Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know exactly what your letter means, which they received from you, relating to the following documents which the letter says have been withdrawn. What I want to know is, does it mean that they are not to be translated? Let me read you the numbers: 18, 19, 48, 53, 76, 80, 81, 82, 86, and 101. Now, does your letter mean that those documents are not to be translated?
DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British Delegation informed me yesterday morning that the objections against those documents on the part of the British Delegation are withdrawn.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on 30 April, in the afternoon, after I had had a conversation with Sir David. The following morning I was informed...
THE PRESIDENT: We won’t bother with that. You say that their objections no longer exist. If they agree to that, well and good.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, apparently there seems to have been some misunderstanding about three of them, Numbers 80, 101, and 76. The others were not objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed to be some misunderstanding between Dr. Siemers and myself. I understood that he did not want to persist in the legal report on the Altmark incident, and I think Dr. Siemers thought that I wasn’t persisting. However, I thought Dr. Siemers was withdrawing that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, are you still objecting to that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am still objecting to it if it is not withdrawn, My Lord. However, the other ones in the list Your Lordship mentioned—that is Numbers 18, 19, 48, 53, 81, 82, and 86—there is no objection to.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir David. Number 76 can be struck out, as far as I am concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That’s all I wanted to know.
DR. SIEMERS: Number 80 about which I have spoken in detail with the British Delegation...
THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it.
DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would be no objection. I would like to ask that it be admitted in any case.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the Translation Division should get on as soon as possible, the Tribunal has decided upon these documents and the only questions upon which the Tribunal has decided is that they shall be translated. The question of their admissibility will be decided after they have been translated, and I will take them in the categories of objection which are set out in Sir David’s memorandum.
In Category A, the first category, Number 66 will be allowed. Number 76 as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. Numbers 101 to 106 will be allowed, the rest are disallowed in A. In B the following documents will be allowed: Numbers 39, 63, 64, 99, and 100. And, of course, Numbers 102 to 107, which are allowed under A. The rest will not be allowed.
Category C: The following will be allowed: Numbers 38, 50, 55, and 58. The remainder are not allowed.
Category D: The following will be allowed: Numbers 29, 56, 57, 60, and 62.
Category E: The following will be allowed: Numbers 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, 41, and of course 99 and 101 which have already been allowed.
In the last category, Category F, the Tribunal has very great doubts as to the relevance of any of the documents in that category, but it will have them all translated with the exception of Document 73.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the Tribunal would allow me to mention the document numbers of the additional extracts from Der Stürmer which were put in cross-examination of Streicher. I had the numbers ready to present at a convenient time.
THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal, I have proposed to hand in that schedule, which is in effect a catalogue or index to the two bundles which the Tribunal had—Bundle A and Bundle B—and I proposed then putting this schedule in as an exhibit itself, which will become GB-450, (Document Number D-833), and if the Tribunal agrees, that would save reading any numbers out.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There is another request I would make. The original of the newspaper, Israelitisches Wochenblatt, was put in, or has been put in. Those volumes I have borrowed from a library, and I was going to ask the Tribunal’s permission to have the extracts photographed and to substitute with the Tribunal’s Secretariat the photostats, and then take back the originals so that they might be returned.
THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.
THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx?
DR. MARX: No, Mr. President, I have no objection to that. I reserve the right to submit some counter documents if it should be necessary. But the presentation of these documents is in accordance with what Colonel Griffith-Jones stated in the course of the proceedings—if they are submitted...
THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this exhibit.
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection to the original of the Jewish newspaper being returned...
DR. MARX: No.
THE PRESIDENT: ...after it is photographed.
DR. MARX: No, I have no objection to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, I believe you still had to supplement your answer to a question I put to you yesterday. I put to you the point that different memoranda, letters, et cetera from you to Hitler were full of National Socialist phraseology. I said you dealt with letters and memoranda from the date of the seizure of power until later when you went into opposition. The Prosecution, however, specifically in the oral presentation of the charges, as I remember it, referred to at least one letter which you addressed to Hitler before the seizure of power in November 1932, and there is in the files another letter of similar contents of August 1932. I think you should state your position with respect to these two letters, supplementing your answer to my question.
DR. SCHACHT: I explained to you yesterday already that up to the decisive election of July 1932, I had in no way intervened in the development of the National Socialist movement, but remained completely aloof from it. After that movement achieved its overpowering success in July 1932, of which I spoke yesterday, I foresaw very clearly the development which would now result. According to the principles of the democratic political concept there was only one possibility, namely, that the leader of that overwhelmingly large party would now have to form a new government. I rejected from the first the other theoretical possibility of a military government and a possibly resulting civil war, as being impossible and incompatible with my principles.
Therefore, after I had recognized these facts I endeavored in everything to gain influence over Hitler and his movement, and the two letters which you have just mentioned were written in that spirit.
DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Austria?
SCHACHT: I never knew anything about plans against Austria. Nor did I know in detail the plans Hitler had for Austria. I only knew—like the majority of all Germans—that he was in favor of an Anschluss of Austria with Germany.
DR. DIX: What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia?
SCHACHT: I knew nothing of his plans against Czechoslovakia until about the time of the Munich Conference.
DR. DIX: Did you, after the Munich Conference, that is to say, after the peaceful, so far peaceful settlement of the Sudeten question, hear a remark of Hitler’s about Munich which was of importance in your later personal attitude toward Hitler? Will you tell the Tribunal the remark which you heard?
