Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn the hearing of this case at 4 o’clock in order to hear supplementary applications for witnesses and documents. The Tribunal hope, therefore, that we may be able to conclude the case of the Defendant Rosenberg before that. I mean, to conclude the case of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his only other witness, or any other witness.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, you replied to me that the conversation with Admiral Canaris did not take place.
ROSENBERG: On the contrary, I said that such a conference with Admiral Canaris did take place.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then maybe this was wrongly translated.
ROSENBERG: Probably.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you whether you requested Canaris in the course of your conversation, in the interests of the counterintelligence service, to choose men who, while working as counterintelligence agents, would be able to do simultaneously political work. Do you remember my question?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was that the main subject of your conversation?
ROSENBERG: That is not correct. Admiral Canaris had...
GEN. RUDENKO: That is not correct? Well, let us not go into that in detail.
In order to speed up the interrogation, I will show you a document, and I will read this passage into the record.
Show this document to the defendant. [Turning to the Tribunal.] I mean, gentlemen of the Tribunal, Document 1039-PS, on Page 2. The part is underlined. I will read this passage.
[Turning to the defendant.] This is your report on the preliminary work concerning the organization of the territory of Eastern Europe. I read:
“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that, under the existing confidential circumstances, my office could in no way negotiate with any representatives of the peoples of Eastern Europe. I asked him to do this insofar as counterespionage work required it and then to name persons to me who, over and above counterespionage service, might be regarded as political personalities, in order to determine their possible utilization later. Admiral Canaris said that of course he would take into consideration my request not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants, and that he intended to act in line with my statements.”
ROSENBERG: That is in accord with what I said.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you are going a little too fast.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] I ask you, do you confirm this quotation?
ROSENBERG: Yes, in the German wording but not in the Russian translation. I understand Russian also and can, therefore, determine that the translation is not entirely correct; for it says here that I, under the existing confidential circumstances, naturally could not negotiate with other countries for eventual collaboration in a civilian administration. That is the first point. And point two is that, since Admiral Canaris had to do with various groups of Ukrainians, Russians, and other people, I was asking him—apart from counterintelligence, that is—not to do espionage work for me or ask me to do espionage work but that he should point out to me people of other nationalities whom I could use later—under given conditions—in civilian administration. That was the meaning; and furthermore, at the end it is quite correct that he agreed not to carry on any political work himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, this absolutely follows the Russian text. What you just told us now means exactly the same in Russian.
ROSENBERG: According to the German translated into Russian it must have been that. I can recognize only the German text, not the Russian translation, which is not in accord with this meaning. You interpret this text as though I were trying to carry on espionage work. I asked Admiral Canaris, since I could not carry on political negotiations with representatives of the Eastern people, simply to tell me from his personal knowledge, apart from his official capacity, what people of the Eastern regions, under certain circumstances, might later work in the civilian administration for me. That is the meaning. The translation is, therefore, not entirely correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well; but you confirm the German text?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: It means you were connected with counterespionage?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I only received Admiral Canaris and told him that, in his official capacity in which he had to function, he should not deal with political negotiations and plans, because I was now being given that task.
GEN. RUDENKO: You heard the admonition of the President of the Tribunal about answering briefly, and I beg you to do so.
ROSENBERG: I would answer more briefly if the questions were put to me factually.
GEN. RUDENKO: I will put to you several questions concerning the aims of the war against the Soviet Union. Do you admit that Nazi Germany, having prepared and pursued war against the Soviet Union, aimed at plundering the economic riches of the Soviet Union, the extermination of her people, the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or not?
ROSENBERG: Five questions are being put to me again, and if...
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you please answer briefly: Do you admit the aims of the aggression as I have put them to you? You will be able to give your explanation later.
THE PRESIDENT: You can answer that question “yes” or “no.”
ROSENBERG: I must answer “no” to all four questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: You deny it. All right. Let us turn to a new document in this connection. I mean the Document 2718-PS, which is in the minutes of the morning session of 10 December 1945. That is your memorandum dated 2 May 1941. [The document was handed to the defendant.] Will you please follow? This document reads as follows:
“1) The war can be continued only if all the Armed Forces are fed with stocks from Russia in the third year of the war.
“2) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will die of starvation if we take out of this country everything that we need.”
I ask you now, did you write that?
ROSENBERG: I neither wrote that nor did I participate in this session, and I cannot determine whether any one of my collaborators knew anything at all about this meeting. It says here, “Senior officers only, two copies, one for the files (I-a) and the second General Limbert.” Therefore, only two people in the Armed Forces knew about this.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into that in detail, Defendant. You do not know about this?
ROSENBERG: This document has been submitted twice already.
GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on to the next one.
THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew of this document.
ROSENBERG: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: We come to the next document, which determines the aims of the war. This is your instruction to the Reich Commissioner for the Baltic countries and for Bielorussia. You stated the following—I mean now the Document 1029-PS; the part which I will read is marked in the margin:
“The aim of a Reich Commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bielorussia must be to strive for the creation of a German protectorate, with a view to transforming these regions later into a part of Greater Germany by the Germanization of racially admissible elements, the colonization of Germanic peoples, and the resettlement of undesirable elements.”
Do you remember these instructions? Please reply first.
ROSENBERG: Yes, I am familiar with this document. I already remarked yesterday that at the beginning all sorts of drafts were made in my office which were not approved by me. The corrections were made by me.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you very clearly, do you know these instructions or not?
ROSENBERG: But I still heard the wrong translation. Nothing is mentioned about “destruction,” but “incorporation,” and the Russian translation again said “destruction.” If it is translated that way, then my question appears in the Russian language as an approval of destruction; and that is a wrong translation which is being made here, which I can follow only because I speak Russian.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you can be heard perfectly well without shouting.
ROSENBERG: I beg your pardon.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are only correcting an error in the translation. Now as regards the rest—Germanization and colonization—is that right? Does that sound right in German? Answer me. Is that right or not?
ROSENBERG: Even in that way it is not translated quite correctly. Here it says “colonization of German peoples,” and now you are translating “Germanization and colonization.” These are two substantives which again give correspondingly different sense, and I would like to add that these drafts made by a collaborator of mine were not actually issued, and that they in no way constitute instructions.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you, was it issued or not; but I ask you was there such a draft? Will you deny that?
ROSENBERG: I am not disputing that such a draft was submitted to my office.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We pass on.
These instructions concern the aims of the war. They are instructions for all Reich Commissioners of the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 8 May 1941. This is Document 1030-PS. I will read only a short excerpt, which states—I quote from Page 4. This excerpt is marked in the margin. In these instructions you state that this coming struggle would be a struggle for the supplying of Germany and all of Europe with raw materials and foodstuffs. Do you confirm this?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then you confirm that.
ROSENBERG: Yes, of course. This document was presented in my office as a draft. That is correct, and I am not disputing it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into details again. I will remind you once more, please reply briefly. You confirmed this point, and that is enough.
ROSENBERG: This document, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. This statement was made by you previous to the attack on the Soviet Union. I will remind you, but I will not submit the document to you since it has already been presented to the Tribunal several times and is at the disposal of the Tribunal. I mean a conference which took place in Hitler’s office on 16 July 1941.
[Turning to the Tribunal.] This is Document L-221, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] You were present at this conference, were you?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Hitler said then that the Baltic States would have to become an integral part of the Reich, and the same applied to the Crimea with adjacent territories as well as to the Volga districts and also the Baku area. Do you recall these statements of Hitler?
ROSENBERG: I have seen this document, purporting to be Bormann’s observations, here for the first time. At that time the Führer made very long, passionate statements. I did not take any exact notes at that conference, but he did in fact speak about the Crimea, and he said that, because of the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, no bearers of arms should be allowed there later and...
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask why. I ask you: did he say that?
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you are going too fast. You must wait until the man is finished.
GEN. RUDENKO: He is going into too many details, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, you admit the Crimea. You agreed with Hitler’s idea concerning the seizure of these territories?
ROSENBERG: You can see from the document and you can see from my speech how I pictured the self-determination of all the peoples in the East in a new order of states; and I controverted the declarations of the Führer. That can be seen here. That was how I argued.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you about that. I am asking you whether you agreed with these ideas of Hitler, or whether you objected to them.
ROSENBERG: Yes, it can be proved that I protested, and it is even shown in the record.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are not concerned with whether or not it can be proved. The question is: did you agree or not. You can answer that, I suppose. Did you agree, or did you not agree?
