Morning Session
[The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand.]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness Guido Schmidt has referred to an incident involving a flag at Pinkafeld, in May 1937. Would you please describe your activities in settling that incident.
VON PAPEN: The flag incident at Pinkafeld is mentioned by myself, or rather by my defense counsel, because it is a typical example of Hitler’s attempts to pass on to an aggressive policy in Austria, even in the days before 1938.
On 1 May 1937 in the small hamlet of Pinkafeld a flag of the German Reich was hauled down by an Austrian official. There was great excitement in the press; I instantly tried to settle the matter amicably with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thereupon I received a telegram to proceed to Berlin at once. I arrived in Berlin and reported to Hitler. Hitler did not receive me. I waited for 3 days. After 3 days, I wrote and told him, “It appears that you are trying to use the flag incident at Pinkafeld to introduce an aggressive policy against Austria. In that case there is nothing more for me to do, and I beg to hand in my resignation.” A quarter of an hour later he called me to the Reich Chancellery. He gave me a lecture, which lasted half an hour, furious and beside himself with rage over the humiliations which the German Reich could no longer tolerate. After his rage had spent itself I told him that our agreement of 26 June ruled that the policy concerning Austria was to be conducted on evolutionary lines. The Agreement of 11 July emphasized that. “If you wish to pursue a different policy, then dismiss me,” I said.
As a result of this very serious conversation he said, “No, no. Go back and settle everything; we do not want to change our peaceful policy.” I returned to Vienna, and the incident was settled satisfactorily with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs within 24 hours.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you talk to representatives of other powers regarding the policy which you pursued in Austria?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I repeatedly discussed this policy with representatives of other powers. For instance, in the summer of 1937 I discussed it with the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this letter which the witness speaks of been produced, or a copy of it? He has spoken of a letter to Hitler: “I wrote a letter.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, we have not got that letter, neither have we a copy of it. The files of the witness were destroyed in Berlin by air attacks.
VON PAPEN: May I add, Mr. President, that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has confirmed the incident in Court and the course it took. Herr Von Neurath also knows this incident very well indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs who confirmed it?
VON PAPEN: The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, who was here as a witness; the witness Guido Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
VON PAPEN: With reference to that question, may I remark that I, of course, very often spoke to representatives of other powers about our Austrian policy. For instance, in June 1938 I discussed it with Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin. In October 1937 I visited Paris, incognito, and there talked to many of the leading politicians about this problem, among them the President of France, M. Daladier, and M. Léon Blum. I assured these gentlemen that we would seek a solution of the Austrian problem exclusively on an evolutionary basis and that the hoped-for union of the two States would never prove a threat to the interests of France, that on the contrary we were only looking for that solution within the European framework, that is, with the consent of France.
At that time, I was under the impression that in England as well as in France it was being increasingly understood that a general settlement was necessary.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof that the defendant could actually have been convinced that the other powers—by virtue of an evolutionary development in Austria—might eventually be prepared to come to a peaceable agreement, I submitted Document Number 74, Page 169. It is a report from Von Papen to Hitler on the conversation just outlined with Sir Nevile Henderson on 1 June 1937.
I draw your attention to this document and should like to point out that Henderson has stated that he was well disposed toward an amicable solution of the Austrian problem and trusted that he too could exercise a corresponding influence in Paris.
I further draw your attention to Document Number 80, Page 177. It is a statement of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Spaak, after the Anschluss. I invite your attention to the last sentence: “I have believed, for a long time past, that the Anschluss complied with the logic of facts and had it been ratified in a normal manner, I should not have been surprised.”
Mr. Messersmith alleged that Nazi propaganda in Austria had been paid for out of German funds. Did you ever give or arrange for any funds for that purpose?
VON PAPEN: The Party never received a penny, either from me personally or through the German Embassy. It is, however, quite possible—and even probable—that German Party funds did pour into Austria. I was never informed of this, for it was a well-known fact that I did not enjoy the confidence of the Party in either country.
There is, however, one exception which I particularly wish to emphasize, namely, the donation—and it was known to me—of funds in support of the “Langot” subsidy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Prosecution has reproached you for your anti-Semitic attitude in connection with your report to Hitler of 12 May, in which you suggested giving financial aid to the Freedom League for the furtherance of their fight against Jewry. What was this Freedom League?
VON PAPEN: The Freedom League was a focal point, a union of the former Christian Trade Unions and the Christian Workers’ Union, under the leadership of the president of the Trade Unions. Dollfuss took over the leadership in 1934. It would be utterly ridiculous to accuse this Freedom League, mainly composed of Catholic workers, of an anti-Semitic attitude in the National-Socialist sense.
The Freedom League fought to purge the administration of Vienna of unsuitable Jewish elements. The problem of this undue alien penetration was absolutely similar to conditions then existing in Germany, conditions which I mentioned yesterday in detail. This fact is also proved by the report submitted yesterday to the Prosecution. I learned that the Czechs were endeavoring to establish close relations with the Freedom League and that for this purpose they desired to support the League with large sums of money.
I thereupon suggested to Hitler that this possible influencing of the Freedom League by Czech politics should be eliminated by supporting it ourselves. But we could not of course tell the Freedom League: “We are now going to subsidize you so that you do not go over to the Czechs.” So I proposed to Hitler that he should give these moneys in consideration of the League’s continued fight against Jewry, which was pure camouflage. Had I wanted to give this money specifically for the fight against Jewry, I would not have written “in consideration of” but “for the furtherance of its fight.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 32, Page 112 of the document book. It is an excerpt from the Austrian Yearbook of 1933-1934, which is an official publication. I draw your attention to the beginning of the second paragraph, where it is explained that the Freedom League originated in the Christian Workers’ Unions and the Christian Trade Unions.
I further draw your attention to the fifth line from the bottom, and I quote, “At the beginning of 1934 the late Federal Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, took over the supreme leadership of the Freedom League.”
I also draw your attention to Document Number 72, Page 166. It is a report of Von Papen to Hitler in which he quotes a report from the Prague Secret Service. Of interest, in this connection, is a reference to the fact that the Freedom League was striving for an understanding with Social Democracy.
