Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: In considering the matters which have been raised this morning, the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a fair trial and at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has decided that for the present it will proceed under rules heretofore announced; that is to say:
First, documents translated into the four languages may be introduced without being read but in introducing them counsel may summarize them, or otherwise call their relevance to the attention of the Court, and may read such brief passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed important.
Second; when a document is offered, the Tribunal will hear any objections that may be offered to it and in this connection, I would refer to the rule which the Tribunal made on the 8th of March 1946, which reads as follows:
“To avoid unnecessary translations, Defense Counsel shall indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have an opportunity to object to irrelevant passages. In the event of disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense as to the relevancy of any particular passage, the Tribunal will decide what passages are sufficiently relevant to be translated. Only the cited passages need to be translated, unless the Prosecution requires the translation of the entire document.”
The Tribunal has allowed the Defendant Göring, who has given evidence first of the defendants and who has proclaimed himself to be responsible as the second leader of Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any interruption whatever, and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi regime from its inception to the defeat of Germany.
The Tribunal does not propose to allow any of the other defendants to go over the same ground in their evidence except insofar as it is necessary for their own defense.
Defense Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will not ordinarily regard as competent evidence, extracts from books or articles expressing the opinions of particular authors on matters of ethics, history, or particular events.
Now, as to tomorrow’s business, the Tribunal will sit in open session for the purpose of hearing applications for witnesses and documents, supplementary applications; and after sitting in that open session, the Tribunal will adjourn into a closed session.
Now, Dr. Stahmer, are you going to refer us to book Number 1? Which is your book? Or are you referring us to your trial brief?
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I shall refer to the trial brief, Page 5. As far as I am informed, the translations show the same numbers as the original German text: Page 5, Paragraph II. Since this book is translated into the three languages, and the document book, I am informed, is also translated, I can limit myself to referring to them briefly to present only what I consider essential.
At the beginning of my presentation from this book I pointed out that Germany had renounced the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact, and that this renunciation as such was justified. After this renunciation had taken place, Germany could proceed to rearm and also to reintroduce general conscription.
Moreover, rearmament and the reintroduction of military conscription were ordered by Hitler only after he had previously and repeatedly submitted, without success, offers of disarmament to the powers concerned. Therefore the conclusion cannot be drawn from that fact alone that at that time the intention existed to prepare or to plan German wars of aggression. In this connection I draw your attention to the fact that also in foreign countries rearmament took place to a considerable degree from 1936 on, and as evidence for this fact I have submitted the speeches and essays which are contained in Churchill’s book Step by Step. The individual excerpts have been designated by me. I am referring to the following in particular. On Page 5 of this book it says . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you must offer these things in evidence as a matter of formality.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, of course. I have the book here with me. I shall submit it immediately; I also have the individual excerpts here which are included in the document book. It is Document Book 2, Page 44, the first excerpt in Volume 2, Page 44.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to number your exhibit in some way?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You have numbered it 40 I see, is that right?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. That is the number in this book. I have numbered these books right through.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but whatever number you propose to use you must say what the number is when you offer it in evidence, so that it will go into the transcript.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President.
The quotation is from Document Book Number 2 and it is Number 40 on Page 9:
“On 18 June the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was signed, which released Germany from the Versailles naval restrictions. That meant in effect condonation of the breach of the military clauses.”
On Page 35:
“The Air Force is in the process of being almost trebled. This is a colossal expansion which is making the most prodigious demands on our production potentialities. But quite apart from these immediate needs, there is the far greater task of so organizing England’s home industries that they will be ready to direct the whole of their enormous and elastic capacity into the channels of war production as soon as a serious necessity for that should arise.”
From the article “In the Waters of the Mediterranean” dated 13 November 1936, I quote, on Page 86, where it says literally:
“But it is no longer thus. England has begun to rearm on a large scale. Her wealth and her credit, the solidarity of her organization, her vast resources and connections, all contribute to this revival. The British fleet is still by far the mightiest in Europe. Enormous yearly expenditure on it is under consideration for the future.”
Furthermore, I wish to produce evidence of the fact that the Defendant Göring particularly, at various times, beginning after the seizure of power, consistently emphasized his serious desire to maintain peace and to avoid a war. He has also repeatedly stated clearly that the measures taken by Germany were not to serve purposes of aggression. As evidence of this I refer to several speeches made by the Defendant Göring, and to begin with I cite a speech of 4 December 1934, which he made at the Krupp works in Essen, and which is contained in the book Hermann Göring’s Speeches and Compositions, Pages 174 to 176, and is reprinted in Document Book Number 1, Page 18.
From this excerpt I wish to quote only the following:
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the shorthand writer has yet heard what the exhibit number is.
DR. STAHMER: I beg your pardon. It is Exhibit Number 6. I quote—and it is the last sentence of the first paragraph:
“Today we want to secure this peace, and we want the world to understand this always: That a respected Germany only is a guarantor of world peace. Only a free German nation will keep this peace and will know how to preserve this peace.
“Therefore we demand for ourselves the same rights as others possess.”
