Morning Session
[The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with reference to your examination yesterday, I have to put the following questions to you in re-examination. Sir David was talking about the fact that before 1933 you had carried out rearmament behind the backs of the law-making bodies. I think that question, as such, has been clarified; but there is one supplementary question. On whom did it depend just what was submitted to the Reichstag?
RAEDER: On the Reichswehrminister.
DR. SIEMERS: And who was the Reichswehrminister at that time?
RAEDER: He was a member of the government and my direct superior. I had to submit everything to him which I wished to get.
DR. SIEMERS: And his name was Gröner, wasn’t it?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: May I draw the Tribunal’s attention to the extract from the Constitution which I have recently submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-3, according to which Article 50 lays down that the Reich President gives all orders and decrees even where the Armed Forces are concerned. For their validity decrees require to be countersigned by the Chancellor or the Minister concerned. By the act of countersigning responsibility is accepted. In this, our case, the Reichswehrminister was the competent Reich Minister; and anything that was done afterwards with reference to the law-making bodies was a matter for the government to decide.
[Turning to the defendant.] Sir David has submitted to you Document C-17. It is the index of a book written by Colonel Scherff, called The History of the German Navy from 1919 to 1939. Was this book ever written?
RAEDER: As far as I know, only the index was compiled. I assume that if anything had been written, then it would have been submitted to me a long time ago, but I never heard of that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that the American Prosecution, at the time when they submitted the document, pointed out that as far as they knew the book was not written.
[Turning to the defendant.] I believe that it is very difficult to base accusations on an index, but I want you to tell me, Defendant, when did you learn of this index?
RAEDER: It became known to me during my first interrogation by an American prosecutor.
DR. SIEMERS: Furthermore, Document D-854, which is GB-460, was put to you yesterday. May I come back to one question put by Sir David. On Page 1 Sir David had been reading as follows:
“But if—as was stated—in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit—or at least its violation was prepared—a long time before the 16th of March 1935....”
Then Sir David asked you: “Do you want to say that this is untrue?” You answered but you did not quite finish your reply, at least it never became quite clear what you said in the German or the English record. I want you to tell me why you are of the opinion that Assmann was not quite right in this respect?
RAEDER: It is an utter exaggeration. First of all, violations—as have been proved here in detail—were mostly of a very minor nature; and only the number of deviations may have given the impression that there were many violations. Secondly, in its essential points, we never actually filled the quotas allowed by the Versailles Treaty; in fact, we remained below the figures granted. Besides, only defense measures are involved, very primitive defense measures—Assmann’s representations are just a great exaggeration.
DR. SIEMERS: What you are trying to say, therefore, is that Assmann’s way of putting it “in practically every sphere of rearmament” is wrong?
RAEDER: Yes, probably Document C-32 will have led him to that conclusion because there were so many points. However, on closer examination they turn out to be very minor points.
DR. SIEMERS: With regard to the important points of rearmament, that is to say construction of large ships, the Navy did not violate the Treaty, did it?
RAEDER: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: By repeating it three times, Sir David emphasized the fact that you had a great deal of confidence in Assmann. I have nothing to say against it, but beyond that I would like to put a supplementary question to you: Did you have that much confidence in him, that in your opinion Assmann could pass a proper legal judgment? Was he a lawyer?
RAEDER: No. Assmann was a naval officer who was not used at the front any more. He was a very clever writer who had written a few volumes about the first World War. He wrote very well, but even the volumes on the naval warfare during the first World War were corrected a great deal by the persons concerned; but against him and his ability to write history nothing can be said.
DR. SIEMERS: I think you remember this document from yesterday. Is it a final historical work? Is it a final and corrected edition?
RAEDER: No. So far as I know, he had not got that far. He was making summaries and extracts from war diaries and records.
DR. SIEMERS: Assmann has written (Document D-854, GB-460):
“If, in this light, there were plans for ‘preparing the construction’ in 1935 of twelve 275-ton submarines, six 550-ton submarines, and four 900-ton submarines, then one will have to consider the strategic points of view valid at that time.”
Added together 22 were planned, and for the following year 14 submarines—by no means built, just planned. Are these figures correct in your opinion?
RAEDER: They are correct in my opinion. The only thing I am not sure about is the 900-ton type; I cannot quite explain that. I cannot remember that at that time we were building 900-ton boats. Apart from the 250-ton type, our first types were 550-tons, and only then did the 740-ton boats come. Perhaps he is thinking of those when he says 900-tons. We did not actually build 900-ton boats.
DR. SIEMERS: On Page 158, Sir David has read to you the following sentence, which I want to repeat because it needs clarification.
“It is probably in this very sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered least to the restrictions of the German-British Treaty. Considering the size of U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality, 118 were completed and constructed.”
I want to remind you that in the original there is the Note Number 6 referring to a letter of the Chief of the Naval Budget Department...
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: ...from the year 1942, presumably containing statistics on the construction of submarines as the years went by. I believe that these figures need to be clarified.
According to material at my disposal, it appears that these 55 U-boats were in accordance with the London Agreement; that is to say, in accordance with the 45 percent agreed on in 1935. You probably have not got the exact figure in mind, but is that roughly correct?
RAEDER: Yes, that is probably right.
DR. SIEMERS: And now, the Figure 118. That, according to material at my disposal, is also well-founded. That is the figure which corresponds to the 100 percent equality in regard to the tonnage of submarines. If we had 118 submarines, then our submarine equipment corresponded to that of Britain at that time. Is that so?
RAEDER: Yes, it is correct; and it is also correct that we included these later boats in the budget and had ordered them after we had seen Admiral Cunningham and his staff in Berlin on 30 December and had reached a friendly understanding in accordance with the agreement, allowing us to build 100 percent. The remark read at the beginning, saying that we had committed most violations in this sphere, is a complete untruth. Until the beginning of the war we only built such U-boats as we were allowed to build; that is to say, first 45 percent and later 100 percent. It was a great mistake, of course, that we did it.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have just said that it was a complete untruth. I think that, even if Sir David used that word against you, one ought not to pass such sharp judgment against Assmann. Do you not think, Admiral, that there was possibly a legal error on his part when...
RAEDER: Yes, that may be.
DR. SIEMERS: ...he wrote these details and that he was not really thinking of what you have just told us had happened; namely, that in 1938 there had been an agreement between England and Germany, according to which Germany could now build 100 percent?
RAEDER: That is quite probable. When I said “untruth,” I meant incorrectness.
DR. SIEMERS: May I remind the Tribunal that in the Naval Agreement of 1935, 100 percent was planned from the beginning and that Germany at first renounced that but had the right at any time to increase to 100 percent, provided that Great Britain was notified. The notification is presumably what you described, Witness; that is the negotiation with Admiral Cunningham?
RAEDER: Yes, that was on 30 December 1938, or it may have been 31 December.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant saying that there was a notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938? Is that what you said; that there was notification to Admiral Cunningham on the 30th of December 1938?
