Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any of the other defendants’ counsel who wish to ask questions of this witness?
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): Witness, can you recall what Hitler said in the Cabinet meeting, regarding his political aims and the program of the new Government?
LAMMERS: Hitler delivered a very long speech, in the course of which the individual ministers also had a chance to speak. One of the details I remember particularly is that the Führer talked, first of all, about the removal of unemployment, something which would definitely have to be achieved. Secondly, he spoke about the fact that an economic revival of Germany would have to be provided for. And thirdly, he talked in detail about the fact that a revision of the Versailles Treaty would have to be effected, and that we would have to try to put an end to the defamation of Germany which was contained in the Versailles Treaty, and that one would have to strive to achieve equality of rights for the German Reich within the circle of nations.
All these statements of Hitler’s were then written down in a special Government declaration. I also recollect that in that Government declaration the protection of positive Christianity was mentioned in particular. I cannot recall the special details. But these, I am convinced, are the main points concerned.
Nothing was discussed which would have required special secrecy. And what was discussed was, in the main, contained in the Government declaration which was published in the press.
DR. SEIDL: Did Hitler say anything at all, during this Cabinet meeting, about the fact that he was going to alter the system of government and that he wanted to govern dictatorially?
LAMMERS: Herr Hitler expressed his opinion to the effect that the present parliamentary system, prevailing up to that time in Germany, had been a failure.
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking about a meeting. What was the date of the meeting you are referring to?
LAMMERS: It was the first Cabinet meeting which the Defense Counsel inquired about. It took place on 30 January 1933, on the day after the seizure of power. The Führer stated that the present governmental system had been a failure. Furthermore he said that the result of that failure had been that the Reich President was obliged, in a state of emergency, according to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, to govern by means of emergency decrees, and that the only possibility was to create a stable Reich Government, a government which would be in power for many years. And further, how one could create such a government would be something which would have to be agreed upon first with the Reich President and the Reichstag.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler say, during this Cabinet meeting, that he wanted to concede to the NSDAP a specially favored position of power?
LAMMERS: He said that the NSDAP, as the strongest party, would naturally have to have due influence in the German Government. He said nothing to the effect that he wanted to put an end to the other parties that still existed and were still represented in the Cabinet, the German Nationalists and the Stahlhelm group.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler explain his foreign political aims during this first meeting and did he say, in particular, that Germany would definitely have to be freed from the shackles of the Versailles Treaty and would again have to take the place befitting her in the community of nations?
LAMMERS: I answered that question already in the affirmative before. Those were the foreign political aims, the complete revision of the Versailles Treaty.
DR. SEIDL: Did Hitler also mention at the time that for the achievement of these foreign political aims one would have to run the risk of another war, possibly even of a preventive war?
LAMMERS: As far as I know and as far as I remember, no mention was made of war, certainly not of a preventive war or an aggressive war.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler, in the period following, in Cabinet sessions or during any other meetings of all or numerous ministers, present a comprehensive plan for the achievement of his foreign political aims?
LAMMERS: No, I knew of no comprehensive plan except the general points I have mentioned. Neither during that meeting nor during later meetings did Hitler elaborate a general plan. In my opinion, he never did discuss and describe in detail any comprehensive plans of a long-term character at all.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, what caused Hitler a) to appoint Hess Deputy to the Führer of the NSDAP and b) to make him a Reich minister?
LAMMERS: He appointed Hess Deputy to the Führer, I believe, because he, as Chancellor of the Reich, no longer wanted to attend to the business of the Party and had to have a responsible man for the technical leadership of the Party.
He appointed Hess Reich Minister in order to create a link between Party and State; to have a man in the Cabinet who was in a position to represent the wishes and views of the Party in the Cabinet. Perhaps he was thereby hoping to create a united front between Party and State, something which became a law later on.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, were the leading generals, a) before and b) after seizure of power, in contact with the Reich directorate and the Political Leadership Corps of the Party?
LAMMERS: Before the seizure of power, as far as I know, contact between the Party and the generals did not exist as such. There could only have been cases of personal contact between individual members of the Party and individual generals.
After the seizure of power I had the opportunity of being present when the Führer, at the beginning of February 1933, had the high-ranking generals, the commanders-in-chief, introduced to him, and I had the impression that the Führer did not know most of these men, for they were all introduced to him—I stood nearby—and it was my impression that he had known only a few of these men previously.
After the seizure of power, of course, the relations between the Party leaders and the high-ranking generals became closer—after the Party had gained a strong position in the State. But what I would like to say is that relations, general relations, between the Party, that is to say between the Reich directorate of the Party and the Political Leadership Corps of the Party on the one side, and the high-ranking generals and perhaps also the generals with lower rank, on the other side—that these relations never went beyond the purely formal, beyond so-called social relations which were based on duty requirements at chance meetings, on festive occasions and public demonstrations, et cetera. I feel that the general relations between the Reich Directorate and the Political Leadership Corps of the Party on the one side, and the generals on the other, were in no instance any closer than that.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the character of these relations change after Hitler became the Head of the State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces?
LAMMERS: As far as the high-ranking generals are concerned, I am of the opinion that in principle nothing changed, for the high-ranking generals regarded the Führer not as the leader of the Party but as the Head of the State, and they considered him the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Consequently, they did not believe that they had to establish any particularly close relations with the Party.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, did joint meetings and conferences take place for the discussion of political aims between the Reich Government, the Reich Directorate of the Party, and the high-ranking generals?
LAMMERS: Such joint meetings or conferences are out of the question. They never took place. That would also have been impossible because of the large number of people involved.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, were members of the Reich Government, the Reich Directorate of the Party and the high-ranking generals in a position to present their views to Hitler with regard to important questions involving the welfare of the nation, particularly on questions which concerned war or peace?
LAMMERS: Jointly, these three groups, if I may say so, naturally could not voice an opinion at all, for they had no connection with each other in any way. But neither could any of these groups—the Reich Directorate of the Party, the Reich Government, and the generals—voice its opinion, in the first place because they were not informed at all about the Führer’s political and economic aims. What attitude could they take? They were simply taken by surprise by the actual execution, by the accomplished facts, and any subsequent voicing of an opinion would have meant a “stab in the back” of the Führer’s policy.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, then a general political plan on Hitler’s part—in which these most important groups were active participants—did not exist at all, and therefore there could be no talk of a conspiracy?
LAMMERS: I know of no such general plan, but I can assure you of one thing, that the large majority, the large majority of ministers never knew anything of any such general plan. Just how far the Führer informed individual persons of such plan, I do not know. I was not present on such occasions. The Führer may have discussed some sort of plans with one person or another, perhaps with a member of the Party of the Reich Directorate or the generals; but just what was discussed on such occasions I do not know. And of course I cannot say whether in such cases these gentlemen agreed or disagreed with the Führer. I also do not know whether shortly before the execution of any large-scale political plans, such as for instance the march into Czechoslovakia or something like that, whether, shortly before, they could still advise the Führer as to whether they agreed or were opposed, or whether they merely received an order which they had to execute.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, if I understand you correctly, then you obviously want to say that all decisions of any magnitude were made by Hitler alone?
LAMMERS: The large-scale political decisions were certainly made by him alone, at most with some few persons being consulted and participating, but never with the Reich Government participating, for the Reich Government—if I may go into detail about this—it was when we left the League of Nations that Hitler for the last time informed the Reich Government before taking an action. Then followed as a large, important action, the march into the Rhineland.
The Cabinet was informed that we were going to withdraw from the League of Nations; it was still informed beforehand.
No one was informed of the march into the Rhineland; the Führer informed the Reich Cabinet only after the march had taken place. On the occasions of the march into Austria, the march into the Sudetenland, the march into Prague, the outbreak of the Polish war, the beginning of the other campaigns against Norway, France, Russia, and so forth, the Reich Government were consulted by the Führer neither beforehand, nor were they informed subsequently; and consequently there were certain ill-feelings among all the ministers because they were in no instance informed in advance of these large-scale plans which had certain implications for the non-military departments as well, and because the Reich Government did not learn until later of the accomplished facts.
Thus, to this extent I can say that all these decisions were made by the Führer alone; and to what extent he consulted persons individually I do not know. However, on the whole, the large majority of the ministers were not informed of all these actions; they just had general information such as any newspaper reader and any radio listener has; or they, as I for instance, sometimes heard of such a matter a few hours before, when it was made known to the press. There was no questioning of the Führer or any information from him beforehand.
DR. SEIDL: Please tell me now just how it actually came about, that the entire governmental power was thus transferred to the Führer?
LAMMERS: That transfer was accomplished, I might say, by way of a gradually developing state customary law.
DR. SEIDL: Slowly, please.
