Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 17

by Various

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get two or three facts clear about 1935 before I put some questions to you.

On the 10th of March Germany announced the establishment of an air force and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I don’t want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the Secret Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at General Thomas’ comment on it.

My Lord, it is at Page 52 of Document Book 12. It is about Page 71 of the German document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Number 12a or b?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 12, My Lord. That is the original one; Page 52, My Lord.

“The Central Directorate of the supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid, for the central organization of the supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the National Socialists came into power, and especially by the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization.” (Document 2353-PS)

And you will remember that on the same day the Defendant Schacht had been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy.

Did you appreciate at the time, Defendant, that that law was the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization?

VON NEURATH: Yes, but only in case of a war, that is, in case of mobilization.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that the point that I am putting to you is that it had already been declared valid for carrying out war preparations. Didn’t you understand that it was a big step forward for war preparations?

VON NEURATH: Not at all. It was not a big step forward at all. It was only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In every country you have to guarantee the co-operation of the various offices in the event of an attack.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your view. Now, at this time, up to May 1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still staffed by diplomats or Foreign Office officials of the older school and had not yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you receive any warnings from your own staff as to the happenings in Austria, or the rearmament, the declaration of the air force, and the conscription?

VON NEURATH: I was advised about happenings in Austria, as can be seen from the report which you submitted to me. The re-establishment of the Armed Forces was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of course I knew about that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but—I am sorry, probably I did not put the proper emphasis on the word. When I said warning I meant a real warning from your officials that these happenings were making Germany regarded abroad as being bloodthirsty and warmongering. Did you get any warnings from your officials?

VON NEURATH: Certainly not, for that was not the case, and if any assertions like that were being made abroad, they certainly were not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you look at Document 3308-PS, the affidavit of the interpreter Paul Schmidt.

My Lord, it is Page 68 of Document Book 12a, and it is Page 65 or 66 of the German version, Paragraph 4.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, just let me read you Paragraphs 4 and 5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says:

“4. The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods, both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis.”

Defendant, let’s take that. In these three points, is it correct, as Herr Schmidt says, that the attempted Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Office?

VON NEURATH: Not only the career personnel of my office were disquieted over this but I, of course, was also disquieted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And taking the last sentence:

“This concern”—that is the disturbance by the Putsch—“over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes”—blood purge and the Putsch—“were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning...”

Is that correct, that among your staff the concern was heightened by recognizing that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and the Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the consultative pact?

VON NEURATH: No, that is a personal opinion of the interpreter Schmidt.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, with respect to you, Defendant, it is not. What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of your experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am putting to you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were concerned that these events had had their effect on the consultative pact?

VON NEURATH: Not in the least.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate...

VON NEURATH: I can only repeat, the two things had no connection with each other.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is he correct in his last statement that that arrangement was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis?

VON NEURATH: That I cannot say; I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at the next paragraph.

“The announcement in March of the establishment of a German Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude toward the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.”

Now, just let us take that. Did—do you agree that the career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded the Franco-Soviet pact as a further very severe, very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy?

VON NEURATH: I do not know in the name of which personnel Herr Schmidt is making these statements. But I, at any event, heard nothing to the effect that my career personnel had expressed these opinions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, here is Herr Schmidt saying, “The career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath.” That is you.

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you saying that Herr Schmidt, who after all was a career official although he was an interpreter for a great deal of the time—are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is accurate when he says that your permanent officials expressed their concern to you?

VON NEURATH: But quite decidedly. How could Herr Schmidt, who was only an insignificant civil servant at that time, know what my career personnel told me and in addition, how could Schmidt judge this? And I should also like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that this affidavit, or whatever it may be, was submitted to him after a serious illness and that he personally knew absolutely nothing more about the contents. That now...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may rest assured, the Tribunal will correct me if I am wrong, that I put these paragraphs to Herr Schmidt and he agreed with them when he was giving evidence before this Tribunal.

But now just look at one other statement at the end of Paragraph 6. Well, we’ll just—we will read Paragraph 6, because I want to ask you about the end:

“The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed that the Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the League Covenant. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in Mein Kampf, offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon. I personally knew about it and discussed it approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in Government circles consulted by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France. Neurath’s position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath than in the general run of ‘old school’ diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold in disrespect.”

Well, now, if this minor official, of whom you just talked, knew about and discussed the march into the Rhineland some 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred, how much before it occurred had you discussed it?

VON NEURATH: Herr Schmidt must have been clairvoyant, for 2 or 3 weeks in advance even I did not know anything about it. I heard of it about 1 week before Hitler’s decision, and if I—if it says here that I—that it was generally known in the Foreign Ministry that I was the only one in the Government circles consulted by Hitler who was confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France, it certainly turned out that I was right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were right—but is it true that you were the only person in Government circles who thought that it could be occupied without interference by Britain and France? Is that true?

VON NEURATH: I am not in a position to say whether I was the only one, but at any rate, I was convinced of this on the basis of my knowledge of international conditions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so that at any rate, whatever the limitations of Paul Schmidt, he knew what your position was quite accurately. Was he not right about it in the last sentence, that your position throughout the period was one which would make Hitler look to you rather than to the rest, the other figures of pro-Nazi diplomacy and foreign affairs, because you were the person who was encouraging him? Is that not the position?

VON NEURATH: I did not encourage him in any way, but I described the situation to him as I saw it, and it was later proved that I had been right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want you to deal with one other point, which is really 1936, but we will deal with it as I have been dealing with Austria.

You have said once or twice that you objected very strongly to the description of the Austrian treaty, the treaty between the Reich and Austria of the 11th of July as being a subterfuge or a façade. That is right; is it not? You objected very strongly to that view?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Hitler had given instructions to the Gauleiter of the Austrian NSDAP to carry on the struggle at the same time as the treaty was signed?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not know anything about that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me remind you. I do not want to put anything that seems unfair.

My Lord, it is Document Book 12, Page 97.

[Turning to the defendant.] This is the report of Dr. Rainer, whom the Tribunal has had the advantage of seeing, and if you will look at the end of one paragraph he says:

“The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons.”—That is Defendant Seyss-Inquart and Colonel Glaise-Horstenau—“Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Führer as being a trusted person.”

Now the next paragraph:

“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party...”

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you say 97 of Document Book 12?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did, My Lord, yes. Yes, My Lord; it is the third paragraph and begins, “At that time...”

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please:

“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria, in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do.” (Document Number 812-PS)

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was another “at that time” that we were looking at. Could you give us some other indication?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is in the middle.

THE PRESIDENT: It is on 98 in ours.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am so sorry, My Lord. The paging must be different. I beg Your Lordship’s pardon.

[Continuing.] “At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austria National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor...”

Mind you, this is the man who is making this statement.

“...successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Dr. Rainer and Globocznik visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg, where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Führer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Führer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiter received organizational instructions from Globocznik and Hiedler.”

Did you not know—did Hitler not tell his Foreign Minister, who had just supervised the conclusion of this treaty, that he intended to give the illegal Gauleiter instructions as to how to carry on the fight? Didn’t he tell you that?

VON NEURATH: No, he did not tell me that, but I do remember—I believe it was the same Dr. Rainer who appeared here as a witness—who stated that Hitler summoned him and other Gauleiter and told them that in the future they were to observe strictly the agreements of 1936. By the way, the matter that you just quoted is not mentioned at all in the document which was submitted to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that’s not mentioned. What is mentioned is the political instructions for carrying out the fight and the organizational instructions from Globocznik. At any rate, you knew nothing about that?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is rather difficult for you to judge whether the treaty is made sincerely if you do not know the instructions that are given to the illegal Party in Austria by Hitler, is it not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, naturally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let’s deal with one or two other points. I would just like you to look at what Mr. Messersmith says at the end of 1935. You remember this statement—I will give you the reference in a moment—that:

“...Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are ‘diplomats of the old school.’ They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.”

