Afternoon Session
COL. POKROVSKY: You have given very important testimony before the Tribunal. You have admitted that in 1941 the warriors of the Red Army at Vyazma were fanatically resisting the Fascist invaders. Many of them were taken prisoner only because they were too exhausted to move. You thereby explained the abnormally high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war. Is that correct?
JODL: That is true with regard to the prisoners, particularly in the Vyazma pocket.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you think of any other reasons you know which would account for this high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war?
JODL: I did not hear of any other reasons.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then I will refresh your memory a little and draw your attention to a short excerpt from our Exhibit Number USSR-353. It is a letter from Rosenberg to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, that is, it was sent directly to the OKW. The letter is dated 28 February 1942. I would draw your attention to a few short extracts from this document. On Page 1, I believe, the following sentences are underlined:
“The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a large-scale tragedy.... A great part of them have died of hunger or from the inclement weather. Thousands have also died of typhus.”
I will leave out a few sentences and proceed to the next page:
“Several intelligent camp commanders have taken this line with some success.”
Before it had been a question of the population being willing to supply the prisoners of war with food of their own accord.
“In the majority of cases, however, the camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to give any food to the prisoners of war and have preferred to let them die of starvation.... Moreover, in many cases, when prisoners of war on the march could no longer keep up from sheer hunger and exhaustion, they were shot in full view of the horrified civilian population; and the corpses were left by the roadside.”
And further on:
“Remarks have been heard like these: ‘The more of these prisoners that die, the better it will be for us.’ ”
And again on Page 3:
“It would be too naive to imagine that what went on in the prisoner-of-war camps could be concealed from the Soviet Government. It is obvious from Molotov’s circular note that the Soviets are perfectly well aware of the conditions described above....”
Have you found the passages in question?
JODL: Yes, I have found them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, did you really know nothing of the reasons for this high mortality?
JODL: No. I heard of the letter here in court for the first time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Defendant Jodl, I am not asking you about the letter. I am asking you about the reasons for these mass deaths among the Soviet prisoners. So you did not know of the reasons which led to these mass deaths?
THE PRESIDENT: Is the document signed?
COL. POKROVSKY: The document bears no signature. It is a captured document, Number 081-PS. It belongs to the documents captured by the United States and was handed to us so that we could submit it to the Tribunal.
[Turning to the defendant.] I did not hear your reply, Defendant.
JODL: I knew nothing about these reasons for the mass deaths. In any case they are completely wrong; that I do know, because I can give rough figures from memory as regards the number of Soviet prisoners of war and their whereabouts.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We will now deal with this question from a different angle. Are you familiar with the name of Von Graevenitz?
JODL: Von Graevenitz? Yes, the name is familiar to me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did he not work in the OKW?
JODL: He was, if I am not mistaken, in the Armed Forces Department as a subordinate of General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: This time you are quite accurate; you are right. Do you know General Österreich?
JODL: No, I do not know that general.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have never even heard the name?
JODL: I do not recall it.
COL. POKROVSKY: This general was chief of the department in charge of prisoners of war in one of your military districts. Do you perhaps remember this general’s testimony about the directive he had received from Von Graevenitz in the OKW with respect to the Soviet prisoners of war? You will now be shown Document Number USSR-151, Page 5 of the German text. You will find there the passage to which I should like to draw your attention.
“At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 I was repeatedly called to Berlin to attend conferences held by the commanders in charge of prisoners of war in the military districts.
“The newly appointed commander of the Prisoners of War Organization in the headquarters of the OKW, Major General Von Graevenitz, presided over the conference.
“During the conference there was a discussion about the treatment of prisoners of war who, because of their wounds or from exhaustion and disease, were unfit to live and unfit to work. At the suggestion of General Von Graevenitz several of the officers present, among them several doctors, gave their opinions on it and declared that such prisoners of war should be concentrated in a camp or in a hospital and be poisoned. Following this discussion, Major General Von Graevenitz issued an order to the effect that all prisoners of war who were unfit to live and to work should be killed and that medical personnel should be employed for this purpose.”
