Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 15

by Various

Morning Session

[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]

DR. NELTE: General, yesterday in answer to my last question about General Thomas you said that he regularly made reports on the war potential of enemy powers to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Were these important reports always submitted to Hitler?

JODL: These reports, with detailed graphic descriptions, sketches, and drawings, were regularly submitted to the Führer and often occasioned violent disputes, because the Führer considered this representation of the enemy potential as greatly exaggerated.

DR. NELTE: Did you and Field Marshal Keitel hold the point of view that the representations of General Thomas were well-founded?

JODL: Field Marshal Keitel and I were both of the opinion that, after a very careful study of enemy achievements in armament production, these statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate.

DR. NELTE: You heard the witness Gisevius say that Thomas was supposed to have been an opponent of Hitler’s war leadership. In the course of years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?

JODL: I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he objected to this exaggerated optimism in which the Führer habitually indulged, and that perhaps in his basic attitude he was of a pessimistic rather than an optimistic nature.

DR. NELTE: Was General Thomas dismissed from his position as head of the Economic Armament Office of the OKW through Keitel’s efforts?

JODL: No, at the time he retired from active service General Thomas was under Minister Speer, but Minister Speer no longer cared to work with him and requested the Führer that he be dismissed from the armament office which Minister Speer had taken over. And that was done by the Field Marshal on the order of the Führer.

DR. NELTE: I can therefore establish...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas relevant to the case of Keitel—how is the question of whether General Thomas was acting against the supposed interests of Germany or not relevant to the cases of either Keitel or Jodl? The evidence of Gisevius was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me—and I think, to the Tribunal—to be entirely irrelevant to the case of either the defendant whom you represent or the case of the Defendant Jodl. What does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try and overthrow Hitler or not?

DR. NELTE: The question which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether Field Marshal Keitel submitted and supported the reports handed in by Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler. Therefore this evidence...

THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Führer. But what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely irrelevant.

DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of Gisevius’ sources of information, in my opinion; but I will withdraw this question. However, in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other source of information, Canaris.

[Turning to the defendant.] Canaris was a regular and frequent guest in the Führer’s headquarters and a guest of yours. What were the relations of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest office chief?

JODL: The relations between Field Marshal Keitel and Canaris from the first day to the last were remarkably friendly, and unfortunately one of too much blind confidence.

DR. NELTE: May I ask what the relations were after the 20th of July?

JODL: I know that even after the 20th of July Field Marshal Keitel did not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of Canaris he supported his family with money.

DR. NELTE: How were the relations between Canaris and Heydrich?

JODL: I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to maintain especially good relations with Himmler and Heydrich so that they would not distrust him.

DR. NELTE: What can you say about the attitude of Field Marshal Keitel to Hitler’s plan in October 1939, the plan to attack in the West?

JODL: I know that Field Marshal Keitel was apparently strongly impressed by the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the General Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in the West. I know it, although I did not experience it personally; but Schmundt told me about it later—I know that during this time he also had a controversy with the Führer which led to the first request to resign. This is what I can report according to what Schmundt told me; I did not witness it myself, nor did Field Marshal Keitel tell me about it personally then.

DR. NELTE: In Document 447-PS, which the Prosecution submitted—these are the guiding principles for special tasks issued with Directive Number 21—under I, 2b, is the now famous paragraph according to which, in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsführer SS is given special tasks on behalf of the Führer in connection with the preparation of a political administration, resulting from the inevitable conflict between two opposing political systems. So much for the brief citation. I will not hand the document to you since you are certainly well acquainted with it, and to make the matter brief I will only ask you to tell the Court how Field Marshal Keitel reacted to the issuing of this order.

JODL: The claim of the Führer to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Army in its operational area with Himmler and the Police led to days of bitter disputes with the Führer. The same disputes had already taken place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my entries in my diary, 1780-PS. Of course I know today why the Führer insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced the Police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the Police and with Himmler, but in the end the Führer put this measure through in spite of resistance all along the line.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution asserted here that in 1940 Field Marshal Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, at that time Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based essentially on testimony of the witness General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions to put to you on this matter. Was Field Marshal Keitel competent to order the killing of a general?

JODL: No. Any death sentence at all had to be confirmed by the Führer.

DR. NELTE: Well, I naturally do not mean a death sentence—in this connection.

JODL: Well. No one at all has the authority to order murder to be committed.

DR. NELTE: I ask this because Lahousen’s testimony made it appear as if this order had been given by Field Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been a politically highly important act considering the importance of Weygand.

JODL: Undoubtedly.

DR. NELTE: Would it not also have been a foolish act in terms of policy?

JODL: It would first of all have been a crime...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that it is argumentative. Go on.

DR. NELTE: If such an order had been given, could it have remained unknown to you?

JODL: I cannot imagine that Field Marshal Keitel, charged with the ordering of the murder, would not have spoken about it to me.

DR. NELTE: What exactly did you hear about the Weygand case?

JODL: I never heard a single word about the Weygand case. I heard only one thing when Himmler reported to the Führer in my presence: “I have given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He is completely provided for there in such a way that he can be satisfied.” That is the only thing I ever heard in which the name of Weygand figured.

DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen was also heard in the case of General Giraud. Did you also know anything of this case of Giraud which attracted much attention?

JODL: I heard a little more about the Giraud case. Shortly after the successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a conversation that he was having Giraud watched by Canaris so that he would not, as the Führer always feared, go to North Africa and there direct the formation of the Colonial Army against us or, so that he could be arrested in the event that he should rejoin his family in the territory actually occupied. That is what he told me. Several months later he said to me again, “I have now withdrawn this assignment to Canaris because the Führer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are concerned with it there will only be difficulties and differences.” The third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel told me that a deputy of Giraud—I believe it was about the end of 1943 or in the spring of 1944—approached the counterintelligence service and said that Giraud, who could not agree with De Gaulle in North Africa, asked whether he might not return to France. I told Field Marshal Keitel then that we absolutely must agree to that immediately because that was extremely favorable for us politically. That is the only thing I ever heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else.

DR. NELTE: The day before yesterday you spoke about the talks in the Führer’s train in September 1939, at which General Lahousen was also present. In this connection you said, “I have no objections to Lahousen’s statement.” But to avoid misunderstandings, I should like you to say whether you mean by that that all the testimony of Lahousen, which also referred to Giraud and Weygand, is credible and correct, or only the part regarding your presence in the Führer’s train?

JODL: Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen which he made about me. As for the other statements which were made here, I have my own opinion, but perhaps that is not appropriate here.

DR. NELTE: Yesterday, in answer to a question by Dr. Stahmer, you spoke about the dispute on the occasion of the 80 RAF officers who escaped. In order to clarify this question, which weighs heavily against Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that Keitel objected violently because the recaptured RAF officers were turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo?

JODL: When I stood at the curtain for those 1 or 2 minutes, I heard the Führer say first of all:

“That is unheard of. That is the tenth time that dozens of officer prisoners have escaped. These officers are an enormous danger. You don’t realize”—meaning Keitel—“that in view of the 6 million foreign people who are prisoners and workers in Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising. That is the result of this careless attitude of the commandants. These escaped Air Force officers are to be turned over to Himmler immediately.”

And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer:

“My Führer, some of them have already been put back into the camp. They are prisoners of war again. I cannot turn them over.”

And the Führer said, “Very well, then they can stay there.” That is what I heard with my own ears at that moment, until a telephone conversation called me away again.

DR. NELTE: Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel about this incident?

