Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 17

by Various

Afternoon Session

DR. NELTE: The defendant has declared that he admits the objective, that is, the factual contents of the general Indictment to have been proved (that is to say, not every individual point), taking into consideration the law of procedure governing this Trial. It would therefore be senseless, despite the possibility of refuting various documents or individual facts, to attempt to shake the Indictment as a whole. Therefore, I shall confine myself mainly to the questions concerning the subjective facts and the conspiracy, and I will treat only these individual points which require treatment because of their special importance concerning the personal participation of the Defendant Keitel.

The disproportion between the import of past events and the defendant’s fate as an individual is so great that the Defendant Keitel, even if not impelled by conscience, must have known after reflection that such a course on my part would lay him open to the suspicion that he was fighting here for his life. But the defendant has already made it quite clear in his argument that he is not fighting to save his head, but fighting to save face.

The defendant belongs to those men who came into the public eye through Adolf Hitler’s death. From 1938 onward he was in his closest circle and was his almost constant companion. It is clear to him what that means for this Trial. It has often been alleged by the Prosecution that by referring to the dead the defendants desired to unload their own responsibility upon them. If it is the purpose of this Trial to obtain the most faithful picture possible of events and connections, it is not fair to start out by discrediting any mention of those who are dead, and who—as the Prosecution also know—are the major culprits. This is especially true of the Defendant Keitel, whose position, influence, and actions cannot possibly be judged correctly without throwing light upon the person of Adolf Hitler and upon his relationship with Keitel.

As can already be seen from Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening statement, we are dealing here with an indictment against the National Socialist system. Actually, the Indictment is a global indictment against this system, split up into 21 individual indictments. The individual defendants are, to a certain extent, mere symbolic figures of the spheres of authority of the State which was ruled by this system: namely, Party, Government, and Armed Forces. If I understand Mr. Justice Jackson correctly, he goes even further in saying:

“Above all personal forces are nameless and impersonal fores; their conflict with each other makes up much of humanity’s history.... What are the real forces which are battling here in front of you?”

This statement raises a problem which, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, cannot be left unmentioned at this Trial, a problem which M. de Menthon also pointed out: The importance and influence of those forces which shape fate. Fate and guilt are not two poles which exclude each other from their respective spheres; they are areas which overlap so that there are spheres of life and spheres of activity in which the interplay of these two forces make the world move. One can only hint briefly here as to what forces are at work which shape fate, that is to say, what forces cannot be considered as originating in the conscious will of the individual defendants: The sense of national unity, historic events, opinions which are rooted in tradition and environment. Therefore, I will have to go into this background insofar as it is relevant to the Defendant Keitel as a person and as a type of one of the groups under the Indictment, because thus only will you be given the possibility of obtaining a correct picture of the share which the Defendant Keitel had in what has happened.

I also want to state that everything I am about to say is said with the full agreement of the Defendant Keitel; and insofar as aspects and facts are stated which might exonerate the Defendant Keitel, they should be taken as a contribution toward the clarification of what has happened, and as an answer to the question of how things could have reached that point. He does not wish to have his position or the part which he played in this drama minimized, but he is anxious at the same time to avoid giving a distorted picture of his character. The defendant has already stated on the witness stand that he was grateful for the opportunity this Trial afforded him to give an account to the world public and the German people of what he did and why he did it. He wishes to help in ascertaining the historical truth of what happened.

I consider it my obligation to express this opinion of the Defendant Keitel because this attitude, based on such reasons, made it considerably easier for me to conduct his defense. It was, and is, clear to the Defendant Keitel that if one considers the horrible consequences and monstrous deeds which—without here raising the question of guilt—undoubtedly were committed by German people, and which can indisputably be traced back to orders and directives with which Keitel came into contact in some form, then one will experience a feeling of guilt, without considering whether this is guilt in the legal sense or the tragic feeling of being linked by fate with the causes and thereby also the consequences.

The Prosecution has maintained that:

“At one time all the defendants had banded together with the Nazi Party for a plan which they well knew could be realized only by the outbreak of a war in Europe.”

With regard to the Defendant Keitel, it is said that from 1933 on he took active part in this conspiracy.

To prove its thesis the Prosecution stated:

(a) that the National Socialist program in itself, according to its wording and meaning, could be realized only by using force;

(b) that the Defendant Keitel recognized, or should have recognized this;

(c) that recognizing this he, together with the others, especially the co-defendants, planned and prepared aggressive wars.

As regards these statements, I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention, first of all, to the principal part of Mr. Justice Jackson’s bill of Indictment, in which he deals with the program of the Party. He mentions there a number of points of the program, about which he says:

“Naturally, these were all aims which were legally unimpeachable.”

At a different point he says:

“I do not criticize this policy; I wish it were generally recognized. Naturally, this acknowledging criticism is subject to the one limitation: As long as these aims would be achieved without an aggressive war.”

According to that, the Prosecution itself do not assume that the wording and meaning of the Party program were such that normal persons would recognize that these Party political aims could be realized by use of force only. I do not wish to repeat what in this connection was said by the individual defendants at their hearings in court. Especially convincing appeared to me what Dr. Schacht stated on this subject. He concludes his critical examination of the important points of the Party program with these words:

“These are essentially the contents of the National Socialist Party Program, and I cannot find that anything criminal lies therein.”

I quote this statement especially because it shows how this program and its recognizable objectives affected a person who may be characterized as intelligent, realistic, free from emotional impulses in politics, and possessing economic penetration and judgment. If that person did not recognize that the Party aims were to be realized by use of force, how was the soldier Keitel to come to such a realization?

Keitel was a professional officer. As such he could not be a member of the Party. Officers were prohibited from any political and Party political activity. The Armed Forces command was intent on keeping the influence of Party politics away from the Armed Forces. This was true both for the time before 1933 and afterward. Hitler himself confirmed this principle because he clearly recognized that the time was not yet ripe for giving the corps of officers, let alone the senior officers, a political character. According to the tradition and conception of their profession, those senior officers had a “national attitude,” as one used to say, and they welcomed the national points of the program which were placed in the foreground by Hitler; they were glad about the co-operation of the Armed Forces and without hesitation placed themselves behind the Government led by Hitler when it proclaimed the fight against the Treaty of Versailles, especially against its military political clauses. An agreement going beyond these aims, or possibly a union with a political object in view, did not exist. The generals, among them also Keitel, thought no differently from millions of Germans who were not Party members or who were opponents, but who regarded the national aims as being a matter of course.

Now, one cannot fail to see that it is somewhat different if millions of Germans, who had no influence, supported that part of the program relating to the national aims, or if the senior officers, who led the Armed Forces, support it. Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the realization of these national aims carried with it the danger of a war. But the state of things seems to me to be such that the generals saw the danger of war not so much in the fact that Hitler wanted to realize these national aims by an aggressive war, but rather in the fact that the realization of these aims would entail sanctions by the former enemy powers. The idea of a realization by aggressive, warlike means was far from the generals’ minds for the absolutely compelling reason of military impotency. I shall later deal more in detail with this problem, which is closely connected with the rearmament. Here it is only important that the circles to which Keitel belonged—and I should like to add, between 1933 and 1938—

(1) had no contact with the Party program;

(2) had no relationship with Party circles;

(3) sympathized with a part of the Party program because it corresponded to their national attitude;

(4) did not think of realizing these national points by an aggressive war, because it would have been hopeless from the military point of view.

Now one could argue that although the generals themselves did not think of waging an aggressive war, they certainly recognized, or should have recognized, that Hitler had the intention, if not now, then in the near future, of waging an aggressive war.

The Prosecution believes it can be presumed that the Defendant Keitel had this knowledge from 1933 on. The argument of the Prosecution that this knowledge is equivalent to knowledge of the National Socialist program has been refuted; the same holds true of the knowledge of the book Mein Kampf—assuming he possessed the book. Therefore, the question is only whether Keitel had knowledge of Hitler’s intentions regarding an aggression for other reasons. For the period up to 1938 Keitel could not have obtained knowledge from Hitler himself because Keitel spoke with him late in January 1938 for the first time. The speeches which Hitler made before that time, just as those of the other Party leaders, were unambiguously aimed at preserving peace. Looking back, one might call it propagandistic camouflage of opposite intentions. If that were the case, then this camouflage successfully deceived not only many millions of Germans, but also the foreign countries which were partly critical and partly hostile toward National Socialism.

Keitel believed the protestations of peaceful intentions, and saw their honesty confirmed also by official proposals of disarmament and treaties with England and Poland. He believed them all the more because, as has already been said, an aggressive war appeared to him an impossibility.

The Codefendant Von Neurath too, frequently declared here that all his information and knowledge of Hitler’s policy up to 5 November 1937 justified his firm conviction that Hitler did not want to realize his political aims by force or aggressive wars. It was only by the speech of 5 November 1937 that this conviction of Von Neurath’s was shaken.

In the arguments in Dr. Schacht’s defense to which I referred, those facts were presented which show a contradiction between the former conduct of the victorious powers and the thesis which the Prosecution advances on this question.

Through their official relations and beyond these, the victorious powers showed that, despite their knowledge of all the circumstances of which the defendants are now being accused, they, that is, the victors, did not believe in Hitler’s intentions, or did not recognize these intentions of realizing his aims by aggressive war.

The Prosecution now makes the accusation against the defendant that he knew, or ought to have known, such intentions of Hitler. This is not convincing, and I can leave it to the Tribunal to judge who—if all contingencies are taken into consideration—had better possibilities of obtaining information on Hitler’s true intentions. I believe the Defendant Keitel may claim for himself the same good faith and the same ignorance, unless such knowledge or participation itself results from other circumstances.

Such circumstances during the years 1933 through 1938 may have concerned Keitel’s activity in connection with rearmament and in the Reich Defense Committee. The charge of illegal rearmament includes two facts which have been summed up by the Prosecution:

(1) Secret rearmament by circumventing the Treaty of Versailles;

(2) Rearmament with the purpose of planning wars of aggression.

For a judicial consideration, however, these facts must be kept strictly apart; for they are different with respect to cause and effect, and they must also be legally assessed from different points of view.

The time between 1933 and 1938 is the fateful period, a period of development and conversion. The forces of the hitherto existing order are struggling against the new which have not yet taken definite shape. Everything is in fermentation. The aims remain obscure. They are camouflaged by the adoption of existing nationalistic tendencies. By clever propagandistic utilization of these tendencies, the psychological basis for the aims pursued by the new rulers is being created without being noticed by those whom it concerned. Here lies the problem of the Armed Forces leadership and of the Defendant Keitel during this period with which I am going to deal now.

This problem cannot be solved without taking into consideration Germany’s military position. In judging the then Colonel Keitel another consideration enters the picture: how the special sphere to which he belonged was affected by this situation. Keitel considered the Treaty of Versailles, and especially the military clauses, as a humiliation for Germany. He considered it a duty toward his country to collaborate in putting an end to this situation. He was convinced that the Treaty of Versailles, because of its impossible military and territorial stipulations, would have to be revised some day. Such a revision appeared to him imperative, in the interest of justice as well as of reason, if a lasting world peace was to be preserved. On the basis of this conviction he believed that as a German and a soldier, he was entitled, in the official capacities in which he acted during this period, to interpret the military stipulations of the Versailles Treaty literally, even if this was in contradiction to the spirit of the stipulation. His justification for this was that the stipulations limited the possibilities of development in an unbearable manner, that is, in a manner altogether insufficient for an effective defense. Though he did not participate personally, he did not consider it wrong for Germany, under the given circumstances, to construct submarines in Finland, not for herself, but for the purpose of gathering experience and training specialists; or to maintain construction and designing offices in Amsterdam in order to observe the progress achieved in the field of aeronautics and to make use of it without actually building planes. Symptomatic of the way democratic Germany of that time thought—without consideration of position and party—was Dr. Brüning’s statement which on 15 February 1932 was broadcast over all U.S.A. radio stations on the occasion of the meeting of the disarmament conference. I am going to quote some passages from that speech:

“The inner-political fights in Germany are very bitter in their outward forms, to be sure; but this must not lead one to overlook the fact that despite many differences there exist indisputably many things in common also. On the two decisive foreign-political questions of today, the questions of disarmament and reparations, uniform opinions prevail among the German people. The demand for equal rights and equal security is shared by the entire German people. Every German Government will have to uphold these demands. That the fight of the parties as to the road which our politics must take is perhaps more bitter in Germany today than in some other countries, is a result of the deep misery which weighs heavily upon Germany and greatly burdens the people’s soul.”