Did you know anything at all about that?
JODL: I knew nothing about that at all, and I cannot comment on this document. It has nothing to do with me and I do not know whether what has been said here is true, but General Von Graevenitz must certainly know about it. I had no connection whatsoever with prisoners of war. That was another office, General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: Von Graevenitz himself defends his statement. He was an executive; he put the directives of the OKW into effect and also issued the relevant instructions and yet you tell me you knew nothing about them?
JODL: I did not say that. General Von Graevenitz is no subordinate of mine. I had no interviews of any kind with him. I have seen him perhaps twice in all my life. I was not responsible for prisoners of war, and I was not competent to deal with them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. We will now pass on to my last group of questions. There are very few of them.
When Defendant Keitel was cross-examined here before the Tribunal, as well as in the preliminary interrogations preceding the Trial—I believe these particular subjects arose during the preliminary interrogation—he said that you would give us more detailed information about directives for the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad. You stated here before the Tribunal that the directives were issued for two reasons: First, because General Von Leeb had reported on the gradual seeping through of the Leningrad populations to the west and south to the front lines; and secondly, they were issued as a reprisal for Kiev. Is that correct?
JODL: Not reprisals, but the justifiable fear that whatever could happen to us in Kiev could also happen to us in Leningrad; and the third reason was the announcement by the Soviet Russian radio that this would actually take place.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. The only important thing for me is to establish the fact that you connected the issuing of this directive with the report from the Leningrad front and with the affair in Kiev; is that correct?
JODL: I did not connect them; but events, as they actually happened, necessarily influenced the decision of the Führer in this direction. These were the reasons which he gave himself.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will remember when the High Command received this information from Leeb—in what month?
JODL: It was in the first days—as far as I remember in the first days of September.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you can also remember the date on which the Germans captured Kiev. Was it not towards the end of September 1941?
JODL: As far as I remember, Kiev was occupied at the end of August. I believe it was on 25 August or about that date. But I cannot...
COL. POKROVSKY: Was that not on 22 September?
JODL: That is entirely out of the question. We have a document here, a report about the incidents in Kiev; I do not know the date of it from memory, but it is Document 053-PS. We must be able to see the date from that document.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is precisely in that document that 23 and 24 September are mentioned. Well, let us, however, suppose that it really did happen in August. Would you not remember the date when Hitler first declared that Leningrad should be razed to the ground?
JODL: I beg your pardon. I have made a mistake all the time about the date. This document is—Document C-323, the Führer decree, is dated 7 October. So, your statement may be correct. I was a month off in my calculations, and the taking of Kiev was actually at the end of September. The reports which we received from Leeb came in the first days of October. I made a mistake. I am sorry.
COL. POKROVSKY: Please, do not mention it; it is of no importance. I only want you to remember when Hitler first stated categorically that he would raze Leningrad to the ground. That is important for me.
JODL: You are referring to the naval document, I assume, the document of the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff.
COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed Document L-221 and will be shown the passage where it is written that, on 16 July 1941, during a conference in the Führer’s headquarters, the following statement was made:
“The Finns are claiming the district of Leningrad. The Führer wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns.”
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes, I have found the place.
COL. POKROVSKY: This took place on 16 July 1941, did it not?
JODL: The document was written on 16 July 1941, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: That was considerably earlier than the date you received the report from the Leningrad front?
JODL: Yes, it was 3 months before then.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was also long before the day when explosions and fires first occurred in Kiev. Is that correct?
JODL: Quite correct.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was clearly not by accident that in the directive you drew up yourself and in the statements you made before the Tribunal, you declared that the Führer had again decided to raze Leningrad to the ground. It was not the first time he had made this decision.