JODL: We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field Marshal Keitel was beside himself, for on the way up he had told me that he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Führer. He hoped that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious with Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Führer. I told him that if the Führer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be notified so that the order might be rescinded—all officers who were prisoners had to make an attempt to escape.

I must say openly that at this moment neither of us had any thought that these recaptured fliers might be shot. For they had done nothing except escape from a camp, which German officers had also done dozens of times. I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of the Army, which certainly, in his opinion, would be far too lenient, and wanted to have them work as punishment for some time in a concentration camp under Himmler. That is what I imagined.

DR. NELTE: In any case, in your presence and in your hearing, Hitler’s orders to Himmler to shoot these officers were not issued?

JODL: I know that with absolute certainty for I know how I felt when I suddenly received the news that they had been shot.

DR. NELTE: Now I should like to ask you a few brief concluding questions.

The Tribunal asked the Defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were present. What can you tell the Court about Keitel’s efforts to resign from his position?

JODL: The first case that I mentioned a while ago must have been in the spring of 1940, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about it, but I did not see it myself. The second case about which I know exactly, was in 1941, November, when there was an enormous controversy between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel, and the Führer chose to use the expression, “I am only dealing with blockheads.”

THE PRESIDENT: We do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us when Keitel attempted to resign...

JODL: This second case was in the fall of 1941. After the controversy, Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I entered the room his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally took it away from him.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not want the details, and now we are being told about details about the resignation, about the way in which it was made.

DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious the matter was to the Defendant Keitel that he even wanted to use his pistol?

THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about the particular desk on which the document was put, or something of that sort. He made his efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance.

DR. NELTE: You can testify about this case when Field Marshal Keitel handed in his resignation in writing?

JODL: I myself saw him writing it, and I read the introduction.

DR. NELTE: If things like this occurred frequently, as you have stated in the course of your testimony, and went as far as the pistol incident indicates, how did it happen that Keitel always remained?

JODL: Because the Führer would not separate from him under any circumstances. He absolutely refused to let him go. I believe that various attempts were made in this direction from other sources, too; but the Führer did not let him go. In the second place, of course our mutual attitude was that we were, after all, engaged in a war for existence in which an officer, in the long run, could not stay at home and knit stockings. Over and over again it was the sense of duty that won the upper hand and caused us to bear all the difficulties.

DR. NELTE: You will understand that one must hold up to the generals “loyalty unto loyalty” and that duty can only go to the point where it does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that?

JODL: I have thought a lot about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for counsel to put. It is an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not a proper question to put.

DR. NELTE: I have finished.

DR. THOMA: Witness, is it true that Rosenberg, in the middle of January 1943, gave you and General Zeitzler the draft of a proclamation to the peoples of eastern Europe?

JODL: That is true. It was after the discussion on the situation. Rosenberg was present in headquarters. He asked me and Zeitzler to step into the next room for a moment and said that he wanted to report to the Führer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples and that he would like to submit it to us first. I recall that.

DR. THOMA: Do you still recall the contents?

JODL: It was a very extensive concession in regard to the sovereignty of these individual eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt, through a policy of reconciliation, to combat unrest and antagonism to the German system.

DR. THOMA: Did you express to Rosenberg your pleasure at this proclamation?

JODL: We said then that this had always been our idea, but that we had doubts whether it was not already too late.

DR. THOMA: What was the success of this memorandum?

JODL: As Rosenberg told me after the conference, the Führer, as he often did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said, “Put it aside.”

DR. THOMA: Did you have the impression that Rosenberg’s suggestions arose from concern about the dangers caused by Koch’s methods?

JODL: Undoubtedly it was an attempt to counteract these methods which were gradually used by Himmler and particularly by Koch.

DR. THOMA: Thank you, I have no more questions.

DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Was the strategic assignment of the divisions of the Waffen-SS under you?

JODL: The divisions of the Waffen-SS, in regard to assignment, were generally treated like the divisions of the Army.

DR. HAENSEL: How many Waffen-SS divisions were there, according to your recollection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions also so that we have a means of comparison.

JODL: At the beginning of the war, I believe, we began with three SS divisions. The number increased until the end of the war to an estimated 35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of Army divisions which varied, but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.

DR. HAENSEL: What was the procedure in setting up new divisions? Who decided whether such a new division would be a Waffen-SS division or a Wehrmacht division?

JODL: As soon as the Führer had ordered the establishment of a new series of divisions he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so many divisions were to be set up and so-and-so many Waffen-SS divisions. He determined the number.

DR. HAENSEL: Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily?

JODL: I had the impression that in setting up the SS divisions, the Führer wanted to go as far as he absolutely could.

DR. HAENSEL: And what do you consider—when you say “could,” what do you consider the limit?

JODL: The limit was in the fact that the soldiers of these Waffen-SS divisions were to be volunteers; and the time came very soon when Himmler had to report, “I do not get any more replacements for the divisions;” and from that time on the situation arose that, when the men came for military duty, the cream of the crop was taken by the SS, and these people, even if they were strict Catholic peasants’ sons, were drafted into the SS divisions. I myself received bitter letters from peasants’ wives about this.

DR. HAENSEL: In connection with this drafting into the Waffen-SS that you have just described, were political viewpoints taken into account? Was a recruit first questioned politically in some way before he was turned over to the Waffen-SS, or was no consideration taken of this?

JODL: No, the decisive thing was that the fellow was big, looked healthy, and promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive thing.

DR. HAENSEL: You said yesterday that in the drafting of recruits no consideration was given to whether a man belonged to the SA or not. Is the same thing true of membership in the General SS? I mean in this sense, was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?

JODL: Not to such a pronounced extent as in the case of the SA. I believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the Waffen-SS and volunteered. But I also know that very many did not do that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were treated in the Army just like any other German.

DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly then, there were many members of the General SS on the one hand who served in the Army; and on the other hand, there were many who belonged neither to the Party nor to the SS but served in the Waffen-SS?

JODL: That is true; it does not apply to the very beginning of the war, but it is absolutely true for the second half of the war.

DR. HAENSEL: And this second half of the war contained the greater number?

JODL: Undoubtedly, that—the second half—I always call that part after the big losses in the first Russian campaign of 1941.

DR. HAENSEL: How strong was the total Waffen-SS at the end of the war, approximately?

JODL: About 480,000 men.

DR. HAENSEL: And the losses, that is the dead and captured, would be added to this number?

JODL: Yes, they would be added.

DR. HAENSEL: And do you have any figures in mind about that?

JODL: It is hard to give an estimate in regard to the SS.

MR. ROBERTS: Witness, you told the Tribunal 2 days ago that you had soldiering in the blood, is that right?

JODL: Yes, this is true.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. And you said yesterday that you were here to represent the honor of the German soldier, is that right?

JODL: Yes, I do that to a high degree.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, yes. And you put yourself forward as an honorable soldier.

JODL: With full consciousness, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And you put yourself forward as a truthful man.

JODL: I represented myself as such a man, and I am.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Because of the things you say you have been made to do in the last 6 or 7 years, do you think your honor has become at all soiled?

JODL: My honor was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it personally.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, you say your honor is not soiled.

Have you—during the last 6 or 7 years, when causing to be said the things which you say you had to circulate—has your truthfulness remained at the same high standard?

[There was no response.]

Can’t you answer that question?

JODL: I believe I am too dull for that question.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, then if you are too dull, I won’t persist in it; I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on.

In 1935 you were lieutenant colonel at the head of the Home Defense Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right?

JODL: Absolutely right.