ROSENBERG: I agreed with many points and rejected other points; but this is a compilation of at least 10 to 15 points.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is an answer.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We will return to this question in a few minutes.
I am now passing on to your own directives, which you issued as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. These documents were already presented to the Tribunal as 1056-PS and EC-347. First of all, I would like to ask you one question: What is this “Brown Folder”?
ROSENBERG: The Brown Folder was compiled by the administrative department of the Eastern Ministry in response to certain requests of industry, of my political department, of the personnel department, and of the technical supply department for officials in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine. Thus it was the first attempt at a general regulation.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, then that is a sort of “Green Folder.” It is quite clear.
Now, let us turn to your directives, Document EC-347. We will show you this document right away. Will you note the passage which has been underlined, on Page 39 of the document, if I am not mistaken. I will read this paragraph:
“The first task of the civilian administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories is to represent the interests of the Reich.”
I omit a few lines.
“The stipulations of the Hague Convention regarding land warfare, which deal with the administration of territories occupied by a foreign power, do not apply, since the U.S.S.R. can be considered as nonexistent....”
Then further:
“Therefore, all measures which the German administration deems necessary or suitable in order to carry out this extensive task are admissible.”
Do you agree that this exposes your secret designs, although you somehow too hastily proclaimed the Soviet Union as destroyed?
ROSENBERG: In the Russian translation I again heard the word “plundering,” but the word “plundering” does not appear in this German text. If the German text is translated in such a way that the word “plundering” appears everywhere, although in the German...
GEN. RUDENKO: I interrupt you and say that the word “plundering” is not in the Russian text, which I just read into the record; so I believe you are simply inventing, or at least you did not hear rightly.
ROSENBERG: May I say a few words in this connection?
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you, did you write this?
ROSENBERG: I did not, in fact, write it, but it was a circular letter which was issued by the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories, and, therefore, I am officially responsible for this Brown Folder. But I would like to say a few words of explanation in regard to this—the explanation about the status of international law in the East I received from the Führer’s headquarters. It stated that, in accordance with the attitude of the Soviet Union toward certain conventions, as far as the Hague Convention was concerned, it did not apply to the Soviet Union in this instance. Furthermore, as this document contains many pages, I was not able to read it in its entirety at the time; but on the second page I have already found a paragraph which shows very obviously what lines the wording followed. It states as follows...
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, one minute, please.
ROSENBERG: But I must be allowed to read from the document.
THE PRESIDENT: We must try and conduct this cross-examination in an orderly fashion. Now, what is the question?
[Turning to General Rudenko.] What is your question?
GEN. RUDENKO: I put to him the question, whether he admitted that he knew of the tasks put before the civilian administration in the occupied territories as they are set forth in the quotation which I just read. He said that he did know. I have exhausted my questions in this particular sphere. The document is in possession of the Defense and the Defense will be able to quote other parts of this document which have not yet been read into the record. This is a very long document. If I had tried to quote it to the Tribunal in its entirety it would have taken too much time.
THE PRESIDENT: [To the defendant.] You answered the question. I understood what the question was, and that you were told that the Hague Convention did not apply to Russia.
ROSENBERG: Yes. May I quote this one paragraph on Page 40, the next to the last paragraph:
“The most important prerequisite for this”—that is, for the development of the East—“is the treatment of the country and of the people in a corresponding manner. The war against the Soviet Union is—with all necessary regard to the securing of foodstuffs—a political campaign with the establishment of lasting order as its objective. The conquered territory as a whole is, therefore, not to be considered an object of exploitation, even if the German food and war economy must lay claim to considerable areas on a large scale.”
And I believe I may say that the fact that the necessities of the inhabitants are taken into consideration cannot be expressed more clearly.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I will put to you a few more questions as to how you treated the population, although we have heard quite a lot about this treatment, as you have too. We pass on.
I asked you about the Crimea and you said, “Yes, Hitler proposed to annex the Crimea to Germany.” Do you remember that you did not only approve of these plans, but you also invented new names for towns—for instance, Simferopol was to be called “Gotenburg” and Sevastopol was to become “Theodorichshafen.” Do you remember that?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct. The Führer told me that I should think of a change of names for these cities. The renaming of very many other cities was discussed, too.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, of course.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I am expected to conclude my entire presentation of evidence with respect to Rosenberg by 4 o’clock. I do not know how I can do that.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not laid that down as a condition. I did not make any order about it. I said only that the Tribunal hoped, and the “hope” was addressed more to the Prosecution than it was to the Defense.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, if I may be permitted to say so, the Soviet Prosecutor has submitted documents again which I already submitted yesterday, and on which the defendant has already given answers. I am referring to Documents 1029-PS and 1030-PS. The defendant himself already said...
THE PRESIDENT: You are wasting the time of the Court by making this entire interposition.
GEN. RUDENKO: Thus you admit the change of the names of Simferopol and Sevastopol.
Next question: You also worked on the reorganization of the Caucasus, and you had organized a special staff. Will you answer “yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Furthermore, you favored Prince Bagration-Mukhransky, an adventurer from the emigré circle, as candidate for the throne of Georgia. Is that true? Answer briefly.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is true. We did mention that—we spoke about him—but we turned down such a candidacy.
GEN. RUDENKO: He was turned down. Is that so? Very well.
As regards the reorganization of the Caucasus, on 27 July 1942 you compiled a special report; is that true?
ROSENBERG; It may be that a report was made. Yes—yes, naturally, it is quite a lengthy report. It has been submitted here.
GEN. RUDENKO: And I will show you this report in order to draw your attention to one short quotation.
[Turning to the President.] I have in mind, Mr. President, a document which has already been submitted as Exhibit USSR-58.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, please pay attention to Page 7, a passage which is marked, which says first that the German Reich must seize all the oil. Have you found this passage?
ROSENBERG: On Page 7 of the text I find the passage—yes, I have found it.
GEN. RUDENKO: The text reads:
“From the economic point of view the German Reich must take control of the total oil supply. The necessary participation in the riches could be discussed in the future.”
Do you confirm that this statement was made by you?
ROSENBERG: This document is a memorandum of my office, and I confirm that it is true.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.
ROSENBERG: May I make a remark in addition? Here we are not talking about the oppression of a people but of an assurance of autonomy and of every possible mitigation for these people. Only I cannot locate that at once from a document which has 14 pages if I only read one sentence.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have just questioned you concerning the tasks of the German Reich with regard to this matter of oil. Now if you look at Page 14 of this same report you will find it at the very end—this is how you define the tasks:
“The problem of the Eastern territories consists of a transference of peoples from a Baltic to a German field of culture and the preparation for the military frontiers of Germany on a vast scale. The task of the Ukraine is to provide Germany and Europe with foodstuffs and the continent with raw materials. The task in the Caucasus is, above all, of a political nature and represents the decisive extension of continental Europe, under German direction, from the Caucasian isthmus to the Near East.”
Did you read this passage?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these were the actual plans?
ROSENBERG: I affirm that this is set down correctly, and that it is in accord with our hope that eastern continental Europe might, some time, be incorporated into the total economic system and economic supply of the rest of the continent, as had been the case before 1914; for at that time the Ukraine was an important country of exports of raw materials and foodstuffs.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, your plan concerning the Ukraine is well known. In this connection I will put the last question concerning aggression. After having seen these documents, which you do not deny, do you admit the aggressive and plundering character of Germany’s war against the Soviet Union and your personal responsibility for the planning and carrying out of this aggression? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or do you not?
ROSENBERG: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: No? Very well.
ROSENBERG: No, because I did not consider this a war of aggression on our part but just the opposite.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course; but we will not go into details.
I have a few more questions to put to you concerning the German administration and the German policy in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
Who was the highest official in the civil administration in the Reich Commission?
ROSENBERG: The Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories was responsible for the administration and legislation in the Eastern Territories, and the Reich Commissioner, for the territorial governments.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal have already heard all about the administration—the former administration—and personnel of the administration.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I have only two or three more questions in this particular sphere.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did the Reich Commissioner have the authority to issue orders for the arrest and execution of hostages?
ROSENBERG: At this moment I cannot recall whether he had such authority by law, or whether that came under direct police jurisdiction. I cannot answer this question with assurance, for at the moment I do not recall a decree to that effect, but it is not entirely impossible; I do not know.
GEN. RUDENKO: It was possible? Very well.
I would like to remind you that you foresaw in your directive this authority of the commissioners to shoot hostages. We will pass right on.
