Morning Session
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged attention to the consideration of the documents offered by Dr. Siemers on behalf of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore, do not wish the documents which they propose to admit to be read because they have already read them all.
I will now deal with the documents individually.
Document 66 is admitted for the purposes of argument, and not as evidence; Document 101 is denied; Documents 102 to 105 are admitted; Document 106 is denied; Document 107 is admitted; Document 39 is denied; Document 63 is admitted; Document 64 is denied; Document 99 is denied; Document 100 is admitted; Documents 102 to 107 are admitted; Document 38 is denied; Document 50 is denied; Document 55 is denied; Document 58 is denied; Documents 29, 56, 57, 60, and 62 are denied. I should have included in that group Document 28, which is also denied. Documents 31, 32, 36, 37, and 39 are denied; Document 41 is admitted; Document 99 has already been denied, and Document 101 has already been denied; Document 59 is admitted; Document 68 is denied; Document 70 is denied; Document 72 is denied; Document 74 is denied; Document 75 is admitted; Document 77 is admitted; Document 79 is admitted; Document 80 is admitted; Document 84 is admitted; Document 85, which is on Page 82 of Volume V, is admitted; Document 87 is denied; Document 88 is admitted; Document 91 is admitted; Document 13 is admitted; Document 27 is admitted.
The Prosecution may, if they wish it, apply to cross-examine the witness who made that document.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): That is Admiral Böhm.
THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Böhm, yes.
Document 83 is admitted; Document 34 is admitted; Document 48 is denied.
Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the last few?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal asked that we ascertain the origins, if possible, of Document 1014-PS. Some question was raised about it by Dr. Siemers. It is Exhibit USA-30.
I have had a search made, and I have some information that we are prepared to submit concerning this document. I should like to point out that 1014-PS and 798-PS and L-3 are documents all concerning this same speech made at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939. They were offered in evidence by Mr. Alderman of the American staff on the 26th day of November 1945.
I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made reference yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the record shows for the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November, and has received the mark Exhibit Number USA-28 for identification only. Mr. Alderman pointed out, as appears in the record, that he was not offering it in evidence, that it was a paper which came into our hands originally through the services of a newspaperman, and that later on the Documents 798-PS and 1014-PS were found among captured documents. They referred to the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Alderman offered these two at that time.
Now Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, and Document 1014-PS, Exhibit Number USA-30, were both found by the forces of the United States in this fashion:
They had been taken from the OKW headquarters in Berlin, and in the course of various journeys in those days they finally arrived at one place and were stored, it now appears, at various places by the OKW under the control of a General Winter of the German forces; and they were transported in three railway trains to Saalfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winter ordered that all documents in his possession be turned over to the Allied forces and they were. These particular documents, together with some other papers, were turned over by General Winter and members of his staff at that time; and on the 21st day of May 1945, they were removed from Saalfelden where they were under the control of General Winter and taken to the Third U.S. Army Document Center at Munich. While at Munich they were sorted and cataloged by Department G-2 Supreme Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Force with the assistance of clerks from the OKW and OKH. On the 16th of June 1945 these documents, together with others, were removed on six trucks from the headquarters of the Third Army at Munich and were taken to the U.S. Group Control Council Number 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which was located in the former offices of the I.G. Farben Company, and were placed on shelves on the third floor of the building and kept under guard. Between the 16th of June 1945 and the 30th of August 1945, the task of collecting, sorting, assembling and cataloging these documents was carried out under the supervision of the British Colonel Austin, with personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and the G-2 Document Center of the G-2 Operational Intelligence Section, 6889 Berlin Document Section, and the British Enemy Document Unit, and the British Military Intelligence Research Section. Beginning on the 5th day of July 1945, and continuing until the 30th of August 1945, these documents were screened at that place by members of the staff of the United States Chief Counsel. Lieutenant Margolies, who is here in the courtroom and a member of our staff, personally picked these documents out of your file 798-PS and 1014-PS from the OKW captured files, brought them to Nuremberg, and lodged them in the document room where they have been kept under strict security ever since.
Now, that is the history of these two documents about which Dr. Siemers raised some question yesterday—a considerable question I might say—and inferred there was something strange about their contents. I think the story which I have given in the form of a statement over the signature of Lieutenant Commander Hopper clearly establishes the source and where they have been ever since; and I think it is only fair to say that, since Dr. Siemers saw fit to point out that this language sounded extremely harsh and was attributed to Hitler, these documents were offered to show these people were actually talking about aggressive war. The reading of the three documents by the Tribunal will clearly show they are all in agreement in substance; of course, there are differences in phraseology, but the important thing and purpose for which they were offered was to show that these people were talking aggressive war. I might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive about the remark, but I think the unanswered proof in the case thus far shows that not only were these things said but they were done.