The next document, Number 70, has already been presented as GB-243. I draw your attention to the first paragraph which reflects the efforts of the Czech diplomats. Document Number 70, Page 164. This is the document mentioned by the Prosecution, part of which has been submitted under GB-243. The first paragraph is important in that it deals with the activities of Czech diplomacy, mentioned a short time ago by the defendant. Furthermore, there is, with reference to this Freedom League, Von Papen’s report, Document Number 73, Page 176, to which I wish to invite your attention.
Another report of Von Papen’s is interesting, Document Number 69, Page 163. It shows the efforts of the Freedom League to gain a foothold in the political constellation of that day.
Witness, in the summer of 1937 Schuschnigg was making efforts to persuade the National Opposition to collaborate. What do you know about it and what were the subsequent developments?
VON PAPEN: In the summer of 1937 Schuschnigg was making efforts to keep his promise to induce the National Opposition to collaborate. The visit of Minister Glaise-Horstenau to Hitler in June 1938 took place with Schuschnigg’s consent.[[1]] This choice of members was effected without any participation on my part. But with regard to this “Committee of Seven” I should like to make a statement. Obviously the Chancellor’s attempts for appeasement were either not sufficiently far-reaching for the Party in Austria, or they were too slow. In November 1937 the Austrian police discovered in the office of this “Committee of Seven” documents known as the “Tafs Papers” which led us to believe that new, illegal, and radical purposes were already prevailing. The Austrian Government did not inform me of these papers, and no official démarche took place. But I did learn that amidst the documentation was a plan for my assassination. It was suggested that an attempt be made on my life which would provide a pretext for marching into Austria.
[1] Later he founded the so-called “Committee of Seven” with Dr. Jury and Dr. Tafs.
The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmidt, confirmed this fact the day before yesterday before the Tribunal, and it appears to me that this suggestion, this plan against me, best proves exactly how great was the harmony between my policy and that of the Austrian or German National Socialists, which the Prosecution insists on taking for granted.
At that time I was very pleased that the Austrian Chancellor had also included Dr. Seyss-Inquart, whom I knew personally, in this work of appeasement. At this point I consider it only fair to make a correction. The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has reported a conversation which he had with me at Ankara, in October 1943. I told him at the time—and I also repeated my statement during my preliminary interrogation—that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had proved to be the greatest disappointment of my life. I had assumed that it was he who had called for the entry of the German troops into Austria and who was responsible for the Nazification of Austria after the Anschluss. In the light of the knowledge we have gained from various documents, I must correct my previous verdict.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: At the end of 1936 your foremost collaborator, Counsellor of Embassy Prince Erbach, was recalled from Vienna. His successor was Counsellor of Embassy Von Stein. Since he took over your duties after you had been recalled on 4 February 1938, it would be interesting to know what his attitude was toward both the Party and you.
VON PAPEN: Later I learned that Counsellor of Embassy Baron von Stein was appointed my Embassy Counsellor by special request of the Party because he was to have control over my policy as regards the Party. Herr Von Stein was an ardent National Socialist. His relations with me were entirely different from those I had with his predecessor, Prince Erbach. But I want to state that also during that period I continued to pursue my original line of policy and that Von Stein merely had the management of technical matters.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Hossbach Document of 5 November 1937 has been frequently mentioned—did you know of this conference at Berchtesgaden that this report was based on?
VON PAPEN: Of this sensational conference, of this truly important document in the hands of the Prosecution, I, of course, never even had an inkling. I first became acquainted with the document here in this courtroom. But if I may be permitted to say something more: The concatenation of ideas between the events of 11 March and this document appears to be rather tenuous. This document indicates that Hitler only intended to march into Austria by force, only intended to carry out the Anschluss by force, if a certain European constellation would make this possible. He expected this constellation to appear between 1943 and 1945.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this is mere argument, isn’t it? He says he never saw the document until he came into this Court. He is now arguing to us about his connection with the events of March 1938. Well, that is a matter for you, not for the defendant.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well, then I shall deal with that later.
Witness, on 4 February 1938 you were, much to your surprise, dismissed from your post in Vienna. Please inform the Tribunal on the matter.
VON PAPEN: At the end of January 1938 I had been to Berlin to see Hitler; I talked to him about the conversation which I had had with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch, and I received no indication of any kind that he intended to dismiss me from his service. I was notified to this effect by a telephone call from Dr. Lammers on 4 February. This sudden dismissal, for which I was given no reasons, coinciding with the dismissals of Von Fritsch and Blomberg and of other leading diplomats, led however to one final conclusion. I was quite aware of the fact that this recall meant a change, at the very least, of the political direction. The following day I discussed the situation with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and told him of my troubles. Subsequently I took leave of the Austrian Government in an official note, and on the following day I went to see Hitler. I must, however, introduce the following: I considered this development, through the very fact of my recall, so serious that I decided on the evening of the 4th that all my political reports, compiled during those 4 years, were to be removed to Switzerland. I wanted to be in a position to prove to the whole world that I had pursued a peaceful and evolutionary policy in Austria during those 4 years; I wanted to be in a position to prove this to the outside world in case Hitler should commit an act of aggression. This decision, particularly on the part of a high-ranking official, was certainly not an easy one to reach, because I would have to suffer all the consequences which this forbidden action might entail.
On the following day, I went to Hitler. I felt the urge to tell him that even if he no longer wanted me, he should at least send another reasonable and moderate man to Austria. During the discussion I had with him he did not mention the reasons for my dismissal. I had suspected that this was due to a wish of Herr Von Ribbentrop, who had become Minister for Foreign Affairs on this 4 February; but Hitler told me that this was not the case. During the discussion on the Austrian situation I told Hitler, inter alia, that I very much regretted that he had recalled me because, particularly during recent weeks, Chancellor Schuschnigg had declared himself willing to have a personal discussion with Hitler in order to eliminate all differences between the two States. When Hitler heard this, he told me, “If that is the case, then I should be very glad if you would go back to arrange for this discussion with Herr Schuschnigg.” I told him, “That is rather a peculiar task. Yesterday you recalled me, and today you want me to go back. But if there is something I can do in the interest of the Austrian problem—if I can bring about such a discussion, I am only too willing to do it.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: How did you prepare that conference?
