Afternoon Session
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the French prosecutor asked you whether you were the deputy of Governor General Frank, and for that reason knew Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz is located?
SEYSS-INQUART: Auschwitz was not in the region of the Government General, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau Upper Silesia.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Then the same prosecutor confronted you with the testimony of a girl of 20 years old, by the name of Kunze, in 3594-PS. According to this testimony you allegedly repeatedly sent reports to Himmler.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday evening, when I was confronted with this matter, I was rather tired, and made a statement somewhat in contradiction to the fact contained in the document, and said that under Paragraph 3 certain reports were mentioned which had no connection with me. Now this witness asserts that reports from me went to Himmler by way of the Security Police, dealing with the condition of the Jews. That is utter nonsense, which the results contradict. The Reich Commissioners were in no way subordinate to Himmler as far as the Jewish question was concerned. I sent perhaps two or three letters concerning individual cases. They went from my staff to the staff of Himmler; but never by way of the Security Police.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient. You were, in addition, confronted with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schöngarth in connection with the question of the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Schöngarth was the successor, or more accurately, the deputy of Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after he had inspected the scene of the assassination. He told me that Himmler demanded the shooting of 500 real hostages, prominent Dutchmen. I was aghast; and Schöngarth said immediately that that was completely out of the question. Thereupon I most certainly said to Schöngarth: “But we must do something, we must react in some way to this.” He then told me that a number of cases of death sentences were on hand which were to be carried out by shooting within the next few days and weeks. He suggested that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to the effect that this was in retaliation for the assassination.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and the Armed Forces commander in the Netherlands, in connection with the question of hostages, issue warnings to the population, as is customary under international law?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe there is a document available which contains a warning by me against sabotage, et cetera, in which I threatened, in the case of violation of the laws, to confiscate property and to draft the population for guard duty.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS.
[Turning to the defendant.] Further, I have to confront you with a document which is an interrogatory of the Defendant General Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the order for the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Christiansen does not say that. He admits that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak, was urging the matter behind the scenes. I made my statement, but perhaps the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, since he was present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yesterday evening I once more studied this question, since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the effect that this statement by the witness, which is really the interrogation of an accused person, was admitted by the Court. In my opinion, Paragraph 21 of the Charter means something else here. I believe that a partial matter like that has no probative value, for it is theoretically possible that Christiansen could now be sentenced by the British on the grounds that his statement is not correct. Now, I do not want to delay this Tribunal, but I wish to call attention to the equivalent statement of Criminal Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted in Document Number 77, Page 199.
Then I call your attention to another matter. The French prosecutor asserted that the Dutch secretaries general were left behind by the Dutch Government to serve as a government, and that you were not justified in interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that and I also believe it is of no consequence. The Netherlands capitulated, and they did so for the entire region except Zeeland.
The terms of capitulation consisted only of military details. From the civilian point of view it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking the government into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should like to submit a document which takes issue with this question. This is a verdict by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 12 January 1942. In my final speech I shall refer to this from the legal standpoint. It will be submitted to the Tribunal in certified form in four languages through the Prosecution who have agreed to this. The Exhibit Number is 96.
Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out mass shootings and, particularly, deportations of civilian workers and the displacement of Jews, in order to weaken the biological power of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I can cite concrete examples which show that I had the opposite intentions. It is certain that during a war losses do arise among the population, and perhaps if I had given more attention or put up greater resistance, I might have prevented something. That this did not take place, I truly regret. But two figures are decisive: the figures for mortality and those showing the increase in the population.
Until the year 1944, the mortality rate in Holland, on the basis of the statistical data of the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, rose from 9.5 to 10 per thousand, whereas in the years 1914-18, the original rate of 12 per thousand increased to 17 per thousand, in other words by almost 50 percent even though the Dutch people were under their own Government, were not in the war, and were not under a blockade. According to the statistics which I received from the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, from 1914 to 1918 there was a decrease of about one-half. In the year of my administration, up until 1944, the population increased from 20 per thousand to 25 per thousand. That is a good one-fourth increase. Of course it is primarily the will to live of the Dutch people. But it is surely also a consequence of the measures of my civil administration.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my client, I should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central Statistics Bureau. I received this by way of the General Secretary in a German and English version, but it is not certified. The original should be in the office of the General Secretary.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to remark that in these statistics...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Because in the Indictment and in the proceedings here, it was claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of germanizing the Dutch people and of breaking resistance, and because he is also held responsible for the poor state of health of the population, the decrease in births, and the mortality rate. These were all assertions made in the Dutch Government report and in part also produced here. Yesterday, with the permission of the Tribunal, I submitted this query to the Dutch Government and I received this answer. In fact it answered more than I requested, particularly taking war victims into account. But we will pay homage to the truth and submit it as we got it.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering that in evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I submit it the way I received it from the General Secretary. It is Number 106.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that the reduction of the birth rate in the years 1914-18 is shown at a lower figure than the report which I received in January of 1945.
DR. STEINBAUER: I still have two brief questions regarding Austria. The first question is this: The American prosecutor has charged that you gave Mühlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say what the notes contained?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that was the outcome of the discussion which I had just had with Dr. Schuschnigg and it included, above all, the agreement to call upon Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaller, and Dr. Fischböck, and the institution of national political sections within the Fatherland Front—in short, things that we had agreed on, things which Adolf Hitler, at Berchtesgaden, did not in any way have to put through for the Austrian National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the American prosecutor asked you whether you knew that Austrians died in concentration camps after the Anschluss. You answered, no, that you did not know this. But people did die in Austrian concentration camps. Here in this room, in the course of months, you have become familiar with concentration camps. Do you mean to say that they were identical with those which you meant?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: And apart from that, I said I heard that it might have been possible that Austrians died in German concentration camps. The Austrian concentration camps can in no way be compared with what we have heard here about German concentration camps.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination-in-chief of the defendant, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my first witness on the Austrian question, General Glaise-Horstenau.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Defendant, you said that you had considered that the laws of land warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you consider that they were all obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Which ones did you consider were obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the contractual stipulations for the protection of the civilian population were outdated by technical developments in weapons, for obviously certain warlike measures like total blockade, demolition bombing attacks, et cetera, are directed primarily at the destruction of the civilian population and consequently are only justifiable if the civilian population is considered a war potential like the troops at the front. But if that is the case, then the civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in such a way also.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And when you say “considered in such a way,” you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the civilian population to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; is that not the conclusion?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is my conclusion, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that conclusion reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe with the increase of the bombing attacks, approximately.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind the increase of the bombing attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; now there are two short questions. You said that you told the Führer that you would not act as a Trojan Horse; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, had he suggested to you that you should act as a Trojan Horse?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not that, but I was fully aware of my difficult position. It was quite obvious to me that I could be misused for such purposes, that behind the back of my ministerial post a situation could be prepared so that Austria would be overrun.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you used that expression after you had been talking to the Führer for some time, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the discussion, but the thought itself had come to me previously; I only brought it up during the discussion.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, you had had this thought for some time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ever since you had gotten into this Austrian matter actively you had had the thought, I suppose?