Now, can you tell us up to the date on which Mr. Messersmith wrote that—on October 10, 1935—of a single instruction of Hitler’s that you had not carried out?

VON NEURATH: I did not quite understand. A single instruction...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry; I mislaid the reference. It is Document Book 12, Page 107. That is the reference to it.

[Turning to the defendant.] You see, Mr. Messersmith is there saying that you and the Defendant Von Papen and Von Mackensen are servile instruments of the regime. Now, I am just asking you whether you could tell us up to the date that Mr. Messersmith wrote, on 10 October 1935, any instruction of Hitler’s that you had refused to carry out.

VON NEURATH: Not only one, but quite a few. I have testified as to the number of times I contradicted Hitler, and I have expressed myself about what Mr. Messersmith is assuming here again—about the importance of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I put it this way: Up to October 10, 1935, what did you tell the Tribunal was the most serious thing that Hitler had ordered you to do and you had refused to carry out? What was the most serious—the one that mattered most?

VON NEURATH: Well on the spur of the moment, that is a question that I cannot answer. How should I know what the most serious question was which I opposed? I opposed all sorts of things.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you can’t remember what you think is the most serious, I shan’t trouble you with it any more, but I want...

VON NEURATH: Well, you are quite welcome to submit it to me, but don’t produce an allegation out of a clear sky without giving me the chance to refute it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was asking you to tell us, but I will pass on to what another American diplomat put. I would like to ask you about Mr. Bullitt’s report, with which I gather you agree. My Lord, that is L-150, and it is at Page 72 of the Document Book 12.

My Lord, I hope that there is no difference of the paging—72 of mine.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; it is 74.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is 74. I am sorry, My Lord.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, it is the second paragraph there. After saying that he had a talk with you, he says:

“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop...’ ”

You agree you said that?

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes, certainly. Yesterday or the day before I testified in detail about what that was supposed to mean. Moreover, it does not make any difference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to see if you agree with the meaning I suggest. That is that as soon as you had got your fortifications in sufficiently good order on your western frontier, you would proceed to try and secure an Anschluss with Austria and to get back the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Isn’t that what it means?

VON NEURATH: No, no, not at all. That is quite clear in the document. What I meant by this and what I expressed was that these countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and France, would change their policy toward Germany, because they could no longer march through Germany so easily.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Defendant, what I am putting to you? I think I made it quite clear—that at the time that you were facing the Western Powers with the remilitarization of Germany and the Rhineland—that is in 1935 and 1936—you were then giving assurances to Austria, which Hitler did in May 1935, and you made this treaty in 1936. As soon as you had digested your first steps, you then turned against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. I am suggesting, you see, that you were talking the exact truth and prophesying with a Cassandra-like accuracy. That is what I am suggesting—that you knew very well that these intentions were there.

VON NEURATH: What?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you didn’t?

VON NEURATH: Not at all, not at all, not at all! That is an assumption on your part, for which there is absolutely no proof.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will not argue it further because we will come on to just one other point before we proceed to 1937.

You have told the Tribunal, not once but many times, that you did not support the Nazi attitude toward the Christian churches, of oppressing the churches. That is I have understood you correctly, have I not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, and you say that you resisted and actively intervened against the repression of the Church. Would you just look at Document 3758-PS.

My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-516. My Lord, Your Lordship will find it in Document Book 12a, Page 81.

[Turning to the defendant.] This is an entry which must have been fairly early in 1936 in the diary of the Reich Minister of Justice:

“The Reich Foreign Minister transmits, with a personal note for confidential information, a letter from Cardinal State Secretary Pacelli”—that is the present Pope—“to the German Ambassador in the Vatican, in which he urges an act of pardon for Vicar General Seelmeyer. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, remarks to this that after the heavy attacks on German justice by the Holy See in the note of 29 January, there is no reason in his opinion to show any deference to the Vatican. He recommends it, however, since for foreign policy reasons it is to our interest not to let our good personal relations with Pacelli cool off.”

Now, Defendant, will you tell me anything that showed the slightest personal interest in the fate of Father Seelmeyer, or were you only concerned with showing a firm front to the Vatican and not losing your good relations with Cardinal Pacelli?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the document has just been submitted to me; I have had no opportunity whatsoever to look this document over and inform myself about it. Likewise, I do not know of there having been any talk about a diary of the Reich Minister of Justice up to now in this Trial. Therefore, I am not in a position to judge how the Reich Minister of Justice could have made this entry in his diary at all.

Since these notes have apparently been taken out of their context, it is not possible for me to form any kind of a picture of the significance of the entry as a whole, and naturally it is even less possible for the defendant to do so.

Therefore, I must protest against the admissibility of this question and against the submission of this document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a perfectly good captured document. It is a copy of the original diary of the Reich Minister of Justice, and it is therefore admissible against the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, you can see the original document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, actually, I am just told by my American colleagues that this diary has been used before, that extracts were put in in the case against the Defendant Von Schirach.

VON NEURATH: Mr. President, I have no objection...

THE PRESIDENT: One moment.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I could not understand a word, Mr. President. I am sorry, I could not understand. I can hear now.

THE PRESIDENT: When you make an objection, you should see that the instrument is in order.

What I said was that you can see the original document. And I am told now that the original document has been used before, and that therefore there is nothing to prevent its being used in cross-examination. It is a captured document, and you can see the original.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not know that, Mr. President.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am putting to you, Defendant, is that your statement to the Minister of Justice shows no concern for the individual priest about whom the complaint had been made; it is merely concerned with your relations with the Vatican and with Cardinal Pacelli, as he then was. Is that typical of your interferences? Is this typical of your interferences for the sake of ill-treated priests?

VON NEURATH: I naturally cannot remember this case any more, but the way it stands there in the entry I was perfectly justified. According to the entry, I said that we had no reason to show any special consideration after the then Cardinal State Secretary, or Pope had attacked German justice, but that, as Foreign Minister I considered it important not to disturb our relations with Pacelli. I cannot see what conclusions you want to draw from this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I don’t want to trespass on the ground of my Soviet colleagues, but you know that the Czech report accuses you, with complete impartiality as far as sect is concerned, of your Government ill-treating the Catholics, Protestants, Czech National Church, and even the Greek Church in Czechoslovakia. You know that all these churches suffered during your protectorate—do you agree that all these churches suffered under your protectorate?

VON NEURATH: No, not at all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, I won’t go into the details, but I am suggesting to you that your care about the various religious confessions did not go very deep.

VON NEURATH: That is again an assertion on your part which you cannot prove.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to put one thing. You remember telling the Tribunal this morning of the excellent terms that you were on with the archbishop of Prague?

VON NEURATH: I said that I had good relations with the archbishop.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at this copy.

My Lord, this is a copy, but General Ecer assures me that he can get the original from the Czech Government files. I received it only a half hour ago. General Ecer, who is here from Czechoslovakia, says that he can vouch for the original.

I’d like the defendant to look at it. Is that a letter which you received from the archbishop?

My Lord, it is Document D-920, and it will be Exhibit GB-517:

“Your Excellency, very esteemed Herr Protector of the Reich:

“Your last letter has filled me with such sorrow because I could not but gather from it that not even Your Excellency is prepared to believe me—that I lost consciousness and had to call university Professor Dr. Jirasek, who remained beside my sickbed for an hour—he is coming again today, together with the specialist on internal diseases....”

And then he gives his name.

“Your Excellency may be sure that I shall always do what I can to please you. But please, have mercy on me, too, and do not demand that I should act against the laws of the Church.

“Yours, et cetera, Karl Cardinal Kaspar, M. P. prince archbishop.”

Do you remember that?