M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake in translation. We understood 106 had been rejected the first time and admitted the second time in the Group 102 to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say that the Group 102 to 107 were admitted; but I have also said 106 was rejected, and it is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is rejected.
M. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected, are they?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact numbers: 102, 103, 104, 105, and 107 are admitted.
M. DUBOST: Very good. Mr. President, we want to offer further explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say a few words concerning the statement made by Mr. Dodd?
I had no doubts, and I certainly have no doubt now, that since these documents were found they have been handled very correctly and Mr. Dodd spoke only about that. I believe it is important to establish: Whether one can determine the connection these documents had with other documents, because in that way one can see whether these were documents belonging to a certain adjutant. For instance, were they together with the Hossbach papers or together with the Schmundt file? If, for instance, the documents were with the Schmundt documents it is probable that they belonged to the adjutant.
THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, does it not? No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight than a document which is not signed. All those matters the Tribunal will take into account when considering the documents, but the admissibility of the document depends upon its being a German document found and captured.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I wanted to say this only because it is unpleasant to have the American Delegation misunderstand my motion concerning the document. I make no charges concerning the manner in which the document was found, I merely say that it is undecided among which papers it was found. It came to my attention that Mr. Dodd treated the three documents concerned in quite the same way, whereas Mr. Alderman on Page 188 of the record (Volume II, Page 286), states that one of these three documents, L-3, was evidently not in order because of its doubtful origin. And therefore he withdrew the document.
May I then, if it please the Court, continue with the examination of the Defendant Raeder?
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, we have a few final questions concerning the conspiracy. I believe it will not take much time. I ask you to look at the Document C-155. That is Exhibit GB-214, in Document Book 10, Page 24—Document Book 10 of the British Delegation, Page 24.
It is your letter of 11 June 1940, which was sent to 74 Navy offices and which the Prosecution has called a letter of justification. The Prosecution wants to deduce from this that you knew that a war was to be expected as early as the summer of 1939. I should like you to answer this charge very briefly.
RAEDER: There is manifold proof to show that I was not expecting a war in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of the German Navy this was quite natural. I have stated quite clearly in my speech before the U-boat officers in Swinemünde that we could not count on it.
DR. SIEMERS: And what was the reason for that letter, C-155?
RAEDER: The reason was that a number of torpedo boats had misfired and this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had not yet been as perfectly developed as they should have been at the beginning of a war. An additional reason was that, now that the war had so suddenly broken out, many officers believed that it would have been better to have developed the submarine weapon as much as possible first, so that at least this weapon would be ready in large numbers in the event of a war. I objected to that opinion precisely because such a war was not to be expected. And on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again—in the second line—that the Führer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of an imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something to strive for, it is rather to be feared.
DR. SIEMERS: There is another key document, that is, Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, the very long speech made by Hitler on 23 November 1939 before the commanders-in-chief.
The document, Mr. President, is in Document Book 10a on Page 261. This is again a Hitler speech where there is no indication of who recorded it. Signature and date are missing.
[Turning to the defendant.] Since this is similar to the other documents I do not have to question you on that point. I would merely like to know, Admiral, did that speech also betray a definite background, a certain mental reservation on the part of Hitler?
RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict between Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also a difference of opinion with the leading generals concerning the offensive in the West. The Führer assembled all the leaders in order to give them his opinion about this whole matter. He stated—and I was present myself—that up to that time he had always been right in his decisions and that he would also be right in the opinion that the western offensive had to be undertaken in the fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh words; in the third from the last paragraph of the document he states: “I shall not be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is against me.” That was directed against the generals. Actually the western offensive did not take place until the spring because the weather conditions delayed them.
DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous proceedings, and I believe we do not have to go into that now. In this connection we come to the last document, that is C-126, which you also have in front of you, GB-45. It is in Document Book 10a on Page 92.
With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command of the Armed Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel, because that document contained a timetable for “Case White”; that is, the case of Poland. Did that document or that directive indicate to you a definite aggressive intention?
RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In all cases certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to put to sea in summer should leave, or whether they should wait. This decision, however, was only to be made in the beginning of August. In connection with that order I issued the order of 2 August also pertaining to that document, to the individual higher Naval offices, namely, an operational directive for the use of Atlantic submarines in the Case White. May I be permitted to read the first lines, because the wording is important:
“Attached is an operational directive for the employment of U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the way of precaution in the event that the intention to carry out Case White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander of the U-boat fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL by 12 August. The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made before the middle of August.
“If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest.” (Document C-126, Exhibit GB-45)
Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place. It was rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under all circumstances in connection with the Case White.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you repeatedly, particularly when you spoke to him personally, that there would not be a war?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against England?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start with England. In connection with this did you speak to Hitler about that question—and if so, when?
RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between 10 and 11 o’clock—I cannot remember the exact hour—I was called into the Reich Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me that the ultimatum had been received from England and France. I came into the study of the Führer where a number of persons were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of the Führer Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I noticed that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that the ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment such as I had never noticed on Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution that you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and strongly supported it.
May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document D-481, which is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution, with reference to this document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special ceremony, you took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the fatherland. In the transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719 (Volume V, Page 262), we read, “The Tribunal will see that Raeder”—in his oath—“put Führer in the place of fatherland.”
I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether it is correct that you had any part in changing the oath from “fatherland” to “Hitler.”
RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The entire matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who is supposed to have observed it so that he could make such a statement. The Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces were called to Hitler on the morning of 2 August. We were in his study and Hitler asked us to come to his desk without ceremony or staging. There we took the oath which he, as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that oath. None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one had asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The oath referred to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever been rendered to the fatherland as far as the words were concerned. Once I took an oath to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath to the person of the Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—Hitler. In all three cases I took the oath to my people, my fatherland. That is a matter of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?
RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my adjutant that I was to come in connection with the taking of the oath. I could not speak with certainty now, but I assume so.
DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath?
RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper and I assume that we were informed of the wording before, at the desk, there.
DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and represents a Reich law.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution asserts that on 30 January 1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the fact that you received the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer briefly to this point, which has been discussed previously in other cases?
RAEDER: When the Führer gave me the Golden Party Badge he said, specifically, that this was the highest decoration which he could give at the time. I could not become a Party member at all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members of the Party. That was generally known, and for this reason that assertion likewise is incomprehensible.
DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by the Constitution?
RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent any misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar Constitution and the decrees which Hitler had issued.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of your staunch Christian and Church attitude, which was generally known? Briefly, how did it work out? Did you have any difficulties with the Party because of it?
RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party, which I think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had considerable prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always had the higher officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders, settle any friction which occurred in the lower echelons, through the proper authorities. If they were more important they were brought to my attention and I took care of them; if they dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the OKW. Since I never let anything slip through, in case of incitement by the Party, the entire relations soon became very smooth and I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that before long they rarely occurred. In that respect we had the advantage in the Navy because there were no territorial matters to administer. We were concerned with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where actually everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because of Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929 after a court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment of a young girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long time and he tried on various occasions to denounce me to the leadership of the Party or to Bormann and even to the Führer. However, I was always able to counteract these attacks so that they had no effect on my situation in general.
This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a strongly worded letter; but it was precisely the strong wording of those letters which was of help in most cases.
I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various instances, such as the one with the SD; however, there were no direct attacks because of my position in regard to the Church. There was only the statement made by Goebbels, which I learned of through my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor with the Party on account of my attitude toward the Church; but, as I have said, I was not made to feel it in a disagreeable way.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any time in explaining the importance which you placed on religious matters in the Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without reading it. It was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, whom you have known for many years and who described the situation and thus clarified everything. In that connection, however, may I put one question: Did you emphasize repeatedly to Hitler that a religious attitude was necessary for the soldiers and the Navy?
RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this course in the Navy until the end without hesitation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit Exhibit Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my Document Book Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to take the time of the Tribunal by asking questions about the contrasting views between the Party and the Navy in matters of the Church. I believe that this document makes it sufficiently clear that a bond between Church and National Socialism was not possible. In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and I should like to read only the first paragraph of the exposé which I have submitted:
“National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible. Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and are at pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of the population as possible, for only in this way can the Christian churches maintain their power. In contrast to this, National Socialism rests on scientific foundations.”
In the second paragraph, the last sentence:
“If therefore in the future our young people do not learn anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which are far inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear of itself.”
And, on the second page at the end:
“Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers, and other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened will the State leadership have full influence over the individual citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and the Reich be guaranteed for all time.”
Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is generally known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast between the Party and the defendant in these matters.