SEYSS-INQUART: The possibility of dissension and of a difference of opinion about this situation was quite clear to me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That your actions might be misconstrued?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all; and secondly, that the fact of my activity could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of course, because you represented both sides at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well now, let us take up this matter of declaring forfeited property of enemies of the State. You made those declarations, I presume, did you not, as Reich Commissioner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was that made under a decree of the Führer’s giving you authority to do that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a basic practice which was current in the Reich, and if I did not get the order I nevertheless had a sort of directive...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now wait a minute. I did not ask you about the practice. It was made under a decree, was it not? That practice was under a decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that decree applied to all occupied countries, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so. I first announced this decree in the Netherlands myself. The measures in the Netherlands came about on the basis of my directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I do not want to get you confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Führer, was it not, giving you that authority; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Let us say on the basis of a directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of a directive of the Führer; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that directive in evidence? Has it been put in evidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now tell us what was in it. What was in that directive?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was the general directive that the property of persons who committed acts inimical to the Reich was to be confiscated. I had already issued a decree similar to this in Austria. The first one was issued in the Reich itself; that was the model.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you were the person in the Netherlands who had complete discretion to make the determination of who was an enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision under the decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that was actually a matter for the Police and the courts.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: I only had influence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the Police did not have to go to the courts to get that determination surely, did they?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Either the Police directly made a decision of this kind or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the court sentenced the people on the basis of certain offenses, and then on the basis of the judgment the property suffered the legal consequences.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the property of the Freemasons was confiscated under that decree. What other property, of what other groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that direction of the Führer? I do not mean individuals; I mean groups.
SEYSS-INQUART: At the moment I cannot think of any others, although there were a few other groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But, in effect—see if I state the practice correctly—the Police would decide that an individual or group of individuals, on account of their words or their actions, were enemies of the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. And the decisive office at the time was that of Heydrich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The decisive factor was Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: And the Netherlands agencies carried through his decisions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you carried through Heydrich’s decisions; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: I carried through Heydrich’s decisions when it came to property rights. The association of Jehovah’s Witnesses belonged to those groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, Jehovah’s Witnesses belonged to the group too?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were also among them.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the property of Jehovah’s Witnesses was confiscated also, since they were enemies of the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: They probably did not have very much, but what they had was confiscated because of their attitude in refusing to serve in the war effort.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They refused—let me get this straight. This is interesting. Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to fight or to serve in the German war effort and therefore their property was confiscated. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not quite. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany refused to serve in the German Army. So first of all they were prohibited there and then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; but Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Netherlands were not prohibited because they refused to serve in the German Army, but rather because we were against this group on principle.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see, on general principles. As pacifists, you were against them, so you confiscated their property; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[The witness Glaise-Horstenau took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU (Witness): Edmund Glaise-Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what position did you have in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was born in 1882 in Braunau in Upper Austria. I came of an officer’s family of French descent. In 1918 I was a major in the General Staff of the Austrian headquarters as adviser on politics and the press.
DR. STEINBAUER: What position did you have then in the Austrian Republic?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After the overthrow of 1918 I was in the civil service as director of archives at the university, a historian and author. Among other things, I was the author of a basic work about the collapse of old Austria, which...
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we want only your public positions; I am interested in knowing about them only.
What public positions did you have?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Director of archives; then, from 11 July 1936 on, I was Minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, as guarantor of the July Agreement; and then during the March days of 1938, I was in the Cabinet of Seyss-Inquart.
In November 1939 I voluntarily entered the German Army, first in the obscure job of a graves registration inspector; and from 1941 on I had to do with military diplomatic tasks and was on duty at Zagreb without troop command. In September 1944 I was dismissed from my post in Zagreb because, being an Austrian of the old regime, I was against the official policy and was one of the basic opponents of the Ustashi terror. Another reason was that I was supposed to have called the head of the State, who was elected and appointed by us, Ante Pavelich, a “criminal subject,” among other undiplomatic things.
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I shall put a few brief questions to you, and it is quite sufficient if you just answer them with a characterizing phrase. The Tribunal does not want to know very much about the Anschluss itself, but everything as to how it came about. Therefore I ask you very briefly: After the July Putsch of 1934, were you in any way connected with Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the economic situation at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The economic situation at that time may be characterized through the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6 million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that means, counting their families, that more than a million were in the misery of unemployment.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities were there regarding the expansion of the economic area?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In this connection I can say openly and immediately that all the possibilities always received “no” as an answer. If Austria wanted the Anschluss, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted to call the Hapsburgs back, the answer was “no.” If Austria wanted to enter a German customs union in order to expand her economic area, the answer was “no.” And when great men like Briand and Tardieu spoke of a Danube federation, we received only cold shoulders from our autarchically minded neighbors. That is the Austrian tragedy.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now a party was formed which took up the Anschluss as the main point of its program. What were the combat methods of this party?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In the year 1918 the standard bearer of this Anschluss was no less than the Social Democratic Party led by Otto Bauer who the year before had declared the Anschluss to be the only possibility for the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party crowded to the front, though it was not unified, to be sure, until the end of the twenties by unconditional subordination to the leadership of Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the leader of the NSDAP in Austria at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The leaders themselves changed frequently. Hitler, however, sent a land inspector by the name of—what was his name; a Prussian—I cannot think of the name at the moment—who was evicted from the country by Dollfuss in 1933. Habicht—Dr. Habicht is his name.
DR. STEINBAUER: And after him, is it correct that it was Captain Leopold?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After him, Captain Leopold rose to the leadership of the Party.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did the Austrian National Socialists stand with respect to Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: They considered themselves bound by absolute obedience and loyalty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now the famous Agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached. After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he tell you about his political objectives?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I became well acquainted with Seyss-Inquart shortly before this agreement. I do not remember exactly what he told me then about his political objectives. In general, it coincides with what he later set up as his political objectives.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what was that, briefly?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Party, not as an organization, but only as a support for an ideology in the totalitarian instrument of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, in the Fatherland Front—at the same time its members were to acknowledge the State and Constitution in Austria, and had Adolf Hitler’s blessing in addition.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself deal with the Führer, Adolf Hitler, or did you talk with him?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Apart from the March days of 1938, I had three opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did Seyss-Inquart enter the Government?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart entered the Government after 12 February 1938.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: As far as I can remember, he visited Adolf Hitler on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he make a report about his visit with Hitler to Schuschnigg and the other members of the Cabinet?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Certainly he told Schuschnigg, and he told me as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he collaborate in the planned plebiscite which was to take place on 13 March 1938?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: At that time, without knowing about the plebiscite, I left, on the 6th of the month, on 2 weeks’ leave. Therefore, I cannot give you a reliable answer to this question.