LAMMERS: First of all, the Führer and the Reich Government had been given, by the well-known Enabling Act of the Reichstag, the power to alter the Constitution. The Reich Government made use of this power in their actual legislation and, of course, use was also made of it by way of passive endurance and by creating a state customary law as was actually recognized in all countries. Thus in the course of the first years, and also during the later years, it came about quite naturally by way of a state customary law, that the Führer acted more independently than would actually have been possible according to the Weimar Constitution. From the beginning important political questions were all removed by the Führer from the jurisdiction of the Cabinet.
Even in 1933 and 1934, when Hindenburg was still alive, the Führer did not wish general political questions to be raised in the Cabinet by any minister. I repeatedly had to have various ministers informed that they were to refrain from bringing up questions which did not directly affect their department for discussion in the Cabinet.
For instance, I had to pass on such information to those gentlemen who wanted to discuss church policy. I had been forbidden to put any general political questions on the agenda of a Cabinet meeting. If, in spite of that, a minister raised a political question during a meeting of the Cabinet, then the Führer generally interposed and silenced the minister concerned, or referred him to a private discussion. Things developed in this way in the course of time.
After Von Hindenburg’s death, when the Führer became the Head of State, such debates in the Cabinet were stopped altogether. Nothing of this sort could be debated any more. The ministers were not allowed to feel that they were political ministers. I had to inform various gentlemen repeatedly, by order of the Führer, that they were requested to refrain from voicing their opinions in regard to such questions during Cabinet meetings.
Then came the time, which I have already described, during which the larger-scale actions took place and there were no more Cabinet meetings. In this connection the Führer acted alone, and all declarations which were made on behalf of the Reich Government were made by him alone, acting on his own and without previous consultation with the Cabinet. I must admit that the Cabinet very often complained about that but could not prevail against the Führer.
Thus gradually the governmental power—if I interpret “Regierung” according to the conception of “government” laid down in Anglo-Saxon law—then after 1936 there was no longer any complete Reich Government at all consisting of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Ministers, that is, a collective, unified body. The Führer was the Reich Government, and this power had slipped into his hands—and one will naturally say that it should not have slipped into his hands. All I can say to this, is that it may have been wrong, it may have been stupid, but it was not a crime. It was a political development such as has happened repeatedly in history. I might recall the fact that in ancient Rome, where the senate had the power and that there...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal really does not want to hear a history of ancient Rome.
LAMMERS: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have described the development of the transfer of governmental powers into Hitler’s hands...
LAMMERS: Yes, but not completely.
DR. SEIDL: In that case, please continue with your account. But all descriptions...
THE PRESIDENT: We have had quite enough. We quite understand that he is saying that Hitler took over all powers and would not listen to any debate at all. It is perfectly clear that he said so.
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
Witness, will you please tell me one more thing about the last question in this connection? Please tell me whether you as Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery considered legal the development you have just described.
LAMMERS: I regarded this development, in the first place, from the point of view of constitutional law. I have discussed these questions repeatedly with Hitler, and I consider this development perfectly legal and, if it is desired, I can explain my reasons in detail.
In particular, I considered this development legal in view of the well-known Enabling Act and later laws which gave the Reich Government plenipotentiary powers and because of which the Reich Government, in turn, were in a position to delegate some of these powers to the Führer and to transfer this power. In that manner that which the Reich Government, as soon...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal is not really interested in whether or not it was legal. What the Tribunal is interested in is whether crimes against other nations were committed. We certainly do not want to hear this in such great detail.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the main point of the Indictment is Count One of the Indictment; and that is concerned with the Conspiracy charged by the Indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: The main point in the Indictment is not whether it was in accordance with German law that Hitler should take over the powers of his Government. There was no such point made in the Indictment.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now turn to some questions which concern the Defendant Dr. Frank. Since when have you known Dr. Frank? What were his activities up to the outbreak of the war?
LAMMERS: I became acquainted with Herr Frank in the course of the year 1932. If I understand you rightly, you want to hear about his activities only from the outbreak of the war?
DR. SEIDL: Up to the outbreak of the war.
LAMMERS: He was Chief of the Legal Division of the Party, then Chief of the National Socialist Lawyers’ Association (Juristenbund) which later on became the so-called Lawyers’ League (Rechtswahrerbund). Then he became a member of the Reichstag, and at the time of the seizure of power in 1933, he became Minister of Justice in Bavaria. At the same time he became Reich Commissioner for Legal Reforms.
Later on—and I do not remember the exact year—he became Reich Minister without Portfolio; and he was the President of the Academy of German Law. He finally became Governor General.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the Defendant Frank’s posts proved to us already, I should think, probably more than once. We do not require them from Dr. Lammers.
DR. SEIDL: I can put another question to the witness.
Witness, what was the relationship between Frank and Hitler?
LAMMERS: The relationship between the two was, at the beginning, I should like to say, good and proper, but not particularly close. At any rate, during the whole time he did not belong to those who could be called the closest advisers of the Führer.
DR. SEIDL: What was Frank’s attitude towards the “Police State” and the question of concentration camps?
LAMMERS: Frank repeatedly made speeches in public in which he stood up for the constitutional state, for right and law, by attacking the “Police State” and in which—although not in very strong terms—he always took a stand against internment in concentration camps, because such internment was without a legal basis. These speeches made by Frank were frequently the cause of severe disapproval on the part of Hitler, so that in the end the Führer instructed me to forbid his making speeches and he was forbidden to publish the printed version of these speeches. Finally, Frank’s activity in standing up for the constitutional state resulted in his being removed from his office as the Reich Chief of the Legal Division of the Party.
DR. SEIDL: Was he not dismissed from his position as President of the Academy of German Law for these reasons?
LAMMERS: Yes, that happened at the same time—and also from his position as Chief of the Lawyers’ League.
DR. SEIDL: Another question: Did Dr. Frank as Governor General have considerable power, or was it not rather the case that his power in many respects was greatly infringed upon?
LAMMERS: One can certainly say that in many respects his power was infringed upon.
There are a number of reasons—first of all, as is self-evident, the Armed Forces. But they bothered him least of all, for in the occupied territories, the Reich commissioners were never members of the High Command of the Armed Forces. That was always separate.
Then Göring, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, had comprehensive powers to issue orders to both the Party and the State in all occupied territories, therefore also in the Government General, and thus could give orders to the Governor General and could, when it was necessary in the interests of the whole, countermand and annul the latter’s decrees.
Thirdly, Frank’s powers as Governor General were considerably limited through the police, since Himmler as Chief of the German Police had direct police powers which he was, to be sure, to co-operate with those of the Governor General but which he did not always do. The Governor General suffered a further loss of power through the fact that Himmler was Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality and as such could undertake resettlements and did do so without consulting Governor General Frank in any way.
Then, there were certain infringements in favor of the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, but in my opinion the infringement of power in this field was very slight, for Gauleiter Sauckel always, where possible, came to an agreement with the local offices beforehand.
Finally there were powers reserved for Reich Minister Speer in the field of armament and technology. There were still other powers reserved for the postal service, the railroads, et cetera. But in the main, these are the gaps, as you call them, Dr. Seidl, in Frank’s power.
DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, was Frank’s basic attitude towards the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, and what was the policy he tried to carry through?
LAMMERS: In my opinion Frank always tried to pursue a policy of moderation and to create an atmosphere of friendship towards Germany in Poland. To be sure, he very often was unable to achieve his aim, especially because of the fact that the powers of the police and Himmler’s powers were too great in the field of resettlement, so that his measures and his intentions suffered set-backs. He found it difficult to achieve his aims.
DR. SEIDL: Did Dr. Frank occupy himself with Germanization aims or did he rather, whenever he could, oppose the policy of resettlement pursued by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality?
LAMMERS: I should not have thought that Frank would be so foolish as to have germanizing intentions or to want to make Germans of Poles. He probably tried to win the people of German origin in Poland for the cause of Germanism. He had many difficulties with regard to the resettlements, since he was not consulted beforehand and since, by way of resettlement, people were simply shoved into the Government General. In that respect he and I agreed entirely. I have repeatedly told the Führer that these mass resettlements could not take place, all at once, without the agreement of the Governor General, and that the Governor General could not govern if he did not know about these resettlement measures in advance and if he could not even exert an influence in connection with these measures.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you stated earlier that the entire Security Police and the SD in the Government General were directly under Himmler or the Higher SS and Police Chief. Did Governor General Frank not try to protest against the policy of force employed by these two men and to relieve the situation?
LAMMERS: On this point he addressed repeated complaints to me, so that I might take them to the Führer, which, however, I could do only in part. In one point, however, we did want to help him. In the Government General there had been established a Secretariat of State for the security system. This was under Krüger, then Higher SS and Police Chief. This, however, functioned for only 4 to 6 weeks and then differences of opinion in this field broke out once more. The State Secretary for Security, Krüger, stated, “I receive my orders from Himmler.” If the Governor General complained about that, then Himmler said, “These are all unimportant matters. I certainly must be able to rule on them directly.” The Governor General said, “But for me they are not unimportant; even those things are important to me.”