VON PAPEN: On my return, I went to see Herr Schuschnigg, and with him too, I discussed the change in the situation created by my recall and the appointment of the new German Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told Herr Schuschnigg, “It appears to me that in this situation a discussion between the two heads of State regarding the differences which have arisen from the interpretation of the July Agreement could be nothing but helpful.” The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has, as a matter of fact, confirmed that we had discussed those personal meetings as far back as November 1937. The proposal was that there should be in Berchtesgaden discussions about all the differences. No definite program was drafted. It was arranged that these conferences should take place on the basis of the July Agreement, that is to say, on the basis of the maintenance of Austria’s sovereignty. The only essential problem discussed was the inclusion of a minister in the Austrian Cabinet who would act as the homme de confiance of both States and whose task would be to keep the peace between the Austrian and German National Socialist Parties, in other words, to eliminate in future all interference by the German Party in Austrian affairs.
Later on, during the Berchtesgaden conference, it was demanded that the Ministry for Security should be handed to Dr. Seyss-Inquart. This demand was entirely unknown to me, nor had I discussed it with Schuschnigg. It was merely mentioned that a suitable man, perhaps Seyss-Inquart, should be given the Ministry of the Interior. Today we know from the testimony of witnesses that, in addition to this official conference of mine, there were Austrian Party channels through which proposals were sent to Hitler, proposals that were unknown to me.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please give us an idea of the course of the discussion at Berchtesgaden.
VON PAPEN: This conference has been repeatedly described here. I accompanied Herr Schuschnigg and Herr Schmidt there personally; and it is quite possible that when I received them at the Austrian or the German frontier, I told them that, in addition to Hitler, they might find one or several generals up there, because quite possibly I had telephoned to Berchtesgaden in the morning and learned that these generals were present.
The course of the conference differed, of course, very much from that of customary conferences of diplomatic life; but it was not quite so dramatic as has been described here by various sources. To my knowledge, these generals, called in by Hitler on the previous evening and unknown to me, were merely effective by their presence and were only meant to have that effect. As far as I know and within the framework of my own participation, they were not called in to join the political conferences.
The tone in which Hitler negotiated, the accusations which he hurled against Schuschnigg, were to my mind most unpleasant; and for that reason I repeatedly intervened as a mediator. I remember very well an incident which occurred when Hitler and Schuschnigg were negotiating together and the discussion became extraordinarily loud. I entered the conference room to find that Hitler was accusing Herr Schuschnigg of being no German, of lacking in national feeling, so that I intervened and told Herr Hitler, “You are completely misjudging Herr Schuschnigg. Herr Schuschnigg’s way of thinking is as German as yours and mine, only he does not want a union of our two countries under the state doctrine which you are now representing in Germany.” During this conference, a program was submitted to Herr Schuschnigg and Herr Schmidt, which was unknown to me personally, as I already said. After negotiating, a number of points were removed from this program, for instance, the commanding of the Austrian Army by General Von Glaise, and all economic demands; and therefore, toward evening, when the conference was coming to an end, I told Herr Schuschnigg that he had better accept the remainder so that further peaceful development should not be prejudiced. Apart from this, Herr Schuschnigg only made the express reservation in connection with this program or this agreement that the stipulations would have to be confirmed by the Austrian Government and the Austrian President. Therefore the possibility for later correction on the part of Austria certainly was provided.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In one point your relation has not been quite clear. Did you arrive at Berchtesgaden only when Schuschnigg and Dr. Schmidt did? Were you already in Berchtesgaden, or had you spent the night elsewhere?
VON PAPEN: I traveled from Vienna to Salzburg with Herr Schuschnigg, spent the night there with him, and went on with him the next morning to Berchtesgaden. In other words, I was not in Berchtesgaden before him. However, Herr Schuschnigg has alleged that the morning before our visit I told him that generals were up there. I cannot remember that; but it is possible, because it may be that I put a telephone call through from Salzburg in the morning and was told of it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is one more point to be supplemented. Schuschnigg said that you met him at the border. Perhaps you can clear up that point, too.
VON PAPEN: Well, Herr Schuschnigg and I had spent the night together in Salzburg, as I have said. The next morning I went ahead as far as the border, and waited for him at the German border.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the Berchtesgaden agreement differ basically from the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
VON PAPEN: The result of the Berchtesgaden arrangements was certainly an enlargement compared with the Agreement of July. But there was no departing from the basis of the July Agreement—from its principles, that is, the maintenance of Austrian sovereignty. This is evident also from the two communiqués by the Governments which were issued on the occasion of the acceptance of the agreement.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to the official communiqué, Document Number 78, Page 174; and also to Document Number 79, Page 175, Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 20 February, with reference to this question.
On 26 February you paid an official farewell visit to Schuschnigg. The Prosecution have presented a file memorandum in this connection. Please tell us about this farewell visit.
VON PAPEN: This note from the files obviously contains the information I gave Herr Von Ribbentrop over the telephone regarding my farewell visit. In this note I drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this note?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The file note is dated 26 February and was submitted by the Prosecution.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Book 11a, Page 1.
VON PAPEN: In this memorandum I mention the pressure brought to bear on Schuschnigg and under which he acted. The fact that I informed the Foreign Office should really indicate that I personally disapproved of this pressure; otherwise I would not have made a report on it. On 26 February my temporary activities, then, were also fully at an end.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On 9 March 1938 Schuschnigg proclaimed the plebiscite. Kindly comment on this.
VON PAPEN: The plebiscite announced by Herr Schuschnigg was, of course, a complete surprise. In my view it was contrary to the spirit of the arrangements agreed upon at Berchtesgaden and contrary to the tendency of a peaceful settlement of the tension.