VON NEURATH: I cannot say what this refers to. I have no idea; there is nothing in it, and I cannot tell you what it referred to.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t remember this occasion when the prince archbishop wrote to you and told you the effect, the illness that he had suffered from and beseeched you not to ask him to do something against the laws of the Church? It doesn’t remain in your mind at all, does it?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we’ll leave that. Well now, I want you to just tell me this, before we pass on to the later occurrences in 1937. You remember you dealt yesterday with your speech—I think it was to the German Academy of Law. You remember the speech, in August of 1937? I can give you a reference. Would you like to look at it?

VON NEURATH: I only need the reference to where I spoke.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember it, I only wanted to save time. Don’t you remember? I will put it to you if you like. It is the speech of the 29th of August 1937, and I will give you the reference in one moment. What I wanted to ask you was this—you said:

“The unity of the racial and national will created through Nazism with unprecedented élan has made possible a foreign policy by means of which the chains of the Versailles Treaty were broken.”

What did you mean by “the unity of the racial will” produced by Nazism?

VON NEURATH: By that I probably meant that all Germans were unified more than ever before. At this date I can no longer tell you what I meant by this, either. But nevertheless I was merely establishing a fact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now tell me. That was in August 1937. You told the Tribunal the effect that the words of Hitler, on the 5th of November 1937, had upon you, and your counsel has put in the statement by Baroness von Ritter. After these words...

VON NEURATH: In November?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, November of 1937.

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, after these words had had that effect, with whom did you discuss them among the people who had been present at the Hossbach interview?

VON NEURATH: This speech was not made at Berchtesgaden at all. That is a mistake; it was at Berlin, this address.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I didn’t say Berchtesgaden; I said at the Hossbach conference. We call it the Hossbach conference because he took the minutes.

VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday with whom I spoke, General Von Fritsch, and with Beck, who was then Chief of the General Staff; and I also testified that we agreed at that time jointly to oppose Hitler and the tendency which he had revealed in this speech.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Hitler?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I testified yesterday in detail that I did not have a chance to speak with Hitler until 14 or 15 January, because he had left Berlin and I could not see him. That was the very reason why I asked for my resignation at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Göring or Raeder?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to just tell me one word or two about this Secret Cabinet Council to which you were appointed after you left the Foreign Office.

Would you look at the first sentences of the report of that meeting on the 5th of November?

My Lord, it is Page 81 in the English Document Book 12, and Page 93 of the German document book.

It is only the first two sentences, Defendant:

“The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s conference was of such importance that its detailed discussion would certainly, in other states, take place before the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet because of its importance.”

Then, if you will look at the people who were there: There is the Führer; the Minister for War; the three Commanders-in-Chief; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Now, Defendant, supposing that in February or March 1938, Hitler had wanted to discuss Austria before the same Council, the same limited number of people. Just let us see who would have taken the places of the people who were there. Instead of Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, you would have had the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and Von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief, would you not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As a matter of fact, Raeder and Göring maintained their positions; the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had taken yours; and you were president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Lammers was secretary of the Cabinet, and Goebbels had become more important as Minister of Propaganda.

Well now, I would just like you to look and see who the people were that formed the Secret Cabinet Council.

Your Lordship will find that on Page 8 of Document Book 12; and it is Page 7 of the German document book.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, do you see who they are? There are the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Defendant Göring, the Führer’s Deputy, Hess, Dr. Goebbels, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, Von Brauchitsch, Raeder, and Keitel. You are saying, if I understand you, that this Secret Cabinet Council had no real existence at all. Is that your case?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why were you receiving special funds for getting diplomatic information as president of the Secret Cabinet Council?

VON NEURATH: I did not receive any. I should like to know...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us just have a look at this. Would you look at Document 3945-PS?

My Lord, it is 129 in Document Book 12a. It will be Exhibit GB-518.

If you will look at the letter of the 28th of August 1939 from Lammers to you:

“In conformity with your request, I have had the sum of 10,000 Reichsmark, which had been placed at your disposal for special expenses in connection with the obtaining of diplomatic information, handed to Amtsrat Köppen.

“I enclose the draft of a certificate showing how the money was used, with the request to send me the certificate after execution, at the latest by the end of the financial year.”

And if you will turn over to the next page, 131, you will see that at the end of March, which was toward the end of the financial year, you signed a certificate saying:

“I have received 10,000 Reichsmark from the Reich Chancellery for special outlays entailed in obtaining diplomatic information.”

Now, will you tell us why you were getting special expenses for obtaining diplomatic information?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I can tell you that. That is an expression used at the request of Lammers who had the treasury of the Reich Chancellery under him, so that I could meet the expenses of my office; that is, for one typist and for one secretary. And in order to justify this to—I do not know which authority, what this authority is called, to the Finance Ministry—I had no special budget—Herr Lammers asked me to use this expression. That can be seen from a certificate which is also in there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. I am going to refer to the other letters. But why was it necessary that the expenses of your one secretary and one typist should not be audited? As it shows on pages...

My Lord, the pages are 134 and 135.

VON NEURATH: I just said that...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On Page 134 you will see there is a letter from you to Lammers: “In my bureau there is a need to incur special expenses, to audit which it does not appear to me advisable.”

Why wasn’t it advisable to audit the expenses of your typist and secretary?

VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you that just now. But at any rate, I did not use any more money for diplomatic information; but these are merely office expenses which I figured in there. And so at the end of this letter which you have submitted to me there is...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now...

VON NEURATH: Please, let me finish my statement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly.

VON NEURATH: There is a report here to me, from my—from this secretary, in which he says—no, this is not the letter I thought it was.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you are finished, I anticipated you might say it was office expenses. Would you look at Document 3958-PS?

My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-519.

[Turning to the defendant.] I submit, that shows you your office expenses were carried on the ordinary budget, the letter of 8 April 1942 to you.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the book?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes; I am so sorry. It is 140. I beg Your Lordship’s pardon.

[Turning to the defendant.] That is a letter to you which says:

“The Reich Minister for Finance has agreed that the budgetary needs announced by you for the financial year 1942 be shown in Special Plan 1. I therefore have no objections to having the necessary expenditure granted—even before the establishment of Special Plan I—within the limits of these amounts, namely:

“For personal administrative expenditures, up to 28,500 Reichsmark; for official administrative expenditures, up to 25,500 Reichsmark; total 54,000 Reichsmark.”

That was providing for your office and personal expenditures during the same period for which you were getting these additional sums. So I am suggesting to you that if these sums of 10,000 marks which you got every now and then were not for office expenditures, I would like you to tell the Tribunal what they really were for.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I would be very pleased if I were also told about this, for I no longer know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, they are your letters, and you got the money. Can’t you tell the Tribunal what you got it for?

VON NEURATH: No, I cannot right now. Perhaps I can tell you afterward.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Possibly it was for obtaining diplomatic information, it says—

My Lord, Dr. Von Lüdinghausen makes the point that the letter I put was in 1939. Of course, there were other letters. I have not troubled the Tribunal with each one, but there is another letter in which there is a reference to a payment on the 9th of May 1941, and, of course, another reference to a payment on the 30th of June 1943. My Lord, these are Pages 133 and 134. I am sorry; I did not give the details. Perhaps I ought to have indicated that.

THE PRESIDENT: The letter on Page 137, which may have some bearing, is a letter from the man signed “K”—from the man who made the previous applications?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

Perhaps would you like to look at that, Defendant? It is Document 3945-PS, a letter of the 14th of July 1943, signed “K”:

“When I went into the matter of the special funds, the competent people in the Reich Chancellery showed an entirely understanding attitude in this matter and asked for a written application from Your Excellency. When I replied that I did not wish to produce such an application before success was guaranteed, they asked for a little more time for a further exchange of views. After a few days I was told that I could produce the application without hesitation, upon which I handed over the letter which I had previously withheld. The amount requested has been handed to me today and I have duly entered this sum in my special cashbook as a credit.”

VON NEURATH: Yes, but in spite of this...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now does that help you? Can you tell the Tribunal what were the outlays, the special outlays for the obtaining of diplomatic information for which you received this money?

