Morning Session
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Von Neurath is absent.
[The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before we leave Mr. Messersmith, Defendant, I want to ask you three questions about the other countries in southeastern Europe that Mr. Messersmith mentioned. Did you know that the German Foreign Office financed and directed the Henlein movement among the Sudetendeutschen?
VON PAPEN: I do not believe that I learned of that at that time. In 1935, when this report was written, the Sudeten-German question was not acute.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When did you learn about it?
VON PAPEN: Mainly here in this room.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Did you know that the Reich was supporting Mr. Codreanu and the Iron Guard in Romania?
VON PAPEN: I believe that that was also much later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You learned that sometime later than 1935, did you? When did you learn that?
VON PAPEN: I cannot say; but I believe that events in connection with the Iron Guard in Romania took place about 1937. I may be wrong; but I do not think so.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think perhaps you have the microphone a little too near you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I am sorry.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did you know that in 1944 you were discussed in a Reich state paper edited by the Defendant Kaltenbrunner as being a possible person to do the same thing in Hungary, to arrange for Hungary’s acquisition by the Reich, doing the internal work inside Hungary in order that Hungary should be acquired? Did you know that?
VON PAPEN: No. In the first place, I did not know that; and in the second place I may say that the idea is impossible, because I was a close friend of the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy. In my interrogatory to Admiral Horthy I asked him a question which he unfortunately failed to answer because he did not remember. It says that in the autumn of 1943 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Keresctes-Fischer, handed me a document showing that German or German and Hungarian forces wanted to bring about the incorporation of Hungary into the Reich through a revolt. At Regent Horthy’s desire, I at once handed this document over to Herr Von Ribbentrop and asked him to take the appropriate measures to prevent it. That is all set down in the files, and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior will be able to confirm it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my point. I do not mind whether you would have taken it or not. The point that I am putting is that you were the choice. Don’t you know that? You know the document I am referring to, D-679, with many comments by Kaltenbrunner, in which you were discussed as being the possible person to do the internal work in Hungary.
My Lord, it is Page 78 of Document Book 11, and Page 46 of the German Document Book 11.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I went over this note the day before yesterday after you submitted it here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you with it if you only learned it here. The only point I want to know is this. Did you know in 1944 that you were being suggested in a German state document as being the person who might do the internal work in Hungary in order that Hungary might be acquired by the Reich? If you say you do not know, I shall not trouble you with it any further. You say you only knew that since the day before yesterday?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and in the second place, it is a historical fact that I repeatedly opposed these efforts in Hungary which aimed in one way or another, ultimately by occupation, at making Hungary a part of the German Reich. I considered that the most mistaken and most impossible policy imaginable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you about the documents since you have not known; we will come to another point.
You remember Gauleiter Rainer, the gentleman with whom you had the fortuitous and I am sure very interesting talk on the eve of the Anschluss; Dr. Rainer, the witness? I would just like you to look at Dr. Rainer’s view of the position when you took over, and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with that.
My Lord, it is Page 6 of Document Book 11; the document is 812-PS. It starts on Page 6 and the passage which I am going to refer to is on Page 8.
Have you got the passage that begins:
“Thus began the first phase of battle, which ended with the July uprising of 1934. The decision for the July uprising was right; but many mistakes were made in carrying it out. The result was the complete destruction of the organization, the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the ‘Altreich,’ and, with regard to the political relationship between Germany and Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two States, the Führer liquidated the first stage of the battle and began a new method of political penetration.”
Would you agree that that is a correct description of your work, “a new method of political penetration”?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. That is a very inaccurate description of my activity.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you don’t agree with Dr. Rainer, tell me—you know, you must know very well, the witness Dr. Paul Schmidt. You know him?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. Now I think you will agree with me that he is one of the personalities against whom nobody had said a word during this Trial. Do you agree? I haven’t heard a word of criticism of Paul Schmidt. Don’t you agree with me?
VON PAPEN: Do you mean the witness—the interpreter Schmidt or the Foreign Minister Schmidt?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter.
VON PAPEN: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter. I will give you my opinion on that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you agree that he is a trustworthy person or not? Do you say that he is not a trustworthy person?
VON PAPEN: I have nothing to say against the human qualities of Herr Schmidt, but I have a very strong objection to the fact that Herr Schmidt takes the liberty of criticizing my political activities in Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, before you explain it, just have a look at it. You will find Dr. Paul Schmidt’s affidavit on Page 41 of Document Book 11, that is Page 37 of the German document book, Document 3308-PS. Now just listen to Dr. Paul Schmidt’s view, Paragraph 8:
“Plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss necessitated a more cautious approach to this problem for a time; but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League of Nations plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made the resumption of the Austrian program safer. When Göring visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that the union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and must be expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained silent and uttered only a mild protest when I translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a Party matter, in which Von Papen’s role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move.”
Then, Defendant, so that we are being quite clear, he makes a mistake, and it is a speech of Hitler’s on 18 February to which, unfortunately, the translator has put your name. I am not relying on that. But what I do want to know whether you agree with is that it was your role, “....to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways....” Do you agree with that as a correct description of your program, your mission in Austria?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary, Sir David, the exact opposite is the case. I explained my task in Austria very clearly and distinctly to the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see.
VON PAPEN: It was a task of pacification and normalization and a continuation of the policy of the grafting together of the two States in an evolutionary way. And now may I say a few words more concerning this affidavit of Dr. Schmidt? At the time when the witness sat here in this chair we established the fact that this affidavit was placed before him when he was still in bed in the hospital after a severe illness, and this document was given to him for his signature...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, with respect to that, the Tribunal will deal with it. We have heard all about it and Dr. Schmidt has been cross-examined and I think you may take it that the Tribunal know everything about the circumstances of the affidavit. If you have anything to comment on the contents of it, I am sure the Tribunal would willingly let you, but you need not comment on the circumstances. That is all before the Tribunal.
VON PAPEN: I will comment on the contents, I will state that Minister Schmidt, who later played a highly influential role with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, in the years which are under discussion here had a very subordinate position in the Foreign Office which did not afford him insight—any exact insight—into conditions in Austria and into my policy and my reports.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is so...
VON PAPEN: Sir David, Herr Von Neurath will be able to confirm that for you tomorrow or the day after.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we won’t argue that any further. The Tribunal have the whole of Dr. Schmidt’s record before them and the affidavit. Now you said you told the Tribunal about your conception of your mission in Austria. If that was your conception of your mission in Austria, why was it necessary for you to get hold of the position of the explosive chambers in Austrian strategic roads? That was rather going back to the development of the “top hat” idea to which you objected so strongly, wasn’t it?—Well, if you don’t remember, let me remind you. It is Document D-689, Page 101.
The Tribunal will find the passage actually on Page 102, and it is 90 and 91 in the German version of Document Book 11, becoming GB-504.
This is the opening of the Grossglockner Road, which, as you know, is a road of some strategic importance going from Salzburg to Carinthia. Do you remember that, after your description about the people being in Salzburg and singing everything except the Horst-Wessel song, and then the German drivers competing, in the third and next paragraph you say:
“The building of this road is undoubtedly a first-class work of culture, in which Reich-German construction firms took the main and decisive part. The chief engineer of the Reich-German firm which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me of the position of the explosive chambers in this tunnel. I sent him to the military attaché.”
That was your combining culture and showing the excellence of German road constructions with obtaining the position of the explosives of the tunnel at the important strategic portion of the road. Why did you consider that of sufficient importance to send it to Hitler with three copies to the Foreign Office?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I am giving an exact account of what happened at the inauguration of this road.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want that. The Tribunal can get that. What I am asking you is why you were sending to Hitler the fact that the Reich-German engineer was disclosing to you the explosive chambers on the important part of this road where this road could be blocked? Why were you sending that to Hitler? That is what I want you to tell the Tribunal.
VON PAPEN: Because it seemed interesting to me that this man approached me voluntarily and told me, “At this and this point, the tunnel can be blown up.” You know that at that time our relations with Italy were very strained and that Italy mobilized on the Brenner border. For that reason it seemed of interest to me that this new connection between Italy and Germany could be broken again at any suitable time. Moreover, I referred the matter to my military attaché because it did not interest me personally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you had then moved out of the class of doing that sort of thing yourself. You were the head of the mission and it was a matter for the military attaché.