The channels of command and the co-operation with the Governor General were not being observed, and it is therefore perfectly understandable that Herr Frank had a very difficult position with respect to the police system.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly, both orally and in writing, declared his intention of resigning and the reasons for it?
LAMMERS: He repeatedly offered his resignation, because of these sharp conflicts which he had, with Himmler in particular, and because Hitler usually decided that he was in the wrong and Himmler in the right. Many statements of his intention or desire to resign were brought to me, some of which I was not even allowed to submit to the Führer. But I informed the Führer of the Governor General’s intentions of resigning and the Führer several times refused Frank’s offer to resign.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that Reichsführer SS Himmler was working towards having Frank removed?
LAMMERS: Reichsführer Himmler personally was indubitably an opponent of Frank’s. There is cause for me to assume from various disapproving statements made by Himmler with regard to Frank that Himmler would have liked it very much if Frank had been removed from his position; and Reichsleiter Bormann who also was not very well disposed to Frank’s personality, would have liked it also.
DR. SEIDL: Who in the Government General had jurisdiction over the concentration camps and was the competent official as far as their establishment and administration were concerned?
LAMMERS: The concentration camps were under Himmler, and organs and departments under Himmler’s control were responsible for the administration and organization. There was an economic department, I believe, attached to the SS, which was responsible for administration; but concentration camps as such were under Himmler’s jurisdiction.
DR. SEIDL: Who was responsible for all questions connected with the so-called Jewish policy in the Government General?
LAMMERS: In occupied territories the Jewish policy, I might say, in its larger implications was handled by Himmler, who directed it. But, of course, the Governor General was also concerned with matters in the field of Jewish policy or with measures against the Jews, for instance, the combating of spotted fever, and, I think, the marking by means of a visible sign. All personal measures were proposed to the Governor General by the Police. But the main policy in Jewish questions, as I learned afterwards, was handled entirely alone by Himmler, who had been given these powers by the Führer.
DR. SEIDL: Is it true that the Governor General, as early as 1940, continuously raised complaints regarding the activities of the Higher SS and Police Chief Krüger?
LAMMERS: I can confirm that. That happened several times. In particular these complaints were made because the SS and Police courts were assuming powers in the Government General which they did not actually have. Consequently, they deprived the Governor General, the only authority competent in this respect, of the administration of justice. There were also shootings of hostages. He repeatedly complained about that. I want to state that all complaints were addressed to me—there were no complaints to me but they were merely always directed to me—so that I could submit them to the Führer.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General continuously made objections about the extensive claim made by the Reich on the Government General, particularly in reference to grain deliveries?
LAMMERS: He had often raised objections but the demands which were put to him were even increased. He did, for the most part, fulfill them, which must have been extremely hard for him.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that the Governor General protested against the removal of art treasures by Himmler’s organization?
LAMMERS: Yes; I have only a very faint recollection of that. It is possible that he also complained about the removal of art treasures, but I cannot remember any details in that connection.
DR. SEIDL: And now the last question. Is it true that the Governor General, in many documents, from as early as 1940 on, made proposals to the Führer regarding the improvement of living conditions of the population in the Government General and that the Führer only very much later acknowledged that the high policy which had been advocated by Frank from the very beginning was correct?
LAMMERS: Herr Frank had often objected to a policy of exploitation and pronounced himself in favor of a policy of reconstruction, in cultural matters as well. He had suggested, for instance, that Polish advisory committees be assigned to the authorities under the Governor General and to the district chiefs, and so forth; that was refused. He spoke in favor of the creation of high schools, theological seminaries, and similar cultural aims, all of which were rejected.
On one occasion he had submitted a long memorandum. This referred to a Polish organization which called itself “The Plough and the Sword.” It had offered to co-operate with the Germans, and Frank submitted detailed proposals in a long memorandum, saying that these Poles could be won over to co-operate only if they were met on proper terms. All these suggestions, coming from Frank, were turned down by Hitler. It is not correct for you to say, Dr. Seidl, that it was not until the last moment that the Führer agreed to these suggestions; all I can say is that they were all turned down without exception.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): By a decree of 17 July 1941 the Defendant Rosenberg was appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Would you please tell the Tribunal very briefly by means of what decrees his authority in the East was limited?
LAMMERS: I can do that very briefly by repeating what I said before. The same limitations which applied to the Governor General also apply to him—these limitations which I have just listed; but I have to add one thing more to that.
The position of Reich Minister Rosenberg was made particularly difficult through the fact that the difference of opinion which existed between him and Minister Goebbels in the field of propaganda was especially detrimental for him. For in the Führer’s opinion Rosenberg was to decide on the Eastern policy and Goebbels was to decide on the propaganda, and these two things could not always be co-ordinated. There were strong differences of opinion between Rosenberg and Goebbels which could be settled only after lengthy negotiations. But the practical success was always slight, because the difference of opinion, which had scarcely been settled, arose again without delay in the next few weeks. There was also another limitation which is different from the case of the Government General, that is, that Rosenberg had two Reich commissioners for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Reich Commissioner Lohse and Reich Commissioner Koch.
DR. THOMA: I am coming to that later.
Can you remember that before the 17 July 1941 decree there had been a conference with the Führer, on the day before, on 16 July 1941, during which, right from the beginning, Rosenberg complained that his ministry was to have no police powers and that all police powers were to be transferred to Himmler?
LAMMERS: Herr Rosenberg was, of course, not quite in agreement with the vesting of police powers in Himmler. He did object to that but without success. Police matters in other occupied territories had been ruled upon in the same way as in this case. The Führer would not depart from his views.
DR. THOMA: In the general instructions to the Reich commissioners there is a passage where it says that the Higher SS and Police Chief is directly subordinate to the Reich commissioner himself. Did this mean that the Police Chief could also give orders to the Reich commissioner in technical matters?
LAMMERS: Normally, no; Himmler had reserved technical instructions for himself. The SS and Police Chief was instructed to get in touch with the Reich commissioner and, of course, to take into consideration the latter’s political instructions, but not the technical ones.
DR. THOMA: Not the technical ones? Please tell the Tribunal, but also quite briefly, what Rosenberg’s political concepts were, from the beginning until the end, with reference to the treatment of the Eastern peoples.
LAMMERS: In my opinion he always wanted to pursue a moderate policy. Beyond a doubt he was opposed to a policy of extermination and a policy of deportation, as was often preached. He made efforts to create order in the field of agriculture by means of his agrarian policy, likewise to create order in the field of education, church matters, universities, schools, and so forth. But he had little success, since one of the two Reich commissioners, namely Koch, in the Ukraine, opposed Rosenberg’s measures, or rather simply disregarded Rosenberg’s orders in respect to these matters.
DR. THOMA: I am thinking about the large political conceptions. Did he ever mention to you that he had the idea of leading the Eastern peoples to a certain autonomy and of allowing them such an autonomy?
LAMMERS: Yes, I can answer that in the affirmative.
DR. THOMA: Did he also mention to you that he intended that sovereign right should be extended to the Occupied Eastern Territories?
LAMMERS: Whether he said it in just that form, that I cannot recollect. At any rate he was in favor of establishing a certain independence for the Eastern peoples.
DR. THOMA: That is to say autonomy. And was it for this reason that he was so deeply interested in tending to the cultural life of these Eastern peoples?
LAMMERS: Yes. He was particularly interested in that. I know that because he also took an interest in the school system, the church, and the universities.
DR. THOMA: Was that possibly the cause of the conflict which he especially had with Reich Commissioner Koch?
LAMMERS: That and many other things. Koch was above all a strong opponent of the agrarian policy. That agrarian policy which Rosenberg considered especially favorable in the interest of his aims was sabotaged by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Can you mention any other fields in which Koch made difficulties for the Minister for the Eastern Territories?
LAMMERS: I cannot at the moment recollect any.
DR. THOMA: Do you know that there was a final row between the two when you were given the order, in collaboration with Bormann, to conduct negotiations between the two, and that Rosenberg refused and demanded that the matter be brought before the Führer?
LAMMERS: The differences of opinion between Rosenberg and Koch were very numerous. They filled volumes and volumes of records. The Führer had given the order that Bormann and I should investigate these matters. Many weeks of investigation ensued; and after the investigation I must say there was never a decision made by the Führer. The Führer always postponed making a decision on these matters. On one occasion—perhaps that is the case which you, Dr. Thoma, are thinking of—the differences of opinion were again particularly sharp. The Führer then sent for Rosenberg and Koch, and instead of settling these differences of opinion, again no agreement was reached. Instead of a real decision, the compromise was made that these two gentlemen should meet once every month and co-operate. That was naturally, in the first place, an unbearable situation for Rosenberg, that he, as the minister in charge, should in every instance have to come to an agreement with the Reich commissioner subordinate to him; in the second place, it could hardly be carried out in practice. Firstly, the two gentlemen met no more than once or twice at most, and then when they did meet no agreement could be reached, and in the long run the Führer thought that Koch was in the right.
