Afternoon Session
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, in the larger towns and in the provinces of the Low Countries, you installed agents who were directly subordinate to you and to whom you gave full powers. Were those agents not members of the NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by “agents”? I had German representatives in the provinces and in the big cities. Do you mean the German or the Dutch ones?
M. DEBENEST: No; I meant to speak of the Beauftragten (delegates).
SEYSS-INQUART: They were Germans, and I assume that all were members of the NSDAP. I do not know for certain, but it is quite possible and I believe that was the case.
M. DEBENEST: Well, then, in order to refresh your memory, will you please take Document 997-PS, which I had handed to you this morning. I refer to Page 9, in the French and German texts.
I would like to inform the Tribunal that I gave an incorrect reference this morning. The document was submitted under the Number USA-708, but it is RF-122.
[Turning to the defendant.] At the top of Page 9 you write:
“Delegates have been provided for the provinces which have a far-reaching independent administration. The creation of these posts was delayed due to the necessity of making a preliminary examination of the situation. It has now been shown that it must be less a question of administrative officers than of men who have had political experience. Therefore, through Reichsamtsleiter Schmidt, Reichsleiter Bormann (Hess’ staff) was asked for men who, coming mostly from the Party, are now on their way and can be installed in their functions in the provinces in a few days.”
That was true, wasn’t it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I find my assertion confirmed that they were not all from the Party.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, but I also notice that these men were specially selected.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, they were politically experienced men for I did not want any administrative bureaucrats but men who were experienced and skillful in public political life, not Party political life.
M. DEBENEST: On what basis did you organize the municipal councils and the regional councils?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, it seems to the Tribunal—I don’t know whether we are right—that it would be better if you would pause after the sentence rather than after each word.
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Will you please tell me what you mean by municipal and provincial councils? According to our concept, the word “council” means a corporate body, but I did not establish any such bodies, I appointed individual men to direct the administration.
M. DEBENEST: In the communes, in the Netherlands, there were municipal councils and in the provinces provincial councils, however differently you may have termed them.
SEYSS-INQUART: Thank you. I understand. In 1941 I dissolved the provincial and community assemblies which had previously existed. I provided for such councils in the community regulations which I issued then, but never actually appointed such councils because the Netherlands population did not co-operate and as a result these community councils would have been only artificial bodies. This provision of my community regulations did not go into effect.
M. DEBENEST: But on what basis did this regulation establish this organization?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall any certain basis. I assume that it was established by law, if it was provided for at all.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will put the question in a different manner and perhaps you will be able to answer it. Did you introduce, by means of your regulations, the Führer Principle?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I called it the “one-man responsibility,” and I am of the opinion that in times of crisis a “one-man responsibility” is the correct thing.
M. DEBENEST: That was, in fact, the system which was also applied in Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true. Perhaps it was not exactly the same, but under the circumstances I considered it correct.
I repeat what I said yesterday: We committed an error here. We committed the error of considering the order imposed by the occupational forces better than that already existing in the occupied territory.
M. DEBENEST: Well, the introduction of this principle had a particular importance, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly thought it did; especially in these territorial districts I had to have a man who was responsible to me for the administration and not an anonymous majority of a representative body.
M. DEBENEST: I am having Document F-861 handed to you, which I submit under Number RF-1524. From the last paragraph you will see the importance which was attached to that in the Reich. It is a letter of the Minister of the Interior dated 6 September 1941. It reads as follows:
“Particular importance must be accorded to the decree because it contains detailed regulations concerning the introduction of the Führer Principle in the municipal government of the Netherlands.”
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The Minister of the Interior was interested in this. I should only like to point out, to get things straight, that the Reich Minister of the Interior exerted no influence, and in the second place that these larger powers were given in 1941 to at least 80 percent of the mayors, who belonged to the democratic party and were therefore my political opponents.
MR. PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven’t you established, by the questions that you have put to this defendant, that he did alter, to a considerable extent, the form of government in the Netherlands, and that he introduced a different form of government? Isn’t that all that you really require for the argument which, no doubt, you intend to present? The details of it don’t very much matter, do they?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I simply wish to demonstrate that, contrary to what the defendant said, he had sought to impose the National Socialist system upon the people of the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, to a large extent, I think he had admitted that. He said just now that he introduced what he called “one-man responsibility,” which is another phrase for the Führer Principle, and that he had dissolved various organizations of the Netherlands Government. All I am suggesting to you is that, having got those general admissions, it isn’t necessary to go into details about the exact amount that the Government of the Netherlands was interfered with or the exact way in which it was replaced. Isn’t it really all stated in a document drawn up by the defendant, namely, the document you have been putting, 997-PS?
M. DEBENEST: More or less, Mr. President, but not entirely.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the only question is whether the details are really very important for the Tribunal.
M. DEBENEST: I thought that those details might have a certain importance, since the governors of the Reich itself attached a great deal of importance to it and, in fact, the whole was part of a plan which had been definitely laid down.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is inclined to think that you have got all that is necessary for the argument which you are indicating that you would present. If there are any particular details that you think important to us, no doubt you can bring them out.
M. DEBENEST: Quite so, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] For what purpose had you centralized the police into a police directorate?
SEYSS-INQUART: I will repeat my testimony of yesterday. The Netherlands police was under three or four different agencies, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, I believe the Army Ministry, and so forth. For the sake of a clear police administration, I thought it necessary to combine these various police organizations in one and to place it under the Ministry of Justice.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not appoint as chief of this police a National Socialist?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: In short, the end that you had in view—was it not to place the Netherlands in the hands of the NSDAP and thus adapt the internal organization of the Netherlands to that of the Reich? In other words, to do something similar to what you had done in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe that one can say that. In particular, the policy of the NSB was not that of the NSDAP. The NSB was different in many respects. In the second place, if I had wanted to do that, I would have been able to make Herr Mussert Prime Minister; that would have been less complicated. The simple explanation is that I used, possibly in a somewhat schematic way, the example of the Reich as a model in setting up an administration in the Netherlands, which, at least in part, made it possible for me to carry out my task of watching over safety and order. Yesterday I only asserted that I forced no Dutch citizen to become a National Socialist. I did not deny that a certain co-ordination was undertaken due to the mistakes which I have repeatedly admitted.