In connection with this point I also refer to the testimony which the Codefendant Von Neurath gave on 22 June 1946. These words which Brüning spoke prove that there was a demand which was upheld by the entire people irrespective of the difference in parties: The demand for equal rights and equal security. The objection to that is: A demand, even if upheld by the entire people, does not in itself create the right to violate or circumvent established regulations. In principle, one can accept that. However, things were not as simple as that. I do not wish to harp upon a fundamental law applying to all countries and giving every nation the right to create for itself a certain state of defense. But even if one is not prepared to recognize such a fundamental law, one will still perhaps understand the state of emergency which actually exists when a country is so limited in its military potential that it is not only liable to military attack by any neighbor but also condemned to political impotency.

In the course of the hearing of evidence the Tribunal has had occasion to recognize that this was true with regard to the situation in which Germany found herself in the year 1933. I want to call your attention to the following passages of the Field Marshal’s report which was submitted to the Tribunal. The following passages, written by this outstanding soldier, summarize as follows the experience of a patriotic and military life as regards the point discussed here under the title “Rearmament”:

“Nature is inclined to pass over weak people. The law that only the strong survive is generally recognized...”

I quote further:

“The world does not take seriously the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation for the strong.”

And finally I quote:

“Above all, it seems to me, we must correct the tragic misunderstanding that a policy directed at security is a war policy.”

The best witness with regard to this question, which is so important for the Defendant Keitel, is the book by a British Major General, A. C. Temperley, (Publishers Collins, 1938) The Whispering-Gallery of Europe, for which the British Foreign Secretary of the second World War, Mr. Anthony Eden, wrote a very friendly, concurring preface.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, wouldn’t it be possible for you to pass over the reading of these passages which come from the book of Major General Temperley? The Tribunal will take notice of them. There are quite a number of long speeches from the book.

DR. NELTE: I intended to ask the Tribunal whether it would kindly take judicial notice of these passages if I submit them.

They carry particular weight because Temperley reports and judges retrospectively from the year of 1936.

The statements made by Temperley, who witnessed the disarmament conference, the official negotiations and the negotiations behind the scenes, are deeply moving because they reveal the tragic—I must use the word—fateful—and primary conflict: fateful because the thesis presented by the representatives of the different countries—which was derived from the national, given conditions and from traditionally bound conceptions—proved that the difficulties could not be overcome and thus formed the origin of the confusion the last consequences of which we have just experienced. Temperley says:

1) (Page 50) “The French had studied the question of disarmament much more thoroughly than any other nation, and some of their best brains of the General Staff and Naval Staff had examined the problem for months... To characterize their problem roughly, it was their goal to disarm themselves as little as possible although they were the strongest power of the world, but at the same time to keep Germany in a state of disarmament down to the minutest detail according to the conditions of the peace treaty...

(Page 71) “In the report which I gave, I spared neither the French nor us. We had made big mistakes, but at that time I came to recognize that in reality the French never thought of disarming at all... M. Paul Boncour certainly was honest and worked intensively in order to achieve success, but the pressure of the French General Staff upon the Government was too great...

2) (Page 126) “Mr. Stresemann knew his people best. It was a race against time. How long could he keep his people in an atmosphere of cooperative acquiescence without any tangible success in the form of concessions on the part of the Allies? Ought the Allied Governments to have given faster and more willingly what they were ready to give? Would this gesture have prevented the catastrophe?... Doubtless, history will provide the answer. I do not know what kind of an answer it is going to be, but it seems certain to me that the most important period, when Germany turned away from the road of peace, will be found to be the period of co-operation between 1929 and 1930... Would a less hesitating policy as regards the cancellation of the debts, economic reconstruction, and concessions in the treaties have prevented Hitlerism and all its consequences? Who knows?... In his Review of International Affairs, 1930, Professor Arnold Toynbee writes: ‘For the foreign observer who visited Germany at that time it was a terrible and strange drama to see a whole nation—one of the greatest and most civilized nations of the world—engaged in a heroic struggle against fate, half paralyzed already in titanic battle, driven by the conviction that its steps had already irresistibly been led on to the path of destruction.’ (Pages 128 and 129) “The German people had lost hope... The French had always contended that Germany would maintain a pretext of modesty as long as the Rhineland was occupied, and that when the occupation ceased the true color would show... This has proved to be a good prediction, yet it was a concurrence of circumstances and the expression of a people taking its last gasp rather than premeditated planning...

3) (Page 151) “I was present at the session and was profoundly moved in the face of the attitude of the French delegation and that of the Little Entente. They believed that they now had Germany financially by the throat and that her utter ruin was only a question of weeks. Our Foreign Office recognized the situation. Yet after a discussion with Henderson I ask myself whether he really did recognize the abyss which was gaping before us...”

Perhaps one certain passage might be of interest, on Page 38, under (4):

“I also name the general staffs, because there is no greater illusion than that they, taken as a whole, are in favor of war. I know the general staffs of many countries very well, and have never known any general staff which would have glorified war or would have wished for war. They knew too much about it. If they advocated strength, it was because they believed in the idea that armed strength can prevent war.

“In opposition to the bloodthirsty pacifists who reject modern weapons, but who immediately clamor for their presence on the battlefield when one must resist attackers... This leads to the conclusion that armaments are not the main reason for wars. The history of the years 1926 to 1931 is not that of a race for rearmament, but that of a slowly developing deterioration of the international situation because of the economic and political chaos, which made disarmament impossible and rearmament unavoidable...

(Page 222) “The Germans actually repeated their successful tactics in circumventing treaties, the very tactics they had used in Napoleon’s time. And yet, one wonders what other honor-loving nation in the same circumstances would not also have done its utmost to circumvent a treaty which had been forced upon it at the point of the bayonet...

(Page 232) “The following 6 months brought Germany’s return, Hoover’s failure and that of the French plans, and the complete change in the atmosphere through Hitler’s seizure of power. However dreadful this was for the peace of the world—the other powers, above all France, have only themselves to blame for it... We should have exerted more pressure upon the French and made greater efforts to keep a moderate government in office in Germany.

(Page 256) “...they felt they were still being treated as outlaws...”

I would like to ask that these opinions of the British general which, as I already said, had the approval of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, be taken into consideration. In this connection I want to refer also to the statements by the following statesmen: Paul Boncour, Henderson, Briand, and Cecil; these statements were submitted by Dr. Schacht’s defense (Schacht Document Book Number 3, Exhibit Schacht-12) on the same subject matter and were accepted by the Tribunal; I also want to refer to the book by Viscount Rothermere: Warnings and Predictions (Page 100).

In examining and deciding whether the Defendant Keitel knowingly violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the meaning of the Indictment, the Tribunal will have to consider the facts which have been presented. Individual charges against him on this point have not been made.

It is unquestionable that from 1933 on rearmament took place in the Reich. The Defendant Keitel has admitted that, and he stated that in the official positions he held up to 30 September 1934 and from 1 October 1935 on he participated in this rearmament in accordance with the functions incumbent on him. Like everything the Germans do, the rearmament too was well thought-out and organized. The Prosecution collected data for that; especially Document Number 2353-PS and the transcripts of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee.

During the hearing of evidence the total picture of this period from 1935 to 1938 was not clearly defined. The Prosecution arranged its presentation of evidence retrospectively and drew a conclusion from the results of the war as to the motive for the rearmament, but at the same time it deduced from the fact, which cannot be denied and has not been denied, that this rearmament could not have been planned and carried out by any one man, that it constituted a joint plot for the purpose of aggressive war.

Now, where is the decisive criterion: in military armament or in other preparations for war from which the conclusion may be drawn that these measures have an aggressive character, that is to say, that they aim at an aggressive war? In principle, from armament itself nothing can be deduced as to the alleged intentions; armament may, in fact it must, look just the same if carried out for security and defense as it would if applied to aggressive war. Therefore, if the intention of rearmament for the purpose of a plot is to be determined, distinction must be made between:

(a) Armament and preventive measures which must be taken in case a mobilization should become necessary for defense at any time;

(b) Rearmament and enacting of measures which exceed, in quantity or quality, the volume under (a) to such an extent that the intention of the political leadership to begin a war will be recognized by those concerned, in which case the political question of whether an aggressive, defensive, or preventive war is intended may be disregarded. Therefore, in the end, the decisive question will be whether in connection with these measures the intention of planning for an aggressive war was expressed or had become otherwise noticeable, or whether the measures, because of their nature and volume, demand the conclusive deduction that an aggressive war was being prepared.

In retrospect, the events are presented as the logical chain of a development according to plan. In reality, not only Hitler’s far-reaching intentions and his planning were subject to an actual course of events in which, objectively viewed, a certain causality seems to be inherent, but the knowledge and approving support of co-operating circles were equally subject to this. There can be no dispute over the statement that the economic capacity of a country, which in its totality must be regarded as armament for the case of war, will eventually get to a point which must be considered of decisive importance in solving the question of when the rearmament, that is, the status of the entire industry essential for war, exceeds the capacity of armament for defense.

While considering this, it must be taken into account, especially for the Defendant Keitel as a soldier, that until he took over the office of Chief of OKW on 4 February he had not held an important position.

Now, what part did the Defendant Keitel play at that time,

(a) In the field of rearmament with regard to material and personnel;

(b) in the field of administrative and—as charged by the Prosecution—military-political rearmament as dealt with under the heading of the Reich Defense Council?

I shall now skip Pages 43 to 46, since they contain the historical development of the organizational principles, and I beg the Tribunal, if it can make use of this information, to consider it in reaching a verdict. I shall continue on Page 47.

When on 1 October 1935 the Defendant Keitel became the Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces in the Reich Ministry of Von Blomberg, there was a Military Economy Branch headed by Colonel Thomas. He was appointed by Von Blomberg as an expert adviser for the organization.

This Military Economy Branch, later called the Military Economy Staff, as a ministerial service post had to represent the Reich Minister of War with the competent and authoritative economy posts, later also with the Plenipotentiary General for Economy (GB), nominated in 1935. The Minister of War, Von Blomberg, generally communicated directly with Thomas at the time when Field Marshal Keitel was Chief of the Armed Forces Department.

To clarify the part Keitel had in the organizational development of rearmament in this period, I would explain the following:

I. The position at the start in 1933 (for the period 1933-38) was as follows: Lack of any kind of basis for production as a consequence of the destruction of the armament industry following the Treaty of Versailles.

Consequence: no capacity for production, no motor vehicles, no mechanical equipment, no offices for construction, no experience.

Thus, the first stage for rearmament: the restoration of a basis for production, and equipment and reconversion of factories.

II. Basic initial factors to procure armaments:

(a) Branches of the Armed Forces, in Issuing orders to firms through their ordnance offices as purchasing agents, were handicapped by budget means and their incorporation in the budget year.

Consequence: Subsidizing of firms for lack of long term orders and through the impossibility of calculation.

(b) War Economy Office in the OKW as the central organizer and representative of the producer firms through War Economy (later Armament) Inspectorates as intermediary offices in the military area, to serve the branches of the Armed Forces as executive. Duties of the organization, which was run by a military staff:

(1) To gain information about and recommend firms to the military branches.

(2) To adjust the orders of the military branches to the capacity.

(3) To provide for the allotment of raw materials, machinery, and manpower.

(4) To further the extension and capacity of industrial plants.

(5) To protect the plants from bad investments, air raids, espionage, et cetera.

(c) The Plenipotentiary for Economy, GBW, as from the autumn of 1935 was the declared organizer of the entire German economy for its mobilization in case of war and its prospective leader during a war.

His duties in peacetime were preparatory only:

1. Statistical co-ordination of the individual industrial and economic branches, including the armament authorities connected with the OKW, and the War Economy office under Thomas.

2. Provision and storing of raw materials obtainable by importation only.

3. Procurement of foreign currencies for importation.

4. Financing of domestic rearmament.

5. Planning of reconversion of the entire economy to war needs, and extension of the special armament industry.

6. Duties as mentioned already under II (b), (3), and (4), together with the War Economy office in the OKW.

In addition to this, but planned to take effect only in case of mobilization, there was collaboration with the following subordinate ministries: a) Ministry of Economics, b) Ministry of Food, c) Ministry of Labor, d) Ministry of Finance, for foreign exchange and purchase of raw materials, e) Ministry of Forestry.

This necessitated, from December 1935 onward, the participation of a GBW deputy for purposes of information in the Belch Defense Commission.

After Dr. Schacht’s retirement from the Reich Ministry of Economics, the GBW became only fiction, because the full powers had been transferred to the Four Year Plan, that is to say, Göring. Only when the powers of the ministry of armament and munitions were extended in August 1943, when it became known as the Ministry for Armament and War Production, was there a revival of the originally planned position of the GBW entailing full powers in time of war, but he remained subordinate as regards organization to the Four Year Plan, with the Führer as the general authority in reality at the top, owing to the failure of the Four Year Plan.