MR. ROBERTS: That is Department L, Landesverteidigung, is that right?

JODL: Yes, that is correct.

MR. ROBERTS: And was Field Marshal Von Blomberg your superior?

JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg was not my direct superior, but one of my superiors.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal Von Blomberg?

JODL: On various occasions I reported to him personally, of course not nearly so much as the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you attend staff talks with him?

JODL: I did not attend large conferences with Blomberg. I believe that there were seldom more persons than General Keitel and I and perhaps one other chief of a department.

MR. ROBERTS: And would they be called staff talks?

JODL: No, those conferences took place in the Office of the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you go to staff talks?

JODL: Of course, since I belonged to the staff.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I thought that.

Now, will you please look at the Document C-139, Exhibit USA-53. First look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not?

JODL: That is signed by Blomberg, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is dealing with “Operation Schulung.” Do you remember what Operation Schulung was?

[There was no response.]

That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn’t it?

[There was no response.]

Can’t you answer me?

JODL: I can answer you as soon as I have read that.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what Operation Schulung was. It isn’t necessary to read the document in order to answer that question.

JODL: According to my recollection—I do not know whether it comes from studying the documents here in Nuremberg—the term Schulung meant preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation of the West Rhine territories in the case of French sanctions...

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, I agree.

JODL: But—there is more to be said in that connection.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that?

JODL: No, that does not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. That is absolutely false, but it...

MR. ROBERTS: Now, just let us look at this document together and see what it says. Now, first of all, it is dated the 2d of May 1935.

“For the operation...” I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it couldn’t be entrusted to a stenographer, isn’t it? The whole document is written in manuscript, handwriting, isn’t it?

[There was no response.]

MR. ROBERTS: You can answer that question surely. Can’t you see whether it is in handwriting or not?

JODL: It is in handwriting, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, why not say so?

Now then, let’s just look at the document. It is from the Reich Minister of Defense; that is Von Blomberg, isn’t it? It is the second copy, “By hand only.” It is, to the Chief of the High Command, Chief of the Naval High Command, and the Reich Minister for Air.

“For the operation suggested in the last staff talks”—that is why I asked you whether you went to staff talks, you see—“of the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name, ‘Schulung.’ ”

Then, may I just refer briefly to the contents:

“This is a joint undertaking of the three branches of the Wehrmacht... The operation must be executed”—and this is a phrase we have become familiar with later—“by a surprise blow at lightning speed.

“Strictest secrecy is necessary ... only peacetime strength....”

And Number 3:

“Every improvement of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness....”

And then:

“The High Command of the Army is asked: How many divisions ready for action?”

Not one token battalion as you said yesterday.

“Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there”—that is in the West—“by the East Prussian divisions which will be brought here at once by rail or sea transport... High Command of the Navy to look after the safe transport of the East Prussian troops by sea, in case the overland route is closed.”

What could that refer to, that secret instruction—so secret it had to be in manuscript—if it wasn’t the reoccupation of the Rhineland?

JODL: If you will permit me to make quite a brief explanation, then the Tribunal will be saved a tremendous lot of time.

MR. ROBERTS: Please, Witness, answer my question first and then make an explanation after, if it is brief. The question is, what could it refer to except the reoccupation of the Rhineland?

JODL: I am not here as a clairvoyant; I do not know the document; I have never read it; at this time I was not in the Armed Forces Department—that has entirely different signatures—I was in the operations section of the Army. I neither saw nor ever heard of this paper. If you look at the date, 2 May 1935, it is proven there in writing, for I entered the Armed Forces Department only in the middle of June 1935. Thus, only on the basis of my general staff training can I give you some assumptions; but the Court do not want assumptions.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good, if that is your answer. And are you saying that you, who heard General Field Marshal Von Blomberg’s staff talk, cannot help the Court at all as to what that secret operation order is about?

JODL: It was before my time. I was not with Von Blomberg then.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look, please at EC-405. Now—let him see the German book, Page 277.

My Lord, that is Page 26. Hasn’t he a German book?

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you did say, did you not, that you remember that the Operation Schulung was the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland?

JODL: No, I said the contrary. I said that I heard the word, Schulung, for the first time here in the Court; and then I wondered what that could have been.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will be able to judge as to what you said by the shorthand notes. You say, do you, that you did not say Schulung meant the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland? Is that right?

JODL: I mean, that as General Staff officer of the operations section at that time I had to know what military preparations were made.

THE PRESIDENT: But, that is not what I asked you. What I want to know is what you said just now when you were asked if you remembered what Operation Schulung meant. What did you say? It is suggested that it may have come through wrongly to us in the translation. What did you say?

JODL: I said, “I believe I recall, but I am not certain whether this recollection did not result from studying the documents here or earlier, that the word, Schulung, meant the preparations for the evacuation of the western Rhine territory and occupation of the Rhine boundary in case of French sanctions, for that was the only thing with which we were concerned at that time.”

All the evacuation measures which I later mentioned anyway in Document EC-405 were part of that.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, you remember the date of that first document, 2d of May 1935. Now I refer to EC-405 which is in the big Document Book 7, Page 261, and it is on Page 277 of the German book, 277. Now this, Witness, is a meeting—I want you to look, please, at Pages 43 and 44 of the original which you have. Have you got 43 and 44?

JODL: 43 and 44, yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, now, you see there—it is a meeting of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council. It is dated the 26th of June 1935 and at letter “F:” “Lieutenant Colonel Jodl ... about ‘participation in Mobilization Preparations,’ ” and the first three paragraphs deal with general mobilization; and I do not want to read them, but the fourth paragraph reads:

“Demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of 21 May 1935 and other utterances the Führer has stated that the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the aide-mémoire of the French Chargé d’Affaires of 17 June 1935 on ‘Recruiting Offices in the Demilitarized Zone,’ the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war or in preparation thereof.”

Now, if Von Blomberg’s handwritten letter of the 2d of May 1935 did refer to preparations for reoccupying the Rhineland by surprise, it was highly dishonest of the Führer, 19 days later on the 21st of May, to say that the Locarno and Versailles treaties were being observed, wasn’t it?

JODL: No, it wasn’t dishonest, for if it is true at all that the term, Schulung...

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter of comment, if you please.

MR. ROBERTS: I shall, of course, My Lord, have to make certain comments on the witness as I proceed. No doubt Your Lordship will realize that I am not endeavoring to depart from this particular ruling which is only for this particular question, presumably.

THE PRESIDENT: I think—the Tribunal think that you ought not to make comments but you ought to confine yourself as far as possible to cross-examination about the facts.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord I—about your Lordship’s ruling—I have had, of course, a very extensive experience in cross-examination in many courts, and I bow entirely to Your Lordship’s ruling; but it is very difficult for a cross-examiner to confine himself entirely to the facts. But I shall do the very best I can.

[Turning to the defendant.] Then I shall read on:

“Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that are urgently necessary may be carried out in the demilitarized zone. The existence of such preparations or the intention of making them must be kept strictly secret in the zone itself as well as in the rest of the Reich....

“Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-gray uniforms, and other items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight.”

And now I want to refer to the last paragraph:

“Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized zone. Without exception such material must be kept in safes.”

You were collecting weapons and uniforms in the demilitarized zone, were you?

JODL: They were weapons and items of equipment of the Landespolizei, the Order Police, and the Gendarmerie. There were no troops there. Consequently, there were no weapons there for them.

MR. ROBERTS: Did the Police wear field-gray uniforms?

JODL: To my knowledge the Police wore a gray-green uniform or a green uniform.