And on the following page, I quote the last paragraph:
“We do not want war, but we want our honor. We will not discuss this honor with anybody in the world; that remains, for it is the foundation for the reconstruction of the entire nation. Only he who has a sharp sword at his side is unmolested and has peace.”
Sir Nevile Henderson emphasizes Göring’s love of peace in various passages of his book Failure of a Mission. The passages are quoted again in Document Book Number 1, Page 63, and I offer it as Document Number 23, Exhibit Number Göring-2. I quote from Page 78 of the book.
“I”—that is, Henderson—“was inclined to believe in the sincerity of his”—that is, Göring’s—“personal desire for peace and good relation with England.”
On Page 83 of the book, it says:
“I would like to express here my belief that the Field Marshal, if it had depended on him, would not have gambled on war, as Hitler did in 1939. As will be related in due course, he took a decisive stand for peace in September 1938.”
On Page 273, which is the next page, there is the following sentence which I quote:
“I saw the Polish Ambassador at 2 a.m. on 31 August 1939, gave him an objective, and studiously moderate account of my conversation with Ribbentrop, mentioned the cession of Danzig and the plebiscite in the Corridor as the two main points in the German proposals, stated that so far as I could gather they were not on the whole too unreasonable, and suggested to him that we recommend to his Government that they should propose at once a meeting between the Field Marshals Smigly-Rydz and Göring.”
On Page 276 of the book, you will find the following sentences which I quote from the last paragraph:
“Nevertheless, the Field Marshal seemed in earnest when after having been called to the telephone, he returned to tell us that M. Lipski was on his way to see Ribbentrop. He seemed relieved and to hope that, provided contact could only be established, war might, after all, be avoided.”
In February of 1937, the Defendant Göring, on the occasion of an international meeting of war veterans in Berlin, made the following speech, which is contained in the book Hermann Göring, the Man and His Work, on Page 265, and which is contained in Document Book 2, Page 42, which is Exhibit Number 39, and from which I quote the following sentences:
“There are no better defenders of peace than the old war veterans. I am convinced that they, above all others, have a right to ask for peace and to shape it. I recognize that those men who, weapon in hand, went through 4 hard years of the hell of the World War, have the primary right to shape the life of the nations, and I know that the war veterans more than anybody else will take care to preserve the blessings of peace for their countries.”
I skip two sentences and then quote further:
“But we know that it is a terrible thing, this final contest between nations. It is my fervent and heartfelt wish that this Congress may contribute towards the basis for a true peace with honor and equality of rights for all sides. You, my comrades, will have to pave the way for that.”
The same desire is evident in the answers given by Lord Halifax to the questions put him. I now read the following passages from this interrogatory and I offer the original as Document Number Göring-22. It is contained in Document Book I, Page 59.
I think I can omit the first two questions. The third question is:
“Did Göring say to you during this discussion, ‘Every German Government would consider the following matters as an integral part of its policy: (a) The incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland into Germany; (b) The return of Danzig to Germany with a reasonable solution of the Corridor question’?
“Answer: Yes.
“Question 4: Did you answer thereupon: ‘But, I hope without war’?
“Answer: I said that His Majesty’s Government wanted all questions affecting Germany and her neighbors settled by peaceful methods. I did not otherwise discuss those questions.
“Question 5: Did Göring answer thereupon:
“ ‘That depends very much upon England. England would be able to contribute much to the peaceful solution of this question. Göring does not want war either for these reasons, but these questions have to be settled under all circumstances.’
“Answer: Yes.”
The next questions concern the conversation with Dahlerus . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Does that purport to be a verbatim account of what the Defendant Göring said? Did he refer to himself in the third person, “Göring does not want a war,” meaning, “I do not want a war”?
DR. STAHMER: He did not want a war either. England would be able to contribute much to the peaceful solution of this question. He does not want war either for these reasons. He, that is, Göring does not want war either, but these questions have to be settled under all circumstances.
This is, of course, indirect speech. In direct speech it would be, “I, Göring, do not want war, but the questions have to be settled under all circumstances.”
The next questions refer to Dahlerus. Question 15, which is the question put to Halifax, is also of importance in my opinion:
“Did you have the impression that Göring’s endeavors to avoid war were sincere?”
The answer of Halifax is:
“I have no doubt that Göring would have preferred to enforce the German demands on Poland without war, if he could have.”
At the end of June or the beginning of July 1938, the Defendant Göring made a speech to the Gauleiter at Karinhall which was distinctly a speech for peace. I am referring to a statement from Dr. Uiberreither of 27 February 1946, the original of which is being presented as Document Number 38, Exhibit Number Göring-4, and is given in Document Book Number 2 on Page 37.
THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in these originals, are you?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, indeed.
In that statement from Dr. Uiberreither, dated 27 February 1946, at Page 38 in Document Book Number 2, Your Honor, it says:
“On 25 May 1938”—says Dr. Uiberreither—“that is, after the plebiscite concerning the reunion of Austria with Germany, which had taken place on 10 April 1938, I was appointed Gauleiter of Gau Steiermark.