VON NEURATH: I am very sorry; I absolutely cannot—I can no longer recall this matter at all. And the remarkable part is that this letter is dated the 14th of July 1943, when I no longer had any functions whatsoever, when I had left altogether. At this moment, I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is very strange, you know. In a further letter, in Document 3958-PS, on 8 January 1943, and in succeeding letters on the 4th of March and the 20th of April, the end of your occupation of the premises of 23 Rheinbabenallee is explained there and when your expenses ceased when you went to live in the country. I was just going to ask you about that—a little about that house. If you will just look at the affidavit of Mr. Geist, the American consul...

My Lord, that is Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420.

[Turning to the defendant.] I referred to this this morning, and the passage that I want you to tell us about is in the middle of a paragraph.

My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11 of the affidavit in the English version.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the separate document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11. The paragraph begins:

“Another instance of the same nature occurred with regard to my landlord...”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship goes on another 10 lines, after explaining about his landlord having to give up his house to the SS, he says:

“I know that on many occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the prospective purchaser or his agent would appear accompanied by a uniformed SA or SS man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood and knew the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner. Indeed, he was my next-door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s house was worth approximately 250,000 dollars.”

[Turning to the defendant.] Was that 23 Rheinbabenallee?

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired it for you, so that the president of the nonexistent Secret Cabinet Council could have it as an official residence? Who acquired it?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand that. Who did what?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired 23 Rheinbabenallee? Who got it?

VON NEURATH: I can tell you about that. In the year 1937, when Hitler was erecting the large buildings for his Reich Chancellery, he told me one day that I would have to move from my apartment, which was situated behind the Foreign Office, because he wanted the garden for his Reich Chancellery, and the house would be torn down.

He said that he had given instructions to the Reich Building Administration to find other living quarters for me. The Reich Building Administration offered me various expropriated Jewish residences. But I refused them. But now I had to look for a house myself, and my personal physician, to whom I happened to mention this matter, told me that he knew of a place in Dahlem, that was Number 23 Rheinbabenallee, where he was house physician to the owner. This owner was Lieutenant Colonel Glotz, who was the brother of a close friend of mine. I informed the Reich Building Administration about this and told them that they should get in touch with this gentleman. In the course of the negotiations, which were conducted by the Reich Building Administration, a contract of sale was drawn up for the price quoted by Mr. Geist, and the price was in marks, not in dollars. This sum, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Glotz, was paid to him in cash, and on his wish I persuaded the Finance Minister to have this money transferred to Switzerland.

I might remark that I was still Foreign Minister at the time. Afterward, I remained in this house for the simple reason that I did not find another one, and Herr Von Ribbentrop, my successor, moved into the old Presidential Palace.

Then in the year 1943 this house was destroyed. At the moment, therefore, I still cannot explain what these moneys were for and whether they were official payments made by the Reich Treasury. With the best intentions, I cannot tell you. But the statements made by Mr. Geist here are completely wrong as I have just stated. I did not buy or have this house transferred from a Jew, but from the Christian Lieutenant Colonel Glotz.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You tell us that you passed the money on to Switzerland on his account?

VON NEURATH: I? Yes. Because Herr—Herr Glotz went to Switzerland. I believe, indeed, his wife was non-Aryan.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I would just like to put the next sentence and then I will leave this document:

“I know too that Alfred Rosenberg, who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in similar fashion.”

Do you know anything of that?

VON NEURATH: I do not know how Herr Rosenberg acquired his house.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I want you to come now to March of 1938. Perhaps I can take this shortly if I have understood you correctly. You know that the Prosecution complained about your reply to the British Ambassador with regard to the Anschluss. As I understand you, you are not now suggesting that your reply was accurate; but you are saying that that was the best of your information at the time, is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite correct. It is true. That was an incorrect statement but I just did not know any better; do you see?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you did not hear—that neither Hitler nor Göring told you a word about these ultimatums which were given first of all to Herr Von Schuschnigg and secondly to President Miklas; you were told nothing about that? Is that what you are telling?

VON NEURATH: No, at that time—at that time I knew nothing. I heard about them later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to leave that. I am not going into that incident in detail—we have been over it several times—in view of the way that the defendant is not contesting the accuracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I should like to know when he heard of the true facts.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged.

[Turning to the defendant.] When did you hear of the true facts of the Anschluss?

VON NEURATH: I heard the details for the very first time here, when this report of Legation Counsellor Hewel was submitted to me. Prior to this time I probably heard that there had been pressure exerted on Herr Schuschnigg, but nothing else. I actually learned the exact details for the first time here in Nuremberg.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I only want to get it quite clear. You say that between the 11th of March and your coming to Nuremberg, you never heard anything about the threat of marching into Austria, which had been made by the Defendant Göring, or Keppler, or General Muff on his behalf? You never heard anything about that?

VON NEURATH: No, I heard nothing of that sort.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then I do want to ask you about the assurance that you gave to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin. I would like you to look at Document TC-27 which you will find in Document Book 12, Page 123 of Document Book 12. The passage that I want to ask you about is in the sixth paragraph. After dealing with the conversation with the Defendant Göring about the Czechoslovak mobilization, it goes on:

“M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject”—that is, the Czechoslovak mobilization—“and today”—that is, the 12th of March—“spoke with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.”

Now, you have told the Tribunal—we have had the evidence of Baroness von Ritter—that the meeting on the 5th of November had this very disturbing effect on you and in fact produced a bad heart attack. One of the matters that was discussed at that meeting was attack, not only on Austria but also on Czechoslovakia, to protect the German flank. Why did you think, on the 12th of March, that Hitler would ever consider himself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty which meant that he had to refer any dispute with Czechoslovakia to the Council of the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice? Why on earth did you think that that was even possible, that Hitler would submit a dispute with Czechoslovakia to either of these bodies?

VON NEURATH: I can tell you that quite exactly. I already testified yesterday that Hitler had me summoned to him on the 11th for reasons that I cannot explain up to this day and told me that the march into Austria was to take place during the night. In reply to my question, or rather to my remark that that would cause great uneasiness in Czechoslovakia, he said that he had no intentions of any kind at this time against Czechoslovakia and that he was—he even hoped that relations with Czechoslovakia would be considerably improved by the invasion or occupation of Austria.

From this sentence and from his promise that nothing would happen, I concluded that matters would remain as they were and that, of course, we were still bound to this treaty of 1925. Therefore, I was able to assure M. Mastny of this with an absolutely clear conscience.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you believe a word that Hitler said on the 12th of March? Did you still believe a word that Hitler said on the 12th of March 1933?

VON NEURATH: Yes, still at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought Von Fritsch was a friend of yours; wasn’t he?

VON NEURATH: Who?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Colonel General Von Fritsch; he was a friend of yours?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not believe that he had been guilty of homosexuality did you?

VON NEURATH: No, never.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t they—didn’t you know that he had been subject in January 1938 to a framed-up charge?

THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer instead of shaking your head.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that, of course; and I learned of it and the fact that this charge was a fabrication of the Gestapo but not of Hitler, at least in my opinion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t you know that those—these unsavory matters concerning Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von Fritsch had been faked up by members of the Nazi gang, who were your colleagues in the Government?

VON NEURATH: Yes. The details were unknown to me, of course.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, you remember that at the time of Munich, when you came back to the field—came back into activity for some time, President Beneš did appeal to this German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention and Hitler brushed the appeal to one side. Do you remember that? In September 1938?

VON NEURATH: No; that, I do not know, for at that time I was not in office any longer and I did not get to see these matters at all. I do not know about that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you don’t know; of course, it was in the German press and every other press that he appealed to this treaty and Hitler refused to look at it; but you say that you honestly believed on the 12th of March that Hitler would stand by that Arbitration Treaty; that’s what you said?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I had no misgivings.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that might be a convenient moment to break off.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you spoke yesterday with regard to the memorandum of Lieutenant General Friderici. Do you remember in that memorandum he referred to a memorandum of yours on how to deal with Czechoslovakia?

Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document 3859-PS, so that the Tribunal can see your attitude toward the Czechs from your own words.

My Lord, that is at Page 107 of Document Book 12a.

[Turning to the defendant.] I will read first your letter to Lammers of the 31st of August 1940.

My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-520.

[Turning to the defendant.] You say:

“Dear Herr Lammers: Enclosed I send you the memorandum which I mentioned in advance in my letter of 13 July 1940 ... about the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian country. I enclose another memorandum on the same question, which my Secretary of State K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me and which, in its train of thoughts, leads to the same result”—I ask you to note, the next words—“and with which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the Führer and arrange a date for a personal interview for myself and State Secretary Frank. As I have heard from a private source that individual Party and other offices intend to submit proposals to the Führer for separating various parts of the Protectorate under my authority, without my knowing these projects in detail, I should be grateful to you if you would arrange the date for my interview early enough for me, as the competent Reich Protector and one who understands the Czech problem, to have an opportunity, together with my State Secretary, to place our opinions before the Führer before all sorts of plans are suggested to him by other people.”

Now, I would just like to take what I hope will be the gist of your own memorandum. If you will turn it over—this is your memorandum—take the first paragraph, Section I:

“Any considerations about the future organization of Bohemia and Moravia must be based on the goal which is to be laid down for that territory from a state-political (staatspolitisch) and ethnic-political (volkspolitisch) point of view.

“From a state-political standpoint there can be but one aim: total incorporation into the Greater German Reich; from an ethnic-political standpoint to fill this territory with Germans.”

And then you say that you point the path; and if you go on to Section II, in the middle of Paragraph 2, you will find a subparagraph beginning—

My Lord, it is the top of Page 109, Your Lordship’s copy:

“These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4 millions live in towns and communities of under 2,000 and in the country, are led and influenced by an intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in proportion to the size of the country. This part of the population also tried, after the alteration of the constitutional situation of this area, more or less openly to sabotage or at any rate postpone necessary measures which were intended to fit the circumstances of the country to the new state of affairs. The remainder of the population, that is small craftsmen, peasants, and workmen, adapted themselves better to the new conditions.”

Then, if you go on to Paragraph 3, you say:

“But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this that the Government and population behaved in this correct manner because they had inwardly accepted the loss of their independent state, and incorporation into Greater Germany. The Germans continue to be looked upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a widespread longing for a return to the old state of affairs, even if the people do not express it openly.

“By and large, the population submit to the new conditions but they do so only because they either have the necessary rational insight or else because they fear the consequences of disobedience. They certainly do not do so from conviction. This will be the state of affairs for some time to come.

“But”—go on to Section III—“as things are like that, a decision will have to be taken as to what is to be done with the Czech people in order to attain the objective of incorporating the country and filling it with Germans as quickly as possible and as thoroughly as possible.

“The most radical and theoretically complete solution to the problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely from this country and replace them by Germans.”

Then you say that that is not possible because there are not sufficient Germans to fill it immediately.

Then, if you go on to Paragraph 2, to the second half, you say—My Lord, that is the last six lines of Page 110:

“It will, where the Czechs are concerned, rather be a case on the one hand of keeping those Czechs who are suitable for Germanization by individual selective breeding, while on the other hand of expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years. If we use such a procedure, Germanization can be carried out successfully.”

Now, Defendant, you know that in the Indictment in this Trial we are charging you and your fellow defendants, among many other things, with genocide, which we say is the extermination of racial and national groups, or, as it has been put in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin, “a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” What you wanted to do was to get rid of the teachers and writers and singers of Czechoslovakia, whom you call the intelligentsia, the people who would hand down the history and traditions of the Czech people to other generations. These were the people that you wanted to destroy by what you say in that memorandum, were they not?

VON NEURATH: Not quite. Here there are...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But just before you answer, what did you mean by saying, in the last passage that I read to you, “...expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years”? Did you mean what you said? Were you speaking the truth when you said it was necessary to expel the intelligentsia?

VON NEURATH: To that I can answer only “yes” and “no.” First of all, I should like to say that from this report it becomes apparent that the memorandum was written by Frank. I joined my name to it, and this was on 31 August 1940. The memorandum which I—the memorandum which is referred to in the Friderici report is from a—is dated later I think, although I do not know offhand.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will find—I will give you, in a moment, the letter from Ziemke, who transmits Hitler’s view, and I think you will find that it is this memorandum that Hitler is dealing with. I will show you Frank’s memorandum in a moment. I am suggesting to you now, as you say to Lammers, that you enclosed your memorandum and you enclosed another memorandum, of which I will read you the essential part in a moment, which is the memorandum of Karl Hermann Frank. But this is a...

VON NEURATH: They are both by Frank.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’ll show it—no; but look at your own letter of the 31st of August: “Enclosed I send you the memorandum,” and you go on: “I enclose another memorandum... which my State Secretary K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me... with which I fully agree.” I am suggesting to you, you know that this is your—this is your memorandum referred to as the—in the Friderici document...

My Lord, that is Page 132 of Document Book 12.

[Turning to the defendant.] ...where General Friderici says, “After ample deliberation the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum.” I am suggesting to you that this is your memorandum which you sent on to Lammers for submission to the Führer. Are you saying—are you really going to tell the Tribunal that this is not your memorandum?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not want to say that at all. At the moment I really do not know any longer. I did not write it, but I agreed with its contents; the letter to Lammers says so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you agreed with its contents, what did you mean by saying that you would have to expel the intelligentsia, except that you were going to break down the Czechs as a national entity and expel the people who would keep going that history and tradition and language? Isn’t that why you wanted to expel the intelligentsia?

VON NEURATH: I never mentioned the word “destroy,” but said that the intelligentsia...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “expel”...

VON NEURATH: I see.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...which is your own word.

VON NEURATH: The class of the intelligentsia was the greatest obstacle to co-operation between Germans and Czechs. For that reason, if we wanted to achieve this co-operation, and that was still the aim of our policy, then this intelligentsia had to be reduced in some way and principally their influence had to be diminished, and that was the meaning of my explanation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you said to achieve your policy, but by achieving your policy you meant to destroy the Czech people as a national entity with their own language, history, and traditions, and assimilate them into the Greater German Reich. That was your policy, wasn’t it?

VON NEURATH: My policy was, first of all, to assimilate Czechoslovakia, as far as possible. But in the final analysis that could not have been achieved for generations. The first thing to do was to bring about co-operation so as to have peace and order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now before I put to you the memorandum of Frank with which you entirely agree, would you look at Paragraph VII of your own memorandum?

My Lord, it is Page 113 of Document Book 12a.

[Turning to the defendant.] In Section VII you say:

“If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German nation after a victorious war, the necessity for a careful and rational utilization of Germans will be apparent to everyone. There are so many tasks that have to be tackled at once and simultaneously that a careful, well-thought-out utilization of the Germans who are suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary.

“The Greater German Reich will have to make use of the help of foreigners on a large scale in all spheres and must confine itself to appointing Germans to the key positions and to taking over branches of public administration where the interests of the Reich make it absolutely necessary...”

You were, in this memorandum, blueprinting the plans for dealing with the Czechs after the war on the basis of the German victory; that is, that they should disappear as a nation and become assimilated to the German Reich. Wasn’t that what was in your mind?

VON NEURATH: To make the Czechs disappear as a nation was altogether impossible. That was not possible at all. But they were to incorporate themselves more closely into the Reich, and that is what I mean by the word “assimilate.”

Moreover, it is also stated in this memorandum—earlier, much earlier—that from the racial point of view—if you want to use that unpleasant expression—there was an extraordinarily large number of Germans within Czechoslovakia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn over and see how the—your State Secretary’s memorandum with which you entirely agree—how that runs.