SCHACHT: May I say first that, according to my knowledge of conditions at that time, Hitler was conceded in Munich more than he had ever expected. According to my information—and I expressed this also in the conversation with Ambassador Bullitt at that time—it was Hitler’s purpose to gain autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In Munich the Allies presented him with the transfer of the Sudeten-German territories on a silver platter. I assumed, of course, that now Hitler’s ambition would be more than satisfied and I can only say that I was surprised and shocked when a few days after Munich I saw Hitler. I had no further conversation with him at that time, but I met him with his entourage, mostly SS men, and from the conversation between him and the SS men I could only catch the remark: “That fellow has spoiled my entry into Prague.” That is to say made it impossible.
Apparently he was not satisfied with the great success which he had achieved in foreign politics, but I mentioned when I spoke about it yesterday the fact that I assumed from that remark that he lacked the glory and a glamorous staging.
DR. DIX: And what were your feelings in regard to your whole political attitude towards Hitler after Munich?
SCHACHT: In spite of the foreign political success I regretted very deeply, and so did my close friends, that by this intervention on the part of the Allied Powers, our attempt to remove the Hitler regime was ruined for a long time to come—we did not know at that time of course what would happen in the future—but, naturally, at that moment we had to resign ourselves to it.
DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Memel?
SCHACHT: I knew nothing at all and never heard anything about it. As far as I know, I learned of the annexation of Memel by Germany on my trip to India, which I had already started at that time.
DR. DIX: And since you were in India at that time, you, of course, heard nothing either about the negotiations, et cetera, which preceded the attack on Poland?
SCHACHT: I had no knowledge about that and therefore I also knew nothing of the May meeting of 1939 which has been discussed several times. In the beginning of March I left Berlin and then stayed for some time in Switzerland; at the end of March I set out for India via Genoa, and so I learned nothing at all about the Hacha affair, that is the establishment of the protectorate in Czechoslovakia, nor of Memel, nor of Poland, since I did not return from the trip to India until the beginning of August.
DR. DIX: The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark have been taken up here. Did you approve of these measures and actions?
SCHACHT: Under no circumstances.
DR. DIX: Were you ever able to express that disapproval anywhere and how?
SCHACHT: Before the invasion of Belgium I was visited on the order of the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, by the Quartermaster General, the then Colonel, later General Wagner who after the collapse committed suicide. He informed me of the intended invasion of Belgium. I was shocked and I replied at that time, “If you want to commit that insanity too, then you are beyond help.”
THE PRESIDENT: What time?
SCHACHT: Before the march into Belgium. Exactly when it was I could not say. It may have been already in November 1939. It may have been in April 1940. I no longer know exactly when it was.
DR. DIX: Even though you did not approve of that action, Germany was after all engaged in a life and death struggle. Did not that cause you to put your active co-operation at her disposal, since you were still Minister without Portfolio, though you no longer held a special office?
SCHACHT: I did not do that.
DR. DIX: Did anyone ask you to do that?
SCHACHT: The visit, which I have just mentioned, of Quartermaster General Wagner, upon order of the Chief of General Staff Halder, was intended to persuade me to act in Germany’s interest during the expected occupation of Belgium. I was to supervise and direct currency, finance, and banking matters in Belgium. I flatly refused that. Later I was approached again by the then Military Governor of Belgium, General Von Falkenhausen, for advice concerning the Belgian financial administration. I again refused to give advice and did not make any statements or participate in any way.
DR. DIX: When did you for the first time...
SCHACHT: I could perhaps relate another instance when I was approached. One day, shortly after America was drawn into the war, I received a request from the newspaper published by Goebbels, that, on account of my knowledge of American conditions, I should write an article for Das Reich, to assure the German people that the war potential of the United States should not be overestimated. I refused to write that article for the reason that precisely because I knew American conditions very well, my statement could only amount to the exact opposite. And so I refused in this instance also.
DR. DIX: When did you hear for the first time of the meeting which we call here simply the Hossbach meeting, or the meeting concerning the Hossbach protocol?
SCHACHT: To my great surprise, I was informed of that meeting on 20 October 1945, here in my cell, and I was extremely astonished that during all previous interrogations I had never been asked about this record, because it can be seen clearly from it that the Reich Government was not to be informed of Hitler’s intentions for war and therefore could not know anything about them.
DR. DIX: Did you take part in similar conferences which were preparatory to attacks, for instance the meeting of November 1940 in which the attack on Russia was discussed? I do not wish to be misunderstood—the Speer document which you spoke of yesterday discusses an attack which according to Hitler was threatened by Russia. I am speaking now of discussions in which the subject was an attack on Russia.
SCHACHT: The fear of an attack from Russia dates back to the fall of 1936 and therefore has as yet nothing to do with the war. I never took part in any conference which indicated intentions of war, consequently not in the conference on the intended attack on Russia, and I never heard anything about it.
DR. DIX: Does that also apply to the meeting of May 1941?
SCHACHT: At the moment, I do not know which meeting that is, but I did not in any way take part in any meeting in May 1941, as during the entire period when I was Minister without Portfolio, I never took part in any official conference.
DR. DIX: Then you also did not get any information about the conferences which the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had in Berlin?
SCHACHT: I did not have the slightest knowledge of the Matsuoka conference except what may perhaps have been said on the radio or in the press.
DR. DIX: Mention has been made in some way that you at one time had made available 200,000 marks for Nazi propaganda purposes in Austria. Is there any truth in this?
