Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 10

by Various

Morning Session

[The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Your Lordship will have noticed that I did not deal with the question of Jews. That will now be taken up by my learned friend, M. Faure, of the French Delegation.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words on an important question? A map was discussed here yesterday, the map which is now visible in court. From that map the Prosecution conclude that a large number of concentration camps were distributed all over Germany. The defendants are contradicting this statement as energetically as possible. In the treatment of my case, the case of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, I hope to adduce evidence to the effect that only a very few of the red spots on this map are accurate. I wish to make this statement here and now, in order that the impression does not arise over again, in the subsequent cases, that this map is a correct one.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, this is only a reproduction of what has already been put in evidence.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but I am at liberty to adduce proof to the contrary.

THE PRESIDENT: Of course you are, but it is not necessary for you to say so now. The fact that the evidence was put in by the Prosecution at an earlier date, of course, gives you every opportunity to answer it, but not to answer it at this moment.

M. FAURE: Defendant, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you were the chief of the diplomatic personnel, were you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

M. FAURE: The personnel followed your instructions, did they not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

M. FAURE: You declared yesterday that you were responsible for the acts of your subordinates?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

M. FAURE: Would you tell me if Dr. Best, Plenipotentiary for Denmark, was a member of your Ministry?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

M. FAURE: Dr. Best told you, did he not, that Hitler had given an order to assassinate Danes when there were acts of sabotage?

VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the question?

M. FAURE: According to the documents that have been produced before the Tribunal, Dr. Best saw you on 30 December 1943 and told you that Hitler had given the order to assassinate Danes when there were acts of sabotage in Denmark; is that so?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was to be done against saboteurs. Hitler had ordered it.

M. FAURE: The order, according to the terms employed by Dr. Best in the document, was to “execute persons, terrorists or non-terrorists, without trial.” Can that not be considered as assassination?

VON RIBBENTROP: From the beginning I strongly opposed these measures, and so did Dr. Best. We went so far as to...

M. FAURE: Defendant, I am not trying to say that you were pleased with this state of affairs. I am merely asking you if you were informed thereof. Is that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the Führer wanted that. I do not know the details.

M. FAURE: But I am not asking for details.

VON RIBBENTROP: And what was ordered afterwards I do not know because, so far as I am aware, it did not go through us, but through another department.

M. FAURE: I note that you actually were informed of the Führer’s order given that day to permit assassination. You therefore considered it normal to belong to a government, the head of which was a murderer.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, the exact opposite is true here, the exact opposite...

M. FAURE: All right, all right, just answer, please.

VON RIBBENTROP: ...for I told him that I had taken my stand and that I held divergent views. The Führer was most dissatisfied with Dr. Best and had the matter handled through other channels, since Dr. Best was against it and so was I.

M. FAURE: I am merely asking you to answer my question very briefly. You can give details through your counsel later.

With regard to Denmark, there was action against the Jews in that country in order to deport them. Did you have anything to do with that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about matters relating to the Jews in Denmark, since I know nothing.

M. FAURE: Did you never hear anything about it?

VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that I discussed the fact with Best, that this question was of no significance in Denmark. He was therefore not proposing to do anything in particular about the Jewish question there, and I declared myself in complete agreement with him.

M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document 2375-PS. This document has not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. I would like to submit it under French Exhibit Number RF-1503. I would like to read with you the second paragraph of this document. It is an affidavit from Mildner, a colonel of the police in Denmark.

“As commander, I was subordinate to the Reich Plenipotentiary, Dr. Best. Since I was opposed to the persecution of the Jews, on principle and for practical reasons, I asked Dr. Best to give me the reasons for the measures that were ordered.

“Dr. Best declared to me that the Reich Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, obviously knew Hitler’s intention to exterminate the Jews in Europe. He had furnished Hitler with a report about the Jewish problem in Denmark and proposed to deport the Jews from Denmark.

“Dr. Best declared furthermore that Ribbentrop was afraid of being held responsible in case the Jews remained in Denmark.

“Dr. Best was now compelled to carry out the measures that were proposed to Hitler by Ribbentrop.

“From the discussion with Dr. Best I gathered that he must have had a discussion or a telephone conversation with Ribbentrop.”

You read that, did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: What is written in this document is pure fantasy. It is not true.

M. FAURE: Very well; I ask then that you be shown Document 3688-PS, which I wish to deposit under the French Exhibit Number RF-1502. It is a note of 24 September 1942, signed by Luther, and addressed to his collaborators. I should like to read with you the first two paragraphs of that document.

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me today by telephone to expedite as much as possible the evacuation of the Jews from different countries in Europe, since it is certain that the Jews stir up feelings against us everywhere and must be held responsible for acts of sabotage and outrages.

“After a short report on the evacuation of Jews at present in process in Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and the occupied territories, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered us now to approach the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Danish Governments with the aim of getting the evacuation started in these countries.”

I suggest that this second document confirms the first as regards your participation in the deportation of Jews in Denmark. Do you agree?

VON RIBBENTROP: It was the Führer’s plan, at the time, to deport the Jews from Europe to North Africa, and Madagascar was also mentioned in this connection. He ordered me to approach various governments with a view to encouraging the emigration of the Jews, if possible, and to remove all Jews from important government posts. I issued instructions to the Foreign Office accordingly, and, if I remember rightly, certain governments were approached several times to that effect. It was the question of the Jewish emigration to certain parts of North Africa; that is true. May I return to this affidavit? This sworn affidavit is pure fantasy of Colonel Mildner’s and is absolutely untrue.

M. FAURE: But, in any case, you admit...

VON RIBBENTROP: Dr. Best once discussed the Jewish question with me, and he said that as far as Denmark was concerned, the question was of no particular importance, since there were not many Jews left there. I explained to him that he would have to let matters take their own course there. That is the truth.

M. FAURE: You admit, nevertheless, that this document signed by Luther is correct, and that you did give the order to evacuate the Jews of Denmark? It is in the letter.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, not in Denmark. I do not even know this document of Luther’s. This is the first time I have seen it.

M. FAURE: Please, simply answer my questions; otherwise we shall waste a lot of time. In your opinion, both these documents are incorrect, you said so; let us pass on.

The German Embassy in Paris...

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say so. That is incorrect. I said that I did not know Luther’s document. It is, however, true that the Führer gave me instructions to tell the Foreign Office to approach certain foreign governments with a view to solving the Jewish problem by removing the Jews from government positions and, wherever possible, to favor Jewish emigration.

M. FAURE: The German Embassy in Paris was under your orders, was it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: The German Embassy in Paris, that is, the Ambassador to the Vichy Government, naturally received orders from me.

M. FAURE: French Document RF-1061 has already been read to the Tribunal and in this document you defined the functions of Ambassador Abetz. It is 3614-PS.

In this document, which has already been read to you twice here, I would remind you that you commissioned Abetz to put in a safe place the public and private art treasures, particularly those belonging to Jews, on the basis of special instructions mentioned here. Abetz executed this mission by pillaging art collections in France.

VON RIBBENTROP: It is not true.

M. FAURE: I would ask that you be shown Document 3766-PS, which has not yet been produced, and to which I should like to give the French Exhibit Number RF-1505. I will go over merely a few lines of this document with you. It is a report from the military administration, which was distributed in 700 copies. It is entitled: “Report on the Removal of French Works of Art by the German Embassy and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France.”

If you will look at Page 3, you will see that the title in the margin is very significant: “German-Embassy: Attempt to remove paintings from the Louvre.”

Page 4, I will read the first sentence at the top of the page...

VON RIBBENTROP: When may I refer to the individual points? Not at all, or here and now?

M. FAURE: When I ask you a question you will answer. I am reading a passage to you:

“Ambassador Abetz, disregarding the prohibition pronounced by the military administration, undertook to send to Germany a series of works of art from the Louvre which had been placed in safety.”

Were you informed of this?

VON RIBBENTROP: I declare that this is absolutely untrue. Not a single work of art was taken out of the Louvre by Ambassador Abetz. That would have been contrary to the express orders of the Führer, who had strictly forbidden it. The report is incorrect.