My Lord, Your Lordship will find the beginning of that is enclosure Number 2 on Page 115.

[Turning to the defendant.] The State Secretary states his problem. He says, in the second sentence:

“The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a Reich Protector as its head, is suitable for settling the Czech problem and should therefore be retained or whether it should now give place to some, other form of government is being raised by various people and is the cause of this memorandum. It will briefly: (A) Indicate the nature of the Czech problem; (B) analyze the present way in which it is being dealt with; (C) examine the proposed alterations from the point of view of their suitability, and finally: (D) express an independent opinion on the whole question.”

Well now, I would like you just to look at your State Secretary’s independent opinion with which you entirely agree.

THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn’t you to read the last two lines?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, My Lord, I’m sorry.

“On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to come.”

Now, My Lord, Frank’s own opinion starts on Page 121 in Section D of the memorandum, and he begins by saying:

“The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be the complete Germanization of area and people. In order to attain this there are two possibilities:

“I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia to a territory outside the Reich and settling Germans in the freed territory; or,

“II. If one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia the simultaneous application of a great variety of methods working toward Germanization, in accordance with an X-year plan.

“Such a Germanization provides for: 1) The changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; 2) the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich, or ‘special treatment’ for these and all destructive elements; 3) the recolonizing of the territory thus freed with fresh German blood.”

Now, I want you just to turn to where your State Secretary gets down to concrete suggestions as to this policy of Germanization. Remember that you entirely agree, in your letter to Lammers.

If Your Lordship will turn to Page 123, there is a heading “Youth; fundamental change in education; extermination of the Czech historical myth.”

[Turning to the defendant.] That is the first point: Destroy any idea they might have of their history, beginning with the time of St. Wenceslaus, nearly a thousand years ago. That is your first point.

“Education toward the Reich idea; no getting on without perfect knowledge of the German language; first doing away with the secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools; never again any Czech universities, only transitionally the Collegium Bohemicum at the German university in Prague; 2 years compulsory labor service.

“Large-scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the German national soil from the north to the suburbs of Prague.

“Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become merely a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to disappear completely as an official language.

“Marriage policy after previous racial examination.

“In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier Gaue must be excluded.

“Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the granting of advantages as an inducement, severest police methods, with exile and ‘special treatment’ for all saboteurs. Principle: ‘Zuckerbrot und Peitsche.’ ”—What is that “Zuckerbrot und Peitsche”?

“The employment of all these methods has a chance of success only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its head controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The direct subordination of the ‘master in Bohemia’ to the Führer clarifies the political character of the office and the task, and prevents the political problem from sinking down to an administrative problem.”

In other words, it was essential to this policy that you should keep your job as Reich Protector and Frank should keep his as State Secretary, and the Gauleiter of the Danube should not be able to interfere and take away Brno as the capital of his Gau.

Defendant, do you tell this High Tribunal, as you told Dr. Lammers, that you entirely agree with what I suggest to you are dreadful, callous, and unprincipled proposals? Do you agree with these proposals?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not agree in the least.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, why did you tell Lammers you did? Why, when things were going well, did you tell Lammers that you did agree with them?

VON NEURATH: Later I made an oral report to the Führer about this. Apart from that, the statements which you just made show quite clearly that this first memorandum was written by Frank, who then added the second memorandum to it, and if you say, as you said at the end just now, that it was my purpose to remain in office as Reich Protector, then I can only tell you that the purpose, if there was a purpose in this connection, was that Frank wanted to become Reich Protector. However, from the point of view of the contents of this memorandum, I can certainly no longer identify myself with them today, nor did I do so on the occasion when I reported to the Führer. This becomes clear from the testimony which I gave yesterday. This testimony...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’m not concerned with your testimony yesterday; I am concerned with what you wrote in 1940 when you wrote—and I will read the words again; I have read them three times:

“I enclose another memorandum on the same question which my State Secretary, K. H. Frank, has drawn up independently of me”—independently of me—“and which in its train of thoughts leads to the same result, and with which I fully agree.”

Why did you...

VON NEURATH: I have just now told you that I no longer agree with these statements today, and that at the time when I verbally reported to the Führer, I did not support these statements either, but to the contrary, I made the proposals to him which I explained yesterday and to which I received his agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are these documents correctly copied? Because you see that in the letter of the 31st of August 1940 there is a reference in the margin, “Enclosure 1; Enclosure 2.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Therefore, the letter identifies the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is so. The one is, as I am suggesting, the defendant’s; the other is Frank’s.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you have mentioned, Defendant, about what—that you dealt with them otherwise to the Führer. I suggest to you that that is not true, that is not true that you dealt with them otherwise to the Führer. I am putting it quite bluntly that it is not true.

VON NEURATH: In that case I must regret to say that you are lying. For I—I must know. After all, I must know whether I talked to the Führer. I delivered a verbal report to him in person and Frank was not present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us look at the report, at your report. Your Lordship will find it on Page 7.

We will see whether it is true or not.

THE PRESIDENT: Page what?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 7, My Lord. It is Document D-739 of the same book, 12a; it is Exhibit G-521.

Now, this is a memorandum, a secret memorandum of the representative of the Foreign Office in the Office of the Reich Protector, of the 5th of October.

[Turning to the defendant.] You will remember your letter was the 31st of August. It says:

“Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector and State Secretary Frank by the Führer, I have learned the following from authentic sources:

“To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Gürtner, gave a report on the Czech resistance movement, during the course of which he maintained that the first trial of the four chief ringleaders would shortly take place before the Peoples’ Court.

“The Führer objected to this procedure and declared that execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through legal sentences, as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter. The Czechs would regard any sentence as an injustice. As this matter had already entered the path of legal procedure it was to be continued with in this form. The trials were to be postponed until after the war, and then amidst the din of the victory celebrations, the proceedings would pass unnoticed. Only death sentences could be pronounced, but would be commuted later on to life imprisonment or deportation.

“Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the Führer touched on the following three possibilities:

“1. Continuation of Czech autonomy in which the Germans would live in the Protectorate as co-citizens with equal rights. This possibility was, however, out of the question as one had always to reckon with Czech intrigues.

“2. The deportation of the Czechs and the Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility was out of the question too, as it would take 100 years.

“3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by Germanizing the Czechs, that is, by their assimilation. The latter would be possible with the greater part of the Czech people. Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections or who were anti-German were to be excepted from this assimilation. This category was to be weeded out.

“The Führer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the multitude of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The Führer further decided that, in the interests of a uniform policy with regard to the Czechs, a central Reich authority for the whole of the Bohemian and Moravian area should remain at Prague.

“The present status of the Protectorate thus continues.”

And look at the last sentence:

“The Führer’s decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.”

Now, Defendant, although you answered me so sharply a moment ago, that document says that after the reception of the Reich Protector and the State Secretary, the representative of the Foreign Office in your office says that the decision of the Führer followed the lines of the memoranda put forward by you and your State Secretary Frank. Why do you say that I am wrong in saying it is untrue that a different line was followed by the Führer? It is set out in that document.

VON NEURATH: To that I have the following reply to give: First of all, the document shows that the Führer touched upon the following three eventualities with reference to the question of the future of the Protectorate. They are the three possibilities which I said yesterday I had proposed. The document also shows, though not directly, that the cause for this Führer conference was primarily quite a different one than merely deciding the question of the Protectorate. On the contrary, the Minister of Justice was present and a legal question in regard to the treatment of the members of the resistance movement was the cause for the discussion and Frank came to Berlin for this reason. I had been to Berlin before that and I talked to the Führer, not about the memorandum, which I had in my hand, but about my misgivings in general and the future of our policy in the Protectorate. My report included those proposals which are mentioned here under 1, 2, and 3.