JODL: No, this decision, if it actually was a decision—and the statements made at this conference—I learned for the first time here in Court. I personally did not take part in the discussion, nor do I know whether the words were said in that way. My remark that the Führer had again taken a decision refers to the verbal order he had given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shortly before, perhaps 1 or 2 days earlier. It is quite clear that there was already talk of this and that in the order I am referring to—a letter of the High Command of the Army of 18 September—and in that way the word “again” is to be explained. I was quite unaware of the fact, and I heard of it for the first time here in Court. It was only here in Court that I heard of the conference taking place at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. The Tribunal will probably be able to judge precisely when Hitler made this statement for the first time.
You have declared that you knew nothing about reprisals against the Jews?
JODL: No.
COL. POKROVSKY: And yet you have just referred to Document Number 053-PS.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
It is a report from Koch, personally signed by him. Maybe you will confirm that it states quite clearly that Koch held the civilian population of the city responsible for the Kiev fires and exterminated the entire Jewish population of Kiev, numbering some 35,000 souls, over half of whom were women. That is what the report says. Is it correct?
JODL: I know that very well indeed, but I only found this document here in the document room; and I used it as a good piece of evidence for the incidents in Kiev. The existence of the document was unknown to me until I came to Nuremberg and it never went to the OKW either. At all events, it never came into my hands. I do not know whether it was ever sent.
COL. POKROVSKY: You also did not know whether the Jews were exterminated or not? Is that true?
JODL: I certainly believe it today. There can be no more doubt about that; it has been proved.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In the document submitted by your defense counsel as Exhibit Number Jodl-3, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6 of your document book, in the last entry made on that page, you will read the following: “A large proportion of senior generals will leave the Army.”
This refers to the entry in your diary of 3 February 1938. Do you remember?
JODL: Yes, that is from my diary.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are we to understand that resignations from the Army could take place at any time, in other words, that any general could retire or resign from the Army whenever he wanted to? That is what you say here.
JODL: At that time, I believe it was quite possible. In the year 1938 I knew of no decree which prohibited it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In Document Number Jodl-64, Exhibit Number AJ-11, which was submitted by your defense counsel, we find a passage which, for some reason or other, was not read into the record; and I would like to quote it now. It is the testimony of General Von Vormann, who states under oath that you, together with General Von Hammerstein, often used such expressions as “criminal” and “charlatan,” when referring to Hitler?
Do you confirm the accuracy of that testimony, or has Vormann expressed himself incorrectly?
JODL: To the best of my knowledge, and in all good conscience, I believe that he is confusing two things. In talking about the Führer, I very often said that I looked on him as a charlatan; but I had no cause or reason to consider him a criminal. I often used the expression “criminal”; but not in connection with Hitler, whom I did not even know at the time. I applied it to Röhm. I repeatedly spoke of him as a criminal, in my opinion; and I believe that Vormann is confusing these statements just a little. I often used the expression “charlatan”; that was my opinion at the time.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is to say, you considered Röhm a criminal and the Führer a charlatan? Is that correct?
JODL: Yes, that is right, because at that time it was my opinion. I knew Röhm, but I did not know Adolf Hitler.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then how are we to explain that you accepted leading posts in the military machine of the German Reich, after the man whom you yourself described as a charlatan had come to power?
JODL: Because in the course of the years I became convinced—at least during the years from 1933 to 1938—that he was not a charlatan but a man of gigantic personality who, however, in the end assumed infernal power. But at that time he definitely was an outstanding personality.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you receive the Golden Party Badge of the Hitler Party?
JODL: Yes, I have already testified to that and confirmed it.
COL. POKROVSKY: In what year did you receive the badge?
JODL: On 30 January 1943.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was it after that when you came to the conclusion that Hitler was not a “charlatan”? Did you hear my question?
JODL: Yes. It became clear to me then that he was, as I said before, a gigantic personality, even if with certain reservations.
COL. POKROVSKY: And after you had reached that conclusion you promptly received the Golden Party Badge? I thank you.
I have no more questions, Your Honor.
DR. NELTE: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the Document Number USSR-151, which was submitted by Colonel Pokrovsky. I should like to ask for this document to be admitted only if General Österreich can be produced as a witness for cross-examination. My reasons for this are the following:
1. The document as submitted contains the heading “Aussagen” or “statements,” but we cannot make out before whom these statements were made.