May I mention that on one occasion the French Government wanted to present me with a work of art from the Louvre, a painting by Boucher. I returned this picture to the Louvre. I do not possess anything, and the Foreign Office never even saw a single work of art, from the Louvre.

M. FAURE: You state that this report is incorrect?

THE PRESIDENT: What is this report you are putting to him?

M. FAURE: It is Document 3766-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but what is this document?

M. FAURE: It is a report from the German military administration, which is in the American documents in the PS series. The Tribunal received a general affidavit referring thereto.

THE PRESIDENT: Captured documents?

M. FAURE: Yes, captured documents. I indicate to the Tribunal that this captured report contains numerous other passages relating to the actions of Abetz, but as the defendant declares that the report is inexact as regards one of its passages, I shall not continue reading the document, in order to save time.

In addition...

VON RIBBENTROP: But this is not a captured document, not a report.

M. FAURE: Please answer my questions. We are not going to carry on this controversy. Your counsel can interrogate you later on.

DR. HORN: I must ask your permission to inquire into the nature of the documents submitted to the defendant. If it is stated that it is a captured report and then that it is not a captured report, the matters should be put right, here and immediately.

M. FAURE: I have already indicated that this document belongs to the PS series of captured documents. The Tribunal has a large number of such documents and I do not think that their authenticity will be disputed.

[Turning to the defendant.] I would now like to ask you the following question:...

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to ask further questions upon this document?

M. FAURE: No, Mr. President.

[Turning to the defendant.] Apart from the questions of art treasures, Abetz also dealt with the question of the treatment of Jews in general, did he not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Abetz had no order. As far as I know he also had nothing to do with the Jewish question. This question was handled by other departments.

M. FAURE: Is it not true that in October 1940 Abetz communicated with you with a view to settling the situation of Jews of German or Austrian descent who were residing in France?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; it did not interest me.

M. FAURE: I would like to show you Document EC-265, which I wish to submit as French Document RF-1504. It is a telegram from Abetz dated 1 October 1940. I will read merely the first and last sentences:

“The solution of the Jewish problem in the occupied territory of France requires, besides other measures, a regulation as soon as possible of the citizenship status of the Reich German Jews who were living here at the beginning of the war...”

And the last sentence:

“The measures proposed above are to be considered as merely the first step toward the solution of the entire problem. I reserve the right to make other proposals.”

VON RIBBENTROP: May I have time to read the telegram first?

THE PRESIDENT: That is a little too fast.

M. FAURE: Yes.

VON RIBBENTROP: So far as I can see, this telegram apparently deals with the fact that Austrian and German Jews are to be repatriated to Austria and Germany from France. I do not know that. This is the first time I have seen this telegram, and I can give no information about it. It probably represents one of the routine measures dealt with by the Foreign Office in the course of the day’s work, but which were not submitted to me; and apart from that, these matters were individually dealt with by other departments, not by us.

M. FAURE: If you will look on the left-hand side of the telegram, you will see the distribution list. There were 19, including you, were there not? You were Number 2.

VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to inform the French prosecutor that every day four, five, six, or eight hundred such documents and telegrams reached my office, of which only 1 or 2 percent were submitted to me.

M. FAURE: Apart from the question...

VON RIBBENTROP: In any case I know nothing about this telegram.

M. FAURE: Apart from the question of Jews of Austrian and German origin, your colleagues and subordinates in the Embassy also dealt with the question of the French Jews. Now, before asking you this question, I should like to read out to you two sentences from a document which was submitted to the Tribunal as French Document Number RF-1207. It is a report from Dannecker, who was responsible for solving the Jewish problem in France. Dannecker concluded his report as follows:

“In this connection, I cannot speak of this matter without mentioning the genuinely friendly support which our work received from the German Ambassador Abetz, his representative, the envoy Schleier, and SS Sturmbannführer and Counsellor of Legation Dr. Zeitschel. I should like to add that the Embassy in Paris has, on its own initiative, placed quite large sums at the disposal of the branch in charge of the Jewish question, for the financing of the Anti-Jewish Institute, and that it will continue to do so in future.”

Therefore, according to these documents, Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel worked together.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Faure, we do not know where you are reading from.

M. FAURE: Mr. President, this document was not given to you in this folder because it has already been submitted to the Tribunal. I merely wished to read two sentences from it.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

M. FAURE: It is evident therefore, from this document, that three officials of the German Embassy, Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel, collaborated with Dannecker in the settlement of Jewish affairs. That is shown by the document, is it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Am I supposed to answer that? Is it a question?

M. FAURE: It is a question.

VON RIBBENTROP: To that question I must answer “naturally.” They certainly collaborated to some extent in the Jewish question in France; that is perfectly clear. But I can also add that the French Prosecution surely is informed that Ambassador Abetz was not only instructed by me, but also acted on his own initiative in always attempting to reach some kind of conciliatory settlement of this question. It goes without saying that the Embassy was involved, one way or the other, in this sphere of action. And it also goes without saying that I must assume responsibility for anything done by the gentlemen in the Embassy, and I should like to repeat that my instructions as well as the activities of Ambassador Abetz were always in the opposite direction. It is quite clear that the basic anti-Semitic tendency and policy of the German Government spread over all the departments and naturally, in any sphere—I mean, every Government office somehow or other came into contact with these matters. Our task in the Foreign Office—which could be proved in thousands of cases if the documents would be submitted—was to act as an intermediary in this sphere. I might say, we often had to do things in accordance with this anti-Semitic policy, but we always endeavored to prevent these measures and to reach some kind of conciliatory settlement. In fact, the German Embassy was not responsible for any anti-Semitic measures of any description in France.

M. FAURE: I would like to draw your attention to another document, Number RF-1210, a French document which is a second report from Dannecker of 22 February 1942, Page 3 of the document, Page 2 of the German text.

VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say here and now that I do not even know who Dannecker is. Perhaps you can give me some information on that subject.

M. FAURE: I informed you that Dannecker was the person responsible for Jewish affairs in France. As a matter of fact, these documents were submitted a long time ago to the Tribunal and communicated to the Defense.

At Page 3 of the document, which is Page 2 of the German, there is a paragraph entitled, “Actions,” from which I read one sentence: “Up to the present, three large-scale operations have been undertaken against the Jews in Paris.”

Now, if you will look at the last page of the document, the last paragraph but one, we read as follows:

“Since the middle of 1941 there has been a conference every Tuesday in which the following services participate:... I, II, and III, military commands, administrative, police, and economic sections; IV, German Embassy, Paris; V, Einsatzstab Westen of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

“The result of the conference is that—with very few exceptions naturally called for by outsiders—the anti-Jewish policy is being brought into one common line in the occupied territory.”

This document clearly shows, does it not, that your collaborators were in agreement with the anti-Jewish policy in the occupied territories and that this policy included the arrest of Jews?

VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to this statement? According to my information, in this case, as so often happened in such cases, the German ambassadors could have served as the branch offices. They might have joined in with a view to guiding matters into peaceful channels.

M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown French Document RF-1220, which is a letter from the German Embassy of 27 June 1942, addressed to the head of the Security Police and the SD in France. Before asking you a question I would like to read with you the first two paragraphs of this letter:

“Following my interview with Hauptsturmführer Dannecker on the date of 27 June, during which he indicated that he required that 50,000 Jews from the unoccupied zone be deported to the East as soon as possible, and that on the basis of notes sent by the Commissioner General for Jewish Questions, Darquier de Pellepoix, under any circumstances something had to be done for this, I reported the matter to Ambassador Abetz and Minister Rahn immediately after the discussion. The latter is to confer with President Laval this afternoon, and he has promised me that he will speak to him at once about the handing over of these 50,000 Jews; also he will insist that Darquier de Pellepoix be given complete freedom of action according to the laws already promulgated, and that the credits which have been promised to him be handed to him immediately.”

Now, I should like to ask you a question. I ask you to answer as briefly as possible: Were you aware of this démarche for the handing over of these 50,000 Jews?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not; I heard about it here for the first time, when this document was, I believe, read out once before.