DR. THOMA: How could it be seen that Koch was considered right?
LAMMERS: Because the Führer reached no decision in regard to the complaints made by Rosenberg which, in my opinion, were justified. Thus the things accomplished by Koch remained.
DR. THOMA: Defendant Rosenberg says that the result was that Hitler gave him the order to confine himself in the administration of the Eastern territories to the most basic lines. Is that right?
LAMMERS: That was approximately the Führer’s order. Both had agreed to come to a mutual understanding on the matter about which the Führer had misgivings.
DR. THOMA: What form did Rosenberg’s relationship to the Führer take and when was Rosenberg’s last report to the Führer?
LAMMERS: As far as I know, Rosenberg visited the Führer at the end of 1943 for the last time; and even before that he had always had considerable difficulties in getting to see the Führer. He was not very often successful.
DR. THOMA: Did this tense situation have the result that Rosenberg offered his resignation in the autumn of 1940?
LAMMERS: Yes, it was not actually an application for resignation, since the Führer had prohibited such applications, but he did say that if he could no longer conduct affairs to the Führer’s satisfaction, he would like to be removed from office, thus, in the end, it amounted to an application for resignation.
DR. THOMA: Can you tell the Tribunal to what extent Rosenberg had influence and popularity among the population in the Occupied Eastern Territories? Is it correct, particularly, that a number of church leaders in the Occupied Eastern Territories sent telegrams of thanks to him because of his tolerant attitude and because he allowed them to practice their religion freely?
LAMMERS: I know of that only superficially, from personal statements made to me by Rosenberg. He may have once told me something like that.
DR. THOMA: I have another question. It has repeatedly come to light during this Trial that Hitler’s military entourage considered him a military genius. What was the situation in the administrative sphere? Hitler was above all the supreme legislator, the supreme chief of Government and Head of State. Did his administrative entourage encourage him in the belief that all his decisions were correct and that he was doing something extraordinary, or who did strengthen him in this belief?
LAMMERS: In this sphere, too, the Führer had an extraordinarily quick power of perception and almost always a correct evaluation of affairs. He was in a position to make frequent use of the large-scale policy which he alone had to determine for legislation and administration. It was then the task of the gentlemen who were to carry this out; above all, the ministers—I, too, to a certain extent—to shape into an appropriate form those suggestions and basic thoughts which he had formulated. If any objections did arise in this connection, the Führer was for the most part willing to listen to them, as long as they did not touch the principle of the matter; he was thus ready to listen to questions of severity, mitigation, or greater stringency, if necessary, or to questions of formulation and construction, but not if a basic tendency was being attacked. Then one had great difficulties with him.
DR. THOMA: And as far as individual problems were concerned, did he personally make the pertinent decisions about everything, or was he hampered in any way by his purpose, by certain aims which he had in mind?
LAMMERS: Very little was reported to him. Normally, in the last years I made official reports every 6 or 8 weeks; in other words six or eight times a year or perhaps, at the most, 10 times. On these occasions, problems could not be discussed. Generally speaking, the Führer left the administration to his ministers...
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard it over and over again about Hitler.
DR. THOMA: I have only one more question. Did you know anything regarding the fact that Hitler had decided to solve the Jewish question by the final solution, that is, by the annihilation of the Jews?
LAMMERS: Yes, I know a great deal about that. The final solution of the Jewish question became known to me for the first time in 1942. That is when I heard that the Führer supposedly, through Göring, had given an order to the SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich to achieve a solution of the Jewish question. I did not know the exact contents of that order and consequently, since this did not come within my jurisdiction, at the beginning I took a negative attitude, but then as I wanted to know something I, of course, had to contact Himmler. I asked him what was really meant by the idea of the final solution of the Jewish question. Himmler replied that he had received the order from the Führer to bring about the final solution of the Jewish problem—or rather Heydrich and his successor had that order—and that the main point of the order was that the Jews were to be evacuated from Germany. With that statement I was satisfied for the time and waited for further developments, since I assumed that I would now in some way—I really had no jurisdiction here—I would obtain some information from Heydrich or his successor, Kaltenbrunner.
Since nothing did come I wanted to inform myself about this, and back in 1942 I announced a report to the Führer, whereupon the Führer told me that it was true that he had given Himmler the order for evacuation but that he did not want any further discussion about this Jewish question during the war. In the meantime or shortly afterwards—this was already at the beginning of 1943—the RSHA sent out invitations to attend a meeting on the subject, “Final Solution of the Jewish Question.” I had previously sent out an order to my officials that I was not defining my attitude to this matter, since I wanted to present it to the Führer. I merely ordered that, if invitations to a meeting were sent out, one of my officials should attend as a so-called “listening post.”
A meeting actually did take place afterwards to discuss this question, but without results. Minutes were taken and the various departments were supposed to express their attitude. When I received these minutes I found that they contained nothing vital. For a second time I forbade taking a definite attitude. I myself refused to take a stand and I remember it very well indeed, because I received a letter which, first of all, was signed by some unimportant man who, as far as I was concerned, had no right to sign. He asked me why I had not yet taken a stand. Secondly, the tone of the inquiry was very unfriendly; he said that everybody had expressed an opinion except me. I ordered that the reply be made that I refused to define my views since I wished to discuss the matter with the Führer first.
In the meantime I once more turned to Herr Himmler. He was of the opinion that it was necessary to discuss this question since a number of problems would have to be solved, particularly since the intention of achieving a final solution of the Jewish question would probably extend to persons of mixed blood, first grade, and would also extend to the so-called “privileged” marriages, that is to say, marriages where only one party was Aryan whereas the other party was Jewish. The Führer stated once more that he did not wish to have a report on it but that he had no objections to consultation on these problems. That some evacuations had taken place in the meantime had become known to me. At that time, at any rate, not the slightest thing was known about the killing of Jews; if crass individual cases came up, I always addressed myself to Himmler and he was always very willing to settle these individual cases.
Finally, however, in 1943, rumors cropped up that Jews were being killed. I had no jurisdiction in this field; it was merely that I occasionally received complaints and on the basis of these complaints I investigated the rumors. But, as far as I could tell, at any rate, these rumors always proved to be only rumors. Every one said he had heard it from somebody else and nobody wanted to make a definite statement. I am, in fact, of the opinion that these rumors were based mostly on foreign broadcasts and that the people just did not want to say from where they had the information.
That caused me once more to undertake an investigation of this matter. First of all, since I, for my part, could not initiate investigations of matters under Himmler’s jurisdiction, I addressed myself to Himmler once again. Himmler denied any legal killings and told me, with reference to the order from the Führer, that it was his duty to evacuate the Jews and that during such evacuations, which also involved old and sick people, of course there were cases of death, there were accidents, there were attacks by enemy aircraft. He added too, that there were revolts, which of course he had to suppress severely and with bloodshed, as a warning. For the rest, he said that these people were being accommodated in camps in the East. He brought out a lot of pictures and albums and showed me the work that was being done in these camps by the Jews and how they worked for the war needs, the shoemakers shops, tailors shops, and so forth. He told me:
“This is the order of the Führer; if you believe that you have to take action against it then tell the Führer and tell me the names of the people who have made these reports to you.”
Of course, I could not tell him the names, first of all because they did not want to be named, and secondly, they only knew these things from hearsay, so as I said, I could not have given him any definite material at all.
Nevertheless, I once again reported this matter to the Führer, and on this occasion he gave me exactly the same reply which I had been given by Himmler. He said, “I shall later on decide where these Jews will be taken and in the meantime they are being cared for there.”
Then he said the same thing Himmler had said, which gave me the impression that Himmler had told the Führer that Lammers would come and probably report to him something about this.
But that final solution of the Jewish problem was nevertheless in my portfolio and I was determined to bring it up once again with the Führer. I succeeded in doing so on the occasion of some particularly crass cases in connection with this question, cases which were such that the Führer let me talk to him about it. By way of example I should mention the entire case.
If a Jew was married to a German woman then he was considered “privileged,” that is to say, he was not evacuated. But if the wife had died...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please...
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I myself should like to ask the witness to speak more briefly. But I ask that this particular question be admitted. In my opinion the witness is trying to describe how this entire final solution of the Jewish problem was carried out in secret and with deception being practiced on Hitler’s entire entourage, and that is why I ask that the witness be allowed to finish his statement since this is a very decisive point in the discussion.
[Turning to the witness.] But, Witness, please be quite brief. I am now putting this question to you: Did Himmler ever tell you that the final solution of the Jewish problem would take place through the extermination of the Jews?