DR. STEINBAUER: But do you know whether this plebiscite had been decided upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-Inquart or not? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: To my knowledge, the plebiscite was not handled by any Ministerial Council.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the National Socialists agree to the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: So far as I could judge on my return from my leave, certainly not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it became known that Schuschnigg wanted to have a plebiscite. Where were you and what did you experience at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: On 6 March, as I have already said, I went on leave, and in Stuttgart I gave a lecture, something I had planned for a long time. And the subject of my speech was “Central Europe in the Year 1000 A. D.”
DR. STEINBAUER: We are not interested in details, only in the facts.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Then I undertook a private visit to Landau in the Pfalz to visit my French relatives, and there Bürckel, whom I had told nothing about my arrival, came to see me, and in his home I heard over the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck. Immediately it was obvious to me that the scheduled plebiscite would, in view of Hitler’s nature, certainly bring about some form of grave countermeasure, and I decided to fly to Vienna at once. Bürckel was to have arranged this. However, he telephoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. I gave the reasons for complying with his request to the American interrogator, and subsequently, only here, I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin. I heard from the mouth of an absolutely authentic witness that he did not want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all solutions by force. During the night between 9 and 10 March I reached Hitler and entered upon a discussion which lasted for 2½ hours, a conference which assumed no concrete proportions and led to no concrete decision. Instead he told me that during the course of the day, at 11 o’clock in the morning, he would have me called in. In fact, he did not call me until 8 o’clock in the evening in order to give me the drafts for Seyss-Inquart: a) of an offer of resignation for Schuschnigg, and b) of a radio speech.
I declared that I could not bring these notes to Austria myself, and I asked that it be taken care of in the regular way by courier.
Later on I received a third draft from Göring, who was Field Marshal at the time. There was a telegram therein, containing a second request to Hitler asking for the marching-in of German troops. I should like to say from the beginning, all these drafts—as far as I know also the third draft—had no actual significance. These were my experiences on the 11th in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you flew to Vienna and met Seyss-Inquart. What did you do with him on that critical morning of 11 March?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I advised him briefly about what had taken place in Berlin, and made entirely clear to him the grave misgivings which I had. Together, Seyss-Inquart and I, at 11 o’clock in the morning, shortly after my arrival, went to see Schuschnigg. While Seyss-Inquart placed before Schuschnigg certain inner political problems which I did not know about because I had been absent, I pointed out to Schuschnigg, who was on the verge of tears, that there was great danger of new world complications, even of a new world war, and, implored him to give in and to rescind the plebiscite which was scheduled for Sunday.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and Seyss-Inquart offer to resign?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot recall whether we went so far orally. This discussion was comparatively brief, but afterwards, at about 1 o’clock, we offered to resign.
For this neither a decree by Hitler nor a decree by the National Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary. Already on Thursday evening I had made my decision in the home of Bürckel that, in connection with the plebiscite, I would also make use of this traditional method of ministerial resignation in order to prevent the worst, if possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did Schuschnigg react to this proposal to postpone the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved, but at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Guido Zernatto—I do not have to tell you who these gentlemen were—made efforts to establish a modus vivendi with Seyss-Inquart. I myself kept in the background since my mission had already been fully accomplished on 12 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the afternoon?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Shortly after this discussion, which led to no result, Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that in accordance with the wishes expressed he would postpone the Sunday plebiscite. I believed that the worst had passed. A short time thereafter Seyss-Inquart was called to the telephone, and returned visibly agitated, saying that he had been advised from Berlin that Hitler could not work any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to demand succession to the post of Chancellor.
Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg. I turned this down for reasons of delicacy. Seyss-Inquart went in alone and returned after a brief period, and we had a discussion which seems to me to be of importance to this Court. He was confident of receiving the Chancellorship, and said to me, almost with an undertone of regret: “Now we will have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work with the Catholics and others who are of similar trends to establish a political combine with which I shall govern.” However, he was going to demand of Hitler, as far as internal politics were concerned, an agreement of 5 years’ tranquillity.
DR. STEINBAUER: And, of course, Hitler did not agree to that. Instead he marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law. You were named Vice Chancellor. Did you sign this law, and why?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a cosignatory of this law. I entered into the Government after Keppler requested me to and I countersigned this law, for three reasons:
First, under the impression that Austria was completely alone in the world, and that no one was lifting a finger on our behalf; secondly, and I must say something here which has been said in the southern German press, I entered under the impression of the overwhelming street demonstrations that were taking place. You can call this mass psychology, or what you will, but this mass psychology was present and it was an unequaled popular demonstration. Thirdly, on the Ballhausplatz, on the night that I received this law into my hands—I did not participate in the origination of this law—the German tanks were rolling past below me, and the occupation of the country by Adolf Hitler was accomplished. With him this meant “bend or break.” If Austria had tried to assert a different will it would not have been possible.
Of course, one is easily inclined to say about my home country that it should have committed suicide from fear of death...
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient, General, thank you. Mr. President, I have no further questions to address to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the July Agreement concluded as a result of pressure from Germany or through mutual desire and mutual interest?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: It was concluded on the basis of mutual desire and mutual interest.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then and later have complete confidence in Schuschnigg and he in you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Up until the winter of 1937-38, my relationship to Schuschnigg was one of complete confidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know anything about the intention of Herr Von Papen to effect the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Never did I have the slightest hint of that sort.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the so-called “Langot aid fund”?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Langot aid fund was a fund which was established quietly by the Government in typical Austrian fashion—this is not intended as criticism, my saying that it is a typical Austrian fashion—for the help of National Socialist family members of National Socialists who had been imprisoned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Schuschnigg and the Government have knowledge of this fund?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Both of them knew about this and they both knew definitely of Langot.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of the NSDAP and particularly of Leopold to Herr Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The NSDAP and Leopold were completely opposed to Von Papen. They were inimical toward him to begin with because he was a Catholic, and they distrusted him additionally in every sort of way.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Did you know a man named General Muff?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes, very well indeed.
MR. DODD: You were in the habit of telling him everything that went on in the Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No.