M. FAURE: If your collaborators Abetz, Rahn, and Zeitschel took such action on this subject without informing you, was it not because they thought they were acting in accordance with your general directives?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so; they worked very independently in Paris, but I should like to repeat once again that I am assuming responsibility for everything that these gentlemen have done. I make a point of emphasizing this fact. I did not, however, know anything about the proposed measure against the 50,000 Jews. And I do not even know whether it was ever put into effect, and in what manner these gentlemen had implicated themselves in the matter. The letter does not make it clear. I know only one thing, and that is that my general instructions were to tread cautiously in such matters and, if possible, to bridge difficulties according to my own basic concepts and not to do anything to force matters but, on the contrary, to smooth them over. I can say no more on the subject.

M. FAURE: During the interrogation of your witness Steengracht, the British Prosecution produced a document, 3319-PS, under the British Exhibit Number GB-287. I should like to refer to this document for one question only.

In this document there is an account of a meeting, or a congress, at which were present all the reporters on Jewish questions from the various diplomatic missions in Europe. This congress was held on 3 and 4 April 1944 in Krummhübel. It was organized by Schleier. This was read the other day. You knew about this congress, I suppose?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, this is the first time I have heard about it. What congress was that? I have never heard that such a congress ever took place. What kind of congress was it supposed to be?

M. FAURE: This document has already been submitted; it was a congress held...

VON RIBBENTROP: I know only about one congress which I asked the Führer not to hold. That I do know. But I know nothing at all about a congress which did take place. Please give more detailed information on the subject.

M. FAURE: The document was handed over to the Tribunal, and I would like to ask you one question. You testified that you were unaware of this meeting at which 31 persons, most of whom belonged to the diplomatic service, were present. I will inform you that during this meeting Embassy Counsellor Von Thadden made a declaration which was reported in the following terms:

“The speaker explained the reasons why the Zionist solution of Palestine and similar alternative solutions must be rejected and why the Jews must be expatriated into the Eastern territories.”

I suggest that this declaration made by an embassy counsellor in the presence of 31 people belonging to your service voiced your own attitude on these matters.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but I do not know in the very least what you mean. May I, to begin with, please have some information on the matter with which we are dealing? I do not understand it at all. I have told you once before that I know nothing about any congress except the one which I countermanded. That was an international congress which was to have been held. I know nothing of a congress of diplomats. Would you kindly place the document in question at my disposal in order that I may make my reply?

M. FAURE: I do not intend to show you this document. I read one sentence contained in this document, and I am merely asking you if this phrase represents your opinion or not. Answer “yes” or “no”.

VON RIBBENTROP: Then I must request you to repeat the sentence. I wish to confirm again, however, that no congress took place; it is not true.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to that question, if the opportunity is not afforded the defendant to give a truthful answer.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question was proper.

M. FAURE: I ask you whether this sentence which I have read out to you corresponded to your opinion.

VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask you to repeat the sentence. I did not understand it correctly.

M. FAURE: “The speaker explained the reasons why the Zionist solution of Palestine and similar alternative solutions must be rejected and why the Jews must be expatriated to the Eastern territories.”

Was that your thesis?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not.

M. FAURE: Was your attention drawn to the fact that the Italian authorities in France protected the Jews against persecution by Germans?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect that there was something of the kind but I no longer remember exactly.

M. FAURE: Did you approach the Italian Government on this subject?

VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that on one occasion I spoke either to Mussolini or to Count Ciano about certain acts of sabotage, espionage, or something of that kind which had occurred in France and against which one would have to be on the alert, and in this connection, I believe, the Jewish problem was also discussed.

M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown Document D-734, which I would like to submit as French Exhibit Number RF-1501. This note is headed:

“Account of a conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia in the presence of Ambassadors Von Mackensen and Alfieri and the State Secretary Bastianini on the 25th of February 1943.”

I would like to read with you the second paragraph on this page:

“Further, the Reich Foreign Minister dealt with the Jewish question. The Duce was aware that Germany had taken a radical position with regard to the treatment of the Jews. As a result of the development of the war in Russia she had come to an even greater clarification of this question. All Jews had been transported from Germany and from the territories occupied by her to reservations in the East. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, knew that this measure was described as cruel, particularly by enemies, but it was necessary in order to be able to carry the war through to a successful conclusion.”

I shall not read the following paragraph, but the fourth:

“France also had taken measures against the Jews which were extremely useful. They were only temporary, because here, too, final solution would be the deportation of the Jews to the East. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, knew that in Italian military circles, and occasionally among German military people too, the Jewish problem was not sufficiently appreciated. It was only in this way that he could understand an order of the Comando Supremo which, in the Italian occupation zone of France had canceled measures taken against the Jews by the French authorities acting under German influence. The Duce contested the accuracy of this report and traced it back to the French tactics of causing dissension between Germany and Italy.”

Now I shall ask you a question: A short while ago you told us that you wanted to make all the Jews emigrate to Madagascar. Is Madagascar in the Eastern reservations mentioned in the document?

VON RIBBENTROP: About what? I have not understood.

M. FAURE: You were talking in this document of deporting Jews to the reservations in the Eastern territories, and a short while ago you spoke to us of settling the Jews in Madagascar. Is Madagascar meant here?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was the Führer’s plan. This document refers to the fact that a large-scale espionage system had been discovered, I believe, in France. The Führer sent me while I was on a journey to Italy and told me to speak to Mussolini and see to it that in cases of Jews involved in these acts of sabotage and espionage, the Italian Government or the Italian Army did not intervene to prevent this measure. Also I should like to state definitely that I knew, and it was also the Führer’s plan, that the European Jews were to be resettled on a large-scale either in Madagascar, North Africa, or in reservations in the East. This was generally known in Germany. That is all that we are concerned with here, and I also knew that some very unpleasant things had occurred at that time and that the Führer was convinced that all of them could be attributed to Jewish organizations in the south of France, I believe. I now recollect very well that at the time I discussed the matter with Mussolini and begged him to adopt suitable measures since these Jews were furnishing all the information to the English and American Intelligence Services. At least that was the information which the Führer was constantly receiving.

M. FAURE: You said, did you not, that all Jews were to be deported to the Eastern reservations? Is that correct? Please reply “yes” or “no”.

VON RIBBENTROP: Whether I was in favor of it?

M. FAURE: Germany deported all the Jews from German territory and territories occupied by her to Eastern reservations. That is true, is it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the contents of the document in detail. I do not know what I myself said in detail. But at any rate I knew that the Führer had ordered that the Jews of the occupied territories in Europe were to be transported to reservations in the East and resettled there. That I did know. The carrying out of these measures, however, was not my task as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Foreign Office, but I did know that it was the Führer’s wish. In this connection, I remember that I received an order from him to discuss the matter with the Italian Government so that they too would introduce corresponding measures regarding the Jewish problem. That applied to other countries as well, where we had to send telegrams quite frequently, so that these countries should solve the Jewish question.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, did you read to the witness the second paragraph beginning: “Further, the Reich Foreign Minister dealt with the Jewish question...”?

M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, the second paragraph. That is the paragraph which I have just been reading.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you read the third one, but I did not know you read the second one too. You read the second one too, did you? Very well.

M. FAURE: Yes, I read it as well, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The document is a new document, is it not?

M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, it is a document which I would like to submit under the Exhibit Number RF-1501. It belongs to the “D” series; it is D-734 of the British document books.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the defendant said whether he admits that it is a substantially accurate account of the conversation?

VON RIBBENTROP: I can no longer say for certain, Mr. President; what I did say at the time, I know only, and gather, from this document, from these words, that the Jews were spreading news from British and American sources. I can remember that at that time a large espionage and sabotage organization was in existence, and that this organization was causing a great deal of trouble in France, and that the Führer ordered me to discuss the matter with Mussolini since the Italians were opposing certain measures we had introduced in France. I spoke to Mussolini and told him that the Führer was of the opinion that, where this question was concerned, we should have to come to a definite understanding.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Defendant, you have already told us that. The question that I asked was whether you agreed that it was a substantially accurate account of the conversation.

VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that in certain points the report is incorrect, but fundamentally the position was as I have just explained it.