“A few weeks later—it may have been towards the end of June or the beginning of July 1938—the former Field Marshal Hermann Göring summoned all Gauleiter of the German Reich to Karinhall.
“He there delivered quite a long address to the Gauleiter, describing the political situation as it was at the time, and discussing in detail the purpose and significance of the Four Year Plan.
“Field Marshal Göring first pointed out that other countries had little understanding for the political developments in Germany, and that consequently there existed the danger of Germany’s being encircled. Directing German foreign policy was therefore a difficult task. Consequently, we should endeavor to strengthen Germany from the economic and military point of view, in order to reduce the danger of Germany being attacked by a foreign power. At the same time, this would result in Germany once more exercising an increasingly important influence in European politics after she had again become strong.
“After that, Field Marshal Göring discussed the Four Year Plan. In this connection he remarked:
“By and large, Germany was cut off from the world’s sources of raw materials and she therefore had to open up sources in her own territory by dint of increased efficiency. This would be done merely in order to make Germany independent of foreign countries, and was not by any means to serve the purpose of preparing for an aggressive war.
“He then stressed, with great emphasis, that Germany’s foreign policy would have to be conducted in such a way that war should not ensue under any circumstances. The present generation was still feeling the effects of a lost World War; the outbreak of another war would be a shock to the German people. Furthermore, it was his opinion that a new war might assume great proportions, and even the outcome of a war against France alone would be questionable.
“In conclusion, he summarized his address by saying that we had to do everything in our power to make the Four Year Plan a success, and that all hardships caused thereby must be borne by the people and were justified, because its success might prevent war.
“I point out that I remember all the details of this speech so accurately because this was the first time that I was informed by a leading personality of these conditions which were so important for Germany, and because, as a result, until the war actually started, I did not believe that it would come to a war.”
In the solution of the Austrian problem no aggressive action on the part of Germany is to be seen. It took place in response to the desires of the majority of the Austrian population for reunion with the Reich. The defendant’s view of this problem can be seen from the telephone conversation he had with the Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop on 13 March 1938. The record of this conversation has already been produced under Document Number 2949-PS, Exhibit Number USA-75. I shall quote from this conversation some passages which have not yet been read. The conversation is contained in Document Book Number 1, Pages 55-56. I am going to quote only the following passages:
“I want to say one thing: If it is said”—this is Göring talking—“that we have used pressure on the Austrian people and done outrage to their independence, it can be said that only one thing was put under pressure, but not by us, and that was the tiny little government. The Austrian people are free only now. I would simply suggest to Halifax, or to a few really important people whom he trusts, that he just send them over here so they can look at the picture. They should travel through the country, they can see everything.”
And a few sentences later:
“What state in the whole world is being harmed by our union? Are we taking anything from any state?”
Then it goes on, I skip two sentences:
“All the people are German; all the people speak German. Thus there is not a single other state involved.”
The Defendant Göring—I am referring to Page 11 of the book next to the last paragraph—did not only wish to maintain peace abroad; he also supported the preservation of peace at home. In this respect he declared in a speech he made on 9 April 1933 at the Berlin Sports Palace—it appears in the book Hermann Göring’s Speeches and Compositions, and is reproduced in Document Book Number 1, Page 35, and I am offering it as Document Number 13; I quote the first sentence:
“Oh the other hand, however, my compatriots, we ought also to be generous. We do not wish to practice petty revenge. After all, we are the victors. . . . Therefore, let us be generous, let us realize that we also thought differently at one time.”
And then a little further down:
“. . . the stronger and freer we feel ourselves to be, the more generously, the more freely are we able to disregard what happened in the past and to extend our hand with complete sincerity in reconciliation.”
I further quote from a speech of the defendant on 26 March 1938, Document Book Number 1, Page 37, likewise a quotation from Hermann Göring’s Speeches and Compositions, the exhibit number of which is 14. I quote only one sentence from it:
“. . . you were great in suffering and enduring; you were great in standing firm; great in fighting. Now you must show that you are also great in kindness, and especially so towards the many who were misled.”
His attitude towards the Church the defendant has . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, can you not give the exhibit number?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, I think it was Number 13. I shall look again. It was Number 14.
His attitude towards the Church was expressed by the Defendant Göring in several speeches. In this respect, on 26 October 1935, he made the following statement. I am quoting from Hermann Göring’s Speeches and Compositions, Document Book 1, Page 39, Document Number 15, the following sentences:
“It rests with the Church alone whether it wishes to have peace. We, the Movement, and in particular the Government and the State, have never attacked the Church; we have assured protection to the Church, and the Church knows that it enjoys this protection also today to the fullest extent.
“Therefore, there is nothing to warrant blaming us for anything in this respect.”
And from another speech of 26 March 1938, which is also quoted from Hermann Göring’s Speeches and Compositions, Document Book Number 1, Page 41, Document Number 16, I quote the first and the second sentences:
“We do not wish to annihilate any Church, nor to destroy any belief or religion. All we want is to bring about a clear separation. The Church has its definite, very important and very necessary tasks, and the State and the Movement have other, just as important and just as decisive, tasks.”