M. DEBENEST: But you placed members of the NSB in all the administrative bodies, the higher offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not exclusively, but I did it because in the last analysis I could rely only on them; all others sabotaged my orders.
M. DEBENEST: You told the Tribunal yesterday of the dismissal of the magistrates of the court of Leeuwarden. Would you tell us again the exact causes of this dismissal?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were not the magistrates but the administrators of the court. This court of Leeuwarden had said in a public judgment that those Dutch citizens who were condemned by Dutch courts and sent to a Dutch prison would be transferred to German concentration camps, maltreated, and executed. As a result, the court no longer felt in a position to sentence a Dutch citizen.
This statement of the court was wrong in my opinion. In my opinion Dutch citizens have not been sent from Netherlands prisons to German concentration camps to be executed there.
In the meantime I cleared up the situation at the suggestion of the Amsterdam judges, and through the Secretary General for Justice I had the court in Leeuwarden requested to continue passing sentence. The court in Leeuwarden did not do so. Thereupon, I dismissed this court.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I have here the document “Verdict of the Court of Appeal of Leeuwarden” and there is no question of Dutch prisoners being sent to concentration camps or being tortured or otherwise put to death. All that is mentioned is that the magistrates of that court do not wish that the detainees be sent to concentration camps after they have served their sentence.
I shall hand you the original of this document so that you can check it. The document has already been submitted under Number RF-931.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not receive a German translation or the original German.
M. DEBENEST: Then I shall read you the translation of the judgment; you may check it:
“Considering that the court wishes to take into account the fact that for some time past various terms of imprisonment have been imposed by the Dutch judges upon the people contrary to the intentions of the legislation, and the penalties of the judges have been executed in a manner which aggravates those penalties to such an extent that it is impossible for the judge to foresee or even to suppose the penalty to be inflicted....”
THE PRESIDENT: Why not summarize the document to the witness, do it in that way? You can give the effect of the judgment.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
This judgment sets out in detail that the judges no longer wish to pronounce a penalty which might result in preventive detention.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear the question?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Mr. President, but why did they not want to pass sentence? I had the German translation here in my hands, and I took this translation as my basis in this matter because I did not recall this judgment. I read it here, and I remember that it stated there that these Dutch prisoners were to go to German concentration camps to be tortured and executed.
THE PRESIDENT: It doesn’t appear to say anything about that in the judgment before us. There is nothing about that in the judgment, is there?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, the defendant claims that the judges did not wish to pronounce any such judgment any more so that people would not be sent to concentration camps to be tortured or executed. There is no question of that in the judgment. The only thing that is mentioned is that the court did not want to inflict any penalty which would result in the people being sent away to concentration camps. I do not see that there is anything in this judgment which the defendant might consider as a personal insult or injury.
SEYSS-INQUART: Now I have the German text. It reads:
“The court wishes to take into consideration the fact that for some time judges have imposed penalties and that Dutch criminals of male sex, contrary to legal prescription and contrary to the intention of the legislator and the judge, have been executed and are being executed in the camp in a manner which”—and so forth.
Those are the concentration camps which the court meant. It concerns the fact that prisoners were sent from Dutch prisons to German camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: As regards education, did you not bring about very extensive changes?
SEYSS-INQUART: I introduced the supervision of the curriculum of the schools, and I made my influence felt in the appointment of teachers, particularly in the very numerous private schools in the Netherlands. Two-thirds of the Netherlands schools were private. I felt it necessary because in these schools there was definitely an anti-German tendency which was taught to the students. The Netherlands Education Ministry had the supervision of these matters.
M. DEBENEST: You thereby prevented a large number of clergymen from taking part in public education.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe so. I ordered, or agreed to the order, that clergymen should not be heads of schools. As for clergymen who were teachers, I agreed to have their pay reduced by one-third. They were able to continue to teach with two-thirds of their income, and with the money which was saved I gave positions to 4,000 young teachers out of work.
M. DEBENEST: Talking of teachers, did you not cause the creation of a special school for teachers?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I believe you mean courses which were given in Amersfoort or for those who volunteered for them.
M. DEBENEST: No. What I mean is those teachers who were compelled to take a course for a few months in Germany before their appointment.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the case. It might be those who were to teach German in the Netherlands schools. In that case, it is possible that I demanded that they first spend a certain time in Germany in order to be employed.
M. DEBENEST: You did, as a matter of fact, make the study of the German language in certain classes obligatory?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the 7th grade, and also in the 8th grade which I newly introduced. But at the same time, I also had instruction in the Dutch language increased in order to prove that I did not want to germanize the Dutch, but only wanted to give them an opportunity to study the German language.
M. DEBENEST: But they already had that opportunity. German was taught simultaneously along with English and French. You imposed the teaching of the German language at the expense of the other two foreign languages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I spoke of the elementary schools in which the study of German had not yet been introduced. It is conceivable that in the secondary schools instruction in German was increased at the expense of instruction in English and French.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not order the closing down of several universities? And why did you do so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I recall only the closing of the University of Leyden. When, according to my instructions, Jewish professors of the faculty were dismissed, the students of the University of Leyden went on strike for an extended period of time, and I thereupon closed its doors. I do not recall having closed any other universities. The Catholic University in Nijmegen and the Calvinistic University in Amsterdam, as far as I can recall, closed of their own accord.
M. DEBENEST: And the Polytechnic Institute at Delft? You did not order it to be closed either?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. That was a temporary measure. It was reopened, as far as I recall.