M. FAURE: Now, you also spoke about this question with Horthy, did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I had to confer several times with the Hungarian Government so as to persuade them to do something about the Jewish problem. The Führer was extremely insistent on this point. I therefore discussed the question repeatedly with the Hungarian Ambassador and the question was primarily to centralize the Jews somehow or other in some part of Budapest, I think it was slightly outside Budapest or in—as a matter of fact, I do not know Budapest very well—in any case, it was somewhere in Budapest itself. That was the first point. And the second point dealt with the removal of the Jews from influential Government posts, since it had been proved that Jewish influence in these departments was sufficiently authoritative to bring Hungary to a separate peace.

M. FAURE: The document relating to your conversation or one of the conversations which you had with Horthy has already been produced. It was that of 17 April 1943. It is Document D-736, which was submitted as GB-283.

During the interrogation of your witness, Schmidt, the British prosecutor asked this witness if he admitted having compiled this account, and this was confirmed by Schmidt. This note bears the following remark at the bottom of the first paragraph: “The Foreign Minister declared that the Jews were either to be exterminated or sent to concentration camps. There was no other solution.”

You did say that, did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I definitely did not say it in those words. But I would like to reply as follows:

It was apparently an account prepared by “Minister” Schmidt, as was his habit, some days after a long discussion between the Führer and Horthy. I have already said that the Führer had repeatedly charged me to talk to Horthy, to the Hungarian Government, to the Ambassador, in order to reach a solution of the Jewish question. At the time when Horthy visited the Führer the Führer emphasized the question to him in a very irritable manner, and I remember perfectly that subsequent to this discussion I talked the matter over with “Minister” Schmidt, saying that I, strictly speaking, had not quite understood the Führer.

The remark mentioned was definitely not made in this way. M. Horthy had apparently said that he could not, after all, beat the Jews to death. It is possible, since there would have been no question of that in any case, that in this connection I did endeavor to persuade Horthy to do something or other at once about the Jewish question in Budapest, namely, that he should undertake now the centralization which the Führer had already wished to carry out for a long time. My objection or my interpolation may have referred to this question.

I must add that the situation, at that time, was as follows: We had been receiving repeated indications from Himmler, to the effect that Himmler wished to handle the Jewish situation in Hungary himself. I did not want this, since, one way or another, it would probably have created political difficulties abroad.

Consequently, acting on the wish of the Führer, who was extremely obstinate on this subject, I, as is known, repeatedly attempted to smooth matters over and, at the same time, pin the Hungarians down to do something about it in any case. Therefore, if, from a long conversation, some remark has been extracted and summarized in brief, and contains some such statement, it certainly does not mean that I wished the Jews to be beaten to death. It was 100 percent contrary to my personal convictions.

M. FAURE: I do not understand whether you answered my question or not. I will have to ask you again. Is the report correct, or is it not correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, in this form it cannot be correct. These are notes. I personally have never seen these notes before; otherwise I should have said at once that this is nonsense and liable to misconstruction. I did not see these notes before; I saw them for the first time in Nuremberg.

I can say only one thing which may possibly have occurred. I might have said...well yes, “the Jews cannot be exterminated or beaten to death, so, please do something in order that the Führer will be satisfied at long last, and centralize the Jews.”

That was our aim, at that time at any rate. We did not want to render the situation more acute, but we were trying to do something in Hungary so that no other department could take the matter in hand, thereby creating political difficulties abroad for the Foreign Office.

M. FAURE: You knew at that time that many Jews had been deported. That may be gathered from your explanations.

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, please. Are you passing from this document?

M. FAURE: I was continuing to speak of it in more general terms.

THE PRESIDENT: You are passing from it, did you say?

M. FAURE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, the Tribunal would like to know whether you did say to the Regent Horthy that Jews ought to be taken to concentration camps.

VON RIBBENTROP: I consider it possible that such may have been the case, for we had, at that time, received an order that a concentration camp was to be installed near Budapest or else that the Jews should be centralized there, and the Führer had instructed me a long time before to discuss with the Hungarians a possible solution of the Jewish question. This solution should consist of two points. One was the removal of the Jews from important government positions and two, since there were so many Jews in Budapest, to centralize the Jews in certain quarters of Budapest.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand your suggestion to be that this document is inaccurate.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it is not accurate. The way I should like to put it, Mr. President, is that when reading the document, it would appear from this document that I considered it possible or desirable to beat the Jews to death. That is perfectly untrue but what I did say here and what I emphasized later on could be understood to mean only that I wished something to be done in Hungary to solve the Jewish problem, so that other departments should not interfere in the matter. For the Führer often spoke to me about it, very seriously indeed, saying that the Jewish problem in Hungary must be solved now...

THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that, I think, already. What I wanted to ask you was this: Are you suggesting that Schmidt, who drew up this memorandum, invented the last few sentences, beginning with the words:

“If the Jews there did not want to work they would be shot. If they could not work they would have to perish. They had to be treated like tuberculosis bacilli with which a healthy body may become infected. This was not cruel if one remembered that innocent creatures of nature, such as hares or deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by them. Why should the beasts who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be shown more leniency? Nations which did not rid themselves of Jews perished. One of the most famous examples of this was the downfall of a people who once were so proud, the Persians, who now lead a pitiful existence as Armenians.”

Are you suggesting that Schmidt invented those sentences or imagined them?

VON RIBBENTROP: Mr. President, I should like to add that I myself was very grieved by these words of the Führer, and I did not quite understand them. But perhaps this attitude can be understood only if we remember that the Führer believed that the Jews had caused this war, and that he had gradually developed a very fanatical hatred for them.

I remember too that later on, after this conference, I discussed with the interpreter Schmidt and the two gentlemen the fact that this was the first time the Führer had used expressions in connection with the Jewish problem which I could no longer understand. These words were certainly not invented by Schmidt. The Führer did express himself in some such way at that time. That is true.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure.

M. FAURE: It appears from his document that you thought there were concentration camps in Hungary and yet you said yesterday that you did not know there were any in Germany. Is that not so?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know that there were any concentration camps in Hungary, but I did say that the Führer had instructed me to ask Horthy to ask the Hungarian Government to concentrate the Jews in Budapest, in certain parts of the city of Budapest. As to concentration camps in Germany, I already spoke yesterday about my knowledge of that subject.

M. FAURE: You admitted that you knew Hitler’s policy to deport all Jews and you admitted that insofar as you were competent as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you assisted this policy, did you not? That is right, is it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: As his faithful follower I adhered to the Führer’s orders even in this field, but I always did my utmost to alleviate the situation as far as possible. This can be stated and proved by many witnesses. Even in 1943 I submitted a comprehensive memorandum to the Führer in which I urged him to alter the Jewish policy completely. I could also quote many other examples.

M. FAURE: If I understand your testimony rightly, you were morally opposed to this persecution of Jews, but you did help to carry them out, is that not so?

VON RIBBENTROP: I repeatedly said at the very beginning of my examination, that in that sense I have never been anti-Semitic. But I was a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler.

M. FAURE: Apart from the Jewish question, you dealt with arrests of French people, did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: The arrests of Frenchmen...

M. FAURE: Yes. Did you or did you not give orders to arrest Frenchmen?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that this was so. Quite possible.

M. FAURE: Can you be more precise on that subject?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I cannot, for the moment, remember any details. In any case I know that Frenchmen were arrested. Just how far this depended on us, at that time, I do not know. It was, I think, in 1944, shortly before the invasion that the Führer issued an order to the effect that a large number of important French members of the resistance movement were to be arrested on the spot, and I believe that we were advised accordingly. It is also possible that we co-operated in this action to a certain extent, but I cannot remember any details.

It was a question of arresting those elements who would kindle the flame of the Resistance Movement in the event of an invasion, and would attack the German armies in the rear. But I cannot give you any more particulars now.

M. FAURE: I ask that you be shown a document which will be submitted as Exhibit Number RF-1506 (Document Number RF-1506). It is an affidavit by Dr. H. Knochen. I shall read some passages from this document.

“At the end of 1943—it must have been in December—there was a conference at the Foreign Office on arrests to be made in France. As I was in Berlin, I was also summoned to it. Present at this conference were: The Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop; the State Secretary Von Steengracht; Ambassador Abetz; another member of the Foreign Office, whose name I do not know; the Chief of the SIPO and the SD, Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the Higher SS and Police Leader in France, Oberg; and representing the Military Commander-in-Chief was his Chief of Staff Colonel Kossmann, if my memory serves me right.