[Turning to the defendant.] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution has also accused you of being a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and the Defense Council. Will you please answer quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so often that I assume that no one in this Court wishes to hear anything further about these things. Were you a member of the Reich Government?
RAEDER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206, Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Führer of 25 February 1938, you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made equal in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted to and did participate in the meetings. Is that correct?
RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent in rank. The reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel was made equal in rank with the Reich Ministers because, in administering the affairs of the War Ministry, he was frequently in contact with them and had to be on the same level in order to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch and myself had seniority over General Keitel we also received the same rank. I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states that on the order of the Führer I could participate in a Cabinet meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the Cabinet when technical matters had to be explained. However, that never occurred, since after that time there were no Cabinet meetings.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that decree by Hitler it states: “The commanders-in-chief... on my orders shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.”
RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is concerned I need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to honor the retiring Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the impression abroad and at home that Von Neurath would still be consulted on foreign policy in the future. However, that Secret Cabinet Council never met.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on 12 March 1939, on the day commemorating the heroes, you made a speech and that in that speech you came forth with a ruthless challenge to fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry.
May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech was entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from an excerpt which was selected from a certain point of view; and I believe that it would be well to know the context of the entire speech. Of course, I shall not read it, but I should like to submit it as Exhibit Number Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document Book Number 3, Page 235, the page from which the Prosecution took the quotation. Will you please briefly express your opinion of that.
RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which will characterize the entire speech?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just as the Prosecution have done.
RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page which contains the quotation of the Prosecution.
RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we read on Line 6:
“He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their own ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them to retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to approach the tremendous problems of the times with courage, and to solve them. Thus the German people and the Führer have done more for the peace of Europe and the world than some of our neighbors are able to realize today.” (Document Number Raeder-46)
Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly in connection with it that after the experiences of the years 1917 to 1919, communism and international Jewry had destroyed the resistance of the German people to a considerable degree and had gained an excessively large and oppressive influence in German affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic affairs, as for example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my opinion, one could not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried to loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large and oppressive influence. Although in pursuing this course the National Socialist Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg Laws—the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course—nevertheless, in the course of the speech which I made in public at the orders of the Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with my conscience to express my personal opinions, which were basically different. It must also be considered that such a speech had to fit into a general framework. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two more short sentences:
“And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth.”
Then the last sentence, on Page 235:
“Within the bounds of German national community the Führer has assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction and to train the young manhood, fit for military service, which was entrusted to us and which has to pass entirely through our hands.”
The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there I spoke of the fact that we should not only train these young people technically in the sense of the technical use of arms but also educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology and philosophy, and I stated that we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party.
I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not be a completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible to have a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed force with monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our Armed Forces would have to be incorporated into the National Socialist State to the extent necessary to create a real people’s community, and it would be the task of the commanders of the Armed Forces to educate their branches of the forces in such a way that they would recognize and live up to the good national and socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This would be done in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, and at the same time to form a people’s community within the State.
And then on the bottom of Page 236:
“This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs peace. Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, a strong one has won it for herself. It is the proud task of the German Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the German nation against everybody.”
And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from the bottom of the page:
“But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant representative of his country, may accept a soldier’s word: What Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not just words but it has been proved by practical examples. The construction work of Germany requires many years of quiet development.”
I think that this is sufficient...
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.
May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is: “The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible entity.” The Prosecution has submitted that. Apart from that, nothing is underlined.
I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused you with having connections with all the political activities of National Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your participation in actions in those countries where participation by the Navy is certainly surprising.
In what way were you connected with the measures concerning the annexation of Austria?
RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of Austria at all and did not take part in any way.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?
RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, but that dealt only with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution considers this document important and therefore I should like you to say a few words about it.
RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my knowledge, is made in every state for every year and in which, according to the political situation, such cases are mentioned which may arise in the course of the year and for which, of course, certain preparations have to be made. For the Navy, however, that document had no sequel as far as Austria was concerned.
DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and then I did not get the page.
DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?
DR. SIEMERS: C-175.
[Turning to the defendant.] Does this concern strategic preparations for various eventualities?
RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, the “Case Red” and the special “Case Extension Red-Green.” All these had to be dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any consequences.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the same type of preparations, since they are necessary for military and strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the Allies—only to show their necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I cannot determine so quickly which of these documents are admitted and which have been rejected. Perhaps I may therefore submit the connected documents at the end in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my quoting the wrong figures.