LAMMERS: That was never mentioned. He talked only about evacuation.
DR. THOMA: He talked only about evacuation?
LAMMERS: Yes, only about evacuation.
DR. THOMA: When did you hear that these 5 million Jews had been exterminated?
LAMMERS: I heard of that here a while ago.
DR. THOMA: In other words the matter was completely secret and only very few persons knew of it?
LAMMERS: I assume that Himmler arranged it so that no one learned anything about it and that he formed his Commandos in such a way that nobody knew anything about them. Of course, there must be a large number of people who must have known something about it.
DR. THOMA: Can you tell me what people must have known something about it, apart from those who actually carried out these exterminations? Who, apart from those people, must have known something about it?
LAMMERS: Well, to start with, Himmler must have passed his order on to other people; and there must have been certain leading officials, and these leading officials must, of course, have had other leading officials subordinate to them who took charge of the Kommandos and who kept everything completely secret.
DR. THOMA: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): Witness, you have already talked about a number of questions which are also of importance for the defense of Defendant Frick, since he was a member of the Reich Cabinet. Can you tell me on the strength of what position, or what position it was, that you are enabled to give these answers? I repeat, can you tell me what your position was within the Reich Cabinet which enables you to answer these questions?
LAMMERS: You mean my own?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
LAMMERS: I was State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery and I was the intermediary between the Führer and the Reich ministers, with two exceptions: the Führer either had direct communication with these gentlemen or the men in question had a way prescribed to approach the Führer other than through me. There were a number of things which did not go through my hands, but which the ministers submitted to the Führer directly. These were all matters of high policy, particularly of high foreign policy. Only in 1937, on the occasion of certain changes in the Cabinet, did I receive the title “Reich Minister,” but my tasks did not change. In particular, I also had no departments.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me when the very last meeting of the Reich Cabinet took place?
LAMMERS: The Reich Cabinet met for the last time in November 1937. To be sure, in 1938, at the beginning of February, there was one more so-called “information conference” of the ministers, during which the Führer announced the change which had been made in the Cabinet involving Herr Von Blomberg and Herr Von Neurath. The last Cabinet meeting in which actual consultation took place, namely in regard to the draft of a penal code, took place in November 1937.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me something about any attempts after that date to get the ministers together?
LAMMERS: After that date I continuously attempted to effect a concentration of the Reich Cabinet, a reactivation, I might say. This was continuously refused by the Führer. I had even prepared a draft, a draft for a decree according to which ministers should at least come together to consult with each other once or twice a month under the chairmanship of Reich Marshal Göring, or, if he were prevented from attending, with me as acting chairman. The ministers were to come together and hear informal reports. That was turned down by the Führer. Nevertheless, the ministers had an urgent desire to meet. My next suggestion was that I invite the ministers once or twice a month to a social evening, a beer party, so that we could get together and talk. To that the Führer replied, “Herr Lammers, this is not your concern; it is my concern. The next time I go to Berlin, I will do that.”
THE PRESIDENT: What are all these details about beer drinking? If they did not meet and he applied to the Führer, asking them to meet, and they never did, that is sufficient. What is the good of going into detail?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct, therefore, to say that the Reich Ministers had to work on their own in their departments, in their special field of activity, and that a Reich Cabinet as such, which decided questions of policy and was informed and held discussions, did not exist any more at all?
LAMMERS: Actually the ministers were no more than the highest administrative chiefs of their departments. They could no longer act in the Cabinet of the Reich Government as political ministers. I tried to describe that earlier. No more meetings took place; conferences were even forbidden. So, how could it have been possible for them to exchange views?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about Hitler’s statement considering the Reich Cabinet as a defeatist club, which he did not want to see anymore?
LAMMERS: In connection with my attempts to reactivate the Reich Cabinet through certain meetings, the Führer told me that this would have to be stopped since an atmosphere might arise which he would not like. He did not use the words “defeatist club” in my presence, but Reichsleiter Bormann told me that he said, “The ministers are not to meet; that might become a defeatist club.”
DR. PANNENBECKER: It has been discussed here frequently that a Reich Minister on his own could not resign. Do you know anything about Frick making an attempt to resign his post as Reich Minister?
LAMMERS: In spite of this prohibition by the Führer, Frick repeatedly stated his wish to be relieved of his office if he no longer enjoyed the Führer’s full confidence and if the Führer would not receive him any more. He told me that frequently; but I cannot recall a written application for resignation. Frick’s wishes to resign were always passed on to the Führer by me although the Führer always rejected such communications very bluntly.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In August 1943 Frick left his post as Reich Minister of the Interior. Do you know any details of what he himself said in that connection?
LAMMERS: At that time Herr Frick himself told me, “I am happy to leave my post as Minister of the Interior, but please see to it that the Führer does not make me Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, as he intends to do. I do not want that office. I want to retire.” And I told that to the Führer.
The Führer ordered Frick to come to headquarters. Before Frick went in to see the Führer alone, he told me that he did not, under any circumstances, want to accept the position of Reich Protector, but when he came back from the Führer he had, nevertheless, changed his mind and had accepted the office. If I am right this must have been in August 1943.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Frick’s position as Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration is also one of the points against him in the accusation. Do you know anything about the appointment of that office?
LAMMERS: As Reich Plenipotentiary for Administration he had the task of co-ordinating other ministries. The following were co-ordinated: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for Education, the Ministry for Churches, and the National Office for Regional Planning. He co-ordinated them under his administration and represented them, so to speak, in the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich, which came into being in 1939 with the outbreak of the war.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me on the basis of what regulations Frick was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration? There are two Reich defense laws, one of 1935 and one of 1938.
LAMMERS: The Defense Law of 1935 I can no longer remember. The draft of the Reich Defense Law of 1938, which was not published, allots to the Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration a great number of tasks which, however, were never passed on to him. He had merely the task of co-ordinating the various departments, which I have just mentioned. At any rate he never exercised actual powers as Plenipotentiary General for the Reich Administration to the extent to which they were allotted him in the Reich Defense Law.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In this connection one also talks of the powers of a so-called Three Man College. This consisted of Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration Frick, Plenipotentiary General for Economy Schacht—later Funk—and the Chief of the OKW. Can you tell me what powers these three exercised?
LAMMERS: The expression Three Man College is first of all quite false; it is not a concept in constitutional law but merely a term of convenience, a term used by officials. These three people, the Plenipotentiary General for Administration, the Plenipotentiary General for Economy, and the Chief of the OKW, each had the power to issue decrees, but they were obliged to have the consent of the other two—that is, with the agreement of the others, anyone could give orders in his field. A meeting of this committee, this so-called Three Man College, never took place. The decrees issued by it are very few, insignificant, and quite unimportant. For instance, I can remember that this committee ruled on the question of reducing the numbers of judges in the disciplinary chambers; that is in civil service matters. A second task in this sphere—in all, there were six to eight decrees at the most, but altogether quite unimportant.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In addition there was later on the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich. Can you compare these two groups, those three and the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich?
LAMMERS: Do you mean the Three Man College for the Ministerial Council?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
LAMMERS: First of all, after the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich was established, it was my principle to stalemate this Three Man College if possible, since it was not at all necessary. The Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich had the task of issuing decrees with legal effect but it actually had nothing to do with the Defense of the Reich. Military matters were never discussed in this Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich, nor did it deal with foreign policy or propaganda. In the main it issued decrees which had the effect of laws. Meetings took place only until December 1939, and after that the members communicated with each other by writing for the purpose of issuing decrees. Political debates never took place.
DR. PANNENBECKER: A Central Office was founded in the Ministry of the Interior for the occupied territories. This Central Office has been cited by the Prosecution as evidence of the fact that Frick had considerable administrative powers, and hence responsibility for the occupied territories. Are you able to say anything about that?
LAMMERS: The Central Office had, in the main, two tasks. One was the obtaining of civil servants, the other was assisting in the issuing of laws and decrees in occupied territories. Such an office was necessary because the occupied territories required personnel and because the Reich commissioners in the occupied territories were directly under the Führer’s command. Written communications went in part through me. If personnel was to be provided for within this framework, then I would have had to do it. But I had no instrument for it. I had only a staff of 12 senior officials and I had no organization in the country; I had no executive officials in those countries. Therefore the Minister of the Interior was brought in, since he had the whole civil service apparatus at his disposal.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You just said that the Central Office gave some assistance in issuing decrees for the occupied territories. Was it possible for the Central Office to issue a decree for, let us say, Norway?
LAMMERS: For what?
DR. PANNENBECKER: To issue a decree for some occupied territory, for instance Norway.
LAMMERS: No, not of itself—at the most after the Reich commissioner had agreed.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Was it at all customary for the Central Office at any time to issue a decree for a certain occupied territory?