It says there at the end, “The decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.” That remark was added by Herr Ziemke or whoever had written the document, but what I said yesterday about the policy is correct. And even if I admit that at that time in the letter to Lammers I did identify myself with these enclosures it was nevertheless dropped.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to remind you that in the passage which I referred to last in your memorandum, as opposed to that of Frank, you were putting forward the organization of the Greater German Reich. I take it in this way, that you envisaged yourself that in the event of a German victory in the war the Czech part of Czechoslovakia would remain part of a Greater German Reich.

VON NEURATH: No, I beg your pardon. It had already been incorporated and here it is also expressly stated that it should remain in that condition, as a protectorate but as a special structure.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just—are you saying that your policy, after this period—this was in the autumn of 1940—that your policy towards the Czechs was sympathetic?

VON NEURATH: I do not think it changed except when there were strong resistance movements there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, why was it that you forbade, in the middle of 1941, any reference of the handling—to the discussion of the handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem? Why did you forbid its discussion?

VON NEURATH: To prevent these problems which were the cause of this memorandum from arising again and again, namely the problem of individual parts of the Protectorate being torn away and added to the lower Danube or the Sudeten country with a general resettlement. That was the purpose of my report to the Führer, as I explained yesterday, so as to put a stop to that discussion once and for all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you also—you particularly prohibited, did you not, any public statements addressed to the Czech population? Well, let us look at the document.

It is Document Number 3862-PS, My Lord. Your Lordship will find it at Page 126 of Document Book 12a. My Lord, it becomes Exhibit GB-522.

[Turning to the defendant.] It is for distribution through your various offices and you say:

“For the motive stated I order that in the future, when arrangements and publications of any kind concerning the German-Czech problem are made, the views of the whole population are more than ever to be directed to the war and its requirements while the duty of the Czech nation to carry out the war tasks imposed on it jointly with the Greater German Reich is to be stressed.

“Other questions concerning the German-Czech problem are not suitable subjects for public discussion at the present time. I wish to point out that, without detriment to my orders, administrative handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem are to be in no way alluded to.”

Then the last paragraph:

“Requisite public statements about the political questions of the Protectorate and in particular those addressed to the Czech population are my business and mine alone and will be published in due time.”

Why did you want to prohibit so severely the addressing of any public statements to the Czech population?

VON NEURATH: That is addressed not only to the Czech population, but especially to the Germans, and just for this reason—that was some special event which I no longer remember—it says here “for the motive stated I order that”—when there was again a discussion about the future of the Protectorate or something was published. That was the reason and I pointed out that that is why it was forbidden.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I suggest to you about the—your proposals and Frank’s speak for themselves. I want you to help me on one other matter.

Do you remember after the closing of the universities that the question arose, what was to happen to the students? There were about 18,000 students who were, of course, out of work because they could not...

VON NEURATH: I beg your pardon, I beg your pardon. There were not so many; there were at the most 1,800 in all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you got it—with the greatest respect either you are wrong or your office. According to the note from Group X of your office:

“According to the data at my disposal the number of students affected by the closure”—I should think that would include high schools as well—“for 3 years of the Czech universities is 18,998.

“According to the press communications, dated the 21st of this month only 1,200 persons were arrested in connection with the events of the 15th of this month.”

And then your office goes on to say by a process of subtraction that leaves 17,800. You were faced with their occupation.

My Lord, it is Page 104, Document 3858-PS. Exhibit GB-523.

VON NEURATH: I do not want to deny my official’s statement. He must have known better than I. I am merely surprised that there should have been 18,000 students in two Czech universities, in a country with a population of 7 millions.

THE PRESIDENT: Hadn’t you better check that by the original?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I shall. I am much obliged to Your Lordship. Well, My Lord, it is quite clear that both figures—they are in figures, and they are 18,998, and then there is the check below, and you have to take off 1,200; that leaves 17,800. My Lord, if it were only 1,800, the second figure could not arise.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, somewhere there must be an error. That would have been more for two universities in Czechoslovakia than there were in Berlin at the best of times. There was a maximum of 8,000 to 9,000 in Berlin per year and in the case of a nation of only 7 millions there are supposed to be 18,000 students in two universities. This cannot be right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it may be that there are three age groups. Your Lordship sees that it is “according to the data at my disposal, the number of students affected by the closure for 3 years of the Czech universities is 18,000.” It may be that is the intake for 2 years, in addition to present students.

[Turning to the defendant.] Anyhow, this is the figure; and it is this problem which has been dealt with by your Ministry. It may be that it includes certain high schools, but at any rate, these are your Ministry’s documents, and I want to know what happened. This was the minutes, as I understand it, from Dennler, Dr. Dennler, who was the head of Group X of your office, to Burgsdorff, who had a superior position; and, if I may summarize it, this letter of 21 November 1939 suggests that the students should be taken forcibly from Czechoslovakia to the old Reich and put to work in the old Reich; and then, the next—on 25 November, you will notice that in Paragraph 2 it says—the writer, who is Burgsdorff, is saying that he is dealing with X 119/39, which is Dennler’s memorandum; and Burgsdorff says that he does not want them to go into the Reich because at that time there was some unemployment in the Reich, and suggests that they should be dealt with by compulsory labor on the roads and canals in Czechoslovakia. Now, these were the two proposals from your office.

My Lord, the second one is Document 3857-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-524.

[Turning to the defendant.] What happened to the unfortunate students?

VON NEURATH: Nothing at all happened to them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, did either of these proposals of Dr. Dennler for forced labor in the Reich and of Burgsdorff for forced labor in Czechoslovakia, did they come up to you?

VON NEURATH: No, none of them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did they come to you for decision? Did they come to you for decision?

VON NEURATH: I think they were submitted to me, but I cannot tell you for certain.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, will you agree with me, or perhaps you will be able to correct my knowledge, that this is the earliest suggestion—you said it was not put into effect—but the earliest suggestion of forced labor came from an officer of your department? Do you know of any other department of the Reich that had suggested forced labor as early as November 1939?

VON NEURATH: There is no connection, and, moreover, if you were to look through suggestions made by all your subordinates, then you, too, might find some proposal which you afterward rejected. Suggestions made by an adviser do not mean anything at all.

Apart from that, perhaps I can clear up this figure of 18,000. Here it says, “According to the data at my disposal, the number of students who will be affected by closing the Czech universities for 3 years will be 18,000.” It is, therefore, three times 6,000, is it not? Which is approximately 18,000.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had already put forward that suggestion, Defendant, about 10 minutes ago, but I respectfully agree with you. That is one matter in which we are not in difference.

Well now, you understand what I am suggesting. It is that these proposals germinated in your office, because they were quite in keeping with the proposals in the memoranda which I have just read to the Tribunal, that you should not only get rid of Czech higher education, but you should have forced labor. Do you remember that was in the State Secretary’s memorandum? What I am suggesting is that it was in your department—the idea of forced labor—as early as 21 November 1939.

Now, Defendant, I have only one other matter, and I hope, as it is a question of fact, that perhaps you will be able to agree with me on reflection. You suggested this morning that the German university in Prague was closed down after the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1919. That is how it came to us. On reflection, do you not know that it continued and that many thousands of students graduated in the German university of Prague between 1919 and 1939?

VON NEURATH: As far as I know, it was a department of the Czech university, a German part of the Czech university, as far as I know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it continued—it continued as a university?

VON NEURATH: Yes, it continued, but as a Czech university.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but German students came there and could take their degrees in German? It was a permitted language? I suggest to you that there are thousands of people who went there from Austria and from the old Reich—went there as Germans and took their degrees in German.

VON NEURATH: Yes, only the old German university, the so-called Charles University, was closed by the Czechs. But a German department, or whatever one might call it, still remained. The Germans studied and took their examinations there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the point is clear. I am not going to argue about the actual thing, but that there was a German university, where German students could study, you will agree.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine further?

STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Defendant, tell us please, when you were Minister of Foreign Affairs did Ribbentrop try to intervene in the foreign affairs of Germany?