2. The document contains no mention of the place where it was drawn up.
3. The document is not an affidavit, although according to the last paragraph General Österreich set it down in his own handwriting; and, therefore, it could have been certified as a statement under oath.
Because of the severity of the accusation which this document brings forward against the administration of the prisoner-of-war system, it is necessary in my opinion to order this general to appear here in person.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
DR. NELTE: Those are the reasons for my request. In conclusion I should just like to point out that General Von Graevenitz is no longer alive. At all events, he cannot be located. I tried to find him as a witness on behalf of Defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a fact that this document was offered in evidence as long ago as February or March?
DR. NELTE: I do not remember that, nor—and I know this for certain—was it issued to us through the Document Division. I am seeing this document for the first time now. But perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky can give some information about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider your request.
DR. NELTE: May I also call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the document is dated 28 December 1945, and it is to be assumed that General Österreich can also be produced by the people who took his testimony at that time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I believe that I can give some information about this document. It was submitted by the Soviet Delegation on 12 February 1946, when it was accepted as evidence by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, just a moment. Was it translated into German then or was it read in Court?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have just received a memorandum from our document room. The document was submitted on 13 February, at the time when I was presenting documentary evidence with regard to the subject of prisoners of war. It is all I have on the matter.
I personally assume that the document was translated into German as a matter of course at that time. I have almost no doubt about it. However, we can easily make sure.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to re-examine the defendant?
DR. EXNER: First of all, I should like to put one question which came up again during the interrogation by the Defense Counsel. It was a point which seems to me in need of clarification.
One of the Defense Counsel reminded you of the photographs which were shown us here depicting atrocities in the occupied countries, and you said that the pictures were genuine.
What do you mean by that?
JODL: I meant to say that it was not trick photography, at which the Russian propagandists were past masters, according to my experience. I meant that they were pictures of actual events. But I also meant to say that the pictures offered no proof of whether it was a matter of atrocities at all, nor did they show who committed them. The fact that they were found in the possession of Germans would even lead us to assume that they were pictures of things which had been perpetrated by the enemy, by the forces of Tito or perhaps the Ustashi. Generally one does not take a picture of one’s own acts of cruelty if any were ever committed.
DR. EXNER: Very well. The English Prosecutor has submitted a new document, 754-PS, dealing with the destructions during the retreat in Norway. Why in this purely military Führer Decree did you write: “The Führer had agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, and has given his orders accordingly....” and so on? Why did you deliberately put in “to the proposals,” and so forth?
JODL: In issuing orders I had a kind of secret code for the commanders-in-chief. If an order was the result of an agreement between the OKW and the Führer, then I started with the words “The Führer has decreed....”
If a decree originated from the Führer himself, I started the decree with a preamble which gave the Führer’s reasons and the arguments in favor. Then, after the preamble, I wrote “The Führer, therefore, has decreed....”
If the Führer was prompted by the proposal of a nonmilitary agency to issue a decree, then, as a matter of basic principle, I added, “The Führer, on the proposal of this or that civil authority, has decided....” In this way the commanders-in-chief knew what it was all about.
DR. EXNER: Did you draft this decree—Document Number 754-PS—without objection or resistance?
JODL: This decree originated in much the same manner as the Commando Order. One of the Führer’s civilian adjutants advised me that Terboven wished to speak to the Führer. He had had trouble with the Wehrmacht in Norway because of the evacuation of the civilian population from northern Norway. The civilian adjutant said he wanted to advise me first before he established connections with Terboven by telephone. Thereupon I at once had inquiries made through my staff of the commander in Norway-Finland. I was told that the Wehrmacht—the commander of the Wehrmacht in Norway had rejected Terboven’s proposals and did not consider them possible on such a large scale. In the meantime Terboven had spoken with the Führer. I then remonstrated with the Führer and told him that, in the first place, the decree and Terboven’s intention were not practicable on such a scale, and secondly, that there was no necessity for it on such a large scale. I said that it would be better to leave it to the discretion of Generaloberst Rendulic to decide what he wanted or had to destroy for military reasons. The Führer however, incited by Terboven, insisted on the decree’s being issued on the grounds of these arguments which I had to set down. But it was certainly not carried out to this extent. This is also shown by the report of the Norwegian Government, and it can also be seen from personal discussions between me and my brother.
