state of occupation by which the laws are upheld as long as they are not directly incompatible with this state of occupation.”
This is a very correct juridical analysis; and now, if it please the Tribunal, I should also like to read a last sentence which preceded this, on Page 16:
“When the public authority of society permits violence and injustice and exercises pressure over souls, then the Church becomes the guardian of consciences. A human soul is of more importance than the whole world.”
I shall now ask the Tribunal to take the file entitled “Belgium.” I point out immediately to the Tribunal that this file does not include any document book. This statement, which deals with very general facts, will be supported as being evidence by the report of the Belgian Government, which has already been submitted by my colleagues under Document Number RF-394. The section which I now take up is a general section concerning military administration in two cases, in Belgium and France; and I shall begin with the file concerning Belgium.
In Belgium the usurpations of national sovereignty by the occupying power are imputable to the military command which committed them either by direct decrees or by injunctions to the Belgian administrative authorities who in this case were the Secretaries General of the Ministries.
Concerning the setting up of this apparatus of usurpation I shall read out to the Tribunal two paragraphs of the Belgian report, Chapter 4, concerning Germanization and nazification, Page 3, Paragraph 3:
“The legal government of Belgium, having withdrawn to France, then to London, it was the Secretaries General of the Ministries, that is to say, the highest officials in the hierarchic order, who, by virtue of Article 5 of the law of 10 May 1940, exercised within the framework of their professional activity and in cases of urgency, all the powers of the highest authority.”
In other words, these high officials, animated, at least during the first months of the occupation, by the desire to keep the occupying authorities as far removed as possible from the administration of the country, took upon themselves governmental and administrative powers. At the order of the Germans this administrative power after a time became a real legislative power.
This regime of the Secretaries General pleased the Germans who adopted it. In appointing to these posts Belgians paid by them they could introduce into Belgium under the appearance of legality absolutely radical reforms, which would make of this country a National Socialist vassal state.
It is interesting to note at this point that in order to strengthen their hold on the public life through the local authorities, the Germans did not hesitate by a decree of 14 May 1942, which is referred to in the official report, to suppress the jurisdictional control of the legality of the orders of the Secretaries General, which was a violation of Article 107 of the Belgian Constitution. The Belgian report states in the following paragraphs where the responsibility lies in this matter of breaches of public order, and I shall quote here the actual terms of this report on Page 4, Paragraph 3:
“In conclusion, whether the transformation of the legal institutions be the consequence of German decrees or that of orders emanating from the Secretaries General makes no difference. It is the Germans who bear the responsibility for these, the Secretaries General being in relation to them only faithful agents for carrying out their instructions.”
I think that it will likewise be interesting to read the three following paragraphs of the report, for they reveal characteristic facts as to German methods in their seizure of sovereignty.
“If it is necessary to furnish a new argument to support this thesis further, it is sufficient to recall that the occupying power employed all means to introduce into the structure which was to be transformed, from top to bottom, devoted National Socialist agents. This was really the work of termites.
“The decree of 7 March 1941, under the pretext of bringing younger men into the administration, provided for the removal of a great number of officials. They would naturally be replaced by Germanophiles.
“Finally, the Germans set up at the head of the Ministry of the Interior one of their most devoted agents, who arrogated to himself, as we shall see subsequently, the right to designate aldermen, permanent deputies, burgomasters, et cetera, and used his rights to proceed to certain appointments of district commissioners, for instance, by putting into office tools of the enemy.”
The Belgian report then analyzes in a remarkably clear manner the violations by the Germans of Belgian public order, classifying these under two headings. The first is entitled “Modifications Made in the Original Constitutional Structure.”
Under this heading we find particular mention of the decree of 18 July 1940, which immediately abolished all public activity; then a series of decrees by which the Germans suppressed the election of aldermen and decided that these aldermen would henceforth be designated by the central authority. This meant the overthrow of the traditional democratic order of communal administrations.
In the same way the Germans, in violation of Article 3 of the Belgian Constitution, ordered by the decree of 26 January 1943 the absorption of numerous communes into great urban areas.
The report then mentions here the fiscal exemptions granted in violation of the Constitution, to persons engaged in the service of the German Army or the Waffen SS. We find here a fresh example of the German criminal and general methods of military recruitment in the occupied countries.