LAMMERS: To my knowledge that has never happened. I do not know of a single case where the Central Office issued a decree.
DR. PANNENBECKER: A decree by the Reich Minister of the Interior has been cited which ruled on the question of citizenship, also with reference to occupied territories.
LAMMERS: Yes, about German citizenship probably.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
LAMMERS: Yes, but that was certainly an internal German matter.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did the Central Office have any right to issue instructions either to the German Plenipotentiary in the occupied territory, say the Reich Commissioner for Norway...
LAMMERS: No, they had no such right at all.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Or did they have a right to issue instructions to lower offices—German offices—or to the occupied territories themselves?
LAMMERS: No, they did not have the right to give instructions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: The Prosecution have further stated that the Central Office also had the right to issue instructions in those territories for which it had not been specifically appointed. Is there any legal provision or any practical case where the Central Office interfered with jurisdiction in the occupied territories?
LAMMERS: No case is known to me.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it then correct to say that the chiefs of the civil administration in the occupied territories were always directly subordinate to Hitler as the Führer, no matter what their official designation was?
LAMMERS: In the occupied territories the Reich commissioners of the so-called chiefs of the civil administration were directly subordinate to the Führer.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did Frick, as Minister of the Interior, have the power to issue orders for the occupied territories insofar as the German Police was active in the occupied territories?
LAMMERS: No, the police authority in occupied territories was vested solely in Himmler who was to act in agreement with the Reich commissioners. The Minister of the Interior had nothing at all to do with the police in occupied territories.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Must it not be concluded from that that this matter came within the competency of the Reich Minister of the Interior insofar as Himmler was subordinate to the Reich Ministry of the Interior?
LAMMERS: There would have been at most a power to issue orders for Germany but not for the occupied territories, and to what extent this power existed for Germany herself is also problematic.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I shall come to that later in detail. Can you tell me what powers the Minister of the Interior had in the police field during that time when the police were still under the jurisdiction of the provinces of Prussia, et cetera, that is, from 1933 to 1936?
LAMMERS: Well, his powers were in any case very limited, but I cannot tell you the details.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did the Reich have the right of supervision?
LAMMERS: Yes, the old right, as it was formerly—the Reich had only the ultimate supervision.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Of course, you know that later on, through a decree, Himmler was appointed Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior, do you not? Do you know who created that designation, “Reichsführer SS” and so forth?
LAMMERS: Yes, I had something to do with it at the time. The proposal of such a title originated apparently with Himmler. I objected to this title from the very beginning for two reasons. Two entirely different matters were being lumped together: the Reichsführer SS, which is a Party affiliation, and the Police, which is a State concern. On the one side was the Reichsführer SS who has the rank of a Reichsleiter in the Party, which is equivalent to that of a Reich minister; on the other side the Chief of Police, who has the position of a State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior and who is subordinate to the Minister of the Interior. But Himmler insisted on this designation, and the Führer considered that he was right.
My objections to this designation proved to be correct in practice, for the Minister of the Interior’s right to issue instructions to the Police now became extremely problematic, since Reichsführer Himmler, as far as the police officers were concerned, was, at the same time the SS Führer and could give them orders in his capacity as Reichsführer SS, and the Ministry of the Interior could not interfere. It was also a practice of his that he usually made the other police officials SS leaders. One therefore could never know exactly in what capacity the person concerned was acting, whether he was acting as member of the SS, or as a member of the Police. And the question of authority in the Ministry of Interior afterwards became almost devoid of meaning, because Himmler dropped the last words of the designation, “Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior,” and completely separated himself from the Ministry of the Interior as far as having an office in the building and the mode of procedure were concerned, and no longer felt himself in a subordinate position.
When Minister Frick lodged a complaint about this with me, which I was supposed to take to the Führer, the Führer told me, “Tell Herr Frick that he should not restrict Himmler as Chief of the German Police too much; with him the Police is in good hands. He should allow him as much free rein as possible!”
Thus for all practical purposes, though not by a special decree, the Minister of the Interior’s authority to give orders was very sharply limited, if not even suspended.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You have just said that Himmler, on his own, arbitrarily exercised jurisdiction over police organizations without bothering about what Frick wanted. But then there was still another channel for commands issued to the police, orders given by Hitler himself. Did he give them to Frick as the competent minister, or did he give them to Himmler?
LAMMERS: Normally the Führer gave these instructions to Himmler. If he gave instructions to me which concerned police matters then I generally passed them on through the Minister of the Interior, or at least I informed him about them.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about whether concentration camps were included in the budget of the Reich or whether they were in the budget of the SS?
LAMMERS: As far as I know—but I cannot say this for certain—the funds for concentration camps did not appear in the budget of the Reich. It was rather this way: The Reich Minister of Finance paid a yearly lump sum to the Party through the Reich Treasurer, who had to distribute it to the various Party organizations. The Reichsführer SS received a lump sum from the SS with which he probably financed this matter. I also cannot recollect that I ever saw any part of the Reich budget in which the concentration camps were mentioned.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about the fact that Himmler opposed the Minister of the Interior’s right to interfere in this field, giving as his reason the fact that the funds for concentration camps had been provided for?
LAMMERS: No, I do not know anything about that.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I now have some questions referring to another field. Do you know anything about Hitler’s efforts to kill incurably insane persons painlessly?
LAMMERS: Yes, this idea occurred to Hitler in the autumn of 1939 for the first time. On that occasion the State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior, Dr. Conti, received the order to investigate this question. He was told to discuss the legal aspect of the matter with me. I spoke against the execution of any such program. But since the Führer insisted on it I suggested that this matter should be given all legal guarantees and be ruled upon by a law. I also had an appropriate draft for a law worked out; thereupon State Secretary Conti was relieved of this task, and in 1940 it was given over to Reichsleiter Bouhler. Reichsleiter Bouhler reported to the Führer, but I was not present. Then he came to see me. I showed him my draft of the law and stated the objections I had to the matter and he left again. Then I presented the drafted law to the Führer; he did not approve of it, but he did not reject it altogether. Later, however, ignoring me, he gave Reichsleiter Bouhler and the medical attendant, Professor Dr. Brandt, then attached to him, plenary authority to kill incurably insane people. I had nothing to do with the drafting of this plenary power. As far as I was concerned, the matter was settled, as the Führer did not want me and had given the work to others to do.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You have just said that the Führer gave the task to State Secretary Dr. Conti in the Ministry of the Interior. Did that order from Hitler pass to Conti through Frick?
LAMMERS: I do not know. State Secretary Conti was called by telephone by the adjutant’s office of the Führer or by Reichsleiter Bormann; and whether that went through Frick or not, I do not know.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything at all about whether Frick himself participated in these measures in some form or other?
LAMMERS: No, nothing about that is known to me.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Then I have a last group of questions, referring to the Protectorate in Bohemia and Moravia. When, in August 1943, Frick was appointed Protector for Bohemia and Moravia did the formal authority of the Reich Protector remain the same as before?
LAMMERS: No. These powers were deliberately altered and in such a way that the Reich Protector from then on was to become a more or less decorative figure. The political direction of the Protectorate was to be transferred to State Minister Frank. The Reich Protector was merely the German representative in the Protectorate with very little actual power. He co-operated in forming the government in the Protectorate. Furthermore he had the limited, rather small right of nominating civil servants, which in the main applied to the medium and lower grade of civil servants; and then he had the right of granting pardons. And in general the State Minister for Bohemia and Moravia, Frank, was obliged to keep the Reich Protector informed. In the main these were the rights of the Reich Protector. Apart from that it was Hitler’s wish that the Reich Protector did not spend too much time in the Protectorate. In fact I have had to pass this information on to him several times.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You said that the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia during Frick’s time was the head of the German administration. Was State Minister Frank under Frick?
LAMMERS: Yes, he was subordinate but the relation was rather that of the head of the State to the head of the Government; State Minister Frank had the political control.
DR. PANNENBECKER: But is it not right to say that Minister Frank was directly subordinate to the Führer?
LAMMERS: I do not believe that that was the situation. I do not remember the decree. He was not directly under him—I cannot say that for certain now. At any rate the Führer received only Frank and not the Reich Protector for political discussions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I do not have the decree with me. I shall have to clear that up later.
Do you know anything about the fact that Frick expressly demanded this division of authority and that, to start with, he had refused to accept the position of a Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; and that this division of authority did not take place until he said that he could not assume outer responsibility for something which was not his inner responsibility?
LAMMERS: I have already mentioned the fact that Minister Frick refused to accept this position, and when this decree appeared, in which the rights of the Protector were laid down—a decree which was not published—Dr. Frick quite rightly had misgivings, thinking, “As far as the outside world is concerned, I shall have responsibilities which are not known at all.” So we published a notice in the press. In that it stated that the new Reich Protector would have only such and such rights, as I previously listed here, such as the nomination of civil servants, the right to pardon and the right to co-operate in the forming of a government in the Protectorate. Thus it was stated to the outside world that Frick no longer had the full responsibility which former Reich Protectors had perhaps had.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you know anything about the fact that the reason for this division of responsibility in the Protectorate was that Hitler did not think that Frick would be hard enough to handle matters there?