SCHACHT: I have not the slightest knowledge of that.
DR. DIX: Now we come to your dismissal as President of the Reichsbank. As you have heard, the Prosecution asserts that you finally brought about your own dismissal in order to evade the financial responsibility. I ask you to reply to that accusation and to tell the Tribunal briefly but exhaustively the reasons and the tactical deliberations leading to your dismissal and that of your assistants. They appear here in the memorandum of the Reichsbank Directorate which has been under consideration several times.
SCHACHT: I should like to divide the question into two parts: The first question is whether I tried to rid myself of my office as President of the Reichsbank. My answer to that question is a most emphatic “yes.” Since the middle of 1938, we in the Reichsbank always considered that if there were no change in policy, we in no event wanted to continue in office, because—and that brings me to the second part of the question—we did not want to assume the responsibility which we were then expected to bear.
For everything which we did previously and for a defensive rearmament in order to achieve equal rights for Germany in international politics, we gladly assumed responsibility, and we assume it before history and this Tribunal. But the responsibility for continuing rearmament which possibly in itself constituted a serious potential danger of war or which would ever aim at war intentionally—that responsibility none of us wanted to assume. Consequently, when it became clear that Hitler was working toward a further increase in rearmament—and I spoke about that yesterday in connection with the conversation of 2 January 1939—when we became aware of that we wrote the memorandum which was openly quoted and is in the hands of this Tribunal as an exhibit. It indicates clearly that we opposed every further increase of state expenditure and would not assume responsibility for it. From that, Hitler gathered that he would in no event be able to use the Reichsbank with its present Directorate and President for any future financial purposes. Therefore, there remained only one alternative; to change the Directorate, because without the Reichsbank he could not go on. And he had to take a second step; he had to change the Reichsbank Law. That is to say, an end had to be put to the independence of the Reichsbank from government decrees. At first he did that in a secret law—we had such things—of 19 or 20 January 1939. That law was published only about 6 months later. That law abolished the independence of the Reichsbank and the President of the Reichsbank became a mere cashier for the credit demands of the Reich, that is to say, of Hitler.
The Reichsbank Directorate did not want to continue along this line of development. Therefore, on 20 January the President of the Reichsbank, the Vice President, and the main financial expert, Reichsbank Director Huelse, were dismissed; three other members of the Directorate of the Reichsbank, Geheimrat Vocke, Director Erhard, and Director Blessing pressed insistently for their resignation from the Reichsbank until it was also granted. Two other members of the Reichsbank Directorate, Director Puhl, whose name has been mentioned here already, and an eighth director, Director Poetschmann, remained in the Directorate even under the new conditions. They were both Party members, the only ones in the Directorate, and therefore they could not easily withdraw.
DR. DIX: That is one accusation which is made by the Prosecution concerning your reasons for writing the memorandum, that is to say, to evade the financial responsibility. The second accusation is that not a word of this memorandum expressly mentions limitation of armaments, but that it essentially treats only matters of currency, technical questions of finance, and economic considerations; and that it was therefore the Dr. Schacht who in his capacity of Bank Director was concerned about the currency, rather than the opponent of rearmament, who made himself heard by this memorandum.
It is necessary that as co-author of the memorandum—as its main author—you state your position with regard to this incriminating interpretation of the memorandum.
SCHACHT: Even at an earlier time I said here that every objection which I made and had to make to Hitler—and that applies not only to myself but to all ministers—could only be made with arguments arising out of the particular department administered.
Had I said to Hitler, “I shall not give you any more money because you intend to wage war,” I should not have the pleasure of conducting this animated conversation here with you. I could then have consulted a priest, and it would have been a very one-sided affair because I would have lain silently in my tomb, and the priest would have delivered a monologue.
DR. DIX: This memorandum is certainly very important, and therefore we have to pause here for a moment. In summarizing—and please check me—I believe I can express your views in this way: This memorandum at the end contained demands such as further means of raising funds by increase of taxation or else by making use of the stock market—both impossible. Taxation could not be increased any more. The stock market had just unsuccessfully attempted a loan.
If these actually impossible demands had been granted, the Reichsbank would have created guarantees that no further funds would be used for one or another form of rearmament. This success was not to be expected; rather you could expect your dismissal. Did my brief but comprehensive summary of this matter express your views correctly?
SCHACHT: That entire letter was composed in such a way that there were only two possible answers to it; either an alteration of financial policy—and that meant a stop to rearmament, which would have amounted to a complete change of Hitler’s policy—or else the dismissal of the Reichsbank President; and that happened. We expected it because at that time I no longer believed that Hitler would change his policy so completely.
DR. DIX: Therefore, the Prosecution are right in saying that your mission ended with your dismissal.
SCHACHT: Hitler certainly confirmed that himself and in the letter of dismissal to me said it expressly. We heard from the testimony of Herr Lammers in this Court that Hitler with his own hand wrote that addition into the letter, that my name would remain connected with the first stage of rearmament. The second stage of rearmament I rejected and Hitler understood that very clearly, because when he received that letter from the Reichsbank he said to those who were present: “This is mutiny.”
DR. DIX: How do you know that?
SCHACHT: The witness Vocke who will, I hope, appear in this Court will testify to that.
DR. DIX: Furthermore, the Prosecution asserted that your exit from the political stage could not be attributed to your policy of opposition to a war but to disputes with Hermann Göring over power and rank. As such, that accusation seems to me to have been refuted already by statements which Göring and Lammers have made up to now. We do not wish to recapitulate. I merely want to ask you whether you have anything to add to the statements made on this subject by Göring and Lammers, or whether you disagree with them.