DR. EXNER: Now let us turn to something else. When there were drafts and proposals to be submitted to the Führer, you often voiced objections and presented arguments. It seems remarkable that when matters contrary to international law were contemplated you raised no objections on the grounds of international law or on moral grounds, but you mostly voiced objections of a practical nature or from considerations of opportunity. Can you tell us briefly why you acted in this manner?
JODL: I already told you that when I gave my reasons for the formulation of the proposal not to renounce the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Namely?
JODL: This form had to be chosen to meet with any success with the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is sufficient. Now, you said yesterday...
MR. ROBERTS: Your Lordship, I object to this merely in the interest of time, because it is exactly the same evidence which was given yesterday; and, in my submission, it is pure repetition.
DR. EXNER: This discussion at Reichenhall was mentioned today. Please tell us briefly how it came about that you made such statements in Reichenhall or how such directives as you described today were decided upon in Reichenhall?
JODL: I have already testified about the conversation with the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, it was only a question of provisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the defendant has just told us that he has given evidence about this already.
DR. EXNER: Yes, about the conversation which preceded it, but you did not testify about the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
JODL: No, I have not yet spoken of the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
DR. EXNER: Please be brief.
JODL: In regard to this conversation at Reichenhall—that is, the orientation of the three officers of my staff—Warlimont’s description is somewhat different from mine. He is confusing here the earlier events with the later ones, which is not surprising, because from 20 July until the time he was arrested, he was ill at home with severe concussion of the brain and complete loss of memory. Up to the time he was captured he was no longer fit for service. That my description is the right one may be readily seen from the notes in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. It is stated there that these divisions would be transferred to the East only to prevent Russia from taking the Romanian oil fields.
DR. EXNER: I should like to correct one point which, it seems to me, was presented erroneously by the Russian prosecutor. He said that Göring and Keitel did not consider the war against Russia to be a preventive war. On Page 5956 of the record (Volume IX, Page 344) it states that Göring, too, considered the war to be a preventive one and that he only differed in opinion from the Führer insofar as he would have chosen a different period of time for this preventive war. Keitel was, in general, of the same opinion.
Furthermore, the Russian prosecutor submitted a document, Number 683-PS. I do not know what exhibit number he gave. I cannot quite see how this document is to be connected with Jodl; and I have the idea that may be a matter of signature, for the document is signed “Joel,” who is not at all identical with the Defendant Jodl. I just wanted to draw attention to this point. Perhaps there is simply a mistake in the names.
Further, the Prosecution said that the defendant made a remark about partisans being hanged upside down, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you have simply made a statement, which you are not entitled to do, about this document. If you want to prove it by evidence you should ask the witness about it. You have told us that this document has nothing to do with Jodl, and that the signature on it is somebody else’s. Why didn’t you ask the witness?
I am told just now that it has already been proved that it isn’t Jodl’s document.
DR. EXNER: The translations this morning were bad; I do not remember having heard that. I do not know whether it is permissible for me now in this connection to read something from a questionnaire? It is only one question and an answer in connection with this remark about the hanging of prisoners, and so on. Is that permissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it arises out of the cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Yes; the Russian prosecutor brought up the question of whether the defendant made this remark during the discussions about the prisoners, in connection with the guerrilla directive—that members of guerrilla bands could also be quartered during combat.
There it says:
“Question: Is it true or not...?”
Oh yes, I must say that is my Document Number Jodl-60, Exhibit Number AJ-7. Page 189 of Volume III of my document book. It is an interrogatory of General Buhle, which was made in America.