The plebiscite was a violation of the Austrian Constitution, too. It was not a decision of the Austrian Government but was a spontaneous measure of the Austrian Chancellor, and in my opinion it was quite evident that those elements in Austria who were in favor of a union of the two States were most displeased with this plebiscite.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness Rainer has said in his testimony, and in the speech which was quoted, that on the evening of 9 March he was at your apartment. Was this a prearranged conference, a conference at all, or an exchange of views?
VON PAPEN: Not at all. I was absent from Vienna from the evening of the 26th, as far as I remember, until about 9 March. On that day I returned to Vienna, and it is naturally possible that these gentlemen came to my Embassy and talked to me there. There was no question of anything prearranged on my part.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you in Berlin on 11 March?
VON PAPEN: On the evening of 10 March a telephone call from the Reich Chancellery reached me at the Embassy with the order from Hitler to go to Berlin immediately that very night. I flew to Berlin the following morning and approximately between 9 and 10 in the morning I arrived at the Reich Chancellery. Why Hitler sent for me I do not know; I assumed that as this crisis developed he might want my advice; perhaps, too, he may have thought that my presence in Vienna would interfere with his plans. At any rate, on this fateful day, 11 March, I was in Berlin and at the Reich Chancellery. I met Hitler surrounded by numerous ministers, Herr Göring, Dr. Goebbels, Von Neurath, state secretaries, and also military people. He greeted me with the words: “The situation in Austria has become intolerable; Herr Schuschnigg is betraying the German idea and we cannot admit this forced plebiscite.”
And when I saw how aroused he was, I reminded him again of his promise to me at Bayreuth and warned him urgently against over-hasty decisions. But on this morning he told me, “Either the plebiscite must be canceled or the Government must resign.”
Today we know from the letter, which he sent to Dr. Seyss by special courier, of this ultimatum to the Austrian Government. At that time he did not inform me of this active intervention on his part. Then during the day I, along with most of the persons present, remained in the large hall while Göring telephoned from Hitler’s private office. What was telephoned is something we, who were waiting in the large hall, could only gather fragmentarily; but of course today we know it from the documents here.
There is only one incident which I want to mention. Toward 5 o’clock in the afternoon, the report came from Vienna that Schuschnigg’s Government was prepared to resign. Thereupon I pressed Hitler to cancel his military orders. Herr Hitler did that. Between 5 and 6 o’clock in the afternoon the order to the military forces standing by was withdrawn. On that occasion I congratulated General Keitel and General Von Brauchitsch, who were present, on our being spared this issue. But 1 hour later the situation was once more entirely different. When a telephone call came through from Vienna stating that the Federal President refused to nominate a Seyss-Inquart Government, Hitler again issued the orders to the troops. Following that, late in the evening, it was learned that the Austrian Government had requested the entry of German troops, since otherwise they could not control the situation. I can still see Herr Von Neurath standing next to me telling me, “This is such an important report from Vienna that we absolutely have to have it in writing.”
Thus we were under the impression that this call for assistance came to us from Vienna. The further events of the evening are known, and I can only say that I personally was deeply shaken by this turn of events because it was perfectly clear that marching in with the Army could lead to incidents and to bloodshed, and new bloodshed between our two nations would not only have badly compromised the German problem again, but would also leave the worst possible impression of the conduct of German policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I draw your attention here to Document Number 97, Page 241, of the third document book. I beg your pardon, it is not yet contained in the book, it is just being presented—Document 97, Page 241. It is an affidavit by Thass, a friend of the witness Papen, who talked to him on the evening of 11 March. I quote approximately from the middle of the document:
“On 11 March 1938, the beginning of the march of German troops into Austria, Herr Von Papen appeared at the Union Club late in the evening where he very excitedly and despairingly declared:
“ ‘I have just come from the Reich Chancellery. I tried to talk Hitler out of marching into Austria and strongly advised against it, but he has carried through with the madness and has just given the order to march into Austria.’ ”
Did you, Witness, know anything about the military plan “Case Otto”?
VON PAPEN: I have heard about this Case Otto for the first time during this Trial. The Case Otto was, it was stated, a theoretical preparation for a military attack in the event that, as a consequence of the restoration of the Hapsburgs, the Czechs and Hungarians should march into Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: This is exactly what the defendant was doing just now when I interrupted you. He said he did not know anything about the document and he is now trying to explain it. This is argument, not evidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, quite, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] Let us pass on to the next question. A little while ago you mentioned that you had decided that the files which were documentary proof for your activity in Vienna should be taken to Switzerland. Was this actually carried out later on?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that was done. My secretary, Herr Von Ketteler, took the files to Switzerland at the beginning of March 1938.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Describe briefly the circumstances of the assassination of your assistant, Baron von Ketteler, after the entry of German troops into Austria. In particular, what did you do to have that case cleared up?
VON PAPEN: During the days of the march into Vienna my secretary and friend, Herr Von Ketteler, had suddenly disappeared. I informed the Viennese police at once, as well as Herr Himmler, Herr Heydrich, and Dr. Kaltenbrunner. They promised investigation. The investigation was for a long time without success. Originally I had assumed that Herr Von Ketteler had fled, since his relations with the Austrian Party had been very bad. But then a few weeks later it transpired that Von Ketteler’s body was found in the Danube below Vienna. I filed a charge of murder by an unknown person with the public prosecutor. I requested a post-mortem examination of the body. The post-mortem examination took place with the result that no signs of death by force were found.
Nevertheless, I am perfectly certain that this new act was an act of revenge by the Gestapo against me and my policies and my friends. I addressed myself to Göring, who was in command of the Gestapo, and asked for his assistance. Göring demanded the files from the Gestapo and told me that there was proof that Herr Von Ketteler had prepared an attempt on Hitler’s life. I stated that that was quite out of the question. But then it was ascertained by Göring, through the Gestapo, that I had taken my files to Switzerland and that Herr Von Ketteler had assisted in this. Herr Göring promised me to negotiate with Hitler and to demand the punishment of the Gestapo people who had taken part in this case. I believe that he did that, but this intervention met with no success.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: After your departure from Vienna you retired to private life. Did you have new offers for posts abroad?