RAEDER: Admiral Cunningham came to Berlin, to this friendly negotiation which had been provided for in the agreement. On that 30 December we arranged with him that from now on, instead of 45 percent, 100 percent would be built.
THE PRESIDENT: Was that an oral arrangement or a written one?
RAEDER: It was a conference between the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff and Admiral Cunningham, and certain other individuals, but I cannot remember the details. However, I am pretty certain that minutes were taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, unfortunately, I have not been able to trace any written evidence. I only know from Exhibit Number Raeder-11, that is the agreement of 1935, that Germany could increase the tonnage, and the agreement of ’37, that Germany had the duty to give notification. Generally, notification is only in writing in diplomatic relations, although, in my opinion, it was not necessarily a duty in this case. Negotiations, as the witness said, did take place.
RAEDER: May I, perhaps, add that apart from the submarine problem, the question of two heavy cruisers, which we had originally dropped, was also settled. We only wanted to build three for the time being; and now we were asking for assent to build the other two, to which we were entitled. That was also agreed upon in accordance with the agreement.
DR. SIEMERS: Document C-140 was put before you yesterday; it is USA-51. You will find it in the British Document Book 10a on Page 104. I want to put one sentence from that document to you again, which has not been quoted by the Prosecution, neither in November nor yesterday. It appears under Figure 2-c. There is the following statement—I want to add that this is the question of sanctions and the possible preparation of a defense against sanctions in 1935. I quote from 2-c: “For the time being I prohibit any practical preparations.”
Witness, I want to ask you...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not 10a, 104.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones has just been kind enough to point out to me the English translation. It appears from it that—as I have also the English translation before me—that there are two documents C-140; one has one page and the other has two. One has not got a heading and is dated, Berlin, 25 October 1933. In my opinion it is the document...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the one on Page 104?
DR. SIEMERS: No, on Page 104 there is, as I just heard from Major Elwyn Jones, the other document, C-140, which has the heading, “Directive for the Armed Forces in Case of Sanctions.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and the date of it is 25 January 1933?
DR. SIEMERS: 25 October 1935, but that is a clerical error. It is 1933.
MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): There appears to be another document which is not in the document book.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, perhaps I may point out that the Document C-140, USA-51, presented by the Prosecution, must be the one I have referred to, because it tallies with the record; I mean the record of the session of 27 November. That is the document to which I have just now referred.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it C-140 or C-141?
DR. SIEMERS: C-140, the same number, and that is the same as USA-51.
Mr. President, perhaps to simplify matters, I may later, after today’s session or tomorrow submit the Document C-140 in the, here presented, English and German text.
THE PRESIDENT: Read the document now and you can settle with Mr. Elwyn Jones about the proper notation of the document, whether it should be C-140 or whatever the exhibit number ought to be.
DR. SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] In the version submitted by the Prosecution, preparation for the defense against sanctions is mentioned. I shall now read a further sentence to you, and I quote, “For the time being, I prohibit all practical preparations.” Would it be right, therefore, that in 1933 nothing whatever was prepared by you in the Navy?
RAEDER: No. Apart from the ordinary state of preparedness, nothing was allowed to be done, in accordance with this order. This was merely a precaution on the Führer’s part in order to take preparative measures in case the opponent might do something.
DR. SIEMERS: You see, the reason why I am asking you this is that yesterday in the cross-examination the preparations that you were supposed to have made in this connection were held against you.
I now come to Document C-189, which is USA-44. I beg to apologize for troubling the Tribunal in that I am asking them, if possible, to look at the document again. It is contained in Document Book Raeder 10, Page 14; and, incidentally, Sir David re-submitted it yesterday. Sir David attached great importance to the two words “against England.” There under Figure 2 it says:
“The Ob.d.M. expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that, therefore, from 1936 onward, the large ships must be armed with 35 centimeter guns like those of the King George class.”
Would this mean that you were using the plans of the English for building ships of the King George class?
The only reason, therefore, why you were pointing this out was that you were considering the 35 centimeter guns used in the King George class by the British Admiralty?
RAEDER: Yes, it was the aim of every navy at that time to know as early as possible which was the largest caliber of guns being used by other navies. I said yesterday that, to start with, we had chosen as a model the French Dunkerque type, but later on we discovered that the British used up to 35.6 centimeters. Ships have to be used, if war breaks out, in their actual state; their gun caliber cannot be changed any more. Therefore we always went as high as possible.
DR. SIEMERS: Would I be right, therefore—please excuse me—if I said that the expression “against Britain” in this connection is not correct grammatically, that according to German language usage it should have said “with reference to England”?
RAEDER: Yes, it should have said “developing with regard to England.” I said yesterday that it would have been quite senseless if I were to do something against Great Britain before the conclusion of the pact.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that was fully gone into in cross-examination, and the defendant stated his explanation of the words used.
DR. SIEMERS: From Document C-190, which is the conversation on 2 November 1934 aboard the Emden between you and Hitler, Sir David has held up to you that Hitler, in a discussion with you and Göring, said that he considered the expansion of the Navy in the planned manner an absolutely vital necessity, since war could not be conducted unless the Navy safeguarded the ore imports from Scandinavia. It was said that this would have to be understood to mean that the Navy was planned in view of a war and in view of safeguarding the ore imports, which really meant aggressive intentions. Are you of the opinion that the British Navy was not planned to safeguard imports to England or for the event of war and was not equipped accordingly?
RAEDER: No, there is not the slightest doubt about that.
DR. SIEMERS: Six submarines are mentioned in this document. Considering that figure, may I ask you to tell me the number of submarines that Germany would have needed in order to conduct an aggressive war?
RAEDER: Well, at any rate, many more than we had in October 1939, a multiple of that.
DR. SIEMERS: From a document, Mr. President, which was submitted yesterday, D-806, I want to quote, in addition to the second paragraph which has been quoted, the first paragraph and put it to the witness. It is D-806, GB-462, submitted yesterday at noon.
[Turning to the defendant.] There it says:
“1.) Reference: Submarine Construction Program. On 27 October 1936 I made decision regarding the full utilization of the still available U-boat tonnage according to the Naval Agreement of 1935 and regarding the immediate ordering of the construction of U-41 to U-51.”
Were these the rest of the submarines within the 45 percent limit to which we were entitled according to the Naval Agreement of 1935?
RAEDER: Yes, that is right, judging from the figures.
DR. SIEMERS: And then, Admiral, you have been very thoroughly questioned about Austria and Czechoslovakia. Since that subject has been gone into in detail, I shall confine myself to just one question: Did you, at any time, receive any tasks or orders of a foreign political nature from Hitler? And did he ask you for your advice especially in foreign political matters?
RAEDER: I was never asked for advice, and I had no foreign political tasks, unless you consider the duties which I had to fulfill in Bulgaria and Hungary after my resignation of a foreign political nature.
DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Czechoslovakia, that is, concerning the document about the “Rest Tschechei,” you were asked whether Hitler had aggressive intentions against Prague at that time. I think the question ought to have been whether his intentions were for an aggressive war.