But was that your plan, Defendant, that, when you introduced German Kultur as showing the road making, at the same time you were getting the strategic information which you could pass on to your Government, undermining the Austrian Government’s strategic plans to use the road?
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant said, did he not, that it was a road which joined Germany to Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The road actually goes from Salzburg, which is practically on the German border, to Carinthia in south Austria, so it was a new highway, taking traffic north and south in Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Did it actually connect Germany with Italy, or did it connect Austria with Italy?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Austria.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well, let’s take something else in which you were interested. You were also reporting as to where the Austrian supply of munitions and manufacture of munitions were going to be situated, were you not?
VON PAPEN: I do not remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don’t recall it, look at it yourself. It is Document D-694. You will find it a few pages on.
It is Page 110, My Lord, in the English book; Page 108 of the German book. It will become Exhibit GB-505. Its date is 26 November 1935. It is Page 110 and the passage that I am going to read is Page 111.
Defendant, you ought to find it just at the top of Page 112 of the German version. You are dealing with the influence of Herr Mandel, whose Jewish extraction you referred to, and then you go on to Prince Starhemberg. It reads:
“After the manufacture of munitions for Italy in Hirtenberg had to be stopped because of Italian protests, he, Mandel, loaded the entire factory on to the railway, in order to continue work in Italy.”
Then, note the next words in brackets:
“Incidentally, an interesting situation for Austria’s supply of munitions....”
Was that one of your conceptions of restoring normal relations, that you should report on the movements in the Austrian munition manufacture?
VON PAPEN: No, that was not my task proper, but this report shows, Sir David, that I was repeating a talk with the Polish Minister Gavronski, who told me that this munitions factory, the only one which existed in Austria, was being moved to Italy. I wrote, with regard to this, that it is a remarkable circumstance if a country has to get its munitions supplies from a foreign country. You must surely admit that that is a peculiar situation and one that deserves inclusion in a report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your explanation. I won’t waste time on it.
Now, I want to pass—and again I want to deal with it very quickly—to your own personal experiences in Austria.
You remember when you went to the Salzburg Festival in 1935, when you had been there about a year; do you remember? I don’t know because you probably went every year.
The point that I want to remind you of is this. Do you remember when you went there that 500 National Socialists greeted you with music and made such a demonstration that some other guests in the hotel wanted to telephone or telegraph to the Federal Chancellery to say that the German Ambassador had caused a great Nazi demonstration? Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the reference to that is at Page 102, Document D-689, which I have already referred to, Page 102 of Document Book 11.
Well now, let me take another example. Do you remember the meeting of the comrades of the first World War at Wels?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was, if my recollection is right, in 1937, was it not?
VON PAPEN: Quite right, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And all the preparations had been made for a nonpolitical meeting, a reunion of the Austrian regiments and old comrades from the German regiments, and after the meeting they were to have a sort of dinner or lunch together, and the evening was to finish in jollity and song. That was the program, wasn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That meeting was addressed by General Glaise-Horstenau and yourself?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Glaise-Horstenau—without any disrespect to him—I think you will agree made a not very powerful speech. That was your impression, wasn’t it, a not very powerful speech? Interesting but not dynamic? Believe me, I am not being offensive to the general. I am merely trying to get the point.
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You made a speech which lasted for quite a short time, didn’t you? Do you remember?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: After your speech, there was beating and shooting through the streets of Wels, wasn’t there? There was a riot there, wasn’t there?
VON PAPEN: May I give you a more exact description?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can. I wanted to establish the fact. You are perfectly entitled now to give your explanation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there a document on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no document on this.
VON PAPEN: A meeting had been arranged in Wels between organizations of the old German Army from the first World War, the so-called Warriors’ Society, (Kriegerverein) and the veterans’ associations of Austria. It was perfectly legitimate and in the spirit of our joint policy that the mutual experiences during the first World War should be renewed between these formations. At this meeting, which according to my wish and that of the Austrian Government was to be completely nonpolitical in character, the following events took place: When I arrived, the place where this meeting of veterans’ associations was held, was surrounded by between 5,000 and 10,000 people. The Austrian Government, to receive their German guests, brought an honor company of the Army, and when the Austrian band played the Austrian national anthem on my arrival, these 10,000 people who surrounded the place sang the German national anthem, for the tune is the same, as you know.
When in the course of the celebration I made a brief speech I found myself constantly interrupted by thousands of people, in a demonstrative manner. Of course, I immediately realized that the Austrian National Socialists had planned a big political demonstration here; so I broke off my speech, and shortly afterwards I left the place, and left Wels also.
It is quite true, as Sir David said, that when the celebration broke up and the Austrian police wanted to proceed against the thousands of persons who were demonstrating, very unfortunate incidents occurred.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if that is your explanation, I have put the facts of the incident. Now I want to pass to another point, because I can only give examples of your activities in Austria.
Before you heard the evidence of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, do you remember the phrase “the Trojan Horse technique” being referred to with regard to Austria?
VON PAPEN: Yes. Seyss-Inquart did not want to lead the Trojan Horse.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before that, you know, you had referred to the Trojan Horse technique.
My Lord, it is Document Book 11, Page 133. The passage I am referring to is from Page 134. The document is D-706, which will become GB-506. It is Page 163, Sergeant Major.
That is your report of 21 August 1936, where you quote an instruction of the Prague Secret Service to its Vienna branch, which says:
“Unfortunately it must be noted that the wild National Socialist excesses of 29 July of this year have not had the result we expected. Austria’s approach to the Third Reich in the field of foreign politics is making further progress, as well as the process of cultural collaboration between the two sister nations. One can also assume from your most recent reports that the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing greater confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and particularly into the ranks bf the Heimatschutz (Home Guard). Opposition to the normalizing of German-Austrian relations, which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears nevertheless to be relatively very great; it obviously lacks only good organization.”
Now, does that Czech report describe correctly what was going on, the superficial normalization of relations and the Trojan Horse movement working inside the country?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, that is the opinion of the Czech Secret Service and perhaps of the Czech Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I remind you, Defendant, that it is the opinion quoted by you in your report to the Führer, and not contradicted. There is not a word in your report suggesting that it is not the truth. In fact you say you introduce it, “To illustrate the present position in Austria...”
You are introducing it as correct information for the Führer, so you cannot, I suggest, write it off by saying it is merely a Czech report.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I do. Let me point out that this report was written on 21 August 1936. That is 1 month after the conclusion of our July Agreement, which you asserted was a deceitful maneuver, but which we and the Austrian Foreign Minister established as a very seriously intended agreement. We were now on a completely different basis with Austria and for that reason I quoted this peculiar Czech report as an interesting document to show how, in spite of our efforts for normalization, the Czechs regarded matters in Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you leaving that document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: What about the last paragraph?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I will certainly deal with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 134.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
It goes on:
“Besides, it appears hopeless and also impracticable for us to strive to influence Austrian legitimism or the Heimwehr movement. There are, on the other hand, comparatively strong elements in Austrian Catholicism which could, with certain reservations, be called democratic. These elements, which are gradually grouping themselves round the Freiheitsbund (Freedom League) and which are inclined on principle to work for an agreement with the Social Democrats, represent, in our opinion, that group which would in certain circumstances be inclined to bring about a revolution in internal politics in Austria.”
Did you put that forward as also representing your view?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I gave the Court a most exact explanation of the aims and character of the Freiheitsbund yesterday; and the Court knows from the report that the Czech Government endeavored to exert a certain amount of political influence on this Freiheitsbund. That is quite clear from the connection. This is all in the Czech report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you were putting it forward, were you not, as your view to Hitler that, to speak loosely, the Catholic Left might be used as a means of approach by you. That is really what you are saying.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, surely you do not want to impute that I submitted a Czech report to Hitler in order to identify myself with this report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what I am accusing you of. If you write to the head of the State, “To illustrate the present position in Austria, I append an extract from a report....” then what I am suggesting is that that means this report accurately represents the position, as I see it. That is what I am putting to you.