MR. ROBERTS: Then what was the need of this great secrecy if this was only police equipment?

JODL: It was the equipment in addition for the reinforced border guards—the customs inspectors—about which I have already said that it was intended...

MR. ROBERTS: My question, Witness, was what was the need for secrecy? What was the need for secrecy if you were not breaking the Treaty of Versailles? Can’t you answer that?

JODL: I have already testified to the reasons for keeping all these measures secret in detail during my direct examination, and I confirm that in all these preparations it was a question—in case of an occupation of the western Rhenish territory by France—of setting up a blockade along the line with the aid of the Police, the Gendarmerie, and the reinforced border guards. That was the intention at that time, only for this eventuality. I have already testified under oath that I learned about the occupation of the Rhineland only 6 or 8 days beforehand.

MR. ROBERTS: I know you have, you see, and I am suggesting to you that your evidence was quite untrue on that point; and I am going to suggest it is quite untrue on many points. Now then, will you please go back to the first paragraph that I read. You say:

“To the aide-mémoire of the French Chargé d’Affaires ... the German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting authorities nor other offices ... have been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of war....”

Doesn’t that subsequent paragraph about the weapons, equipment, insignia, and field-gray uniforms show that the truth was not told to the French Chargé d’Affaires?

JODL: I only repeat the answer that was given to the French Chargé d’Affaires. I believe that that was essentially true: No mobilization tasks, such as disposition, equipment, and arming of formations for the event of war. There was no thought of war, no one mentioned it with even one word.

MR. ROBERTS: I will not repeat the point, I submitted—may I just remind you—and I think there are copies for the Tribunal too—of Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty.

Article 42 defines the area, the left bank of the Rhine and the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east. Article 43:

“In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently of temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind; as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”

I suggest to you the step you were taking—mentioning at that meeting—was a clear breach of Versailles. Do you agree, or don’t you?

JODL: No, I do not agree to that. They were taken in the event that the enemy should not abide by the treaty and should attack us again, as that time in the Ruhr district.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I propose to refer to you a document which has been described as your speech, L-172, from time to time—and I want to make it quite clear first as to what you say the document is, because you wouldn’t say one thing one day and the opposite the next, would you, Witness? That document has your writing in places, has it not? I can refer you to the pages if you like. If you look at page...

JODL: That is unnecessary. It contains many handwritten corrections and notations by me. But I have...

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Witness, for saving me that trouble then. And is that a speech—the notes of a speech—which you delivered at Munich to the Gauleiter in 1943?

JODL: I have already clearly said that this was the rough draft, not the speech that I made but parts of the first draft and most of the contents consist of notes by my staff, which they sent me for the preparation of this speech. I crossed out whole pages and sent the whole rough draft back again and only then did I make my speech.

MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to examine that, because you said quite differently, did you not, when you were interrogated by one American officer on two separate occasions? You said quite differently, did you not?

[There was no response.]

Were you interrogated on this matter on the 8th of October last year by Colonel Thomas Hinkel? Do you remember that? Perhaps you would not remember the date.

JODL: No. Oh, we spoke about this matter a few times.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and you were sworn when you gave your answers to the interrogators?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Well now, may I read, to refresh your memory, a copy from the shorthand notes of the interrogation?

“I show you a photostatic reproduction of a number of pages of a lecture, which was purported to have been given by you on the 7th of November 1943, and ask you if those pages represent the lecture that was delivered. For the record, that is identified as L-172.”

Then you answer:

“Yes. A number of things are not contained therein, which I explained with the map.

“Question: ‘You interpolated the remarks that do not appear in the written part; is that correct?’

“Answer: ‘Yes, many particulars I set forth just with the map at hand.’

“Question: ‘Is that your handwriting appearing on the cover page?’

“Answer: ‘No, it is not mine.’

“But the remaining sheets you identify as the written version of a lecture at Munich?

“Answer: ‘I cannot say whether it was actually my lecture as it was, because I see the signature of Buttlar. It isn’t the lecture itself. That is the materials of the brochures which had been furnished to me.’ ”

Then:

“Do you identify...”

Just follow this, will you, Witness?

“Do you identify the first 29 pages as constituting the lecture that you delivered?

“Answer (after examining the document): ‘Yes, that is my lecture.’ ”

Do you want to alter that sworn answer now? Do you?

JODL: I have not read the transcript of the notes which were taken here. I do not know the translation. I made several other statements in that regard. I observed in the second interrogation that that was not actually my speech, and that...

MR. ROBERTS: I will read the second one, Witness. I have that for you. This was on the 16th...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, had you finished what you wanted to say?

JODL: No, I had not finished. I was interrupted.

THE PRESIDENT: Then finish what you want to say.

JODL: I wanted to say that before I had looked over the whole document, at the first moment, of course, I had the impression that that was the copy from which I delivered my speech. However, when I looked at it more carefully in the course of the interrogations, I noticed that it was only the material collected for this speech, and I said clearly and distinctly:

“It contains the first draft, the outline and the conclusion by me. The whole middle part is only material furnished by my staff, and the whole thing is not at all the speech which I gave.”

That is word for word what I told Colonel Hinkel.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Let me read now what I was going to read, the second interrogation. This is the 16th of November 1945, 4 days before the Trial:

“This document is identified for the record as L-172. I show you the photostatic reproduction in order to refresh your recollection concerning it.

“As I remember your previous testimony, it was to the effect that the first part of the document is the speech that you wrote for delivery to that meeting. The second part consists of various thoughts on the basis of which this speech was prepared; is that right?

“Answer: ‘One moment, please. This is not my real lecture. This is a conglomeration of the pieces of writings which are partly drafts of my own, that is, the introduction; but all the appendices are the basis of my lecture furnished me by my staff.

“ ‘The photostats appended to the original lecture—it was a photographed copy—and also a number of maps which were drawn up were included.

“ ‘This is not my lecture as such; and the annotations made here, in this calligraphic manner, were not mine. I made them in my own handwriting.

“ ‘I do not know the origin of this copy. Most likely it was furnished me by the OKW for the purpose of my giving this lecture. It is altogether a conglomeration of various pieces of writing, and it is usable only with limitations. However...’ ”

And just listen to this, will you?

“ ‘...as to the broad lines of it, this is what I have used as a lecture.’ ”

Then the next question was:

“I believe you stated before that the written speech that you had was not given as set forth in the text because you interpolated various remarks in the course of the speech, particularly whenever you referred to one of the maps that you placed before the audience, in order to follow the campaigns which you discussed. Isn’t that correct?”

Now listen to this:

“What I have written down I have actually spoken and I followed this text written down by myself. But in regard to the momentary situation on the various fronts”—and that is Part 3 and 4, where you will find a note “delivered extemporaneously”—“I had that so clearly in mind that I did not need to base my speech on any written statements. Also, I referred to the maps freely.”

Then the last question on this point:

“Is it not true, however, that the document before you represents, in general, the speech that you gave at Munich in November 1943 to this meeting?”

The answer is:

“Yes; much, without doubt, is the same. All the appendices with regard to these various theaters of war and other appendices I had not used during my speech. I had returned them.”

Do you agree with your answer to that interrogation?

JODL: On the whole, you have confirmed just what I said. However, I do not know why we have to talk so long about it. The case is completely clear. It is...

MR. ROBERTS: Well, please do not worry yourself. I know I am stopping you; but I apprehend that I am stopping you from saying something quite irrelevant, and in the interest of time I regard it as my duty to stop you. Please do not worry about why I should do something.