MR. DODD: Do you know Stephan Tauschitz, the Austrian Ambassador to Germany?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Not him either. We spoke to him about some topic but that I should let myself be used as an informer was contrary to my tradition as a soldier of the Empire.
MR. DODD: Then what did you think you were being brought to Berlin for by Bürckel from Stuttgart?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot follow you, I am sorry.
MR. DODD: What did you understand to be the purpose of your trip when you were being brought to Berlin from Stuttgart in March 1938, when Hitler wanted to see you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not go to Berlin from Stuttgart, but rather from the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I considered this matter and finally accepted, a) because I wanted to know what was going on in Berlin...
MR. DODD: I wanted to know what you thought was the purpose of your trip when you left, from wherever it was, to go to Berlin. That is all. What did you understand was the purpose?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: My intention was to comply with Hitler’s invitation and to see just what was taking place in Berlin.
MR. DODD: All right. Now you have told the Tribunal that you were interested only in a peaceful solution of the question. Surely, when you got this false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for Seyss-Inquart, you certainly did not think you were proceeding in a peaceful and loyal manner insofar as Austria was concerned; did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: From all these three things I had gained the absolute impression that if Schuschnigg were to cancel the Sunday plebiscite, then a peaceful solution would still be possible.
MR. DODD: And what do you suppose you were going to do with that telegram, that false telegram that asked Hitler for help because of disorders? This was days before it actually took place. You knew that this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you even consent to carry that back to Austria?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not take it along. There was even a sharp difference of opinion between myself and Field Marshal Göring. I did not take it along. It was given to a courier.
MR. DODD: You told us; you know we have your notes here, in which you said that you did carry it along.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, never did I say that. That was contrary to the truth. I never put down or said that I took any of these three things along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that. I should like to call your attention to the fact that, according to the agreement of 12 February, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with Reich and Party agencies in the Reich.
MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you knew that the telegram was a falsehood, did you not? Whether you carried it or Globocznik did, it was not true, was it?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I beg your pardon, I had nothing whatever to do with this telegram afterwards. Months later I asked Seyss-Inquart whether this telegram had ever been sent off and he said “no,” it had never been sent. I have already said that all three documents were not used.
MR. DODD: Certainly they were not given to you by Hitler to be thrown away, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they were not going to be utilized, did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Anything further was the task of Seyss-Inquart who, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had contact with the Reich and Party offices...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of answering something else?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Very well...
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to think that you had some other reasons, but I do not want to press it any further.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, I would be very grateful if I could follow, but I do not understand this question.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand it, I do not think there is any point in pressing it.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I should be very grateful if you would repeat it.
MR. DODD: What I suggested in my question was what you, at least, knew about this false telegram which was handed to you, a draft of it, I think you said either by Hitler or by Göring. You were then a Minister without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You certainly knew it was a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria and deal with Seyss-Inquart, knowing that such a telegram had been arranged, and that it had been sent by courier.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The telegram had lost all significance through the fact that Schuschnigg canceled the plebiscite, and I told Schuschnigg explicitly—leaving it to Seyss-Inquart, who sat beside me, to say anything more specific—that Hitler would march in if we did not call off the plebiscite. That is exactly what I said to Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am not going on with it.
Do you remember telling us that at the time that Göring was talking to Seyss-Inquart at the telephone, you found out that the Defendant Von Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Göring in Berlin?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I am sorry. I only heard about that after the collapse in 1945, from Wiedemann.
MR. DODD: What I want to know is, how did you find that out?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I found out from Captain Wiedemann, whom I just happened to be with.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, you know Defendant Von Papen once wrote a letter to Hitler and he said that you were a willing collaborator with him with respect to the possibility of union or Anschluss with Germany, and that was way back in 1936. Do you know about that? It is in evidence in this case, USA-67, Document 2246-PS. Were you a willing collaborator with Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a willing collaborator for the normalization of the relations between the two countries; but I am not familiar with this document.
MR. DODD: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
We will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
[The witness Rainer took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH RAINER (Witness): Friedrich Rainer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: What functions, and for how long, did you have in the NSDAP?
RAINER: I have been a member of the NSDAP since 10 October 1930. Until 1934 I had no functions. Afterwards Gauleiter Klausner of Carinthia called me to the Gauleiter’s office. Beginning in 1936 I worked in the Landesleitung. Landesleiter Leopold, in the autumn of 1936, relieved me of my position because there were differences of opinion between us. In February of 1938 Klausner again appointed me his political adviser and co-worker in the Landesleitung. In May 1938 the Führer appointed me Gauleiter of Salzburg. On 1 December 1941 I was transferred to Carinthia. Those were my political functions.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were therefore Gauleiter of Carinthia at the end?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: And through years of work in the NSDAP you had a chance to get to know it well?
RAINER: Yes, I know the conditions well since the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you get to know Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The first time that I met Seyss-Inquart was in August 1935. We had a conversation which lasted a few minutes. A few days later I was arrested, and for 6½ months I was in the custody of the Austrian police. After my release in approximately April or May 1936 I met Seyss-Inquart again in Vienna and remained in contact with him after that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was he a member of the Party?
RAINER: During the time that the Party was prohibited Seyss-Inquart was not a member of the NSDAP, but he was a member of the Styrian Home Guard. That organization was, I think in 1933 by agreement between its leaders and Habicht, taken over entirely as part of the Austrian NSDAP. After the Anschluss that transfer was not recognized by the Reich Treasurer, Schwarz, and the members of the Styrian Home Guard, among them, I believe, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had to apply again for membership.
DR. STEINBAUER: So your statement in the famous “Rainer letter”—I shall call it the Rainer letter henceforth for short—is incorrect?
RAINER: At that time I did not know that the transfer in its original form had not been recognized by the Reich Treasurer.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we can say you knew Seyss-Inquart, you had talked to him quite frequently, and surely he would have told you his ideas regarding the Anschluss?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What were these ideas? Please be very brief.
RAINER: The Anschluss, at that time, was not the subject matter of our discussion. The idea of the Anschluss was a point in the program of all Austrian parties; it remained the ideal goal for all of us. In this case, however, what we were concerned with was that the Austrian State should once again steer a course toward Germany and that internal conditions should be peaceful. The difficulty in this connection was that the State founded by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, by disregarding the democratic constitution, was going to permit only a one-party system. It was particularly difficult, therefore, to draw into participation and to legalize the great mass of the opposition of the National wing. That task, according to Seyss-Inquart’s conception and my own, was to be carried out without further bloodshed by peaceful means. With good will on both sides and a postponement of radical means such a way seemed possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then came the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you, at that time, went to see Adolf Hitler to clarify his attitude toward the party. What did Adolf Hitler say to you at the time?