In connection with that, you have been asked about Göring’s threat to bombard Prague, and you quite rightly admitted to Sir David that such a bombing would be a threat. Sir David commented on it as being near to aggressive war; but in order to be quite clear, I want you to tell the Tribunal when you learned of this planned bombing.
RAEDER: Only after the whole matter had been settled, and only by way of conversation. I heard no announcement and I knew nothing else of it beforehand.
DR. SIEMERS: So you knew nothing of it before the occupation of Prague?
RAEDER: No, because military undertakings against Prague were altogether unknown to me.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there is the Document C-100. Mr. President, it was presented yesterday under the Number GB-464.
THE PRESIDENT: 463, I’ve got it.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; 463.
[Turning to the defendant.] From that document I want to quote to you from Page 10. It is Page 3 of the attached document. I want to put the following sentence to you. I quote:
“Führer asked Ob.d.M. whether there were any special wishes of the Navy with reference to bases on Dutch-Belgian coast. Ob.d.M. says no, since bases are within reach of the British coast and are therefore useless as submarine bases.”
According to this, Witness, you were not in favor of an occupation of Belgian and Dutch bases, nor did you in any way occupy yourself with this question.
RAEDER: This was always my point of view, that from the experience of the first World War Belgium and Holland, as far as the Navy was concerned, could not offer any useful bases, since all forces were under the control of the British Air Force. In the first World War serious fighting occurred between the submarines leaving their ports and destroyers stationed nearby. Therefore I declared myself not to be interested in Belgium and Holland.
DR. SIEMERS: Skipping various documents, I now come to D-843, GB-466. This is a document in which Dr. Breuer from the Oslo Embassy expresses the view that the danger of a British occupation of Norway was not really very great and that certain actions were only taken in order to provoke Germany.
I have one more question on that. Did the Embassy in Oslo, that is to say Breuer, know about the information that Admiral Canaris was supplying to you?
RAEDER: I cannot tell you that, as far as I am concerned. I was never in direct contact with Dr. Breuer, only with the naval attaché; but I must add that Dr. Breuer had only been in Oslo for a comparatively short period and that apparently he was not particularly well informed. The statements made by Norwegian Ministers were certainly not properly judged by him.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an order from Hitler that the Foreign Office should not be informed about probable plans concerning Norway?
RAEDER: Yes, he expressly ordered that, and it is obvious that for that reason the Reich Foreign Minister himself was informed very late.
DR. SIEMERS: In other words, as far as you can see, the ambassador could not have had Canaris’ information through military sources.
RAEDER: No, hardly.
DR. SIEMERS: Then there were several documents, D-844 and D-845. It was put to you from those that there was no danger in Scandinavia. Was the information that you received at the time different?
RAEDER: Yes. I had continual information...
THE PRESIDENT: All this was gone into yesterday, and the witness gave the same answer.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that the following has never been mentioned before. Did you know whether as early as 5 April mines had been laid in the territorial waters off Norway?
RAEDER: The Allies had announced it on 7 April, but the actual operations must have taken place a few days earlier.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday...
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] Dr. Siemers, the only purpose of re-examination is to bring out matters which are favorable to your client which have not been raised in cross-examination, that is to say, to explain anything which has not been given in cross-examination. When he has given this account in cross-examination it is no good putting it to him again in re-examination. We have heard it.
DR. SIEMERS: I think that on this particular point one explanation is missing.
[Turning to the defendant.] Yesterday you were asked, rather unexpectedly, what had been the technical changes since 1936 and how the legal situation regarding submarine warfare would have been influenced thereby.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: It is a somewhat difficult question to answer in two seconds. You have mentioned aircraft. Can you not supplement your statement?
RAEDER: Yes, I forgot the most important point due to the fact that there was a rather lively controversy. The important point is that the spotting of vessels at sea by aircraft was something quite new and had been developed very efficiently. That development continued very rapidly during the war, until submarines could very quickly be located and pursued.
DR. SIEMERS: Regarding D-841, which is the affidavit from Dietmann, may I, with the Tribunal’s permission, make a formal application? In this affidavit, there is the following sentence:
“It is my personal opinion that the higher authorities of the Navy in Kiel and other places in Germany had knowledge of these dreadful things.”
THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t “had knowledge” but “must have had knowledge.” It seems to me it is in the translation “must have had knowledge.”
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I have not got the German and I do not know how the original is worded. I only have the English translation. It is not quite clear to me how the German version was worded. May I ask the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Is the document put in in the original German or is it put in in the English? The deposition is in German presumably.
DR. SIEMERS: I presume that originally the statement was in German. The copy I have states that this is a translation and that is English, but I have not seen the German original.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there must have been a German copy for the witness yesterday. I don’t know whether or not it is the original. I didn’t see it but I assume it was.
THE PRESIDENT: It isn’t the case that the deposition was made in German, then translated into English, and then translated back into German, was it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is why I assume it was the original. I am sorry this was done. I haven’t got the original document in front of me but I assume that was so. I will find out in a moment for you.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What is the point, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that this sentence should be struck from the document. It does not record a fact.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean you are asking to have it struck out or...
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the witness sets out fully the facts in the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit and then it is true that he introduces the sentence “By my personal opinion....” but the gist of the statement is that from these facts which I have stated the higher formations of the Navy in Kiel and in other places in Germany must have had knowledge of these terrible conditions. A man who has been working in that detachment of the German Navy and knows the communications between that detachment and the headquarters is in a position to say whether headquarters would have knowledge from the facts he has stated. His inference has a greater probative value than the inference which the Court can draw. The objection to the statement of a matter of opinion is where the witness gives his opinion on a matter on which the Court is equally capable of drawing an opinion from the same facts, but the importance of that statement is that he is saying “working in the bow and being familiar with the chain of command and communications.” I say that anyone at Kiel must have been able to learn from these facts what was going on at these places—so that is the narrow point, whether his special knowledge entitles him to express a view which the Court, without that special knowledge, would not be in a position to draw.
