Afternoon Session
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, in pursuance of the statement made by the Soviet Delegation, I will ask for permission to bring before the Tribunal for direct examination the field marshal of the former German Army, Friedrich Paulus, who will be examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.
[The witness, Paulus, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please tell me your name?
FRIEDRICH PAULUS (Witness): Friedrich Paulus.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Would you like to sit down?
GEN. RUDENKO: Your name is Friedrich Paulus?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were born 1898?
PAULUS: 1890.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were born in the village of Breitenau, in the district of Kassel, in Germany?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: By nationality you are a German?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are field marshal of the former German Army?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your last official position was Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army at Stalingrad?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Will you please tell us, Witness, did you on 8 January 1946, make a statement to the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics?
PAULUS: Yes, I did.
GEN. RUDENKO: You confirm this statement?
PAULUS: Yes, I confirm this statement.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please, tell us, Witness, what you know regarding the preparation by the Hitlerite Government and the German High Command of the armed attack on the Soviet Union.
PAULUS: From personal experience, I can state the following: On 3 September 1940 I took office with the High Command of the Army as Chief Quartermaster I of the General Staff. As such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and had in addition to carry out the instructions of a general operational nature which he delegated to me.
When I took office I found in my sphere of work, among other things, a still incomplete operational plan dealing with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational plan had been worked out by the then Major General Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose had been temporarily transferred to the High Command of the Army.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Oberst Halder, turned over to me the continuation of the work which was ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, on the following basis:
An investigation was to be made as to the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, with regard to the terrain, the points of the attack, the manpower needed, and so forth. In addition it was stated that altogether about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. It was furthermore to be taken into consideration that from the beginning Romanian territory was to be utilized for the deployment of the German southern army. On the northern flank the participation of Finland in the war was taken into account, but was ignored in this operational plan of the army.
Then, in addition, as a basis for the plan which was to be worked out, the aims—the instructions of the OKW—were given: First, the destruction of those parts of the Russian Army stationed in the west of Russia, to prevent the units which were fit for fighting from escaping deep into Russia; second, the reaching of a line from which the Russian air force would be unable to attack German territory effectively, and the final aim was the reaching of the Volga-Archangel line.
The operational plan which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November and was followed by two military exercises with the command of which the General Staff of the Army entrusted me. Senior officers of the General Staff of the Army were also assigned. The basic strength requirements assumed in these military exercises were: The launching of one army group south of the Pripet territory, specifically from southern Poland and from Romanian territory, with the aim of reaching the Dnieper-Kiev line and south of it; north of the Pripet territory another army group, the strongest, from the area around Warsaw and northward, with the general direction of attack being the Minsk-Smolensk line, the intention being to direct it against Moscow later; then a further army group, namely Army Group North, from the area of East Prussia, with the initial direction of attack being through the Baltic States toward Leningrad.
The conclusion which was drawn from these military exercises was at that time that in case of actual hostilities provision should be made firstly for reaching the general line Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried forward if the situation developed favorably, supply lines, et cetera being adjusted accordingly. In connection with these military exercises and for the evaluation of the theoretical experience gained therefrom, there was a further conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the chiefs of the general staffs of the army groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, there was a speech about Russia by the then chief of the section Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kinsel, describing Russia’s geographic and economic conditions, the Red Army, et cetera. The most significant point here was that no preparations whatever for an attack by the Soviet had come to our attention.
With these military exercises and conferences that I have just described the theoretical considerations and plans for this offensive were concluded. Immediately thereafter, that is on 18 December 1940, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive Number 21. This was the basis for all military and economic preparations which were to be carried out. In the Supreme Command of the Army this directive resulted in going ahead with the drafting and working out of directions for troop deployments for this operation. These first directions for troop deployment were authorized on 3 February 1941 by Hitler after a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the Obersalzberg; thereupon they were forwarded to the troops. Later on several supplements were issued. For the beginning of the attack the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces had calculated the time which would make it possible for large troop movements to be made on Russian territory. That was expected from about the middle of May on. Preparations were made in accordance with this. Then at the end of March this date underwent a change, when Hitler decided, due to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack this country. Consequently, in the orders issued at the beginning of April 1941 this tentative date for the start of the operation. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast. I think you had better begin again where you said that at the end of March Hitler made a change in the plan.
PAULUS: [Continuing] Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date foreseen for the beginning of the attack had to be postponed by about five weeks, that is to the last half of June. And, indeed, this attack then did take place on 22 June 1941.