RAINER: A few days after 11 July 1936 I was called to Berchtesgaden, and on 16 or 17 July I visited Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can go a little quicker than you are going, Witness.
RAINER: The Führer made very serious and thorough observations, and he demanded in very severe words that the Austrian National Socialists should respect the Agreement of 11 July under all circumstances. He criticized the previous methods, and he used the expression that they had been heroic, but stupid. He pointed out that the continuation of such methods would lead to continuous difficulties in foreign politics.
He demanded that the National Socialists in Austria should use the existing political possibilities. Upon my specific question whether this included the Fatherland Front, he said “yes.” He assured us that in the near future the general tension would be relieved by an improvement in the relationship between these two German states.
DR. STEINBAUER: In its essentials, therefore, he approved of Seyss-Inquart’s policy?
RAINER: The Führer’s statement, to me, meant a confirmation of the correctness of the way in which we had decided to go.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was Seyss-Inquart also the leader of the Party?
RAINER: No, Seyss-Inquart was never the Party leader.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he subordinate himself to the leadership of the Austrian NSDAP as you state in your letter?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was a member of the National Opposition group, and in that capacity he recognized the existing leadership.
I want to draw your attention to the fact that he recognized Klausner in that letter because Klausner, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had replaced Leopold by request of the Führer, since he promised to steer a quiet, clear, and open course. Co-operation with him appeared to assure adherence to the Berchtesgaden agreement.
Seyss-Inquart, however, had explicitly stated that in his capacity as trustee for the Berchtesgaden agreement and Minister in Schuschnigg’s Government he was independent of Klausner.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, Witness, after the understanding of 12 February 1938 did you, during a railway journey, meet Seyss-Inquart who was coming back from his visit to the Führer?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did he tell you about his conference with the Führer?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart returned in a sleeper, and we sat together in his compartment. He had a piece of paper—I think it was an envelope—and on that there were notes. I remember that he described the formalities which had taken place at the beginning by saying that he had come in his capacity as an Austrian Minister, bound by oath to the Constitution, and responsible to the President and the Chancellor of Austria. He said that he was greeting, in Adolf Hitler, the leader of all Germans. Afterwards he told me in detail about points of that conference, not all of which I can remember now. My whole impression was that the discussion had passed satisfactorily, and I recognized that the conference had been conducted in a spirit of full loyalty to Chancellor Schuschnigg. As far as I can remember, the Anschluss as such had not been dealt with at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you remember his telling you that he had stated to Hitler that he would be Schuschnigg’s living guarantor, and not a Trojan Horse?
RAINER: I do not wish to confirm those exact words. The expression which Dr. Seyss-Inquart repeatedly used was that he was not a Trojan Horse leader. Furthermore, I remember that he had used the expression frequently that he was the living guarantor for mutual adherence to the agreement of Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he also say that he refused to have a cultural fight?
RAINER: I do not believe that I can remember that. At any rate, that was his point of view, and I certainly assume that he spoke to the Führer about that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Führer agree to these proposals?
RAINER: I had the impression that Adolf Hitler was in full agreement with the suggestions of Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart tell Schuschnigg that?
RAINER: That I must assume. At any rate, he did state that that was his intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he tell the Austrian National Socialists the same thing?
RAINER: Yes, because that was particularly necessary. Seyss-Inquart made a speech at a conference of leaders at the beginning of March and pointed out that an evolutionary course and measures which were to a certain extent disappointing to the radical followers—namely, the dissolution of the illegal organization—were specifically desired by Adolf Hitler.
I think I can also remember that during the large demonstration at Linz, and on the occasion of the demonstrations at Graz, he referred to that specifically; for the visit to Adolf Hitler in Berlin gave him the necessary legitimate foundation in the eyes of the National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter of yours you wrote that Seyss-Inquart had been informed of preparation for revolutionary steps.
RAINER: May I ask you, Dr. Steinbauer, which revolutionary steps you mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: Those of 10 March.
RAINER: May I have permission to go into some detail in this connection? The expression “revolutionary steps” is too far-reaching. The measures which were introduced were mainly these: After Chancellor Schuschnigg’s speech at Innsbruck, Major Klausner was convinced that thereby every basis for an inner political understanding had been destroyed and that this speech would be like a spark in a powder barrel.
Whereas previously we had had consultations under what circumstances the vote might be “yes,” it had now, in view of the attitude of the broad masses, become impossible.
A clear-cut indication of attitude by the National Socialist leaders had to be brought about. During the night, the new Gauleiter were still being given their first piece of information about the Party not being agreeable to the proposed plebiscite, and that therefore the slogan would be, for the time being, to refrain from voting. The strictest discipline was demanded, because we feared that feeling would soon run very high. On 10 March the long-prepared propaganda of Zernatto began, and clashes occurred. We also had reports to the effect that large groups of the Protective Legion, forbidden in February 1934, were being armed. Strictest alert was ordered for the formations, therefore, and the formations received orders to provide protection for the Nationals.
Essentially, these were the steps ordered on the 10th; I think I informed Dr. Seyss generally, in the afternoon, regarding the atmosphere in the provinces. I probably did not inform him about individual organizational measures.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he promote that atmosphere?
RAINER: No.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he demand demonstrations, or did he prevent them?
RAINER: He neither promoted them, nor did he urge them. Prevention at that stage was no longer possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened on the morning of the 11th?
RAINER: On 11 March in the forenoon I was working at the office of State Councillor Jury at 1 Seitzergasse. I no longer know at exactly what task. We met Dr. Seyss, Glaise-Horstenau, and several others about noon in the office of Dr. Fischböck, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart told us of the outcome of the conferences with Dr. Schuschnigg.
The result of our consultation was the letter which the Ministers and State Councillors wrote to Dr. Schuschnigg, which set a time limit for 2 o’clock in the afternoon, demanded the cancellation of this unconstitutional plebiscite and the fixing of a new plebiscite a few weeks later in accordance with the regulation of the Constitution, or we would resign.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened? Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite. How did you hear about that?
RAINER: Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite, but he refused to give a date for a new plebiscite and gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported to the Chancellery in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it produced the statement from the Reich that this solution, as a half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that started the intervention by the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: But was not intervention already brought about through the fact that Glaise-Horstenau, as has been stated, or a courier, took a letter from Adolf Hitler to Vienna?
RAINER: It was my view that certain drafts which Globocznik showed me at midday, and which had been addressed to the Landesleitung offices, had been brought along by Glaise-Horstenau who came back from Berlin that morning. As I heard later, that was reportedly done by a courier. In my opinion this was not an intervention on the part of the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was there collaboration between the Party and the Reich on one hand, and Seyss-Inquart on the other?