LAMMERS: That was obviously the reason, yes.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In that case I have no further questions.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): As a supplement to the statements already made by the witness, I have still a few questions.
Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Funk beginning with the year 1933 was the Press Chief of the Reich Government. That is known to you?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: You yourself were at that time already in your office, were you not?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Did the Defendant Funk in this capacity as Press Chief of the Reich Government exercise any influence on decisions made by the Reich Cabinet or on the contents of bills of the Reich Cabinet?
LAMMERS: That question must be answered in the negative. At the most, he may have had an influence from the journalistic point of view, that is, for an attractive title for a law, or some sort of popular wording, or something like that. But he did not vote on the contents of the laws. In his position as Press Chief, he was first Ministerial Director and then State Secretary; he had nothing to say about the contents.
DR. SAUTER: Then why was he, as Press Chief of the Reich Government, invited at all to attend the meetings of the Reich Cabinet at that time?
LAMMERS: Well, because of the reporting to the press afterwards.
DR. SAUTER: That is to say, only to inform the press of the discussions and decisions of the Reich Cabinet? And he had no influence whatsoever on decisions or not on the bills either?
LAMMERS: Yes, that is right.
DR. SAUTER: But without having any influence on decisions or the authority to propose laws.
LAMMERS: Yes, that is right.
DR. SAUTER: In this capacity as Press Chief of the Reich Government, the Defendant Funk had, as you know, to give reports regularly on press matters to the then Reich Chancellor, Hitler. Do you know when these regular reports made by the Press Chief of the Reich Government to Hitler ceased?
LAMMERS: At the latest they ceased 1 year later. These were joint conferences. Funk and I, at the beginning, had as many as three to four meetings a week with the Führer, and this lasted through the summer of 1933. During the winter the meetings became fewer, then became more frequent again, and ceased altogether in 1934, after Von Hindenburg’s death.
DR. SAUTER: Who made these press reports to Hitler after that?
LAMMERS: The Press Chief Dr. Dietrich.
DR. SAUTER: Excluding Dr. Funk?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Funk later on became President of the Reichsbank. Do you know anything about who had to decide about credits given, or to be given, to the Reich by the Reichsbank?
LAMMERS: That decision was the Führer’s. The way it happened in practice was that the Minister of Finance submitted the application for a credit. That was done in duplicate. One letter with the appropriate order was directed to the Reich Minister of Finance, and the second letter with such an order was addressed to the President of the Reichsbank.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, these technical details do not really interest us. We are only interested in this: Did Dr. Funk, as President of the Reichsbank have any influence on the question of whether and to what extent the German Reich could claim credit from the Reichsbank? Only this interests us.
LAMMERS: I can answer that only by citing technical details. All I received were those two documents from the Finance Minister. It was entirely a matter of having them signed. They were signed in one second by the Führer and then they were sent back. I never had an order to negotiate with Herr Funk or with Herr Schacht or with the Minister of Finance. It was entirely a matter of having them signed, nothing else.
DR. SAUTER: So that according to your knowledge these instructions came from Hitler and not from the Reichsbank president?
LAMMERS: The instructions were signed by the Führer.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, you have already mentioned once the so-called Committee of Three or Three Man College, which was formed in the later years. Regarding this Committee of Three the Prosecution maintain that Funk was also a member of this committee, and that this committee represented, so to speak, the highest court as far as the legislation of the Reich Government during the war was concerned.
LAMMERS: One cannot say that at all. I have already stated that these three men, each acting independently, had the right to issue decrees with the consent of the two others, and that there were very few and quite insignificant decrees.
DR. SAUTER: You mean decrees of little importance, decrees for his department?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Furthermore, Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Göring stated during his examination that the powers which Dr. Funk had as Plenipotentiary for Economy—I think in 1938—were transferred for the most part to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, that consequently Dr. Funk’s powers, generally speaking, existed only on paper. I should be very interested in knowing whether these powers of the Plenipotentiary for Economy were transferred to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, in other words, Göring, formally, as well as in fact.
LAMMERS: That was based on a decree of the Führer and a special order issued by the Führer.
DR. SAUTER: When was that, approximately?
LAMMERS: The Four Year Plan was set up in 1936, and it was extended in 1940 for another 4 years. These special powers which Herr Funk later surrendered to the Four Year Plan were based on an agreement between Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Funk, an arrangement which, as far as I know, had the Führer’s approval.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, you have already told the Tribunal that since 1938, I think, no more meetings of the Cabinet took place and that in the end Hitler even prohibited informal discussions among ministers. Can you tell us anything as to whether and, if so, how often the Defendant Dr. Funk had an opportunity, during the 7 years he was Minister, to talk to Hitler, to report to him, and so forth?
LAMMERS: Well, during the first years, as I have said, he reported frequently as Press Chief.
DR. SAUTER: And later as Minister of Economics?
LAMMERS: Later, as Minister of Economics, he very rarely came to the Führer. At many conferences he was not consulted, even at conferences in which he ought to have been consulted. Quite often he complained to me about that. I tried in every way to do my best to include him in such conferences, but I did not always succeed.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, I have noticed that minutes have been read here in which it is clearly said, and I think by you, that the Defendant Funk as Minister for Economics has asked you that he be permitted to participate in this or that important conference, and that you had expressly stated in that record that the Führer had refused that, or that the Führer had prohibited it. May I show you an example? I remember a meeting of 4 January 1944, Document 1292-PS, concerning questions of labor employment. In those minutes it says—once more said by you—that Funk’s request to be able to participate had been refused. Can you remember such cases and can you give us the reasons?
LAMMERS: Yes, I can remember such cases, but I do not know whether they were mentioned in the minutes. Probably I informed Herr Funk that I had made the greatest effort to have him participate in these conferences; the Führer, however, had refused.
DR. SAUTER: The reason?
LAMMERS: Frequently the Führer made objections; those were various reasons in the case of Funk. He was sceptical about him and did not want him there.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, in April of 1941 you are supposed to have informed the Defendant Dr. Funk that Rosenberg had received an order from Hitler for a uniform treatment of the problems in the Eastern Territories. Besides giving that message to Funk you are supposed to have passed it on to Göring and Keitel. From that fact the conclusion has been drawn by the Prosecution that Funk was one of the influential persons concerned with the preparation for aggressive war against Russia.
Can you tell us whether and, if so, why you also passed that message on to the Defendant Funk at that time?
LAMMERS: Either the Führer told me to do so—which I do not think was the case—or I believed that from the economic point of view Funk would be interested in this information. I passed it on to him as a special personal gesture; I do not remember any particular reason now. I certainly must have passed the same message on to others, but not in writing; the others probably received it orally.
There was no question at all of an aggressive war when Rosenberg was given that task by Hitler. He was supposed to be merely a sort of political commissioner for the Eastern Territories. He was to study the conditions of the peoples there.
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, roughly at the same time, that is to say, the spring of 1941, and shortly before the beginning of the Russian campaign, you are supposed to have had some further discussions with the Defendant Funk on the subject of what turn the foreign political situation in respect to Russia might possibly take in the near future. On that occasion you are supposed to have told Defendant Funk something regarding the reasons why Hitler believed in the possibility of a war against Russia. What did you tell Defendant Funk at that time regarding these preparations for the war undertaken at one time or another?
LAMMERS: It must have been what I knew myself at the time, namely, information which the Führer had given me, that troop concentrations in Russia had been observed, which allowed the conclusion to be drawn that an armed conflict with Russia might occur. These were the words the Führer used. He believed that things would come to a head with Russia and therefore wished that one man, and that was Rosenberg, should concern himself with Eastern questions, since the possibility of an armed conflict with Russia did exist. That is probably what I told Funk. I cannot imagine what else I could have told him.
DR. SAUTER: At that time, Dr. Lammers, you are supposed to have mentioned not only troop concentrations on the Russian side along the Eastern frontier of Germany, but also the Russian march into Bessarabia.
LAMMERS: Yes, it is possible that that was the case. The Southeast, at any rate; and perhaps I mentioned that the discussions which had taken place with Russia, with Molotov, were unsatisfactory.
DR. SAUTER: In that connection, since you now refer to the discussion with Molotov, you are supposed to have told Defendant Funk in particular that Russia was making considerable claims on the Balkans and in respect to the Baltic Sea, and that because of these claims Hitler was reckoning with the possibility of war. Could that be correct?
LAMMERS: It is possible that we have talked about it, but I cannot remember for certain.