“The Minister stated the following: The Führer expects in France more attention to be paid in the future than hitherto. The enemy force must not be allowed to increase. Therefore all German services will have to carry out their duties more meticulously.”

I omit the next paragraph. Then we read the following:

“He sees arising danger, in the event of invasion, of those prominent Frenchmen who do not wish to collaborate with Germany, and who are secretly active against her. They might constitute a danger to the troops. These dangerous elements should be sought out in business circles, university centers, in certain military and political circles, and all classes of society connected with them. He believes that it will be necessary to strike an immediate blow against these people. He suggests that they number easily 2,000 people or more. At a moment when it is necessary to defend Europe against her enemy, there is no reason why we should shrink from taking preventive measures of this kind in France. As to the practical means of putting this into effect, the Minister stated, Ambassador Abetz will have to take up this matter immediately and draw up a list in collaboration with the German services in order to take account of all the questions that arise out of this matter.”

I end the quotation here. Do you admit the accuracy of this document?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I distinctly remember that discussion. This was a Führer order to the effect that immediate action be taken—I have just spoken about this—in view of the pending invasion, to arrest all potentially dangerous elements who could fan the flame of resistance in the rear of the German armies. I considered this a perfectly comprehensible measure which any Government, with the welfare of the troops at heart, would have made.

I then held this conference. The Führer expected a far greater wave of arrests, but only a comparatively small number, I believe, were arrested then.

Subsequently we had comparatively little to do with the actual arrests; they were carried out by the police.

But it is perfectly clear that this conference did take place at the time indicated and that we did what had to be done at the moment, as proposed, namely, the arrest of those elements which might have been dangerous in case of an invasion. That is quite true.

M. FAURE: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: There are two things that I want to say. One of them relates to the Prosecution and one of them relates to the Defense. It is desired that the Prosecution should furnish documents to the interpreters when they are going to use documents in the course of examination or cross-examination. Documents need not necessarily be in the language which the interpreter is going to use, but there must be some document in some language, one of the languages, placed before the interpreters in order to assist.

The other point is that I am told that the defendants’ counsel are not getting their documents ready for the Translation Division in anything like the 2 weeks beforehand which was specified by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, it is true, said that the documents must be furnished to the Tribunal or the Translation Division 2 weeks ahead, if possible. Those words “if possible” are being treated too lightly and the documents, I am told, are sometimes coming in as late as 48 hours before the case of the particular defendant is to be taken. That is not sufficient and it will lead to delay. That is all.

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, in the course of the cross-examination of this defendant by the French Prosecution, reference was made to Document 3766-PS and I understood Dr. Horn to say that that document was not a captured document. That was my understanding of his statement. I am not altogether sure that that was what he said when he approached the microphone. So that the record will be perfectly clear, I now wish to inform the Tribunal that it is a captured document and I do not know upon what basis Dr. Horn made that assertion.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have not, so far, had any opportunity—it has been stated that we are dealing with a captured document, and I have had no opportunity of checking the matter beforehand. It said on the top of this document that it was a USA exhibit, Document Number 3766-PS, and I had no opportunity of checking this on its arrival. I have therefore requested that this fact be kindly established by the French Prosecution. That was my sole objection. I did not deny that it was a captured document; I was merely unable to prove it.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecutors wish to ask questions of the defendant? Colonel Amen, the Tribunal hopes that you are not going over ground which has already been gone over.

COL. AMEN: Most certainly not, Sir.

[Turning to the defendant.] You speak English pretty well, Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: I spoke it well in the past and I think I speak it passably well today.

COL. AMEN: Almost as well as you speak German?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I would not say that, but in the past I spoke it nearly as well as German, although I have naturally forgotten a great deal in the course of the years and now it is more difficult for me.

COL. AMEN: Do you know what is meant by a “yes man” in English?

VON RIBBENTROP: A “yes man”—per se. A man who says “yes” even when he himself—it is somewhat difficult to define. In any case, I do not know what you mean by it in English. In German I should define him as a man who obeys orders and is obedient and loyal.

COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you were a “yes man” for Hitler, isn’t that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: I was always loyal to Hitler, carried through his orders, differed frequently in opinion from him, had serious disputes with him, repeatedly tendered my resignation, but when Hitler gave an order, I always carried out his instructions in accordance with the principles of our authoritarian state.

COL. AMEN: Now, you were interrogated frequently by me, were you not, before this Trial?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, once or twice, I believe.

COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read to you certain questions and answers which were given in the course of these interrogations, and simply ask you to tell the Tribunal whether or not you made the answers that I read to you. That question can be answered “yes” or “no”; do you understand?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

COL. AMEN: “I have been a loyal man to the Führer to his last days. I have never gone back on him. I have been a loyal man to his last days, last hours, and I did not always agree with everything. On the contrary, I sometimes had very divergent views, but I promised to him in 1941 that I would keep faith in him. I gave him my word of honor that I would not get him into any difficulties.”

Is that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that according to my recollection is correct. I did not see the document and I did not sign anything, but as far as I can remember, that is correct.

COL. AMEN: Well, what did you mean by saying that you would not get him into any difficulties?

VON RIBBENTROP: I saw in Adolf Hitler the symbol of Germany and the only man who could win this war for Germany, and therefore I did not want to create any difficulties for him, and remained faithful to him until the end.

COL. AMEN: Well, what you really meant was that you were never going to cross him, and you promised him that in 1941, isn’t that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: I would never cause him any difficulties, yes, I did say that. He often found me a rather difficult subordinate, and that is when I told him that I would not cause him any difficulties.

COL. AMEN: In 1941 you told him that no matter whether you differed with his opinion in the future, you would never press the point, isn’t that true?

[There was no response.] “Yes” or “no”?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite that, but...

COL. AMEN: Well, approximately that, is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it cannot be put that way. I only meant, if I may explain it this way, that I would never cause him any difficulties; if a serious divergence of opinion should ever arise, I would just withhold my own view. That was what I meant.

COL. AMEN: Well, you gave him your word of honor to that effect, isn’t that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, yes.

COL. AMEN: And at that time you had talked about resigning, isn’t that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is also true, yes.

COL. AMEN: And that made the Führer lose his temper and become ill, correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. “Ill” is not the correct expression, but he became very excited at that time. I should prefer not to mention the details.

COL. AMEN: Well, he said it was injuring his health, isn’t that correct, and told you to stop arguing with him about any of these questions and do what he told you to do? Right?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not wish to say anything more about the personal reasons, nor do I believe that these are matters which could be of any interest here. Those would be personal matters between the Führer and myself.

COL. AMEN: Well, I am not interested in that. I am interested only in ascertaining if it is not a fact, and if you did not swear under oath, that on that occasion you swore to Hitler that you would never express or press any divergent views to anything which he desired. Is that not correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, no! That is absolutely untrue, the interpretation is false. I told the Führer that I would never create any difficulties for him. After 1941 I had many divergencies with him, and even at that time I always voiced my own opinions.

COL. AMEN: Well, Ribbentrop, whatever divergent views you had you were never able to put any of them into effect after 1941, were you? “Yes” or “no?”

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question. Please repeat it.

COL. AMEN: I say, no matter how divergent your views were, or what views you expressed to the Führer on any of these questions after 1941, your suggestions being contrary to the Führer’s were never put into effect. Isn’t that correct? You always eventually did what the Führer told you to do and what he wished, regardless of your own views.

VON RIBBENTROP: You are putting two questions to me. To the first I must reply that it is not correct that Hitler never accepted suggestions from me. Question Number 2, however, is correct. I can answer it by saying that if Hitler at any time expressed an opinion to me and issued an order, I carried the order through as was natural in our country.

COL. AMEN: In other words, eventually you always said “yes”, isn’t that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: I carried out his order, yes.

COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you some more of your testimony:

“He”—referring to the Führer—“considered me his closest collaborator. We had a very serious conversation then, and when I wanted to go away, I promised it to him and I have kept it to the last moment. It was sometimes very difficult, I can assure you, to keep this promise, and today I am sorry that I gave it. Perhaps it would have been better if I had not given it. It put me from then on in the position that I could not talk to Hitler, in very serious and important moments of this war, in the way in which I would have liked to, and in which, perhaps, I might have been able to talk to him after this conversation in 1941.

“I must explain all this to you. If you do not know the background of these things you might think perhaps that as Foreign Minister during these last years I would like to say more about this. Perhaps I might say one could give some more information about this, but I want to be and remain loyal to this man, even after his death, as far as I can possibly do it. But I reserve the right to prove to posterity that I kept my promise and also the right to show the role which I have played in the whole of this drama.”

Did you or did you not make those statements under oath to me?

VON RIBBENTROP: They are...

COL. AMEN: “Yes” or “no”?

VON RIBBENTROP: Here again we have two questions. To question Number 1, I would say that I know nothing at all. To the second question, I answer “no.” I certainly never testified under oath to that. I was put on oath only twice, but that is not relevant here. The statement is not verbatim and must have been wrongly translated. It is correct that I said that I was loyal to the Führer and that I further said that I had many arguments with him, that we were not always of the same opinion, and that is the essence of my statement. That is correct.

COL. AMEN: I asked you only one question, and I ask you again to answer it “yes” or “no.” Did you or did you not make those statements in the exact language that I just read them to you?

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Colonel Amen, he really did answer that, because he said it is not verbatim.

COL. AMEN: But it is verbatim.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of opinion. He says it is not verbatim.

COL. AMEN: Well, very good, Your Lordship.

[Turning to the defendant.] In any event, you can see that you stated the substance of what I just read to you; correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, yes.

COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, Ribbentrop, you testified and gave this particular testimony in English, did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have often spoken English at interrogations, that is quite true, but whether it was precisely this statement which was made in English, I do not know. In any case, I repeat, these statements on both points are to be understood that way; that is how they were meant.

COL. AMEN: And when you gave your testimony in English, that was at your own request, was it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct.

COL. AMEN: At whose request?

VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know. I believe it just happened that way; I cannot remember. I believe I spoke English mostly, and German a few times. Most of the time, however, I spoke English.

COL. AMEN: Now, I am going to read you a little more of your testimony and ask you the same question, which I hope you will answer “yes” or “no,” namely: Did you give this testimony in the course of the interrogation:

“Question: ‘Do you feel that you have an obligation to the German people to set forth historically not only the good things, but the bad things, for their education in the future?’

“Answer: ‘That is a terribly difficult question to answer.’

“Question: ‘Does that counterbalance the loyalty you feel towards the Führer?’

“Answer: ‘I do not want to stand before the German people as being disloyal to the Führer.’ ”

Did you make those statements?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, though I can no longer remember very exactly. But that is quite possible. So much has been said in the course of the last few months, and then too, from a physical point of view, I have, as you know, not been quite up to the mark, so that I just cannot remember every single word.

COL. AMEN: All right. Now see if you recall having made these statements:

“I always told the Führer openly my view if he wanted to hear it, but I kept myself entirely back from all decisions, but if the Führer once had decided, I, according to my attitude toward the Führer, blindly carried out his orders and acted in the sense of his decision. In a few decisive foreign political points, I tried to give my opinion more forcefully. This was in the Polish crisis and also in the Russian question, because I considered this absolutely important and necessary, but from 1941 I had but very little weight and it was difficult to bring an opinion through with the Führer.”

Do you recall having made those statements? “Yes,” or “no,” please.

VON RIBBENTROP: That is more or less true. Yes, I practically remember it.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal has already heard a very long cross-examination of the defendant, and they think that this is not adding very much to what they have already heard. The defendant has given very similar evidence already.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. I will pass to another subject.

[Turning to the defendant.] You have testified that there was a sharp line of demarcation between the political and the military situations. Correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Between—I did not understand that.

COL. AMEN: You have testified that there was always a sharp line of demarcation between the political and the military elements.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. The Führer always differentiated rather strongly between these two elements; that is correct.

COL. AMEN: And that information belonging to the military was kept exclusively for the military and not made available to your office, for example? Is that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: I heard little of military matters and plans; yes, that is correct.

COL. AMEN: And that the contrary was also true, that the information which you obtained was not made available to the military; is that correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: That I am in no position to judge, but I would assume so, since I do not know what information the military received from the Führer.

COL. AMEN: Well, you told us that the Führer’s entire plan was to keep those political and military channels separate each from the other. Correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, in general he kept them very severely apart. I have already said so several times. That is why I have only just now had cognizance of many military documents for the first time. That was perfectly in keeping with the Führer’s decrees on secrecy, that no one department should know more than was absolutely essential.

COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact that was not true at all; was it, Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already given you my answer.

COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact you had secret agents out who were working jointly in foreign countries for your office, for the Army, and for the Navy; isn’t that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is incorrect.

COL. AMEN: You are quite sure of that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I am certain of that.

COL. AMEN: And you are swearing to that?

VON RIBBENTROP: You mean agents who did something, who...

COL. AMEN: Who were out obtaining information for your office, for the Army, and for the Navy at the same, jointly?

VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that highly improbable. It is, of course, possible that somehow or other, some man may have worked for different departments, but this was definitely not done on an organized scale. The organization—we maintained a very small intelligence service abroad—and the intelligence services of the other departments of the Reich generally worked, as far as I was informed, completely apart from ours. It is possible that here and there some person or other would work for other, for different departments. That is quite conceivable. For instance, some person or other in our legations, as was customary at the English, American, Russian, and other legations, who had dug themselves in as consular assistants or some other kind of assistants, and carried out intelligence work for some organization or other.

COL. AMEN: So you want to change the answer you made a moment ago; is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not wish to change it at all. Fundamentally, as an organized routine matter, I never introduced any of the secret agents who worked for the different departments abroad. It is, however, conceivable that the department of the Foreign Office dealing with such matters may have appointed somebody. It was, however, a fairly insignificant affair. Today I say “unfortunately.” It is quite possible that other agents from this department, working for other departments, for Counterintelligence or the SD, et cetera, were correlated. Later on we even—I should like to add the following: I had pronounced differences of opinion with Himmler, over the intelligence services abroad, and it was only through the good offices of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner that I obtained an agreement to the effect that certain items of information would be placed at my disposal. But later this agreement was not honored. I think it was practically ineffective, because it was already too late. That, I believe, was in 1944.

COL. AMEN: Will you look at Document Number 3817-PS, please? Will you first tell the Tribunal who Albrecht Haushofer was, please?

VON RIBBENTROP: Albrecht Haushofer was a former collaborator of mine and was a man who, yes, who dealt with German minority questions. Could I perhaps read the letter first? Is it a letter from Haushofer? It is not signed.

COL. AMEN: Yes, it is. Have you finished reading?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, not quite, not yet. Shall I read the others too, or only the first letter?

COL. AMEN: We shall get to the other letters in a moment. I am trying to make this as short as we possibly can. Does that letter refresh your recollection that Haushofer was out in the Orient investigating various matters and making reports to you as early as 1937?

VON RIBBENTROP: At the moment I cannot recall that Haushofer was in Tokio but it is conceivable, it is possible that such was the case.

COL. AMEN: Well, the letter is addressed to you and it encloses a report, does it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Isn’t this a letter from Count Dürckheim? Isn’t there some misunderstanding? But if you say this was written by Haushofer, then it is conceivable that he was in Tokio; it is possible. I am not acquainted with the details. I sent Count Dürckheim to Tokio at that time but it is possible that Haushofer was there too. To be candid, I have, at present, forgotten all about it.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have just seen that this letter is not fully dated and is unsigned but I hear from Colonel Amen it was allegedly written in 1937. In 1937 Ribbentrop was not yet Foreign Minister. He was appointed Foreign Minister only on 4 February 1938.

COL. AMEN: It has the date on it—3 October—and it was captured with Haushofer’s documents.

VON RIBBENTROP: But I consider it quite probable that this letter is from Haushofer, although, to be quite candid, I no longer remember exactly that he had been to Tokio in 1937.