In conclusion, I confirm the fact that the preparation for this attack on the Soviet Union, which actually took place on 22 June 1941, dated back to the autumn of 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared?
[To the witness] Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward?
PAULUS: I gave it at the beginning: From the time my personal observations began, when I entered office, on 3 September 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances was the participation of the satellite states secured?
PAULUS: From personal observation, I can say the following regarding this:
About September 1940, just at the time when I had received this operational study for the attack on the Soviet Union there was planned from the outset the use of Romanian territory for the deployment of the German right or, that is to say, south wing, and that was taken into consideration from the outset. A military mission headed by the then Lieutenant General of Cavalry, Hansen, was sent to Romania. A whole panzer division, the 13th, was transferred to Romania as a training unit. To those who knew about the plans for the future it was obvious that this step could only serve the purpose of preparing the future partner in the war for the task intended for him.
Further, in regard to Hungary:
In December 1940 Colonel Lazslo, the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, came to the headquarters of the Army High Command at Zossen. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization. The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of regrouping its units, which were organized in brigades, into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized troops and of panzer units. The chief of the Organization Division of the General Staff of the Army, then Major General Buhle, and myself advised Colonel Lazslo. At the same time, several Hungarian military commissions were in Berlin, and with them also the Hungarian Minister of War, General Von Bartha, and they discussed armament deliveries to Hungary with German authorities.
It was clear to all of us who were informed as to future plans that all these measures, including the supplying of arms to other armies, were only conceivable at that time if these weapons were to be employed in future military projects.
Regarding Hungary there is a further point:
Due to the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler, at the end of March 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On 27 or 28 March I was called to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where there had just been a conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army had participated, that is, had been ordered to be present.
When I arrived I was advised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia in the first place to eliminate a threat to the flank of the intended operation against Greece, and get hold of the rail line going from Belgrade southward through Nish, and then also with an eye to the future—to Plan Barbarossa—to keep the right flank free from the outset.
I was instructed to go to Vienna, taking with me a number of competent General Staff officers of the Army, to deliver and explain pertinent orders to German commanders, and then to travel on without fail to the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest and to reach an understanding with it on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia.
On 30 March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Werth, of the infantry and then with the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Lazslo. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly, and the desired result was achieved. This result was then put down on maps. The map that I received from the Hungarian General Staff contained not only the deployment of the troops intended for the attack against Yugoslavia, but also forces on the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, which were to be placed there to protect our rear against the Soviet Union.
The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.
As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler’s view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory. I can cite one example: The question of the Dragowitsch oil territory. Later, when the attack began against Soviet Russia, the 17th German Army which was fighting at that point had the explicit order from the Supreme Command to take the Dragowitsch oil fields at all costs before the arrival of the Hungarians.
Regarding this future partner, according to my observation the procedure of Hitler was such that he counted on her certain participation and therefore delivered the armament to her and helped with the training, but that he kept to himself the time when he would initiate the ally into his plans.
Thirdly, the Finnish question. In December 1940 the first visit of the Chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was made to the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen. Lieutenant General Heinrichs had a conference with the Chief of the Army General Staff, the contents of which I no longer remember; but he made a speech about the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 before the General Staff officers of the High Command of the Army, and the General Staff officers of the Army groups who happened to be present at the time in connection with the discussion of the military exercises.
This speech before these General Staff officers had its great significance at that time because of the fact that it was delivered at the same time that Directive Number 21 of 18 December was issued. This speech was significant, it dealt with experiences won in the war with the Red Army and in addition gave an insight into the value of the Finnish troops as possible future partners in the war.
I took part in a second conference with the Chief of the Finnish General Staff at the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen, in the second half of May 1941. The Chief of the Finnish General Staff arrived from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Army. The subject of the subsequent conferences in Zossen with the General Staff of the High Command of the Army was the co-operation of the Finnish forces in the south in Plan Barbarossa—in co-operation with Army Group North—which was to proceed from the deployment area in East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached that the Finnish troops in the south were to synchronize their movements with the advance of German Army Group North and likewise that the joint advance later against Leningrad should be subject to consultations and agreements depending on the development of events.
Those are the personal observations which I made regarding the first appearance and the enlistment of allies in preparations for the aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: How, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on the U.S.S.R. carried out—the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces?