Then it says:
“Question: ‘According to a stenographic transcript, you also took part in a report on the military situation on the evening of 1 December 1942, which resulted in a lengthy discussion between the Führer and Jodl as to combating partisans in the East. Is that correct?’
“Answer: ‘I took part in this discussion, but I no longer remember the exact date.’ ”
THE PRESIDENT: What page did you say, Dr. Exner?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the third page of the third book—or the third document in the third book.
DR. EXNER: It is Page 189. I have just read Question 4. Now I come to Question 5:
“Question: ‘Is it or is it not correct that on this occasion Jodl asked the Führer to return the directive which had been drawn up in his office relative to the combating of partisans?’
“Answer: ‘That is correct.’
“Question 6: ‘Is it or is it not correct that in this draft the burning of villages was expressly prohibited?’
“Question 7: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer wanted to have this prohibition rescinded?’
“Answer: ‘Since I never had the draft of the directive in my hands, I do not know for certain if the burning of villages was expressly prohibited. However this is to be assumed, because I remember that the Führer protested against individual provisions of the directive and demanded the burning down of villages.’
“Question 8: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer also had misgivings about the draft because he did not want any restrictions to be placed on soldiers who were directly engaged in combating the partisans?’ ”
According to the minutes Jodl stated in reply:
“This is out of the question here. During the fighting they can do whatever they like, they can hang them, hang them upside down or quarter them; it says nothing about that. The only limitation applies to reprisals after the fighting in those areas in which the partisans were active....
“Answer: ‘It is correct that the Führer had fundamental misgivings about these restrictions. Jodl’s remark is correct as far as its contents are concerned. I can no longer recall his exact words.’
“Question 9: ‘Is it or is it not correct that following this remark all those present’—Führer, Keitel, Kranke, and you yourself—‘including the Führer, laughed and the Führer abandoned his standpoint?’
“Answer: ‘It is probable that all of us laughed on account of Jodl’s remark. Whether after this the Führer really abandoned his standpoint I do not know for certain. However, it seems probable to me.’
“Question 10: ‘Then how were the expressions “hang, hang upside down, quartered,” interpreted?’
“Answer: ‘The expressions, “hang,” “hang upside down,” “quartered,” could in this connection only be interpreted as an ironical remark and be understood to mean that in accordance with the directive no further restrictions were to be placed on the soldiers in combat.’
“Question 11: ‘Could you perhaps say something about Jodl’s fundamental attitude towards the obligation of the Wehrmacht to observe the provisions of international law in wartime?’
“Answer: ‘I do not know Jodl’s fundamental attitude. I only know that Keitel, who was Jodl’s and my own immediate superior, always endeavored to observe the provisions of international law...’
“Question 12: ‘Did you ever have the experience yourself that Jodl influenced the Führer to issue an order which violated international law?’
“Answer: ‘No.’ ”
THE PRESIDENT: None of that last part arises out of the cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Did you have anything to do with prisoners of war?
JODL: I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war. It was the general Armed Forces Department which dealt with them.
DR. EXNER: Now, one last question.
It is alleged by the Prosecution, and during yesterday’s examination it was reaffirmed, that there was or had been a conspiracy between political and military leaders for the waging of aggressive wars and that you were a member of that conspiracy. Can you say anything else about that before we finish?
JODL: There was no conspiracy...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal does not think that that really arises out of the cross-examination. Anyhow, he said it already; he said that he was not a member of a conspiracy. There is no use repeating his evidence.
DR. EXNER: It was again said yesterday that there was a very close connection with the Party and the members of the Party and, of course, that is connected with the conspiracy. That is why I should have thought the question permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: He said already that he was not a member of the conspiracy.
DR. EXNER: In that case, I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I merely wish to join in the objection which Dr. Nelte has raised to the written statement of Lieutenant General Von Österreich. I refer to the reasons which he has given. That is all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Jodl, you spoke—I think it was the day before yesterday—about the number of SS divisions at the end of the war. Do you remember that?
JODL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said there were 35 at the end of the war. Is that right, 35 about?