VON PAPEN: I retired to private life, since my experiences after the 30th of June and later in Austria were not such as to make me desire a new post. I can only say that, during the period following, Herr Von Ribbentrop asked me twice to go to Ankara as Ambassador and that I refused it twice.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As a last question with reference to the Austrian complex, I want to ask whether Hitler awarded you the Golden Party Badge after the march into Vienna? Please make a statement on that.
VON PAPEN: That is correct. As we know, Hitler was accustomed to make sudden dismissals; and he had dismissed me abruptly on 4 February and solved the Austrian question without me. For public consumption he used to camouflage such acts with cordial letters and decorations. Perhaps I should have turned down this Golden Party Badge at that time, because I was no longer in any official position and there was no reason for my accepting it. However my position in those days was so difficult that I did not want to make it any worse. My assistant Ketteler had disappeared, and I had to expect that I might be involved in a State trial because I had removed my files to Switzerland. Thus I accepted the badge. But I deny that doing this established my Party membership. I believe that no one who knows me—even among the gentlemen sitting in this dock with me—will maintain that I was ever in my life a National Socialist.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I now come to the discussion of a relatively brief period, that is, your time in Turkey. May I start on that now?
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into the affairs after the Anschluss in March 1938, in view of what the Prosecution has stated? I mean, does it throw any light upon the past? As I understand it...
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I have finished then with the entire Austrian complex. I now have to deal only with a brief subject, the defendant’s activities during his time as Ambassador to Ankara. I am only asking whether this would be a suitable moment to begin with this, or whether the Court wishes to recess. I shall have completely finished in about an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: We will in a moment, but what I was asking you was why is it necessary to go into the history of the defendant in Ankara in view of what the Prosecution have said with reference to their charges against the defendant? As I understand it, the Prosecution have said that they make no charges against the defendant in connection with his work at Ankara. Unless the history of that time throws light upon the past, upon the time up to March 1938, it does not appear to be relevant to this Trial.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In discussing his activities in Turkey, I shall confine myself to a few points, for the sole purpose, as the Tribunal have observed, of throwing light on the previous activities of the Defendant Von Papen. The evidence will, therefore, refer to the fact that through his activities the defendant made it quite clear that he was a definite opponent of the war in every phase, and that in every phase of the war he merely tried to achieve peace. This material from the period in Turkey is, therefore, to furnish the counterevidence against the charge that previously the defendant had been in any way an active participant in the war policy. We must also get a complete picture of a man who is under the indictment of conspiracy. If he was in an official position directly before the outbreak of the war and during the war, then certainly we must investigate whether his attitude during that time does not supply precise counterevidence against his having been previously in any way in agreement with the plans which, it is true, were first executed during his early days in office. The questions are brief, and we shall...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Under what circumstances were you appointed Ambassador to Ankara in April 1939? Why did you accept this post?
VON PAPEN: I accepted the post, after I had refused it twice, under quite extraordinary circumstances. On the day of Italy’s occupation of Albania, Herr Von Ribbentrop called me up and urgently asked me to come to Berlin. There he explained to me that the post in Ankara, which had been vacant for 6 months, would have to be filled immediately because of the complications which might arise in the southeast from the occupation of Albania. Before I accepted this post I carefully considered whether I could do and had to do anything more for the Hitler Government. After 15 March, the entry into Prague, we knew that we were sitting on a powder keg. In this European problem there were two possibilities of conflict; one was the Polish problem, where I could do nothing; the other was the southeast problem which had become acute through the occupation of Albania. I felt that I could do something here and could contribute to the maintenance of peace in Europe. For that reason I offered to go to Ankara at this moment.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: First you went to Ankara to obtain information; you obtained a picture of the situation there, and then in an oral and a written report you explained your opinion. Please comment on this.
VON PAPEN: In Ankara I immediately obtained a picture of the whole situation because I knew all the leading personalities there.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you aren’t proposing to take the defendant through all the intricacies of Turkish politics, are you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not my intention. The problem is dealt with in a report which the defendant made in Berlin not only to Hitler but also to other offices. The making of this report and its contents show a positive activity for the maintenance of peace. That is why I have gone into this affair briefly. And, Witness, I ask you to outline...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this report is also in the files of the Foreign Office to which I do not have access.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you had better deal with the subject, but deal with it shortly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, please continue.
VON PAPEN: I will be very brief, My Lord. I came back from Turkey, and told Hitler in a report what had to be done in order to maintain European peace. I sent this memorandum also to Keitel and Brauchitsch. I stated in this report that it was necessary, in order to keep the situation in the southeast under control, for Italy immediately to give positive promises indicating that her military forces would be withdrawn from Albania and her relations with Turkey would be adjusted, in order to remove there any doubt in the sincerity of Italian policy. A very heated discussion on this advice followed between Count Ciano and myself. Count Ciano was in Berlin on that day to sign the German-Italian Alliance. When I made my suggestions to him, he was most indignant at these demands and complained about me to Herr Von Ribbentrop. A very heated discussion then took place with Herr Von Ribbentrop who told me that he was in charge of German foreign policy and not I, and that it was after all not my task to make suggestions for keeping the peace. Then I offered my resignation to Herr Von Ribbentrop and told him it was useless under the circumstances to send me to Ankara; but Herr Von Ribbentrop withdrew his statement, and I returned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this report, did you warn in general against a war adventure and what reasons did you give for this warning?
VON PAPEN: The memorandum which I gave also to General Keitel and General Brauchitsch also contained a military presentation of the situation, in which I stated that to begin a war over the Polish Corridor would of necessity lead to a world war. If such a world war were to break out, Germany’s position would be hopeless, for there was no doubt that England would keep its promise to Poland and that England and France would come to Poland’s aid.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your reaction to the news about the outbreak of war on 1 September 1939?
