Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 17

by Various

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, My Lord, the first application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath with regard to M. François-Poncet. That has been dealt with; that is covered.

Then, My Lord, the next is an application from Dr. Marx on behalf of the Defendant Streicher to put in an affidavit by the publisher, Herr Gassner of Der Stürmer. My Lord, the publisher is intended to deal with the question of the rise and the circulation of Der Stürmer during the years 1933 to 1935. The Prosecution have already submitted to the Tribunal that they did not think that that was relevant when an application was made to call Herr Gassner as a witness. The Prosecution still take the same position. My Lord, it is for an affidavit, and we leave to the Tribunal as to whether they would like the affidavit, but the Prosecution fail to see the relevance of that evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Would Dr. Marx like to say something about that now?

DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Mr. President, I have just discussed this matter with Defendant Streicher; and he tells me that the witness, Herr Gassner, whom I have proposed to call and from whom an affidavit had been proposed, would only be in a position to speak about the publication figures of Der Stürmer from the year 1941 onwards. That, of course, is of no interest whatever to the defense. I shall, therefore, forego the affidavit and rely on what the witness Hiemer has said in that respect. Therefore, it will not be necessary at all to procure the affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is by Dr. Kranzbühler on behalf of the Defendant Dönitz for further consideration and admission of the affidavit of the former fleet judge, Jäckel, by reason of the course of the cross-examination.

My Lord, I think the most convenient course would be if the Prosecution do not object to the application at this time but reserve the right, when Dr. Kranzbühler makes the use that he desires of the affidavit, to consider whether we shall then object.

THE PRESIDENT: This is really evidence in rebuttal, is it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, in rebuttal of the points raised in the cross-examination. It is very difficult to decide whether one should make a final objection until one knows what use Dr. Kranzbühler is going to make of it. I suggest that we do not object at this stage.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, these applications and the Tribunal’s orders granting the witnesses are always subject to that provision.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, then the Prosecution makes no further objection.

My Lord, then there are two applications on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath, a request for minutes from the interrogatory of the...

THE PRESIDENT: They have both been withdrawn, have they not?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, they have? I was not certain.

My Lord, then Dr. Thoma makes application on behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg for three matters: The exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant; the entry of Dr. Strauber 27 May 1944; and third, a note of the Ministerialrat, Dr. Beil.

My Lord, the Prosecution feel that these documents are cumulative, and they leave it to the Tribunal with that suggestion—that the case is already well covered. I do not know if Dr. Thoma wishes to say anything further.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I should like to refer to it quite briefly, as apparently there is an error in the matter of Dr. Beil. It is a question here of the interrogatory. I have sent to Beil an interrogatory which has not yet been returned. Otherwise, there is nothing that I know about this matter; but I have made an application which has not been mentioned yet. I applied for some of Rosenberg’s writings, Tradition und Gegenwart, new speeches and translations, to be included in the document book, for these deal with questions which were discussed on the occasion of Gau educational meetings and discussions and which also deal with such questions as the peaceful living together of the nations of Europe, religious tolerance, his advocacy of an ideal humanity, and similar writings. I request that these articles be admitted. Apart from that, I have no further applications to make; and for the rest I leave the decision, of course, to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: If I understand what you said aright, Dr. Thoma, you were not referring to any of the applications which are before us. The applications which are before us are an exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant in the autumn of 1944; another is an entry which Dr. Strauber made; and the third is a note of Dr. Beil; you have not referred to them, have you?

DR. THOMA: Yes, that is right. I have to confess that these applications are completely new to me. These applications must have been made by Rosenberg on his own initiative, because I cannot find any trace of them. Or perhaps an error was made in the memorandum to the Tribunal. I do not know the applications.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, the copies of the applications are before us, and they appear to be signed both by the Defendant Rosenberg and by yourself.

DR. THOMA: In that case, this must have happened months ago. I cannot remember; this is from 3 June.

THE PRESIDENT: At any rate, you do not want them?

DR. THOMA: Application Number 3 is settled.

I have re-read the applications just now, and I do remember them. I ask you to make a decision favorable to the defendant.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next applications are for a number of documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Papen, and the Prosecution have no objection to this.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them—certainly Numbers 3, 5, and 13—have either been admitted or rejected, I think.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. I had a note opposite 13. I really think they have been dealt with, My Lord; they are in the books, and I do not think any further discussion is required.

THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in the book?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think so, My Lord. I do not know if—Dr. Kubuschok says he agrees with me.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Bormann, a request for a decree of Hitler’s and a decree issued by Bormann in 1944. My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to these.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite understand the meaning of the last one. Can you tell me what it means?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I took it myself that it was “to” the SD, instead of “of” the SD—the appertaining of members of the head office of the National Socialist Party of the SD. I am afraid that that guess on my part does not meet with approval.

DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): My Lord, this concerns a decree from Bormann in which he prohibits members of the Party Chancellery belonging to the SD. It is a decree of Bormann’s applying to the Party Chancellery.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the remaining applications are on behalf of the Defendant Göring, the admission of an affidavit by Baron von Gersdorff, and a book by Joseph Chapski. My Lord, my Soviet colleague has dealt with that by submission in writing, dated 20 June. I did not propose to say anything further about that, My Lord. Colonel Pokrovsky is here if Your Lordship would like to hear him further.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already made an order with reference to this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship has.

THE PRESIDENT: We made the order on 9 June, apparently, that for the Defendant Göring three witnesses could be produced either personally...

Perhaps we had better hear from Dr. Stahmer about this.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr. President, that is the way I understood the decision of the Tribunal. I had applied for five witnesses. The Tribunal ordered that I could produce only three out of the five witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: That is right.

DR. STAHMER: Then with reference to the affidavit nothing was said, as far as I can remember, in that particular decision, so that I had assumed that I would be free to ask for admission of affidavits insofar as the Tribunal considers them necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, after the Tribunal had made that order about limiting the number of witnesses to three, did you not receive a communication, to which you have replied, I think, suggesting that possibly you might be able to dispense with actual oral witnesses and do that whole part of the case by affidavits?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, I received that communication; and I have already negotiated about the matter with the Russian Prosecution. We did not quite reach an agreement, however; and therefore I made a written application to the Tribunal a few days ago.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but was not the agreement which you were trying to arrive at an agreement that only three affidavits should be produced on either side? Or was it more than three?

DR. STAHMER: No. The question which remains and which we have not agreed upon is whether I will be given the opportunity to read a few of the affidavits here.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Dr. Stahmer, I think the position is, then, that unless you are able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet Prosecution, we shall have to abide by our previous order.

DR. STAHMER: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: You will make further efforts to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Prosecution and let the Tribunal know.

DR. STAHMER: I will.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if your Lordship will grant me the indulgence of mentioning three exhibits. They all refer to the diary of Admiral Assmann, My Lord, which was introduced during the cases of the Defendants Dönitz and Raeder. There are three exhibits concerned.

The first is Document D-879. We thought that would be more complete if a connecting page was put in to make the continuity of the exhibit. For that purpose, My Lord, the Prosecution asks that Exhibit GB-482 be withdrawn and that there be submitted the two pages which were originally in it with a connecting page. That is merely adding a connecting page, My Lord.

The second is Document D-881...

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to that on the part of the Defense?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think so, My Lord; I have not heard of any.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the documents relate to, did you say?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The diary of Admiral Assmann, who was on the staff of the Defendant Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is only a question of putting the exhibit in proper form.

The second document, My Lord, is D-881, which is another passage from the same diary, on 23 February 1940. I promised Your Lordship that I should put in an exhibit when I dealt with the diary in cross-examination; and, My Lord, the exhibit has been prepared, and I want to put it in under the Number GB-475. That is, Document D-881 will become Exhibit GB-475.

The third, which is in the same position as the second, is Document D-892. That exhibit has now been prepared and will become Exhibit GB-476. Copies are available for the defendants and will be given to them after the approval of the Court is given.

THE PRESIDENT: And copies, of course, will be supplied to the Court as well?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, My Lord. They are just awaiting the formal approval of the Court, and they will be submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David, that is all right.

Then, Sir David, we will consider the other matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.

THE PRESIDENT; Very well.

Yes, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I just wanted to use this opportunity to submit to the Tribunal the affidavit of Robert Scholz, the Chief of Special Staff Rosenberg. It has been translated into English and French, and I should now like to submit it under Exhibit Number 41 to the Tribunal. I have already shown it to Mr. Dodd, and he has not objected.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, I wanted to ascertain whether and up to what date after this session we may submit affidavits and documents. The reason is that during recent days I have received two affidavits and a document, the relevance of which we have not yet definitely decided upon.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like to know when the Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense think would be the best time to deal with these matters which are outstanding and with any evidence which either the Defense or the Prosecution may wish to bring in rebuttal.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I have not had the chance of discussing it with any of the Counsel for the Defense; but I should have thought at the end of the evidence. One might reasonably hope that the evidence will finish this week. It might be possible to deal with it on Saturday morning or on Monday, and suit the Counsel for the Defense, and, of course, as the Tribunal decides.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal, I think, will expect the Defense Counsel and the Prosecution to be ready, directly when the end of the evidence comes, to deal with all these additional questions which are outstanding and also with any applications that they may have with reference to rebuttal.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I wanted that to be clearly understood, that it will be expected that it is to be done immediately the evidence closes. That, I think, answers Dr. Kraus’ point about the affidavits and documents. That would be the most appropriate time.

Sir David, have you got any ideas as to how long that would take?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think a very short time. I should have thought that 2 days or thereabouts would see it through. I have discussed it with Mr. Dodd, and that was the view we took.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In about 2 days at the outside?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the outside, My Lord, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.