JODL: If I remember rightly, I said between 35 and 38.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is this. You were referring only to Waffen-SS divisions, were you not? Only the Waffen-SS?
JODL: Yes, only the Waffen-SS. It is true they were...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they completely co-ordinated into the Army and under the command of the Army?
JODL: For tactical operations they came under the Wehrmacht commanders, but not for disciplinary matters. As regards the latter their superior was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was discipline the only thing that brought them under Himmler’s jurisdiction?
JODL: He was also looked upon as their commander for all practical purposes. That is seen from the fact that the condition of the divisions, their equipment, and their losses were frequently or almost exclusively reported to the Führer by Himmler himself.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When had they been co-ordinated into the Army? When? What year?
JODL: They were co-ordinated into the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I want to see if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right?
JODL: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the strength of the large troop concentration or an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one time, did you not?
JODL: Yes, I was afraid of that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. When was that? When?
JODL: It began through...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you fear it? When did you first fear that attack?
JODL: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it arose from the first talks with the Führer at the Berghof on 29 July.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then from the military point of view, from that moment on, it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not?
JODL: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had only been a conjecture.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How could you afford to wait for the political clarifying work if you were afraid of an immediate attack?
JODL: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with, until the spring of 1941. Up to then we only took measures for defense. It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, then, just one other question. I am not at all clear on this. During that attack did you then advise that Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack? What was your advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it?
JODL: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a written statement I made to the Führer in which I drew his attention to the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of course how the campaign would begin, but no human being could imagine how it would end...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): We have heard all that. I did not want to go into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You were afraid that Russia was going to attack. If that was true, why didn’t you advise Germany to attack at once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand.
JODL: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into Russia; I merely said that if there were no other possibility and if there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too, could only see the possibility of a preventive attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[The defendant left the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner?
DR. EXNER: I have four witnesses to bring before the Tribunal, but I should like to begin by making a request. In consideration of my lame leg may I leave it to my colleague Jahrreis to question these four witnesses?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner.
Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only one counsel may appear in court and in the presentation of the case on behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the first witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
[The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?
GENERAL HORST FREIHERR VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS (Witness): Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff during the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: During what period?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff from 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: What was your position on the staff?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was first General Staff officer of the Army, and in my capacity as department chief I was in charge of the Operations Department of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am going to have a document shown you, Document Number 823-PS, Exhibit Number RF-359. It is in document book Jodl, second volume, Page 158. Will you please be good enough to have a look at it.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Do you want me to read the whole document?
DR. JAHRREISS: I want you to glance through it. Who is the author of the document?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is written by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Department QU, Administration Group.
DR. JAHRREISS: By whom is it signed?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is signed by me.
DR. JAHRREISS: By you. To what extent is that document connected with the Defendant Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The document has nothing at all to do with the Defendant Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then please will you look at the signatures at the upper right-hand corner on the first page; there is an initial which can be read as a “J.”
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: That must be a mistake. The initial is exactly the same as the one which appears below in the signature to the written note, and this initial is that of the Chief of the Quartermaster Department, Colonel Polleck.
DR. JAHRREISS: Colonel Polleck?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: If you will look at Page 2, you will see two signatures at the bottom. The first must be that of the expert. I cannot recognize it for certain. I take it for the signature of the Senior Administrative Counsellor Niehments.
DR. JAHRREISS: You mean the initial behind which there are the Numbers 4 or 9 for the date?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean the top one.
DR. JAHRREISS: The top one?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The top one. The bottom initial is the signature, the initials of Colonel Polleck. When the document had been submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I initialed it again at the top, and marked it for the Quartermaster Department, that is the “QU” underlined at the top. Then it was again initialed by the “QU” chief, and after that it is marked “Administrative Group” and initialed again by the man who dealt with it. In addition I should like to point out that all this relates to prisoners of war, and that was a field of work with which Jodl actually had nothing to do. In the quartermaster and organizational branches of the Armed Forces Operations Staff we had several fields of work which, although they came from his staff...