I refer further to a document submitted by a clergyman Werner Jentsch, dated 30 October 1945, addressed to this Tribunal, Document Book Number 1, Pages 44 to 46, Exhibit Number 17.
I quote only one sentence, Figure 8:
“Hermann Göring himself, through his chief adjutant, had the following answer given to a petition for the introduction of a special chaplain’s office within the headquarters of the Air Force; that he could not at the moment do anything because Adolf Hitler had not yet made a final decision concerning the question of religion. However, he wished full freedom of religion in the Air Force, including the Christian denominations, and every member of the Air Force could choose for himself whatever chaplain or civilian pastor he desired.”
The affidavit from Gauleiter Dr. Uiberreither, dated 27 February 1946, deals with the question which I mentioned earlier and which is contained in Document Book Number 1, Page 31. It, under Figure 2, deals with the events of the night of 9 to 10 November 1938 and the knowledge thereof, as follows:
“A few weeks after the action against the Jews on the night of 9 to 10 November 1938—towards the end of November or the beginning of December 1938—Field Marshal Göring again called all the Gauleiter to Berlin. During this meeting he criticized the action in harsh words and stated that it had not been in keeping with the dignity of the nation. Moreover, it had also seriously lowered our prestige abroad. If the murder of Legation Counsellor Von Rath was regarded as an attack by Jewry against the Reich, then the German Reich had other means of countering such an attack than appealing to the baser instincts. In an orderly state no irregular mob action ought to take place under any circumstances.”
And in the last paragraph, under Number 2, it says:
“In conclusion, he asked the Gauleiter to use their entire influence to see to it that such incidents, which were detrimental to Germany, would not recur in the future.”
I can skip Page 16, Paragraph 5, as an explanation on that has already been given.
That the Defendant Göring took his duty as Supreme Administrator of Justice very seriously becomes apparent from an affidavit of Judge Advocate General Dr. Lehmann of 21 February 1946. I shall read from this affidavit in Document Book Number I, Page 106, Document Number 27, Exhibit Number Göring-6. I quote from Figure II onwards:
“II. The opinion I have of him is the following:
“The Reich Marshal originally took a negative attitude toward lawyers. He was evidently influenced by the Führer. This attitude underwent a change to the extent that he occupied himself with legal matters of the Air Force. At the end of the war the Reich Marshal was one of the high commanders who liked to consult lawyers. He took special interest in the legal department of the Air Force and attached great importance to it. He assigned to this department difficult cases for investigation concerning which he was sceptical of the reports of the other offices.”
From the following paragraph:
“The Reich Marshal had himself thoroughly informed concerning matters which I had to discuss with him. He devoted an unusual amount of time to these matters. The conferences, even when there were considerable differences of opinion, took a quiet and objective course.”
Then from Paragraph III:
“III. Concerning the legal department of the Air Force, the Reich Marshal reserved for himself the confirmation of sentences in many cases, including all death sentences.
“In passing judgment on individual cases he was inclined to show occasional leniency—in spite of the harshness demanded of all judges by the Führer. In cases of treason, and especially in moral crimes, he showed merciless severity. I know from the records that in severe cases of rape he would often reverse a judgment because he considered the death sentence was necessary. It did not matter whether the woman involved was from Germany or from the occupied territories. I believe that I remember at least one case from the records where he even changed the regular manner of execution and ordered that the soldier be hanged in the Russian village in which he had committed the rape.
“IV. When presiding at a trial the Reich Marshal was very forceful but benevolent; also in his recommendations for mercy to the Führer.
“V. In his own decisions the Reich Marshal doubtless knowingly often acted contrary to the ideas and demands of the Führer, especially in political matters, which he judged much more mildly, and in cases of excesses against inhabitants of the occupied countries, which he judged much more harshly than the Führer.
“I have often discussed the personality of the Reich Marshal with his legal adviser, a very experienced, quiet, and conscientious lawyer, as well as with the Judge Advocate General, who was distinguished by the same qualities, and was often with him. We were of one opinion about the Reich Marshal.”
In the course of this Trial, the Prosecution has repeatedly referred to the so-called Green File, which was submitted under Document Number 1743-PS. This is not, as the Prosecution maintains, a regulation for the spoliation and annihilation of the population. Its object was rather the economic mobilization and the uninterrupted operation of industry, the procurement and regular utilization of supplies, and of transport facilities in the territories to be occupied by military operations, with special consideration of the fact that Russia had no private enterprise, but only a strict centrally regulated state economy. In addition to that, vast destruction had to be anticipated in view of the Russian attitude. Nowhere does it contain an order or directive to exploit certain groups of the population beyond the necessities caused by the war.
From that Green File I have cited a whole series of passages which are to prove my statements. I cannot refer to them in detail; I should like to draw your attention only to one very characteristic passage which is on Page 94 of this Green File, second paragraph:
“Among the native population, that is, in this case, workmen and clerical employees, the best possible relationship is to be established.”
Somewhat below, on the same page:
“Endeavors must be made for good relations with the population, in particular also with the workers in agriculture.”