RAINER: If you mean “conspiracy” by “collaboration,” then I must say definitely, “no.” But the collaboration which was agreed upon at Berchtesgaden was carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Klausner give the order that the Party was free to act and that it was to seize power?
RAINER: Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, the Party was bound not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been retransmitted by Keppler during the early days of March, and Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had called Keppler, who was already in the plane, back in order to impress upon him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, surely, the question was what Klausner did, and the witness is now telling us what a lot of other people did.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
I asked you, when did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiter to seize power?
RAINER: That order was given by Klausner on the evening of 11 March.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart approve?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was not informed of that until some time later.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I must put to you the fact that Gauleiter Eigruber, of Upper Austria, has stated in an affidavit that he received a telegram in which he was addressed as Landeshauptmann. Do you know anything about that?
RAINER: I know nothing whatever about telegrams, or a telegram. I know that Klausner’s order was telephoned from 1 Seitzergasse. That evening Globocznik was also putting through calls from the Chancellery. I assume that Eigruber is referring to one of these telephone calls.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that Globocznik, who was Gauleiter of Vienna before this illegal period, told you that he misused the name of Seyss-Inquart for the seizure of power?
RAINER: Globocznik told me that several inquiries had been directed to the Chancellor’s office which were passed on to him over the telephone, and that he did not always state his name in that connection. One special case relative to Salzburg is known to me very well.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter you also made a statement which mentions some assistance rendered on 25 July 1934. The Prosecution considers that this has some connection with the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss.
RAINER: That remark goes back to a conversation during which Seyss-Inquart told me that after 25 July he had been afraid for a few days that his name might be connected with those events. But after a few days it turned out that there was no such connection. Subsequently he tried to exert his personal influence toward reconciliation and he took over some defense cases. That is what I meant.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that is your explanation for the expression “rendering assistance”?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that pressure was exercised on President Dr. Miklas by the Austrian National Socialists, so that he would appoint Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The negotiations, which occupied the entire late afternoon and evening, were under a certain amount of pressure; for practically in the whole of Austria the change had already been carried out. The overthrow of Schuschnigg’s Cabinet loosed a tremendous avalanche. During the negotiations that fact made itself felt.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you mean that clearly there was pressure, but not physical, directly upon the person of the President?
RAINER: There can be no question of that.
DR. STEINBAUER: But then, how do you explain that at that time 40 SS men marched into the Chancellery building and occupied it?
RAINER: An occupation by the SS is hardly the right expression. When, toward 8 o’clock in the evening, Miklas had again refused to nominate a National Socialist as Chancellor, Keppler stated that at 8 o’clock—not as originally declared—they would march in and he stated his fear for the safety of the negotiators. In fact, as was said in Austria, things were generally in commotion and the situation appeared very unsafe. The Chancellery building was occupied by the police and by the guards and was put in a state of defense. I informed the Landesleitung of this situation and asked them to take protective measures so that willful acts would not cause unnecessary misfortune. In consequence of the measures which were then introduced, I estimate that no earlier than 10 o’clock in the evening an SS leader reported in civilian clothes, stating that he and his men had been assigned to protect the negotiators. Seyss-Inquart considered that step excessive but I asked him to take the measure into consideration, and he then allowed these men to pass through the police and guards, and they were admitted to the courtyard of the Chancellery building. There was never any pressure nor were there acts of force; it was merely a precautionary measure.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were Gauleiter of Carinthia. Did you also have administrative powers during the war in the neighboring area of Italian sovereignty?
RAINER: Yes. In September 1943, I was appointed Supreme Commissioner in the operational zone “Adriatic Coastland,” with my seat in Trieste, and I had six provinces under my authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you recruit foreign workers there for employment in Germany?
RAINER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner was this done?
RAINER: It was done through recruiting, that is to say, without employing coercion, since for many decades these workers were accustomed to go north to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: These workers were put to work in your Gau, were they?
RAINER: The majority were put to work in my Gau, but also in other parts of the Alpine regions.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the living conditions of these people in your Gau?
RAINER: Their living conditions were the general and normal ones.
DR. SERVATIUS: Where were they accommodated? In camps? Did you see any such camps?
RAINER: They were housed by their employers. Where larger numbers of them existed they lived in camps which were looked after by the Italian consulate and the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Labor Front supervise matters in practice?
RAINER: Yes, it was bound by an agreement to that effect, of which I was informed, and it took great pains to carry out that task.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself inspect any camps?
RAINER: Yes. I inspected camps repeatedly and I found conditions to be in good order. In the case of certain industries, for instance the water works, I found that conditions were exceptionally good.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you give us the names of these camps?
RAINER: A particularly good impression was made on me by one camp attached to some water works at Münd on the Drau River; the same applies to Schwabeck.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did these foreign workers behave at the end of the war? Were there riots?
RAINER: No. Due to the considerable number of workers in my small Gau I was worried about the food supply. Relations with the population were good because the Carinthian is a good-natured and agreeable type of person. I myself have experienced that French workers who had already been collected by the British in camps to be transported away, went back to their farmers, preferring to wait there rather than in the camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the National Socialist Party strongly represented in Carinthia?
RAINER: Yes. There were so many National Socialists in Carinthia that Schuschnigg said on one occasion: “One ought to put barbed wire around that county and the concentration camp would be complete.”
DR. SERVATIUS: But their relations with the foreign workers were good?
RAINER: Yes, naturally.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: Witness, when did you come to the conclusion that this Defendant, Seyss-Inquart, was not a member of the Party as you stated in your letter? When did you change your mind about that?
RAINER: I did not learn until fairly late after the Anschluss that he was not a member of the Party. I cannot tell you the exact year any more.
MR. DODD: But it was not long after you wrote this report, was it, that you found out that what you had said in here was not exactly so? You had misunderstood?
RAINER: In that report I made various attempts to describe matters in a manner favorable to Seyss-Inquart, because I refused to support the Prosecution against Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I asked you. I asked you if it was a fact that you found out soon after you wrote this letter that you were in error in stating that Seyss-Inquart had been a member of the Party. Now you can answer that very directly, I think, without any long statement.
RAINER: I do not believe that I noticed it shortly afterwards.
MR. DODD: Well, when was it? That is all we want to know. If at any time you actually did receive such information, when did you receive it?
RAINER: That I can no longer say and it did not appear important to me at the time.
MR. DODD: All right. Now when did you change your mind or find that you were in error in saying that Seyss-Inquart knew about and participated in the staged demonstrations or the arrangements for the demonstrations which were to take place in Vienna? When did you find that that was misinformation or a mistake?