PAULUS: The attack on the Soviet Union took place as I have related, according to a plan prepared carefully and well in advance. The troops for this attack were at first assembled in the rear of the deployment area. By special orders they were then moved by groups into jumping-off positions, and then took up their position along the entire long front from Romania to East Prussia for a simultaneous attack. The Finnish theater of war was excluded from this operation.
Just as the large-scale operational plan, as I described it at the beginning, was to a certain extent tried out theoretically, the detailed employment of troops was discussed during military exercises by the staffs of army groups, corps, and divisions and drawn up in orders down to the details long before the beginning of the war.
A large-scale diversion, which was to be organized in Norway and along the coast of France was designed to simulate an invasion of Britain in June 1941 and thus divert Russia’s attention.
All measures were taken not only for operational but also for tactical surprise, as for instance, the prohibition of open reconnaissance on and across the boundary before the beginning of the war. That meant on the one hand, that possible losses which might be caused due to the lack of reconnaissance had to be taken into account for the sake of surprise, but on the other hand it meant that a surprise attack across the boundary by the enemy was not feared.
All of these measures show that it was a question of a criminal attack.
GEN. RUDENKO: How would you define the aims pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: The aim to reach the Volga-Archangel line, which was far beyond German strength, is in itself characteristic of Hitler’s and the National Socialist leadership’s boundless policy of conquest. From a strategic point of view, the achievement of these aims would have meant the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. With the winning of the line I have mentioned the main areas of Soviet Russia with the capital, Moscow, would have been conquered and subjugated, together with the leading political and economic center of the Soviet Union. Economically, the winning of this line would have meant the possession of important agricultural areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production in Russia, and also the main network of communications in European Russia.
How much Hitler was bent on taking economic objectives in this war can best be shown from an example out of my personal experience.
On 1 June 1942, on the occasion of a conference of commanders-in-chief in the region of Army Group South in Poltava, Hitler declared, “If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grosny, then I must end this war.”
For the utilization and the administration of the territories to be conquered, economic and administrative organizations had already been formed and were kept in readiness long before the beginning of the war.
To summarize I should like to state that the objectives given indicate the conquest of the Russian territories for the purpose of colonization with the utilization and spoliation of and with the resources of which the war in the West was to be brought to a conclusion, with the aim of finally establishing domination over Europe.
GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the criminal initiation of the war against Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: May I please have the question repeated?
GEN. RUDENKO: I repeat the question. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have just put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion.
Is that what Counsel for the Defense wish to object to?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President, that is what I want to do.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this question rather differently.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who of the defendants was an active participant in the initiation of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: Of the defendants, as far as I observed them, the top military advisers to Hitler. They are the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; Chief of the Operations Branch, Jodl; and Göring, in his capacity as Reich Marshal, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Economy.
GEN. RUDENKO: In concluding the interrogation I shall make a summary. Have I rightly concluded from your testimony, that long before 22 June the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose of colonizing the territory of the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That is beyond doubt according to all the developments as I described them, and also in connection with all the directives issued in the well-known Green File.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The British?
BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The United States?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants’ counsel?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as Counsel for the General Staff, I ask you to afford me the opportunity to examine the witness tomorrow morning. The presentation of the witness by the Prosecution came as a surprise to the defendants’ counsel, at any rate, and I think a consultation about the questions to be asked, especially in view of the importance of the testimony, is absolutely necessary. I therefore ask to be permitted to conduct the cross-examination at the beginning of tomorrow morning’s session.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if the Prosecution has no objection, the Tribunal thinks that this application ought to be granted.
GEN. RUDENKO: If the Tribunal so wishes, the Prosecution will not object.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. I don’t know whether any other member of the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I assume that all defendants’ counsel may conduct their cross-examination of the witness, General Paulus, tomorrow morning?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I was only asking whether any other member of the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: I personally would be able to put my questions after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire and the case will go on. He will be recalled tomorrow morning and in the meantime you will go on with your case.
[The witness left the stand, and Major General Zorya approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: General, you won’t, I presume, think it necessary to read any more of Field Marshal Paulus’ statement, will you?
GEN. ZORYA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.
GEN. ZORYA: Referring to the explanation concerning the beginning of the criminal attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, I should like to remind the Tribunal that in the morning session of the Tribunal on 30 November 1945, the witness, Lahousen, was interrogated and gave evidence of sufficient interest in our case.