SCHACHT: In his oral presentation the prosecutor said that throughout the entire material which he had studied he could not find one piece of evidence for my opposition to a policy of war. I can only say in this respect: If someone on account of his shortsightedness does not see a tree on a level plain, there is surely no proof that the tree is not there.
DR. DIX: You have heard from the Prosecution that you are accused of having remained a member of the Cabinet as a Reich Minister without Portfolio. That was also the cause for misunderstanding yesterday. I merely wanted to express yesterday that you had resigned as an active minister and head of a department, that you resigned as Minister of Economy and His Lordship correctly pointed out, that of course you remained a Minister without Portfolio, that is without a special sphere of activity until January 1943. Of that you are accused by the Prosecution. What caused you to remain Reich Minister without Portfolio? Why did you do that? Did you have any particular financial reasons? Excuse my mentioning that, but the trial brief, on Page 5, charges you with that motive.
SCHACHT: I have already repeatedly explained here that my release from office as Minister of Economy encountered very great difficulties, and you have also submitted several affidavits confirming the fact.
Hitler did not, under any circumstances, want it to be known that a break or even so much as a difference of opinion had occurred between one of his assistants and himself. When he finally approved my release, he attached the condition that nominally I should remain Minister without Portfolio.
As regards the second accusation, it is as unworthy as it is wrong. There was a law in Germany that if a person held two public offices he could be paid only for one. Since I was in addition President of the Reichsbank I continuously received my income from the Reichsbank, at first my salary and later my pension; therefore as a minister I drew no salary whatever.
DR. DIX: Did you then, during the entire period of your position as Reich Minister without Portfolio, have any other function to fulfill in that capacity? Did you take any part in important decisions of the Cabinet, did you participate in discussions—in brief, was the Minister without Portfolio just a fancy dress major or was the position one of substance?
SCHACHT: I have already emphasized again and again in this Court—and I can only repeat it again—that after I left the Reichsbank I had not a single official discussion; I did not take part in a single ministerial or official conference and that, unfortunately, it was not possible for me to bring up any subject for discussion; for I had no factual basis or pretext for such a possibility, for the very reason that I had no particular field to administer. I believe that I was the only Minister without Portfolio—there were also a few others—who was not active in any way at all. As far as I know, Seyss-Inquart was undoubtedly Minister without Portfolio; he had his administration in Holland. Frank was Minister without Portfolio and had his administration in Poland. Schirach—I do not know whether he was Minister without Portfolio; I think it has been mentioned once, but I do not know if it is correct—he had his Austrian administration in Vienna. I had nothing further to do with the state administration or in any other way with the State or the Party.
DR. DIX: What about the ordinary course of affairs? Were there perhaps any circulars sent out by Lammers on which you acted?
SCHACHT: On the whole—and I think it is understandable after what I have stated here—I watched carefully for every possibility of intervening again in some way but I remember and state with absolute certainty, that during the entire time until the collapse I received all in all three official memoranda. The numerous invitations to state funerals and similar social state functions really need not be mentioned here as official communications. I did not participate in these occasions either. However, these three instances are interesting. The first time it was a letter from Hitler—pardon, from Himmler—a circular or request or a bill proposed by Himmler who intended to transfer court jurisdiction over the so-called asocial elements of the population to the police, or rather the Gestapo, that is to say, a basic principle of the administration of justice to separate the functions of prosecution and judge...
DR. DIX: Well, that is known, Dr. Schacht. You can assume that is known.
SCHACHT: In regard to this question I immediately assented in the copy of a letter which Reich Minister Frank had sent me in which he took a stand against this basic violation of legal principles, and the bill was not made law. It would indeed have been extremely regrettable, because I am firmly convinced that I myself was a definite anti-social element in Himmler’s sense.
The second instance was a letter concerning some discussions about state property in Yugoslavia, after we had occupied Yugoslavia. I answered that since I had not taken part in the preliminary discussions on the draft of the law I should not be counted upon to assist in this matter.
Finally, the third incident—and this is the most important—occurred in November 1942. Apparently by mistake there came into circulation the draft for a law of the Reich Minister for Air, which contained the suggestion of taking 15 and 16 year old students away from the high school to enlist them for military service in the anti-aircraft defense, the so-called Flakdienst. I answered this letter because it was a welcome opportunity for me to state for once my opinion on the military situation in a long detailed reply which I sent to Göring.
DR. DIX: On the third of November?
SCHACHT: It is a letter of 30 November, which on the second of December I believe was given personally by my secretary to the adjutant of Göring in a closed envelope, with the request that he himself open it.
DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht.
[Turning to the Tribunal.] That letter has already been submitted under Document Number 3700-PS by the Prosecution, but it is also in our document book under Exhibit Number 23; Page 66 of the English text and Page 59 of the German text. If we were not so pressed for time, it would have been especially gratifying for me to read this letter here in full. It is a very fine letter. However, I want to take time into consideration and I merely ask you, Dr. Schacht, to state briefly your opinion of its content.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read the letter. It isn’t necessary for you to read it now, is it?
DR. DIX: Very well. Well, then, would he speak quite briefly about the letter before the recess or do you not wish to say anything further?
SCHACHT: Yes. I would like to say in this connection, if it is permitted, that to my knowledge this letter has already been read here by the American Chief Prosecutor, that is...