III. In collaboration of the GBW with the War Economy Office in the OKW the “Mobilization Plan for Rearmament” had been set up, with General Thomas presiding. This “Mobilization Plan for Rearmament” acted on behalf of the Armed Forces and the GBW who supplied particulars of the industrial plants to be assigned from general production for reconversion to armament production in time of war. It was to attend to:

(a) labor requirements, (b) raw material requirements, and (c) industrial equipment (special machinery for weapons, et cetera).

The prerequisite of modern warfare is not so much the exploitation and organization of the manpower of a country into military formations, but it is essentially a problem of industrial capacity and of its appropriate utilization for the production of all necessary raw materials. This process must of necessity precede any rearmament, and requires expenditure of money and, even more, of time.

When Germany proclaimed her equal rights as regards defense—that is, military sovereignty—she did not possess the necessary resources for a material rearmament, as they had been taken away in the execution and recognition of the disarmament plan. It has been confirmed here during the Trial by various sources that first 10, then 7 to 8 years were allowed and anticipated for providing material equipment in the form of hitherto prohibited modern weapons and supplies, especially including munitions, for the peacetime Armed Forces which had been announced to the world with the proclamation of liberty for national defense in 1935. This becomes comprehensible if one considers that even the U.S.A. with its unlimited means, which were not impaired by the effects of war, required 4 to 5 years for the necessary conversion and rearmament in this war. Thus we see that rearmament, if it is intended to exceed the limits of defensive armament, can only be achieved gradually in the case of nations, which—like Germany in 1934—had no armaments.

First stage:	Procuring of essentials with regard to industries and raw materials for the production of war supplies.
Second stage:	Placing of orders with the armament industry for the first equipment of the peacetime strength of the Armed Forces and execution of these orders within the framework of the means provided by the annual budgets.
Third stage:	Procurement of the munition and weapon supplies to be stored for the equipment of a mobile Armed Forces which would be developed, in the case of war, from the permanent peacetime strength in accordance with the manpower capacity of a nation. Those supplies would include the necessary replacements during the war.

If one considers that in 1934 Germany had no modern weapons, no submarines, and no military aircraft at her disposal, it can well be believed that any reasonable soldier had to assume under the given circumstances there could be no thought of a war, let alone a war of aggression.

Accordingly, the tasks which the Defendant Keitel assumed in his official capacity of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Department must be considered as purely preparatory and organizational. Keitel, of course, bears the responsibility for General Thomas, Chief of the Defense Economy Staff. The technical details and the extent of his activity can be seen from Document 2353-PS, which is correct in essence despite the fact that Thomas, in the declaration prefixed to this historical document, now wants it to look as if he had presented his original notes in an exaggerated way and given them a more favorable turn to please Hitler and avoid arrest. This does not correspond to the facts. What Thomas wrote proves, according to the Defendant Keitel’s opinion, that a “war armament” with mobilization of the industrial capacity and its conversion to war economy did not begin until early in October 1939. It further proves that the statements of the defendants who were examined here, as far as they were connected with this rearmament, and especially those of Dr. Schacht until 1937, are in complete agreement on the following point: At this period wars of aggression were not avowedly desired, and that in the light of the state of actual armament they must have appeared impossible.

But rearmament in manpower also shows the same picture during this period. The evidence has demonstrated that up to the spring of 1938 only 27 peacetime divisions were scantily equipped and that 10 or 12 reserve divisions were in preparation; at that time the Wehrmacht had no other supplies or armaments at its disposal. If despite this fact, and operating without general mobilization, it succeeded by the autumn of 1938 in preparing an army of almost 40 divisions for the aggression against Czechoslovakia, at a time when it had the poorest protection on its western border, one can see what the maximum war potential was in those days.

Under such circumstances, and with knowledge of the armament situation and war potentials of neighboring countries which were mutually united by alliances and assistance pacts, none of the generals of the old school could ever think of bringing about a war. The fact that already one year later, in 1939, the state of German armaments was substantially improved, must primarily be attributed to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Finally it must be pointed out that during this period there was no strategic plan for any aggression whatsoever. General Jodl has declared on the witness stand that when in 1935 he came to the Armed Forces Department, no plan nor anything similar was in existence, except what was provided for in case of internal unrest. The occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland zone was not planned, but was improvised by Hitler. The Initial Assembly and Combat Directives of June 1937 is a general instruction for possible military conflicts.

For the sake of completeness I must also call attention to Document EC-194. This is an order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Von Blomberg, on the subject of aerial reconnaissance and the observation of submarine movements during the occupation of the Rhine. Keitel signed and forwarded this order. It is the only existent document of that period.

The Reichswehr had a permanent force of 100,000 men, as had been laid down by the Treaty of Versailles. It is indisputable that in view of the size of the Reich, its unprotected borders and the way East Prussia was cut off, this figure was absolutely inadequate for creating a feeling of internal security and the possibility of defense in the face of an attack from the outside world—an elementary right for any country and nation. This state of inadequacy, which had been created by the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, was the subject of reflection even before 1933 with a view to improving it without actually making use of soldiers for the purpose. An examination was made and it was found that in case of mobilization a series of tasks could be taken over by the civil ministries. Here tasks of a purely defensive nature were concerned, which cannot be considered aggressive. They were tasks of national defense, and principally the following: I have enumerated them in my manuscript and, without reading them, I would like the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of these points. As it is quite clear these are matters for defense only.

(1) Protection of the frontiers by reinforcement of the customs service;

(2) Postal security by Reichspost agencies (repeater offices);

(3) Railroad protection by Reichsbahn personnel;

(4) Laying of cables instead of overhead telegraph lines;

(5) Construction of railroad viaducts and elimination of level crossings on main traffic roads;

(6) Construction of frontier fortifications in the East, Oder-Warthe line, Pomeranian line, Oder line (terrain expropriation);

(7) Improvement of maritime traffic with East Prussia and of rail transit through the Corridor;

(8) Fortifications in East Prussia;

(9) Reinforcement of frontier protection in East Prussia;

(10) Preparation by the Reichsbahn of mobile loading ramps;

(11) Reinforcement of the coastal customs service;

(12) Development by the Reichspost of the radio network (amplified transmitters and receivers);

(13) Manning of permanent army signal stations with Reichspost personnel;

(14) Relieving the Reichswehr from the charge of detaching soldiers for duties which can be carried out by civilian personnel;

(15) Protection of frontier crossings by the local authorities (Landräte);

(16) Co-ordination of motor vehicles, et cetera.

The advisory body for these tasks and their execution was, up to 1933, the Committee of Experts. It consisted of experts coming from the different civil ministries, who after being accepted by the Minister of the Interior—Severing, up to the end of 1933—met for conferences at the Reich Defense Ministry. The Reichswehr Minister charged the then Colonel Keitel to direct these meetings. At these meetings the experts received and discussed the desires of the Reich Defense Ministry as regards the afore-mentioned tasks, which the individual ministers could take over in case of a mobilization.

During Minister Severing’s time this co-operation worked without friction with the idea of satisfying as far as possible the wishes of the Reichswehr Minister, and it continued in the same way after 30 January 1933. The scope and content of the tasks remained the same. When, on 4 April 1933, a Reich Defense Council was established by a resolution of Hitler’s new Reich Government, the committee was retained and only its name was changed: The Committee of Experts became the Reich Defense Committee. However, it did not change its field of action and was not given any new jurisdiction. It only grew in size as it went on developing, especially after the introduction of compulsory military service. Now, as before, the Reich Defense Committee was a body which had to give advice about those tasks of national defense concerning the civilian sector which had to be prepared and also partly taken over by the civil ministries. For this Count of the Indictment it must be made quite clear that after 4 April 1933 Keitel’s position did not change either, and especially that he was not a member of the Reich Defense Council.

The Reich Defense Council, which has taken up a lot of space in the statements of the Prosecution, may be considered as virtually nonexistent in the light of the evidence produced—later on I will come back to the time after 1938. In any case the Prosecution could not prove that there was any session of the Reich Defense Council during this period. The minutes submitted dealt without exception with the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee, and the members of this committee reported to their competent ministries, who in turn had an opportunity, within the framework of the cabinet, to translate into concrete form the suggestions and proposals discussed in the Reich Defense Committee. Thus there were never any sessions of the Reich Defense Council whose existence was merely formal, so that witnesses could rightly say that the Reich Defense Council existed only on paper.

Keitel, up to 30 September 1933, as colonel and section chief in the Reich Defense Ministry, and later from October 1935 as major general and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry, was a member of the Reich Defense Committee. Therefore, from 30 September 1933 to 30 September 1935 he was not in the War Ministry, and thus had no function connected with this Count of the Indictment. Neither did he during this time participate in sessions of the Reich Defense Committee, the minutes of which have been presented by the Prosecution as having special probative value. The session of 22 May 1933, described as the second session of the working Committee of Experts, was the last session in which Keitel participated before being transferred to serve with the troops. The first session after his transfer to the Reich War Ministry was held on 6 September 1935. It is put down as the 11th session of the Reich Defense Committee. Although in the examination of Keitel’s responsibility one has to exclude the work done by the Reich Defense Committee during the two years between sessions 3 and 10, I will nevertheless make it the subject of my statements, as it is from these very minutes that one can see what the Reich Defense Committee was doing.

Only the knowledge of these minutes makes it clear why an institution, which in this or some other form exists in every country and which serves the purpose of national defense as deemed legitimate by every country, has now been presented as an important factor in submitting evidence on plans and preparations for aggression.

The minutes of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee in 1933, 1934, and 1935 reveal the character of the work as that of preparations for the event of war. But it is likewise evident that it is a question of preparations intended to bring about a more perfect degree of readiness in national defense in case of mobilization. If the “political situation” is twice mentioned, these allusions indicate the fear of military sanctions from neighboring states. (Reference is made to the case of Abyssinia, which led to sanctions against Italy.) Everything is rooted in the thought of overcoming that state of military impotency which made it impossible to safeguard the open frontiers of the Reich.

The recurring idea of obligation to secrecy can only be attributed to fear arising from the situation at the time lest the revelation of measures, however defensive, might produce preventive measures on the part of the victorious powers.

That these suspicions were well-founded is shown by the intransigent attitude of certain states after the complete disarmament of Germany, and this question is important for Keitel’s attitude, for he affirms that the conclusion drawn from the obligation to secrecy, namely, that secrecy is a proof of bad conscience, and bad conscience is a proof of knowledge of illegality, is erroneous.

The Reich Defense Committee never passed resolutions; it was an advisory body on matters of national defense insofar as the civilian sector was concerned with mobilization. At no time did it ever indulge in deliberations concerning rearmament as regards manpower or material, or concerning plans of aggression. The Prosecution has tried in one instance to show that the Reich Defense Committee was involved in plans for aggression.

I do not wish to read the next few sentences. Here we deal with the well-known event of freeing the River Rhine for traffic, a question which was designated as the technical liberation of the Rhine River. This came up in Göring’s testimony.

They pointed out Document Number EC-405, the minutes of the Committee for Reich Defense, session of 26 June 1934, in which there is mention of “participation in preparing mobilization.” In these minutes under (c) can be found: “Preparation for the liberation of the Rhine.” From this the prosecuting authorities have drawn the conclusion that already on 26 June 1934 the Reich Defense Committee was contemplating the “liberation of the Rhine.” The witness Reich Marshal Göring has stated during his hearing that, given the unequivocal wording of the German text, it is a question here of the technical freeing of the river Rhine, but not of any strategic or political matter. I am mentioning this manifest error by the prosecuting authorities, which can only have occurred through a gross mistake in translation, because it has led to an erroneous conception of the prosecution as to the competence of the Reich Defense Committee, and because it is the only case which has come up in connection with this complex.

The true nature of the Reich Defense Committee’s activities is set out quite simply and clearly in the Manual of Mobilization for the Civilian Administration; Documents 1639-PS and 1639a-PS. It refers to the result of discussions between all the experts of the Reich Defense Committee, and is an appendix to the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces as well as to that of armaments.

These three mobilization plans all taken together form the basis of your decision. You may see from them whether the Prosecution is right in its assumption of a total planning for aggressive war, or whether the Defendant Keitel was right when he stated during his hearing:

“What has been discussed and planned here is what every country is entitled to do and what the responsible agencies are bound to do, if they do not wish to violate their most sacred duty, namely the safeguarding of the security of their country.”

The decision of 4 February 1938 was fateful for General Keitel as well as for the German Wehrmacht: for Keitel who could not yet form an opinion on the newly-created office of the “High Command of the Armed Forces” (OKW) for the Armed Forces which on that day lost its relative independence.

Hitler broke down the last barriers between himself and the Armed Forces—the nation in arms—by removing both the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the constitutionally responsible Reich War Minister. This truly portentous decision was fatal for Keitel and the German nation, though at the time of its occurrence this was not realized by the participants. That they must be blamed for not realizing it is easy to say now, in retrospect.