Among other things, this witness, when enumerating the more intimate members of the inner circle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Army, mentioned Pieckenbrock by name.
I present to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-228, the testimony of the former chief of Section I of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General of the former German Army, Hans Pieckenbrock, former chief and colleague of Lahousen. Pieckenbrock gave this testimony in the order prescribed by the laws of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, on 12 December 1945.
For the moment I should like to read a few lines only into the record from Pieckenbrock’s testimony, relating to the matter which we are now investigating. These lines are on Page 1 of the Russian text of his testimony and they are marked with a red pencil. This Page 1 corresponds to Page 34 of the document book.
“I must say”—said Pieckenbrock—“that already since August and September 1940 the Foreign Armies East of the General Staff of the Army began to increase considerably its intelligence assignments to the Abwehr concerning the U.S.S.R. These assignments were unquestionably connected with the preparation of war against Russia.
“The more precise dates for Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union I learned in January 1941 from Canaris. I do not know what sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the Soviet Union was fixed for 15 May.”
The Soviet Prosecution also has at its disposal the testimony of the former chief of Department III of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General Franz von Bentivegni of the former German Army, which was given by him on 28 December 1945. I present those documents under Document Number USSR-230.
I shall at the same time also only read into the record those parts of Bentivegni’s testimony underlined in red pencil, which have a direct bearing on the beginning of military preparations against the Soviet Union. These first two excerpts of the testimony are on Page 37 in the document book which is submitted to the Military Tribunal:
“I learned first of Germany’s preparation for a military attack on the Soviet Union in August 1940, from the head of the German Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris. In an unofficial conversation which took place in Canaris’ office he told me that Hitler had started to take measures for an Eastern campaign, which he had spoken about as early as 1938 in his speech at a meeting of Gauleiter in Berlin.
“Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler’s had now begun to take concrete form. This was evident from the fact that divisions of the German Army were being forwarded in large numbers from the West to the eastern frontiers and, in accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia.”
These are the first two paragraphs of Bentivegni’s testimony.
And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual time of fascist Germany’s military preparations for the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, I should like to dwell for a moment on the testimony of General Müller. This testimony, dated 8 January 1946, was written in a camp for prisoners of war. I present it to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-149.
All the material to which I have so far referred emanated from circles of the highest commanding officers of the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: General, on this document of General Müller, does it appear where that document was made and where General Müller is now?
GEN. ZORYA: The photostat bears a date written in General Müller’s hand. This date is 8 January 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Where?
GEN. ZORYA: If I might have a look at the photostatic copy which I have just presented to the Tribunal, I would be able to tell you where the date is written.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but there are many prisoners-of-war camps. We want to know which one and where it is.
GEN. ZORYA: In a camp located near Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this document got any authenticating signature on it at all? So far as we are concerned, isn’t it simply a photostatic copy of a writing by somebody?
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, this document, like all other documents which have been submitted so far by the Soviet Delegation, is a noncertified photostatic copy.
Taking into consideration the wish of the Tribunal and in execution of this wish the Soviet Prosecution took measures to ensure that only the originals of these documents or documents whose authenticity is certified will be presented in complete order to the General Secretary. This will be done in the course of several days and all the material will be given in best order to the General Secretary.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where the writer of the document is now?
GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already. If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the general’s whereabouts.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn now. That will enable you to consult your colleagues.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, to my regret I must present the same objections to this document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union under USSR-149, and must submit the same request which I made this morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have not yet made a decision in regard to this question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal has already made a decision.
I think it would be better if, when defendants’ counsel go to the place from which they wish to speak, they would arrange these earphones before they speak.
I say the Tribunal has already made a decision which governs this case. They pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union that documents which were not identified as authentic documents, must be identified as authentic, and the Soviet prosecutor at that time undertook to certify that all documents which he made use of were certified as authentic documents. And if they are not so certified, they will be struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this document.
This document is a document which appears to be a document, a letter, or report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does not contain upon its face any certification showing that it is an authentic document. The Counsel for the Soviet Union said before we adjourned, that he undertook—as he had already undertaken—to produce a certificate that the document was an authentic document; that is to say, that it was written by the person who purported to write it, and in those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document provisionally.
If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document will be stricken from the record.
DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will accept a letter written to the Soviet Government or a statement as documentary evidence for the contents of this statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said provided that it is certified as an authentic document. I have said that more than once.
DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the Prosecution or the Government of the Soviet Union or to any other Prosecution would become documentary evidence by the certification that it has actually been written by the person who signed it, which would make it impossible for the Defense to cross-examine the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are dealing with witnesses who are scattered all over the globe, and as we are informed that it is not the practice in the Soviet Union for affidavits to be made in such cases, the Tribunal considers such a document to fall within Article 19—provided it is an authentic document.
We are affording the defendants’ counsel the greatest assistance in bringing witnesses to this Court, but we cannot undertake to bring witnesses from all over the world upon questions which are very often of very little importance.
DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am grateful to the Tribunal for their willingness to assist us. Therefore I only request to ascertain in each case where the person, who has made that statement, has his residence, so that the Defense may try to reach him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the immediate vicinity of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think that it was only fair, if such a document as this were to be put in evidence, that he should be produced for examination or cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, but we do understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the vicinity of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and I am reminding defendants’ counsel that they can always apply, if they think right, to issue interrogatories which would be put to any such person as this who has written such a document as this.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
GEN. ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to make inquiries about General Müller. General Müller is in a prisoner-of-war camp, Number 27, in Krasnogorsk, in the Moscow region.
May I continue my statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: All the material, Your Honors, which I have mentioned to date emanated from circles of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. If I can so express myself, General Müller belonged to the middle category of German generals. He was Chief of Staff of an army; he commanded an army group. His testimony reflects a series of events which may be considered worthy of attention, since they explain the circumstances accompanying Germany’s preparations against the Soviet Union.
I wish to refer to Page 40 of the document book. There you will find the first page of General Müller’s statement. The first paragraph, Page 1, of the statement is marked with red pencil. I now proceed to quote from it:
“The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union began as early as July 1940. At that time I was first general staff officer in the staff of Army Group C at Dijon in France. General Field Marshal Von Leeb was commander-in-chief. This army group consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 7th Armies, which were occupation armies in France. Besides this, Army Group A (Rundstedt), whose task was to prepare ‘Case Sea Lion’ (the invasion of England by Army Group B—Von Bock) was also in France. The staff of Army Group B was transferred to the East (Posen) during July and was given the following forces, transferred from France—part of the armies of occupation: The 12th Army Command (List), 4th Army Command (Von Kluge), and 18th Army Command (Von Küchler), plus several general commands and about thirty divisions. A greater part of this number was taken from Army Group C (Von Leeb).
“Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order for the demobilization of 20 divisions. This order was cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not demobilized. Instead of this, after their return to Germany they were sent on leave, and thus kept ready for rapid mobilization.
“Both measures, the transfer of about five hundred thousand men to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order disbanding about three hundred thousand men, show that already in July 1940 plans existed for war operations in the East.
“The next order which gives evidence of Germany’s preparations for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued in September 1940 regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new army command (A.O.K. 11) of several general commands and about forty divisions and panzer divisions. The forming of these units was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the commander of the reserve army (Generaloberst Fromm), partly in France, but mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the OKH called me to Fontainebleau. The Chief Quartermaster I in the General Staff of the Army, then Lieutenant General (afterwards Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the order that my staff (Army Group C) was to be transferred to Dresden by 1 November and that Army High Command II (Generaloberst Weichs) which was under the command of the staff, should be transferred at the same time to Munich. The task was the leading of training of the above-mentioned 40 divisions which were to be newly created.
“In accordance with this order, confirmed later by signature by the Chief of the General Staff Halder, the transfer of these units was carried out on time. These 40 divisions were put into action in the invasion of the Soviet Union.”
Thus initiated, the preparation for the military attack on the Soviet Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with customary German pedantry.
I would, Your Honors, remind the Tribunal that the witness, Paulus, stated at this session that in August 1940 the elaboration of the previous plan of attack on the Soviet Union, known as Plan Barbarossa, was already so far advanced as to render possible the conducting of two military exercises under the direction of Paulus.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I don’t think it is necessary to read the statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has already given the evidence in the witness box.
GEN. ZORYA: I am not reading it into the record. I am merely referring to a circumstance which will enable me to proceed to General Müller’s statement that this system of military exercises, which originated in the General Staff of the German Army, eventually spread over the entire Army and that the entire armed forces participated in the execution of these games which, per se, were already a preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the record that passage of the statement which is underlined in blue pencil, Page 41 of the bundle of documents:
“Insofar”—General Müller states—“as in the future the Army was to attack the Soviet Union, the first plan was to train soldiers and general staff officers.
“Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders from the Chief of the General Staff Halder to attend the military exercises of Rundstedt’s army group at St. Germain, near Paris. The object of this military exercise was the attack and advance from Romania and South Poland in the direction of Kiev and southwards. The plan had in mind the intention also of the participation of Romanian troops. In the main this military exercise anticipated the conditions of the future order concerning the strategic deployment of forces, to which I will refer later.
“The director of the military exercises was the Chief of the General Staff of the Rundstedt army group. There were present: Rundstedt, Halder, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the 6th Army, Colonel Heim, of the 11th Army, Colonel Wöhler, and of Kleist’s tank group, Colonel Zwickler and several generals of the panzer forces. The military exercises were held at the place occupied by Rundstedt’s army group, approximately between the 31st January and 2d February 1941. The exercise demonstrated the necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces.”
The documents I have presented to date characterize the measures of the military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the strategic deployment of the German armies for launching an attack against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.
As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period of 1940 and were put into action at least 6 months prior to the appearance on the scene of Directive Number 21 concerning the Plan Barbarossa.
I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken by the fascist conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet Union.
Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September 1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl.
This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number 1229-PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I do not intend to quote this document again, but I do consider it essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany’s Eastern front should be camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action of some kind was brewing against the Balkans.
The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the Protectorate and in Austria.
The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of antiaircraft units and of the insignificant extent of roadbuilding activities.
I here take the liberty of making two pertinent observations. According to Pieckenbrock’s testimony, the intensification of the work of this intelligence organization against the Soviet Union began prior to the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information on the regrouping of forces from West to East.
I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni.
On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni’s deposition, it is said—I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil—beginning at the last paragraph, Page 1 of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of the document book:
“In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received from Canaris orders to intensify the work for counterintelligence in the localities where concentration of the German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place.”
On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1, Bentivegni continues:
“In accordance with this order, I immediately gave a corresponding order to the German Abwehr agencies, Danzig, Königsberg, Posen, Kraków, Breslau, and Vienna.”
And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39 of the document book, I read:
“In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives for the preparations for the execution of the Plan Barbarossa.
“a) Preparation of all links of Abwehr III for carrying out active counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, as for instance the creation of the necessary counterintelligence groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended for taking part in the operations on the Eastern front, and paralyzing the activity of the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence organs.
“b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow against Great Britain.
“c) Counterintelligence measures to keep secret the preparations being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the transfer of troops to the East be kept secret.”
The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation of the Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department I of the German Army, Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the activities of the intelligence service of the German Army in connection with the preparations for the realization of Plan Barbarossa. I would refer you to Page 35 of the document book and to Paragraph 2 from the top. This corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock’s testimony. Pieckenbrock states:
“In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris and the chief of the espionage detachment (Abwehr II), Colonel Lahousen, about measures connected with Plan Barbarossa. During this conversation they kept referring to a written order on this subject, which Lahousen had. I, personally, as head of Abwehr I, beginning in February 1941 and up to 22 June 1941, more than once had official talks with the Chief Quartermaster IV, Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and with the head of the detachment Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kienzl. These conversations dealt with the more precise definition of various tasks assigned to Abwehr, with regard to the Soviet Union, and in particular with the verification of old intelligence data about the Red Army, and also details about the dislocation of the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union.”
I now skip one paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement and read further:
“All Abwehrstellen which were working with the espionage against Russia were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task—the intensification of espionage work against Russia—was given to all intelligence organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more successful direction of all these field Abwehr organs, a special intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name of Wally I. This staff was in the vicinity of Warsaw in the village Sulajewek. Major Baun, as the best specialist on work against Russia, was appointed chief of the staff of Wally I. Later, when following our example, Abwehr II and Abwehr III had also established staffs Wally II and Wally III, this organ became known as a whole staff Wally, and directed the entire intelligence, counterintelligence, and diversionary work against the U.S.S.R. as a staff had to become active in the front line. At the head of staff ‘Wally’ was Lieutenant Colonel Schmalschläger.”
I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement on Page 36 of the document book:
“From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at which I was also present, I know that a great amount of preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941 many conferences of the leaders of Abwehr II took place at the quarters of Jodl’s deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in a cavalry school in Krampnitz. One particular question settled at these conferences in accordance with the needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units, Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units among the individual army groups.”