COL. AMEN: Well, now...

VON RIBBENTROP: He was a collaborator who worked with us in the early years but later dealt more with German minority questions, so that I lost track of him in recent years.

COL. AMEN: I will just pass along through this document. You will find the next document is dated 15 April 1937, requesting reimbursement and funds for this trip.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And then passing to the next document, you will find a letter to the Deputy of the Führer, Hess, saying:

“I am using the courier to send you also personally a short report which is going to Ribbentrop at the same time. It contains as briefly as possible a summary of what I could observe and hear over here in 4 weeks.”

Do you see that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see the letter. Yes, yes!

COL. AMEN: Then you will pass on to the next letter, dated 1 September 1937, addressed to yourself.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Enclosing a report covering the first 4 weeks.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it before me.

COL. AMEN: Now, we will pass the report over just for the moment and you will come to a letter dated 17 December 1937.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal thinks this is very far from the matters which they have really got to consider.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir. If seems to me that this indicates very clearly that copies of the same report which is included here were being sent simultaneously to the Army, to the Navy—that went to Raeder—and one to the Army and to Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is true that the witness’ first answer was that they did not have joint agents but he subsequently qualified that and said they might sometimes have had joint agents.

COL. AMEN: That is right, Sir. If you think he has conceded that point...

I should like to put this in as Exhibit USA-790.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but may I be allowed to say that we are not, in this case, dealing with an agent. Herr Haushofer was a free collaborator of ours, interested in politics in general, and in the question of the German minorities in particular. If he was in Tokio at that time, and he doubtless was there, although it has slipped my memory, then I must have told him to speak to several persons over there and report to me. He apparently, as I have only just gathered from this letter, either because he liked to be busy or for some other reason unknown to me, or because he knew the other gentlemen, placed these reports at the disposal of these other gentlemen, on his own initiative. But he certainly was no agent sent out by different departments. I think the only person who knew him well was Rudolf Hess; otherwise, I believe, he knew nobody at all. I fear I am not giving you quite the right ideas; he was a private tourist, who submitted his impressions.

COL. AMEN: Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you were not very close to Himmler; is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have always said that my relations with Himmler were good during the first few years, but I regret to say that in the latter years I was not on good terms with him. I naturally—it was not very noticeable to the outside world—but I do not wish to discuss this matter in detail. Many things have already been said about it and there were serious and violent divergencies, due to many reasons...

COL. AMEN: I do not care what the divergencies were. In what years did you get along closely with him?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand your question.

COL. AMEN: In what years were you close to him?

VON RIBBENTROP: The first divergencies between Himmler and myself arose, I believe, in 1941, over Romania and difficulties in Romania. These divergencies were smoothed over, and naturally to all outward appearances we had to work together as before, and we often exchanged letters on our respective birthdays and on other occasions. But later on relations were not very good. The final break came in 1941. Formerly I had been on good terms with him and also shared his opinion for the creation of a leadership class, at which he was aiming.

COL. AMEN: And you had at least 50 social appointments with Himmler in 1940 and 1941?

VON RIBBENTROP: How many?

COL. AMEN: Fifty?

VON RIBBENTROP: Fifty? No, that certainly could not have been the case. Perhaps five or thereabouts, I cannot say for certain. But after 1941 relations between us were more strained, and later they were not very good. Others, I believe, have already testified to that effect.

COL. AMEN: Well, I do not want to take any more time, except...

THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments between Ribbentrop or something other?

COL. AMEN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to go into?

COL. AMEN: Well, I expect, Sir, that any person that has as many appointments as are indicated by these books certainly has discussed with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the entire matters which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has told the Tribunal that he had never heard anything about concentration camps from Himmler.

VON RIBBENTROP: I wish to repeat my statement that at no time did Himmler discuss this matter with me. As for our 50 meetings, I do not know, we may have met frequently, despite everything, but I cannot remember 50 meetings. Possibly five or ten, I do not know. I do not believe it to be of vital importance since it is not a decisive factor. Of course we had to work together in various fields and this collaboration was mostly very difficult.

COL. AMEN: Well, there were many business appointments which you had with him also, were there not? Just take a look at this sheet of entries from Himmler’s appointment book and tell me whether that conforms to your...

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want this matter gone into any further.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir, but these were business appointments as distinguished from social. There are no further questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, during the last sessions of the Tribunal you explained in great detail the bases of German foreign policy. I should like to ask you a few comprehensive questions and request you to answer these questions laconically in terms of “yes” or “no.” Do you consider the Anschluss as an act of German aggression? Please answer this.

VON RIBBENTROP: Austria?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression. It was the accomplishment of a purpose.

GEN. RUDENKO: I must request you...

VON RIBBENTROP: But I presume I can say a few sentences at least, after saying “yes,” or must I never say anything else but “yes” and “no”?

GEN. RUDENKO: I must beg you to answer my questions. You have replied far too extensively. I would like you to summarize your replies, precisely by saying “yes” or “no.”

VON RIBBENTROP: That depends on my state of health. I must ask you to forgive me.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand.

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not consider the Anschluss as an act of aggression, that is “no.” I consider it the realization of the mutual purpose of both nations involved. They had always wished to be together and the government before Adolf Hitler had already striven for it.

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more: Please answer “yes” or “no.” Do you consider that the Anschluss was not an act of German aggression? Do you consider...

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, he gave you a categorical answer to that; that it was not an aggression.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses are not to be confined to answering “yes” or “no.” They must answer “yes” or “no” first, and then make a short explanation if they want to. But, anyhow, with reference to this question, he has answered it categorically.

GEN. RUDENKO: The second question: Do you consider the seizure of Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression in that sense, but a union in accordance with the right of self-determination of nations, as laid down in 1919 by the President of the United States, Wilson. The annexation of the Sudetenland was sanctioned by an agreement of four great powers in Munich.

GEN. RUDENKO: You evidently have not understood my question. I asked you whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia, of the whole of Czechoslovakia, as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not an act of aggression by Germany. I consider, according to the words of the Führer, and I believe he was right, that it was a necessity resulting from Germany’s geographical position. This position meant that the remaining part of Czechoslovakia, the part which still existed, could always be used as a kind of aircraft-carrier for attacks against Germany. The Führer therefore considered himself obliged to occupy the territory of Bohemia and Moravia, in order to protect the German Reich against air attack—the air journey from Prague to Berlin took only half an hour. The Führer told me at the time that in view of the fact that United States had declared the entire Western Hemisphere as its particular sphere of interest, that Russia was a powerful country with gigantic territories, and that England embraced the entire globe, Germany would be perfectly justified in considering so small a space as her own sphere of interest.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Poland as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No. I must again say “no.” The attack on Poland was rendered inevitable by the attitude of the other powers. It might have been possible to find a peaceful solution to the German demands, and I think the Führer would have trodden this path of peace, had the other powers taken this path with him. As matters stood, the situation had become so tense that Germany could no longer accept it as it was, and as a great power Germany could not tolerate Polish provocations any further. That is how this war arose. I am convinced that primarily the Führer was never interested in conquering Poland.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Denmark as an act of aggression by Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, the “invasion” of Denmark, as it is called, was, according to the Führer’s words and explanation, a purely preventive measure adopted against imminent landings of British fighting forces. How authentic our information was is proved by the fact that only a few days later English and German troops were engaged in battle in Norway. That means that it was proved that these English troops had been ready for a long time for fighting in Norway, and it came out from the documents discovered later on and published at the time, and from orders issued, that the English landing in Scandinavia had been prepared down to the smallest detail. The Führer therefore thought that by seizing Scandinavia, he would prevent it from becoming another theater of war. I do not therefore think that the invasion of Denmark can be considered as an act of aggression.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not consider this attack on Norway as an act of aggression on the part of Germany either?

VON RIBBENTROP: We have just been talking about Norway. I was talking about Norway and Denmark, a combined action.

GEN. RUDENKO: Together with Denmark. All right, it was a simultaneous action. Do you consider the attack on Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is the same question. I must again say “no,” but I would like to add an explanation.