VON PAPEN: No, for another report which you also submitted to the Court shows that I asked Hitler to work against these efforts made by the Czech Government to exert influence on the Freiheitsbund by binding it to ourselves. I am of quite different opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you asked Hitler to give 100,000 Reichsmarks to the Freiheitsbund. That is exactly what you are following out in what you have suggested here, that they might be a body who would be a useful point d’appui for you in order to gain an influence with another section of Austrian opinion. I am suggesting to you that the two things are quite consistent. You tell Hitler that they are useful.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you support them with 100,000 Reichsmarks. That is what I am putting to you.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That you were all the time burrowing under one section of Austrian opinion after another in order to work towards the suppression of the freedom of Austria—that is what I am putting to you. I do not think there is any doubt about it.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, if this report shows anything clearly, it is the fact that, apart from the National Socialists in Austria, there were other groups, namely, the Christian Trade Unions and the Freiheitsbund, who worked politically towards the union of the two countries. And you cannot say I am committing a crime if, as a diplomat who wants to bring about such an aim in an evolutionary way, I co-operate with the interests of these groups.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was not anything very evolutionary about the Trojan Horse, was there? However, that may be comment. Let us go on to another point.
Did you know Baron Gudenus?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that he was the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto. Do you remember?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is shown in my report.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well now, let us just look and see what Baron Gudenus had to say.
Your Lordship will find that on Page 93, and it is 72 to 75 of the German version, Document D-687 which will become GB-507. It is Paragraph 2 (b) and it appears on Page 74, Defendant.
“Baron Gudenus, the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto, writes to....”
There is a mistake there, my Lord. The “me” should be “one.”
“....one of my acquaintances on 30 March:
“....I brought back many gratifying impressions of the progress of our Movement with me from Austria; but I cannot deny that in some respects the Government’s policy worries me greatly. Of what use is it that the ringleaders of February and July 1934—or those of them who were caught—are sentenced, if the Government is too weak, too slovenly, or intentionally too tolerant, to prevent ‘brown’ and ‘red’ propaganda being carried on privately unhindered in the cinema, in the press, and on the radio, and mainly by State officials or organs of the Fatherland Front, supported and paid by financial and other means which are pouring in bountifully from Germany. What is that learned idealist Schuschnigg actually doing? Does he not notice that Papen and the other ‘brown’ agents in his own country continually spit into the hand so persistently held out to them? He must not imagine that he can thus maintain and save Austria, as long as Hitler rules in a Germany which is painted brown inside and out. The methods over there have, it is true, become more clever and more careful, but this makes them all the more dangerous.”
That was about 7 months after your arrival.
“Sinister also are the continual differences between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg....” and so on.
Now, isn’t it correct, Defendant, that anyone, that everyone, even a visiting monarchist agent, knew that these activities were going on with you on the top and the Austrian National Socialist Party working underneath?
Before you answer, it is only fair to look at your own comment on that.
“The difficulties of the internal Austrian situation could hardly be described more graphically than in this letter.”
Why did you not say to Hitler, if these were the facts: “Baron Gudenus is talking nonsense. I am carrying out a perfectly honest moral assignment for the normalizing of relations with Austria.” Why did you not deny it, if it was not true?
VON PAPEN: It seems to me that this report shows, in the first place, that I passed on to Hitler with complete frankness all the reports which I received, even that of an adherent of the Hapsburg restoration. Obviously to 100 percent...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting, Defendant, that you passed them on because they were true; you adopted them and passed them on to Hitler because they were true reports; that that was a true picture of the situation. That is what I am suggesting to you. You just tell the Tribunal, were they true or were they not? If they were not true, why did you pass them on without saying they were not true? That is what I am asking you.
VON PAPEN: If you read this report by Baron Gudenus, you will see that he speaks of internal conditions in Austria and of the sinister differences existing between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg, the rivalry between their guards, and the constant underground Republican sentiment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is 3 lines out of 20. There is a lot more before you come to that part. That is what I am asking you about; the other 17 lines of the report.
VON PAPEN: Sir David, the points which I have just mentioned are proof of the internal weaknesses of the Austrian Government, on which I am reporting. If you mean that I should have explained to Hitler that I was not a “brown” agent, well surely on 26 July we came to a very clear agreement as to under what conditions my work in Austria was to be done. There was no necessity for me to explain that to Hitler in a report. I sent this report for his information only.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your explanation, just look at the next paragraph of your letter. It shows in another way how you were working. Paragraph 3:
“The film ‘The Old and the Young King’ ...”—the Tribunal may not remember, but you correct my recollection. That is a film, if I remember rightly, dealing with Friedrich—the relations of Friedrich Wilhelm I and Friedrich the Great. Am I right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The film ‘The Old and the Young King’ was shown here for the first time a few days ago in the presence of Herr Jannings.”—That is Emil Jannings, the actor.—“It provoked enthusiastic demonstrations. The scene where the king stresses the fact that ‘French trash and Roman books do not mean anything to Prussia’ led to particularly vociferous applause. The police wanted to ban it. Together with Herr Jannings, we explained to them that, should this film be banned, we would take steps to prohibit the showing of all Austrian films in Germany. This had the desired effect. The film—except for the above-mentioned scene, which was expunged—is being shown now and will be shown on the screen at Klagenfurt and Graz within the next few days.
“Yesterday I received Jannings and a number of actors from the Burgtheater as my guests. He said he was very satisfied with his success, and we discussed in detail plans for a Bismarck picture for the production of which I recommended Beumelburg to write the script.”
That is, you were forcing a film which contained Prussian propaganda to be shown in Austria on the threat of excluding Fräulein Wessely and “Maskerade” and the other Austrian films of that time from the German market; you were forcing your propaganda on the threat of excluding Austrian films; is that right?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and I will also tell you the reason. I must enlarge your historical knowledge of these things, Sir David. Frederick the Great played a very important part in the relations between Germany and Austria, as you know; and at that time we were trying, in the relationship between our two countries, to clear up the historical inaccuracies which originated in the time of Frederick the Great. For this purpose the famous Austrian historian, Professor Srbik, wrote a big work. The film which we are discussing served the purpose of showing that a great German history is common to both peoples alike. To help the cultural rapprochement of the two countries I insisted that this film should be shown, and this was done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not the slightest doubt about your motives in wanting the film to be shown, Defendant, but what I am asking you is, why you pressed it against the wish of the Austrian authorities by threat of excluding Austrian film production from the German market? Why did you threaten the Austrian authorities in that way?
VON PAPEN: It frequently happened that the Austrian police were afraid that certain films might be made a basis for demonstrations. But after we had talked matters over with the police, and had agreed that certain parts of the film should be cut, they were quite ready to admit it; and of course, I also told them that if we did not reach an agreement, the consequences would be that Germany would send no more films to Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I put the point. Do you remember telling the Tribunal that you did not keep up contacts with the NSDAP in Austria? Is that Correct?
VON PAPEN: No, it is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did keep up contacts?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Close contacts?
VON PAPEN: I did not understand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Intimate contacts? Were your contacts close?
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if they were not, will you just turn a page back. It is probably Page 72 of your report. It is the same report.
My Lord, it is Page 93 of Your Lordship’s book.
You began that report by saying:
“I have first to report on the development of the local NSDAP:
“On 23 March complete agreement was reached in Krems between Captain Leopold, (Retd.) and Generaldirektor Neubacher. In accordance therewith, Neubacher subordinated himself to Leopold in every way and recognized him as Führer for Austria. As soon as Schattenfroh is released from the concentration camp, he will become deputy leader, while Neubacher, as the closest confidant of Leopold, will be consulted on every important question.”
Furthermore, Leopold has nominated somebody else and asked him to be deputy, while:
“Major General Klupp, (Retd.) will be taken into consultation in strict confidence,” and I want to read the last lines:
“Furthermore, Leopold expressed the desire that at long last, the continual intrigues against him on the part of émigrés living in the Reich—of the type of Frauenfeld and his friends—be stopped.”