M. DEBENEST: How about the Catholic Commercial College at Tilburg?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember that.
M. DEBENEST: It was in 1943.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember. It is quite possible that for some reason or other it was closed, probably because it seemed to me to endanger the interests of the occupation forces.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to investigate this in detail, is it? If the defendant said that he closed one school without giving an adequate reason why, isn’t that sufficient for you to develop your argument?
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Later on you attempted to turn the University of Leyden into a National Socialist university?
SEYSS-INQUART: If you consider the appointment of 2 or 3 professors out of some 100 or 50 professors as such, I should have to say yes. I cannot recall any other measures. Once it was suggested to me to establish a university in Leyden at which German and Dutch students could study, and that studies there should find suitable recognition in Germany. This did not come about.
M. DEBENEST: Anyway, you admit that you had the intention of creating this school?
SEYSS-INQUART: “Intention” is a little too strong. These ideas were discussed. There was another idea. In the Netherlands, in the German Wehrmacht, we had a number of university students who had not been able to continue their studies for understandable reasons. It was considered at that time to hold courses at Leyden for these university students in the Wehrmacht, which would be a sort of continuation of their studies.
M. DEBENEST: I shall have Document F-803 presented to you, which I submit under the Number RF-1525. This is a report from the Ministry of National Education of the Netherlands. It is on Page 23 of the French version and Page 16 of the German version.
I shall read the passage:
“Attempts were made to make the University of Leyden a National Socialist university by appointing National Socialist professors. However, these attempts failed as a result of the firm attitude taken by the professors and by the students. Certain professors even....”
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on Page 15?
M. DEBENEST: That is on Page 23 of the French text, in the last paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: What is it?
M. DEBENEST: It is F-803.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask what document it was. I asked what is the nature of the document.
M. DEBENEST: I pointed out to the Tribunal that it was a report of the Minister for Education in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: Was he appointed by the defendant, or appointed before the war?
M. DEBENEST: It is the present Minister for Education. I would point out to the Tribunal that I am obliged to go into a certain amount of detail, because when the French Prosecution presented its case, we did not have all the documents at our disposal, and the Dutch Government is anxious to have these facts presented in as detailed a manner as possible.
I might add that today I am producing documents which emanate from the Dutch Government.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Page 23?
M. DEBENEST: Page 23 of the French text, six lines before the end of the last paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: “Attempts were made to make the University of Leyden a National Socialist university by appointing National Socialist professors. However, these attempts failed as a result of the firm attitude taken by the professors and by the students. The professors even presented their collective resignation in May 1942, and as there was no reaction to it, they presented it a second time in September of the same year.”
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, the defendant has already said this, has he not? This is Leyden University that you are speaking about, is it not?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. If I understood correctly, I believe the defendant said that there had been question of creating a National Socialist school in Leyden but that he had not put this project into effect. On the other hand, it appears from this document that it did not depend upon him but that it was a result of the attitude of the teachers. That is what I wanted to bring out.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I comment on that?
M. DEBENEST: Certainly.
SEYSS-INQUART: The fact that there was an attempt to make Leyden a National Socialist university is stated only in this document. I repeat my assertion that I appointed two, or at the most three, professors who were National Socialists, and this document shows clearly what my attitude was. I did nothing at all against the demonstrative gesture of resignation of the professors. The second attempt was also unanswered. The fact that arrests occurred then is connected with the fact that part of the professors were otherwise suspected, and these professors were sent to St. Michelsgestel. That is this concentration camp where the inmates played golf.
M. DEBENEST: Then that was a coincidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not say that. Certainly after the second attempt we checked up on the gentlemen a little.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not take measures to oblige the students to do forced labor?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think that this was done as long as they were studying, for I had issued express orders for the exemption of all students. Advanced technical students were given exemption and university students who were actually studying or had fulfilled the requirements for study were not forced to work, either, as far as I remember.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I shall give you briefly an account of Paragraph 2 of your regulation. It is the Ordinance of 11 March 1943, Number 27.
“Any student who, after the present regulation has been put into effect, has successfully passed the final examination or a similar test in one of the studies mentioned in Paragraph 1 and specified as such by orders of the Secretary General in the Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture, is compelled to work for a determined period within the scope of the allocation of labor.”
Is that your ordinance?
SEYSS-INQUART: Does it say labor service?
M. DEBENEST: I have not got the German version in front of me. It is Ordinance Number 27.
SEYSS-INQUART: Ordinance Number 27. May I ask what paragraph it is?
M. DEBENEST: Second paragraph.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct. It says, “Students who have taken the final examination,” that is, who are no longer studying but have finished their studies. Members of the same age groups were meanwhile drafted for labor commitment, and those exempted by me now had to make this up. But their study was not disturbed or interrupted.
M. DEBENEST: Therefore, the students were able, freely, to continue their studies?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall any obstacles.
M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you please look at the next decree, that is, Number 28, which is a decree of Secretary General Van Damm. This decree forces the students to make a declaration of loyalty.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct.
M. DEBENEST: What were the consequences?
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not understand the consequences. The universities were, at that time, the seat of anti-German activities. I demanded from the university students a declaration promising they would uphold the laws in effect in the occupied Netherlands territories, that they would abstain from any action against the German Reich, the Wehrmacht, and the Netherlands authorities, and that they would not interfere with public order in the university.
I cannot understand why a university student could not make such a statement. Those who did make it were able to continue their studies without any hindrance. But the Dutch professors, by way of sabotage, refused to give them any instruction.
M. DEBENEST: Well, then, those who did not subscribe to this declaration, what happened to them?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were no longer university students, and if they belonged to the age groups which I had called up for labor commitment, they were drafted.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not apply the Führer Principle to the universities?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not believe quite as strictly as in the community administrations. But I gave the president of the university greater power because I demanded greater responsibility from him.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Was not a certain National Socialist propaganda made in the universities?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that could not be entirely prevented.