At the time everybody who was not an inveterate skeptic or pessimist had to base his judgment on the development of things in general and on the strength of the personalities involved. Neither the one nor the other could be clearly appreciated on 4 February 1938.

It was not a personal decision of the Defendant Keitel who did not know Hitler personally in these days and who met him for the first time man to man in the preliminary discussions. Hitler assigned him to the newly-created office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Keitel accepted it. Even if we disregard entirely the human emotions connected with such a brilliant promotion there was no reasonable ground for the then Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry to decline the offer, since Von Blomberg himself had recommended him. Hitler’s ideas about this office could not be discerned by Keitel. I shall pass to the next page...

The decree gave Keitel a wonderfully impressive office name as “Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.” The historical foundation is the elimination of the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces, which up to 4 February 1938 was in the hands of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and on that day was taken over by Hitler himself. Hitler created at the same time the responsible Ministry of War, which up to that time had also been administrated by Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Dr. Lammers says the following about the origin of the Führer’s Decree of 4 February 1938: (Morning Session of 8 April 1946; Volume XI, Page 29.)

“The Führer informed me that the Reich Minister of War, Von Blomberg, is resigning his office and that he avails himself of this opportunity to make some other changes in the Reich Government, particularly since the Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, is going to retire, which will make a change; there is also a change in the High Command of the Army. In this connection the Führer gave orders for a decree to be worked out regarding the Command of the Armed Forces. It was to be merged with the Ministry of War. As a directive the Führer gave me the following instruction:

“In the future I shall not have any War Minister; neither will I have in the future a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to stand between me, as the Supreme Commander, and the other commanders-in-chief within the Armed Forces.

“In accordance with this instruction the decree was formulated, by which the High Command of the Armed Forces was established as an Army Staff directly subordinate to the command of the Führer. The Führer did not want any independent office in this function, inserted between himself and the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces branches. In consequence, General Keitel, now appointed Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, had no independent commanding authority over the different branches of the Armed Forces. Such authority would not have been considered for other reasons as well.”

Field Marshal Von Blomberg declares in the affidavit I have submitted: To Question 24:

“At our last discussion Hitler pointed out that he presumably would not fill my position again, and that he would thereby become himself the real Supreme Commander of the German Army...

“He asked for a suggestion for the assignment of a Chef du Bureau who would direct and carry out current tasks under him and thus under Hitler’s responsibility.

“I named Keitel, who, under me, had administered this office very capably.”

In answer to Question 27:

“I proposed Keitel as Chef du Bureau, believing that I had put him in the right job.”

In such a position he would not be a military adviser to Hitler. Whether and in how far Hitler ever asked for his advice, I do not know. Even so, Keitel’s responsibility, in my opinion, would not thereby be established.

Question 29:

“Was it not Hitler’s intention to create a tool for himself in the person of Keitel, whose capacity for organization and hard work seemed to him valuable, as an executive organ for his decisions and orders?

“Answer: This question is emphatically confirmed by me. Hitler’s original intention at that time was most certainly to have at his disposal a trustworthy subordinate organ, and in no way an adviser endowed with any responsibility.”

The decree of 4 February 1938 regarding leadership in the Armed Forces is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, I do not need to read it to you. One sees from this and from the hearing of witnesses regarding the position of the Defendant Keitel and questions of his competence and responsibility, that:

(1) Hitler did not want either a responsible War Ministry or any other person but himself to exercise the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces. He united in his own person both these institutions by declaring that, in regard to the commanding authority, he would from now on exercise this directly and personally, as well as the functions of the Reich War Ministry which were to be administered by Keitel under his instructions.

(2) Hitler thus created a military staff for a military-technical program. He designated it the High Command of the Armed Forces. This “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht” was therefore nothing more—and, I may add, no less—than the military chancellery of the Führer and Supreme Commander. Such chancelleries already existed as Reich Chancellery, Presidential Chancellery, and Party Chancellery. The Defendant Keitel was assigned to the post of chief of the military chancellery with the title of Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (for short, Chief OKW).

(3) Hence it follows that the OKW was not intended to be an intermediary agency between the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the three Armed Forces’ sections. The assumption to the contrary held by the Prosecution, which is based on a graphic representation, is founded upon an erroneous opinion.

An independent intermediary level between the Supreme Commander and the three Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force such as existed before 4 February 1938 no longer existed. The OKW, in which the Defendant Keitel was the Chief of Staff, was no independent military agency or authority, but exclusively Hitler’s military-technical staff and his War Ministry office. The OKW had no independent authority whatsoever, neither the power to issue orders nor the command authority. Therefore, the OKW could not issue its own orders. On the contrary, all instructions, decrees, general directions, or orders issued by the OKW were the expression of the desires of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches were always aware of the fact that no intermediary level existed between them and the Supreme Commander, and they never considered or recognized the OKW as such. This is confirmed by the affidavits of the Codefendants Admiral Dönitz and Admiral Raeder, as well as by the testimony of Reich Marshal Göring and Dr. Lammers.

The idea that the OKW, or the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, would have had authority to issue instructions or orders independently is therefore erroneous. All official business, oral or in writing, which went beyond an exchange of ideas with other military agencies or authorities, was subject to the exclusive decision of the Supreme Commander himself. The OKW was merely the executive staff of the Supreme Commander.

(4) Therefore, when documents issued by the Supreme Commander or by the OKW show signatures or initials of the Defendant Keitel, or of a chief of office or section chief, one must not draw the conclusion that the persons concerned had authority to issue orders independently. In each instance it was merely a case of noting, forwarding, or transmitting the orders of the Supreme Commander himself. Because of the demands made on Hitler’s time in his positions as head of State, Reich Chancellor, Party Leader, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, it was not always possible to obtain his personal signature, unless it concerned fundamental matters of unusual significance. It must be noted that in all cases Hitler’s personal decision or approval had to be obtained.

Such being the state of affairs, we cannot accept the Prosecution’s argument that because the Defendant Keitel signed or initialed documents he is co-responsible for their actual contents. It would be arbitrary to infer the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel as chief of the military chancellery because he forwarded or signed orders, instructions, and so on, a responsibility which in my opinion can be charged only to the person who promulgates the order by virtue of his authority.

A real responsibility for this could be laid upon the Defendant Keitel only in case it were proved that he willfully participated in drawing up these orders, instructions, et cetera.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, would that be a convenient time to break off?

[A recess was taken.]

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): Gentlemen, Counsel for the Defense have presented a request to the French Prosecution to have certain documents communicated to them. This request is divided into two parts.

The first part concerns the Scapini incident, which arose from the publication of a document in the course of my own statement. I am able to communicate to the Defense the answer which the French Government has made to its request.

The French Government has found in the archives left behind by the German authorities the answer which was made to the protest raised at the time of the massacre of French prisoners. It is, by the way, a purely dilatory answer. The German authorities replied that the Armistice Commission was not competent; that the request must be made by the Scapini Embassy. I have handed this document to the Defense and I think that the incident is closed.

The second part of defense counsel’s request concerns a statement made by my colleague, M. Edgar Faure, who at the beginning of his speech announced to the Tribunal that he had examined approximately 2,500 documents, of which he had retained only 200. I can, of course, not answer on behalf of M. Edgar Faure. I only know that the French Delegation has only a total of 800 documents in its archives, and has submitted them all to the Tribunal and to the Defense. I therefore think that it is merely oratorical hyperbole and that my colleague wished to allude to covering letters which were of no importance. In any case, I had previously informed defense counsel Dr. Nelte that all the documents of our delegation were open for him to see and that he would be able to verify that we had no other documents than those which we had published.

On the other hand, the requests which we forwarded to Paris to have complementary documents which might have been forgotten sent to us have all been in vain. We therefore conclude that we have here all the documents which we could make use of in this Trial.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am grateful to the French Delegation for the explanation given now regarding the complaint I made this morning. If I had had that explanation a few days earlier, what happened this morning would not have occurred. I regret it very much indeed.

I continue on Page 64 to the effect that Keitel co-operated in drawing up orders. In order to clarify this as much as possible I would like furthermore to point out the following:

The “instructions,” which were of fundamental significance for the planning of military operations, are operational orders issued to the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches by the Supreme Commander in this capacity. Before these instructions were drawn up Hitler discussed the military-technical aspect of each order with the competent OKW experts and also with the Defendant Keitel. The instructions, aside from opinions manifested by the individual experts, were exclusively the expression of the Supreme Commander’s wishes, and they were not directed to the OKW but to the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches, to whom they were forwarded through the OKW. The three Armed Forces’ branches on their part ordered, on the basis of the general instructions, the details incident to their execution. Therefore, I shall not refer in this connection to the statement of the Charter according to which the carrying-out of orders is not accepted as a ground for exemption from punishment. For the transmission of the order was not an order issued by the OKW to the Armed Forces’ branches, but the forwarding of the expression of the wishes of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The order directed to the OKW, if you will, referred in all cases to the elaboration of some desire expressed by the Supreme Commander and to the purely external act of transmitting the finished idea without having authority of expressing an opinion thereon. It must be assumed that the Prosecution, perhaps influenced by the defendant’s rank of Field Marshal, did not appreciate correctly this position of the Defendant Keitel. This rank had no relationship to the real authority of the defendant to issue military orders. One is inclined to imagine that a Field Marshal is a military commander. However, as we have seen, the Defendant Keitel had no command authority whatsoever.

Field Marshal Von Blomberg, whose testimony has been submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution, defines the position of the Defendant Keitel as Chef du Bureau. This definition is materially correct. A Chef du Bureau has to see to it that the bureau which he directs operates properly; that the affairs are correctly and promptly attended to by the competent officials. But he does not participate in the final decisions deemed correct by his superior, in this case the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. If this principle holds true in general, it is especially true here. It is known that Hitler did not accept any advice from Keitel concerning military decisions. This has been proved by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of General Jodl.

The Defendant Keitel has clearly outlined in Affidavit Number 8, called “Coordination in the State and in the Armed Forces,” his activity and that of the OKW. The affidavit gives an idea of the difficult and thankless work of the Defendant Keitel. It consisted mainly of a co-ordination of the desires and needs of the Armed Forces’ branches. It consisted, furthermore, in reconciling, divergencies as they arose and in the struggle against Hitler’s negative attitude toward any proper procedure, that is to say, through the competent departments.

In every branch of the Armed Forces there exist interests which differ from the interests of other branches and which cannot be entirely satisfied; sometimes they even oppose each other. This is true especially for the replacement of personnel, but also for the supply of everything that is required for special warfare.

The point of intersection of all these factual and personal differences of opinion was the OKW.

If one desires to estimate properly the incontestable fact that the Defendant Keitel was shown hostility and was personally judged unfavorably by nearly all sides, one must note that this fact occurred as a necessary result of the overlapping of factually opposing interests and personal differences of opinion, which Keitel tried to settle by means of co-ordination or mediation, that is, in nearly all cases by means of compromise. No particular personal experience is needed in order to know that the objective mediator will always incur the ingratitude of both parties. The same picture becomes evident in the relationship to the numerous offices which were endowed with special official authorities or which had Hitler’s favor and special confidence for personal, mostly Party political, reasons. One must realize these differences and overlapping interests to appreciate the heavy burden involved in Keitel’s position and, I might add, in order to judge correctly the significance of his position.

It is difficult to realize the special relationship between the leadership of the Armed Forces and the political sector because the functions of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, of Reich War Minister and of head of State were from 4 February 1938 all embodied in the person of Hitler.

Therefore, since 4 February 1938, complete accord existed between the political leadership and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces since both powers resided in one and the same person.

The assumption of the Prosecution that the chief of Hitler’s military staff was closely connected with his superior Hitler and must therefore also be held responsible for political questions, if not as the perpetrator, then in some form as provided in Article 6 of the Charter, is erroneous.

In this connection there is no need to enter into the hierarchy of the Führer State and the binding character of the Führer order. The military hierarchy is older than the National Socialist ideology; moreover it must be stated and taken into consideration that the introduction of the absolute Leadership Principle into the Armed Forces signifies the final elimination of all efforts which could perhaps be regarded as democratic in a certain sense, or in any case as a restraint on the dictatorial appetite of Hitler. In this connection I refer to the affidavit of Keitel, Document Book 2, Number 9, “The OKW and the General Staff.” The rigid application of the Leadership Principle, judged retrospectively, gradually adulterated the healthy military principle of obedience into immoderate militarism. This found its expression, among other things, in the prohibition of all criticism, from the highest authorities to the lowest. I refer you to the speech made, by Hitler in the Kroll Opera House in 1937 or 1936, also to the critical marginal note—statement of General Winter—in the decree prohibiting applications for release on the part of the generals in 1938, and finally to the removal of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the War Minister.