That is a pretty complete picture of the set-up of the Party in Austria, wasn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Well, Sir David, may I call to your attention the fact that this report is dated 4 April 1935, a date previous to the July Agreement, when my interest in these Party affairs can still be readily understood.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you attach importance to the date, just look at the report of 1 September 1936, which is on Page 33 of Document Book 11, Page 26 of the German book. You remember this is the report which you referred to, and you said:
“For the method to be employed (Marschroute) I recommend on the tactical side continued and patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.”
You told the Tribunal that that meant you wanted a change in the officials of the Ministry of the Interior. I am not going to trouble about a statement like that, but just go on for a moment:
“The conference on economic relations proposed for the end of October will be a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects.
“In discussion both with Government officials and with leaders of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who take their stand entirely on the Agreement of 11 July, I am trying to direct the next developments so as to aim at corporative representation of the Movement in the Fatherland Front.”
Now, it is quite clear, is it not, that you were on 1 September 1936, after the agreement, having discussions with the leaders of the illegal Party, Leopold and Schattenfroh, so may we take it—I don’t want to spend time on it—that throughout your time in Austria you were in close and constant touch with the leaders of the Austrian National Socialist Party?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David, the conference which you just mentioned refers to and is justified by the July Agreement; I have already explained that to the Court yesterday. In the July Agreement Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg promised that members of the National Opposition would be called upon for co-operation. Consequently it was, of course, my duty to be interested in whether and to what extent the co-operation of such forces was actually sought by Schuschnigg. That was the subject of this talk with the leaders, and I can state expressly that my contact with the Austrian Party, after the July Agreement, was only in this connection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, I am not going to go into that further. I have referred the Tribunal to two documents, and there are other references which I need not worry about.
I want you to come now to November 1937. Could you fix as carefully and closely as you can the date of your meeting with the Defendant Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I met the Defendant Seyss-Inquart by accident—that is, not by appointment—at the Olympic Winter Games at Garmisch-Partenkirchen in January 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: January 1938. I just want to collate these dates. You had become very friendly with the Foreign Minister Guido Schmidt, who gave evidence here, had you not?
VON PAPEN: I was on very friendly terms with the Foreign Minister, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you gave him the “Du,” although you were 20 years his senior; you had given him the “Du” for some time? You had been on intimate relations? Is that right?
VON PAPEN: I do not think that a friendship can be measured by 20 years’ difference in age. I regarded Herr Schmidt, as I have said, as an upright man.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will agree with me that it is unusual for an Ambassador to be on terms with a Foreign Minister, especially one 20 years his junior—not his contemporary—on such terms that he used the familiar “Du” to him. Won’t you agree with me that it is a quite unusual form of intimacy between an Ambassador and a Foreign Minister?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, if you had ever been in Austria in your life, you would know that in Austria almost everyone says “Du” to everyone else, and to clear up this incident, may I add the following: On the day of our separation, when I left Austria, I said to Foreign Minister Schmidt, of whom I am very fond, “Dear friend, we have worked together so much, now we can say ‘Du’ to each other.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am interested in is this: It was in November 1937 that you and Dr. Guido Schmidt first began to discuss the question of Herr Schuschnigg meeting Hitler, was it not?
VON PAPEN: I believe that I discussed this matter not only with Foreign Minister Schmidt but also with Herr Von Schuschnigg himself at that time. After a discussion between them...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment; will you answer my question? You discussed with Schmidt—you heard Dr. Schmidt give his evidence that the Defendant Göring had told him with great frankness, as the Defendant Göring said he told everyone else and has told this Court, that he was out for the union of Germany and Austria by any means and at all costs. You heard Dr. Schmidt say that Göring had told him that that was his view, and I say, in all fairness, it is perfectly consistent. It is the view he has expressed here and apparently to a lot of other people. Do you remember that Dr. Schmidt said that? You can take that from me.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard that the Defendant Göring said that, not only to Dr. Schmidt, but to Mussolini and to the High Tribunal, and I think to several other people. Had he never said it to you?
VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. With regard to the Austrian...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that it was his view?
VON PAPEN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know that was Göring’s view?
VON PAPEN: Please let me say something. Of course, I knew that Göring’s wish was to bring about a union of the two States, and I myself was present at the talk with Mussolini.
Please consider, however, that at that time Herr Göring was not competent to decide foreign policy. The question of what our policy in Austria should be had been agreed upon between Hitler and myself exclusively and I do not remember discussing it with Marshal Göring in the years between 1936 and 1938.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am dealing with November 1937, at the moment, and 3 months later the Defendant Göring was very competent in foreign politics in the Austrian question, as you, who listened to the accounts of his telephone conversations, must know.
I just want you to take the dates as we have got them now. Göring had told Schmidt his views; you and Schmidt were discussing this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. In January you had a political discussion with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch.
I am one date out of order. On 11 November, as Mr. Dodd put to Dr. Seyss-Inquart, he had written a letter to Dr. Jury saying, “I don’t think anything will happen this year, but the developments will take place in the spring.” Then, after that letter, he sees you at Garmisch in January, and in February you finally arrange this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you know very well that the whole object of the meeting was to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to the Reich’s wishes, the appointment of Seyss-Inquart, a general political amnesty which would release all the members of the Nazi Party in Austria and put them at the disposal of their leaders, and a declaration of equal rights for the Party? Didn’t you know that the whole object of the meeting was to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to these terms so that you would have the Austrian National Socialist Party unfettered and free to work for Germany’s interests in Austria?
VON PAPEN: In my talk with Dr. Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch-Partenkirchen we discussed the necessity of making the Austrian Nazi Party independent, that is, under all circumstances removing it from the influence of the Reich, in the form agreed upon in the July Agreement, and with the aim that the way should be paved for a union of our two countries, and that that aim should be pursued from the Austrian side in terms of foreign policy, and not by the Reich.
When I met Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch no mention was ever made of this meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg. I was at that time not in a position to know whether such a talk would ever take place. That was not decided until 5 February, as you will recall. In other words, we discussed only the perfectly general question of how we could get nearer to our goal.
May I further recall to your memory that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had received an official commission from the Federal Chancellor to investigate all existing possibilities of incorporating the National Opposition, that is, the Austrian National Socialist Party, into Schuschnigg’s political program. That was his official mission, so that after all I had a right to discuss these things with him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Dr. Rainer—the witness that the Tribunal has seen—wasn’t he present at the Garmisch meeting too?
VON PAPEN: That seems to have been the case, Sir David; I do not remember it any more. Seyss-Inquart has told me that it is possible that Dr. Rainer joined us on a walk. I personally do not remember. I did not carry on any political discussion with Rainer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you have given your explanation as of the turn of the year. I just want to remind you of one other point. You were very well aware of the Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch crisis in the Army, were you not? I don’t want to go into disagreeable details again, because it is not at present before the Tribunal, but you knew that that crisis had arisen?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you will see the importance of this. General Von Fritsch had been at the War Academy with you, had he not?
VON PAPEN: Yes, quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was an old friend, and you knew, as I think everyone who has mentioned his name in this Court has said, that General Von Fritsch was a man of the highest character and that the sort of charge that was brought against him was one which anyone who knew him would regard with ridicule if it wasn’t so tragic, and they would regard it with contempt? That was your view?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you had a pretty good idea, had you not, apart from the treatment of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, that Von Fritsch had been the subject of a trumped-up charge in order to prevent him becoming head of the Armed Forces? You knew that, didn’t you?
VON PAPEN: In any case, that became clear to me later, when I learned of the circumstances.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, that is not the important thing, Defendant, your state of mind on 5 February 1938. You knew by then that the Nazi clique in the Government had brought a framed-up charge against a man whom you regarded as the soul of honor, did you not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now with that knowledge, on 5 February, after you see Hitler, you tell him about the fact that Schuschnigg may come, and he jumps to it at once. He says, “Go and get Schuschnigg,” doesn’t he? He was quite bored, if I may put it that way, with what you had to say up to that point. As soon as you say there is a chance of a meeting with Schuschnigg, Hitler seizes it like a trout to a May fly, doesn’t he, or rather, like a lion to the kill; that is right, isn’t it?