M. DEBENEST: In particular, did not the students have to visit certain exhibitions and be present at lectures organized by the Party or even by the Reich offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know, but it is possible.
M. DEBENEST: In short, you interfered in the administrative domain, in the realm of teaching, and you also interfered in a similar manner in the cultural life of the Dutch people?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, to the extent which I stated yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: You did, in fact, create various professional syndicates, is not that what you told us?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: You alleged that the acceptance into these syndicates was not obligatory and that you never imposed payment of dues?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is not correct. Membership in these syndicates was obligatory. I am also convinced that the head of the syndicates required the members to pay their dues. I refused to conclude from the failure to pay dues that a person was no longer a member of the syndicate, and consequently could no longer practice his trade, or that his dues could be collected by way of court action.
M. DEBENEST: However, do you not recall the difficulties which arose in this manner with the medical profession?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was just thinking of the Medical Syndicate. Certain circles therein desired that the members who did not pay their dues should be prohibited from carrying out their profession, or that at least the dues should be collected through court pressure. I told these gentlemen that if it was not possible to persuade the members to pay their dues, I, for my part, would not assert any force.
M. DEBENEST: What were these circles?
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps you can tell me, then we shall save more time.
M. DEBENEST: Was it not the NSB for instance?
SEYSS-INQUART: In what connection?
M. DEBENEST: Did you not yourself say that certain circles had demanded the payment of dues? I am asking, what circles?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean what friends or co-workers of mine urged me to insist on payment? The question is not very clear to me.
M. DEBENEST: I am just asking you to say exactly what you mean by “circles.” You yourself used the word—unless it is a mistranslation.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the Tribunal thinks really that you are spending too much time on these various small subjects. We have spent the whole afternoon on these various measures which the defendant introduced in the Netherlands. It is perfectly clear according to his own admission that he was altering the whole force of administration in the Netherlands.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not also take part in the persecution of the churches?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the measures could be called “persecution of the churches,” but I took measures concerning the churches.
M. DEBENEST: What measures in particular? What measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that the most serious, in your eyes, would be the confiscation of various Netherlands monasteries. One of them was turned into a German school and the church building was torn down.
M. DEBENEST: You alleged yesterday that priests or at least one priest could visit concentration camps? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I did not say that. I said only that in the Jewish camp at Westerborg there were Catholic and Protestant Jews, who were visited on Sundays by a clergyman from outside. I do not believe that clergymen were allowed to pay visits to the concentration camps under the control of German Police or were able to enter them.
M. DEBENEST: Just one question as regards the press. Did the press retain a certain—I repeat, a “certain”—liberty during the time of the occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: From my point of view, much too little. The press was under fairly strict control by the Propaganda Ministry. The editors were employed after being judged suitable by the Netherlands Propaganda Ministry. I believe that it is a matter of course for an occupying power that for such an important instrument one takes only people who have a certain positive attitude. I would have wished that these men could have been given much more freedom of speech, and I believe that I can say that so far as I exerted any influence, this was the case; but even the Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands was not almighty.
M. DEBENEST: Were there not reprisal measures taken against certain newspapers?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know...
THE PRESIDENT: We might get on a little bit more quickly. There is a very long pause between the question and the answer.
SEYSS-INQUART: I must first recall the circumstances. If unexpectedly I am questioned about something which happened 5 years ago I must think over carefully what actually happened in individual cases. For example, I can say “no” immediately, but I am sure that the answer is wrong.
Now, for instance, reprisals—I know that once in The Hague the editor’s office of a newspaper was blown up. That was a measure taken by the Security Police. It was the seat of an illegal propaganda group.
M. DEBENEST: You spoke yesterday of the sterilization of the Jews in Holland. Who introduced this measure?
SEYSS-INQUART: If you say “introduced,” I believe that I can answer the question correctly. The Security Police informed me that a number of Jews had themselves sterilized by Jewish doctors and that thereupon these Jews were freed of all restrictions and could dispense with the wearing of the Jewish star. These were not Jews who otherwise would have been evacuated, but who would have remained in Holland subject to certain restrictions.
I asked the head of my health department to investigate the matter. He informed me that this was a very serious operation in the case of women, and thereupon I asked the Higher SS and Police Leader to forbid this action, at least in the case of women. Then the Christian churches protested to me. I answered the Christian churches—I assume you have the letter in your files—describing the state of affairs and pointing out expressly that no compulsion must be exerted here. Shortly thereafter this action was finished. As I heard, the Christian churches informed the Jews, and when they were sure that no compulsion would be exerted on them they no longer submitted themselves to this operation.
I myself returned their property to the Jews in question, and the matter was ended; although I must say today that the further away one is from this period of time, the less understandable it is.
M. DEBENEST: But was it you who had the idea of this sterilization?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the matter was reported to me by the Security Police.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, I shall have Document 3594-PS handed to you, which I shall submit under Number RF-1526. It is an affidavit by Hildegard Kunze, an agent of the RSHA. Third paragraph:
“I remember that either in this report or in another report he”—that is, Seyss-Inquart—“suggested that all Jews who were privileged to remain in Holland should be sterilized.”
There is no question of police agencies there.
SEYSS-INQUART: This involves the correctness of the memory of a stenographer. In the third point, moreover, she does not even assert that the report in the third paragraph is the one she mentions in Paragraph (2), and which she ascribes to me. It is out of the question that she saw any report from me wherein I made such a suggestion. The case was reported to me as a fact by the Security Police, as an already existing fact or one in process of realization.
M. DEBENEST: So you contend that it was not you but the Police. In any case, you tolerated it?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the male Jews were concerned I tolerated it for a time; that is true. It was made clear to me that no direct compulsion was exerted on these Jews, no threat to their disadvantage.
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, do you claim that you forced no one to go and work in Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: On the contrary, I believe I enrolled 250,000 Dutch people to work in Germany, and I testified to that yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Good. I shall not dwell on that point.