It cannot and shall not be denied that the Defendant Keitel was absolutely in favor of the Leadership Principle in the leadership of the Armed Forces and that the essay “Foundations of the Organization of the German Armed Forces” (L-211) can be regarded as a contribution to the conduct of a future war—not, however, that an actual war was anticipated at that time or that it was the reason for this essay.

What does this mean in regard to the Defendant Keitel? Anyone recognizing the Leadership Principle as being militarily correct must act accordingly. Professor Jahrreiss has stated that the Leadership Principle, like every other political system, is not absolutely good or bad, but that everything depends on the manner and methods used in applying it.

Keitel has a military background and favors the Leadership Principle for the field he knows. According to this principle the responsibility lies completely with the one who has authority to command. While the Leadership Principle in fact hardly underwent any change in the civilian areas where it was also applied, though superficially, this principle necessarily made itself felt much more strongly in the military sphere, particularly in the relationship between the commanders-in-chief and their chiefs of the General Staff.

Formerly the chiefs of the General Staff had been the really responsible commanders, now they became the operational assistants to the commanders-in-chief. In the formulation of orders they were “collaborating advisers” in the field of strategic operations, for which these officers had been especially trained. Keitel was neither a commander-in-chief nor a chief of the General Staff; he was the chief of the military chancellery under Hitler, a soldier and an administrator of war-ministerial duties, therefore a “minister,” claims the Prosecution.

One should not refer in this Trial to formal distinctions when the real functions give another picture. This is particularly important in the case of Keitel. It should be determined what he actually was and how he acted in reality.

The dual position created by the decree of 4 February 1938 has led to an erroneous conception of Keitel’s functions. We assume that Hitler dissolved the Reich War Ministry because he no longer wished to have a War Minister; in spite of the fact that on 4 February 1938 a considerable number of functions up to then handled by the Reich War Ministry had been assigned to the individual Armed Forces’ branches, there were a number of functions which had to be retained and administered in the OKW.

But taking into account the idea of an intended strict concentration of functions pertaining to the conduct of the war, Keitel was unable to deal even with those on the basis of complete authority and according to his own judgment, but had to present the demands of the Armed Forces and co-ordinate the Armed Forces’ affairs with the tasks of the other ministries.

It cannot and will not be denied that this concentration of duties in the person of Hitler was impracticable. Thus, a huge amount of preparatory and executive work rested with Hitler’s military staff, whose Chief of Staff was Keitel. Hence, it was also responsible, although not with reference to important questions, especially those of a fundamental nature. It was, of course, a matter of judgment to what extent the Defendant Keitel considered matters essential and fundamental and submitted them. But the evidence showed that when in doubt about matters, after conscientious examination, Keitel was inclined to present them rather than to make his own decision about them.

The sources from which Hitler obtained his news, through Himmler, Bormann or some other way, were so intricate that Keitel had no way of knowing whether Hitler had the information that seemed to him to be important. To avoid the unavoidable discussions afterward with Hitler who, being distrustful of everyone, always took it for granted that people would intentionally conceal things from him, Keitel was anxious not to leave himself open to the reproach of having omitted anything. A characteristic example is the case of the mass escape of 80 R. A. F. officers from the POW Camp Sagan.

Here the point is simply to show that Keitel in his capacity as guardian of the actual war functions which still remained in the OKW, held no position as a minister. Here, too, he was the Chef du Bureau, the head of the military chancellery, a position which is also held by the chief of a ministerial office, or even a state secretary. I wish to refer again in this connection to Dr. Lammers’ statement, and to the affidavits of Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, which I have already mentioned repeatedly.

The text of the Führer decree of 4 February 1938 shows that Hitler also wished to make this clear. If Hitler had not had the definite desire to exclude everyone else from a responsible, and perhaps for him uncomfortable function in the highest military sector, he might have given Keitel at least the authority to take part in Cabinet meetings. In the Führer decree in which the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy as well as Keitel had been given the “rank” of a Reich minister, it was explicitly ordered that both commanders-in-chief should be entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings. The fact that this was decreed simultaneously is a convincing argumentum e contrario. It proves that Hitler did not wish to give his Chief of Staff of the OKW an opportunity to present his own opinions and possible doubts before the Cabinet. Hitler gave the Defendant Keitel the “rank” of a Reich minister for the purpose of enabling him to carry on direct negotiations with the departmental ministers. Had Keitel not had the rank of a Reich minister, he would have been limited to conferences with state secretaries and the like, and thus be very much handicapped in carrying out the Führer’s orders and his tasks.

It is in error, therefore, that the Prosecution has classified Keitel as a Reich minister “without portfolio.” He was not a minister, nor a member of the Reich Government. State Secretary Stuckart in a document submitted to the Prosecution has listed all members of the Reichsregierung. Keitel is not among them; he is mentioned in this document only as the holder of one of the highest offices.

Now, the Prosecution has not limited the term Reichsregierung to membership in the Reich Cabinet, but considered other committees as part of the Reichsregierung, too. It would seem, therefore, as if the Prosecution looked upon the legal structure based on German law as irrelevant. Pursuant to Appendix B to the general bill of Indictment, the Reichsregierung in the sense of the Indictment is composed of:

1. Members of the regular Cabinet after 30 January 1933, the day Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. The expression “regular Cabinet” used here includes: Reich ministers, that is, heads of departments of the Central Government; Reich ministers without portfolio, ministers of State with the function of Reich ministers, and other officials entitled to participate in the Cabinet meetings.

2. Members of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich.

3. Members of the Secret Cabinet Council.

Regardless of the individual responsibility of every defendant the Tribunal must examine whether the concept of a “Reich Government” as defined by the Prosecution is correct, that is, practical; whether, as to the composition of this group, the Prosecution’s concept of a “Reich Government” appears justified. In any case it is not sufficient to accept as correct the assertion of the Prosecution in this respect.

I assume that my colleague Dr. Kubuschok will enlarge on this during his case.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal feels that you are taking a very long time over this question of whether Keitel was—what his exact position was.

DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, that the Prosecution also took a great deal of time to make clear what position Field Marshal Keitel occupied in their opinion. He is not here as Field Marshal, but as the Chief of the OKW.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if they have, I must confess that I have forgotten. It seems to me and the Tribunal generally that you are taking up far too long on this topic. You have got many other topics which are of very great importance to the defendant, and you have already been speaking for several hours, and you occupied a large number of pages in order to try and define what Keitel’s position was. I thought you might be able to cut it down.

DR. NELTE: I shall try.

I have explained that Defendant Keitel did not belong to Group 1; that is to say, that he was not a minister.

He was neither chief of a Government department, nor a Reich minister without portfolio, nor a state minister having the functions of a Reich minister, nor an official who was entitled to attend Cabinet sessions.

In the hearing of evidence it was proved that despite the Führer Decree of 4 February 1938 there never existed a Secret Cabinet Council; that such council was never set up; that it never held a session; and that no persons involved ever received a commission. Thus, it is proved that the defendant was also never a member of the Secret Cabinet Council.

It is true that Keitel was a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. Witness Dr. Lammers has confirmed that the fact of his becoming a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich did not change Keitel’s official position, and especially did not make him a minister. In his affidavit of 25 November 1945, Codefendant Dr. Frick says that Keitel worked in the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich as “liaison man.”

Although he is not listed among the members of the Reich Cabinet, Keitel’s capacities as a member of the so-called “Dreimänner-Kollegium” (Three Man College) and as a member of the Reich Defense Council have been mentioned by the Prosecution. I believe I may refer to the result of the hearing of evidence. It was shown that a Three Man College as a Government committee never existed, and that the Reich Defense Council, after the unpublished Reich Defense Law of 1938, never held sessions, or in any case that it never held conferences, or passed resolutions.

In order to clarify the Defendant Keitel’s responsibility and competence it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask that this statement be not considered a theoretical and therefore superfluous discussion. The very fact that the Prosecution makes a sweeping and fundamental assertion...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, may I ask what you have been doing if you have not been analyzing the concept of the OKW?

DR. NELTE: Up to now I have explained Keitel’s position as Chief of the OKW. In statements on Page 74 and the following pages I wanted to explain to you that the Prosecution, and others as well, have talked about the OKW: and “OKW” is a word which has three different types of significance.

Mr. President, if you will be good enough to permit me to submit this in its written form, and if you would consider it as having been presented in Court, then I am willing to leave out the pages up to 77 and submit them to you. In any case, it appears to me to be an important part of the explanation regarding the interpretation of the word “OKW,” and the fact that this is not identical with Keitel is particularly important.

May I do that?

[The President nodded his assent.]

In that case, then, I shall continue at Page 77.

In order to clarify the Defendant Keitel’s responsibility and competence it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask that this statement be not considered a theoretical and therefore superfluous discussion. The very fact that the Prosecution makes a sweeping and fundamental assertion, and that the French Prosecution undertakes a pointedly legal examination of the question as to the office in which each defendant was active with regard to the counts he is charged with, makes it my duty to clear up a mistake made by the Prosecution. However, this mistake is all the more excusable, because not only foreign countries but large groups at home, even within the Armed Forces, did not know what OKW meant. It became a popular collective term for the supreme command of the Armed Forces without anybody taking the trouble to find out who and what was behind the three words “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.” This corresponds to the law of inertia governing the association of human beings, to the almost pathological mania to abbreviate titles of military commands. Since, furthermore, the communiqués of the High Command of the Armed Forces were published daily, and all announcements referring to war events began with the words: “The High Command of the Armed Forces announces,” not only did these words become impressed upon the public’s mind, but also the conception that the “High Command of the Armed Forces” was the supreme military command. The conception would be correct had the words OKW not been translated with Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) but rather as Supreme Commander (Oberkommandierender) of the Armed Forces. It was Hitler alone, as “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” who was the incarnation of what everybody imagined the OKW to be, namely, the central military planning and command headquarters and thus the supreme command and executive headquarters for all military matters. In this respect the OKW was synonymous with Hitler as “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” which was his official title.

If, in naming the headquarters of the supreme commander, it was desired to avoid the title “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” which was in accordance with the prevalent Leadership Principle, the title “Oberkommando der Wehrmacht” was bound to be used. This headquarters comprises the supreme commander himself, that is, Hitler, and his assistants, his staff.

The Führer Decree of 4 February 1938 bearing the heading: “Decree concerning the Command of the Armed Forces” resulted, through the unfortunate and vague nature of its wording, in an interpretation that the “Chief OKW” mentioned therein was the chief in the sense of director, of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is true that it follows from the decree that “Chief OKW” is to mean “Chief of Staff OKW,” that is chief of Hitler’s bureau in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. But since then, every time that people have spoken and speak of the OKW, everybody thinks of Keitel without examining whether the expression means: OKW-Oberkommandierender (Supreme Commander) of the Armed Forces, OKW-Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, or OKW-Staff of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

The Prosecution makes no distinction in this respect, just as the German agencies were unaware of the exact difference, or at any rate paid no attention to it. They, just like the Prosecution now, thought it right to claim the OKW’s jurisdiction and responsibility for anything having a connection with the Armed Forces or members of the Armed Forces. From this viewpoint to claiming Keitel’s personal jurisdiction by virtue of the title “Chief OKW” there is only a short step. For Germans and foreigners the recollection of the first World War was a contributing factor in forming this opinion, which was not based on an examination according to constitutional law. The relationship between Hitler and Keitel prompted the comparison with the relationship between the Kaiser and Von Hindenburg. This comparison had results for the Defendant Keitel which are shown at this Trial. Without thinking of the fundamental differences between Von Hindenburg as Chief of the Great General Staff which existed until 1918, and Keitel as the chief of Hitler’s military executive staff, and without knowing the field of Keitel’s jurisdiction and what possibilities Keitel had as regards Hitler’s plans and measures by virtue of the functions assigned to him, comparisons were made which gave rise to doubts about him. When furthermore—after the catastrophe had set in—Keitel once again came to play an outwardly similar part as representative of the Armed Forces when he had to execute the signature for unconditional surrender, this comparison also turned out to his disadvantage. People do not ask about jurisdiction when things go badly, but look for a guilty person and the guilty person is judged by external appearances. Quite naturally the great attention paid to Keitel’s person at this Trial can largely be traced to the fact that after Hitler’s death Keitel came into the public eye.

In order to see clearly what part Keitel really played, and what share he had in what happened, I now wish—after investigating his legal competencies—to examine what actual influence he had upon the development and carrying-out of the measures, the effects of which constitute the subject of this Trial. From everyday experience we know that it does not matter so much what a person is supposed to be in a particular position, but what he has made of that position by virtue of his personality. I believe I may say that in the course of this Trial the personality of no other defendant has been judged in such varying and contradictory ways as that of the Defendant Keitel.

Decisive for Keitel’s material responsibility is his actual position in the tug-of-war with and around Hitler, his effective influence upon that group, and thus on those circumstances as a whole which could have influenced the operations of Hitler’s headquarters in the military field.