VON PAPEN: Yes, Sir David. I described to the Court the impression made on me by events in Berlin and by my own dismissal on 4 February. Do you think it is surprising that I now tried, just because I was afraid another course would be adopted, to bring about this long-desired discussion between the two chiefs of state which I hoped would clear up the differences and prevent the adoption of a radical course? I told Foreign Minister Schmidt and Chancellor Schuschnigg that, when I asked them both to take part in a discussion to clear up matters if they could possibly do so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to go through the circumstances of the meeting of 12 February, because I went through them with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the Court is well aware of them.
I want to ask you this one question, and I do ask you to consider it carefully because the question of your own veracity may depend on it.
Are you now saying that there was no pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg at that interview?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, I never made such a statement—you know that yourself, because it is in my reports; I myself said that pressure was exerted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am asking you is this, and please let me make it quite clear because the Court have heard the evidence of your friend Dr. Schmidt and a lot of other evidence. I only want to ask you the one question, and please get it clear.
Do you now, on this day, say that pressure was not put on Chancellor Schuschnigg to make him agree to the terms of 12 February? That is the one question I want to ask you, and I give you the chance of answering. What do you say today? Was or was not pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I never denied it. I do not understand why you ask me. I never denied it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Ribbentrop denied it quite strongly, but we won’t go into that.
Now, one other question and then I am finished with Austria.
Did you arrange a meeting between Hitler and Cardinal Innitzer?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I did; and that was...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange that the leaders of the Church and the diplomatic corps, apart from the French and British representatives, should be present at Hitler’s entry into Vienna?
VON PAPEN: As for the leaders of the Church, it is not customary for them to be present at parades, and I certainly did not suggest it. As to the diplomats...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange for the diplomatic corps to be present?
VON PAPEN: It is possible that some of my diplomatic colleagues asked me if they could attend this ceremony, and I said that of course they could attend; why should they not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue about the way you put it.
My Lord, I have now finished with Austria. I have three very minor matters which I hope will take a short time, but this might be a convenient period in which to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[A recess was taken.]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, are the Tribunal to take it that broadly you were against the anti-Semitic movement and propaganda?
VON PAPEN: On the contrary, it was my aim and my desire, and it constituted the entire program of my work, to contribute as far as possible to a union between the two countries, because that was the great wish of the German nation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think you can have understood my question. Let me repeat it. I am now coming to the Jews.
VON PAPEN: Oh, the Jews?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, let me repeat it again. Are the Tribunal to take it that broadly you were against anti-Semitic action and propaganda?
VON PAPEN: Yes; I have already told the High Tribunal just what my attitude in principle was toward the racial question and toward the question of the elimination of foreign influence in certain cultural aspects of public life. These are two entirely different questions, however.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I appreciate that. Now, will you look at Document 3319-PS, which is Exhibit GB-287?
My Lord, it begins at Page 48 of Document Book 11a. It is on Pages 44 and 45 of the German book.
The part I want you to refer to is on Pages 58 and 59. This, Defendant, is from a confidential report of the work session of the consultants on Jewish questions of the German missions in Europe, on 3 and 4 April 1944. I want you just to look at Page 44, I think, of the German version, Page 58 of the English, at the contribution to this discussion of a certain Herr Posemann, from Turkey. Was he from your staff? If you would not mind, just say “yes” or “no,” because it must go to a short end...
VON PAPEN: May I tell you just who Herr Posemann was?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said, if you would tell me, was he a member of the Embassy staff, and if not, what was he; that is what I want to know.
VON PAPEN: No; certainly not. Herr Posemann was a German bookseller who had settled in Ankara. He was certainly not a member of my Embassy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, at any rate, he was a consultant of the German Foreign Office for this discussion. Now, just listen to what he says:
“Early last year the Turkish Government struck a blow at Jewry in connection with an attempt to solve the minorities problem. Very drastic measures were taken to carry out this action. Suspicions on the part of Allied circles that purely anti-Jewish measures were concerned were countered by Turkey with references to simultaneous measures taken against the minorities. At any rate, Turkey abandoned further measures to find a solution of the minorities problem and therewith of the Jewish problem. For this reason it is impossible to continue to practice anti-Jewish propaganda under our direction at the present moment, as it is undesirable and would be a burden on Turkey’s present foreign policy. There are no anti-Jewish publications in Turkey, apart from caricatures and comic books about Jews. The first signs of realization of the extent of international Jewish domination are evident in the translation of the Protocol of the Elders of Zion and of Ford’s book, The International Jew. The sale and distribution of these brochures have been promoted by the Embassy. For the time being, work is possible only within this narrow range since, as was already emphasized, an anti-Jewish propaganda obviously inspired by Germany might cause us unfavorable political complications.”
Now, do you believe in the Protocol of the Elders of Zion? Do you believe it is a correct and authentic work?
VON PAPEN: Not at all, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why was the marketing of these brochures being promoted by the Embassy?
VON PAPEN: Perhaps I may give the Tribunal a very brief explanation on the whole connection of this meeting. The meeting had been called by the Foreign Office, and was to be attended by experts from the embassies and legations who had been specifically employed to deal with the Jewish problem. In my Embassy there was no such expert, as I always refused to have one. For this reason the Party had of its own accord instructed the bookseller Herr Posemann to deal with this problem, and had delegated him to attend this conference.
If Herr Posemann here sets forth that the Embassy circulated the propaganda brochures which are mentioned here, then he is gravely mistaken. Firstly, the Turkish Government would never have tolerated the circulation of such material, and secondly, you, Sir David, can convince yourself today that all these brochures are still lying in the basement of my Embassy at Ankara.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that this statement made at the Foreign Office meeting, you say, is wrong?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you had nothing to do with that; that is your answer? I want to ask you one or two things about the Catholic Church. You remember the Fulda Declaration of the Bishops?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right, is it not? That was made and based on an assurance which Hitler gave to the Church of his good intentions, on 23 March 1933? Do you remember Hitler’s making a statement like that?
VON PAPEN: Not only on the 23d, but also in the Government declaration Hitler expressly stated his view that every policy must be based on both the Christian denominations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that in turn was the result, at least in part, of a statement of yours at a Cabinet meeting on 15 March 1933, when you stressed the importance of incorporating political Catholicism into the new State; that is a correct and factual statement, is it not? That is the way the thing works out?
VON PAPEN: Completely, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
VON PAPEN: I made every effort to induce Hitler to establish this Christian basis of his policy firmly by means of solemn engagements; and I think I have already explained to the High Tribunal that I really made every effort to carry through this program.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now let me ask you to look once again at Document 11, Page 96; Page 78 of the German version, which is Document 2248-PS. It is your report to Hitler of 27 July 1935. Now in that report you use these words: “....the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany....”
My Lord, it is on Page 99 of the English text and it is Page 86 of the German text. My Lord, it is the first paragraph, Page 99:
“Cultural problems have a special significance. The way in which Germany deals with her political and religious difficulties, the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without weakening the Christian foundations of Germany will not only have a decisive reaction on England or Catholic Poland. We may rather say that the solution of the German-Austrian question stands or falls with it.”
Now, what I want you to bear in mind: This is your account to Hitler in July 1935, over 2 years after the Concordat: “....the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany....” Now your counsel quoted one passage of His Holiness the Pope’s allocution, and I would just like you to look and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with the next passage, which occurs after the bit quoted by Dr. Kubuschok.
My Lord, this is a new document—no, My Lord, I am sorry. It is an old exhibit. It is Document 3268-PS, which is Exhibit USA-356. Your Lordship remembers that Dr. Kubuschok quoted a portion, in his document book, of the Pope’s allocution. My Lord, I have some extra copies.
Now after the bit which Dr. Kubuschok quoted as to the Concordat having prevented worse evils, His Holiness goes on to say:
“The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become more and more embittered: the disbanding of Catholic organizations; the progressive suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of the citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic defamation, by means of clever, closely organized propaganda, of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, and of the Church’s institutions, teaching, and history; the closing, disbanding, and confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and publishing houses.”
Do you agree with His Holiness that that is a correct description of the action of the German Reich against the Catholic Church?
VON PAPEN: Completely.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you also to look at the “Mit Brennender Sorge,” which is Document 3280-PS.
Your Lordship will find it at Page 40 of Document Book 11—I am sorry, My Lord, it is Page 47. I said 40. It is 40 of the German text.