A lot has been said here about German policy in occupied territories. I will, therefore, put only a few questions to you.
First of all, as regards the Ukraine, you have here described the situation in such a light as to show that Koch was the sole person responsible, whereas you have always assented that, on the contrary, you were the benefactor of the Ukrainian people.
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; I never said that I was a benefactor.
GEN. RUDENKO: In your document, which has been submitted by your defense counsel and which I will therefore not submit to you, Document Rosenberg-19, Riecke wrote, in a letter to all Reichsleiter of the press in November 1942:
“Koch has declared ‘that the Ukraine is for us only an object of exploitation, and that it must pay the expenses of the war, and that in a certain way the population must, as a second-rate people, be utilized for the tasks of the war, even if they have to be caught with a lasso.’ ”
This was the policy of Koch in the Ukraine. This document was submitted by your counsel. I will ask you now: Did you write to Koch on 14 December?
ROSENBERG: May I reply to that? I do not have the verbatim document in front of me. I only know that it was a letter written by Riecke to me with the big complaint which so many others had also had, and that he requested me...
GEN. RUDENKO: Koch?
ROSENBERG: Yes—to complain, and that he used rather drastic language, and that we both strove to reach orderly methods of work here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have been all over this matter of Koch as to the Ukraine today, and so it is not helping the Tribunal to go over it again.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Yesterday you stated here repeatedly in your explanations as regards the atrocities and extermination of the Soviet population that you were not informed, and that these were police measures. Did I understand you correctly?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not exactly true. I was informed of many combats with partisans and of bands and, as I have stated, of some shootings; and also I was told about the fact that German agricultural leaders, German officials and policemen, and peaceful Soviet farmers were attacked by these partisans and bands and were murdered by thousands.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We know that the partisans who fought against the enemies of their country were called bandits by you and treated accordingly. I do not argue that. But I am speaking of the extermination of the civilian population, of old men, women, and children. Did you have knowledge of this?
ROSENBERG: In these combats we tried especially to protect the farming population and others too; and when we heard about what appeared to us to be excessive measures by the Police, we put the most severe demands to them that even in the full heat of battle these matters were to be considered; and the Police told us that it was easy to make those demands from behind a desk, but, if in White Ruthenia the partisans murder and burn 500 White Ruthenian burgomasters with their families in their houses and we are shot at from the rear, then terrible conflicts must follow.
GEN. RUDENKO: I will remind you that, in your directive concerning occupied territories and organization of administration and the primary task for administration, you personally planned the police measures as your first task. Do you deny this now? I ask you, do you deny this now?
ROSENBERG: If it is Document 1056-PS, I proposed seven urgent measures. I cannot tell you at the moment which is the first one here. I ask that you submit this document to me.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I will ask that one paragraph of this document be shown to you, “Police measures,” which is in the very first place.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this document been put to him?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the use of going into it again?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, Defendant Rosenberg asked for it. I would like to say simply that the defendant tried to make me believe that he was not informed and that these were purely police measures. I am going to prove that he put as his primary task the carrying out of these police measures.
ROSENBERG: It goes without saying that in an occupied territory in the middle of such a war the Police are responsible for police protection measures. And the third point is “the supply of the population with foodstuffs in order to avoid famine.” I repeat, “supply of the population in order to avoid famine.”
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Very well. We heard about this in detail yesterday. I have a few last questions to put to you. First of all, I would like to ask you about the Zuman incident. The document has already been submitted to the Tribunal, but I consider it my duty as a representative of the Soviet Union to put to you this question concerning the shooting of Soviet citizens for the sole purpose of obtaining a stretch of land needed as a hunting ground. You remember this document?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I gave an extensive explanation on it yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, this has been gone into before before the Tribunal. Why should the Tribunal’s time be taken up by going over and over again on the same grounds? We have said that we would not have things done cumulatively.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, a few details of this question are of great importance, and the defendant did not explain them; therefore, I would like very much to ask this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: First of all, the Tribunal will rise tomorrow afternoon at half past 4.
Now, as to this question, the Tribunal think that the matter has been sufficiently gone into; but, if there is a particular point which has not been dealt with before, a question may be asked in that connection.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, on 2 April 1943, you addressed a letter to Himmler regarding this incident regarding the shooting of hundreds of Soviet citizens in the region of Zuman, because this place was needed as a hunting ground. Did you not address such a letter to Himmler? Until June 1943, furthermore, you were interested in receiving a reply. What were the results of this letter?
ROSENBERG: First, I wrote to the Chief of the German Police; and I had to wait for what he, as the official responsible for the measures of security in the Ukraine, might cause to be done. When I did not receive any further information, I brought this case as a personal complaint before the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: When did you report it to Hitler?
ROSENBERG: This complaint to the Führer was dealt with in the middle of May 1943 and, since it was a rather lengthy complaint, probably reached him several weeks in advance, that is, 5 or 6 weeks elapsed between 2 April and the day it was dealt with, the middle or end of May. I believe that is a very short time for dealing with a complaint because: First it had to be investigated rather thoroughly by Lammers and Bormann; then it had to be reported to the Führer; the Führer then had to make his decision and give his directives; and then I was summoned.
GEN. RUDENKO: When was this complaint discussed for the last time?
ROSENBERG: In May—between the middle and the end of May 1943.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was it discussed in the presence of Koch?
ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that Koch presented a report to Hitler—a memorandum from the Forestry Office. Is that true?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, this memorandum confirmed that it was a fight against the partisans?
ROSENBERG: Not quite exactly like that, but it said that this forest district had to be utilized for the necessary supply of lumber for the Armed Forces or the Administration and that these needed forests harbored many restless partisans and guerrilla bands. Therefore there was great danger for the workers in these districts and it had come to shootings between them and partisans and guerrilla bands; and, since one could not watch over all of them, a transfer of certain groups from these forest districts into forest areas farther south took place. Koch added that then many of these people who had been transferred expressed their thanks for having received better land than they had had before. That was the information that Koch had given.
GEN. RUDENKO: They were grateful that one December night they were evicted from their houses and taken away hundreds of kilometers and hundreds of them shot. They appreciated that very much. I should like to ask you the following, however. In your letter to Himmler on 2 April 1943, you also attached a memorandum from the Forestry Office; and in this memorandum it is stated—I am going to read this passage—you should remember this incident—this terrible incident when men were shot because hunting ground was needed. In the memorandum of the Forestry Office it is stated, “There is no doubt that several villages located in the forest region of Zuman were evacuated principally in order to create a hunting area.” This is stated in the memorandum of the Forestry Office.
ROSENBERG: I only want to point out that we are dealing here with an assistant of the Forestry Office in Berlin, who had added that on the basis of his reports. What Koch had produced was a report from the Chief of the Forest Administration in the Ukraine, himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. The last question in connection with this incident: Did you believe Koch when he stated that?
ROSENBERG: If I am asked on my conscience, that is hard to answer; but there was a...
GEN. RUDENKO: It is exactly on your conscience, if you like.
ROSENBERG: A description of actual conditions by the Forestry Administration was included, and I could not protest against such a presentation since it appeared well-founded, and I had to admit to myself that I had made a mistake in protesting.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not protest against that, I quite understand. I shall finish by just reminding you of one quotation from your letter:
“Hundreds of people in and around Zuman were shot by using a whole police company ‘because they were communistically inclined.’ No Ukrainian believes that. The Germans are also astonished by this argument; because, if this was done for the safety of the country, then the communist-infected elements in other regions should have been executed at the same time.”
I have here to put to you the last question. Here in the Tribunal yesterday you declared several times that you wanted to resign from your post. Moreover, you spoke about your letter to Hitler, dated 12 October 1944, where you asked for directives for the future. Regarding this my colleague, Mr. Dodd, has already reminded you that at that date, 12 October 1944, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories no longer had any territories, because the Germans were out of Russia by that time. I would like to ask you the following question: How could you ask to be relieved of your post, you, who for years had dreamed about getting this position of Reich Minister and even becoming a member of the Secret Cabinet? You asked Hitler to grant you this position of Reich Minister. Do you remember that?
ROSENBERG: In the first place I was never a member of the so-called Secret Cabinet. That is not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I shall correct myself. You dreamed of becoming a member of the Secret Reich Cabinet.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: And also dreamed of becoming Reich Minister; is that also true?
ROSENBERG: When the question as to my task became acute, there was a long discussion one way and another about the form of that task. Dr. Lammers, commissioned by the Führer, told me that the Führer intended either to appoint a Reich inspector because he wanted both Reich Commissioners to...