I am now coming to the next paragraph:
The German Armed Forces entered the war fully respecting the international conventions.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is this part?
DR. STAHMER: Page 23, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Which volume?
DR. STAHMER: In the trial brief.
THE PRESIDENT: We seem to have only 22 pages in our trial brief. Are there two volumes?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, I believe it is in the second trial brief. The division was made to accelerate the translation. May I continue?
The German Wehrmacht entered the war fully respecting the international conventions. No large-scale excesses by German soldiers were noted. Individual offenses were severely punished. However, immediately after the beginning of hostilities there appeared reports and descriptions of atrocities committed against German soldiers. These reports were carefully investigated. The result was recorded by the German Foreign Office in White Papers, which were sent to Geneva. In this way the White Book came into being which deals with the crimes against the laws of war and humanity committed by the Russian soldiers.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors, Defense Counsel for Göring, Dr. Stahmer, intends to submit to the Tribunal and to read into the record excerpts from the so-called White Book which was published by the Hitler Government in 1941 in connection with some of the violations which supposedly took place concerning German prisoners of war. I consider that these excerpts cannot be submitted and read into the record here because of the following reasons:
There can be put in evidence only facts which refer to this case; there can be submitted to the Tribunal only documents which refer to the crimes which were perpetrated by the German major war criminals.
The White Book is a series of documents of invented data regarding violations which were perpetrated not by the fascist Germans but by other countries. Therefore the data contained in the White Book cannot serve as evidence in this case. This conclusion is all the more justified in that the White Book is a publication which served the purpose of fascist propaganda, and which tried by inventions and forged documents to justify or hide crimes which were perpetrated by the fascists. Therefore I request the Tribunal to refuse the reading into the record, or submitting to the Tribunal, excerpts from the so-called White Book.
THE PRESIDENT: On what theory do you justify the presentation of this evidence, Dr. Stahmer?
DR. STAHMER: The question whether it is possible and permissible to refer to these White Papers during this Trial as a means of evidence, has been discussed repeatedly. In particular it was the subject of debate when we were concerned with the question of whether I should be allowed to refer to this White Book as evidence. So far as I know, it has been admitted as evidence for the time being. It was already pointed out, during the debate which arose in regard to this subject, that, as far as evidence is concerned, it is relevant for the evaluation of the motives.
At the time I already pointed out that the crimes committed against German prisoners of war are of importance in order to understand the measures taken on the part of Germany. One cannot evaluate the underlying motives of the men who committed these offenses, or gave orders to commit them, if one fails to consider the background against which these deeds were enacted, or investigate the motives which caused them to commit these acts. And because of the importance of the motive, in order to know about the accusations raised by the Germans, it seems to me that this reference to this document is absolutely necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are here to try major war criminals; we are not here to try any of the signatory powers. Therefore you must justify the introduction of evidence against the signatory powers in some legal way.
DR. STAHMER: The presentation, if I may repeat, is made for the following reasons:
The defendants here are accused that under their leadership crimes and offenses against members of foreign armed forces were committed which are not in accordance with the Geneva Convention. On our part we plead that if harsh treatment and excesses occurred on the German side, they were caused by the fact that similar violations occurred also on the other side, and that consequently these offenses must be judged differently and not be considered as grave as would be the case if the opposite side had conducted itself correctly. Anyway, these facts are relevant for the evaluation of the motive.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you attempting to justify the introduction of this evidence on the ground of reprisals?
DR. STAHMER: Not only on the ground of reprisals, but from the point of view of the motive for the deed.
THE PRESIDENT: You are asking us to admit a document, a German governmental document. Now, under the Charter we are bound to admit documents, governmental documents, and reports of the United Nations, but it is nowhere said that we are bound to admit or are at liberty to admit documents issued by the German Government. We cannot tell whether those documents contained facts truly stated or not.
DR. STAHMER: We have here in the document books, court records of legal inquiries. These must in my opinion have the same value as evidence as official documents. They were records of court proceedings which are quoted in the White Book.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like, Your Honors, to point out only one thing here. Defense Counsel Stahmer tries to submit these documents in order, as he says, to present his reasons which would explain the crimes of the Germans. I should like to state here that these documents, which have already been submitted to the Prosecution, and which were mentioned yesterday here during the cross-examination of the Defendant Göring, show quite clearly that the document regarding the crimes was drafted before the beginning of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what are the dates of these documents that you are asking us to admit?
DR. STAHMER: I have the individual ones here. Meanwhile I am having the records looked for.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I suggest, Your Honor, that I support fully the objection made by General Rudenko. I had supposed that the one thing counsel on both sides were agreed upon, when this matter was under discussion before, was that no reprisals against prisoners of war are tolerated. Even my learned adversary, Dr. Exner, agreed that that is the law.
Secondly, certainly, we must know what crimes it is that are sought to be excused. Are these the motives for what crimes? Counsel says they are bare on their motives. Was it their motive in shooting American or British fliers, that there were some violations on the part of the Russians as they claim? The only way, it seems to me, that evidence of this character is admissible would be to bring it under the doctrine of reprisal very strictly by taking specific offenses and saying: “This offense we admit, but we committed it in reprisal for certain other specified offenses.”