VON NEURATH: Is that a question?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is a question.

VON NEURATH: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Would you please tell us in what form this intervention took place?

VON NEURATH: By communicating to the Führer his own ideas on foreign policy, without giving them to me for consideration.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Yesterday you stated here that in 1936 you had differences of opinion with Hitler and that on 27 of July 1936 you asked to be relieved of your duties as a Minister. This document was cited here yesterday, but did you not write to Hitler then?—and I will read the last sentence of your letter to him:

“Even if I am no longer Minister, I shall be constantly at your disposal, if you so desire, with my advice and my years of experience in the field of foreign policy.”

Did you write these words in your letter to the Führer?

VON NEURATH: Yes indeed; yes indeed.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And did you fulfill the promises you made to Hitler? Whenever it was necessary to cover by diplomatic manipulations the aggressive actions of Hitler, as for instance at the time of the annexation of the Sudetenland, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and so on? Did you help Hitler with your experience? Is that right?

VON NEURATH: That is a great mistake. On the contrary, as I have stated here yesterday and today, I was called in by Hitler only once; and that was on the last phase of the Austrian Anschluss. With that my activities came to an end, but in 1938, to be sure, I went to see him of my own accord, to restrain him from starting the war. That was my activity.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We have already heard this. I would like to ask you another question concerning the memorandum of Friderici without repeating what has already been said here concerning it. You remember this memorandum well, as it was just presented to the Court a short time ago. In the last part of the memorandum of Friderici—it is the last paragraph but one—it is stated:

“If the governing of the Protectorate were in reliable hands and guided exclusively by the order of the Führer of the 16th of March 1939, the territory of Bohemia and Moravia would become an integral part of Germany.”

It was for this purpose that Hitler chose you to be Protector; is that not so?

VON NEURATH: Not a bit; that was not the reason at all. The reason was—I have described it in detail yesterday.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. We shall not repeat the reasons; we spoke about them yesterday.

Well, you deny that you were precisely the man who was supposed to carry through the invasion of Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: To that I can only answer “no.”

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Do you admit that you were, in the Protectorate, the only representative of the Führer and of the Government of the Reich, and that you were directly subordinate to Hitler?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right; that is stated in Hitler’s decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, it is stated there. I will not read this decree, which would only delay the interrogation. This decree has already been presented to the Court.

Do you acknowledge that all administrative organs and authorities of the Reich in the Protectorate with the exception of the Armed Forces, were subordinate to you?

VON NEURATH: No. I am sorry to have to say that that is a mistake. That is also stated in the same decree of 1 September 1939. Apart from that, there were numerous other organizations, that is, Reich authorities, which were not under my jurisdiction; quite apart from the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, as far as the Police are concerned, we will speak about that separately. So you think it is a mistake that the decree does not mention it, or do you interpret the decree otherwise?

I shall read the first paragraph of the decree of 1 September 1939. It is stated there:

“All the authorities, offices and organizations of the Reich in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, with the exception of the Armed Forces, are under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector.”

It is also stated in Paragraph 2:

“The Reich Protector supervises the entire autonomous administration of the Protectorate.”

And Paragraph 3:

“The office of the Reich Protector is in charge of all administrative branches of the Reich administration with the exception of the Armed Forces.”

As you see, it is stated very bluntly and definitely here that all the institutions of the Reich were subordinate to you, while you were subordinate to Hitler.

VON NEURATH: I have to tell you again that as to administrative agencies, yes; but there were a number of other authorities, Reich authorities and offices which did not come under my jurisdiction, for instance, the Four Year Plan.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now let us pass to the question of the Police. Yesterday, in answer to a question of your counsel, you stated to the Tribunal that as to this decree of 1 September, signed by Göring, Frick, and Lammers, Paragraph 13 was not comprehensible to you. Let us examine other paragraphs of the same chapter concerning the Police.

Paragraph 11 says:

“The organs of the German Security Police in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia have the task of investigating and combating all hostile attempts toward the government and population in the territory of the Protectorate, informing the Reich Protector as well as the subordinate organizations, keeping them currently informed on important events, and advising them as to what to do.”

Paragraph 14 of the same decree states:

“The Reich Minister of the Interior (the Reichsführer SS, and the Chief of the German Police), with the agreement of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia releases the legal and administrative directives necessary for carrying out this order.”

Thus, according to this decree, the Police and the SS were obliged to let you know about all their measures and, moreover, all their administrative and legal acts and measures had been carried out with your knowledge. Do you acknowledge that?

VON NEURATH: No; that is not right. First of all, there was at one time an order that they were to inform me. But that was not carried out and was forbidden by Himmler directly. And the other, the second regulation to the effect that the administrative measures—or whatever it is called—could or should be carried out with my approval, was never applied.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: So you deny it?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I now present to you the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, of 7 March 1946, on this very question; that is, on the question of the Police and to whom they were subordinated.

Mr. President, I present this testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-494.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this in the English book as well, do you know?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No, Mr. President. This document that I am presenting now is an original, signed by Frank.

[Turning to the defendant.] Karl Hermann Frank, during an interrogation, testified:

“According to the order on ‘The Structure of the German Administration in the Protectorate and the German Security Police,’ all German authorities and offices in the Protectorate and thereby the entire Police, too, excepting the Armed Forces are formally subordinated to the Reich Protector and are bound by his directions. Owing to this the Security Police was bound to carry out this basic political policy set forth by the Reich Protector. Orders as to carrying out State Police measures were mainly issued by the Chief of the Security Police with the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin.

“If the Reich Protector wanted to carry out some State Police measures, he had to have the permission of the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin; that is, in this case the State Police also submitted each order for reconfirmation to the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. The same applied also to directives for the carrying out of State Police measures given by the Higher SS and Police Leader to the Chief of the Security Police.”

I would like to draw your attention to this paragraph that I am reading now:

“This system of channels for issuing directives remained in force during the whole existence of the Protectorate and was used as such by Von Neurath in the Protectorate. In general the Reich Protector could, on his own initiative, issue directives to the State Police through the Chief of the Security Police. The carrying out of such directives was, however, subject to approval by the Reich Security Main Office if State Police measures were concerned.

“In regard to the SD (Security Service), which had no executive powers, the authority of the Reich Protector respecting the issuing of directives to the SD was greater and not subject to the approval of the Reich Security Main Office in every case.”

Do you confirm this testimony of Frank?

VON NEURATH: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right.

VON NEURATH: I refer you to a statement by the same Frank, which I have learned about here, which was made last year, during which he said something quite different. He said that the entire Police were not under the Reich Protector, but came under the Chief of the Police in Berlin, namely, Himmler. It ought to be here somewhere—this statement.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Don’t worry about it; I will come back to this testimony.

Tell me, please, who was the political adviser in your service?

VON NEURATH: Political adviser?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, political adviser.

VON NEURATH: In general I had various political advisers.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In order not to waste time, I will show you a short document, and I ask you to read it.

On 21 July 1939 the Chief of the Security Police wrote a letter to your State Secretary and Higher SS and Police Leader, Karl Hermann Frank. The letter had the following contents:

“In an order of 5 May 1939 the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia appointed the SD Leader and Chief of the Security Police as his political adviser. I have ascertained that this order has not yet been published or carried out. Please provide for carrying out this order.

“Signed, Dr. Best.”

Do you remember your order now?

VON NEURATH: I cannot remember that decree at the moment, but I do remember that this was never carried out, because I did not have this SD leader as my political adviser.

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, just one more minute, please, to finish this question, and then we can break off.

[Turning to the defendant.] But did you issue such an order on 5 May?

VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you about that at this date—but it is probably true. I do not want to deny it; I do not know any more.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: But you did issue this order?

All right. I thank you, Mr. President. It is possible to adjourn now. I shall require 30 minutes more.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 26 June 1946, at 1000 hours.]

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ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH DAY
Wednesday, 26 June 1946