RAINER: I am not aware that Dr. Seyss-Inquart participated in demonstrations in Vienna.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I said. If you misunderstood me, I am sorry. Now turn around and maybe if you will look at me it will help a little. You told the Tribunal, in answer to a question from Dr. Steinbauer, that Seyss-Inquart did not provoke the demonstrations and he could not prevent them at that stage. But what Dr. Steinbauer asked you was if what you said in your letter about his participation in the plans was true. You know what you say in your letter or your report, do you not? Do you remember what you said in this report about Seyss-Inquart and his participation?
RAINER: The details of my report are no longer in my memory.
MR. DODD: Would you like to look at it?
RAINER: Yes, please.
MR. DODD: While you are waiting for it I can clear some other things up here. Now as a matter of fact, you gave us an affidavit in November, swearing that this was true, did you not?
RAINER: I specifically stated in this connection that I was partly relying on information received from authoritative individuals and that afterwards I had further information showing me that not everything had been correctly represented. I also stated specifically, and had it included in the record, that I had made these statements with a certain bias. A supplement to my affidavit was also made.
MR. DODD: Just a minute. On 15 November 1945, right here in Nuremberg, under oath, you executed this affidavit in which you said that you confirmed the facts of this report and that they were all true to the best of your knowledge and belief. Now what information have you received since 15 November and from whom, that warrants you in making statements contrary to this report today before this Tribunal?
RAINER: I wish to state in this connection that the point of view which I adopted on 15 November is maintained by me today.
MR. DODD: Well, is this report true or not in its entirety, as you told us it was on 15 November?
RAINER: The report must not be taken literally. Partly it is based on statements made by reliable people, and I made it to the best of my knowledge and belief according to the situation existing, I believe, in July 1939, with a certain bias.
MR. DODD: Well, you told us it was true in November, did you not?
RAINER: I did not say that. I said specifically...
MR. DODD: I will show you your affidavit. Your affidavit is attached to that document that you have, and that is your signature, is it not, and you have sworn to the truth of it?
RAINER: I made a specific statement in connection with it, and as a precaution I made a short note about it afterward. The formulation of the reservations was discussed at length.
MR. DODD: Now you answer my question. Is that the affidavit that you executed under oath on 15 November here in Nuremberg? Yes or no?
RAINER: Yes.
MR. DODD: Now, in there you say that you testify and confirm that “The facts which form the basis of the above-mentioned letters and reports are true to the best of my knowledge and belief,” and you also say further up that you have read the letters and the report.
Now, is that affidavit true? Were you telling the truth when you said that to us under oath in November?
RAINER: That affidavit is correct, but I demand that the explanations which I gave in connection with it and which were made apart from the record at that time—at least they were taken down in shorthand—be added to it.
MR. DODD: Why did you not ask that there be included in the affidavit anything that you wanted about this report if it was not altogether true? You were swearing to it. Did you ask that something be added to it or that it be changed?
RAINER: I considered this statement to be a statement of the genuine character of the documents which had been submitted to me. The record of my statements contained my opinion of the contents of these documents, and as a precaution I added a statement that in this case, too, I wished certain reservations to be taken down. They were subsequently formulated by one of the gentlemen interrogating me, stating “...to the best of my knowledge and belief...” and then he went on to say that all these reservations which I had stated had been expressed in accordance with the method customary with you.
MR. DODD: Now, are you really serious in telling this to this Tribunal today about this affidavit? Are you really serious about this last statement?
RAINER: I am absolutely serious about it. I have nothing to hide.
MR. DODD: Now maybe we can shed a little more light on the kind of reports that you make. I have another one here that you have not seen. You made a speech in 1942. This is Document 4005-PS. It becomes USA-890.
You had better have a copy of this in front of you, USA-890. Do you remember that speech that you made on 11 March 1942 in Klagenfurt before the Leader Corps and the bearers of honor insignia and blood orders of the Gau Carinthia, in which you told the whole story of the development of the events of March 1938? Do you remember the day you made that speech?
RAINER: I did make a speech of that kind.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, let us look at it. Were you telling the truth the day you made that speech?
RAINER: I represented the events in a way in which my audience would understand.
MR. DODD: Were you telling the truth when you made that speech? I did not ask you if you made it interesting; I asked you if you told the truth.
RAINER: I believe I spoke the truth at the time, but I also believe that there were certain things on which I was not correctly informed.
MR. DODD: Now, let us take a look and see what you said in 1942 with reference to this report, 812-PS.
Now, if you will turn to—I think it is Page 8 of your text, I am trying to locate for you the sentence that begins:
“Only in co-operation with us, Jury, and a number of co-workers of Leopold, and also with Leopold’s consent, was it possible to achieve Seyss-Inquart’s appointment to the post of State Councillor. More and more Seyss turned out to be the clever negotiator. We knew he was the one who would best represent the interests of the Movement in the political forefield. He also unconditionally subordinated himself to Klausner’s leadership. He always conducted himself as Klausner’s deputy and conscientiously followed Klausner’s instructions.
“With Seyss’ appointment to the post of Staatsrat, we found a new possibility to enter into further negotiations. At that time there were a number of grotesque situations. We were informed on events in the Schuschnigg camp by the political apparatus; our own connection to Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler we had via Keppler.”
Did you say that in your speech as reported there in the text of it, and how do you reconcile that now with what you have told the Tribunal about the report to Bürckel?
RAINER: It is not known to me where that record of the speech originates. I should have to have an opportunity....
MR. DODD: I will tell you. It is a captured document that was found down there in the files, so you need not worry about that. What I want to know is whether or not you now admit that you made this speech and you said these things at the time that you made it.
RAINER: I made the speech, but I declare emphatically that whatever I have said under oath today about that point is the true version. This is a broad statement designed for the audience of that time, which cannot be taken as literally as something which I say today, conscious of my responsibility.
MR. DODD: You are not speaking broadly for the benefit of an audience here today, are you?
RAINER: That is correct.
MR. DODD: Let us turn a page and see what you said about Papen, and about the conference. You go on to say how you got information, how you met in the Ringstrasse, and so on. If you will follow right along now, we will not lose the places.
“Papen had been expressly told to handle preparations for the conference confidentially. In Austria, only Schuschnigg, Schmidt, and Zernatto knew about it. They believed that on our side only Papen was informed. Papen, too, thought that only he knew about it, but we too were informed and had had conversations with Seyss about the subject.”
That is the Berchtesgaden conference. Now, were you telling the truth when you said this in 1942, or not? Or was that a broad statement for the benefit of the audience?
RAINER: I cannot today check this document against a correct reproduction of what I said then.