DR. DIX: Read?
SCHACHT: Or mentioned, or at least the most important points were read. I believe it is sufficient if you submit the letter to the Court in evidence.
DR. DIX: Yes, that has been done.
Now, that constituted your entire activity as Reich Minister without Portfolio?
SCHACHT: Yes, that was the end of it.
DR. DIX: Therefore if one wanted to define your position in one word, one would say, just a kind of retired major (Charaktermajor).
SCHACHT: I don’t know what a “Charaktermajor” is, at any rate, I was never a major, but I have always had character.
DR. DIX: But, Dr. Schacht, that is a historical remark about authority conferred by Kaiser Wilhelm, the First as German Emperor on Bismarck.
THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, we spoke of the letter, dated 30 November 1942, to Göring. Did that letter have any consequences?
SCHACHT: Yes, the letter had very considerable consequences. It had the result that on 22 January I did at last receive my long hoped-for release from my position of a nominal Minister without Portfolio. The reason given for it, however, was less pleasant. I believe the letter is already in the files of the Tribunal. It is a letter attached to the official document of release from Lammers.
DR. DIX: Yes, very well. We put a question on that subject during Lammers’ hearing.
SCHACHT: Yes. But I should only like to refer to the statement which says: “...in view of your entire conduct in the present fateful struggle of the German nation...”—so that was my whole attitude.
DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, it is Number 26 of the document book. It is on Page 76 of the English text and on Page 69 of the German text.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please continue.
SCHACHT: It was, therefore, my entire attitude during this war which led to my dismissal, and the letter of dismissal also contained the statement that I would be dismissed for the time being. According to Lammers’ statement, as we have heard, this expression “for the time being” was included in the letter, also on the Führer’s initiative. I was very clearly aware of this wording when I received the letter.
Two days later I was removed from the Prussian State Council, of which I was a member—a body, incidentally, which had not met for at least 8 years. At any rate, I was not at the meetings. Perhaps it was 6 years, I do not know. The text of that decision was communicated to me by the chairman of that State Council, Hermann Göring, and because of its almost amusing contents, I still recollect it very clearly. It stated:
“My answer to your defeatist letter undermining the power of resistance of the German people is that I remove you from the Prussian State Council.”
I say it was amusing because a sealed letter written by me to Göring could not possibly shake the power of resistance of the German people. A further result was that Party Leader Bormann demanded from me the return of the Golden Party Badge and I did that at once. After that I was particularly closely watched by the Gestapo. I gave up my residence in Berlin immediately, within 24 hours, and for the whole day the Gestapo spies followed me all over Berlin both on foot and by car. Then I quietly retired to my estate in the country.
DR. DIX: Now, since the trial brief has mentioned material and pecuniary reasons for the decisions which you made, it appears to me justified and necessary to ask what was the position regarding your property and your income after 1933? In your reply please take into consideration that it is striking that in 1942 there was an increase in your income.
SCHACHT: A few months ago, apparently with the approval of the Military Government, there appeared in the press a list of donations which the Party leaders and ministers in Germany received and, in that connection, of their income and their property. I was also listed, not under “donations,” but it was stated that in 1942 I had an unusually high income. This list is incorrect, since it is a gross figure which is mentioned and it does not take into consideration the fact that the war profit tax was later deducted from it. When the list was compiled the tax was not yet determined, so that about 80 percent must be deducted from the sum which is given there. The income is then no longer striking in any way. In regard to my property, the list shows that over a period of 10 years it has hardly changed, and I want to emphasize here particularly that in the last 20 years my property remained approximately the same and did not increase.
DR. DIX: If I remember rightly you reduced your own salary as President of the Reichsbank at a certain time on your own initiative?
SCHACHT: When, on Hitler’s suggestion, President Hindenburg in March of 1933 appointed me again to the position of President of the Reichsbank, Hitler left it to me to fix my own income. At that time, I voluntarily reduced my income to less than 25 percent of my former income from the Reichsbank.
DR. DIX: Did you ever receive presents or donations from Hitler, either in money or in valuables?
SCHACHT: As I have just mentioned, I have never received any kind of donations from Hitler, and I think he would hardly have risked offering me one. I did, indeed, receive one present from Hitler, on the occasion of my 60th birthday. He gave me a picture which certainly had the value of about 20,000 marks. It was an oil painting by a German painter Spitzweg; and would have been worth approximately 200,000 marks if it had been genuine. As soon as the picture was brought into my room I recognized it as a forgery, but I succeeded about 3 months later in tracing the original. I started proceedings on the subject of the genuineness of the picture, and the forgery was established before a court.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not appropriate for the Tribunal to listen to this.
DR. DIX: Did Hitler ever bestow on you the right to wear a uniform or give you any kind of decoration or military rank?
SCHACHT: If the Tribunal will permit me I would like to say that I returned the forgery and it was never replaced; so that I have received no presents from Hitler.
Hitler offered me a uniform. He said I could have any uniform I desired but I only raised my hands in refusal and did not accept any, not even the uniform of an official, because I did not wish to have a uniform.
DR. DIX: Now, another subject: Did you know anything about the concentration camps?
SCHACHT: Already in the year 1933, when Göring established concentration camps, I heard several times that political opponents and other disliked or inconvenient persons were taken away to a concentration camp. That these people were deprived of their liberty perturbed me very much at the time, of course, and I continuously demanded, as far as I was in a position to do so during conversations, that the arrest and removal to concentration camps should be followed by a clarification before the law with a defense and so on, and suitable legal proceedings. At that early time the Reich Minister of the Interior Frick also protested energetically along the same lines. Subsequently this type of imprisonment, et cetera, became less known in public, and in consequence I assumed that things were slowly abating. Only much later—let us say the second half of 1934 and 1935...