Now, if you notice, that is quite early, on 14 March 1937, 4 years after the Concordat, and he says in the second sentence at the beginning:
“It discloses intrigues which from the first had no other aim than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others—like the enemy in Holy Scripture—sowed the tares of suspicion, discord, hatred, calumny, of secret and open basic hostility to Christ and His Church, fed from a thousand different sources and employing every available means. They, and they only, along with their silent or vocal protectors are responsible for the fact that on the horizon of Germany there is now to be seen, not the rainbow of peace, but the threatening stormcloud of destructive religious wars.”
Now, Defendant, what I want you to tell the Tribunal—do you agree with that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you agree with these statements of the head of the Church, how could you possibly write to Hitler, 2 years after the Concordat, in July 1935, that he had “eliminated political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany”? It was absolutely wrong, wasn’t it, that Hitler and the Nazis had not touched the Christian foundations of Germany? They had uprooted them and were in process of destroying them?
VON PAPEN: Sir David, you are confusing two completely different things, political Catholicism...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I don’t want to interrupt you, but I have made that point quite clear. The point I am putting to you is not the elimination of political Catholicism. I am not, for the moment, dealing with the relation between you and Monsignor Kaas. What I am dealing with is your other statement, that it had been done without touching the Christian foundations of Germany. What I am putting to you is what His Holiness is saying, that the Christian foundations of Germany were being destroyed. I don’t mind, for the moment, about the views that Monsignor Kaas had of you or you had of Monsignor Kaas. I know what they are.
VON PAPEN: Let me explain these things to you. The struggle against the Church and its institutions, against which His Holiness the Pope inveighs in his encyclicals in the years 1937 and 1945, and in which he recognized the intensification of the situation obtaining during the war—all of these things were an attack on the Christian foundations of Germany, an attack which I always condemned most strongly. But this has no connection at all with the elimination of so-called political Catholicism for which I hoped and which I demanded. These are two completely different things. Perhaps it is hard for you to understand, since you are not familiar with circumstances in Germany.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Please believe, Defendant, that I have spent a great deal of time in pursuing the troubles between you and Monsignor Kaas. I am not going to bring them out before the Tribunal because they are not important. I appreciate and agree—not as well as you do, but I appreciate the position of political Catholicism and I am not asking you about that. I am asking you about your statement. Why did you say to Hitler that he had not touched the Christian foundations of Germany? That is what I want to know. You must have known in 1935 that that wasn’t true?
VON PAPEN: But, Sir David, that is a complete distortion of the contents of this report. I am telling Hitler that the Christian foundations of Germany must not be weakened and that may still be read in the report today: “Political Catholicism must be eliminated without weakening the Christian foundations of Germany.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you appreciate how it begins. You say “....that a clever hand which eliminates it without touching....” Just let me remind you: Didn’t you say, in your interrogation, that your trouble—part of your trouble in the summer of 1934, before you made the Marburg speech, was due to the nonfulfillment of the Concordat, that after it had been signed, with the consent of Hitler, “....he treated it just as a scrap of paper and I couldn’t do anything”? Then there was the persecution of the Churches and the Jews at the same time. That was late in 1933 and in 1934. Is that your view in 1934, “....that there had not only been treating of the Concordat as a scrap of paper but persecution of both the Churches and the Jews”?
VON PAPEN: I do not know which document you are quoting from, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is your interrogation on the morning of 19 September 1945.
VON PAPEN: Yes, of course. When I delivered the Marburg speech, I believed that the State was violating all these things; otherwise, I would not have made the speech. But in this speech, Sir David, I again expressly emphasized the fact that no European occidental state can exist without a Christian foundation, and that by disregarding our Christian basis we would cut ourselves off from the group of Christian peoples and from our mission in Europe. I could scarcely say it more clearly than that. And perhaps I can tell you something else on the subject of political Catholicism. You have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do as you want to. I especially want to avoid burdening the Tribunal with the exchanges between you and Monsignor Kaas, because both of you used harsh language and it might not sound very good if I repeated it now. If you want to go into it, do, but don’t open it up unless you must.
VON PAPEN: I regard this accusation which you are making against me as one of the most tremendous for it violates my whole conception.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you remember you told the Tribunal just before the adjournment that you had introduced Cardinal Innitzer to Hitler when you went into Austria. You remember that after the statement to which Dr. Kubuschok has referred, that Cardinal Innitzer in a broadcast from Rome made it clear that he was only accepting the Nazi rule of Austria on certain conditions. Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like to see what happened to Cardinal Innitzer.
This is a new document, My Lord, D-903, which becomes GB-508. My Lord, this is a statement in the form of an affidavit from a priest, Dr. Weihbacher, which I only got from Vienna on 7 June.
You will see that this priest—well, at any rate I take it he is a priest; he is the archbishop’s secretary in the cathedral chapter. Let’s just look at it.
“On 8 October 1938”—that is a little over 6 months after you had arranged for Cardinal Innitzer to meet Hitler—“a serious attack was made by youthful demonstrators on the archbishop’s palace in Vienna. I was present during the attack and can therefore describe it from my own experience.”
Then he describes how they smashed window panes, broke in the gate. The priests took the archbishop into an inner room and hid him there. They took the cardinal to safety in the personalia archive and locked the iron door behind him, and:
“....then we two priests, seeing ourselves opposed by a crowd of invaders, personally took up a stand at the entrance to the cardinal’s house chapel in order to prevent any destruction from being wrought there at least.”
My Lord, this is about 10 lines from the foot of the page.
“Shortly after we had reached the chapel, the invaders stormed into the cardinal’s rooms adjoining the chapel. As soon as they reached the door we warded them off. Pieces of wood came flying into the chapel; I received a push that knocked me over; but we managed to prevent them from entering the chapel. The demonstrators were youths aged from 14 to 25 and numbering about a hundred. After we had warded off the first troop, we opened up the Tabernacle and consumed the consecrated wafers so as to prevent the Most Holy from being desecrated. But new invaders were already storming in; and we warded them off. In the meantime an indescribable orgy of destruction was going on in the remaining rooms among all the fittings. With the brass rods holding the carpet in place on the staircase, the youths destroyed tables and chairs, candelabras and valuable paintings, and in particular all the crucifixes.”
Then it describes the plate-glass doors and so on, and there was an alarm when the cardinal was discovered. This priest himself was dragged from the chapel by about six people and dragged across the anteroom to the window with shouts of “We’ll throw the dog out of the window.”
And then, eventually, the police came, and you will notice their idea of what was proper reparation.
“Then a lieutenant colonel of police arrived and apologized. He was followed by a representative of the Gestapo who expressed his regret that the police had not been very active in their intervention.
“Meanwhile other demonstrators attacked the cathedral rector’s house at 3 Stephansplatz where they threw the cathedral curate Krawarik out of the window into the yard. This priest lay in hospital until February with both thighs fractured.”
Now I ask you to look at the penultimate paragraph:
“That the demonstration was not the result of youthful wantonness or embitterment, but a well-laid plan known to official quarters, is obvious from the speech of Gauleiter Bürckel who, on 13 October on the Heldenplatz, in the basest possible manner represented the cardinal as guilty.”
Now, Herr Von Papen, you had a great responsibility in relation to Cardinal Innitzer, had you not? You had introduced him to Hitler. You must have learned from the ramifications and communications of the Catholic Church of this attack on the cardinal’s house 6 months after the Anschluss, did you not? You must have learned of this.
VON PAPEN: I heard about it later, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What protest did you make when you heard of this disgraceful attack on the principles of the Church, the throwing of the cathedral curate out of the window and breaking both his thighs, the desecration of the chapel, the breaking of crucifixes? What protest did you make about it?
VON PAPEN: I should like to remind you, Sir David, that I had resigned from office more than 6 months before and no longer had anything whatsoever to do with these matters. Naturally the details of the incident were in the highest degree regrettable and, indeed, amounted to criminal attacks; but the details did not appear in the German press, so that I am probably seeing them for the first time in this form here. But let me add...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Defendant, you haven’t answered the question. The question was: What complaint did you make about it?