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, please. So that we shall not linger too long on that question, I am going to submit to the Tribunal a document: This is your personal letter—the last document...
THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, I do not know what the question is, and you are interrupting the witness before he has answered any question.
GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. I have but one aim here, because I should also like to shorten my interrogation in accordance with the desire of the Tribunal. So I am going to submit the letter of Rosenberg of 6 February 1938, addressed to Hitler, wherein he requests the post of Reich Minister from Hitler. That is a short letter. I ask permission to submit this document as Document USSR-117.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, I am going to read this document into the record. It is not very long:
“6 February 1938. My Führer, because I was unable...”
THE PRESIDENT: The document is translated into German, is it not?
GEN. RUDENKO: The original is in German.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in German to start with. It is not necessary to read it all; you can put it in like other documents.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.
[Turning to the defendant.] In this letter you expressed your resentment in connection with the appointment of the Defendant Ribbentrop as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You thought that the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Hitler Cabinet could have been filled by yourself, Defendant Rosenberg; is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, and I do not find it so extraordinary that I should not have expressed my wish to be used in the State service of the German Reich after so many years of activity.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You speak in this letter of the existence of a secret cabinet; is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Well, may I read through this letter a little? Because I cannot answer fragmentary questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, yes. [Handing the document to the defendant.] Please read it through.
ROSENBERG: Yes, I have read this.
GEN. RUDENKO: Everything that is contained in it is correct?
ROSENBERG: Certainly, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is your own letter?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You asked to be appointed into this secret Reich Cabinet?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You asked for the position of Reich Minister?
ROSENBERG: I reported that I had spoken to Party Member Göring about the question of this appointment; and since the Führer had charged me with the ideological education of the Party and since the foreign political office of the Party still existed and the impression might thereby arise in the Party that I had somehow been refused by the Führer, I therefore asked the Führer to receive me personally to discuss this matter. I think it quite understandable that I should express the wish to speak about a matter which was important to me personally.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore—here is my last question—you were the closest collaborator of Hitler in carrying out all his plans and his ideas?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; that is absolutely wrong.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, let us consider it as a reply to my question. I have finished, Mr. President.
M. HENRI MONNERAY (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): I have only a few questions to ask the defendant.
[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, is it correct that the deportation and the execution of the Jews in France put your organization in a position to seize furniture and valuables which belonged to these Jews?
ROSENBERG: It is quite true that I received a governmental order to confiscate archives, works of art, and later, household goods of Jewish citizens in France.
M. MONNERAY: The mass deportation of Jews could only increase the profits of your confiscation and seizures; is that not so?
ROSENBERG: No. The deportation of Jews has nothing to do with that. The suggestion for these measures was given only when I was informed that the Jewish people in question no longer inhabited their institutions, castles, and apartments—that they had left Paris and other places and had not returned.
M. MONNERAY: Once the Jews were deported they were absent; is that not true?
ROSENBERG: When the German troops marched in, Paris was almost entirely depopulated. The rest of the Parisians and inhabitants of cities in the north of France returned in the course of time; but, as I have been informed, the Jewish population did not return to these cities—particularly not to Paris. Therefore they had not been deported, but they had fled. I believe the number of those who had fled was given as 5, 6, or 7 millions or more.
M. MONNERAY: Do you mean to say by that, Defendant Rosenberg, that in the time that followed, when new deportation measures were carried out in the course of the German occupation of France, the apartments and homes of people deported were not seized by your organization?
ROSENBERG: No, I cannot express it that way. It may very well be that the apartments of Jewish persons who had been arrested had also been confiscated under certain circumstances, but I cannot give any exact information about that.
M. MONNERAY: One can, therefore, say that the deportation measures gave to your organization a greater chance of success in seizures and confiscations; is that not true?
ROSENBERG: No, that does not agree with the facts; but, as may be seen from the report which the French Prosecution made here, what actually happened was that confiscated apartments generally were sealed by the Police. Two months were allowed to elapse to see whether or not the owners of these apartments would return, and only after the fact had been established that this was not the case were the household goods transferred to Germany for those whose homes had been damaged by bombs. That can be seen from the report which the French Prosecution has submitted here.
M. MONNERAY: I suppose that there are very few cases—and I am sure you would agree with me on this—of people who had been deported returning after two months?
ROSENBERG: On the contrary! I was informed about such cases. Even in Document 001-PS, regrettable as it is from the humane point of view, it is clearly stated that we had heard that a large number of Jewish personalities, who had been formerly arrested, had been released again.
M. MONNERAY: You remember, certainly, the memorandum which you sent to Hitler on 3 October 1942, which has already been presented to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-1327. In that document you remind Hitler of your jurisdiction and your powers; and you say that it is a matter for you, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, to seize the homes of Jews who had taken flight, who were absent, or who were called upon to leave. I can submit this document to you in order to refresh your memory if necessary.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
The first lines of that document are the ones I am referring to. I emphasize the words “the Jews who were called upon to leave later.” It is a document of 3 October 1942, which has already been submitted.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct—that is according to the facts. And as I have already said before, it is possible that a number of apartments of arrested people—other people who were absent—were included in that; but as I said before, in the other report there was more detailed information. But this document as such corresponds to the facts; it is a letter from me.
M. MONNERAY: The consequence of this act was that you were entrusted not only with the seizure of apartments which you found vacant at the time of the arrival of the Germans in Paris but also of apartments of people who were, as you say, “called upon to leave” in the following period.
You surely know, Defendant Rosenberg, under what conditions, in territories occupied by the Germans in the West as well as in the East, Jews were called upon to leave—namely, in special trains which generally led directly to concentration camps?
ROSENBERG: No, I did not know about those trains. We definitely dealt with deserted apartments, and I was probably informed that eventually also the apartments of people who had been arrested, people who were still living, or had long since fled would be taken into consideration. Nothing more is stated here, and I could not give you any further information. As to the reports which have been submitted here at the Trial, I have seen them here for the first time. I can only tell you that in the end I was informed that, before the conquest of Paris by Allied troops, all available furniture and household equipment was turned over to the French Red Cross.
M. MONNERAY: Do you agree with me on the following point: That your organization had the right to seize valuables and apartments which had become vacant after the arrival of the German troops in Paris? Do you agree with me on that point?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
M. MONNERAY: Defendant, you have just said that you had no knowledge whatsoever of the deportations in special trains to special destinations. Do you know—and I suppose you do know it since the document to which I am referring has already been produced before the Tribunal—that in Paris every Tuesday since 1941 and until the end of the German occupation conferences called “Tuesday meetings” brought together the representatives of the various German organizations in Paris—that is to say, the experts in Jewish affairs in the different German administrative organs—to be exact, a representative of the German Military Command, a representative of the Civilian Administration, a representative of the Police Department, and a representative of the Economics Department? At these meetings there was also present a representative of the German Embassy in Paris and also a representative of your Special Staff.
I am referring to Document Number RF-1210, which is a report of Dannecker of 22 February 1942. He was the responsible chief and the main expert on anti-Jewish terrorist action in Paris during the occupation. If you wish, I will submit that document to you.
ROSENBERG: I remember these declarations made during the Trial very well, but I have never received a report about these Tuesday conferences which took place regularly. The fact that my deputy for the furniture action had to maintain closest liaison with the Police was a matter of course, since the confiscations of such articles could not be carried out by my office, that being an exclusive right of the Police. Therefore, one had to speak to the Police about these matters. It was not reported to me that there were regular Tuesday conferences. I believe that if such a report had been consistently turned in it would have been submitted to me.
M. MONNERAY: You agree, however, that these Tuesday meetings were extremely useful to the interests of your organization. As a matter of fact, the various collective actions which were taken against the Jews—that is to say, arrests, police raids, and deportations—were discussed in those meetings. Did it not, therefore, seem completely logical and natural for your organization to be regularly informed of these actions in order that it might take the resulting economic steps—namely, seizures of property?
ROSENBERG: In my opinion that is not logical at all, because if that certain Chief of Police sent secret transports of that kind into these camps, as has been revealed here, then it does not follow that he would report about that every Tuesday to the other gentlemen. Neither do I believe that this Chief of Police informed the representative of the Foreign Office about these things in detail.
M. MONNERAY: You are perhaps badly informed on this point, but I would like to read again the concluding passage of the report which says, “The conference had as a result an alignment of Jewish policy as complete as could be realized in the occupied territory...”