VON PAPEN: When the news of the outbreak of the Polish war reached me in Ankara, I was profoundly shocked. I had, of course, hoped that Hitler would avoid this step which must plunge us into the greatest misfortune.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 14, Page 62, an affidavit of the lady who was for long years private secretary of the witness Von Papen. I will quote a brief passage from Page 64, the second paragraph from the end:
“I heard the radio announcement of the outbreak of war in the Embassy at Ankara with the Ambassador and the entire staff. Afterwards I walked in the Embassy park with the Ambassador. The Ambassador was extraordinarily excited and shaken. I had never seen him like this, not even after the darkest days of June 1934 and not even after the murder of his friend Ketteler.
“That is why I can recall exactly every word which the Ambassador said to me on that occasion: ‘Remember my words: To have provoked this war is the greatest crime and the greatest madness which Hitler and his people could have committed. Germany cannot win this war. All will be buried under the ruins.’ ”
Witness, what were your decisions for the future?
VON PAPEN: What could I do? I could either protest—then, in order not to be shot as a traitor in Germany, I would have to remain abroad. I could emigrate. I would never have done that, for I have always believed that one can work better in one’s own country than as an emigrant. I could resign; then I would return to Germany and become a soldier. The best thing, it seemed to me, was to remain where I was and where I could best help my fatherland.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now I come to discuss your various efforts toward peace. Please describe first your negotiations with the Dutch Minister, Dr. Visser.
VON PAPEN: Immediately after the Polish campaign I had negotiations with the Dutch Minister in Ankara, at that time Dr. Visser, who declared himself willing to have his Foreign Minister mediate in London. The condition for a peace would, of course, have been the restoration of Poland with a corresponding adjustment of the Corridor problem, the problem of the German sections.
I reported this possibility for peace negotiations to Herr Von Ribbentrop, but it seemed to me that it was not followed up in Berlin; and therefore in November 1939 I went to Berlin myself. Herr Von Ribbentrop told me, “The Führer does not want to hear anything of peace negotiations; please do not undertake any further steps.”
Nevertheless I went to Hitler, reported the Dutch offer to him, and expressed the wish of the Dutch Minister, Dr. Visser, to come to Berlin personally. Unfortunately Hitler rejected all my arguments.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I wish to point out that with the approval of the Court an interrogatory on this subject was sent to Minister Dr. Visser, but the interrogatory has not yet been received.
Did you make further suggestions as to ending the war in 1939? I am thinking in this connection of a report on the restoration of legal life in Germany.
VON PAPEN: Yes. In December of 1939 I sent a detailed report for Hitler to Herr Von Ribbentrop, and in this report I said that the first condition for any conclusion of peace and for any readiness abroad to conclude a peace would be the renunciation of the present government methods in Germany; that is, a return to constitutional conditions in Germany. Then I told Hitler, “If you do this, you will have more credit abroad; and it might be possible to prepare the way for peace negotiations.”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the instruction which you received from Berlin in regard to peace efforts, and what did you do nevertheless?
VON PAPEN: The Reich Foreign Minister repeatedly issued strict orders to the chiefs of missions under no circumstances to extend any peace feelers. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, such attempts would be a sign of weakness.
I did not observe this ruling because I was determined on my own initiative to do everything to shorten the war. For that reason, in the spring of 1941 before the Balkan crisis, I addressed myself to His Majesty the King of Sweden with the request to begin a peace mediation. I also asked the President of Turkey, Ismet Inönü, to consider the possibilities of mediating. President Inönü agreed to do so, while His Majesty the King of Sweden refused, saying that the situation did not seem to him suited to such efforts. The Turkish President asked only that he be officially requested to mediate. That, of course, was not done.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you think about the events of 10 May 1940, the entry of German troops into Holland and Belgium; and what statement, did you make in this connection?
VON PAPEN: On 10 May 1940 I visualized the impression which had dominated the whole first World War, the question of why Germany had violated Belgian neutrality. It was completely incomprehensible to me that this psychological error should be repeated a second time and I expressed this opinion of mine in a letter which I sent to the Dutch Minister, Dr. Visser, on 10 May.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do in order to check the spread of the war to the Balkans?
VON PAPEN: When the Yugoslav crisis broke out and our troops marched through Bulgaria, I had Hitler send a personal letter to the Turkish President. In this letter he assured the Turkish President that under no circumstances did he intend to fight Turkey, and for that reason he had ordered German troops to keep at 40 kilometers distance from the Turkish border.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In June 1941 you concluded a treaty of friendship with. Turkey. Will you state briefly the reasons for that?
VON PAPEN: The reasons were very simple: To limit the war. Turkey was to know that in spite of our alliance with Italy, in spite of the war in the Balkans, in spite of the war with Greece, we would never threaten Turkey. Turkey was also to know that we would not attempt to advance through Turkey to the Suez Canal. The negotiations were very long and difficult, because Herr Von Ribbentrop did not want in this treaty any mention of Turkey’s contractual obligations to the Allies. I then pointed out to Herr Von Ribbentrop by cable that the Turks were faithful to their treaties.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know of Hitler’s intentions against Russia? What did you think about this war?
VON PAPEN: The beginning of the war with Russia was, of course, a complete surprise to us. We had heard of the massing of troops on both sides, but of course I assumed and hoped that Hitler would keep his pact with Russia and that he would not begin this war. I considered the beginning of the war against Russia a crime, from the point of view of German as well as European interests.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, after you returned from a visit to Germany in the fall of 1943, continue your efforts toward peace?
VON PAPEN: In the fall of 1943, after Stalingrad, it had become clear that no peace could be established with the Hitler Government. Regarding this, there was much discussion between me and my friends, including my military friends. In the fall of 1943 I was initiated into the so-called Beck Plan, which has been mentioned here by the witness Gisevius. At that time this plan did not intend to eliminate Hitler through an attack on his life, but the intention was to have his headquarters surrounded by troops and then to put Hitler on trial. The reasons for this were obvious. Even if many generals were of the opinion that this war had to be stopped, they were afraid of taking action against Hitler because they were of the opinion that Hitler still enjoyed very great prestige. Moreover, there was the further difficulty that if Hitler were removed, no one knew what the Allies would do with us.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this should be taken more shortly, Dr. Kubuschok.