I want to know whether that document roughly represents what you said in the speech. It is quite a different thing to being in a wastepaper basket.

JODL: The introduction and the conclusion, as contained here in the first draft were, of course, basically retained in the speech in this form. However, the whole speech was only finally worked out on the basis of this first draft; it was shortened, changed, parts were crossed out, and mistakes were eliminated. And only then came the main part of the speech for which only the material is here. There is no proof, and I am not in a position to say whether I actually spoke even one sentence of those which are here in the form in which it is found in the first draft.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I will accept that.

JODL: If you give me a copy of my actual speech I will recognize it.

MR. ROBERTS: That is all we can give you, Witness, because that is all we found.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we might as well adjourn now.

MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship please.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I should like to call attention to the following: When my client was interrogated here, he was heard through an interpreter, since he does not understand the English language. On the basis of this testimony the minutes were, as I have just heard, set down in the English language. These minutes he never saw and he did not sign them. And now these minutes, which were compiled in English, are submitted to him in a German translation. In my opinion it is quite impossible under such circumstances to tie the defendant down to specific words which are contained in the minutes. He abides by what he said, but he cannot recognize everything that is in those minutes when...

THE PRESIDENT: That is true. We will keep these facts in mind. The Tribunal will keep these facts in mind, if you will draw them to their attention.

MR. ROBERTS: If it please the Tribunal, I am passing from that point. The witness, I think, said the document was the basis of his speech; and I accept that answer and I pass to another point.

Would you please give the witness his diary, 1780-PS, German C-113. And it is Page 133 in the large document book, Page 133.

Witness, I think you have seen this entry. My Lord, it is the 5th of November 1937 I am dealing with:

“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course and conduct of policy....”

Page 133 of the large book.

THE PRESIDENT: When you say, large book, you mean Number 7?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Number 7; I am sorry. I should have given it a number.

[Turning to the defendant.] 5th of November 1937:

“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces...”—et cetera.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the chief of Armed Forces and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

“...the intention of L...”—does that mean your department, Landesverteidigung—its intention to have these thoughts put on paper?

[There was no response.]

MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, Witness.

JODL: “Intention of L,” that means the intention of the Department of National Defense (Landesverteidigung) to have these thoughts put down on paper and transmitted to the branches of the Wehrmacht.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, the meeting that you were talking about was what we have called the Hossbach Conference, was it not, which is 386-PS? The Tribunal is very familiar with it. You remember the conference, do you not? You have read it many times here?

JODL: Yes, but I was not present at this conference. I do recall the things that were read here.

MR. ROBERTS: I know you were not present. But presumably you, as head of the Home Defense Department, were told of what was said at the conference?

JODL: I have already stated with regard to that that the report which I received was in no way sensational. The directives for the preparations after this time are available to the Court in writing; what we prepared and worked out at the time is proved thereby. We have the orders of 20 May and of 14 June; they are available.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were only asked whether you were told what happened at the conference. It was not necessary to make a long statement about that.

MR. ROBERTS: You see, I try to put simple questions, and I am asking for simple answers. The last thing I want is to interrupt you.

Were you told that at that conference Hitler said that Germany’s problem was a question of space?

JODL: No, not one word.

MR. ROBERTS: Were you told that Hitler said that the German question could only be solved by force?

JODL: No.

MR. ROBERTS: And were you told that Hitler said that German rearmament was practically complete?

JODL: No.

MR. ROBERTS: And the last question I will ask you: Were you told that Hitler said that the first aim in the event of war would be Austria and Czechoslovakia?

JODL: The report about the more active preparations for the march against Czechoslovakia was, I believe, contained in these statements. But I can only say that the details which I received from Field Marshal Keitel are not in my recollection at present. I recall only one thing, that it was no surprise or sensation for me, and only small corrections of the directives which had been given out up to that point were necessary.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Thank you. Now then, you were not present at Obersalzberg when Keitel was there with Schuschnigg the following February, were you?

JODL: No, I was not present.

MR. ROBERTS: But Keitel later told you what had happened?

JODL: He made a few brief remarks about that in narrative form, for after all, I had no further concern in this matter.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you make that entry in your diary; that is, the next entry to the one I was referring to, Page 133, Book 7, the same page, under 11th of February 1938:

“Evening 12 February General Keitel, with General Reichenau, and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and Schmidt were again put under severest political and military pressure.”

Did Keitel tell you that?

JODL: Yes. You have only inserted the word “again.” That is not in my diary. This entry I made personally, because Keitel told me that during lunch Reichenau and Sperrle had carried on warlike conversations, that they had talked about the new rearmament of Germany.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, in March—I think this is common ground—you signed or initialed one or two orders for the “Operation Otto.”

JODL: Yes; but at that time it was not called Otto but “For the March into Austria.”

MR. ROBERTS: Hitler, when he heard that Schuschnigg was going to obtain the opinion of the people by plebiscite, decided to invade at once, did he not?

JODL: Yes, I was told, when he heard that there was to be a grotesque violation of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said that he would certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances. This is what I was told.

MR. ROBERTS: He would not tolerate public opinion being ascertained?

JODL: No; he would not tolerate public opinion being abused through this trick. That is how it was told to me.

MR. ROBERTS: So the Armed Forces of Germany then marched into Austria? That is right?

JODL: That is right; the Wehrmacht marched in.

MR. ROBERTS: And Austria, from that day, received all the benefits of National Socialism, is that right?

JODL: That is a political question. At any rate it could perhaps have become the happiest country on earth.

MR. ROBERTS: I wasn’t asking what it could have become, but what it received. It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, the suppression of opponents, and the persecution of Jews, didn’t it?

JODL: Those are questions with which I did not concern myself. Those questions you have to put to the competent authorities. In addition it received me as artillery commander; and they loved me; I only want to confirm that.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you?

JODL: The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about this officer; I can say that.

MR. ROBERTS: They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn’t they?

JODL: No, they did not have to be. At any rate, after I had been away for a long time, they certainly did not have to write enthusiastic letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war from these Austrians to whom my heart belonged.

MR. ROBERTS: There was one man who was not pleased to see you, wasn’t there?

JODL: I know no such person.

MR. ROBERTS: Don’t you?

JODL: No.

MR. ROBERTS: What about Schuschnigg?

JODL: I never saw Schuschnigg. He doesn’t know me and I do not know him. I don’t know...

MR. ROBERTS: He wasn’t pleased to see you come in, was he?

JODL: I cannot say that.

MR. ROBERTS: What happened to him?

THE PRESIDENT: We know that, Mr. Roberts.

MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can’t imagine my question is not admissible, but if you don’t want me to put it—it is one of a series of questions—I won’t.

Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn’t he?

JODL: I was told that the Führer had decided: “I do not want a martyr, under any circumstances, but I cannot liberate him; I must put him in honorary custody.” That was the impression I had during the entire war.

MR. ROBERTS: Honorary custody?

JODL: It was called honorary custody.

MR. ROBERTS: What? Was he an honorary member of Dachau?

JODL: That I do not know. Those are not questions that you can put to me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp.

MR. ROBERTS: That is an honor that one would be glad to dispense with, isn’t it?

JODL: I would gladly dispense with much that took place during these years.

DR. EXNER: Please, I must protest against questions like that, purely political and based purely on legal questions and on matters which the defendant cannot at all answer through his own knowledge. It is not a fact whether Schuschnigg was happy.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, in my respectful submission, these questions are perfectly proper; they are questions the like of which have been put by every counsel who has cross-examined both for the Prosecution and the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, the Tribunal thinks that the cross-examination is proper.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am passing from that point. I am grateful to you.