Did you not also introduce certain legislative clauses as far as nationality was concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: You mean the nationality of Dutch citizens?
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I did that.
M. DEBENEST: Did you take part in the arrest, interning, and deportation to concentration camps in Germany of Dutch citizens, and in what way?
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to explain briefly the matter of citizenship.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly.
SEYSS-INQUART: Quite a few Dutch enlisted in the Waffen-SS. It was the intention of the Führer to give them German citizenship. However, with that they would have lost their Dutch citizenship, and that was something they certainly did not want to happen. Therefore, I issued a decree that upon the acquisition of German citizenship, the Dutch citizenship would not be lost for a year, during which time the person involved could make his decision.
This should serve to clarify the purpose and the object of this decree of mine.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to put to you again the question which I put to you a few minutes ago. Did you take part in arresting, interning, and deporting to concentration camps Dutch citizens, and under what conditions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Bringing anybody into and keeping him in a concentration camp was exclusively a matter for the Police. I do not recall a single instance in which I requested the Police to put any Dutchman into a German concentration camp. It may have happened that I ordered the German Police to take Dutchmen to Hertogenbosch or Amersfoort. Especially at the time when the Netherlands courts were very lenient with black-market operators and slaughterers who supplied the black market, I did demand their internment in a concentration camp for 2 or 3 months.
However, if you have specific cases in mind, please mention them and you may be assured that I will tell you everything exactly as I remember it.
M. DEBENEST: No, your answer is sufficient.
Did you participate in the seizure of hostages and in their execution?
SEYSS-INQUART: I stated yesterday that I recall only one actual hostage case, which took place in 1942, and I told you what I had to do with it. The so-called shooting of hostages, beginning with July 1944, was not actually shooting of hostages, but rather executions carried out by the Police on the basis of a Führer decree.
I myself never ordered a single shooting. But I would like to repeat: If, for instance, I called the attention of the Police to the fact that in any certain locality of the Netherlands an illegal resistance movement was causing much trouble, and gave the Police instructions to investigate the case, it was perfectly obvious to me that the leaders of the resistance movement could be arrested by the Police who, on the basis of the Führer decree, would shoot them.
But I must repeat: I had to meet my responsibility, even in the face of a difficult situation whereby those who were guilty—that is, legally guilty and not morally, because morally I probably would have acted the same way as they did—those who were guilty were not put before a court.
M. DEBENEST: As far as the facts which you mentioned yesterday are concerned, this deals with hostages who were shot following an attempt upon the railroad at Rotterdam?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Who selected those hostages?
SEYSS-INQUART: Hostages were selected by the Security Police, and the Higher SS and Police Leader submitted this list to me. As I testified yesterday, I asked why he selected the people that he did and he explained that to me. Then, in checking the matter over, I crossed off the names of fathers who had several children. I returned the list to the Higher SS and Police Leader and asked him to take my attitude into consideration in the execution of this decree.
Therefore, through my direct intervention, I saved fathers of several children from being shot.
M. DEBENEST: How many hostages were selected in this manner?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot recall that today, perhaps 12 or 15. Out of that number, 5 remained. That was the number finally arrived at after cutting down on the original figure of 50 or 25.
M. DEBENEST: I am going to have you shown a document concerning the seizure of these hostages. It is Document F-886, which becomes RF-1527. This is a statement made by General Christiansen, or rather, it is a copy of a statement made by General Christiansen, which was taken from an affidavit by the head of the Dutch Delegation. Will you please look at the fourth paragraph before the end of the first statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I just said that this was only the copy of a statement which comes from an affidavit of the head of the Dutch Delegation. If the Tribunal desires, we can certainly have the original submitted as soon as we have received it.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, there is no certificate at all identifying the copy, is there?
M. DEBENEST: I thought, Mr. President, that an affidavit of the representative of the Dutch Delegation existed in Nuremberg. On the original—I beg your pardon; it was not reproduced, but the original does contain the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to prove by this affidavit? About the hostages?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. It says that the defendant himself selected these hostages.
THE PRESIDENT: In what proceedings was the affidavit made?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, it was during the proceedings which were taken against General Christiansen in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: How do you say it is admissible under the Charter?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that we have already submitted documents of this nature—that is, copies—to the Tribunal, copies which have been certified as being copies of an original which is being kept in the country where it originated.
THE PRESIDENT: If the original from which the copy was taken were a document which is admissible under the Charter, that would probably be so, if there were an authentic certificate saying it was a true copy of a document which is admissible under the Charter. But is this document admissible under the Charter?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I believe that it is admissible because it is purely and simply an affidavit. It is an affidavit which has been legally received in the Netherlands.
THE PRESIDENT: And you haven’t got a German edition of it?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President, this document has been translated into German. I have had it translated into German.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, this appears to be a document which is in Dutch, and General Christiansen, who gave the evidence, was a German, was he not?
M. DEBENEST: No, Mr. President, the original affidavit is in Dutch.
THE PRESIDENT: The original is in Dutch, is it?
M. DEBENEST: The original is in Dutch, yes. That is according to the information that I have. Yes, the original is in the Dutch language.
THE PRESIDENT: And what was the affidavit given in, what proceeding?
M. DEBENEST: In Dutch, with interpreters.
THE PRESIDENT: I mean what proceeding, before what court?
M. DEBENEST: I suppose before a Dutch Military Tribunal. Yes, before a Dutch Military Tribunal.
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): May it please the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: This document is an excerpt from criminal proceedings in the Netherlands taken against General Christiansen upon the request of the Dutch Government. The Minister of Justice of the Netherlands has let us have an extract of the minutes which were taken in the Netherlands in legal form during the proceedings which were carried on against General Christiansen. The text was, therefore, made in the Dutch language.
THE PRESIDENT: This deposition, this affidavit is in Dutch. Now, General Christiansen, is he a Dutchman?