DR. DIX: When you met Gisevius, you mean?
SCHACHT: Yes, when I met Gisevius—I heard on repeated occasions that not only were people still being deprived of their liberty, but that sometimes they were being ill-treated, that beatings, et cetera, took place. I have already said before this Tribunal that as a result, as early as May 1935, I personally took the opportunity of drawing Hitler’s attention to these conditions and that I told him at the time that such a system was causing the whole world to despise us and must cease. I have mentioned that I repeatedly took a stand against all these things publicly, whenever there was a possibility of doing so.
But I never heard anything of the serious ill-treatment and outrages—murder and the like—which started later. Probably because, firstly, these conditions did not begin until after the war, after the outbreak of war, and because already from 1939 onwards I led a very retired life. I heard of these things and of the dreadful form in which they happened only here in prison. However, I did hear, as early as 1938 and after, of the deportation of Jews; but because individual cases were brought to my notice I could only ascertain that there were deportations to Theresienstadt, where allegedly there was an assembly camp for Jews, where Jews were accommodated until a later date when the Jewish problem was to be dealt with again. Any physical ill-treatment, not to speak of killing or the like, never came to my knowledge.
DR. DIX: Did you ever take a look at a concentration camp?
SCHACHT: I had an opportunity of acquainting myself with several concentration camps when, on 23 July 1944, I myself was dragged into a concentration camp. Before that date I did not visit a single concentration camp at any time, but afterwards I got to know not only the ordinary concentration camps but also the extermination camp in Flossenbürg.
DR. DIX: Did you not, while in Flossenbürg, receive a visit from a “comrade-in-ideas”—if I may say so?
SCHACHT: I know of this matter only from a letter which this gentleman sent to you or to this Tribunal, I believe, and in which he describes that visit. I can only, on my own observation...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it is improper to give the contents of a letter from a person unidentified. I have said to this Tribunal before that these letters which come from unidentified persons—if he is identified, it has not been done in evidence—come to all of us. I am sure members of the Tribunal get a great many of them. If that is evidence, then the Prosecution should reopen its case, because I have baskets of them.
I think it is highly improper to take communications and put them in evidence directly and it is even more improper to relate all of them by oral testimony when the document is not produced. I think this kind of evidence has no probative value and I object to it.
DR. DIX: May I be permitted to say that I would never do anything improper nor have I done it. I do not intend in any way to submit this very harmless jocular letter to the Tribunal as evidence. But this letter, which reached me through quite regular channels, informed Dr. Schacht and myself that there existed a plan to murder him in Flossenbürg. That is why I also questioned the witness Kaltenbrunner on this matter. The only reason why I am asking Dr. Schacht is that I expect him to inform the Tribunal that according to this information there was in fact at that time an order to murder him. This fact, not the letter, is not without some significance, because if a regime wants to kill a man then that is at least proof of the fact that it is not particularly well-disposed toward him. That is the only reason why I asked that this letter be submitted, and it is, of course, also at Mr. Justice Jackson’s disposal. It is really quite an amusing letter, written by a simple man.
But I would never have considered submitting this letter as a document in evidence. If the Tribunal have objections to hearing the matter, a matter which was also discussed when Kaltenbrunner was examined, then I shall willingly omit it. I am quite astonished that the matter should be given so much significance.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that the letter isn’t being offered in evidence, and therefore you ought not to refer to it. Well, then, don’t refer to it.
DR. DIX: All right, we shall leave it.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, now, at last you were released. What did you do then?
SCHACHT: After that time I did nothing more apart from continuing my efforts towards the removal of Hitler. That was my only political activity. For the rest, I was living on my estate.
DR. DIX: Did you not go on a journey in the spring of 1939?
SCHACHT: Excuse me, you are speaking of the time after the dismissal as President of the Reichsbank, I thought you meant minister. I was just talking of 1943.
DR. DIX: No. No.
SCHACHT: You are going back to the year 1939. After the dismissal in January 1939 I already mentioned that Hitler suggested to me that I should go on an extensive journey abroad and at the time I went to India by way of Switzerland, where I again saw my friends.
DR. DIX: Were you in any way politically active in India?
SCHACHT: In India I merely traveled as a tourist. I was not politically active but, of course, I visited several governors and I spent 3 days as the Viceroy’s guest in his house in Simla.
DR. DIX: Did you not have political connections with Chinese statesmen in Rangoon?
SCHACHT: When I was in Burma, after leaving India, I received a visit in Rangoon from a Chinese friend who had visited me before in Berlin on occasion and who had been commissioned by his government to talk to me about the Situation of China.
DR. DIX: That is Chiang Kai-Shek’s China?
SCHACHT: Chiang Kai-Shek’s China which was already at war with Japan at the time. The other China did not then exist and this gentleman asked me upon the request of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Cabinet...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can’t see the slightest relevancy to this. In the first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had heard it it has no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against him that he did anything in China and we will stipulate that he was as pure as snow all the time he was in China. We haven’t a thing to do with that and it is taking time here that just gets us nowhere and is keeping us away from the real charge in the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands that you say it is irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant?
DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each other too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: In this testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read...
THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant Schacht went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with the fact that he went to India and China. How is it relevant?
DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to be mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put a question, referring to Schacht’s negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy from Chiang Kai-Shek—with the Chinese—and at that point Mr. Justice Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht maintained friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government and gave support to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same reason for which I attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that in regard to the Union of Soviet Republics also Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line in his economic policy during the years when Hitler was conducting a political campaign against Russia. Here we have a second instance, where he is demanding relations which were contrary to the principles of Hitler’s policy; that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against Hitler’s ally, Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations with the Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment’s time at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence.
DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion.
SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written memorandum I advised Chiang Kai-Shek’s government to continue holding out against Japan, giving as reason that the economic resources of China would last longer than the economic resources of Japan; and I advised Chiang Kai-Shek to rely primarily on the United States of America in his foreign policy.
DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August 1939, you found a situation which must have appeared quite tense to someone who was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to contact the Cabinet or Hitler in order to discuss this situation?
SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question of Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a letter to Hitler, a letter to Göring, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say, the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had come back from India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting that at least one of them would ask me for an account of my experiences; and then, I should have had an opportunity of talking to the leading men once again. To my very great surprise, I did not get an answer from Hitler at all; I received no reply from Göring; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that he had taken note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me but to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step, which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely the attempt to gain access to the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I still want to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, particularly General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment?
SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew perfectly well that bare economic and general political statements would of course accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly have referred to Hitler’s leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: “I also have sworn this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps, but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag.” If these two steps had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no war.
DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to repeat the description of that whole affair or of your attempts at the Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to Gisevius’ testimony or do you wish to change anything in it?
SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius’ statement is correct in every single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris mentioned among many reasons which then kept us from making the visit, that Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately if we said anything to him against the war or if we wanted to prevent him from fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler. But the main reason why the visit did not come about was quite correctly stated by Gisevius. Moreover it is also mentioned by General Thomas in his affidavit which we shall later submit. The main reason was: the war was canceled. And so I went to Munich on a business matter and to my surprise while in Munich, war was declared on Poland; the country was invaded.
DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A meeting of the Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before the war or before the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. At the time you were still a Minister without Portfolio.
Normally you would have had to sit on the minister’s bench during that meeting.
Did you take part in that meeting?
SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I would like to add at once that during the entire war, I was present at only one meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering the matters which I already mentioned here yesterday. It was after Hitler’s return from Paris. I had to participate in this meeting of the Reichstag, which followed the reception at the station because, as I said, it would otherwise have been too obvious an affront. It was the meeting during which political matters were not dealt with at all, but at which the field marshal’s rank was granted by the dozen.
DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned to stop the outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the particular chapter of your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler and his government. We want to make it a rule, if possible, not to repeat what the witness Gisevius has already stated but only to supplement or correct or state what you know from your own memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however, may I ask you whether you know from information you received or from other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in authoritative circles abroad?
SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want to point out that I have already stated repeatedly here that I continually discussed the situation in Germany—thus also my own position—with my friends abroad—not only with Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with neutrals—and I would like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting stations did not tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht’s opposition to Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever information on this subject transpired in Germany.
DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government begin?
SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime. Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy.
I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves to listen to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without opposing them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when the economic leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, they disappeared from my anteroom and thronged into that of Göring. In a word, one could not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS bodyguard.
Therefore, as has been stated here—and I do not want to pursue it further—I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time.
DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to 1938, still limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, merely touching on it briefly and confirming it. By the way, were you in any way directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations at Godesberg or Munich?
SCHACHT: In no way.
DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming at a revolt. Is Gisevius’ account of the year 1938 correct or is there something to be added to it?
SCHACHT: Gisevius’ statement is complete and reliable.
DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a coup d’état in the late summer of 1938?
SCHACHT: Yes.
DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after war broke out?
SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every general whom I could contact. I used the same arguments which I have just mentioned in connection with the prospective interview with Brauchitsch; therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually spoke to all these generals.
DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in this connection?
SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General Hoeppner but in a whole series of conversations I attempted to make him take action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and later he too, unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence of 20 July 1944.
In the year 1942—and this has not been mentioned here up to now, because Gisevius did not participate—I tried again to mobilize General Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special journey to Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters at that time, and Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely resolved to act, but he told me that, of course, he could only do so if he again received a command at the front. Then I...
DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strünck, who knew of these matters, was in Frankfurt?
SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them.
DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that Frau Strünck was granted me as a witness and she was here. In order to save time, however, I have decided to dispense with this witness since she could make only cumulative statements on what Gisevius has already said and I do not think it is necessary. Schacht himself has just stated the only piece of information which she could have added, namely this trip, this special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben. On the strength of experience the Tribunal will itself know that in the course of a revolutionary movement, stretching over years such as this, many journeys are made and in respect to this particular journey it is not important to submit special evidence. In order to save time, therefore, I have decided to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strünck. Excuse me, I merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next...
SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course always participated in the conversations—mentioned by Gisevius here—with the other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, Olbricht, et cetera. These things did not come about for some time on account of the negotiations abroad for which the generals were always waiting. I think that enough has been said here about this topic and I need not make further report on it. I come then to one last point, which does not become apparent from Gisevius’ statement but about which an affidavit from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here. I can mention it quite briefly in order to save time. Naturally, together with the group of Beck, Goerdeler, my friend Strünck, Gisevius, and others I was completely informed of, and initiated into, the affair of 20 July. However, and I think it was mutual, we told each other whenever possible only those things which the other absolutely had to know, in order not to embarrass the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strünck, et cetera, I had another connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt and that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later.