I submit that general allegations of this character and relating to prisoners of war are admittedly inadmissible and carry us far afield in the trial of this case.
DR. STAHMER: May I point out one more fact: For instance, I have here a telegram sent by the Foreign Office representative with the High Command of the Army to the Foreign Office, dated 12 August 1941. In other words, this is an official document, and until now the Prosecution has submitted official documents in considerable numbers which have been used as evidence against the defendants. If now an official document is being produced here to exonerate the defendants, I think that this also ought to be admitted and to the same extent, provided that this is legally permissible. The formal side of the matter is that we have here a telegram, as I said, from a representative of the Foreign Office with the Army High Command, that is, from an official authority, addressed to the Foreign Office, dated 12 August 1941. It says here, for instance: “In the captured operational report Number 11, of the 13th of last month, 10 o’clock, of the staff of the 26th Division, 1 kilometer west of Slastjena in the forest north of Opuschka it says: ‘The enemy left about 400 dead on the battlefield . . .’ ”
THE PRESIDENT: You must not read it, as we are discussing its admissibility.
DR. STAHMER: I beg your pardon. I misunderstood you, Mr. President, you asked me what document . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The date of the White Book.
DR. STAHMER: The date of the White Book, I see, we misunderstood each other; it is Berlin, 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a date, that is a year.
DR. STAHMER: It says, “Bolshevist Crimes against the Laws of War and Humanity. Documents compiled by the Foreign Office, First Volume, Berlin, 1941.” That is the name of the document; the date of its publication is not apparent from the book itself. The individual documents and preliminary proceedings are contained in this book, followed by a number of records which have individual dates.
THE PRESIDENT: Then there is nothing to show when that document was communicated, either to the Soviet Government or when it was communicated—if it was—to Geneva or to the Protecting Power.
DR. STAHMER: It was forwarded to Geneva. It was duly handed to the Red Cross in Geneva.
THE PRESIDENT: When?
DR. STAHMER: In 1941. I had proposed to obtain these books from Geneva and to bring in information from the Geneva Red Cross.
Mr. President, may I once more point out that it is an official document published by the Foreign Office. It is a series of reports compiled in an official publication.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not the real point that the Tribunal is considering. The question is, how can you justify in a trial of the major war criminals of Germany, evidence against Great Britain, or against the United States of America or against the U.S.S.R. or against France? If you are going to try the actions of all those four signatory powers, apart from other considerations, there would be no end to the Trial at all, and their conduct has no relevance to the guilt of the major war criminals of Germany, unless it can be justified by reference to the doctrine of reprisal, and this cannot be justified in that way. And therefore the Tribunal considers the document is irrelevant.
DR. STAHMER: I now turn to the subject of aerial warfare, evidence on Page 25 of my trial brief. Relevant to the question of guilt is the question whether the German Air Force started to attack open cities only after the British Air Force had carried out a great number of raids against nonmilitary targets.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I object to this evidence. I was not quite sure whether Dr. Stahmer had passed dealing with this evidence with regard to the air war, or whether he was illustrating his argument. I want to make it quite clear that I object to the first part of it as being too remote, that is, the evidence about the various conferences which took place with regard to the regulation of aerial warfare.
With regard to the second part of the evidence, I object to the documents which purport to show that Great Britain attacked nonmilitary targets. Where I have been able to check the allegations, I find there is a complete dispute as to whether the targets were military or nonmilitary targets, and therefore I cannot accept the German official reports as being evidence of any purported value on their part, and I respectfully submit that, unless the Tribunal had authority from the Charter, it ought to take the same line.
I make these two additional points to the points raised by my learned friends, General Rudenko and Mr. Justice Jackson, on the general question. I do not want to take up more time with the argument by developing that point. I will be pleased to help with any aspect of it.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me, Dr. Stahmer, that this matter stands upon exactly the same footing as the matter upon which we have just ruled.
DR. STAHMER: That is right. I believe that from this book on aerial warfare one document is of importance in my opinion, which is quoted on Page 27. It is merely a statement by the French General Armengaud concerning the fact that the German Air Force operated in Poland in accordance with the laws of warfare and attacked military targets exclusively. I believe there will be no objection to reading at least this quotation. It is Page 27.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 27 of the trial brief?
DR. STAHMER: Page 27 of the trial brief. There I give a quotation from General Armengaud, the French Air Attaché in Warsaw, of 14 September 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: There it says: After the outbreak of war the German Air Force under its Commander-in-Chief, Göring, did not, by order of Hitler, attack any open cities in Poland; this was confirmed by Buttler, the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs on 6 September 1939, and by the French Air Attaché in Warsaw on 14 September 1939 (Documents 41 and 46 of the White Book). The latter, General Armengaud, says literally:
“I must emphasize that the German Air Force acted according to the laws of war; it attacked military targets only and, if civilians were often killed or wounded this happened because they were near the military targets. It is important that this should be known in France and in England, so that no reprisals will be taken where there is no cause for reprisals, and so that total aerial warfare will not be let loose by us.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what is the origin of that?