[Turning to the defendant.] The only question I ask in conclusion is that Schuschnigg was kept in prison or kept in confinement for several years without any charge and any trial. That is right, isn’t it?

JODL: It may be, I do not know.

MR. ROBERTS: You knew, did you not, when you signed those orders for the march into Austria, that Germany had given an assurance in May 1935 to respect the territorial integrity of the state of Austria and that on the 11th of July 1936 there had been entered into by your Government and the Austrian Government an agreement by Germany to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria? Did you know of these things?

JODL: At that moment I did not know that; in my position as a colonel in the General Staff that did not concern me in the least. What would that have led to?

MR. ROBERTS: I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is there an entry in your diary—it is a passage in L-172, the basis for the draft of your speech—that after the Anschluss Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? My Lord, that is Page 290 of Book 7. Do you remember that passage?

JODL: In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it was put down exactly what strategic improvements had taken place through the various actions of the Führer, in retrospect, but only these strategic results....

MR. ROBERTS: Well, but—again I do not want to stop you, but did you say that—something to this effect—and I will give you the document if you like—that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim?

JODL: In the first draft I set down that through the taking over—through the Anschluss of Austria—the strategic situation of Czechoslovakia had become so hopeless that at any time it must fall a victim to a pincers attack; a strategic retrospect about facts, indisputable facts.

MR. ROBERTS: I accept that, Witness. Now I go very shortly to the case of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of documents. I want to deal with item 17, which the Tribunal will find on Page 29 of Book 7. And it is marked—if you’ll hand it up—and I have flagged that for you, Witness, item 17.

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: You are familiar with that?

JODL: Yes, I know that.

MR. ROBERTS: And I do not propose to read it again, because it was read very recently; but you agree, do you not, you said yesterday, the problem was this: First of all, you must have a surprise attack; if you were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack.

JODL: On the basis of the stipulations made by the Führer; yes.

MR. ROBERTS: You must have a surprise attack first, and your troops would take 4 days to get into their battle position.

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And therefore you must know the time, the incident which is going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the incident is going to take place.

JODL: Yes, I said that one would either have to predetermine the time or one must know it in advance; otherwise the demands could not be carried out.

MR. ROBERTS: And, therefore, you must create the incident yourself.

JODL: I testified to that at length yesterday. Either one of the many had to be exploited or perhaps one would have to help the situation along a bit; but, as I said, those are General Staff considerations which, when we capture them from the French, you consider entirely irrelevant.

MR. ROBERTS: It is set down at the end of the document on Page 30 that either the Wehrmacht or the counterintelligence section would be charged with the manufacture of the incident in the last paragraph.

JODL: Yes, I therefore wrote: “In case the counterintelligence service is not charged with the organization of an incident aside from that”—“in case.” These are all theoretical deliberations of the General Staff in a situation, which I depicted quite accurately yesterday, where such incidents already occurred every day.

MR. ROBERTS: I know. Then, if this had taken place, the world would have been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go to war?

JODL: I do not believe that this would have been reported to the world. Rather, I believe the true reason would have been told the world, which, furthermore, was made known constantly through the press, that 3½ million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people permanently. That was the issue.

MR. ROBERTS: If the world is going to be told the truth, what is the earthly good of manufacturing an incident?

JODL: I testified as to that yesterday—I can only repeat what I said yesterday at length: I knew the history of war too well not to know that in every war things like that happen—the question as to who fired the first shot. And Czechoslovakia at that time had already fired thousands of shots which had fallen on this territory.

MR. ROBERTS: Now, I say, Witness, subject to correction, that you are not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is, if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you want to manufacture an incident? If you can’t answer it, say so.

JODL: Well, it isn’t at all confirmed that I wanted to bring about an incident. I wrote, “in case ... not.” We never prepared one and that is surely the essential thing.

MR. ROBERTS: I won’t argue any further with you. I have put my point and will leave it. But now I want, on quite another point, to refer to the last paragraph on Page 29, the same document:

“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack.”

Perhaps you would read this paragraph, known already to the Tribunal.

“...death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.”

That means an air raid before there has been any declaration of war or any warning to the civilian population, doesn’t it?

JODL: That meant that I called the attention of the Führer, through this document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result could or would come about.

MR. ROBERTS: Would you call that a terror attack? A terror attack?

JODL: It cannot be said under what conditions such an action would be launched. These are all theoretical tasks for our General Staff. How and if that was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with justice or injustice; that depended on the political decision.

MR. ROBERTS: I will show you later how those thoughts were carried into practice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were recalled to the OKW on the 23d of August 1939, from your artillery employment. We know that, don’t we?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: That was a great compliment to the opinion that the Führer had of you, wasn’t it?

JODL: The Führer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. On a very small point, Witness, you told the Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with the Führer, I think, until September 1939; but your diary, on the 10th of August 1938—it is Page 136 of Book 7—your diary said you attended a conference at the Berghof with the Army chiefs and the Air Force groups. Didn’t you meet the Führer then?

JODL: That which you asserted in your first sentence, I did not say. What I said was, word for word:

“On 3 September I was introduced to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke with him for the first time.”

That is what I testified to, word for word, yesterday. I had seen the Führer a dozen times before then and I had heard him when he delivered his big speeches, after he was Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong. Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you right when you said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped?

JODL: That applies to the period of the siege of Warsaw. The terror attack, I might say, which was to hit the entire city through artillery bombardment, that took place after two previous warnings.

MR. ROBERTS: It is a matter of history, is it not, that Warsaw was bombed, with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of September 1939 before any declaration of war? Isn’t that a matter of history?

JODL: As far as this historical fact is concerned, Field Marshal Kesselring, who is very well informed about this, testified to that here in detail. He said—and also Reich Marshal Göring—that on this date the militarily important objectives throughout Poland were attacked but not the population of Warsaw.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You are quite right, now Kesselring—If the Tribunal wants the reference, he gave evidence as to the bombing of Warsaw, the English transcript, Page 5731 (Volume IX, Page 175).

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, I suppose the result of the Polish campaign was naturally a source of satisfaction to all of you?

JODL: The military development of the Polish campaign, from the military point of view, was extremely satisfactory to us. Of course things happen in life that would give more satisfaction than a military action.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want you to look at a letter. This is—My Lord, this is a new exhibit, D-885, and it is GB-484.

That letter is in your writing, is it not? Is it in your writing?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, it is written to Police President Dr. Karl Schwabe, Brünn, Moravia, Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939:

“My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of 22 September, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought about for us an unusually favorable point of departure politically as well as militarily. The difficult part for the people as well as the Armed Forces is still ahead.”—I propose to read it without comments and comment afterward.

“But the Führer and his associates are full of the greatest confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry. Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of. This time we will show that we have better nerves and greater unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and not let them perk up, of this I am convinced.”

Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the troops:

“Thanking you heartily once more for your words of appreciation which exceed my modest contribution in the shadow of the powerful personality of our Führer. I am with a Heil Hitler.”

Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties and don’t have concentration camps and don’t persecute Jews? Is that why you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don’t break treaties?

JODL: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political situation generally was represented that way, and that I was actually of that opinion at the time.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now you deal with:

“Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the many strong-willed and devoted men who are at the head of the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.”

Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the Gestapo?

JODL: No, these are the Gauleiter.

MR. ROBERTS: The Gauleiter?