The second heading of the report reads: “Introduction into Belgian Public Life of New Institutions Inspired by National Socialism and the Idea of the State.” Such institutions were, in fact, created by the German authorities. The most remarkable are the National Agricultural and Food Corporation and the Central Merchandise Offices. The report analyzes the characteristics of these institutions and proves that they aimed at destroying traditional liberties. They were organs of totalitarian inspiration in which the Leadership Principle was applied, as we have seen was the case in similar institutions in the Netherlands.
I should like now to read the brief but revealing conclusion of the Belgian report on Germanization. We think that it has been sufficiently established by the preceding statement that the Belgian Constitution and laws were deliberately violated by the German occupying power, and this with the purpose, not of assuring its own security, which is obvious, but with the skillfully premeditated intention of making of Belgium a National Socialist State and, consequently, capable of being annexed, seeing that two nationalist states that are neighbors must necessarily exclude each other, the stronger absorbing the weaker.
This policy was carried out in violation of international laws and customs, of the Declaration of Brussels of 1874, and of the Hague Regulations of 1899.
I shall not give detailed indications concerning other applications of this usurpation in connection with Belgium, because many indications have been furnished to the Tribunal already, notably in the economic statement and likewise in M. Dubost’s presentation. And, moreover, as the regime in Belgium was closely bound up with the regime in France, the indications which I shall give in the two other sections of my brief will relate particularly to these two countries.
However, before concluding the presentation which I am now making, I should like to mention the abuses committed by the Germans against the universities of Belgium. We find here again the same phenomenon of hostility—very understandable of course—on the part of the doctrinaires and Nazi leaders against the centers of culture; and this hostility showed itself especially with regard to the four great Belgian universities, which have such a fine tradition of spiritual life. I must point out to the Tribunal that the observations which I intend to present on this point have been taken from the appendices to the Belgian report of which I read some extracts. I must point out that these appendices have not been submitted as documents, although they are attached to one of these originals, which marks their authenticity. I shall have these appendices translated and submitted later and I shall ask the Tribunal, therefore, to consider the indications which I shall give it as affirmations, the proof of which will be furnished, on the one hand, by the deposit of documents and, on the other hand, by oral evidence, since I have called a witness on the subject of these questions. If this method satisfies the Tribunal, and I beg to be excused for the fact that the appendices have not been actually presented with the document, I shall continue my statement on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, what are the appendices to which you are referring?
M. FAURE: They are documents which are in the appendix of the Belgian report. They are as follows:
The subject matter of this report is to be found in the Belgian report itself, which has already been submitted. On the other hand, another copy of the same section has been established as the original with a series of appendices. For this reason the appendices were not translated and submitted at the same time as the main report, of which this was only a part. They are appended notes which trace events that occurred in university life. But, as I indicated to the Tribunal, I propose to prove these points by the hearing of a witness. I thought, therefore, that I could make a statement which would constitute an affirmation of the Prosecution and on which I would produce oral evidence. On the other hand, I shall submit the appendices as soon as they have been translated into German, which has not yet been done.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal is satisfied with the course which you propose, M. Faure.
M. FAURE: I shall mention first that in the University of Ghent the Germans undertook special propaganda among the students, with a view to germanizing these young generations. They utilized for this purpose an organization called “Genter Studenten Verband,” but their efforts to develop this organization did not achieve the success they had hoped. They set up in this university and in others a real espionage system under the cover of an ingenious formula, namely, that of “invited professors,” German professors who were supposed to have been invited and who were observers and spies.
The report of one of these invited professors has been found in Belgium. This report shows the procedure adopted as well as the complete failure of the German efforts to exert influence.
In all the universities, the Germans made arrests and deported professors and students, and this action was resorted to particularly when the students refused—and rightly so—to obey the German illegal orders which compelled them to enter the labor service.
As regards the University of Brussels, it should be pointed out that this university had been, from the beginning, provided with a German Commissioner, and that 14 professors had been irregularly dismissed. Later, the University of Brussels was obliged to discontinue the courses, and this as a result of a characteristic incident:
On the occasion of the vacancy of three chairs at the university, the Germans refused to accept the nomination of the candidates proposed in the usual way, and decided that they would appoint professors whose views suited them. This clearly shows the generally applied German method of interfering in everything and putting into office everywhere agents under their influence.