THE PRESIDENT: But ought he not theoretically to state all the facts; and if he does state all the facts, then the Tribunal will be in the same position as he is to form a judgment; and it is for the Tribunal to form the judgment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is exactly the point to which I was addressing my argument, that there is the additional fact, that because he was working there, was part of the chain of naval command and he is speaking of the knowledge of the naval command from the point of view of somebody who was working in it, and, therefore, he has on that point his opinion as to the sources of knowledge; and the necessity of constructive knowledge is an additional fact. My Lord, the state of a man’s mind and the expression of his knowledge may be a fact in certain circumstances, just as much a fact as that stated, as Lord Bowen once put it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if the state of his knowledge is directly relevant to an issue.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the point here.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a form of expert evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, in a sense, it is not as Your Lordship says, in a form, it is not in a usual form, but it is the evidence of somebody who has special knowledge. My Lord, it is a well-known distinction, for example, in the laws of libel between the persons who have expert knowledge and the public at large; and, My Lord, the opinion of someone with a special knowledge of the facts must have probative value within Article 19 of the Charter. My Lord, if the provision that this Tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of evidence is to mean anything at all, I submit it should cover the expression of opinion on a point such as this; that is the ability to have knowledge, which is given by somebody who is in a special position to state such an opinion.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a very small point, Sir David, and we have got to decide the matter and form our own opinion about it; and this man isn’t here for the purpose of being cross-examined for anything of that sort.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is so, My Lord, but, of course that, with respect, cuts both ways. I mean here he gives an affidavit and part of it as the basis leads up to that conclusion. I should respectfully submit that that conclusion is a statement of fact—but, if Your Lordship says so, the time will come when we can ask Your Lordship to draw that conclusion as a matter of argument ourselves; but, My Lord, on the general position, the only reason that I have occupied even this much of the Tribunal’s time is that Article 19 is an important matter in the view of the Prosecution and, therefore, we have to argue against its being whittled down. It is the only reason that I’ve taken up the Tribunal’s time.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I just draw your attention to one point. Sir David has just been mentioning the well-known legal difference. That is just what I want to base my argument on, the difference between facts and opinions. Here it is a question of opinion and please note the following sentence does even go further; there, the witness is coming to a legal opinion and he is stating who is responsible; therefore, he is passing some sort of judgment. Furthermore, I beg you to consider that this is quite a minor official who, after all, cannot possibly make statements of such portent to the effect that higher formations in Kiel and some other places in Germany—he is quite vague—had some sort of knowledge.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before the Tribunal adjourn, might I make a correction and an apology? My Lord, I thought that a copy in German had been put to the witness yesterday—of this affidavit; and apparently it was a copy in English. The original affidavit was sent off on the 6th of May; it was verified over the telephone by Colonel Phillimore and it has not yet arrived. An English copy was sent and has been processed and the original will be put in as soon as it arrives. My Lord, I thought that we had got the original but apparently it has not yet arrived, but it is an English document put to the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you let Dr. Siemers see the original as soon as it arrives?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered Dr. Siemers’ application and it has decided that the passage to which he objects and which he asks the Tribunal to strike out in the affidavit of Walter Kurt Dietmann shall not be struck out in view of Article 19 of the Charter. The passage contains an opinion only, and the Tribunal will consider that opinion in relation to the whole of the evidence when it is before the Tribunal and will decide at that time the probative value of this opinion as well as the probative value of the other evidence.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I just have...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, may I remind you that you told us that your re-examination would take, you hoped, about half an hour?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, I shall conclude very shortly.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, in connection with this Commando decree which we discussed a good deal, Sir David yesterday put a case to you regarding the attack on the ship Tirpitz. In this connection I should like to ask you: Do you recall that in the testimony of Wagner there was the question of a British sailor named Evans?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And do you recall also that, according to the affidavit of Flesch, Number D-864, GB-457, Flesch declared, “I am unaware of the fact that Evans wore a uniform”?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I do not need to submit the document to you?
RAEDER: No, I recall it.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall further that it is said in Document UK-57, submitted on the same day as Wagner’s testimony: “The British sailor Evans was captured wearing civilian clothing”?
RAEDER: Yes. I have the document here.
DR. SIEMERS: And that was one case where the SD, obeying the Commando order, committed a murder without the knowledge of the Navy?
RAEDER: Yes. This man had been apprehended by the SD or the Police, not by the Navy. He had only been interrogated in the meantime by the admiral.
DR. SIEMERS: The second case of which you are accused is the sabotage attack on German ships near Bordeaux. I clarified this situation in Wagner’s testimony the other day.
Do you recall that his document also states that these men tried to escape to Spain in civilian clothes?
RAEDER: Yes, that is true.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when using the small fighter craft mentioned yesterday under the command of Vice Admiral Heye, did our soldiers ever wear civilian clothing?
RAEDER: No, never.
DR. SIEMERS: Always in uniform?
RAEDER: Yes, always in uniform. These craft were a weapon just like submarines, speed boats, et cetera.
DR. SIEMERS: As my last point, Mr. President, I should like to point out that yesterday Colonel Pokrovsky submitted a document, USSR-460, which deals with the Moscow notes.
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, the point is that yesterday the Tribunal made a decision about submitting to the attorneys for the Defense extracts from USSR-460. Today the prosecutors have exchanged opinions among themselves; and the Prosecution of the United States, represented by Mr. Dodd; Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe for Great Britain; and myself for Russia, have agreed that it is necessary for us to request you to permit us to read into the record here today the three brief extracts referring to Dönitz, to Keitel, and to Jodl so that they will be included in the record. These are the excerpts which yesterday the Tribunal did not allow to have read into the record as evidence. If we understood the Tribunal rightly it was due to lack of time as the session was dragging on.
Due to these circumstances these three extremely important excerpts—important from our point of view—the accuracy of which was confirmed yesterday by the Defendant Dönitz, have not been included in the transcript of the session. For that reason I am requesting just about 5 minutes time to read these excerpts into the record today, on behalf of the Prosecution of the three countries.
THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient course, Dr. Siemers? Would you like to have them read now so that you can put any questions upon them?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I make some remarks about this document? The Soviet Delegation has been kind enough to put the original at my disposal. I perused the original yesterday, and I looked at the extracts. The Soviet Delegation desires to retain the original but has also been kind enough to put instead a photostatic copy of the extracts involved at the disposal of the High Tribunal. I am completely in agreement with the suggestion, but I personally do not have the intention of putting any questions on this document, which is clear to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: And so I would like to ask that the resolution put forth by the High Tribunal yesterday be upheld, that this should not be read, just as other documents were not read out either.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document was originally in German. Presumably it has been translated into Russian; it has certainly been translated into English. Unless the French members of the French Prosecution want it read if it hasn’t been translated into French there doesn’t seem to be any use in taking up the time of the Tribunal by reading it into the record. We have got the document in English, and we have all read it.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think there is one reason. Even if it is read into the record, it will at least be tomorrow before the transcript is available for the defendants who are referred to, and this witness, or this defendant, will be off the stand. If they want to cross-examine about what he has said about them, then we will have, I suppose, to bring this defendant back on the stand. I think we will lose far more time by doing that, rather than now having Colonel Pokrovsky take 5 minutes to read it. They will all hear it, and then if they want to examine about it, they can do so promptly.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, very well.
Dr. Siemers, if you don’t want to ask any questions about it, you can conclude your re-examination now, and then Colonel Pokrovsky can read the document. Then any of the other defendants can question the witness if they want to, upon it.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that not be the best way, Colonel Pokrovsky?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, certainly.
DR. SIEMERS: I agree, Mr. President, but I do believe that this document need not be read, because Mr. Dodd was somewhat mistaken when he said that the defendants are not familiar with this document. They and their counsel are thoroughly familiar with it. I believe everyone knows it, and I do not think that it needs to be read. However, in the final analysis, it really makes very little difference to me personally.