VON PAPEN: I made no protest, for I was no longer in an official position at the time. I was a private citizen, and all I learned officially about these things was what the German papers were allowed to publish.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, Defendant, surely you have told us that you were one of the leading Catholic laymen in Germany. You are not going to tell the Tribunal that in the Catholic Church it wasn’t known to every bishop in Germany and probably to every parish priest that this abominable and sacrilegious insult had been offered to a prince of the Church in his own house in Vienna. Surely it would permeate through the Church in a few days.
VON PAPEN: That is quite possible, Sir David; but would you expect me, a private citizen, to do anything? What could I do? The Tribunal did not take notice of the discussion which I brought about between Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler. You mentioned that for the first time here today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly why I am putting this incident to you, that you were responsible for bringing about the meeting between Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler in March of 1938. When His Eminence is attacked in October, I should have thought—it is not for me to express my thoughts—that you might have taken the trouble to protest to Hitler, and all that you do is to take another job under Hitler within 6 months, in April 1936.
What I am asking you is why you didn’t make a protest. You could have written to Hitler. The Defendant Göring has expressed his great religious interests. A number of the other defendants have said that they had great religious sympathies. Why couldn’t you have got in touch with them?
VON PAPEN: Because in autumn 1938 I retired from political life; I was living in the country and was no longer taking any active interest in politics. But perhaps I may say just why I was responsible for promoting a meeting with Cardinal Innitzer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not the point that I am interested in at the moment, the meeting on 15 March. I am interested in the fact that this took place, that you knew of it, and made no protest.
Now I am going to come to another point. Dr. Kubuschok can raise it later on, if he wants.
Defendant, you have heard a number of your codefendants giving evidence and saying that they didn’t know of the terrible repressive measures that were taking place in Germany. You knew very well about these repressive measures, did you not? You knew about the action of the Gestapo, the concentration camps, and later you knew about the elimination of the Jews, did you not?
VON PAPEN: I only knew this much, that in the years 1933 and 1934 political opponents were interned in the concentration camps. I very frequently protested against the methods used in concentration camps. In various cases I liberated people from these camps; but at that time I was quite unaware that murders had even been committed in them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let me take that up. It is good to get down to a concrete instance.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that at the beginning of 1935 your secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was ordered to return from Vienna to Berlin for examination by the Gestapo. Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember that he refused to go and he sent you a detailed report of his reasons for not going? Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us look at that together very shortly.
My Lord, that is Document D-685, which would become Exhibit GB-509; Your Lordship will find it at Page 87 of Document Book 11, and it is at Page 60 of the German version.
Now, at Page 87 there is Herr Von Tschirschsky’s own letter to you, in which he says, at the end of the second paragraph: “I am not in a position ... to comply with the Gestapo demand to report to Berlin for interrogation.”
And then he says that—to quote his own words—that he has been influenced only by the “human, understandable desire to live” and then he sends a report, he encloses a report, to you of what had happened to him on 30 June which got him into the bad books of the Gestapo.
Do you remember that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And summarizing the beginning of it, which would be almost humorous if it did not show such a dreadful state of affairs, your secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was arrested simultaneously by two competing groups of Reich policemen, I think the Criminal Police and the Gestapo, and there was a severe danger of Herr Von Tschirschsky and some of the police being shot before they could decide who was to take him into custody. But I want you to come to when he is taken into custody.
My Lord, it is at Page 89, and it is at the end of Page 65 of the German version, Defendant.
You see, this is after, I think, the Gestapo had won the internecine struggle and it got possession of the body of Herr Von Tschirschsky, and then he says, just toward the end—My Lord, it is the middle of Page 89.
He is told the other police are following the Gestapo and he says:
“....we went to the Gestapo building in the Prinz Albrecht-Strasse and through a courtyard to a back entrance. There was another exchange of words between the two groups of Criminal Police. I again joined in this debate and suggested as a way of clearing up the misunderstanding that a man from each of the groups should see some higher authority in the building and let him decide what should be done. There would still be three Criminal Police officials and four SS men available to guard me and the other two gentlemen. This course was adopted; and eventually they came back and explained that the misunderstanding was now cleared up and we could be taken away. Whereupon we were taken by three SS men, not accompanied by the Criminal Police officials, on a lengthy trip through the building into the basement. There we were handed over without comment and were ordered by the SS men on duty there to go and sit on a bench against the wall, in the passage. We were then forbidden to talk to each other. I spent a few hours like this sitting on the bench. It would make too long a story to give further details of the events which took place during this time. I will therefore restrict myself to the case of the shooting of a well-known personality who was publicly stated to have committed suicide.
“The person in question was brought in under the escort of three SS men and led past us into a cell running parallel to our corridor. The leader of the detachment was an SS Hauptsturmführer, short, dark, and carrying an Army pistol in his hand. I heard the command ‘Guard the door!’ The door leading from our corridor into the other one was shut. Five shots were fired and immediately after the shots the Hauptsturmführer came out of the door with the still smoking pistol in his hand, muttering under his breath, ‘That swine is settled.’ Feverish excitement reigned all around; cries and shrieks of terror were heard from the cells. One of the SS men on duty, a comparative youngster, was so excited that he apparently lost all consciousness of the entire situation and informed me, illustrating his remarks with his fingers, that the person concerned had been liquidated by means of three shots in the temple and two in the back of the head.”
You had a pretty good idea of SS and Gestapo methods after Herr Von Tschirschsky had given you that report, hadn’t you?
VON PAPEN: Yes, and you can also see that this report...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell us, before we leave that elevating extract which I have just read, who was the well-known person who was supposed to have committed suicide and who was shot with three shots in the temple and two in the back of the head. Who was it?
VON PAPEN: I cannot tell you. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you mean to say that Herr Von Tschirschsky was on your staff for several months afterwards and he never told you who this was?
VON PAPEN: I do not recall, Sir David, that he discussed this matter with me; and in any case I may have forgotten it. In any event one of the personalities who died on 30 June.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause. You say you might have forgotten. Do you mean that dreadful occurrences like this were so familiar to you that you cannot remember the account of the actual shooting of a supposed suicide who was a prominent person?
Have another think. Cannot you tell the Tribunal who this unfortunate man was?
VON PAPEN: If I remembered that, I would willingly tell you. I have no reason to conceal the information.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let the Tribunal see how you passed this on to Hitler. You believed, did you not, that Herr Von Tschirschsky was telling the truth? You said so. You believed he was telling the truth, didn’t you?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at page...
My Lord, it is Page 86 of the English version; and, Defendant, it is 58 of the German book, Page 58.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you going to investigate the facts as to what happened to the man who made this report?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes, I will clear that up, I am so sorry.
Defendant, just before we come to what happened when he made the report, Herr Von Tschirschsky himself was—I think he went to a concentration camp and had his head shaved and then eventually after a certain period he was released and rejoined your service and was in your service up until February of 1935. Is not that so, Defendant?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is quite correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord. That takes up the story until we come to February 1935. He is then asked to report to the Gestapo and then this correspondence takes place.
Now, you see that in your letter to Hitler of 5 February, which is Document D-684, Exhibit GB-510, you say:
“As already reported yesterday by telegram, I have passed on to Herr Von Tschirschsky the order of 2d instant, repeating the demand that he appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo, 5 February.
“He then announced to me officially that he would not comply with this order as he was convinced that he would be killed in one way or another. He will give all his reasons for this refusal in a report which I will submit as soon as I receive it.
“Yesterday I finally relieved Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I had already suspended for the duration of the proceedings, of his post. It goes without saying that I shall break off all connections of an official nature as soon as the files and such have been handed over tomorrow.”
Then you say you telegraphed the Defendant Von Neurath and you had given Herr Von Tschirschsky sick leave. Then just look at the last paragraph.
“After I had repeatedly asked that Herr Von Tschirschsky be given a chance to clear himself before a regular judge of the charges laid against him, I am naturally exceedingly sorry that the affair is now ending thus. I left nothing undone to induce Herr Von Tschirschsky to take the course indicated to him of submitting to interrogation by the Gestapo.”
Defendant, is that right, that you left nothing undone to get this man in your staff sent to his death to be murdered by the Gestapo?