DR. DIX: Perhaps it would be proper—and also more intelligible in connection with your participation in 20 July—if I read a brief part of Colonel Gronau’s affidavit which refers to Lindemann.
[Turning to the Tribunal.] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the English text. I shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains only matters on which evidence has already been given. I shall read only the part that deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 of the English text and on Page 170 of the German text, and I start with Question 5:
“Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together. When was that?
“Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to him, whereupon I established the connection.
“Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what was Schacht’s attitude toward him?
“Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made severe reproaches that the generals”—that should read “he severely reproached Lindemann”; it is incorrectly copied here—“because the generals were hesitating so long. The attempt at revolt would have to be made prior to the landing of the Allies.”
“Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July 1944?
“Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures.
“Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan?
“Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt was to be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what was to happen thereafter.
“Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan?
“Answer 9) Yes.
“Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the military in the event of a successful attempt?
“Answer 10) Yes.
“Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944?
“Answer 11) Yes.
“Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment?
“Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity.”
Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the Putsch in logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that could not be avoided, but we must now go back again to the year 1941. You have already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made abroad. In 1941 you were in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction there?
SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my foreign friends and again and again looked for some way by which one might shorten the war and begin negotiations.
DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. I think the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have on two occasions stated the contents briefly, once when the translation was discussed and again during the discussion on the admissibility of the letter as evidence before the Court. I do not think I need do it here nor that I need read it. I should merely like to submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on Page 84 of the German and Page 91 of the English text. And—I say this now, we shall discuss it later—the same applies to the article which appeared this year in the Basler Nachrichten and which deals with a conversation which an American had with Schacht recently. I shall not read that either since I have already stated the main points of its contents. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text and Page 99 of the English text. I might point out that this article has already been the subject of certain accusations made during the cross-examination of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet Prosecution.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard to Document 32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by an unknown writer describing his conversations with an unknown economist. The article in question was published in the Basler Nachrichten on 14 January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was already well under way, and I cannot consider that this article can be presented in evidence with regard to Schacht’s case.
DR. DIX: I might—may I, before the Tribunal decides, say something very briefly?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We have discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence. The Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me it would...
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy.
DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point out that we have already discussed the question once before. Of course, the Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall...
THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional. It is not a question of the Tribunal’s reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for decision.
DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely surprised at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch as the representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to that article in his observations during the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal, but he referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. However, if the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing the article as documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to leave it. I will then—and I think I may—ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that in 1941 he had a conversation with an American who was a professor of national economy, a conversation which dealt with the possibility of peace. I leave it to the Tribunal. For me, it is no—I thought it would be simpler, if I submitted the article.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that you used the document yourself in cross-examination?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory question was asked in order to reach a decision on this point and I particularly emphasize...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you.
GEN. RUDENKO: I say, that we did not use this document during the cross-examination of the witness Gisevius, but we did ask an explanatory question in order that when the document was presented by Dr. Dix, we could object to it as being of no probative value. I especially...
THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the document to Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know is did you not put the contents of the document?
GEN. RUDENKO: No, no, we did not submit the contents, and we did not discuss the substance of the document. We merely asked a question—did the witness Gisevius know about the article in the Basler Nachrichten of 14 January 1946? That was the question, and the witness answered that it was known to him.
DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It appears to me that the Soviet Delegation does not desire to have the article submitted as evidence. I therefore withdraw it as evidence. And since I have no due reasons to the contrary, no factual reason to the contrary, 1 can certainly fulfill this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would like the Tribunal to consider the matter as settled.
May I now put my question?
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, you had conversations in Switzerland?
SCHACHT: Yes.
DR. DIX: What was the subject of these conversations, in broad outlines, and with whom did you have them?
SCHACHT: This article, which has just been discussed...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, Your Honor, may I interpose an objection? The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to this document was that I want to know who this economist is. I want to check this thing. There are very peculiar circumstances about this document, and I object to his retelling a conversation with an unknown economist. All I ask is that he identify time and place and person with whom he had his conversation, so that we can do a little verifying of this effort to get something before the Tribunal that did not appear until 1946.
DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which its comparative triviality really does not merit. I shall, therefore, dispense with this question too. Please do not now refer to the conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution to put the question which Mr. Justice Jackson has just mentioned during cross-examination.
Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that with the unknown professor.
SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and to bring about some form of mediation which I always sought for particularly through the good offices of the American President. That is all that I can say here. I do not think I need go into details.
DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and Göring—you have already mentioned Hitler—or besides, did you, during the war, state your views about the policy of the war in writing at any time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned.
SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February 1940. In the summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and the witness Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think he was asked about the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, I pointed out somewhat as follows—I shall use direct language—“You are at present at the height of your success.”—This was after the first Russian victories.—“The enemy believes that you are stronger than you really are. The alliance with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall and then Italy will drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid at all is questionable in view of Japan’s weakness in the face of America. I assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage war against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of the American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will enter into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse foreign policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude a peace.”
DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war?
SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr Von Ribbentrop conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr Von Weizsäcker, the reproachful message that I should not indulge in defeatist remarks. That may have been in 1940 or in 1941, during one of those 2 years. I asked where I had made defeatist remarks and it appeared that I had talked to my colleague Funk and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could never win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained the view that Germany’s economic power was not sufficient to wage this war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent both to Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary.
DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable moment...