THE PRESIDENT: If the defendants’ counsel do not want it read then the Tribunal does not want to have it read unless defendants’ counsel want to ask questions upon it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I, as defense counsel for Admiral Dönitz, am not interested in having the document read. I know the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised that the Defense Counsel know the document and do not put any value on having it read nor do they wish to put any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, Mr. Dodd and Colonel Pokrovsky, it does not seem that it serves any useful purpose to have it read.
MR. DODD: No, I am satisfied, Your Honor. I have not heard from Keitel’s attorney; I assume he is satisfied. I am just concerned that at some later date—a very interesting document to us, of course—and I am just concerned some question may be raised and I am also sympathetic to the desires of these defendants not to have it read publicly.
The Defendant Schacht’s counsel has not spoken either. I think it might be well, Mr. President, if we had a careful statement from counsel for each of these men that they do not want to question or, if so, that we can be completely sure that it will not be raised again.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the defendants’ counsel are all here or all the defendants are represented and they must clearly understand what I am saying and I take it from their silence that they acquiesce in what Dr. Siemers has said, that they do not wish the document to be read and they do not wish to ask any questions.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have not understood your decision, My Lord. Are you permitting me to read into the record these few excerpts or are you not?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Colonel Pokrovsky; I am saying that as the defendants’ counsel do not wish the document to be read it need not be read.
COL. POKROVSKY: We do give a great deal of importance and significance to this document as it involves not only the interests of the Defense but also the interests of the Prosecution. The document was accepted by the Tribunal yesterday but for some reason only a very small part of the characterization given therein by Admiral Raeder was included in the stenographic record for the day. I do not see any reason why these excerpts should not be read into the record now, and why the witness Raeder, who intimately knew the Defendants Dönitz, Keitel, and Jodl, should not hear the excerpts here and now.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky and Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal ruled yesterday that it was unnecessary that the document should be read and the Tribunal adheres to that decision in view of the fact that the defendants’ counsel do not wish it to be read and have no questions to put upon it.
Yes, Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I will now conclude my examination of Admiral Raeder. I do not know whether other questions will be put to Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any question which has arisen out of the cross-examination which the defendants’ counsel want to put?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to put two questions, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, in cross-examination you were confronted with orders and memoranda as to the U-boat warfare.
RAEDER: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider yourself responsible for these decrees dealing with the U-boat warfare which you issued during your term as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
RAEDER: I consider myself fully responsible for all decrees issued as to the U-boat warfare which took place under my responsibility as well as every naval operation which I ordered. In the Naval Operations Staff and together with the officers of the Naval Operations Staff I worked out these directives; I approved memoranda and in accordance therewith I gave my orders. The Commander of the U-boat fleet was solely the tactical commander of U-boats. He transmitted the orders and he carried through the details of the operations.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, yesterday Sir David charged you that he could not determine who actually gave the orders to change the log book of the U-boat which sank the Athenia. Admiral Godt testified in answer to my question that he had issued this order at the request of Admiral Dönitz. Do you know of any facts which would show this testimony of Admiral Godt to be incorrect?
RAEDER: Actually I was never concerned with this case. I only decreed the three points which have come up here several times.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Therefore, you consider Admiral Godt’s testimony as being correct?
RAEDER: I assume that it is correct since everything else he said was very reliable.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the High Tribunal I should like to call my first witness, the former Reich Minister of the Interior, Severing.
[The witness Severing took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
KARL SEVERING (Witness): Karl Severing. I am 70 years old and I live at Bielefeld.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute. Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, please tell the High Tribunal what role you played in the Social Democratic Party up until the year 1933 and the principal ministerial posts you held up until the year 1933.
SEVERING: At the age of 16½ I entered the labor union movement and when I was 18 years old I entered the Social Democratic Party and as a result of that fact I held honorary positions in the Party at a relatively early age.
In the year 1905 I became councillor in the city of Bielefeld. I was member of the Reichstag from 1907 until 1912; and I again became a member of the Reichstag and at the same time a member of the Prussian Diet in 1919. I was in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Diet until 1933. I was Minister in Prussia from 1920 until 1921; then again from 1921 to 1926, and from 1930 until 1933; from 1928 until 1930 I was Reich Minister of the Interior.
DR. SIEMERS: When and why did you leave public life?
SEVERING: I retired from official public life in July 1932, and from political life when the Social Democratic Party was prohibited.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you arrested when leaving public life in 1933, or perhaps at a later date and, if so, at whose order?
SEVERING: I was arrested on the very same day on which the Enabling Act was scheduled to be read and passed in the Reichstag. The order for my arrest was signed by the then Minister of the Interior, Herr Göring, who at that time was also President of the Reichstag and, if I may utter an opinion, who would have had the obligation, as President of the Reichstag, to protect the immunity of the members of the Reichstag. Under breach of this immunity I was arrested the moment I entered the Reichstag building.
DR. SIEMERS: But you participated in the vote on the Enabling Act?
SEVERING: The Chairman of the Social Democratic Reichstag faction had complained to Göring against the treatment to which I was subjected with the result that I was given leave to vote. But the voting had already come to a close. However, Reichstag President Göring still permitted me to give my “no” vote for the Enabling Act.
DR. SIEMERS: You were arrested thereafter but only for a very short time?
SEVERING: On the next day I had to appear for further interrogations. I was permitted to leave Berlin on the second day and was given the order to hold myself ready at my home in Bielefeld for further interrogations.
DR. SIEMERS: Despite your well-known anti-Nazi attitude, you were not arrested later and put in a concentration camp, if I am not mistaken.
SEVERING: I was never in a concentration camp, thanks to the respect—and I say this with all modesty—which the old Prussian officials, my previous subordinates, had for me. At the end of October 1933 I heard from the Police Chief in Bielefeld that trouble was brewing for me. The police notified me that they would not be able to give me any protection and advised me, therefore, to leave Bielefeld for several months. I followed this advice and, from October 1933 until the end of March 1934, I lived in Berlin using a false name. I first stayed with friends, and then I went to a small Jewish sanatorium at Wannsee. I feared another arrest in August 1944; according to someone whom I knew in the police my name was on a list of people who were to be arrested summarily—men and women who were suspected of having plotted against Hitler in July 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say ’44 or ’34?
DR. SIEMERS: ’44. After the attempted assassination of Hitler of July 1944.
SEVERING: May I continue?
DR. SIEMERS: Please do.
SEVERING: After the attempted assassination of Hitler orders were given to the police to arrest certain people. My name was on the Bielefeld list. Then a police official whom I knew from the past pointed out that I was close to my seventieth year and had lost my son in the war. Thus he succeeded in having my name struck off the list.
DR. SIEMERS: Aside from what you have told us now, did you suffer any further disadvantage at the hands of the National Socialists?
SEVERING: Well, I was considerably hindered in my movements. I was not especially surprised that my mail was censored and my telephone tapped. I considered that as a matter of course. But I could not even take a trip without being followed and watched by the police.
If you do not mind, I should like to call your attention to the fact that in addition to material damages there is also harm to one’s ideals (ideelle Schädigungen), and in this respect I suffered a great deal at the hands of the National Socialist Party after it assumed power. A political measure, taken in connection with the polls of 1932, was used against me, I might say, in a criminal way. They talked about me and my friend Braun as the “thieves of millions,” and this epithet was also applied to the members of my family.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, is this witness going to give any evidence which has relevancy to the defendant’s case?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, bring him to it then as quick as possible.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well.