JODL: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, but I mean we have one or two Gauleiter here, Gauleiter Sauckel, for instance; in a large area like Thuringia, he couldn’t do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or Gestapo, wouldn’t he?

JODL: We are not at all concerned with that here. The fact is that these Gauleiter actually directed the organization of the State and the administration in this war in a noteworthy way. Despite the catastrophe the people were much better taken care of than in the years 1914-18. That is uncontested and it is to the credit of these people.

MR. ROBERTS: They were better taken care of?

JODL: Even in the most terrible conditions at the end every man in Berlin received his normal rations. It was a model of organization, I can only say that.

MR. ROBERTS: And a model of organization because no opposition to the government or the Party was allowed, was it?

JODL: Certainly, it made it easier on one hand, and on the other hand, led to terrible catastrophes about which, of course, I only heard here for the first time.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, the letter speaks for itself, and I will go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence:

“That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share to keeping the Czechs at it and to not let them perk up...”

What did you mean by that?

JODL: Since he was Police President in Brünn, it was his task to see that quiet and order were maintained in Brünn and not to tolerate a Czech uprising at our backs while we were at war. That is a matter of course. I did not say that he was to murder or germanize the Czechs at all, but he had to keep them in order.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect the integrity of Norway and Denmark, did you not?

JODL: I said yesterday, with reference to the two declarations of...

MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, it is such a simple one.

JODL: Yes, I believe, I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good; and we know there was an assurance at the beginning of the war to reassure all these western neutrals, and there was another assurance on the 6th of October; and you say that in November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway?

JODL: Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday.

MR. ROBERTS: I know you did. Please don’t always say that. I have got to ask you to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see. “Norway,” as your speech said—and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book 7—perhaps you had better give it to him—Page 11 of your notes...

[Turning to the Tribunal.] It is in the middle, My Lord, under Paragraph 8:

“In the meantime we were confronted by a new and urgent problem: The occupation of Norway and Denmark....

“In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby, besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the north, would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime necessities”—“Notwendigkeiten”—that is the word, isn’t it—“Notwendigkeiten”...

My Lord, that ought to be “necessary” and not “imperative”—“erforderten.”

“...which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the Atlantic by a number of air and naval bases.”

[Turning to the defendant.] You wanted air bases and U-boat bases, didn’t you?

JODL: Militarily they were tremendously important to us, there is no doubt about that; but the prerequisites to taking them, those were the reports which we had, the threat to Norway.

MR. ROBERTS: What I suggest to you, you see, is this: In this, like the case of the other three Low Countries—in this case, you simply made an excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not done it for months, and you breached Norway’s neutrality at your own chosen time. Is that right?

JODL: In order to answer that question “yes” or “no,” one would have to undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both our own and the other side. Then one can say if it is correct or not. Before that has been decided, only a subjective opinion exists. I have mine, and you have another.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And I point out to you that it was Germany on every occasion who violated the neutrality. The other countries, the Allies, did not.

JODL: In the case of Norway, the English did that first in the case of the Altmark by laying mines and by firing upon German ships in Norwegian territorial waters. That has been proved indisputably. There is no doubt about that.

MR. ROBERTS: The Altmark, as you very well know, Witness, was not an occupation at all; it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine your Navy would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of talking about the Altmark? It was not an occupation at all.

JODL: But it was a violation of international law as far as Norwegian sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do that, but you yourselves could not carry out a combative action in Norwegian waters. I know the regulations in this connection exactly.

MR. ROBERTS: Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred prisoners? What is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for it?

JODL: You are just quoting one small example from the tremendously real picture of England’s occupation, but there are hundreds of them.

MR. ROBERTS: It is the example you quoted, Witness, not I. I did not quote it.

JODL: I can only say that we were under the definite subjective impression that we carried through an enterprise, in the last second, for which British troops were already embarked. If you can prove to me that is not true, I shall be extremely grateful to you.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, now I am going to call your attention to the only outside evidence that you have produced about that, because it was read rather hurriedly—quite rightly, yesterday.

[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, it is in Jodl’s Document Book 2, and it is Page 174. Well, My Lord, it begins at Page 174. My Lord, that is on the left-hand top corner. Page 174 says that Albrecht Soltmann was an expert specialist, that he evaluated files from the British landing brigade, and that he examined diaries. That is on the second page, and the bottom of Page 175:

“The documents and statements by prisoners showed that a short time before our landing in Norway the British invasion troops had been embarked on destroyers. On the following day they were again disembarked and remained in the vicinity of the port of embarkation. They were then reembarked after the German invasion of Norway for the second time and transported to Norway. What intention the English pursued in the embarkation of their troops before our landings could not be determined from the documents and from the statements of prisoners. Whether they intended to occupy Norway before our invasion could at that time only be conjectured, because the prisoners did not make any exact statements in this respect. The conjectures are based on the special equipment of these British troops. Insofar as I could evaluate the documents and statements furnished by prisoners they did not contain proof of the English plans with regard to Norway.”

And this is the next question:

“Have not the results of all documents and statements furnished by prisoners been to the effect that in the invasion of Norway we arrived only just ahead of the English?

“Answer: ‘Yes, the information in the documents and the statements furnished by prisoners could be interpreted to mean that in our invasion we were just ahead of the English. However, whether this was considered unmistakable evidence I cannot judge.’ ”

And then they deal with French documents captured in a railway train. The witness does not know anything about them.

[Turning to the defendant.] That is pretty poor evidence, isn’t it, on which Norway was to be invaded, contrary to all the treaties and all the assurances?

JODL: I quite agree with you on that; you are quite correct. But that is only because Soltmann was unfortunately not the expert in this field. He was not even an officer of the General Staff. I had forgotten that. We had further and quite different evidence which lay before me on my desk; namely, all the commands carried by the English landing brigade. They confirmed our assumptions absolutely and definitely.

MR. ROBERTS: An invasion without any warning or any declaration of war?

JODL: That is a political question.

MR. ROBERTS: You have told the Court yesterday what a stickler you were about international law, how keen you were to see that international law was observed. You knew that was against international law, didn’t you?

JODL: These matters were not in our regulations, but only the provisions which applied to the Wehrmacht. The concept of an aggressive war was not found in any regulation. We went only by the Geneva Convention and the Hague Land Warfare Regulations.

MR. ROBERTS: I mean if an honorable German gives his word he keeps it, does he not? He does not break his word without saying that he is going to depart from it, does he, an honorable German?

JODL: That seems to be a practice which is generally observed all over the world when human beings work together, but not in the sphere of politics.

MR. ROBERTS: If that is your code of honor, why is it not grossly dishonorable for Germany to break her word over and over and ever again? Or would you rather not answer that question?

JODL: No, you would do better to put that question to the people who were responsible for German politics.

MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I will leave that. Now I want to come to the invasion of Holland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. I beg your pardon, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

You have no doubt at all, have you, on the documents that in the event of war in the West, it was always Hitler’s intention to violate the neutrality of those three small countries?

JODL: From the beginning, in his orders for the attacks in the West, he had the intention to go through Belgium; but he had reservations with regard to Holland for a long time, which were only rescinded later—I believe in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions were not specific. Regarding Belgium his intentions in that direction were known comparatively early, that is, about the middle or the early part of October.

MR. ROBERTS: You could not, of course—I mean Germany naturally wanted to wage an offensive war and an offensive war in somebody else’s country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn’t it?

JODL: The German objective in this war was to win, at that time.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. You couldn’t attack in the West unless you attacked through Belgium, could you?