I shall deal with this fundamental topic when taking up the charges made by the Prosecution against Keitel and other defendants on the strength of the cross-examination of Dr. Gisevius, in other words, after the presentation of evidence for Keitel has been completed.

In view of the comprehensive scope of Justice Jackson’s questions and the answers given thereto by Dr. Gisevius, the testimony of Dr. Gisevius has become of tremendous importance in the case of the Defendant Keitel. Had Dr. Gisevius’ statements about Keitel been true—that is, statements made by him on the basis of information, in most instances in terms of conclusive findings—the Defendant Keitel could not have told the truth during the presentation of evidence. The importance of that fact becomes evident when it is considered that a negative opinion on truthfulness would of necessity destroy Keitel’s defense, which in its essence draws on the subjective aspect of facts as a whole. In view of this fact and the importance of the testimony of Dr. Gisevius also for other defendants, it becomes my duty to explain the contrast between Keitel’s answers and the testimony of the witness Gisevius.

Experience teaches us that dead witnesses are the best witnesses, because their purported utterances cannot be directly refuted. Evidence on the strength of information belongs to another group of statements which almost defy refutation. The testimony of Gisevius combines both possibilities, in that he bases his testimony primarily on information obtained from witnesses who are dead. Justice Jackson used Dr. Gisevius as star witness in his comprehensive attack on the Defendant Keitel. After the completion of the presentation of evidence against Keitel, he did not bring forward one individual circumstance, but an Indictment on all Counts and a general judgment, on Keitel’s answers.

The counterevidence is concerned with proving the objective incorrectness of facts based upon information obtained from certain individuals and further, with establishing proof of the unreliability of the information. I call to mind the words which the Defendant Keitel said under oath upon completion of his direct examination by me while in the witness box:

“One may hold it against me that I was wrong and made mistakes, that my attitude toward the Führer Adolf Hitler was wrong and weak, but it should not be said of me that I was a coward, that I was untruthful, and that I was disloyal.”

I sum up in condensed form the charges made against the Defendant Keitel during interrogation by the Prosecution, as follows:

(1) Keitel built an impenetrable ring round Hitler so that the latter could be told nothing.

(2) Keitel failed to pass on to Hitler reports he had received from Canaris whenever they concerned atrocities, crimes, and the like, or he gave orders to modify them.

(3) Keitel had a tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army.

(4) Keitel threatened his subordinates, when they made political statements, that he would not protect them; he even said that he would turn them over to the Gestapo.

Dr. Gisevius says in one part of his statement that Keitel had no influence over Hitler. He exonerates Hitler by explaining that Keitel had formed a ring round Hitler, in order that the latter should be told nothing. The British and American Prosecution in their Indictment called Keitel a powerful staff officer who had exerted great influence over Hitler; the French Prosecution described Keitel as a willing tool of Hitler; the German generals called him a “yes man” who could not carry anything through; and now Keitel grows, according to the statement of Dr. Gisevius, into a real handyman and buffer for Hitler, who hid from the latter anything bad, who submitted to him only what he saw fit, and permitted no one to approach Hitler.

To assert that Keitel blocked access to Hitler, can only be maintained by somebody who did not know the conditions prevailing around Hitler. Before the war Keitel worked in Berlin in Bendler Strasse, while Hitler was in Wilhelmstrasse. Keitel came perhaps once a week to report, or on special order. At that time, on account of the distance, it was in fact impossible for Keitel to exert any influence over access to the Führer. It was equally impossible when Hitler was at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden for weeks at a time, while Keitel remained in Berlin.

At the beginning of operations, Keitel was with Jodl and the Armed Forces Operations Staff at the Führer’s headquarters. Here also they were separated. Keitel did not sit in Hitler’s anteroom, but rather in other buildings or barracks. He came from time to time with General Jodl to the conference on the situation, in which, besides Hitler, some 15 or 20 officers of all three branches of the Armed Forces took part. Apart from the conferences on the situation there was no personal contact. When Hitler wanted Keitel for anything he sent for him. Personally and individually there was closer contact in Berlin between Hitler and his adjutants, the Chief of the Party Chancellery, the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. Keitel not only could not decide who should see Hitler, he also could not possibly prevent anybody going to Hitler.

Hitler’s sources of information were the responsible heads of each department; it was occasionally not clear whence Hitler obtained his information, as I have already stated. Gisevius did not know these conditions from his own experience; he himself was never near Keitel, who never saw or spoke to him and did not know his name. When he gave his opinion here, he could only base it on information given him by Canaris, Thomas, and Oster.

General Jodl has been heard regarding this question. He certainly is the best witness in this matter, since he, as well as Keitel, lived in direct proximity to Hitler and therefore could form his own judgment. He stated concerning this matter:

“Unfortunately, it was impossible to keep things from Hitler. Many channels of information led directly to Hitler.”

Upon my interrogation, at the suggestion of the Tribunal, Jodl fully confirmed that what Keitel had testified was quite correct, and that what witness Gisevius stated in this respect was, in general, merely figures of speech.

The Codefendants, Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, have confirmed that the allegation of the witness Gisevius that Keitel was able to keep the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces away from Hitler is false. If, however, this was not the case, it follows that the way from the branches of the Armed Forces to the Führer was open at any time. Through the hearing of witnesses it was also established that apart from Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Canaris in particular had direct access to Hitler. Thus, the accusation of the witness Gisevius that Keitel had formed a ring round Hitler is proved false.

The witness Gisevius has declared that reports were submitted to Keitel by Canaris about atrocities in connection with deportations, extermination of Jews, concentration camps, the persecution of the Church, and the killing of insane persons, all of which Keitel withheld from Hitler. The same is alleged about the reports of General Thomas, Chief of the War Economy Office, the purpose of which was to inform Hitler about the war potential of the enemy and make him listen to reason.

Concerning Admiral Canaris’ reports, it must be said that as chief of espionage and counterintelligence he naturally delivered regular reports which concerned the conduct of the war, including the conduct of economic warfare. It is affirmed that reports were submitted on subjects which belonged neither to the jurisdiction of the Counterintelligence Office nor to that of the OKW. It has been proved that Hitler took strict care that every worker confined himself to his own special field, and it was particularly forbidden for military offices to concern themselves with political affairs.

Keitel has declared under oath that he knew nothing about the atrocities, and especially the extermination of the Jews and the concentration camps. This is in absolute contradiction to the assertion of the witness Gisevius that Canaris submitted reports to the Defendant Keitel on the above-mentioned subjects.

One can assert that reports of any kind whatsoever were delivered to Keitel without fear of being contradicted, especially when one has no fear that these reports will be found. For if they are not delivered they cannot be found, because they do not exist. Now Gisevius has declared that he collected documents from the beginning which contained incriminating material. Is it not remarkable, under these circumstances, that up to now none of these reports have been produced? As far as they were available at the OKW, they have been used in the accusation and as evidence. Can it be sufficient under these circumstances for a witness to declare that he knows from third parties that such reports were submitted to Keitel?

Canaris, because of his particular activity, which took him constantly to foreign countries on personal secret errands for Hitler, had access to Hitler at all times. He would thus have had an opportunity to go to Hitler immediately if he had had such serious misgivings of conscience, as Gisevius has declared he had. Why did he not do so?

Now, Gisevius, who in general has pronounced comprehensive and damning accusations, has, luckily for Keitel, at one point of his deposition made a positive declaration that permits of objective verification. I quote:

“...I believe that I have still two examples to mention, which to me are particularly characteristic: First, the attempt was made by all possible means to induce Field Marshal Keitel to warn Hitler against the invasion of Holland and Belgium, that is, to inform Hitler that the information submitted by Keitel about alleged violations of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was false. The Counterintelligence Office was to prepare reports incriminating the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I request that this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that this report which was ostensibly made by the OKW was false. This is an instance where Herr Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he was supposed to have transmitted...”

I have submitted to General Jodl, here on the witness stand, Document 790-PS, which refers to the case of the White Paper concerning violations of neutrality by Holland and Belgium. Jodl testified literally, and I quote:

“...I understand the question, and would like very briefly to state the facts how it was possible—if disgust does not choke me. I was present when Canaris came to the Field Marshal in the Reich Chancellery with these report notes and laid before him the draft of the Foreign Office’s White Paper. Field Marshal Keitel then looked it through, above all paying attention to the comments which Canaris had made at the request of the Foreign Office, namely, that the reports were perhaps still somewhat in need of improvement, that he should confirm the fact that a military operation against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that, as is expressed here, a final really striking violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said a word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table and said: ‘I refuse to do this, why should I take any responsibility at all for a political decision? In this White Paper there appear word for word, true and correct, the very same reports that you, yourself, Canaris, brought to me.’ To this Canaris said: I am entirely of the same point of view. It is, in my opinion too, entirely superfluous to have this document signed on the part of the Armed Forces, and the reports that we have here are altogether quite sufficient to prove the violations of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and Belgium.’ And he advised Field Marshal Keitel not to sign it at all. That is the way it happened. The Field Marshal then took the paper with him and I do not know what happened subsequently...”

Keitel did not sign the White Paper. Therefore in the only verifiable case a clear proof is obtained of the incorrectness of Gisevius’ testimony.

According to the statement of the witness Gisevius, Keitel exerted a tremendous influence on the OKW and the Army. These words, without any presentation of concrete facts, are only a phrase in the mouth of a man who had no contact whatsoever with Keitel. They are refuted by the statements of Reich Marshal Göring, Admiral Dönitz, and Admiral Raeder. Jodl has defined this statement as merely a figure of speech.

Insofar as the witness speaks of his tremendous influence on the OKW, it must appear questionable what he really means. Naturally, Keitel as Chief of Staff had influence in the OKW, influence which resulted from his position, which I have already discussed. His position in relation to his subordinates will be taken up later. The important thing, however, is whether Keitel had a decisive and culpable influence on what happened. That this was not the case has even been confirmed by Gisevius, and also the fact that he had no decisive influence on the branches of the Armed Forces; it has also been established by the results of the testimony.

A particularly damaging charge against the Defendant Keitel was “that instead of placing himself in front of his subordinate officers to protect them, he threatened to hand them over to the Gestapo.”

In contradiction to this it has been established that no chief of office in the OKW was dismissed in the years up to 1944; furthermore, until 20 July 1944, the day of the attempt on Hitler’s life and the transfer of the judicial power in the home Army to Himmler, no officer of the OKW was turned over to the Police. Admiral Dönitz has confirmed that the branches of the Armed Forces and the OKW were very scrupulous in maintaining the privileges of the Armed Forces in relation to the Police.

The Court has also seen here how General Jodl spoke about his relationship to the Defendant Keitel. I think this remark has a special importance, not only because Keitel lived on companionable and friendly terms with his official subordinate, General Jodl, during their long years of co-operation. As natural as that may appear, the less natural it is if one reflects that Jodl, in spite of his officially subordinate position, in reality became more and more Hitler’s sole strategic adviser. What this means, considering the preponderance of the operational tasks in the war, has been convincingly demonstrated here by General Jodl.

If Keitel accepted this without jealousy, freely acknowledging the superiority of his subordinate Jodl in this domain, this proves that Keitel possessed a trait of character which refutes the information derived from obscure sources by the witness Gisevius.

The proven fact that Keitel lived on friendly and companionable terms with his subordinate Chief of Office, Canaris, is also in contrast with the assertion to the contrary by the witness Gisevius.

In this connection it is necessary to refer to the fact, not submitted by Keitel but testified to by Jodl without Keitel’s consent, that the latter supported and helped Canaris’ family after his arrest. I only refer to this to refute the perhaps most serious personal reproach, according to which Keitel did not behave decently toward his subordinates and abused his superior position—which was especially powerful in military life—even to the point of threatening them with violence.

In reality, according to Gisevius’ evidence, Admiral Canaris not only played a double role officially, but also with respect to the Defendant Keitel; in exploiting the friendship shown to him he expressed a similar attitude, whereas among his own group he openly spoke in a spiteful way about Keitel.

Finally, in this connection reference must still be made to the evidence of the witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels (Session of 8 May 1946) from which it is clear that Keitel always treated the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff kindly.

The witness mentions a quarrel between himself and Lieutenant Colonel Ziervogel on the one hand and Himmler on the other, in which Keitel, to whom the incident was reported, immediately and energetically intervened in writing to protect his subordinates against Himmler. The affidavit of the Chief of Office in Canaris’ office, Admiral Bürckner, to which I refer, testifies in the same way to Keitel’s kindly attitude toward his subordinates. At any rate, it must be said in clarification that Keitel many times had occasion to speak energetically to his office and department chiefs.