[Turning to the witness.] Herr Minister, try to be as brief as possible in this connection. It is of course true that with respect to your ideals you suffered harm as well, but as the basis of my examination and your testimony I would like to ascertain whether serious harm was caused to you and I would like to have you tell us, but briefly, whether National Socialism...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, what relevancy has this got to Raeder’s case?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, my intention is to show that Minister Severing, after a brief description of his life during Nazism can, without bias, give entirely impartial answers in reference to Raeder. Since he had no advantages but rather disadvantages at the hands of the Nazis and on the other side...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have dealt sufficiently with the disadvantages now. Go to the matter which relates to Raeder. He has given us, from 1933 to 1944, a fairly general account of his life and that ought to be sufficient.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses the Defendant Raeder, that in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he violated the Treaty of Versailles, in the intention of carrying on aggressive wars, and that behind the back of the Reich Government. In order to shorten the testimony, I would like to point out to you that it is an undisputed historical fact that Germany, in developing her Navy within the framework of the Versailles Treaty, violated the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty. All that is known to the Tribunal. Even before this time, the government applied for the construction of armored cruiser A within the compass of the Versailles Treaty. A great inner political conflict arose over the construction of this cruiser and, in connection with a debate before the Reichstag on this cruiser, the witness made a speech. I have a brief excerpt from this speech which I should like to submit to you and which I should like to read. Mr. President, this is Exhibit Number Raeder-5, to be found in Document Book 1, Page 13. This is an extract from a speech by the former Reichsminister Karl Severing before the German Reichstag on 20 January 1928.
[Turning to the witness.] Herr Minister, at this period of time you were not a Minister; rather, you gave this speech as a deputy of the Social Democratic Party?
SEVERING: Yes, that is correct.
DR. SIEMERS: The extract reads:
“Now the armored cruiser. The fact that a government, which knows precisely what gigantic sums we must raise during the coming year, should make such demands, is, to say the least, quite surprising. It says, the Peace Treaty permits it—yes, but the Peace Treaty also decrees the payment of reparations. The 9,300,000 marks demanded for this year will play their decisive part only in the consequences entailed which would require the raising of several hundred million marks, which during the next few years seems to me absolutely impossible. Considering the development of weapons for naval warfare, I am not convinced of the military value of armored cruisers. It may be that armored cruisers are the backbone of the defense at sea, as the government says. But, to form an active fighting unit (Gefechtskörper), the backbone must also be made up of other elements, of U-boats and airplanes; and as long as we are not allowed to build these, armored cruisers are of very little value even for defense.”
Is that extract from the speech correct?
SEVERING: Yes, that, extract is reproduced correctly.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it right to conclude here that the Social Democratic Party and you, personally, at that time, were of the opinion that the Wehrmacht which was granted Germany by the Versailles Treaty might not be sufficient for a defensive war?
SEVERING: That is correct.
DR. SIEMERS: Will you please comment on that a little more extensively.
SEVERING: That the 100,000-man army granted to Germany was not sufficient even for a defensive war was and is known today possibly to everyone in Germany concerned with politics. Germany got into a very bad situation with regard to her eastern neighbors since the establishment of the Corridor. The insular position of East Prussia forced Germany even at that time to take measures which I reluctantly helped to carry out; but the population of East Prussia had a right to be protected against attacks which were threatening from the East. I am not speaking about an aggressive war and I am not speaking of any plans of the Polish Government; but I would like to refer you to the fact that in the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, there were aggressive groups in Poland who set foot on German soil, possibly with the idea of establishing a fait accompli...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, this evidence is all a matter of argument. Not only is it a matter of argument, but we have had it over and over again from nearly all the defendants and a good many of their witnesses; and, surely, it is not assisting the Tribunal in the very least to know what this witness said in 1928 or what view he took in 1928.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I believe this will become clear in the following. Minister Severing was a member of the government that held this cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928. I agree with the High Tribunal that the matters have been heard frequently—these things only once, however—but I should like to point out that Sir David even yesterday in cross-examination accused the defendant, despite his testimony, that, against the will of the Reich Government and against the wish of the Parliament, he had violated the Treaty of Versailles. If, therefore, after the testimony of Raeder, the Prosecution persists in their opinion, I have no other possibility to prove the incorrectness of the opinion of the Prosecution than by questioning a witness who...
THE PRESIDENT: The question whether the Treaty of Versailles was violated is a question of fact and, of course, upon that you can give evidence and you did give evidence through the Defendant Raeder; but this witness is not talking about the question of fact. He is arguing that Germany was entitled to defend herself in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. That is what I understood his evidence to be and that is a question of argument, not a question of fact.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I know juridically...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the class of evidence which has just been given by this witness will not be listened to by the Tribunal. If you want to prove facts by him, you can prove them, but you cannot prove arguments or his views upon arguments.
DR. SIEMERS: Could Germany with her Wehrmacht protect herself against the incursions in Silesia by Poland?
SEVERING: In the year 1920 the Wehrmacht would not have been able to protect Germany in East Prussia; therefore, it was necessary to protect the population of East Prussia, and this was achieved in that I, personally, agreed that all weapons which were found in East Prussia were to be given to the population. Under conditions which applied at that time, it was, even for purposes of inspection, very hard to pass through the Corridor by rail; so that in 1920, I had to make a tour of inspection by way of water from Stolpmünde to Pillau. I am mentioning this fact to show the difficulties of transportation through the Corridor. In 1920 and ’21, it was not possible for the German Wehrmacht to prevent attacks of Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia and, I am sorry to say, and I emphasize “I am sorry” that a certain self-defense had to be created in order to protect and defend German life and German property.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, were the measures with regard to rearmament as they were wanted and accounted for since January 1928 by Reichswehrminister Gröner based on defensive or offensive ideas as far as you know Gröner?
SEVERING: As far as I am acquainted with Gröner and his own personal way of carrying on his office, everything that he conceived and carried out was in view of defense.
DR. SIEMERS: Then this should also apply to the armored cruiser A. I should like to know why the Social Democratic Party, which was interested in the idea of defense, was against the building of this armored cruiser.
SEVERING: In 1928 the Social Democratic Party was against the building of the armored cruiser as the economic situation did not warrant expenses which were not absolutely necessary. And the Social Democratic Party wanted to prove and to show that they did everything within their power in order to make the much-discussed disarmament a reality. They did not believe that the building of an armored cruiser would be a favorable gesture for the bringing about of appropriate negotiations.
DR. SIEMERS: On 28 June 1928 a new Reich Government was formed. Müller was Reich Chancellor; Stresemann was Foreign Minister, and you were Minister of the Interior. What position did your government take to the then pending problem of universal disarmament stipulated in Versailles, or to the then pending problem of rearmament by Germany?