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has said, has he not, that he does not know anything about these Tuesday meetings—he received no reports of them?
M. MONNERAY: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then why are you asking about them?
M. MONNERAY: The agencies in Paris collaborated actively in the terrorist policy of the Police and benefited by it through the economic step which followed—namely, the seizure of valuables.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not been able to connect him with these reports—with the document. He has not signed the document. Nothing shows on the document that he received it—at least, I suppose not—or you would have put it to him. He says he did not know the document.
M. MONNERAY: Allow me, Mr. President, in that case to ask, whether he contests the reality of the evidence concerning the representation of his Paris organization at this meeting.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you deny its presence at this meeting?
ROSENBERG: I cannot give any information about that, because I have not received any report.
M. MONNERAY: I would like to conclude this cross-examination by reminding you of a document which has already been produced, quoted, and discussed—that is Document 001-PS. In that document the defendant proposes, in the first paragraph, the transport of all seized household goods to the East, and in Paragraph 2 he suggests to Hitler that French Jews instead of other Frenchmen should be shot as hostages.
Considering, as a result of the questions and answers, that the organization of the defendant could benefit by these measures of execution and deportation, it seems that the real motive of this document is very clear. It is necessary—is not that your opinion, Defendant—first to get rid of the people in order to be able afterwards to seize their property?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not true.
M. MONNERAY: I have no more questions to ask, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask anything of the witness, Dr. Thoma?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I quite briefly ask the defendant whether he wants me to ask him another question? I believe I shall have finished immediately.
ROSENBERG: No.
DR. THOMA: Thank you. The defendant does not want any more questions. Then, with the permission of the Court, I should like to call the witness Riecke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will he be long or not?
DR. THOMA: Half an hour at most.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Well then, the defendant may retire.
[The witness Riecke took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
HANS JOACHIM RIECKE (Witness): Hans Joachim Riecke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
Dr. Thoma, will you spell the name, please?
DR. THOMA: R-i-e-c-k-e.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, what position did you have in the Economic Staff East and in the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories?
RIECKE: I held both positions upon orders from Göring. I was in charge of the food and agriculture department.
DR. THOMA: What was the task of these offices?
RIECKE: The first main task of this office was the reconstruction of Russian agriculture; the second task was the utilization of the surplus areas in the south for the Armed Forces and for nutrition purposes.
DR. THOMA: What offices were established for administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories?
RIECKE: In addition to the Foreign Ministry there existed a number of special assignments: Göring for agriculture, Himmler for police, and Sauckel for the recruitment of manpower.
DR. THOMA: Who was in charge of agriculture?
RIECKE: Agriculture—and also the entire economy—was under Göring. He gave his instructions directly or through State Secretaries Körner and Backe.
DR. THOMA: Were the figures for delivery—the quota in agriculture—higher than those imposed under the Soviet administration?
RIECKE: The figures imposed for delivery were adjusted to the former Russian figures. During the first year the actual quantities delivered were lower than during the Russian era. In the next year, as far as crops were concerned, they were lower; as far as livestock was concerned, higher.
DR. THOMA: Were the actual deliveries according to Göring’s directives?
RIECKE: No, Göring had expected considerably higher figures.
DR. THOMA: Did Germany ship agricultural machinery—scythes and so on—into the Occupied Eastern Territories and in what quantities?
RIECKE: A large-scale program for agricultural machinery under the name of the Eastern Agricultural Program was set up in Germany whereby, with regard to war conditions, large amounts of agricultural machinery and equipment were shipped into the occupied Russian territories. The reason for that was the removal and large-scale destruction of agricultural machinery and equipment by the Russians during their retreat.
DR. THOMA: On 5 February 1942 an agricultural decree was issued. What were the reasons for that?
RIECKE: The main purpose of that agricultural decree was to get the population to co-operate voluntarily. In the beginning it was intended to maintain the collective economy. That proved to be impossible, because—as has been mentioned—part of the heavy machinery, especially tractors, was no longer available. On the other hand, it was not possible to resort to individual farming, as some of the population wished, because smaller equipment was also lacking. Therefore a compromise solution was reached by so-called agricultural co-operatives whereby the Russian peasants got a share of the land to work, but a part of the work was still carried on collectively.
DR. THOMA: What was the result?
RIECKE: The result of the agricultural decree was generally favorable. The extent and quantity of the tillage increased. A particularly good example of the results was the conditions in the so-called Kharkov Basin, where in the spring of 1942 the farms which had been converted to agricultural co-operatives had already achieved more than 70 percent of the spring tillage, whereas the unconverted collective farms had achieved only about 30 percent.
DR. THOMA: On 3 June 1943 the so-called private property declaration was issued. What were the principles involved?
RIECKE: The basic purpose of the private property declaration was to turn over to the Russian peasants as personal property the shares of land which had been allotted to them by the agricultural decree.
DR. THOMA: How was the vegetable supply of large cities handled—for example, in the Ukraine?
RIECKE: Around the large cities considerable lands for garden plots were allotted to the working population.
DR. THOMA: Now some questions about Latvia. Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?
RIECKE: No; on the contrary. The nationalization measures taken by the Russians during the occupation were discontinued. The land which had been separated from the farms for purposes of settlement was returned to the former owners. To say it in one sentence: The conditions existing before the Russian occupation were re-established.
COL. POKROVSKY: I beg to be excused, but I cannot understand—with the best of wishes—what all these questions, even in the remotest way, have to do with the case of the Defendant Rosenberg. It seems to me that further questions of the defense counsel, if they are along these same lines, should not be allowed.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you ought to show that what the witness is testifying about is connected in some way with the Defendant Rosenberg.
DR. THOMA: With this question I want, first, to refute the Soviet assertion that after the occupation the Barons had their land returned to them—I refer to the Soviet Prosecution’s document, Document Number USSR-395, which I submitted to the Tribunal yesterday. Secondly, I want to prove with it that that area was supposed to be administered in an orderly way and in such a manner that the population co-operated voluntarily. Thirdly, I want to prove that during the entire German occupation not one Ukrainian nor one citizen of the Soviet Union starved, because the agricultural work was conducted accordingly. But I can demonstrate this proof only through statements of an expert. I believe that I have only a few more questions, and then I shall have finished with this subject of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?
RIECKE: I have answered that question already. On the contrary, socialization was revoked, and the land separated for settlement purposes was returned to the Latvian peasants. In a word, conditions as existing before the Russian occupation were re-established.
DR. THOMA: Were former large German estates reinstated?
RIECKE: No. On the contrary, Latvian peasants’ property—which after 1919 had been created at the expense of large German estates—was left in their hands. It remained their property.
DR. THOMA: What were the ideas behind the so-called reprivatization?
RIECKE: Reprivatization was intended to give the Latvian peasants the feeling of security derived from working their own property.
DR. THOMA: Did this law also apply to Estonia and Lithuania?
RIECKE: The law applied in a similar manner also to Estonia and Lithuania.
DR. THOMA: Do you know about a statement of Darré’s to the effect that the local small farmers should be removed from their property and be proletarianized?
RIECKE: I do not remember any such statement.
DR. THOMA: Do you know about the Society for the Administration of the Eastern Territory?
RIECKE: There were two societies by that name. I assume that the one you are referring to was the one founded in order to take care of the state-owned property and the plants which were shown to have been formed during the Russian occupation in the Baltic provinces, and which were still left after the return to private ownership. In the former Russian territories of the so-called Reich Commission, the MTS organization also took care of these areas.
DR. THOMA: What was the attitude of Rosenberg toward the various measures, such as labor recruitment, delivery of foodstuffs, et cetera?
RIECKE: Rosenberg could not escape the orders given by the Führer. Yet he always advocated that these measures be carried out without coercion against the population, and that they be co-ordinated with each other.
DR. THOMA: Who took care of the Eastern Workers in the Reich?
RIECKE: To my knowledge the Labor Administration, through its labor offices.
DR. THOMA: How were the Eastern Workers quartered in the country in the Reich? Do you know anything about it?
RIECKE: The provisioning and quartering of the Eastern Workers in the country in the Reich were quite satisfactory on the whole. I received reports directly by way of the offices of the Reich Food Estate.
DR. THOMA: Can you tell us something about Rosenberg’s general attitude toward the Eastern people?
RIECKE: As I have said before, Rosenberg personally wanted to get the Eastern people to co-operate. This was true especially in the matter of cultivating and maintaining their cultural life. For instance, Rosenberg, as far as I know, always intervened for the re-opening of the colleges and special schools.
DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg have any restrictions in this sphere? Did he have to oppose other points of view to attain this goal?
RIECKE: Strong forces were at work counteracting Rosenberg’s efforts; and especially in the Führer’s headquarters there were Bormann and Himmler, whose opinions were strongly supported by Reich Commissioner Koch, and who in turn was supported by Bormann and Himmler in his work. That led to the fact that a large proportion of the measures which Rosenberg had planned, especially in the Ukraine, were sabotaged by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Now one last question: What do you know about the concentration camps and about the treatment of the inmates in protective custody?
RIECKE: I, of course, knew of the existence of concentration camps but not their number and what happened in them. During the years of 1933 and 1934 various representations were made about individual cases of maltreatment. Later, persons who visited concentration camps turned in definite, positive reports. In the last days of April of last year, near Berlin, I met inmates of concentration camps being marched to the rear. Conditions were so terrible that I immediately saw Himmler and asked him not to let these people go on marching but to turn them over to the enemy. That discussion took place in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel. Himmler unfortunately gave only an evasive answer.
DR. THOMA: There is one more question that just came to my mind. In addition to providing food for the Armed Forces, were measures taken in the Occupied Eastern Territories to get foodstuffs for the German people?
RIECKE: About two-thirds of the supplies of foodstuffs from the Occupied Eastern Territories went directly to the Armed Forces. The remaining third was shipped to Germany, and we always considered it as compensatory for the feeding of the foreign workers, whose number was increasing continuously.
DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture; is that correct?
RIECKE: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Chief of the Main Department for Food and Agriculture in the Government General was frequently in Berlin in order to try to fix quotas there which would be bearable to the population?
RIECKE: As I recall, he several times expressed that opinion during the regular negotiations which took place with the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: According to your own observations, what was the food situation of the population of the Government General?
RIECKE: According to my own observations and the reports which I received, the rations which had been fixed were far lower than in the Reich, but considerable compensation was achieved through both the black market and the open market.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that every effort was made by the administration of the Government General to increase agricultural production?
RIECKE: Considerable efforts were made by the Government General to promote agriculture; and one can even say that the entire remaining industry, insofar as it was not used for armament, worked exclusively for the production of food. Furthermore, fertilizer was shipped from the Reich, although only in limited quantities, as well as machinery and equipment, in accordance with the program for the Eastern territory.
DR. SEIDL: What percentage of the total German food supply did the occupied countries deliver?
RIECKE: According to the calculations which were made independently by our Ministry, the deliveries from occupied territories in 1942 and 1943 amounted to about 15 percent of the total food supply of Germany, during the other years around 10 percent, usually less.
DR. SEIDL: Now one last question: The Soviet Prosecution have submitted a document, Document USSR-170. It deals with a meeting of the chiefs of the German offices in the occupied territories which took place on 6 August 1942 under the chairmanship of the Reich Marshal. I will have this document handed to you, and I want you to tell me whether the description given in that document correctly characterizes the relations between Germany and the occupied territories. You were present at that meeting yourself.
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
RIECKE: The document represents the minutes of the meeting in which I took part. First, I have to say that the document—that is to say, the minutes—principally contains the speech of the Reich Marshal, and does not indicate the actual relations between Germany and the occupied territories with regard to the food situation. The demands which Göring made in this meeting were so high that they could not even be taken seriously. It was also clear to us, engaged in the food sector, that in the long run we could never achieve anything by force. The additional demands which Göring made in that meeting were actually never fulfilled. I do not think that Göring himself believed that these quotas could be fulfilled. As far as I know, Göring’s additional demands were never submitted at all to France; Belgium in spite of a prohibition received grain; and Czechoslovakia got fats in spite of another prohibition.
On the day before that meeting, there had been a conference of the Gauleiter which—as well as I can remember—was dominated by the increasing air attacks in the West and the augmenting difficulties, especially for the population, resulting therefrom. The western Gauleiter were of the opinion that the food supply for Germany was becoming insufficient in view of the increasing burdens for the population, but that, on the other hand, a large part of the occupied territories was still enjoying a surplus. The Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture and the representatives of the occupied territories themselves were in a certain sense accused of not demanding and delivering enough from the occupied territories. Göring followed up these demands; and, due to his disposition and his temperament, this led to the strong exaggerations contained in the minutes and in this document.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, how were foreign workers fed in Germany?
RIECKE: All groups of foreign workers, with the exception of the Eastern Workers, received the same rations as the German population.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what about the supplies for the Eastern Workers?
RIECKE: For certain items the Eastern Workers received less than the others; and in the case of bread and potatoes, higher rations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the food supply such that the state of health of the workers was endangered?
RIECKE: That question cannot be answered in a clear-cut fashion. It must be considered in connection with the performance demanded of the workers. For normal work these rations should have been entirely sufficient.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel intervene especially for better nutrition of these workers?
RIECKE: As far as I know, Sauckel appealed several times to my minister on behalf of a better supply of food, whereupon Backe always answered with the counter demand that no additional workers should be brought to Germany. Backe repeatedly suggested that the number of workers be limited and that they be supplied with better food instead.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in your capacity as State Secretary for Agriculture, did you not also go to Holland at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945?
RIECKE: Yes; at that time I was in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: On that occasion, was it not the case there that the Wehrmacht offices and the Police raised serious complaints about sabotage of Dutch agriculture, particularly about the responsible government agencies in Holland?
RIECKE: I do not remember a conversation of that kind.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart intervened for the reduction of food exports from Holland to Germany?
RIECKE: Yes, on various occasions, and also in that meeting which this document describes.
DR. STEINBAUER: And also, in spite of complaints, that he left the Dutch officials in the Food Department?
RIECKE: Yes, that is the case.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is all.
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER: (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Mr. President, may I put several questions to the witness?
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, could you give me information about the following questions? Did the inmates of concentration camps who worked in the armament industry get the same supplementary rations for heavy and very heavy labor as the other workers?
RIECKE: During the time when I was charged with these problems, it was decided to give all prisoners, including concentration camp inmates, the same rations as the rest of the population, if they were working. Therefore, they should have received the same rations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was the Defendant Speer, or the Ministry under his direction, competent for the orderly maintenance of the rations in the plants insofar as the latter—the plants—were in charge of the food supply?
RIECKE: No, Speer’s Ministry was not competent in these matters. As far as delivery upon demand was concerned, the food offices were competent. The distribution of delivered foodstuffs in the plants, however, was the affair of the camp or plant administrations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And one further question: What measures had Speer taken in order to prevent a general food catastrophe which would have affected the millions of foreign workers in Germany in an equal manner?
RIECKE: Beginning in December 1944, Speer purposely subordinated armament tasks to the problem of nutrition with the idea in mind of a change-over to a new regime, a new administration, an occupying power. From this time on, Speer gave food transport priority over armament transport. He saw to it that seed for the spring tillage was distributed with the transportation means at his disposal. Speer emphatically advocated reconstructing food processing plants damaged by air attack even before armament plants. And above all, during that last phase, Speer helped us prevent the senseless destruction of food processing plants, against the instructions issued by Hitler. He did this with complete self-abnegation and without consideration for any possible consequences.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, did you participate in the Western campaign?
RIECKE: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?
RIECKE: As commander of a battalion in the field.
DR. LATERNSER: During the Western campaign, did you receive any dubious orders—I mean to say, orders which were in violation of international law?
RIECKE: I received no such orders.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you have any reason to believe, or did you establish, that looting was tolerated by higher military authorities?
RIECKE: No. On the contrary, looting was most severely punished.
DR. LATERNSER: Later you were also in the East, but—as I have heard not as a soldier. Could you look into the operational areas there, as well as the regions governed by the commissions?
RIECKE: Both were open to my observations.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the treatment of the local population by the German soldiers?
RIECKE: Taken as a whole it can be said that, especially in the Ukraine, the treatment of the civilian population in the army’s sector—in the operational area—was better than elsewhere; consideration was shown for the necessities of the civilian administrative sector.
DR. LATERNSER: And what do you think is the reason for that difference?
RIECKE: I attribute it to a different basic attitude of the soldier who was free of political tendencies and also to the fact that the troops, of course, wanted to have peace and quiet in the rear areas.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution want to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: I can be through in 2 minutes, if Your Honor please.
[Turning to the witness.] Were you a member of the Nazi Party?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: When did you join?