In Pieckenbrock’s testimony which has just been read into the record, special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with which Lahousen’s department had been entrusted, and to special task units known under the code name of Brandenburg 800.
Here these points are clarified by the testimony of a former colonel of the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen’s deputy in Department II, Ausland Abwehr, attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to the Tribunal as evidence Stolze’s testimony of 25 December 1945, which was given to Lieutenant Colonel Burashnikov, of the Counterintelligence Service of the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-231 (Exhibit Number USSR-231), which I beg you to accept as evidence. I shall read into the record individual extracts from this testimony which are underlined in red pencil. I begin the quotation from Page 48 of the document book. Stolze testified as follows:
“I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a special group under code name ‘A,’ which had to engage in the preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the intended attack on the U.S.S.R.
“At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and which contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R. after Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union. This order was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and initialed by General Jodl (or by General Warlimont on Keitel’s instructions—I do not quite remember which.)”
I am omitting two lines which are irrelevant to our case and read on:
“It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, Abwehr II, in conducting subversive work against Russia, with the help of a net of V men, must use its agents for kindling national antagonism among the people of the Soviet Union.”
I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the document book on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, and to note the following passages in his testimony:
“In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian National Socialists who were in the German Intelligence Service and other members of the nationalist fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set out above.
“In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnik (code name ‘Consul I’) and Bandara, to organize immediately upon Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet armies, and also to convince international public opinion of alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.
“We also prepared special diversionist groups by Abwehr II for subversive activities in the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union.”
I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the document book, beginning with the third line from the top you will find Stolze’s testimony:
“Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty training regiment for special tasks, Brandenburg 800, under the immediate command of the head of Abwehr II, Lahousen. Among the objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure of operationally important points, such as bridges, tunnels, and important military installations, and holding them till the arrival of the advance units of the German Army.
“Contrary to the international rules governing the conduct of war, the personnel of this regiment, mainly composed of Germans from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy uniforms and equipment in order to camouflage their operations.
“During the course of preparations for Germany’s attack on the U.S.S.R., the command of the Brandenburg Regiment also collected supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment, and arms, and organized separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the Russian language.”
Your Honors, the testimonies of Stolze, Bentivegni, and Pieckenbrock, which I have presented in evidence, disclose the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of Plan Barbarossa.
I shall not detain the Tribunal any further with these questions. But before proceeding to a further presentation, I should like to point out that the department of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was likewise interested in intelligence work. I shall limit myself to submitting one document which is typical of the manner in which the Hitlerites, by exploiting their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through which country, as was known, the supply routes passed for the delivery to the U.S.S.R. of motor vehicles and war material of the most varied nature.
The document, which I intend to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178 (Document Number USSR-178) was taken by us from the German Foreign Office archives, which fell into the hands of advance units of the Red Army. This document is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s letter to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on a sheet of note paper with the letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the document book before you, you will find this document on Page 52. I read into the record the underlined extracts from this letter:
“28 June 1943; top secret.
“To the Foreign Minister Herr Von Ribbentrop; Berlin; Object: Elections to the Iranian Parliament.
“Most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of exercising German influence on the course of the imminent Iranian parliamentary elections.”
And a few lines further on it is stated:
“In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are necessary. . . . It should also be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany.
“I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one million tomans from the Foreign Office. This money can be sent by the people whom we are sending there by airplane.
“Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS Obergruppenführer.”
This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode.
In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office and of the Reich Führer SS waxed in strength and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of espionage work.
I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120), and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The text of the agreement reads:
“By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Führer has entrusted the Reich Führer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic, and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the Führer has established that the direction of the Intelligence Service, insofar as foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Führer SS had been reached:
“1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Führer SS represents an important instrument for obtaining information in the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for this is close, comradely, and loyal co-operation between the Foreign Office and the main office of the Reich Security Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by the diplomatic service is not affected by this.
“2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the main office of the Reich Security Service the information on the situation in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German foreign policy. It hands over to the main office of the Reich Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of the Secret Intelligence Service.
“3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics, obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be a sufficient summary of this document with which you are dealing to say that it is a document signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop and that it shows that there was a unification of the German Secret Intelligence Service? The details of that unification are not really a matter which very much concerns this Tribunal, and therefore, as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.
GEN. ZORYA: I summarize this document and would add that this agreement, signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a state of affairs that it became extremely difficult to differentiate prevailing conditions in fascist Germany or to distinguish where Himmler’s Gestapo service ended and the Foreign Office activities of the Defendant Ribbentrop began.