VON PAPEN: As a result of all these considerations, I attempted to learn what the Allies would do with Germany in such a case; and for this purpose I turned to the American Minister, at that time Mr. Earle, who reported on the matter in the press, too.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 93, Page 214. This is the interrogatory of Freiherr von Lersner, whom I wanted to call as a witness but who could not come here because of transportation difficulties. On Page 214, the answer to Question 7 is:
“My activities for the mediation of peace negotiations were always based on my own initiative and extended to the attempt to mediate general world peace between all belligerent states. Prior to all peace measures, I engaged in detailed discussions with Ambassador Von Papen and was always warmly supported by him to the utmost, although every peace measure was forbidden him and was at least as perilous for him as for me.
“He also made me acquainted with a number of foreigners, above all with the Apostolic Delegate to Istanbul, Archbishop Roncalli.
“When in 1942 I resolved to go to the Vatican, not only did Ambassador Von Papen urgently advise me to make the trip; but he also personally procured for me all the necessary papers and passports for Rome, where in spite of the express prohibition of the Reich Government I suggested to Cardinal Maglione and the diplomatic director of the Curia, Bishop Montini, a world peace drive by Pope Pius XII with all belligerent powers.
“When in April 1944 I had the opportunity to establish contact with Mr. George Earle, the former American Minister to Vienna and Sofia, the friend of President Roosevelt, with whom I had long been personally acquainted, Papen again helped me in every way. He even took it upon himself....”
THE PRESIDENT: These are details. Is it not sufficient to say that the defendant said that he endeavored in every way to make peace? Then you can refer, if you like, to any interrogatories or affidavits which confirm what the defendant says.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I will dispense with any further reading of this answer to Question Number 7, and I refer then to Document 94, Page 217, a letter of the witness Lersner to Mr. Kirkpatrick. He makes reference in the letter to the fact that as early as 1939 the Defendant Von Papen intended to bring Lersner to Turkey, so that on the basis of his international connections he could work for peace. He describes the difficulties in connection with this plan, which, however, was carried out by Papen. The letter also mentions further peace efforts with Admiral Von Horthy and with King Boris of Bulgaria. I should like briefly to give documentary corroboration to the questions raised by the witness Gisevius. I wish to present evidence that Von Papen was by no means unfavorably received in the circle of the conspirators of 20 July, but that on the contrary he was scheduled for the office of Foreign Minister. I refer to the affidavit of Count Bismarck, Document Number 90, Page 201. Count Bismarck, in the course of the events following 20 July, was sent to a concentration camp. This indicates the character of the witness. In Document Number 90 Bismarck points out that in case of a change of government Papen would have placed himself at their disposal. There was an agreement to send communications through Herr Von Trott, who worked in the Foreign Office. Trott was condemned to death following the events of 20 July.
Finally I refer to Document Number 89, Page 199, a letter from Pfeil to the son of the witness Papen. Pfeil points out that Colonel Count von Stauffenberg, the would-be murderer of 20 July, had proposed to the defendant that he serve as Foreign Minister later. The Court has already admitted this letter.
Witness, what was your position as regards the Party during your period in Turkey?
VON PAPEN: My position as regards the Party was exceptionally bad. For years I waged a battle with the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in Turkey. This man told my Embassy officials, “Herr Von Papen belongs in a concentration camp, or he must be shot.” I had to struggle a long time to have this man removed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do during this time regarding Church matters?
VON PAPEN: During the war I did everything in my power to counteract an intensification of the fight against the Church. That means that I took all such institutions in Turkey under my personal protection.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer here to Document Number 53, Page 141, and Document Number 51, Page 138.
What did you do with respect to the Jewish problem during your period in Turkey?
VON PAPEN: I opposed all measures of the German Government against German Jews. A long Party trial took place because German members of my Embassy had consulted a Jewish doctor. I defended these officials of mine against this charge, and I refused to take away the passports of the German Jews in Turkey and to deprive them of their citizenship.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 227, the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. In Questions 4, 5, and 6 he discusses this problem. In the answer to Question 6, the last paragraph is very noteworthy, and as the witness Von Papen has not yet mentioned it I should like to quote it. Page 229, the last paragraph of the answer to Question 6:
“I remember particularly clearly an incident in the spring of 1944, when I called upon Herr Von Papen at the request of Mr. Barlas, the Refugee Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, in order to request his assistance in saving 10,000 Jews in France from deportation to Poland for extermination. These Jews had formerly held Turkish nationality but they had later given it up. Herr Von Papen complied with my wish and through his intervention the lives of these Jews were saved, as I learned later from Mr. Barlas himself.”
I continue to quote:
“Details of this incident, on which Mr. Steinhardt, then United States Ambassador in Ankara, and Numan Menemencioglu, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, were also informed, can be obtained by questioning Mr. Barlas.”
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to point out to you again, Dr. Kubuschok, that you have taken very much longer than you said you were going to take.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a very short time, in a few minutes, I will be through.
I ask the last question of the witness: When, on 2 August 1944 Turkey broke off relations with Germany, you returned to Germany, why did you not remain in Turkey and separate finally from Germany?
VON PAPEN: I can state that on the day of the severance of relations between Turkey and Germany the British Prime Minister Mr. Churchill said the following in the House of Commons: “The breaking-off of relations between Turkey and Germany will have many consequences, including consequences for Herr Von Papen. On 30 June he escaped the blood bath. This time he will not succeed.”
As a result, I received requests from the Allies to remain in Turkey. I refused to do so. I said, “I shall return to Germany where I belong. I will not emigrate, for perhaps I might still do something for my fatherland.” Thus I returned to Germany. When I arrived there I observed that as a result of the terror methods which had been launched after 20 July there was no possibility at all of doing anything. For the rest of the time a Gestapo guard was placed before my door.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 226, which has already been mentioned, the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. I refer to the answer to Question 3 and I should like very briefly to read the last half of this answer in connection with the problem just mentioned by the witness:
“The last conversation on this subject took place on 2 August 1944, on the day before his final departure from Ankara after the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between Germany and Turkey.