M. DUBOST: General Christiansen is a German.
THE PRESIDENT: If he is a German why does he give his evidence in Dutch? If he did not give it in Dutch, why isn’t the German copy here? You see, we have a certificate here from a colonel, who is said to represent the Government of the Netherlands, that this document is a true copy of General Christiansen’s evidence. Well, the document which we have here is in Dutch, and if General Christiansen gave his evidence in German, then it can’t be a true copy and it is subject to the translation in Dutch. What do you say to that?
M. DUBOST: The deposition made by General Christiansen was received through an interpreter in conformity with Dutch procedure and was transcribed in Dutch. It is not possible for a Dutch Tribunal to receive minutes in a foreign language. The minutes are taken in the Dutch language.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I just say a few words in this connection, please? I know, for I am in contact with the defense counsel for General Christiansen, that there was a court-martial proceeding on the part of the English instituted against him. I have misgivings about this document, since it is not confirmed, and we cannot judge whether the interpreter who interpreted from German into Dutch was a suitable and adequate interpreter; and also, since in this manner I do not have the opportunity, as defense counsel, to cross-examine General Christiansen. It seems to me that through the mere submission of this document the rights of the Defense have been greatly infringed upon.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I have just been informed that General Christiansen is right now imprisoned at Arnhem by the Dutch authorities.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Debenest, the Tribunal will admit the document if you get a certificate from the court who tried General Christiansen. But the only certificate you have at present that this is a true copy is from a Colonel Van—some name that I can’t pronounce. There is nothing to show, except his statement, that he is an official on behalf of the Dutch Government. We don’t know who he is.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President, but we will get the original for the Tribunal later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you will submit an original later on.
M. DEBENEST: Van—is the accredited representative of the Dutch Government with the French Delegation.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have only a French translation in front of me which reads as follows:
“Christiansen is not here as a witness, but rather as a defendant, and he was interrogated as such, and he is not bound by oath to tell the truth. He can say whatever he pleases without being held responsible for what he says.”
For that reason alone, I believe the document is to be refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the reason why the Tribunal is prepared to admit the document, when it is certain that it has got the document, is that Article 21 provides that reports, including the acts and documents of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for the investigation of war crimes and the reports and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United Nations, shall be taken judicial notice of. It is for that reason that the document is, in the opinion of the Tribunal, admissible when the authentic document is before it.
[Turning to M. Debenest.] Now, you undertake then to produce a properly certified copy of the document.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I please comment on this document?
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly wait until I read to you the passage which I wish to submit to you.
It is on Page 4 of the French text, the fourth paragraph before the end of the first statement, the second paragraph of the page:
“I think that I can recall that already upon that occasion Seyss-Inquart said that five hostages would be shot. I didn’t know any one among these hostages. I did not select these five men, and I had nothing whatsoever to do with their execution. It was a case of a purely political nature in which I became involved in my capacity as commander.”
Now you may give us your attitude if you choose to do so.
SEYSS-INQUART: The picture which is given here by General Christiansen as a defendant, not as a witness, completely coincides with the picture that I gave. In the beginning of this record General Christiansen says that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and the OKW gave him the order through his chief of staff to take the hostages, and he says further that through his legal department he had issued a proclamation that the hostages would answer with their lives if further sabotage acts should take place. He then says that they did take place, and he contacted the Commander, West or the OKW and received the answer that the hostages were to be used. Then he goes on to relate that he advised me of this order, indicating that the original ruling with regard to the hostages still applied, and so I said that 5 of them were to be executed. That is what I have always maintained, and I also said that 25 were to have been killed and that I negotiated for the lives of the remaining 20.
The report, therefore, is fundamentally correct and agrees with what I have said.
M. DEBENEST: But in this document no mention is made of 25 hostages. We are only dealing with the fact here it was you who chose these 5 hostages.
Take the following page of the statement of 5 March 1946. General Christiansen declares:
“I remember now that Lieutenant Colonel Kluter also took part in this conference. There were thus seven participants in all. I therefore transmitted the order to use hostages and Seyss-Inquart said immediately that five men were to be apprehended. You are asking why it was as simple as all that. Obviously Seyss-Inquart had authority to do this.”
It was therefore you, in fact, who designated and chose these hostages?
SEYSS-INQUART: The repetition of these words in no wise changes the fact that 25 hostages were demanded, as the witnesses will confirm to you tomorrow, and that I intervened so that only 5 were demanded, and that altogether the entire matter was in the hands of the Army and the Higher SS and Police Leader; the proclamations were issued in the names of both of them. As Reich Commissioner I assumed the right to reduce the number of hostages as much as possible. The final figure was determined by the Commander and the Higher SS and Police Leader.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, did you read the last paragraph in the affidavit, Page 4 at the bottom?
M. DEBENEST: That is right, Mr. President, I did not read it. I am going to read it.
“I will ask you to note that at this conference with Seyss-Inquart he expressly reserved the right to appoint hostages.”
SEYSS-INQUART: I can say nothing more than what I have already said. The selection of hostages was probably made by the Higher SS and Police Leader according to directives which he had received from the Armed Forces commander, or, rather, from his superiors. I myself asked to be shown this list, for I, as Reich Commissioner, was interested in knowing who was to be selected, and I tried to exert influence to the effect, as I have already said, that the fathers of many children were crossed off this list.
Furthermore, I do not wish to be polemic in face of the subjective descriptions of General Christiansen. We got along very well together in our work. The Court will decide whether I am not telling the truth or whether he is mistaken in this case.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly what I was thinking. You therefore do contend that this is the only case in which you intervened as far as the seizure and execution of hostages is concerned?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe so, yes.
M. DEBENEST: Did you know about the execution of hostages following the assassination attempt made on Rauter?
SEYSS-INQUART: I stated the extent of my information yesterday. I did not know the exact figure. It was known to me, however, that shootings were taking place, the shooting of those men who, on the basis of their demeanor and actions, were to be shot under the decree of the Führer by the Security Police. The actual figure was made known to me later.