DR. STAHMER: May I have a look? It is contained in the document concerning the bombing war, Number 46, “Report of the French Air Attaché in Warsaw, General Armengaud.” It is dated 14 September 1939, and then comes the report from which I have already quoted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: I have submitted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: And now I proceed to Page 30 of the trial brief. And in Paragraph 10, I refer to the creation of the Secret State Police by the Defendant Göring. A passage is quoted there from the book, Hermann Göring, the Man and His Work, Document Book 2, Page 53 and 54. I submit it as Document Number 44, and I quote from it the following passage:
“It can be seen from the big Stettin trial and also from others, that Göring took ruthless measures against men who acted on their own authority against his instructions.
“The Prime Minister looked into hundreds of individual cases in connection with the supervision of political prisoners. He did not wait until he was asked; the offer was made on his own initiative.
“On the occasion of the Christmas amnesty of 1933, he ordered the release of nearly 5,000 prisoners from the concentration camps. ‘Even they must be given a chance.’ It would have been only too understandable if those released had found doors and gates closed to them whichever way they turned. That, however, would not be in keeping with the spirit of this act of mercy. Nobody was to consider himself shut out. Therefore, Göring in a clearly worded decree ordered that no difficulties were to be placed in the way of those released, by the authorities or by the public. If this action were to have any point, every effort must be made to take back these people, who had sinned against the state, into the community again as full fellow Germans.”
And from the last paragraph, I read the second sentence:
“In September 1934 he ordered the release of an additional 2,000 prisoners in a second big amnesty.”
In this connection I beg to offer a telegram which I received a few days ago, and I request that it be admitted as evidence. It is an unsolicited telegram originating from a certain Hermann Winter, Berlin W 20, Eisenach Street, 118. It has been included in the document book which I submit. I believe it is the last document in my document book.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If we are to examine unsolicited correspondence or telegrams, if it is to become evidence, I have a washbasket full of it in my office that, if that kind of material could be used as evidence in this case without any verification, I could bring here in rebuttal. It does seem to me that we should know something more about this than that just a wire has come in from some unknown person who may not even have been the signer; maybe it is an assumed name. I think we are entitled to a little better foundation than that.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any other basis?
DR. STAHMER: I have no other basis, and I beg to have your decision whether this telegram is admissible as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT; Well, I do not think we could admit it simply as a telegram which has been received by you from an unknown person.
DR. STAHMER: I request your decision. Is it being refused? I am coming to the end, Page 34.
THE PRESIDENT: Of the trial brief?
DR. STAHMER: Page 34 of the trial brief, Figure 12. With respect to the question of whether one could blame the defendants for having had confidence in Hitler and following him, it is important to know Churchill’s attitude, expressed in his book Step by Step, and I am quoting two passages, Document Book Number 2, Page 46.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This is in 1937, before the events with which we have mainly been dealing here. I do not think it is very important. Mr. Churchill’s speeches are well known, but I do think that we waste time going into Mr. Churchill’s opinions back in 1937, before the event, when he is doubtless in the same position as Dahlerus, the witness, with reference to his knowledge of what was going on behind the scenes.
THE PRESIDENT: Inasmuch as we have already received this book and some passages from it, you may state this.
DR. STAHMER: I may state it? Thank you. On Page 187, in an article, “Friendship with Germany,” of 17 September 1937, is written:
“One can condemn Herr Hitler’s system and still marvel at its patriotic achievement. Should our country be defeated, I could only desire that we would find an equally indomitable champion who would give us our courage again . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: I only said that you could read it because you had read from this book of Mr. Churchill’s, but at the same time it seems to be absolutely irrelevant.
DR. STAHMER: I did not—Oh, I see. May I refer to the quotation on Page 323 which is also a description of Hitler’s personality. I consider it of importance especially because I attach considerable weight in particular to Churchill’s judgment. It says: “Our leadership must at least . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Stahmer, do you not think we have heard sufficient about Hitler’s personality?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, but not from that source. If the Tribunal . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably the Defendant Göring knows more about Hitler than Mr. Churchill.
DR. STAHMER: If the Tribunal does not wish it to be read, then of course, I will abide by that wish.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is cumulative.
DR. STAHMER: Well, in that case I have finished. I may still of course keep in reserve the evidence which I have not been able to submit up to now, about which I spoke this morning. I said this morning, I had a certain amount of evidence which I have not been able to submit because I have not received it yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Would this be a convenient time, if Your Honor please, to make the record concerning the documents which I was to offer formally for the record?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite follow? What documents are you referring to?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The ones used in cross-examination . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: . . . which Your Honor spoke to me about.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand they have been handed to the Secretary and they have been marked.
The affidavit to Halder is USA-779. It is offered.
Document Number 3700-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-780; Document Number 3775-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-781; Document Number 3787-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-782; Document Number 2523-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-783; Document Number 014-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-784; Document Number 1193-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-785; Document Number EC-317 is offered as Exhibit USA-786; Document Number 3786-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-787; Document Number 638-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-788; Document Number 1742-PS is offered as Exhibit USA-789.