I shall then continue by explaining that officers did not generally concern themselves with politics, and that only when the situation became worse did they make political information the subject of their argumentation. And I add that Keitel has, in fact, defined his attitude with words based on the assumption that the soldier in war must declare his faith and obedience, and if Keitel ever heard anything about such matters, he would reprimand these officers.

Dr. Gisevius himself has said here that it was strictly forbidden for officers to concern themselves with political questions. The Defendant Keitel has stated that Hitler several times categorically declared the politicians were not allowed to concern themselves with military questions because they knew nothing of them; neither were the generals allowed to concern themselves with politics, because they knew nothing about that either.

Hitler’s fundamental attitude in this question is shown in the decree dating from 1936, or the winter 1936-37, by which political reports to or for the Armed Forces were prohibited.

In logical execution of Führer Order Number 1, Hitler not only wanted an absolute separation of the fields of activity, but also that no office should ever be informed of the proceedings in another office. It was only a logical consequence that Hitler strictly prohibited any discussion of political questions by officers, and that the Defendant Keitel, while carrying out this prohibition which he himself approved, charged his officers, when there was reason to do so, to refrain from such discussions.

It is obvious that this was not a question of an academic discussion of political problems, but of an attitude revealing itself as negative toward the position of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. As long as there were successes, there was no question of this. After Stalingrad one could hear expressions of opinion, which at that time were characterized by Keitel as the expressions of a weak nature.

In accordance with his fundamental attitude that a soldier in wartime should show unconditional and natural loyalty toward his people and fatherland as represented by the head of the State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (and to an extreme degree when reverses set in), Keitel was actually ruthless in condemning such expressions. He did not wish even to cause the impression that he was of a different opinion than his superior, that he personally had fears.

I now continue at the bottom of Page 19:

Keitel did this with “words.” That does not mean that this was mere camouflage which did not reflect his inner attitude, but it does mean that the manner, perhaps often rough and harsh, in which the Defendant Keitel spoke to his officers, more than once led to an officer being punished or disciplined.

Dr. Gisevius, however, perhaps wanted to suggest that Keitel had dealt with his subordinates in the OKW in a morally reprehensible way.

He did not know the Defendant Keitel personally and therefore cannot give a personal opinion; he had to rely on the information of officers who were strongly opposed to Keitel, without such opposition ever becoming apparent. No one ever contacted Keitel to entice him to join in the conspiracy. That is plausible since the conspirators, knowing the character and the soldierly attitude of Keitel, could not expect any success. Since on the other hand Keitel was completely innocent, which does not need to be proved, the following situation results:

Keitel knew nothing of conspiratorial activities; what he did encounter appeared in the shape of technical objections or personal remarks which were dealt with by Keitel officially and in a cordial manner, as by a superior of whom the subordinates say that he barks but does not bite. On the other side the so-called conspirators had to consider everyone a foe who was not in favor of their own aim. Every move and every word was weighed and critically judged. As every conspirator hopes for the success of his revolutionary activities he has to gather evidence for the coming reckoning. This is, of course, a task for a future police minister and home secretary.

From an impartial estimation of the facts, verified by the evidence presented, it is shown that the accusations arising from the testimony of the witness Gisevius are not correct. But the picture would not be complete if light were not thrown on the personality of the witness Gisevius by his own evidence. This judgment is made up from two factors:

(1) The career and the position of the witness.

(2) The trustworthiness of his information.

On Page 92 of my text I have stated in detail the functions Dr. Gisevius carried out. I have not emphasized anything which, from my point of view, might impeach him in any way for having given the evidence here which you all have heard. I have only impartially confirmed the following:

(a) He evaded military service through falsified papers put at his disposal by Oster.

(b) He lived in Germany during the whole time from 1933 without restriction of liberty, and remained in office up to 20 July 1944.

(c) He was an official of the German Reich and was in its pay from the middle of 1937 to the beginning of 1939 with the exception of leave.

(d) He was Vice Consul of the Reich in Switzerland from 1943 in the Consulate General at Zürich, placed there through Canaris as intelligence agent, and was naturally paid for it. At the same time he was in touch with the enemy’s intelligence service.

(e) He had since 1933, when he worked in the Gestapo, exact knowledge of all the horrible happenings and knew what consequences could arise there for the German people.

(f) A special circumstance, which shows the witness Dr. Gisevius in his true light, is the advice, or the suggestion, which he gave to the experienced bank specialist, Dr. Schacht, that he should allow inflation to set in and thus get the control of matters into his own hands. This suggestion leaves only two possibilities: either complete ignorance of the national economic importance and social effect of an inflation, or else a boundless unscrupulousness which completely disregards the fate of employees and workmen. An inflation brought about knowingly can be described only as a crime against the people. Schacht described it as a catastrophe. Schacht answered him, according to the record: “You want the catastrophe; I want to avoid it.”

In order to judge the reliability of the statements by the witness Gisevius before this Tribunal, I must refer to the book submitted by the witness as evidence: To the Bitter End. This book is also a “statement” of the witness Gisevius.

To err is human, but when in the year 1945, after the collapse of Germany, a book appears in which facts and occurrences are presented of historical and, for those personally involved, of moral and even criminal importance, the incorrectness of which has become obvious in the meantime, then the error is unforgivable and reference to false information is no longer an excuse.

Of the many inaccuracies contained in this book I will only point out briefly the four which were established before this Tribunal through the cross-examination by Dr. Kubuschok, which refer to the Defendant Von Papen, and I beg you to take official, cognizance of it.

(1) Dr. Gisevius has asserted in his book that Von Papen did not resign notwithstanding the events of 30 June 1934. It is established that Von Papen did resign and that the public announcement was simply contemplated to be made at a later date.

(2) Dr. Gisevius asserted further that Von Papen took part in the Cabinet meeting which he describes with exact details and when the law was resolved that the measures taken on 30 June 1934 were correct in the interest of the State. Actually Von Papen has never taken part in this meeting.

(3) Dr. Gisevius asserted finally that Von Papen went to see Von Hindenburg, but had not raised a sufficient protest against the measures. Actually what happened was that the attempts of Von Papen to visit Von Hindenburg were frustrated, therefore he failed to see him.

(4) The assertion in the book of Dr. Gisevius that Von Papen took part in the meeting of the Reichstag in which the measures of 30 June were approved, must equally be labeled incorrect information.

It could not be termed an unfounded reproach if such a statement were to be described as dubious and the author as unreliable. It is difficult for me as a German defense counsel to deal calmly with this problem. The statement of Gisevius reveals the entire tragedy of the German people. It is for me a proof of the weakness and of the decadence of certain German circles, who played with the idea of revolt and high treason without any feeling for the distress of the people. They were a higher level of future ministers and generals without the backing of the large masses of our people, the working classes, as Reich Minister Severing has declared here very clearly.

Mr. Justice Jackson has used the word “resistance movement” in connection with the examination of the witness Gisevius. We have often heard during the progress of this Trial about dauntless, brave men and women, who fought for their country, and have suffered and died for it. They were our enemies. But no one who tries to judge these things impartially would deny them acknowledgment of their heroism. But where do you find this heroism in the group around Gisevius? If one has read his book To the Bitter End and has heard him here, one looks in vain for a readily self-sacrificing man. Even the late deed of a Stauffenberg lacks heroism, because it lacked the resolution of self-sacrifice. Gisevius, up to 1938—when there might still have been time to succeed in holding back the wheel of fate—always speaks about negotiations, conferences; but all these men wished the others, that is, the generals, to act. If one considers the knowledge of affairs which Gisevius had as member of the Gestapo, and all his friends had; if one takes into account the realization of the great danger hovering over the people—then the decision to take action should not have been in doubt for an instant for patriotic men, as the members of the group claimed themselves to be. But what did they do? When the leaders of the army hesitated or refused, they did not think of taking action themselves, but turned to the foreign countries.

One would have full understanding for those Germans who were treated in an outrageous manner or who had been thrown out by the Government, particularly when they had no means or ways to undertake direct action. But the Gisevius group had such means and possibilities. Men in the most influential key positions, men in the OKW, in Hitler’s closest circle, belonged to them; men who had the possibility to get close to Hitler and to his evil men behind the scenes. Not one of them mustered up courage for action when there was time. What did they do instead? They remained in office, they helped effectively so as to allow crimes such as led to this Trial to be committed.

I should not like to leave any doubt that the fact of the conspiracy in itself is of no importance in the question of credibility to be discussed here. Whoever is a conspirator out of pure motives, who risks his life, in the full realization of the danger which threatens his country, is not only clean, but also deserves the gratitude of the fatherland.

If Gisevius and his friends, who owing to their positions were informed about everything which most Germans only learned of in all its horror through this Trial, had served their country in unselfish sacrifice, then perhaps we and the whole world would have been spared much distress and suffering.

Admiral Dönitz, who knew Admiral Canaris, the source of information, well, said:

“During the time that he was in the Navy, Admiral Canaris was an officer in whom little trust was placed. He was altogether different from us. We said that he had seven sides to his character.”

But, Gentlemen, what does Dr. Gisevius say about Canaris on Page 319 of the book To the Bitter End?

“The successor was Canaris, at that time captain in the Navy, quite clever and more cunning than Himmler and Heydrich put together.”

On the subsequent pages I have analysed those personalities who have been quoted by Gisevius as being the chief sources of information. I do not wish to go into this in any more detail. We are concerned here with the persons of Canaris, Nebe, and Thomas.

As regards Pages 96 to 103, I shall make the following brief summary. With reference to Canaris, I only want to say that he was living in the closest touch and was very friendly with Himmler, Heydrich, and the Gestapo, although he was supposed to be their sworn enemy. Thomas, who was also allegedly a member of the group from the beginning, was an excellent General Staff officer, and he was an exemplary organizer and untiring worker in the Army Economic Staff under Keitel and later in the Army Economic Armament Staff in the High Command of the Army; you know his publication, 2353-PS. This man was the spirit and the driving power behind rearmament which he, as well as Keitel and others, considered necessary to the extent which he energetically pursued. But he is also the same man who organized the “Barbarossa-Oldenburg Plan” and who later, under the Four Year Plan, became the head of the economic staff of the Plan Oldenburg. The results of that plan need not be explained here by me.

It was General Thomas who, according to very convincing outward appearances, used all his powers for the economic direction of the war, and who, after leaving Speer’s division, was not dismissed but was assigned by Keitel to work with the records office so that he could write the book which forms the main point of the Indictment with regard to rearmament. If what Gisevius has said about Thomas is true, then since 1933 he played a double game, and was an opportunist and not a man who can be expected to give impartial information.

The figure of Canaris is almost mystical. This is probably necessarily the case with men who concern themselves with matters which cannot stand the clear light of day. His position was of great importance for the entire conduct of the war. It is clear that such people must have to the highest degree the confidence of both the political and military leaders. One can judge by the amount of confidence which somebody enjoys whether he is trustworthy. He also enjoyed the confidence of the Defendant Keitel, with whom, as is proven, he associated in a friendly and companionable way, and not only as a subordinate with his superior. Jodl declared that Keitel was much too trusting. Can one believe that such a condition existed for years if Keitel dealt with the alleged reports of Canaris, as the witness Gisevius has testified here, or if he could even have received an order to commit murder from Keitel, as Lahousen would have us believe in the cases of Generals Weygand and Giraud?

Now if Canaris enjoyed such great confidence with Hitler and Keitel, but at the same time also worked authoritatively in Gisevius’ group, his character must not only be considered dual, but unreliable and untrustworthy as well. It is understandable that a person might temporarily display such a dual nature, if it is done for the sake of a higher aim, to serve one’s country, to liberate it from a tyrant. However, one searches here in vain for such a serious aim, for a deed which makes the unlawful action appear in a light of greater moral right.

Canaris believed that he could satisfy his revolutionary duty by expressing doubts in the circle of his trusted political associates and raising the severest kind of criticism. He waited, like others, for the generals to act—as an admiral he apparently did not count himself in this circle—while he himself cultivated his confidential relations with Hitler and Keitel. According to the testimony of the witness Gisevius, one must assume that he permitted his political associates to establish contacts abroad.

When did Canaris tell the truth? He was necessarily entangled in falsehood. Did he not have to tell his political associates something, which, in the opinion of the group, looked like activity? Did he not also have to report on what he supposedly had told Keitel? He is the typical example of an overrefined, highly intelligent drawing-room conspirator, protected by the nature of his obscure activity, which to a large extent could not be checked, in whom however the spirit of action was lacking.

Keitel had such confidence in Canaris, and such a liking for him, that he again and again ignored Jodl’s various warnings and even until after 20 July 1944 maintained his confidence in Canaris.