RIECKE: In 1925.
MR. DODD: 1925?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: You were also a member of the SA?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: What rank did you hold in the SA?
RIECKE: My last rank was Gruppenführer of the SA.
MR. DODD: Previously, you were an SA Sturmführer, were you not?
RIECKE: In 1930, yes.
MR. DODD: When did you become an SS Gruppenführer?
RIECKE: In October 1944.
MR. DODD: That is all. I have no other questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions to ask in re-examination?
DR. THOMA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that concludes your case in behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg, does it not?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like to state that the Document Rosenberg-19, which General Rudenko referred to, was not submitted to the Tribunal as an exhibit by me. Furthermore, I should like to inform the Tribunal that a number of affidavits, which have been approved, have not as yet been received.
THE PRESIDENT: You can mention them later, of course.
DR. THOMA: I should further like to make the request that my document book Number 1 be not accepted in evidence but considered the same as before, that is, as having general probative value according to the decision of 8 March 1946; therefore, not as evidence, not as a matter of proof, but just as argument. I assume that it had been approved in this sense previously, and that it was only rejected as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I anticipate that we shall not interfere in your argument.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to give an explanation—that is, about the fact that Document Rosenberg-19 represents a letter from Riecke addressed to Rosenberg, dated 12 March 1943. This document was submitted by the defendant’s counsel, Dr. Thoma. It is found in the Rosenberg Document Book Number 2, Page 42, and has been translated into all four languages. It is in the possession of all the prosecutors and is also in the document book which has been submitted to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has ruled to accept this document from the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, the position is this: That a document does not go into evidence unless it is offered in evidence. Dr. Thoma has not offered this document in evidence, and I understand that the Soviet Prosecution has not offered it in evidence. If you want to offer it in evidence, and the document is an authentic document—which I suppose it is—you can offer it in evidence.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We did not offer it as evidence, only because we thought that it was already contained in the document book presented by the Defense; and, therefore, we had no need to present it again. If the defendant’s counsel, Thoma, refuses to present it, then we shall do so.
THE PRESIDENT: You are wrong in assuming this. You see, documents do not go into evidence unless they are offered in evidence. The fact that they are in the books does not mean that they are in evidence; therefore, if you want to offer it in evidence, you must do so.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In that case, Mr. President, we are going to offer it in evidence now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you will give it a USSR number.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, we are going to give it a USSR exhibit number and, with your permission, will offer it in evidence tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, we will proceed to deal with the supplementary applications. The witness can retire.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application is that of Dr. Seidl’s with regard to two witnesses. First of all witness Hilger, who was previously granted as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop but withdrawn by counsel on the 2nd of April. I believe that the witness is in the United States and that there is a report that he is too ill to travel. But apart from this, My Lord, the purpose of the witness is to give evidence as to the discussions and treaty negotiations which took place in the Kremlin at Moscow before the German-Soviet agreement of the 23rd of August 1939; and the allegation states the conclusion of the alleged secret agreement dealt with in the affidavit of the witness Gaus.
My Lord, the other application is for a witness Von Weizsäcker, who is going to deal with the same point.
The Prosecution, of course, loyally accept the decision of the Tribunal on the admissibility of the Gaus affidavit, but they respectfully submit that that does not affect this point. What is desired is to call witnesses as to the course of the negotiations before these treaties—before an agreement was arrived at in respect to these treaties—and that is a point which we have had several times; and, of course, while all circumstances have a slight difference, the Tribunal have—as far as I know—ruled universally up to now that they will not go into antecedent negotiations which have resulted in agreements.
There is also the position that, of course, Dr. Seidl has put in the Gaus affidavit, and he has had his opportunity to examine the Defendant Von Ribbentrop; and the Prosecution respectfully submit that to call two secondary witnesses—without any disrespect to their position in the German Foreign Office, they are witnesses of a secondary importance compared with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—to discuss these negotiations seems to the Prosecution to be going into irrelevant matter and entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case.
I confess I do not myself appreciate any special relevance that these witnesses could have to the case of Hess, but I do not put it so strongly on that ground; I put it on the ground which I have just outlined to the Tribunal.
With regard to the third application of Dr. Seidl, I am not quite sure whether he means that he wants the Prosecution to provide him with an original or certified copy of the secret agreement, or whether he desires to tender a copy himself. But with regard to that, again the Prosecution take the line that that point—which, after all, is only one tiny corner of one aspect of the case—is sufficiently covered by the evidence which has already been brought out before the Tribunal from the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus and the evidence of the Defendant Ribbentrop.
That is the position of the Prosecution with regard to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the affidavit of the Ambassador Dr. Gaus, which has been accepted by the Tribunal as Exhibit Hess-16, describes only a part of the negotiations. Ambassador Dr. Gaus was not present at the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the pacts. I have, therefore, made the additional application to call Embassy Counsellor Hilger as a witness after his having already been approved as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.
I have, furthermore, requested that the Tribunal procure the text of that secret supplementary appendix. I have to admit, however, that this request no longer has the importance it had at the time it was made. In the meantime we have received a copy of that secret supplementary appendix.
Furthermore, I have a copy of the secret appendix to the German-Soviet border pact of 28 September 1939; and I have an affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus of 1 April of this year certifying that these copies are identical with the text of the secret agreements drafted on 23 August and 28 September 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that document being produced for the consideration of the Tribunal?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, My Lord. As I say, the Tribunal have considered our objection on relevance, and we have lost on it; and, therefore, it is not really open to me to argue any question of the relevance of the document in view of the decision of the Tribunal.
The only point that I make is that if Dr. Seidl produces an alleged copy of the treaty, supported by an affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, then it immensely strengthens my argument, I submit, against him being allowed to call the witness.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, on the question which is now being discussed by the Tribunal, have submitted today a document to the General Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal. If this document is already in your possession, then I need not talk about our position here; but, if you find it necessary, Your Honors, I am going to set it forth here. We object on the ground of considerations, which are set forth in this document signed by General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you presenting an argument or a document of some sort?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not going to argue about it nor return to this question if you have this document.
THE PRESIDENT: You misunderstood me. You mentioned a document which you asserted was in the possession of the Tribunal. I am not aware that we have any document from the Soviet Prosecution. It may be that it has been received; and, if so, we will consider it of course.
What I wanted to know is whether it was an argument or an original document of some sort.
COL. POKROVSKY: The document deals with the official answer of the Soviet Prosecution on the question as to whether we consider it necessary to grant the request of Dr. Seidl regarding a group of questions connected with the German-Soviet Pact of 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: You think it would be possible to be content with just the document which is in your possession now?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, certainly—unless you wish to say anything. We will consider the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: There is going to be no further information regarding it. Our position has been defined in detail in this document signed by General Rudenko; and, if you have this document before you now, I have nothing more to add regarding it.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, on 13 April I made a written motion to be permitted to submit a documentary supplement as Exhibit Hess-17. I submitted six copies of this document with the request to have it translated. The following documents are included:
1) The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which was already submitted by the Prosecution under Exhibit GB-145; 2) the related supplementary protocol of the same date; 3) the German-Soviet Friendship and Border Pact of 28 September 1939; 4) the secret supplementary protocol of the same date which is related to it; and 5) the second affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus, mentioned before.
Furthermore, on 15 April I made the motion to call the witness Dr. Gaus—who is in Nuremberg—here before this Court if the Tribunal do not consider the affidavit sufficient. I ask the Tribunal to make its decision about these motions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.
Now, with reference to Von Neurath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is an application for a witness Dieckhoff, in regard to whom interrogatories have already been granted. As I understand, the reason is that the witness Tschirschky has been found to have retired from the German Foreign Office some 18 months earlier than was thought. Baron Von Lüdinghausen has suggested that, to balance the calling of Dieckhoff as a witness, he will give up the calling of the witness Zimmermann and have an affidavit or interrogatory instead. My Lord, that seems to the Prosecution a very reasonable suggestion, and we have no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean, no objection to Dieckhoff as a witness and Zimmermann for an affidavit or interrogatories?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is all with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, with regard to the Defendant Schacht, it is only the petition of the witness Huelse; and the Prosecution do not really mind whether Dr. Dix calls him or puts in an affidavit. I think that it is only a question of whether the witness will be available to come here from Hamburg; and, if he is available, we have no objection to him being called as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, My Lord, the next one on the list is an application on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel: Withdrawal of interrogatories for Mende granted on 23 March, as the prospective witness is not located; and interrogatories for Marenbach in place of Mende, who can give the same testimony. Dr. Servatius believes that Marenbach is located at the Garmisch internment camp. The Prosecution have no objection to that.