I shall now, with the permission of the Tribunal, proceed to the presentation of the next document. The document which I have just read—I am referring to the Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement concerning the conduct of intelligence work abroad—also justifies the assumption that under the name of German diplomatic representation in such countries which maintained normal diplomatic relations with Germany, a whole intelligence network of the Gestapo was actively functioning.
If this summary, in the opinion of the Tribunal, corresponds to the contents of the document, I shall proceed to the following section of the report, “The Satellites of Germany.”
When Plan Barbarossa was read into the record in Court, there was one part of the entire case which, in my opinion, received comparatively little attention. I refer to Part II of Plan Barbarossa, Document Number 446-PS. This part bears the name of “Presumed Allies and Their Tasks.” I should like, here and now, to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the questions touched on in this part. In the first place, I consider it essential to remind you of the contents of this part by repeating it. Document Number 446-PS, Plan Barbarossa, is on Page 14 of the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal. I consider it essential to read out Part II of this case:
“1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.
“The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German command on their entry into the war.
“2. Romania’s task will be to tie up, in co-operation with the group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary services in the rear area.
“3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German northern landing group (units of Group XXI) due to arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will be up to Finland to eliminate Hangö.
“4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish railways and coal being available for the movements of the German northern group not later than the beginning of the operation.”
In the speech of the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko, attention was drawn to the opening sentence of this section:
“On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.”
This justified the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in pointing out in his speech that on 18 December 1940, the date of the Barbarossa document, Romania and Finland were already following in the wake of the predatory policy of the Hitlerite conspirators.
There is only one more document which was submitted by the United States Prosecution and which mentioned Germany’s presumed allies in her aggression against the U.S.S.R.
This document, numbered C-39, is entitled “Provisional Case Barbarossa.” It is, as the Defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a timetable for the preparations of Plan Barbarossa after June 1941. This timetable was confirmed by Hitler. The text of this plan is on Page 57 of the document book. In Part II of this document, entitled “Negotiations with Friendly Powers,” we read:
“a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any large extent the units stationed for security reasons on the Turkish frontier.
“b) The Romanians have begun, at the instigation of the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania, a partial, camouflaged mobilization in order to be able to close their frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.
“c) Hungarian territory will be used for the deployment of Army Group South only insofar as it would be expedient for introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Romanian forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on this subject will be made to Hungary.
“d) Two German divisions have been deployed in the eastern part of Slovakia; the next ones will be unloaded in the area of Prosov.
“e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish general staff take place as from 25 May.”
Mr. President, in order to correlate the following documents with the testimony given by Paulus, I shall merely refer to the fact that this witness testified to the previous preparations for military aggression in that fortress which was Romania, thereby proving that corresponding measures for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, founded in the image and pattern of the German Army, were taken in September 1940 when a special military mission was sent to Romania. The chief of this mission was Cavalry General Hansen. His Chief of Staff was Major General Hauffe, his chief quartermaster Major Merk. Major General Von Rotkirch commanded the 13th Panzer Division.
The task of this military mission was the reorganization of the Romanian Army and its preparation for the subsequent attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. The preliminary trend of this task, as Paulus has testified, was given to Hansen and his Chief of Staff by Paulus and they got the last directives from the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.
General Hansen received directives from two sources: from the OKW where his military mission was concerned, and from the OKH in all questions dealing with the Army. Directives of a military and political nature were received only from the OKW.
The military mission acted as liaison between the German and the Romanian general staffs.
The form assumed by the agreement and, even more, the publication of the true aims of high-ranking fascist leaders in the country, did not always suit the satellites.
I now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document Number USSR-233), the minutes of a conversation between Ion Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu which were captured by the advance units of the Red Army. This document, Your Honors, figures on Pages 59-62 of your document book.
In connection with Ribbentrop’s speech in Budapest on the subject of Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following annotation in the course of this speech—last paragraph, Page 2 of the Russian text of the document, Page 60 of the document book:
“Without hesitation, I stressed the point that as early as 6 September, when I took over the government of the country, supported only by Monsieur Mihai Antonescu, I declared, without asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of adherence to the Axis powers. I said that this was the only example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a policy which no doubt could only appear odious. . . .”
When making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected it to receive such wide publicity.
Mr. President, I intend to read into the record a long document which will take considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.