GEN. RUDENKO: Just a moment. I would like you to give shorter replies because you explain the basic questions far too extensively. You deny that this was an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: The Russian Prosecutor will understand that we are dealing with very important questions, which are not easily explained in a sentence, especially since we did not have the opportunity to explain the matter in detail. I shall be quite brief.

GEN. RUDENKO: I quite appreciate that you have already been answering questions of this nature for 3 days running.

VON RIBBENTROP: I shall now be very brief. After the Polish campaign military considerations proved to be the decisive factors. The Führer did not wish the war to spread. As for Holland, Belgium, and France, it was France who declared war on Germany and not we who declared war on France. We therefore had to prepare for an attack from this direction as well. The Führer told me at the time that such an attack on the Ruhr area was to be expected, and documents discovered at a later date have proved to the world at large beyond a shadow of doubt that this information was perfectly authentic. The Führer therefore decided to adopt preventive measures in this case as well and not to wait for an attack on the heart of Germany, but to attack first. And so the timetable of the German General Staff was put into practice.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Greece as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: The attack on Greece and Yugoslavia by Germany has already been discussed. I do not believe I need give any further details on this point. That is here...

GEN. RUDENKO: I also do not think it is necessary to give detailed replies. I ask whether you consider the attack on Greece as an act of aggression on the part of Germany? Answer “yes” or “no.”

VON RIBBENTROP: No, and I consider that the measures adopted in Yugoslavia and the measures taken by Greece in granting bases, et cetera, to the enemies of Germany justified the intervention of Adolf Hitler, so that here too one cannot speak of aggressive action in this sense. It was quite clear that British troops were about to land in Greece, since they had already landed in Crete and the Peloponnesos, and that the uprising in Yugoslavia by the enemies of Germany, in agreement with the enemies of Germany, as I mentioned yesterday, had been encouraged with the intent of launching an attack against Germany from that country. The documents of the French General Staff discovered later in France showed only too clearly that a landing in Salonika had been planned...

GEN. RUDENKO: Witness Ribbentrop, you have already spoken about that in much detail. You explained it yesterday at great length. Now will you please answer “yes” or “no” to my last question: Do you, or do you not consider the attack on the Soviet Union as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: It was no aggression in the literal sense of the word, but...

GEN. RUDENKO: You say that in the literal sense of the word it was not an act of aggression. Then in what sense of the word was it an aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: You must let him answer.

VON RIBBENTROP: May I offer a few words of explanation? I must be allowed to say something.

GEN. RUDENKO: You...

VON RIBBENTROP: The concept of “aggression” is a very complicated concept, which even today the world at large cannot readily define. That is a point I should like to emphasize first. We are here dealing, undeniably, with a preventive intervention, with a war of prevention. That is quite certain, for attack we did. There is no denying it. I had hoped that matters with the Soviet Union could have been settled differently, diplomatically, and I did everything I could in this direction. But the information received and all the political acts of the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1941 until the outbreak of war, persuaded the Führer, as he repeatedly told me, that sooner or later the so-called East-West pincers would be applied to Germany, that is, that in the East, Russia with her immense war potential, and in the West, England and the United States, were pushing steadily towards Europe with the purpose of making a large-scale landing. It was the Führer’s great worry that this would happen. Moreover, the Führer informed me that close collaboration existed between the General Staffs of London and Moscow. This I do not know; I personally received no such news. But the reports and information which I received from the Führer were of an extremely concrete nature. At any rate, he feared that, one day, Germany, faced with this political situation, would be threatened with catastrophe and he wished to prevent the collapse of Germany and the destruction of the balance of power in Europe.

GEN. RUDENKO: In your testimony you have frequently stated that, in the pursuit of peaceful objectives, you considered it essential to solve a number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. Now this testimony is obviously arrant hypocrisy since you admitted just now that all these acts of aggression on the part of Germany were justified.

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not mean to say that; I said only that we were not dealing with an act of aggression, Mr. Prosecutor, and explained how this war came to pass and how it developed. I also explained how I had always done everything in my power to prevent the war at its outbreak during the Polish crisis. Beyond the precincts of this Tribunal, history will prove the truth of my words and show how I always endeavored to localize the war and prevent it from spreading. That, I believe, will also be established. Therefore, in conclusion I should like to say once more that the outbreak of war was caused by circumstances which, at long last, were no longer in Hitler’s hands. He could act only in the way he did, and when the war spread ever further all his decisions were principally prompted by considerations of a military nature, and he acted solely in the highest interests of his people.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now I beg you to answer the following questions:

I understand that you have submitted to the Tribunal a document, Number 311, written by yourself, which is an appreciation of Hitler entitled the “Personality of the Führer.” You wrote that document not so very long ago. I am not going to quote from it, since you doubtlessly remember it, as you wrote it a very short time ago.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am not quite sure what document that is. May I look at it?

GEN. RUDENKO: This document was submitted by you to your own defense counsel, as Exhibit Number 311, and submitted to the Tribunal by your attorney. On Page 5 there...

VON RIBBENTROP: Will you be kind enough to give a copy of this document?

GEN. RUDENKO: It is Document Number 311.

THE PRESIDENT: It cannot have been submitted to the Tribunal as 111, without anything more. What is it, 111-PS or 111?

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is a document of the Defense submitted as Ribbentrop-311. We have only a Russian translation here, which came to us together with a German document book. I presume that the document book has been submitted to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: It is R-111—it is Ribbentrop-111, you mean. It is not 111; it is Ribbentrop-111.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is Document 311.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I’ve got it now. It is in Document Book Number 9.

GEN. RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: On Page 5 of the document, your appreciation of Hitler, you state, “After the victory over Poland and in the West, under an influence which I mainly ascribe to Himmler, Hitler’s plans were extended, that is, in the direction of establishing German hegemony in Europe.” Do you remember the passage of the document you wrote yourself, Defendant Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: May I see this document? I do not know it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to ask counsel for Defendant Ribbentrop to submit this document to his client.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are dealing here with...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.

Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is inclined to think that this document is quite irrelevant. It is apparently a document prepared by the Defendant Ribbentrop, upon the personality of the Führer. I do not know when it was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant.

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I too am of the opinion that it is irrelevant. I included this document only in case the defendant did not have an opportunity to speak in greater detail of his relation to Hitler. Since he has had that opportunity I should like to withdraw the document.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal consider the document quite irrelevant.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was presented by the defense counsel in the Document Book. It was written by the Defendant Ribbentrop in the course of this Trial. All the prosecutors considered it admissible since this document, this appreciation, presented by the Defendant Ribbentrop would justify us in asking a large number of questions. But if the Tribunal considers that it really is quite irrelevant to the case, I shall, of course, refrain from quoting it.

THE PRESIDENT: We have not yet had an opportunity of ruling on the admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have seen them this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President.

[Turning to the defendant.] I should like to put a few questions with regard to German aggression against Yugoslavia. I should like you to acquaint yourself with Document 1195-PS. This document is entitled “Preliminary Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.” I invite your attention to Paragraph 4 of the first section of the document. It states: “The Führer has, in connection with the partition of Yugoslavia...” Have you found the place?

VON RIBBENTROP: Can you tell me, please, on what page it is?

GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4: “In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions...”

VON RIBBENTROP: I must have the wrong document.

GEN. RUDENKO; Document 1195-PS.

VON RIBBENTROP: Ah, yes. The beginning.

GEN. RUDENKO: I begin again:

“In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions:

“The transfer of territories occupied by the Italians is being prepared for by a letter of the Führer to the Duce and will be carried out by detailed directive of the Foreign Office.”

Have you found the place?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not see the place.

GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4, beginning with the words: “The Führer...” Do you have it?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have already read this paragraph into the record.

VON RIBBENTROP: It begins: “In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions.” That is how the document begins. May I ask—now what passage are you quoting?

GEN. RUDENKO: It ends with the following words: “...will be carried out according to a detailed directive of the Foreign Office.” And then reference is made to a teletype from the Quartermaster General of the OKH.

VON RIBBENTROP: There must be some mistake. It is not mentioned here.

GEN. RUDENKO: Probably you did not find it in the document.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, it is 12:45 now. Perhaps this would be a good time to adjourn.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

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