[Turning to the defendant.] In what way did you and the Navy participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?
RAEDER: In a directive...
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the document of the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126—no, excuse me—USA-26. It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 147. It is a draft for the new directive “Grün” of 20 May 1938.
RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 and says with regard to the Navy:
“The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard to the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. Those measures must be confined to what is absolutely necessary, and must be carried out inconspicuously.”
The entire course of action at the end of September and beginning of October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla which we had taken over from Austria was put under the command of the Army.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?
RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat and minesweepers.
DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy participated?
RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate in the preparations for the occupation of what the document calls the “remainder of Czechoslovakia”?
This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. The Prosecution points out that according to that you had already been informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied after some time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you please tell us something about that?
RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way in which it is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. Point 1 deals with the securing of the borders of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks.
Points 2 and 3 are “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia,” “Occupation of the Memel Country.”
Number 2, “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia”: The first sentence reads, “It must be possible to shatter the remainder of Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should become hostile toward Germany.”
That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia; that did not mean that it was certain that any action would be taken.
In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the occupation of the Memel country, where it says: “The political situation, particularly warlike complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it necessary for the German Armed Forces to occupy the Memel country.”
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to my document, the part which the witness has just read is missing in the English translation—so that you will not look for it unnecessarily.
[Turning to the defendant.] So here again this is a possible eventuality?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the Athenia was sunk. From the military point of view that case has already been clarified by Herr Kranzbühler, but I should like you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position and give an explanation of the incident with special consideration of the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and insulting accusation. They have made the accusation that you, purposely and in violation of the truth, held England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the Athenia, although you knew perfectly well that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat. As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the Völkischer Beobachter.
Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. Document Book 10 of the British Delegation on Page 97.
[Turning to the defendant.] I would like you to explain that point.
RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young submarine commander of the submarine U-30 met an English passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed, by mistake, that it was an auxiliary cruiser. In order to avoid misunderstanding I should like to state here that the deliberations of Kapitänleutnant Fresdorf, which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval Operations Staff at that time and that this commanding officer could not have known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that auxiliary cruisers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest channel, England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the Athenia was broadcast by the British radio, and we probably received the news during the night of the 3d to the 4th, and transmitted it to the various news services.
In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the offices of the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information as to how far our nearest submarine was from the place of the torpedoing. I was told, 75 nautical miles. At about the same time, State Secretary Von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, who had been a naval officer in the first World War, learned of this situation and made a telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff, asking whether it was true. He did not call me personally. He received the answer that, according to our information, it could not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American Chargé d’Affaires—I believe Mr. Kirk—in order to speak to him about the matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the first World War it was clear to him how important it was that there should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told him what he had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally told the same thing to the American Naval Attaché, Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in good faith. I believed that I could tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. State Secretary Von Weizsäcker then came to see me personally, if I remember correctly. We were very close friends, and he told me what he had told the American Chargé d’Affaires. He apologized, I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that concluded the case for the time being.
The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal way, we would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the reason. We would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned. Disciplinary measures would have been taken against the officer. I also reported the incident to the Führer himself in his headquarters and told him that we were convinced such was not the case, and the Führer ordered that it should be denied. This was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed of the order by my press department.
The submarine returned on 27 September...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the Prosecution, it is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.
RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Dönitz has already described how he received him and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air.
The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and confirmed that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all these messages he had heard that he himself discovered that it was not an auxiliary cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer.
I reported the facts to the Führer because they could have had severe political consequences. He decided that, as it had been denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but also within official circles and government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to tell State Secretary Von Weizsäcker or the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. My order to the Commander of the U-boat fleet reads:
“1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the Führer.
“2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a mistake.
“3. The further political handling of the matter is to be attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything has to be done.”
With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and Admiral Dönitz has already reported that he was punished by disciplinary procedure. To our great surprise, about one month later that article appeared in the Völkischer Beobachter in which Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I knew absolutely nothing about that article beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because, knowing that our submarine had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the question to lay the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the Admiralty of all people.
I found out later that the order to publish such an article was issued by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the Reich Press Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the Propaganda Minister had himself drafted that article. Later I could not prevent it. I did not see the article nor did any of my officers of the High Command of the Navy see it. They would certainly have come to me at once so that I could have prevented its publication. We had no reason to expect such an article 4 weeks after the torpedoing of the Athenia. That is the case of the Athenia.
DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler knew about the article. When did you discover this?
RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.
DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?
RAEDER: No, by no means.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two.