On 22 November 1941 the German military administration notified the President of the University of this decision. Therefore, the university decided to go on a sort of strike and, in spite of all the efforts of the Germans, this strike of the University of Brussels lasted until the liberation.
On this question of the Belgian universities, I should like now to read something to the Tribunal. This concerns the University of Louvain. Before reading this, I must indicate to the Tribunal the circumstances.
The Germans had in this university, as in the others, imposed upon the students compulsory labor. This we already know. But what I am going to read has to do with an additional requirement which is altogether shocking.
The Germans wished to oblige the Rector of the University, Monseigneur Van Wayenberg, to give them a complete list with the addresses of those students who were liable to compulsory service and who evaded it. They wished, therefore, to impose upon the rector an act whereby he would become an informer and this under threat of very severe penalties. The Cardinal Archbishop of Malines intervened on this occasion and on 4 June 1943 addressed a letter to General Von Falkenbausen, Military Commander in Belgium. I should like to read this letter to the Tribunal. This letter is to be found in a book which I have here and which is published in Belgium, entitled “Cardinal Van Roey and the German Occupation in Belgium.” I do not submit this letter as a document. I ask the Tribunal to consider it as a quotation from a publication. This is what Cardinal Archbishop of Malines writes:
“By an oral communication, of which I have asked in vain for the confirmation in writing, the Chief of the Military Administration Reeder has informed me that in case Monseigneur the Rector of the Catholic University of Louvain should persist in refusing to furnish the list with the addresses of the first year students, the occupying authority will take the following measures:
“Close down the university; forbid the students to enroll in another university; subject all the students to forced labor in Germany and, should they evade this measure, take reprisals against their families.
“This communication is all the more surprising, as a few days previously, following a note addressed to your Excellency by Monseigneur the Rector, the latter received from the Kreiskommandant of Louvain a notification that the academic authority would have no further trouble with regard to the lists. It is true that the Chief of Military Administration Reeder informed me that this answer was due to a misunderstanding.
“As President of the Board of the University of Louvain, I have informed the Belgian bishops, who make up this board, of the serious nature of the communication which I have received; and I have the duty to inform you, in the name of all the bishops, that it is impossible for us to advise Monseigneur the Rector to hand over the lists of his students, and that we approve the passive attitude which he has observed up to now. To furnish the lists would, in effect, imply positive co-operation in measures which the Belgian bishops have condemned in the pastoral letter of 15 March 1943 as being contrary to international law, to natural rights, and to Christian morality.
“If the University of Louvain were subjected to sanctions because it refuses this co-operation, we consider that it would be punished for carrying out its duty and that however hard and painful the difficulties it would have to undergo temporarily, its honor at least would not be sullied. We believe, with the famous Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, that honor is above everything—‘Nihil praeferandum honestati.’
“Moreover, Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of the fact that the Catholic University of Louvain is a dependency of the Holy See. Canonically established by the Papacy, it is under the authority and the control of the Roman Congregation of Seminaries and Universities and it is the Holy See which approved the appointment of Monseigneur Van Wayenberg as Rector Magnifique of the University. If the measures announced were to be carried out, it would constitute a violent attack on the rights of the Holy See. Consequently His Holiness the Pope will be informed of the extreme dangers which threaten our Catholic University.”
I shall end here the quotation of the letter, but I must point out to the Tribunal that in spite of this protest and any considerations of simple practical interest, which the Germans might have had in maintaining correct attitude in this matter, the Rector Magnifique was arrested on 5 June 1943, and was condemned by the German military court to 18 months imprisonment.
Having recalled the painful facts which the Tribunal has just heard, I should like to observe that they might almost give us the impression that such an event as the arrest and sentence of a prelate, rector of a university, for a wrongful reason was, since there were no tragic consequences, of relatively secondary importance. But I think we should not subordinate our intellectual judgment to the direct test of our sensibility, now grown so accustomed to horrors; and if we reflect upon it, we consider that such an outrage is in itself very characteristic, and the fact that such treatment should have been considered by the Germans as the expression of justice, that is truly characteristic of the plan of Germanization with its repercussions on the world.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.