JODL: In any event, any other attack was tremendously difficult and was highly doubtful. I have already said that.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line, so that you couldn’t attack her frontally.

Well, now, if you secured the coast of Belgium and Holland, you secured air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That is what you hoped, wasn’t it?

JODL: No doubt the strategic position of Germany in the battle against England improved through our having the coast; that is true.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the Tribunal know already. I do not intend to read them, but the first document in order of date is 375-PS, USA-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is during the Fall Grün time. That was the Air Force appreciation which, in the last paragraph of the document, Page 11, I think, it says:

“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great Britain....”

And the Army is asked to say how long it would take.

That was at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, wasn’t it?

JODL: Yes, but this document, I believe, has already been characterized as a ridiculous piece of paper, being the work of an insignificant captain.

MR. ROBERTS: He seems to have been a very good judge, at any rate, judging what happened afterwards.

Well now, the next document—I know you were in Austria, but no doubt you heard about it from Keitel—was the Chancellery meeting the 23d of May 1939. That is L-79, it is Book Number 7, Page 275. Do you remember there that the Führer said:

“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be militarily occupied. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored....

“In this matter, considerations of right and wrong or treaties have no significance....

“The Army will have to take positions essential to the Navy and the Air Force. If Belgium and the Netherlands are successfully occupied and held, if France is also defeated, then fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured....

“Daily attacks by the German Air Force and Navy will cut her life lines.”

There wasn’t any doubt as to the policy of the Führer in May 1939, was there?

JODL: It was in Court here that I first heard about this conference and about the things which were purportedly discussed at that time; and I am not able to judge whether it is correct, for I did not hear it, not even from Keitel, not even later.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Did you hear about the speech made by the Führer on the 22d of August 1939?

[Turning to the Tribunal.] I do not know if the Court has got this. It is not in the Document Book; 798-PS, in Document Book Number 4. There are some loose copies, My Lord.

[Turning to the defendant.]

“Those countries”—Holland, Belgium—“and Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate their neutrality.”

You always thought Hitler was a good prophet, didn’t you? You thought Hitler was a good judge.

JODL: Very often, yes, very often.

MR. ROBERTS: And he was a good judge that England and France would keep their word, whereas Germany would break hers.

Now, then, that is August. Now then I want to...

JODL: But that I don’t know.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, I want to come to the document which you put in yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, wait a minute. Defendant, what do you mean by saying you don’t know that? Do you mean that you did not know the document? You said, “I don’t know that.”

JODL: I do not know what the Führer actually said in his conference on the 22d of August. I did not even know that a discussion had taken place, for I was in Vienna. I only know what is ostensibly in documents which have been submitted here.

MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to put the whole Document L-52. Dr. Exner, quite properly of course, read some extracts; but I want to read some more. Have you got copies for the Tribunal?

Now, L-52 was Hitler’s memorandum on the 9th of October 1939. May I point out that the 9th of October 1939 was 3 days after his renewed assurances to the western neutrals.

I want to refer—certain passages you have read; I want to refer to others.

[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, what I am now reading from, starting with the outside page, is the 5th page. It is Page 27 of the original, which appears in the bottom right-hand corner.

[Turning to the defendant.] I read the paragraph on Page 25 of your original, Witness.

“Germany’s military means of waging a lengthy war are, as far as our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the U-boat arm.

“The U-boat can even today, if ruthlessly employed, become an extraordinary threat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat warfare lie in the great distance of approach to the scene of their activity, in the extraordinary danger attached to these approaches, and in the continual threat to their home bases. That England has not, for the moment, laid the great mine fields as in World War I, between Norway and the Shetland Islands, is possibly connected—provided the will to wage war exists at all—with a shortage of necessary blockade materials. But if the War lasts long an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and outward routes. Every creation of U-boat bases outside these constricted home bases would lead to an enormous increase in the striking power of this arm.”

Is that a covert reference to the Norwegian bases, do you think, giving access to the Atlantic?

JODL: I do not believe so. I believe it is a general correct naval strategic consideration and can apply just as well to a base at Murmansk which, for instance, we already had at that time, or in Spain, or in some other state that was neutral at the time; but it is not a reference to Norway, for I have declared under oath that at the time, the Führer never gave a thought to Norway, not the slightest thought, before he received the report from Quisling.

MR. ROBERTS: I have your answer. Now, may I go on reading?

“The German Air Force: It can only succeed in effective operations against the industrial center of England and her south and southwest ports, which are gaining in importance during the war, when it is no longer compelled to operate offensively from our present small North Sea coast by tremendously devious routes involving long flights. If the Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English and French, then the enemy air forces, in order to strike at the industrial heart of Germany, would need to cover barely a sixth of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really important targets. If we were in possession of Holland, Belgium, or even the Straits of Dover as jumping-off bases for German air attacks, then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted.

“Such a shortening of the air approaches would be all the more important to Germany because of our greater difficulties in fuel supply. Every 1000 kilograms of fuel saved is not only an asset to our national economy, but means that 1000 kilograms more of explosive can be carried in the aircraft; that is, 1000 kilograms of fuel would become 1000 kilograms of bombs. This also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear and tear, and above all, in the precious blood of soldiers.”

Then I ask you to turn to your Page 41.

My Lord, it is two pages on, and Your Lordship will see “41” nearly at the top of the page, with an asterisk, and the heading, “The German Attack.” Has Your Lordship got it?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: “The German Attack. The German attack is to be launched with the fundamental object of destroying the French Army, but in any case it must create a favorable initial situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation of the war. Under these circumstances the only possible area of attack is the sector between Luxembourg in the south and Nijmegen in the north, excluding the fortress of Liège. The object ... is to attempt to penetrate the area Luxembourg-Belgium, and Holland in the shortest possible time and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English forces.”

I suppose I can’t ask you to say what is your opinion of the honesty of giving those western neutrals a guarantee on the 6th of October and saying that is the only possible means of attack in that memorandum of the 9th. I suppose that is a question of politics, is it?

JODL: That is a political question, but the declarations were always made only on the condition of the strictest neutrality of these countries. But this neutrality was not kept, for British fliers flew over this area by day and by night.

MR. ROBERTS: Why should the wretched people of the Netherlands and Belgium be destroyed and mutilated because British airmen fly over their territory—destroyed and mutilated by the German Army? What is the logic of your remark at all?

[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, there was one more passage from that document I should like to read. If Your Lordship is thinking of adjourning, perhaps I might read it, and then I will have finished with the document. My Lord, it is the next page, and it is toward the end of the page. It is against the lettering—the number L-52. It is just above, “Time of Attack.”

[Turning to the defendant.] It is on your Page 52, Witness, at the very beginning, or just at the end of Page 51:

“All the leaders must keep firmly fixed in their minds the fact that the destruction of the Anglo-French Army is the main objective, the attainment of which will make possible the prerequisite conditions for later and successful employment of the German Air Force against other objectives. The brutal employment of the German Air Force against the heart of the British will to resist can and will follow at the given moment.”

Did that mean terror attacks against the civilian population?

JODL: You are asking me continually about a document which from the first to the last word was written by the Führer, as I have already told you. You are producing a rather interesting picture of the Führer as a strategist and as a military leader, and it is of interest to the world; but I cannot see how this concerns me. These are the thoughts which the Führer put down as military commander and are of great interest for all soldiers in the world. But what does it have to do with me? That I do not understand.

MR. ROBERTS: But may I point out, Witness, that your own counsel produced it and you relied on certain parts of it. That is how it concerns you; you relied on it.

JODL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

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