M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you did not intervene in this question of the shooting of hostages at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I cannot say that, for I discussed at length with the deputy of the Higher SS and Police Leader what should be done in such a case—for after all it was a very grave matter—and whether he should carry out these executions; I said yesterday that I agreed. I declared yesterday that I could not contradict him in his decision actually to carry out the executions at this point.
M. DEBENEST: Who was this Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Schöngarth.
M. DEBENEST: What do you think of Dr. Schöngarth?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Dr. Schöngarth was not a man who was especially harsh and very eager to deal with this matter. He must certainly have found the matter unpleasant.
M. DEBENEST: But was he a man whom one could trust?
SEYSS-INQUART: I always had confidence in him.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case, I am going to have a document shown to you, Document F-879, which I submit under Number RF-1528.
I wish to inform the Tribunal that once again this is a copy of proceedings which was received at Amsterdam by the War Crimes agency. It is signed by people who were questioned, and it also comes with an affidavit as in the preceding case. Here again, if the Tribunal wishes it, I shall obtain the original for the Tribunal later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will submit the original as before.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Or else get it from somebody in the Government.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, Mr. President.
Defendant, will you kindly look at Dr. Schöngärth’s statement on Page 5 of the French document; it is the third statement, the fifth paragraph. Have you found it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I have.
M. DEBENEST: This is what Dr. Schöngarth says:
“After the investigation, I personally went to see Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the Reich Commissioner in Holland, with whom I discussed the matter. Seyss-Inquart then gave me the order to take increased measures of reprisal by executing 200 prisoners, who were condemned to death, at the place where the assassination attempt had been made.
“This execution was aimed at intimidating the population. It was announced by a public notice that a large number of persons would be executed because of this assassination attempt.”
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: Well?
SEYSS-INQUART: In any event, it is confirmed that we are concerned here with the shooting of Dutchmen who, as this man says, had been condemned to death for having participated in some sort of sabotage or other matter; they were, in line with the Führer decree, to be shot anyhow. That is the first and most important point. The question is whether the figure of 200 was mentioned; and the question further is whether I demanded that number. I still maintain what I have already said in reply to the testimony of former collaborators; but I also maintain my own declaration to the effect that I never even would have had the power to give an order like that to Dr. Schöngarth. He was not at all my subordinate in such things. I certainly did state that we must act with severity in this case. That is quite right. The figure of 200—I even believe it was 230—only came to my knowledge later. The public notice which he mentions here is signed by Dr. Schöngarth.
M. DEBENEST: You did not say “severe measures”; you said “stricter measures of reprisal.” It’s not quite the same thing.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand the question.
M. DEBENEST: I repeat: You did not say “severe measures,” but “stricter measures of reprisal.”
SEYSS-INQUART: The severe measures which were to be taken would, of course, serve to intimidate. But we were not concerned with reprisals; that is, the shooting of people whom otherwise one would have had no reason to shoot.
M. DEBENEST: But it seems to me that this document is extremely clear. It deals with “measures of reprisal” following the assassination attempt against Rauter.
SEYSS-INQUART: Which were to be carried through in such a way that Dutchmen were executed who would have been executed in any event; for he confirms here that the people had been condemned to death.
M. DEBENEST: Will you kindly repeat the explanation. I did not get the translation.
SEYSS-INQUART: Here we were concerned with the shooting of men who would have been shot in any event, for it says specifically here that they had already been sentenced to death, as it says in the next paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: I already wrote it down 5 minutes ago. You have said it already. He has said it already. The document speaks for itself, M. Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, Mr. President.
You stated yesterday as well that no hostage had been shot at the hostage camp of Michelsgestel.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is unknown to me.
M. DEBENEST: Nevertheless, you stated that yesterday. Or are you still claiming that none had been shot at that time?
THE PRESIDENT: Will the defendant answer, please? Don’t just nod your head. It does not come through the sound system.
SEYSS-INQUART: I wanted to say only that I know of no case. Perhaps on some occasion such a case did occur, but I do not remember.
M. DEBENEST: Nevertheless, you are not denying that some may have been shot?
SEYSS-INQUART: There might have been reasons which necessitated such a shooting. But I do not recall a single case.
M. DEBENEST: The hostages who were executed in this manner, were they all people who had been sentenced to death?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know because I do not know whether anyone was shot at all.
M. DEBENEST: In the case of the execution of hostages at Rotterdam, was not one of the hostages arrested the day before the execution, and shot the very next day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am not informed on that point. I can see from this document that we are talking about hostages from Michelsgestel. I do not recall that hostages were taken from this camp. But in the circumstances it may have been possible, for this was an actual hostage case.
M. DEBENEST: No. I am not asking you whether hostages were taken from the camp of Michelsgestel. I am asking you, in the case of the execution of the hostages of Rotterdam, whether one was not arrested on the eve of the execution and shot the next day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know.
M. DEBENEST: I will give you the name. Maybe that will help you remember the case: Baron Schimmelpennink.
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I recall Baron Schimmelpennink came from Zeeland. But I do not know any more than that.
M. DEBENEST: You do not know under what conditions he was arrested, and why?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; I know only that a Baron Schimmelpennink was among those five hostages who were shot.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore do admit that numerous executions followed the setting up of the summary justice courts in the Netherlands by you?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. That is certainly not the case. For these shootings, from the middle of 1944 onward, cannot be traced to my directives and my summary justice courts, but rather to a direct decree of the Führer.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore claim that there was not a single case of execution as a result of your order of 1 May 1943?
SEYSS-INQUART: The executions did not come about on the basis of summary courts which I had provided for in this decree against violations of this decree. It is possible that the Higher SS and Police Leader used this decree as the basis for his decisions.
M. DEBENEST: But you are still contending that you had no power over this Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not have the power to command him, but we certainly worked together in a close understanding.