VON PAPEN: I think it would be fair, Sir David, to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the other letters which show that I asked Hitler not only once, but repeatedly, to have the matter of Tschirschsky investigated by means of a regular trial.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite true and it was referred to in that letter.
VON PAPEN: Yes, of course, but please let me finish...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite true.
VON PAPEN: When this proposal was turned down and the Führer would not agree to have a regular trial, he, Hitler, let me know that he would use his personal influence, and that he would assume personal responsibility that nothing would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky if he was investigated by the Gestapo. You will also find that in these letters. The Führer promised him exceptional immunity if he would allow himself to be interrogated by the Gestapo. Therefore, after the suggestion for a regular trial had been turned down and Hitler had promised that nothing would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky, I asked Herr Von Tschirschsky to submit to the investigation, as the charges made against him had to be cleared up somehow. But I believe...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn back to your letter of 31 January, which you will find...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think you should read the whole of this letter which you have just been on, 5 February, at some stage.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will. My Lord, I am so sorry. My Lord, I do not want to omit anything; but I am, of course, trying to shorten the matter; but I will read anything Your Lordship wants.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ought to be in possession of the whole letter. You stopped at the word “courier,” in the middle, with reference to reporting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. With reference to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian Government:
“With regard to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian Government, I am afraid that if I dismiss him abruptly tomorrow, the matter will become the theme of public discussion. I think this scandal should be avoided and I have therefore given Herr Von Tschirschsky sick leave in the meantime, as far as the public is concerned. I shall report his dismissal later.
“I shall return to the Tschirschsky affair and its connections with other current Gestapo questions in Vienna later, in a detailed report.”
My Lord, I am grateful.
THE PRESIDENT: You left off after the word “Gestapo” in the next paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will read the whole thing again.
“After I had repeatedly asked....”
THE PRESIDENT: No, you read that down to “Gestapo,” but you did not go on with the rest.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “But if he persists in his resolve to avoid this interrogation, even though he knows that this means social and material ruin for himself and his family, and as he has given me his word that he will do nothing while an émigré which would be harmful to the Führer and to the country, I can only add my wish that everything should be avoided which could turn this affair into an open scandal.”
I am grateful, My Lord.
Now, Defendant, you had already said to Hitler on 31 January, which was 5 days before that—Page 84, My Lord, and the foot of Page 55 and the beginning of 56 of the German book:
“Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I have, incidentally, for the time being relieved of his duties, has now learned from several sources which he—and I myself as well, unfortunately—regards as authentic, that some persons belonging to the Gestapo have for some considerable time been planning to liquidate him.”
My Lord, that will be Document D-683, Exhibit GB-511.
You believed that it was authentic on 31 January that the Gestapo wished to neutralize him. On 5 February, in the part that the Tribunal just asked me to read, you say it will be the ruin of his social and material position for himself and his family, but if the thing is kept quiet, your wish is that everything be done to avoid a scandal.
Now, Defendant...
VON PAPEN: My wish was first of all that everything possible should be done to have the matter cleared by means of a public trial.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first wish, but you very soon gave that up.
VON PAPEN: Just a moment, please. After Hitler had refused to agree to my wish, and after he had determined that Von Tschirschsky would enjoy the personal protection of Hitler during his investigation by the Gestapo—that is, if the head of the State says “I will be responsible for the fact that nothing will happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky!” then you will allow that naturally the only course of action open to me is to say to Herr Von Tschirschsky, “Take this course and let them interrogate you; for after all you have to clear yourself of the suspicion resting on you.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, let me remind you that there is not a word in your letter of 5 February about any promise from Hitler to give an indemnity to Herr Von Tschirschsky. All that you are saying is that he will disappear into disgrace. There is nothing in any other letter either.
VON PAPEN: Yes. It is in one of Tschirschsky’s reports. I cannot find it at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can find anything about an indemnity, I can only tell you that I have not been able to find it in any of your letters.
VON PAPEN: But it is there.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the defendant could look for this document at the recess, at 1 o’clock.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, very well. My Lord, if there is such a document, I am very sorry; I don’t know about it.
Yes, My Lord; I am sorry. I think I have got the reference. On Page 91, My Lord. It is not in the defendant’s letter, but there is a reference in Herr Von Tschirschsky’s report. On Page 91, My Lord. Page 69. It says:
“In conclusion—the reason why I feel myself under no obligation either to appear before the Gestapo or to return to the Reich at all, in spite of the extraordinary protection promised me by the Führer and Reich Chancellor—I make the following declaration:
“During the period of my activities in Berlin, information had already frequently reached me to the effect that there existed in the Reich a terror organization which had sworn the oath of mutual allegiance in life and death. It is expressly pointed out to men who are or who may be accepted into this brotherhood that they are under an obligation to submit to the secret court and that they are in duty bound when carrying out their tasks to feel that they belong in a high degree to the brotherhood and only in a smaller degree to Adolf Hitler. I could not have believed this monstrous thing, had I not been informed of it about 6 months previously by a man in the Reich—I wish to stress this particularly—who is not opposed to the Third Reich, but quite the opposite, a man who in his innermost convictions believes in Adolf Hitler’s mission, a Reich-German and a National Socialist of many years’ standing, who himself at one time was to be asked to join this brotherhood but who was able to withdraw from it cleverly. This man has assured me of his willingness publicly to announce the names which he mentioned to me of members of this brotherhood, or to swear an affidavit to this effect in case these people should be already dead. He must only be assured that this terrorist brotherhood is no longer active, especially as there are persons belonging to this brotherhood who are among those most trusted by the Führer and Reich Chancellor.”
I am sorry; I knew there was nothing in the letters from the defendant, but I had forgotten that there was this passage in the letter.
Now, that was Von Tschirschsky. You told us that Baron von Ketteler was murdered at the end of your time in Vienna. You remember Baron von Ketteler’s father was murdered, if my memory is right, and that caused the German expedition against the Boxers in China. That is the family the gentlemen belonged to, is it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the effect of this, the murder of Von Ketteler, on you after the experience with Von Tschirschsky was that you were ready to take new employment under the Nazi Government in Turkey.
There is just one other point that I want to put to you.
VON PAPEN: May I add just a few remarks on this point? I told the Court...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Papen, I will finish on that because I think we have the other reference to Marchionini’s affidavit, and then you can make all the other remarks you like.
Why didn’t you after this series of murders which had gone on over a period of 4 years, why didn’t you break with these people and stand up like General Yorck or any other people that you may think of from history, stand up for your own views and oppose these murderers? Why didn’t you do it?
Now you can give your explanation.
VON PAPEN: Very well. You can see that I submitted Von Tschirschsky’s report on these murders to Hitler, in all its details, but what you do not know is the fact that I myself frequently told Hitler that such a regime could not possibly last; and if you ask me, Sir David, why despite everything I remained in the service of the Reich, then I can say only that on 30 June I personally broke off the relations into which we had entered on 30 January. From that day onward I did my duty—my duty to Germany, if you wish to know. I can understand very well, Sir David, that after all the things we know today, after the millions of murders which have taken place, you consider the German people a nation of criminals, and that you cannot understand that this nation has its patriots as well. I did these things in order to serve my country, and I should like to add, Sir David, that up to the time of the Munich Agreement, and even up to the time of the Polish campaign, even the major powers tried, although they knew everything that was going on in Germany, to work with this Germany.
Why do you wish to reproach a patriotic German with acting likewise, and with hoping likewise, for the same thing for which all the major powers hoped?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The major powers had not had their servants murdered, one after the other, and were not close to Hitler like you. What I am putting to you is that the only reason that could have kept you in the service of the Nazi Government when you knew of all these crimes was that you sympathized and wanted to carry on with the Nazis’ work. That is what I am putting to you—that you had this express knowledge; you had seen your own friends, your own servants, murdered around you. You had the detailed knowledge of it, and the only reason that could have led you on and made you take one job after another from the Nazis was that you sympathized with their work. That is what I am putting against you, Herr Von Papen.
VON PAPEN: That, Sir David, is perhaps your opinion; my opinion is that I am responsible only to my conscience and to the German people for my decision to work for my fatherland; and I shall accept their verdict.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have finished.