My Lord, I think there was a formal one from Dr. Thoma with regard to the use of the sworn statement by Professor Denker, but there is no objection to that.
THE PRESIDENT: We have already allowed that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have already allowed that; this is only the formal application.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Then we will consider those matters. There are a number of documents for the production of which the Defendant Sauckel’s counsel is applying.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been suggested to us that counsel for the Defendant Sauckel and Counsel for the Prosecution could help us over that matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, my friend, Mr. Roberts, has been dealing with Dr. Servatius upon this point; so, perhaps he could help the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, will it take a long time for that or not?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think so. The Tribunal, I understand...
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to inform the Tribunal that the Soviet Prosecution did not receive any documents which the British Prosecutor has just mentioned, and we ask that these documents not be discussed until the moment when we shall have the opportunity to get acquainted with them.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that these documents have not been translated yet. The question really is the preliminary one of which documents should be translated, and we were only going through the documents in order to see which documents were sufficiently relevant to be translated; so that it would not be...
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the Tribunal—I understand—have made a preliminary order of just striking out the documents which Dr. Servatius and I agree should not be presented. My Lord, that leaves a very large number of documents, of which I think the Tribunal has a list. My Lord, the first 68 documents—or rather from documents 6 to 68—are regulations dealing with the conditions of the employment of labor in Germany. My Lord, I have seen Dr. Servatius’ proposed document book, and he has marked certain passages which he would desire to read, and which would have to be translated, My Lord; and that does cut down the bulk of the documents very considerably.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, we have not read all these documents yet, and they are not translated. Can you indicate to us whether you have any objection to them being translated?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think I could object to those first documents from 6 to 68—the passages marked “being translated,” because from their description they appear to be relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, 6 to 68.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the passages which are actually marked?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then will you go on?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: 69 to 79 he has already struck out.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, 80 and 81 I object to. They are documents making allegations of breach of the Hague Regulations by the Soviet nation. My Lord, I submit that that is not relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: The allegations of illegal acts by the Soviet Government with reference to individuals?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, I submit that that could not be relevant at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and 82 to 89; you do not object to these?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not object to these—the passages as marked.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Dr. Servatius promised, as far as he could, to cut down the passages which were going to be marked.
My Lord, 90 and 91 I object to. Dr. Servatius wants to put in, under the description of documents, a large number of affidavits, the number of which I think is not yet ascertained—affidavits by various persons as to the conditions of labor and the conditions under which foreign workers were employed. My Lord, the Defendant Sauckel has been allowed a certain number of witnesses and also affidavits or interrogatories from other people. My Lord, I submit that this application under 90 and 91—two files of affidavit—is not really an application for documents at all, and it should be disallowed.
My Lord, Number 92...
THE PRESIDENT: Number 92 he has struck out.
MR. ROBERTS: 92 has been struck out.
My Lord, Number 93 is, in fact, a book which was referred to by the French prosecutor; and, therefore, of course, Dr. Servatius would be entitled to refer to it in his case.
THE PRESIDENT: Are the passages marked in that or not?
MR. ROBERTS: Well, he has not marked any yet. There are some pictures, My Lord, of...
THE PRESIDENT: He only wants the pictures?
MR. ROBERTS: I think so, My Lord, showing the cherubic happiness of the foreign workers in Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 94 is an affidavit of Sauckel’s son. It is only required, I understand, if one of three other witnesses who have been allowed is not available. My Lord, it is to deal with the allegation that Sauckel ordered the evacuation of Buchenwald; and, My Lord, I cannot object to this very short affidavit, if Dr. Servatius cannot produce one of the three witnesses who have been allowed to him.
My Lord, 95 is Sauckel’s speeches, and Dr. Servatius again has promised to cut down the passages which he has marked. It is difficult to object to that in view of the allegation of conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 96 and 97 are books in which there are very short extracts which have been marked, and, again, as it deals with a relevant period of the alleged conspiracy, My Lord, I do not see how I can object to that.
THE PRESIDENT: In the same category, yes. Does that meet with your views, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I discussed the matter with a representative of the Prosecution and that represents in principle the result. I would like to add, however, something with reference to a few documents—namely, Documents 80 and 81. One is the photostat copy of a deportation order in the city of Oels, the other an affidavit concerning forced labor in Saaz. I need the first document in order to prove that the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare was obsolete—that is to say, that before the armistice, while fighting was still going on, the population of the Eastern German provinces was sent to Russia for forced labor. I supplemented the motion orally at that time, because I considered the proof for the deportation of a large part of the population for forced labor, obtained by questioning the mayors of cities from Upper Silesia to East Prussia, as insufficient. I believe that this is of great importance for the defense of my client, as it proves that the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare was considered nonexistent in the East.
Document 81 deals with the state of affairs after the armistice—but which appears as only a continuation of what previously occurred in the Eastern territories—and confirms the fact that, under the occupation of the Soviet Army, such conditions generally continued to exist—namely, the recruitment of the population for work not in the sense of the Hague Convention for the repair of local roads, for instance, but rather for the purpose of working in industry and for activities outside the framework of the Hague Convention and for work outside the country. I do not believe that I should be refused this evidence.
Now as to Documents Number 90 and 91, their contents have already been presented. They are two folders with a collection of affidavits. The attempt is made to bring evidence in refutation of a government investigation such as we have met up with here. We have received reports from the Soviet and French Prosecution; we have received reports from Czechs; all of which constitute a huge quantity of material of mosaic-like patterns that can only be dealt with in this manner.
I once before explained that I do not have a government at my disposal which could prepare such a report, and so I suggest bringing a collection of affidavits. Now I do not intend to read every one of these affidavits here. My motion is that the Court appoint a deputy who would study that folder and prepare a brief report about it for presentation to the Tribunal. A similar problem will arise later when questions concerning the political organizations are dealt with—namely, the problem as to how these immense quantities of material can be presented to the Tribunal.
If I bring one witness, one witness only, it will be said, “Well, one witness cannot, of course, cover the entire ground.” On the other hand, I cannot have a hundred or more witnesses. So this would be a middle way: That a person appointed by the Tribunal study these affidavits and then give a report. That is the content of these two folders.
THE PRESIDENT: How many affidavits have you in mind or have you obtained?
DR. SERVATIUS: So far I have received very little. It proves that those who could give information are very reticent, because they are afraid that they might be prosecuted on that account. I hope, however, to be able to make a selection of reasonable statements, which I believe will amount to about 20 or 30 affidavits. I would limit it to that, because I do not care to take up the Court’s time with unnecessary work dealing with these affidavits. Judging from the present state of my collection, I may even have to consider withdrawing my motion altogether, because I have to admit myself that the amount of material reaching me is very small; but I ask to be given another chance, and at the appropriate moment I shall present the case to the Court again.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Is that all you want to say?
DR. SERVATIUS: There is still Document Number 93, the illustrated booklet, Europe Works in Germany. I should like...
THE PRESIDENT: Did the Prosecution object?
DR. SERVATIUS: No, the Prosecution does not object. I should like to project some pictures on the screen for the purpose of showing particularly under what conditions these people from the East arrived and what their condition was later, insofar as it can be shown from a propaganda pamphlet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: There was one other point which I ought to mention. Perhaps Dr. Servatius would be good enough to listen.
My Lord, Dr. Servatius has applied in writing to the Tribunal, by letter dated 5 March 1946, for all medical reports of Dr. Jäger, who was a chief camp doctor at Krupp-Essen; secondly, all monthly reports of a man called Groene, who was a colleague of Dr. Jäger; thirdly, all minutes of monthly conferences which the chief camp leader held with his subordinate camp leaders at Krupps.
My Lord the position is this: That the French put in—oh, I think our American colleagues put in—an affidavit of Dr. Jäger, and Dr. Jäger himself has been granted as a witness for Sauckel, and so he will be seen in the witness box.
My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to Dr. Jäger being asked, I suppose, to bring his reports with him if they are available. We do not have them, and I do not think we know where they are.
THE PRESIDENT: But the witness is being called.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have received a portion of these documents already, and I assume that the rest may also reach me. I believe the material which I have now is sufficient for my purposes so that the Prosecution need not take further pains.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean we need make no order?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is not necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 18 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this volume, Russian documents presented in the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 11, by Various.]