SEVERING: I have just made a reference to this problem. We were of the opinion in the Social Democratic Party, even after entering the Müller government, that we would have to use all our efforts in order to solve just this problem. In September of 1928 the then Reich Chancellor Müller, replacing the Foreign Minister Stresemann who was ill, went to Geneva in order to bring this problem up before the League of Nations. Müller made a very resolute speech which, if I remember correctly, was received very coolly by Allied statesmen; so that any practical suggestions for the realization of disarmament could not be hoped for in the near future.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, in July 1928 you spoke with Reichswehrminister Gröner about the budget and specifically about the fact that secret budgets of the Wehrmacht, on the armored cruiser and so forth, had become known. What attitude did you take in this connection and what were the results following your agreement with Gröner?
SEVERING: In order to answer this question I would like to touch again on the extract from my speech, which you just submitted to the High Tribunal. In the same Reichstag session in which I gave this speech, the Reichswehrminister Gröner appeared for the first time as successor of Gessler. I had said a few farewell words in honor of Gessler who was leaving. I greeted the new Minister with the remark that my political friends would show him respect, but that he would have to earn our confidence first. It was probably while thinking of this remark that Gröner came up to me in the first session of the Müller Government and said that he was looking forward to a sincere collaboration with me. I quoted a passage from Iphigenie on that occasion, “May there be truth between us.” Only complete sincerity would make possible fruitful co-operation, I said.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal thinks that this is an absolute waste of time and this speech of the witness is entirely irrelevant. Why do you not ask him some questions which have some bearings on the case of Raeder?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that the Prosecution has made the accusation that the rebuilding was undertaken by means of a secret budget and that a secret rearmament was carried on with the idea of starting wars of aggression. It is not quite clear to me how I can cross-examine the witness in any other way than by asking him how these secret budgets, which to a certain extent are practically identical with violations of the Versailles Treaty, were dealt with in his government. That is exactly what I just questioned the witness on.
THE PRESIDENT: This speech that you have drawn our attention to is simply a speech in which he said that he did not think that armored cruisers were of any use. That is the only meaning of the speech, except insofar as it refers to the fact that reparations had not been paid. For the rest it simply says that armored cruisers, in his opinion, are of no use.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I may not and do not wish to make a plea here. In the speech which I read something else is said. It says there that the Social Democratic Party was against the building of this armored cruiser, because of economic reasons and not because of strategic reasons, and that if an armored...
THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with a charge of making an aggressive war in 1939?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I did not raise the accusation of an aggressive war; the Prosecution did that, but I have to protect my client against the accusation that in 1928 he had intentions of carrying on an aggressive war; I assert that he had no intention of that sort, that the Reich Government knew about the violations of the Treaty, that the Reich Government took the responsibility for them, and the testimony of the Minister will show that these are actual facts which were challenged only yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct questions on issues of fact. Then the Tribunal will listen to them if they are relevant, but the Tribunal considers that the evidence of his speech that you have been dealing with is an utter waste of time.
DR. SIEMERS: I shall try to be brief. As a result I shall put questions to the witness which he will answer one by one.
[Turning to the witness.] You just said that you demanded of Gröner confidence and absolute truthfulness. Did you ask him in this connection for enlightenment on the secret budgets and the violations of the Treaty of Versailles which had taken place up to that time?
SEVERING: I specifically asked him for enlightenment since, in January of 1928, the then Reich Chancellor Marx had frankly admitted that under Kapitän Lohmann in the Navy Department there had been misrepresentations in the budget which could not be in accordance with good bookkeeping and political honesty.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Gröner reply?
SEVERING: Gröner then told me that he had the intention of discussing these matters at a cabinet meeting and of clarifying all these matters.
DR. SIEMERS: Were the commanders-in-chief of the two branches of the Wehrmacht to be present at this meeting?
SEVERING: On 18 October they were to appear and did appear.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, when did you meet Admiral Raeder for the first time?
SEVERING: The first official contact, according to my recollection, was made the beginning of October 1928, probably on the day when he paid me an official visit on my assuming office.
DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-6, I submitted to the High Tribunal, as the High Tribunal will probably recall, a speech by Raeder dated 23 January 1928. There was a covering letter with this document. This letter will now be submitted to the witness.
[Turning to the witness.] According to this document, did your meeting with Raeder take place on 5 October 1928, 5 days after the appointment of Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
SEVERING: This discussion probably took place on that day. May I mention...
DR. SIEMERS: Just a moment, Herr Minister. I think it will be safer if you look at the letter. There it says: “Following our discussion of 5 October...” May I ask you to confirm to the High Tribunal that this report made by Raeder was saved by you and that it is a true and authentic copy?
SEVERING: The letter which I put at your disposal is the original of the letter by Raeder. It is in accordance with the incidents which you just mentioned.
DR. SIEMERS: Then, on 5 October this conversation with Raeder did take place. Were the conversations between you and Raeder basically in accordance with the ideas expressed in this speech?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall that in this speech Raeder declared emphatically that a war of aggression was a crime?
SEVERING: Yes, I remember that.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you on the occasion of this conversation tell Raeder that you had agreed with Gröner that the actual violations of the Treaty of Versailles would have to be discussed and clarified and that a cabinet meeting would have to be held?
SEVERING: I do not recall this detail, but it was quite probable.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you demand of Raeder that between yourself and him there should be absolute sincerity and truthfulness?
SEVERING: Of Raeder, too, but especially of the chiefs of the Army.
DR. SIEMERS: As a result of this discussion with Raeder, did you have the impression that you could work with Raeder in a satisfactory manner and that he would tell you the truth?
SEVERING: Yes, I had that impression.
DR. SIEMERS: On 18 October 1928 the cabinet meeting which we have already mentioned took place. May I ask you to describe briefly that cabinet meeting, provided it is agreeable to the High Tribunal to have the witness picture this session. I believe that a description of this session would save time, rather than to have me ask single questions. Therefore, Herr Minister, be brief in telling us what happened.
SEVERING: At this session, members of the cabinet were familiarized with the details of what might be considered a concealment of the budget or violations of the Versailles Treaty. Both gentlemen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, spoke, if I remember rightly.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the entire cabinet attend?
SEVERING: Yes, perhaps with the exception of one or two members who were ill, but it was a session which in general might be called a plenary session.
DR. SIEMERS: The principal members were present?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Were Müller, Stresemann present?
SEVERING: I cannot tell you whether Stresemann was present. He was still ill in September and whether he had recovered by 18 October, I cannot say. But I might add, that if Herr Stresemann was not present, certainly someone else was present as an authorized deputy from the Foreign Office.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Admiral Raeder and General Heye at this meeting expressly give the assurance to the cabinet—as I remember, in form of an affidavit—that only those violations had occurred which were mentioned by them?
SEVERING: Whether that was proclaimed in a solemn manner by affidavit or by word of honor, I cannot say; but, in any event, at the request of the Reich Chancellor and especially at my own request, they said that no further violations would take place.
DR. SIEMERS: They assured you specifically that there would be no further violations without the knowledge of the Reich Government?