Although Canaris was the most bitter enemy of the Gestapo, he worked, certainly not out of conviction, closely and on an astonishingly friendly basis with Himmler and Heydrich. There existed a certain competition; Himmler also had a central intelligence office, which at first concentrated on the domestic sphere, although later, step by step, it expanded abroad. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner testified that this competition carried with it a possibility of friction, which, in view of Himmler’s thirst for power, with which Canaris also was familiar, might easily lead to the Counterintelligence Department becoming integrated into the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). Canaris saw himself and the circle of conspirators endangered. He therefore did something very clever in organizing co-operation, with the result that Himmler covered him in various dubious affairs. For a long time this co-operation functioned well, until the Oster case and the Ankara case afforded the RSHA’s foreign intelligence service, organized by Kaltenbrunner, an opportunity to discredit the Counterintelligence of the OKW so strongly that Hitler decreed the transfer of the Counterintelligence Department. What is important in this connection is the fact of Himmler’s particular co-operation with Canaris, and the ensuing consequence, resulting with compelling logic, that Canaris at no time could have presented a report which would have seriously incriminated Himmler and his organizations. For if Canaris had presented such a written order to Keitel, he either would have had to refer the report to Hitler or inquire from Himmler and the RSHA respectively. In both cases Himmler would have become informed. The consequence would have been clear. Co-operation would have become enmity, and enmity with Himmler meant the greatest danger for Canaris and his group. I believe that this compelling logic is stronger than any account by the witness Gisevius which concerns itself with alleged statements by Canaris.

Such was the versatility of character in a man whom one may judge at will, but who was neither a conspirator nor can lay claim to credibility.

For an opinion on the character and credibility of General Thomas, the following documents are important: Document 2353-PS (Green File), Document EC-270 and Document EC-271.

(1) Document 2353-PS, entitled “Part A: Work done in the fields of war economy and armaments industry until the beginning of mobilization in 1939” was presented by the Prosecution to prove rearmament. It does furnish this proof, which is not being denied by the Defendant Keitel.

After being taken prisoner, Thomas made a declaration in reference to this work of his which says that after 20 July 1944 he revised his rather critical memorandum on the rebuilding of German war economy in such a manner that in case of need, that is, in proceedings before a German court, it might serve in his defense.

His declaration, which precedes and is attached to Document 2353-PS, is either untrue, in which case it cannot be presented as evidence by the Prosecution, or it is true, thereby raising the question of the credibility of this immediate witness as a source of information for Dr. Gisevius.

On the whole, the memorandum is true. It is also true, however, that Thomas wholeheartedly co-operated not only in rearmament but also in the organization Oldenburg, that is, in economic preparation for war against the U.S.S.R. I refer to Exhibit USA-141 (conversation of 29 April 1941).

Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to organizational reconstruction of the economic sector of the Barbarossa-Oldenburg Plan. There it says:

“He”—the Reich Marshal—“has delegated the task to an economic leadership staff headed by the Chief of the Wirtschafts-Rüstungsamt (Economy and Armaments Office) (Thomas).”

For this task General Thomas thereby became attached to the Reich Marshal as the chief of this entire undertaking. As explained in Keitel’s affidavit (Document Book 2, Exhibit Number K-11), Thomas prepared and directed the entire organizational construction of the undertaking.

Is this consonant with the contention of Gisevius, and now also of Thomas, that on principle they were opposed to war, and with their convinced attitude against Hitler? The task which Thomas assumed and organized was unmistakably incompatible with valid international law. At no time did he protest against assumption of this office. The attitude of General Thomas can also be ascertained from Document EC-270, submitted by the Prosecution on 6 May 1946. It is the draft of a letter written on 27 April 1938 by the War Economy Staff (Chief General Thomas), addressed to Department L (National Defense within the Armed Forces Operations Staff); it is not signed by the Defendant Keitel. This involves the struggle for power by Plenipotentiary (GBW) Funk, and Göring as the Delegate of the Four Year Plan. Document EC-271 shows that the aim of General Thomas was to place the entire war economy under the supervision of OKW, that is, under the War Economy Staff which he headed. Under the guise of an interpretation of the decree of 4 February 1938 on “direction of German armament” he attempted to prevent Funk’s subordination to Field Marshal Göring as Delegate of the Four Year Plan; at the same time he also wanted to prevent the plenipotentiary from becoming independent. It was “to be established” (Page 5 of the document, last paragraph of the communication) “that in all questions pertaining to the Armed Forces’ supplies, the plenipotentiary was to carry out the instructions of OKW.”

This plan did not succeed; nor did Keitel approve it. But from Document EC-270, with special reference to Figures 1 to 9 (Pages 2 to 4) it follows that the endeavor of General Thomas was to extend the scope of his office to that of a General Staff on Economics within the OKW, a plan which Thomas had been pursuing for years already, in opposition to Keitel and Jodl; he is the man, an opportunist and a double-dealer, who claims to have fought against methods he terms corrupt and contrary to international law. The Defendant Keitel admits that Thomas made reports pointing to the scarcity of raw materials; he expressed doubts as to whether armaments would suffice to carry on a war. But these doubts were shared by the generals, especially by Keitel. Generaloberst Jodl confirmed the fact that such reports were submitted to Hitler and Thomas, so that Dr. Gisevius’ contention is proved incorrect in that respect too.

But it is worst of all with friend Nebe. The witness Gisevius has described Nebe as one of his most intimate friends who held the same views as he did. According to the statements of Dr. Gisevius, Nebe had been his friend since 1933 and was thoroughly familiar with the views of the witness. He remained in the RSHA—an organization discussed from many angles here—until 20 July 1944, and in the year 1944 he was in charge of the headquarters of the Special Service (Sonderdienst) for the prevention of the escape of prisoners of war. This is shown by Document USSR-413 submitted by the Prosecution.

To describe this witness—from whom Dr. Gisevius, after leaving the Gestapo, claims to have received important information continuously—it should be pointed out that from 1933 to 1944 Nebe served in the RSHA, evidently to the satisfaction of his superiors Himmler, Heydrich, and Kaltenbrunner—otherwise he would not have stayed in office so long and would not have been promoted to the rank of Police General and SS-Gruppenführer.

So while on the one hand for 11 years he carried out the duties of his office with the well-known methods of the Gestapo—which was under Himmler—and later the Kripo, Dr. Gisevius refers to him as his friend and staunch political associate. Now it might be assumed, perhaps, that in the position he held he was able to prevent disaster, possibly even to hold up execution of orders. Document USSR-413, just referred to, shows that Nebe did not do this. In the deposition by Wielen, forming part of the document, the horrible case of the 50 escaped R.A.F. fliers, in which General Nebe, the friend of Dr. Gisevius, was involved, is dealt with.

Wielen states as follows in this connection:

“One day during that time I received, about noon, an order by telegraph from General Nebe to proceed to Berlin immediately, to be entrusted with a confidential order. Arriving in Berlin on the evening of that day, I reported to General Nebe at his office, Wendischer Markt 5-7. I gave him a condensed report on the position of the matter at that time. He then showed me a teletype order signed by Kaltenbrunner, to the effect that, in conformity with the Führer’s explicit and personal order, more than half of the officers who escaped from Sagan were to be shot when recaptured. General Nebe himself seemed shocked at this order. He was deeply worried. I heard later that he did not go to bed that night, but spent the night on his sofa in his office. I myself was likewise shocked at this frightful step which was to be taken, and refused to carry it out. I said it violated rules of war and undoubtedly was bound to result in reprisal measures against those of our own officers who were in English camps as prisoners of war, and that I flatly refused to take any responsibility in the matter. General Nebe declared that in this instance I would not be in any way responsible as the State Police was to act entirely independently, and that, after all, orders given by the Führer had to be executed without protest.

“Nebe furthermore added that naturally it was my duty to keep the matter in deepest secrecy, and that the reason for his showing me the original order was so that I would make no trouble for the State Police.”

Any comment seems superfluous. This is significant of Nebe’s personality. The trustworthiness of a person is an inseparable part of his entire personality. Information obtained from a person who for more than a decade was able to play such an abominable double role can lay no claim to credibility.

I believe that this analysis of the statements of the witness Dr. Gisevius and of the men belonging to the Gisevius group gives me the right to say that the charges made against the Defendant Keitel by the witness can be no suitable foundation for the argument of the Prosecution, namely, that the Defendant Keitel

(1) formed a circle around Hitler;

(2) had tremendous influence on the OKW and the Armed Forces;

(3) did not submit reports on atrocities and crimes to Hitler; and

(4) did not protect his subordinates, but even threatened them with the Gestapo.

Rather is it true that the real position of Keitel, however important it may have seemed to outsiders, was neither decisive nor of importance either for the total sum of events or for the basic and important decisions of Hitler. Justice can be done to the actual importance of this activity if one says that it was tremendous, because physically and spiritually it went beyond human strength; because it placed the defendant perpetually in a dilemma between his military point of view and the unbending will of Hitler to whom he was faithfully, far too faithfully, devoted. Physically it presented an almost insoluble problem, for it had no sharply defined, clear outline but called for the perpetual balancing of essential differences; the adjustment of personal sensitiveness; the “self-protection” against encroachments of the individual offices among themselves or against the OKW; clever maneuvering when Hitler, in explosive reaction to disagreeable news, wished to issue extravagant orders; the settlement of all disagreeable matters which Hitler did not wish to attend to himself.

It was a tremendously thankless task, which found only very slight compensation in the brilliant position in the immediate proximity to the head of the State, in the decorative participation in all events of what is called world history, in the representative discharge of the duties of a field marshal.

This evidence does not appear convincing if it is intended to prove that Keitel also actively participated in the political conversations. When the Defendant Keitel took part in State visits and conversations with foreign statesmen, he did not participate in the conversations, although present. Hitler liked to have Keitel in his entourage as the representative of the Armed Forces. Thus, Keitel was present at Godesberg when Prime Minister Chamberlain went there, also at Munich on 30 September 1938, and at the visit of Molotov in November 1940. He was also present at the meetings of Hitler with Marshal Pétain, General Franco, King Boris, Regent Von Horthy, and Mussolini. This function of Keitel is, however, insufficient to make the defendant a general who must have taken a decisive part in the shaping of political events.

How little this assertion is justified is seen from the fact testified to by Admiral Bürckner that Keitel was extremely careful not to encroach on the affairs of the Foreign Office and gave his officers orders not to engage in matters referring to foreign policy. In domestic politics the exclusion of the Chief of the OKW resulted from the removal of the Reich War Minister, already dealt with, and the thereby intended and achieved elimination of political representation of the Armed Forces in the Cabinet.

It is obvious, and has also already been pointed out, that the position of the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW involved, and in time of war to an increased extent, his coming into some kind of contact with all the ministries and highest offices, and dealing with them as the representative of the OKW, that is to say, of Hitler.

That did not make Keitel a politician, that is to say, a man who took part in an advisory capacity in the determination of the Government’s aims, and had an influence on them. In his high office he naturally worked to carry out these aims and bears a responsibility to that extent, but not as a political general.

Mr. President, I am now beginning a long chapter. Do you want me to start with it?

THE PRESIDENT: Go on reading then until 5 o’clock.

DR. NELTE: The idea of war against Russia was rejected by Keitel. This found visible expression in the memorandum which Field Marshal Keitel drew up, discussed with Von Ribbentrop, and handed over to Hitler. According to his sworn statements the reasons were:

(a) military considerations;

(b) the Nonaggression Pact with the Soviet Union dated 23 August 1939.

In spite of being personally presented, the memorandum had no success. Hitler, as usual in questions of strategic nature, rejected Keitel’s point of view as unconvincing.

In this connection, and owing to Hitler’s curt rejection, Keitel asked for release and transfer to the front. This is the case which Reich Marshal Göring confirmed in his interrogation. Hitler refused, sharply criticizing the habit of generals asking to be released or tendering their resignation whenever he did not approve their opinions or suggestions.

That was decisive for Keitel: he remained at his post, did his duty, and fulfilled his obligations in carrying out the tasks incumbent upon him within the framework of further preparations. Here, too, in keeping with his conception of duty, Keitel did not make known to the outside world his basically negative attitude toward the war with Russia, after Hitler had made his decision.

This case is in several respects typical of Keitel and of the way he is judged by others. We know—and it has been proved by the evidence—that other generals were also opposed to war with the Soviet Union. Their objections, too, were waived or rejected by Hitler. They, too, accepted the decision of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, continued to do their duty and carried out the orders given to them. But there was one basic difference: these other generals went back to their headquarters after the discussion. There, in their own circle of officers they spoke about the decision made by Hitler. Of course it was disputed, yet they acted in accordance with it.

Since Field Marshal Keitel, due to his military conception, as already depicted, did not make known to the generals, when they appeared in the Führer’s headquarters for discussions, what his own attitude was, which was also at variance, the impression was bound to arise that Field Marshal Keitel completely agreed with Hitler and did not support the scruples of the Armed Forces’ branches.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think you might stop there.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 9 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.

An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.

[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 17, by Various.]