“To my advice not to leave Turkey, but to address an appeal from here to the German people and the German Army to overthrow Hitler and discontinue the senseless war immediately, Von Papen answered in substance as follows:
“ ‘I have learned from history that dictatorships cannot be done away with from a foreign country; one must be in the country itself in order to fight the regime effectively. Therefore, I have determined to return to Germany and to conduct the fight against the Hitler regime there and thus hasten the end of the war.’ ”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have finished questioning the witness Von Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of Defense Counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Papen, I should like to ask you a few questions, with the permission of the Court.
How long have you known Herr Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: Since 1932.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Is it true that it was the express wish of the then Reich President Von Hindenburg that Herr Von Neurath was to be taken into the Government which you formed in 1932, as Reich Foreign Minister?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is entirely true.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you aware, or did you know from previous activities of Herr Von Neurath in his various positions as Ambassador but especially in his last post in London, that Herr Von Neurath was a faithful follower and an impassioned champion of a policy of peace?
VON PAPEN: That was known to me and to everyone in Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And you yourself approved of this also?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little too fast. Go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself also approve of this peace policy?
VON PAPEN: Of course I approved of this policy. Otherwise we would not have found ourselves side by side in this Cabinet engaged in common work.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, a few months later, take any part in the negotiations leading to the transfer of the Reich Chancellorship to Hitler?
VON PAPEN: In no way.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know that Reich President Von Hindenburg made the express condition that Herr Von Neurath was to remain as Reich Foreign Minister also in the new Hitler Government?
VON PAPEN: I have already mentioned here that this was an express condition of Hindenburg’s.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was Hitler’s attitude to that in principle? Did he accept it only in order to be able to form the Government at all, or did he approve of Hindenburg’s choice?
VON PAPEN: I believe that Hitler approved completely of the choice of Neurath as Foreign Minister.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself ever talk to Hitler about this?
VON PAPEN: Yes, frequently. And I learned from Hitler that he thought highly of Herr Von Neurath’s personality and capacity.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And did you ever talk to Herr Von Neurath himself about it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he make the decision to form this Cabinet readily?
VON PAPEN: I imagine that Herr Von Neurath also had the same inner reservations I had at that time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, according to your knowledge, as far as you could learn from statements of Hitler’s, what were Hitler’s foreign political aims and efforts at that time?
VON PAPEN: Hitler’s foreign political aims at that time were quite limited: Abolition of discrimination by peaceful means and by strengthening Germany’s position in the world.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Until the end of 1937, did you ever hear any statements from Hitler indicating that he might be determined to use armed force if his peaceful efforts did not have the desired result?
VON PAPEN: I never heard from Hitler of any such intentions.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then it is always asserted that in leading Party circles he expressed such sanguinary intentions?
VON PAPEN: I never heard that in the Party, even among the most radical National Socialists, anyone ever spoke of the idea of a war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then to sum up, you agreed fully with the aims of a peaceful policy that were intended and advocated by Herr Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now the charge is made against Herr Von Neurath of having co-operated in the rearmament of Germany. What was Hitler’s reason and motive for this rearmament, which it may be supposed started before the actual taking over of the military sovereignty?
VON PAPEN: I stated yesterday that the actual rearmament began only after I had resigned from the Cabinet. But as far as I am informed, all of my former colleagues held the view that a rearmament was only to serve the purpose of giving Germany a defensive protection for her borders.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to the problem of Austria. Do you know the attitude of Herr Von Neurath concerning the Austria problem?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath’s attitude concerning the Austria problem was the same as mine. Like myself, he constantly protested in the Cabinet against the terror measures staged by the Party in 1933 and 1934.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you yourself, when Hitler sent you on an extraordinary mission to Vienna, under Herr Von Neurath? And did you receive your instructions from him or only from Hitler?
VON PAPEN: I was not subordinate to Herr Von Neurath but had asked that I might be directly subordinate to Hitler. But, of course, I reported all steps which I took to Herr Von Neurath and the Foreign Office, as is proved by the documents submitted here.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the negotiations in the summer of 1936 which led to the Agreement of 11 July between Germany and Austria?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath had exactly the same opinion as I had, that this agreement was to serve and had to serve the cause, once and for all, of peace between these two peoples of the same race.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he influence Hitler in this direction, too?
VON PAPEN: I do not know, but I certainly assume he did.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that he was honest and sincere in this agreement? What is your opinion? I point out here that the Prosecution asserts and makes it a charge against Herr Von Neurath that this agreement was concluded with a treacherous intention.
VON PAPEN: I spoke in detail on that point yesterday, and protested against the Prosecution’s charging us with treacherous intentions. Herr Von Neurath had such intentions just as little as I did.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I have two more brief questions.
Do you know what attitude Herr Von Neurath took as to Germany’s leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I know that very well. Herr Von Neurath was of the opinion that it was advisable to leave the Disarmament Conference. But, like me, he was of the opinion that it was a mistake to leave the League of Nations. With his approval, as I told the Court yesterday, I followed Hitler to Munich at that time in order to persuade him not to leave the League of Nations.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
DR. SEIDL: With the approval of the Court, substituting for my absent colleague, Dr. Stahmer, I should like to ask a question on behalf of the Defendant Göring.
Witness, this morning you said that in connection with the murder of your friend Ketteler in 1938 you turned to Göring because he was in charge of the Gestapo. Is it not a fact, and were you not aware of this fact, that from 1936 on, at the latest, the Gestapo was exclusively under Himmler and was formally under the Reich Minister of the Interior?
VON PAPEN: It is possible that through my 4 years’ absence from Germany in Austria I did not know that fact. It has been established here, of course. In any case, I had the feeling when I turned to Göring that he was in a position to defend me against the Gestapo; and after Hitler had refused to speak to me on this matter, it was only natural that I should turn to him as the second man in Germany.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
Sir David, would you prefer to start after the adjournment?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was thinking that I might have the documents arranged then and it might be more convenient for the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 5 minutes to 2.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged, Your Lordship.