M. CHAMPETIER DE RIBES: Mr. President, Dr. Stahmer in his presentation did not speak of Document Number Göring-26. It concerns a note from the German Government to the French Government relating to the treatment of German prisoners of war in France dated 30 May 1940. The reasons which made us reject the White Book from the discussion make it necessary to reject this document too. I gather that Dr. Stahmer realized that and, therefore, did not speak of it any more, but I would like him to be assured that this document has been definitely rejected from the discussion.
DR. STAHMER: I have not mentioned the document. I withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Counsel for the Defendant Hess.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Your Honors: Before commencing the submission of evidence I have to make the following remarks at the request of the Defendant Hess:
The Defendant Hess contests the jurisdiction of the Tribunal where other than war crimes proper are the subject of the Trial. However, he specifically assumes full responsibility for all laws or decrees which he has signed. Furthermore, he assumes responsibility for all orders and directives which he issued in his capacity as Deputy of the Führer and Minister of the Reich. For these reasons he does not desire to be defended against any charges which refer to the internal affairs of Germany as a sovereign state. That applies in particular to the relations between Church and State, and similar questions. I shall, therefore, submit evidence only with reference to questions in the clarification of which other countries can have a justified interest. This applies, for instance, to the tasks and activities of the foreign organization of the NSDAP. Beyond that, evidence will be submitted to the Tribunal only insofar as this is necessary to ascertain the historical truth. This applies, among other things, to the motives which caused Rudolf Hess to fly to England and to the purposes for which he did it.
The evidence which I have prepared is collected in three document books. In view of the acceleration of the Trial desired by the Tribunal, I shall forego quoting any documents whatsoever from the first book and ask the Tribunal to take cognizance only of those parts of the document book which have been marked in red. I shall read only the affidavit which is at the end of the document book, and that is the affidavit of the former secretary of the Defendant Rudolf Hess, Hildegard Fath, and I shall read furthermore . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if your are passing from your opening remarks and going to deal with the documents, I think it is right to point out to you that there can be no challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court, here. Article 3 provides that the Tribunal shall not be challenged by the Prosecution or by the Defendants or their Counsel, and the Tribunal cannot hear any argument upon that subject. Now you can go on with your documents.
DR. SEIDL: There will furthermore be read from the second volume the record of a conversation between the Defendant Rudolf Hess and Lord Simon, which took place on 10 June 1941 in England. So as to prevent interruption in the reading of the documentary evidence, I shall today read only the affidavit of the witness Hildegard Fath, Page 164 of the document book. The affidavit reads as follows:
“Having been advised of the consequences of a false affidavit, I declare under oath the following, which is to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg:
Then come the “Personal Data;” and I am now quoting literally from Figure 2:
“I was employed as private secretary of the Führer’s Deputy, Rudolf Hess, in Munich, from 17 October 1933 until his flight to England on 10 May 1941.
“Beginning in the summer of 1940—I cannot remember the exact time—I had, by order of Hess, to obtain secret weather reports about weather conditions over the British Isles and the North Sea, and to forward them to Hess. I received the reports from a Captain Busch. In part I also received reports from Miss Sperr, the secretary of Hess with his liaison staff in Berlin.
“Hess left a letter behind on his departure by air for England, which was handed to the Führer at a time when Hess had already landed in England. I read a copy of this letter. The letter began with words more or less like this:
“ ‘My Führer; when you receive this letter, I shall be in England.’ I do not remember the exact wording of the letter. Hess occupied himself in the letter mainly with the proposals which he wanted to submit to England in order to achieve peace. I can no longer remember the details of the proposed settlement. I can however state definitely that no word was mentioned about the Soviet Union or about the idea that a peace treaty should be concluded with England in order to have the rear free on another front. If this had been discussed in the letter, it certainly would have been impressed upon my memory. From the content of the letter the definite impression was to be gained that Hess undertook this extraordinary flight in order to prevent further bloodshed, and in order to create favorable conditions for the conclusion of a peace.
“In my capacity as secretary of long standing, I have come to know Rudolf Hess quite well and his attitude towards certain questions. If I am told now that, in a letter of the Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, of 17 April 1941, it was mentioned that the Führer’s Deputy had discussed the introduction of corporal punishment against Poles in the annexed Polish territories, I cannot believe that this attitude of the department headed by Hess was due to any personal decision of his. Such a proposal would be totally contradictory to the behavior and attitude which the Führer’s Deputy displayed with regard to similar questions on other occasions.”
I shall refrain from reading the affidavit of the witness Ingeborg Sperr, Page 166 of the document book.
From the first two volumes of the document book I wish still, as I have already said, to read only parts from a discussion between Hess and Lord Simon. However, in order to prevent the report of this discussion from being interrupted, I ask permission of the Tribunal to read this document to the Tribunal next Monday?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. You mean not to go on any more now?
DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall stop now.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you no other document you wish to produce?
DR. SEIDL: I beg your pardon? Yes, there are some documents in Volume 3 of the document book; but, however, I should prefer to submit these documents coherently to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, if you wish it, we will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 23 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]