MR. DODD: Well, why not? It was in 1942. Do you not remember? Do you mean that you do not know whether you told the truth or not, or you do not know whether you said this or not?
RAINER: In those days I gave a description before the simple people of Carinthia and I...
MR. DODD: Did you lie to them or did you tell them the truth?
RAINER: No, but I speak to people like that differently than I would speak under oath before this Tribunal, having to make concrete statements about concrete points. It seems impossible to me that I should today be required to confirm individual points of a speech which was made 4 years ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you have an answer? He is not answering your question.
MR. DODD: No, Sir, he is not.
[Turning to the witness.] I asked you whether or not you made these statements on that day, and if you did so, were they true? Now, you can tell us that very simply and we do not need any long answer. You have read it over and you have heard me read it. Now, please give us an answer.
You do not need to read any more. You have read it once and I have read it to you. Was that true and did you say it?
RAINER: In details it is not correct.
MR. DODD: Well, is it true in any respect? Is it true that Papen was informed and that Seyss-Inquart knew about that conference long before it took place or sometime before it took place? That is what we want to know.
RAINER: When we met during the Olympic winter games in Garmisch, we encountered...
MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. You are not answering my question. That is the next paragraph or the next sentence which you have been reading. I know that is coming and I am going to ask you about the meeting in Garmisch. I am now asking you if what you said about Von Papen and Seyss-Inquart is the truth, and that is all I want to know.
RAINER: It is correct that at about this time we were informed about the intention of having a conference.
M. DODD: And that Seyss-Inquart knew about it.
Now, let us go on a little bit further and find out about this Garmisch meeting. You were invited down there to the Olympic games, you say, and you had a meeting with Papen and Seyss-Inquart and they went through some negotiations, and then you went on to Berlin.
Now, I want to move down a little bit. There is a lot of interesting material here. We do not have the time to go into it all just now. You go on down quite a bit, and I want to ask you about what you say you had already prepared.
“We had already prepared the following”—and you are talking about Schuschnigg and the impending conference. It is on the back of Page 9 of your text, Witness, and it is on Page 5 of the English text, the last paragraph. You say:
“We had already prepared the following:
“The last result of the conversation Seyss communicated to me in a shop in the Kärntnerstrasse. I called the telephone number where Globus was to be reached in Berlin....
By the way, for the benefit of the Tribunal, Globus is Globocznik, is he not? He is the same person, is he not?
RAINER: Yes.
MR. DODD: “....and told him about the negative result of the conversation. I could speak with Globus entirely freely. We had a secret code for each name, and besides we both spoke a terrible dialect so that not a soul would have understood us. Globus immediately wrote down this report....”
and so on.
“In the meantime, Keppler had gone to Munich by sleeping car.”
Then, a sentence or two further down:
“I then forwarded instructions by Party member Mühlmann, who proved to be an excellent liaison man to government offices in the Reich. He left for Salzburg on the same train as Schuschnigg. While Schuschnigg had his car taken off at Salzburg and spent the night there and went on by car to the Obersalzberg, Mühlmann continued on and got to Berchtesgaden. Keppler and he went to the Führer before Schuschnigg and were able to tell him everything. Schuschnigg arrived in the morning, was received, and experienced boundless surprise that the Führer took up the negotiations where they had been broken off without results the day before between Seyss and him. The Führer did not conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg expected. He went the whole hog. Schuschnigg was finished off that time, in a manner one can hardly imagine. The Führer got hold of him, assaulted him, and shouted at him and reproached him for all the dirty tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the past years. Schuschnigg had become a heavy smoker. There was connection even with his bedroom. We knew about his way of life. Now he was smoking 50, now 60 cigarettes. Now, in the presence of the Führer, he was not allowed to smoke. Schuschnigg could not even smoke.
“Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg. He only stood at attention before the Führer, held his hands against the seams of his trousers and all he said was ‘Yes, sir,’ ‘Jawohl.’ ”
Now, what about that? You say all these things in your speech and were they true when you said them? Right up to that point, Witness, you have read it with me. Did you say this or not, and was it true when you said it?
RAINER: The events as I have described them here are, as a whole, correct. Individual expressions which I read here are not mine. In that point this document has been supplemented by somebody else. Whether the events described here are correct in detail, is something I cannot say for certain because much of it did not happen in my presence.
MR. DODD: I just wanted to know if you said it; that is all. Very well, we will go on.
You also told them that Schmidt finally went to Ribbentrop and asked him to give Schuschnigg one cigarette and so they gave him one. Let us go on quite a few pages to a more important matter. It is on Page 13.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you be able to finish tonight, because we were going to adjourn at a quarter to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I will. I shall need only 2 more minutes to finish. I do not think it takes much time. I just have one or two items in this speech.
[Turning to the witness.] You know in this speech you told your listeners about the day that Seyss-Inquart came to a meeting and told you that he had been bound by his word of honor not to talk about the plebiscite. You know what you told your listeners that day. You will find it on—well, you can find it, I can assure you it is in the text and it will save time if you believe me. It is on Page 13 of the English text. You say:
“We asked Seyss: Is it true? Seyss said: I am bound by my word of honor not to speak, but we want to act as if it is true.” “Diplomat that he was ...”—was your observation—“... the matter was clear to us.”
He let you know, did he not, that Schuschnigg had told him about the plebiscite. He let you know, did he not? Please, can you not answer my question without—you will not find the answer to that on that page.
RAINER: The description here coincides with my memory.
MR. DODD: [Turning to the Tribunal.] Just one last matter and I am not going to have many more questions for him.
You also told your listeners that in the night from Thursday, 10 March to Friday, 11 March, all Gauleiter were in Vienna waiting for information:
“On 10 March we issued orders to the SA and SS, Lukesch and Kaltenbrunner, to call out, beginning Friday, half of the formations, and that the best men were to remain armed in their barracks in the event of a civil war,” and so on.
Did you say that?
RAINER: With arms and in barracks? That cannot be right. The instructions at that time were, and it is unlikely that I recounted them otherwise, that half the strength should remain assembled at home, that is, in assembly areas. There is no question of barracks, and weapons we had almost none.
MR. DODD: You know, in this whole speech almost everything, except in more detail, that you wrote in your report to Bürckel, is contained. The truth of the matter is that you were telling, in both instances, what you believed to be the truth, is it not? That is the truth of the matter. When you made your report to Bürckel and when you made the speech to the leaders and the members of the blood order, you were reporting what you thought were the facts, and what of course, you know now are still the facts.
RAINER: I cannot recognize this matter as being authentic.
MR. DODD: Well, I certainly do not have many more questions, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.