DR. SAUTER: And you know, Dr. Lammers, that in this connection an organization was established under the heading “Central Planning?” Do you know that?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Defendant Funk was also made a member of the Central Planning, and I think that was at the end of 1943. Is it correct that Funk, when he joined the Central Planning, was no longer at all interested in the use of workers for German production, and why was that so?
LAMMERS: I believe that Funk’s only interest in the Central Planning was to receive raw materials for civilian production.
DR. SAUTER: For civilian production at home?
LAMMERS: Yes, at home. That was his interest in the Central Planning, since he was responsible only for the distribution of these economic goods, and civilian production had been transferred to Minister Speer.
DR. SAUTER: When?
LAMMERS: I think that was at the very moment when the Minister for Armament and Munitions was converted into a Minister for Armament and War Production. I think that was in 1942. Thus Funk was, of course, very interested in raw materials; but the employment of labor, in my opinion, interested him very little, since he did not have enough raw material at all to allow civilian production to go on.
DR. SAUTER: And then, Dr. Lammers, I have one last question: Can you remember that Defendant Funk in the year 1944—it is supposed to have been in February and also a few times during subsequent months—visited you and told you of his trouble because of the unsatisfactory position which he was occupying as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary for Economics, and that on this occasion he talked to you about the question of whether his conscience would allow him to retain his position as President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics, and, if so, why he did so and why he did not place this office at the disposal of somebody else? Perhaps you can say something about this?
LAMMERS: I have frequently discussed these questions with Funk.
DR. SAUTER: When?
LAMMERS: In 1943, but particularly afterwards in 1944. I know that he was considerably worried about this and that he wanted very much to have an opportunity to take his worries to the Führer personally. If he did remain in office then it was only because he realized that during wartime he could not resign from his post; that would not be the right thing for a good German, to resign during wartime. But he had the most fervent wish to be able to report to the Führer about the economic situation and mainly about the particular impressions which the Gauleiter in the individual districts had. He had the most fervent wish, once for all, to report to the Führer and learn at least something about the war situation and talk about the question of ending the war. That was since the beginning of September. I made several attempts to submit the matter to the Führer; and I nearly succeeded later by camouflaging the real reason and pretending there was another important reason, some question of finance.
I submitted the matter to the Führer; but the Führer sized up the situation, and, although Herr Funk had been waiting at my office for days for the report, he refused the request, probably because of Bormann’s efforts towards this end. With the best intentions Funk did not succeed in seeing the Führer and I did not succeed in taking him to the Führer.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have otherwise no further question.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, if you wish to close the session at 5 o’clock, I must say that I shall not have finished by 5 o’clock; and I am reluctant to break off my examination. I leave it up to the Tribunal whether we should extend the session or whether we should break off now.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better go on, Dr. Dix; we have nearly 10 minutes.
DR. DIX: Witness, other witnesses and you too—you on the strength of vast experience and your position as Chief of the Reich Chancellery from the seizure of power until the collapse—have stated that applications for resignation were prohibited by Hitler. I therefore do not want to put any more questions on that subject; I merely want to discuss the attempts to resign which Schacht actually made. I ask you first of all to answer the general questions with “Yes” or “No.”
Did Schacht send in applications for resignation or not?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: I should now like to discuss with you the individual applications for resignation. I cannot expect you, without any help, to recall individual occasions. I permit myself therefore to help your memory along a little in connection with the first question.
Please recall March 1937, when Schacht stopped Reichsbank credits, that is, gave notice with reference to them and you visited him in connection with this. Was that the first application for resignation?
LAMMERS: I remember that very exactly, since Herr Schacht’s application for resignation was very unpleasant for Hitler; and he gave me the task of straightening the matter out with Schacht. Thus I made several personal visits to Schacht, but he refused to withdraw his application for resignation; and he gave, as his reason, the fact that he could not approve any longer the Führer’s credit policy and that he was afraid of inflation and would have to protect the German nation from that. As for the freedom of action, he had to...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into details? We gather that there are several offers to resign. Is it necessary to go into the details of each one?
DR. DIX: In that case we leave it. It is enough for me, Dr. Lammers, if you confirm that in March 1937 Schacht made his first application for resignation.
LAMMERS: And then there was a compromise and Herr Schacht, first of all, was to remain in office 1 more year, although the law called for a term of 4 years.
DR. DIX: Please try to remember what happened further in August 1937. Göring had issued a decree concerning mines. It was Schacht’s view that this was an unwarranted interference with matters under his jurisdiction. Did a second application for resignation follow?
LAMMERS: Yes.
DR. DIX: And did not Schacht write a letter on that occasion addressed to Göring, 5 August, a copy of which he sent to Hitler? Can you remember that?
LAMMERS: Yes. It was because of that letter that Hitler dismissed Schacht afterwards.
DR. DIX: Now we come to the war. Did Schacht also repeat his applications for resignation during the war? Please recall the summer of 1941 and a memorandum which Schacht sent to Hitler regarding the necessity of a speedy conclusion of peace?
LAMMERS: The first application for resignation was handed in because it had been prohibited to listen to foreign broadcasting stations. Schacht was thereby forbidden to listen to many foreign stations; and he complained about it and handed in an application for resignation, whether in writing or verbally, I do not know. The request was refused, and later he submitted a memorandum in which he discussed the end of the war and the political and economic situation. I had to tell Schacht, in answer to this memorandum, that the Führer had read it and had nothing to say in reply. Thereupon, in 1942, Schacht again asked me to ask the Führer if he was disposed to receive another memorandum. At this the Führer gave me the order to write to Schacht and tell him to refrain from submitting any further memoranda.
DR. DIX: I could, Mr. President, recall the important points of this memorandum of the summer of 1941 for the witness. If the Tribunal is familiar with the details of this memorandum, which we do not have and which we could ascertain only on the basis of the witness’ memory by asking him questions, then I should like to present to him the exact contents of this memorandum. If on the other hand the Tribunal is of the opinion...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you the memorandum?
DR. DIX: No, we do not have the memorandum—only in memory—that is to say, Schacht remembers it.
THE PRESIDENT: If the memorandum is lost and you can prove the loss, you can put the contents of it to the witness. If the contents are not relevant it is no good even for the witness. Are the contents of the document relevant?
DR. DIX: These points which I want to submit I do consider relevant. It is not very long either. It is not long.
THE PRESIDENT: So far as the question of proof is concerned, the rule is, I think, if the document has been lost, you can prove the contents of it and you can put it to the witness. Yes, you can put the main points to him, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX: The question which you put to me involves considerable responsibility. At the moment I can merely assure you that I am convinced that the memorandum has been lost; but whether I can prove it, the negative fact that it is lost, that is something I cannot say at the moment. I am convinced it is lost.
THE PRESIDENT: Herr Schacht presumably is going to say it was lost. You, of course, cannot prove it yourself but I mean you can prove it by Schacht.
DR. DIX: Yes, Schacht will prove it when he becomes a defendant on the stand.
[Turning to the witness.] This was in September 1941, that is to say, after the great successes in Russia by the German Army. Then Schacht wrote in this memorandum to Hitler that Hitler had now reached the peak of his success and that this was the most favorable moment for him to aim at peace. In the case of any further duration of the war...
MR. DODD: I suggest, would it not be more proper for counsel to ask this witness, first of all, whether or not he recalls the contents of the memorandum before reading what purports to be the contents?
THE PRESIDENT: I think he should, yes.
DR. DIX: I did not remind him of the contents; I just wanted to recall to him the individual points. Dr. Lammers has already said that.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better put it to him sentence by sentence and not all at once.
DR. DIX: But, I am not proposing to read it, Your Honors, I am merely trying to repeat the contents as Schacht remembers them. I cannot read it, of course, since I do not know it.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you ask the witness if he remembers what the contents were, not putting it in a leading form.
DR. DIX: Yes, I shall certainly ask him. But I think he has already answered, that he no longer remembers all the details, therefore I wanted to aid his memory by recalling the main points.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him what he does remember of it.
DR. DIX: Well then, Dr. Lammers, without my presenting the main points to you, what do you remember?
LAMMERS: I think that in this memorandum Herr Schacht set forth the economic capacities of Germany and of foreign countries, that he pointed out that this period in 1941—I believe it was in the autumn—was the most favorable moment for peace negotiations, for bringing the war to an end. He also explained the world situation but I cannot remember how. He sketched the political situation in other countries. He talked about America, Italy, Japan, and he compared the factors. After the Führer had looked at the memorandum he put it aside and he said, “I have already disapproved of that; I do not want that.”
Further details I do not know.
DR. DIX: When you mention “other countries,” do you remember that he stated that Italy’s withdrawal was merely a question of time, since the opposition group around the King would not rest until Mussolini was brought down?
LAMMERS: Yes, it is possible that it did say that, but I cannot remember definitely.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The Tribunal will adjourn now.