SEVERING: Yes, exactly that.
DR. SIEMERS: And over and above that, they stated that now the Cabinet knew about everything?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: A declaration to that effect was made?
SEVERING: Yes, such a declaration was made.
DR. SIEMERS: Were important matters connected with these secret budgets or violations of the Treaty of Versailles?
SEVERING: I may state here and have to admit even that since I was used to violations of the Versailles Treaty, I was especially interested in the extent of the violations with regard to the sum. I wanted to know what I could do in my new capacity against secret arms-bearers and against illegal organizations; and I asked what was the total sum involved. I was thereupon told—and I believe that this was set down and confirmed in writing later—that perhaps 5½ to 6 million marks was the amount involved in these secret budgets.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you remember the budget figures of those days better than I do. What can we gather from these figures? Must we conclude that they were grave violations involving aggressive intentions or may we gather that in the final analysis they were just trifles?
SEVERING: I do not have the figures as they apply to the budget plans of the Navy and the Army. I cannot quote the figures from memory. But the impression I gained from the reports of the two Wehrmacht leaders was that only trifles were involved. It was this impression which caused me to assume a certain political responsibility for these things, and especially in view of the fact that we were assured that further concealment of budget items or other violations were not to occur in future.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember that Gröner at this session declared that the small infringements of the Treaty dealt purely with defense measures, with antiaircraft guns, coastal fortifications, et cetera?
SEVERING: I cannot give you the details today, but I might remind you that all the speeches which Gröner made at the time when he was Defense Minister were along these general lines. In all of his speeches in the Reichstag, Herr Gröner expressly declared that he was an advocate of sound pacifism. In answer to your question I reply that Gröner’s statements, and also my own, were based on defense and defensive measures.
DR. SIEMERS: In other words at the end of this session, the Reich Government expressly accepted the responsibility for these infringements and the small secret budget items?
SEVERING: To the extent that we have mentioned.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder in the future adhere to the clear directives of the Reich Government?
SEVERING: I cannot answer that in a positive manner, but I can say that I did not observe any violations on the part of the Navy in respect to the agreements during my term of office as Minister of the Interior.
DR. SIEMERS: Are you personally of the opinion, since you know Raeder sufficiently well, that he kept the promise he made to you not to resort to secret violations?
SEVERING: Raeder gave me the impression that he was an honest man and I believed that he would keep his word.
DR. SIEMERS: Just one more question, Herr Minister. Of course, you cannot remember the details, but do you perhaps recall that on the occasion of the cabinet meeting of 18 October there was discussion about a Dutch firm which was designing U-boats?
SEVERING: No, I cannot give you details of the discussion; but I do know that at that period of time, there was much talk—either in another cabinet meeting or by a subcommittee of the Reichstag or by a different parliamentarian body—of experimental workshops which had been established for the Army and the Navy in Russia, Sweden, and Holland.
DR. SIEMERS: Purely experimental workshops?
SEVERING: I can say only that there was talk to this effect. Whether these experimental workshops had been established I cannot tell you from my own experience.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, could Germany, by reason of governmental discussions going on at the time, hope that some day, despite the Versailles Treaty, she would be permitted to build U-boats?
SEVERING: The leading statesmen...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, how can he answer that there was a hope that they would be allowed to build U-boats? That is what your question was, was it not; was there a hope?
DR. SIEMERS: I know, Mr. President, these questions were already dealt with by the governments which obtained through the years 1928 to 1932; and I believe that Stresemann carried on these discussions. Since Stresemann is no longer alive, I would like to ask Herr Severing on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to the Tribunal that it is mere political gossip.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, on whom did it depend what was brought up in the Reichstag? Raeder is accused of acting behind the back of the Reichstag. Who submitted this to the Reichstag? Did Raeder do that?
SEVERING: I do not quite follow you. Who submitted the budget, you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes.
SEVERING: The budget went through the hands of the experts of the various Ministries and the entire Cabinet, and the budget was submitted to the Reichstag by the Cabinet.
DR. SIEMERS: The matter of dealing with the budget before the Reichstag was a matter for the Reich Government and not for the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is that right?
SEVERING: Inasmuch as a budget item was submitted to the Reichstag, the competent Reich Minister took care of it in the main committee and the plenary session of the Reichstag, but the political responsibility was assumed by the entire Reich Cabinet.
THE PRESIDENT: It was never alleged as to the Defendant Raeder that he had submitted the budget to the Reichstag; it was never put to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, yesterday it was asserted...
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t argue! Go on with any other questions.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you recall whether at the end of 1929 you talked with a member of the government with regard to the various leading personalities in the Wehrmacht, and that you made a comment which subsequently became known concerning certain personalities?
SEVERING: Yes, it is correct that on one occasion I had been asked to give a personal estimate of certain military personalities. I named Gröner and Raeder in this connection.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, how many concentration camps do you know of?
SEVERING: How many do I know of now?
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry; not now. How many did you know of before the collapse of Germany?
SEVERING: Perhaps 6 to 8.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you know before the collapse of Germany or rather did you know in 1944 already about the mass murders which have been dealt with so frequently in this proceeding?
SEVERING: I gained knowledge of concentration camps when murder, if I may say so, became professional and when I heard of a few cases which affected me personally very deeply. First of all, I was told that the Police President of Altona, a member of the Reichstag and a Social Democrat of the right wing of the Party, had been murdered in the concentration camp at Papenburg. Another friend of mine, the chairman of the Miners Union, Fritz Husemann, is said to have been murdered shortly after his being committed to the same concentration camp. Another friend of mine, Ernst Heimann, was beaten to death in the Oranienburg Camp according to the reports received by his family.
Dachau was known even in the north of Germany as a concentration camp. Some Jewish inmates returned from Buchenwald in the spring of 1939, and in that way I learned of this camp. Columbia House at Berlin I figured to be a concentration camp also.
That was my only knowledge of camps and their horrors up until the time when the London radio started to report about concentration camps. I perhaps might mention another case. In 1944 a friend of mine, a member of the Reichstag, Stefan Meier, who had served 3 years in the penitentiary, was put into a concentration camp in or near Linz. After a brief stay there he was murdered, according to reports received by his family.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, you just heard of these and similar individual cases?
SEVERING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: You were not familiar with the fact that thousands were murdered every day in gas chambers or otherwise in the East?
SEVERING: I believed I should tell the High Tribunal only of those cases which were, so to say, authentically reported to me. Everything I learned of later through indirect reports, from my friend Seger or from the book of the now Generalintendant Langhoff, had been told me but I had no possibility of checking up on their accuracy.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Minister, did you and your Party friends have the possibility...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, are you going to finish this examination, or are you going on? Do you see the clock?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I should like to leave the decision to the High Tribunal as to whether we shall have a recess now. I understand there will be a cross-interrogation so that...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but presumably you know what questions you are going to ask; I don’t.
DR. SIEMERS: I cannot say exactly what answer the witness is going to give. It might take perhaps another 10 minutes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn now till a quarter past 2 o’clock.