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a minute, Witness. I do not mind your giving us a lecture, but I should like to get to the point. There are remarks in the margin of this document, do you see them?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is any one of them written by Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No, they are initialed with a “K” for Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. JAHRREISS: But the French Prosecution assert that these are comments made by Jodl on the prisoner-of-war question; and if I understood you correctly, you mean to say that this was not possible at all for reasons of competency?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Apart from the fact that there is not a mark on the document made by Jodl, it is unlikely that Jodl had any knowledge of the affair at all, because of the way in which it had to be dealt with.
DR. JAHRREISS: But is it not correct, Witness, that Department “QU” came under Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Actually, it is correct, but in “QU” Department, just as in “Org.” Department there were several fields of work which the Generaloberst had given up and which were dealt with either directly by the head of the department, or through the deputy chief, with the Chief of the OKW.
DR. JAHRREISS: You say prisoner-of-war questions were among those, is that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Among other things also the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: What other work did this Department “QU” have?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As its main task or in its first department, “QU-1,” Department “QU” looked after nothing but supplies and also supervised the provisioning of the various theaters of war, which came directly under the OKW. The second department was occupied mainly with military administration, and the third department dealt with general questions, such as the prisoner-of-war system—for example, questions concerning international law and so on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the Führer’s headquarters?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the “Org.” Department, an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but in the neighborhood of Berlin.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of Department “QU” by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the Chief of OKW?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of cases.
DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the beginning of the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your duties there?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of positions in the higher command offices for mobilization.
DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too.
DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1 October 1939 on?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold this position for the next mobilization year.
DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1 October—let us say on 5 or 6—then Jodl would not have been Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff at all?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on...
MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers that are submitted have no relevancy at all.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t quite understand what the relevancy of the evidence at the moment is.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the Tribunal for consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at another date, and we have no challenge of that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1 October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something else would have happened. That does not help us very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was the only thing to be shown.
May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the Tribunal rules you may not go into that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially connected with the suppression of partisans?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with by my department from that date on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of partisans, issued in May 1944?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous regulation concerning guerrilla warfare?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first had to get further experience.
DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it correct to speak of a “guerrilla war,” as has been done here several times?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard to time and space.
DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting went beyond the general conception of the franc-tireur system?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by “extent”?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by “extent” the dimensions of the area affected by guerrilla fighting.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with regard to people involved?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was never any mention of Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very limited extent.
DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to the intentions of the military leaders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Why?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla fighting was urgently needed at the front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht command wished for their purposes?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case, because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and, although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were most successful.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of the 1st Cossack Division.
DR. JAHRREISS: When, please?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW about the difficulties he was having in his division?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine from my old regiment. He came to see me at headquarters and on that occasion—in the summer of 1943 or maybe during the autumn—talked to me in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit, particularly because of the Government’s policy in the East. At that time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government’s policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care of the affair?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence in the interests of our volunteer units.
DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties with morale? What has that got to do with this case?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the decisive question.
[Turning to the witness.] General...
THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my question will become a leading one.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you won’t take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are leading to decisive ones.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?
DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness has, in fact, already answered my question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it a little further but...
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May 1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946, are correct.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following statement. I quote:
“It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the civilian population in operational areas and the methods of guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews.”
I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have arrived at that view?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the Führer’s order?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Führer always held the view that anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler’s?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether disagree with this arrangement, because we hoped that in these zones the Reichsführer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves, which were, mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces released for the front.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander, Southwest?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief?
DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army; and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.
DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried out strictly from a military standpoint?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.
DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding international law in these wars of aggression?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every positive attitude to the Führer’s successes, there was a certain anxiety about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the forces, which made careful work difficult.
After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue to be successful in maintaining peace.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards Hitler after the Munich Agreement?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that to render the Führer’s political aims feasible it was only necessary to keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe should be produced by the laying down of arms.
DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember...
THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of war?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first preparations were begun in about September 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the offensive informed before it began?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, “no.” The first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned: but I do know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these movements.
DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very territory?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.