M. DEBENEST: He therefore consulted you about all reprisal measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. How do you mean?
M. DEBENEST: Were not the reprisal measures which were taken or which were announced by him applied with your agreement?
SEYSS-INQUART: The reprisal measures and his announcements were made in his domain. In many cases I myself did not learn of these announcements at all, or not until afterward. There was no directive which I gave for these measures. I again and again refer to the fact that this resulted from the Führer decree given by Himmler to the Police.
M. DEBENEST: Very well. Were you in favor of these measures of reprisal?
SEYSS-INQUART: I fully approved of action being taken against members of the resistance movement who committed sabotage and other acts. There were no other means for taking steps except arrest by the Police, passing of judgment on the part of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and shooting on the part of the Police. I could not oppose these measures. You may interpret that as agreement, if you want to. I would have preferred it if courts had given the judgment.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, certainly.
I am going to have you shown Document F-860, which is a letter which I am submitting under Number RF-1529. This is a letter written by you, dated 30 November 1942 and addressed to Dr. Lammers. I will pass over the first part.
I am sorry. I forgot to tell the Tribunal that the originals are not here; they are just photostat copies. But I have in my possession an affidavit which I shall submit to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: It is all right, M. Debenest. You need not bother to give us an affidavit. We have the photostat copy.
M. DEBENEST: I will pass over the first two pages of the French copy, and will pass on to the second paragraph.
“The drafting of the special police law (Polizeistandrecht) was effected in accordance with the views expressed in a letter of the Reichsführer SS. I believe that I have conformed with all the wishes which are contained in it, only I would not like to appoint the Higher SS and Police Leader as court administrator, for, from the point of view of the Dutch, this would mean a curtailment of the authority of the Reich Commissioner, particularly in view of the fact that the Reich Commissioner is designated in the Führer decree as the guardian of the interests of the Reich. However, in the decree I have assigned to the Higher SS and Police Leader all the powers which a court administrator needs. I believe that this special police law may be a useful instrument and to a certain extent an example for all further regulations.”
You did, therefore, have authority over the Police Leader?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had the authority over the special police court, but not over the Higher SS and Police Leader. I remained the top court administrator, even for the police court in an emergency state. All the same I could not give executive orders to the Police. Anyway, this police law existed in the Netherlands for two weeks at the most.
M. DEBENEST: It is nevertheless certain that we here find special tribunals and that you entrusted them to the Police Leader.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct, but only within the scope of police courts in an emergency state, and what the police courts did at that time I assume responsibility for. This was on occasion of the general strike in May 1943.
M. DEBENEST: Well, we quite agree then. You did entrust these emergency courts to the Police.
Very well, I will now have you shown Document 3430-PS. This document is a collection of all the speeches which you made during the occupation of the Netherlands. Will you please take...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, is that the only reference you are making to this Document Number 860?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President, I am only concerned with the second part. The first part concerns the Police.
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think it is imposing a very heavy burden on the Translation Department? There are 18 pages of it.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I quite agree with you. I intended to use this document for the police organization, which is in the first part. But I did not think it was necessary to do so right now because I wished to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: I only mean this: If you are only going to use a small part of the document it does not seem necessary to make the Translation Department, who have a very great deal of work to do, translate 18 pages of it.
Here’s another one—F-803, which has got many more than 18 pages in it, and of which very little use has been made. But go on.
M. DEBENEST: I know, Mr. President. I did not use more of it because the Tribunal considered that it dealt with details which it did not consider important. That is the only reason.
THE PRESIDENT: You have passages on each of these 18 pages? I am very much surprised.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly not, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, anyway.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, we will now pass to another subject.
When you arrived in Holland, didn’t that country possess very considerable stocks of foodstuffs and of raw materials?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, a great many supplies were on hand. An extraordinary amount.
M. DEBENEST: Were not important requisitions made during the first years of the occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, in accordance with a decree within the scope of the Four Year Plan all supplies were requisitioned and a 6 months’ reserve supply was set up in the Netherlands with the obligation on the part of the Reich to supply all further needs as required.
M. DEBENEST: You therefore claim that these stocks were to be reserved for the Dutch population?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly.
M. DEBENEST: Certainly? Very well. Will you take the document which I have shown to you this morning, 997-PS, Pages 9 and 10.
SEYSS-INQUART: Do I have the document before me?
M. DEBENEST: Page 12 of the French text and Page 11 of the German. You write:
“The stocks of raw materials have been collected and with the agreement of the Field Marshal have been distributed in such a manner that a quota sufficient to keep Dutch economy running for 6 months will be left behind. Raw material quotas and food rationing, et cetera, will be assigned the same way as in the Reich. Considerable stocks of raw materials have been guaranteed for the Reich, such as, for example, 70,000 tons of industrial fats which represents about one-half of the amount which the Reich still needs.”
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that coincides with the description I have just given you.
M. DEBENEST: But I thought you said that the stocks were at the disposal of the Dutch people and not for the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is an error in transmission. I said that the supplies were confiscated and enough left there for only 6 months and that future needs would be supplied by the Reich in the same proportion as the Reich was supplied. But primarily these stocks were confiscated for the Reich.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, the translation did not come through. You received numerous complaints about these requests, didn’t you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
M. DEBENEST: And what measures did you take?
SEYSS-INQUART: The attention of the gentlemen who were with me, that is, Secretary General Hirschfeld and the other secretaries, was called to the fact this was a strict directive in the framework of the Four Year Plan. In some cases I may have transmitted the complaints to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, if the stocks were taken away in what seemed to me excessive quantities.
M. DEBENEST: In addition to these requests, were there not mass purchases made by the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes...
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now? Will you be much longer, M. Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, everything will depend upon the length of the answers which the defendant will make, but I think that in half an hour or three-quarters of an hour at the most I shall have finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then we will adjourn.