[The witness Dieckhoff resumed the stand.]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, since what date do you know Herr Von Neurath?

DIECKHOFF: Since 1913; I met him when I joined the Foreign Office. He was legation counsellor in the Foreign Office at that time. I then met him again in Constantinople, and there I had contact with him. Then I did not meet him again until 1930.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In what capacity did you have dealings with Herr Von Neurath beginning with 1930?

DIECKHOFF: Herr Von Neurath was then, from 1930 till 1932, Ambassador to London; and I was head of the Department “England-America” in the Foreign Office.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How was the co-operation during that time between the Foreign Office—that is, yourself—and Herr Von Neurath, who was then Ambassador to London?

DIECKHOFF: The co-operation was excellent.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath’s appointment to the position of Reich Foreign Minister?

DIECKHOFF: I remember that most of the leading officials of the Foreign Office were greatly upset by the sudden departure of Brüning, whose steady and moderate policy we approved at the time. We submitted to the change in the person of the Foreign Minister only because Neurath replaced Brüning and we knew that Herr Von Neurath was a man of high standards and an experienced diplomat. Furthermore, we knew that he had represented Brüning’s policy in London; and we expected that as Foreign Minister he would continue Brüning’s policy.

I welcomed Herr Von Neurath, I think it was on 2 June, at the station in Berlin when he arrived in Germany. From conversations with him I gathered the impression that he very much disliked to leave London and to take over the Foreign Ministry. But he said to me, “I do not think I shall be able to refuse the wish of the old gentleman.” That, of course, was Reich President Von Hindenburg.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What position did you hold yourself during the time when you worked under Herr Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry?

DIECKHOFF: At first, I remained at the head of the England-America Department until 1936. Afterward, in April 1936, I took over the re-established political department. In June State Secretary Von Bülow died, and in August 1936 I was appointed acting State Secretary in the Foreign Office. I remained in that provisional position until March 1937, and then I became Ambassador to Washington.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, as Foreign Minister, retain the old officials of the Foreign Office?

DIECKHOFF: He retained the old officials in practically all the leading positions of both the domestic and the foreign service. The State Secretary Von Bülow for instance remained for 4 years, until his death, in the same position in the Foreign Office.

He sent Ambassador Von Hoesch to London as his successor, and he sent Ambassador Von Hassell to Rome, and Ambassador Köster to Paris—all of these were old diplomatic officials.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us from your own experience during your activities what the aims of Neurath’s foreign policy were?

DIECKHOFF: It was the aim of Herr Von Neurath to maintain good relations with all states and thereby to re-establish gradually Germany’s status of equal rights which we had lost in 1919. This was the same policy that had been pursued by Stresemann and Brüning. Herr Von Neurath was aware of the difficulties of Germany’s position. He talked to me about it repeatedly. He was under no misapprehension about it. He saw things realistically. His tendency was to exercise moderation.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Herr Von Neurath’s entry into Hitler’s Government, which was formed on 30 January 1933?

DIECKHOFF: I know about this only what I was told by State Secretary Von Bülow when I returned to Berlin from leave at the beginning of February 1933. According to this, Herr Von Neurath had no part in the formation of the new Cabinet, that is, Hitler’s Cabinet. Apart from that, he was sick during that time. He heard of the plan of making Hitler Reich Chancellor and of forming a new government. He wanted to discuss it with Reich President Von Hindenburg in order to obtain certain reservations for himself; but he came too late and could not obtain these reservations. In spite of this, he retained the Foreign Ministry in the new Cabinet because he did not want to refuse the wish of the Reich President.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the National Socialist domestic policy?

DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath, soon after 30 January 1933 viewed the domestic policy with some anxiety, chiefly because he felt that it strongly affected our foreign policy. When, in June 1933, I visited him in London, where he attended a conference as head of the German delegation, he told me about his anxieties; but he thought that these things would die down and that developments would be similar to those in Fascist Italy, where things had been very wild in the beginning, but had settled down afterward. He was hoping that the same would happen in Germany.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I am coming now to the year 1936. One of the principal questions which dominated that year was the Austrian problem. Can you tell us what Herr Von Neurath’s attitude was toward the repeated interferences of German circles in the internal affairs of Austria?

DIECKHOFF: Yes. Herr Von Neurath considered such German interference in the internal affairs of Austria not only inadmissible but damaging. He told me so repeatedly. He was striving for an improvement of the economic relations with Austria and thereby trying to improve gradually the political relations also. He wanted to leave the sovereignty of Austria untouched. This was also the aim of the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and Austria, that is, the economic strengthening of Austria and thereby the re-establishment of good political relations between the two countries.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you hear anything before March of 1938 that Hitler had the intention to incorporate Austria into Germany, if necessary, with force?

DIECKHOFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever hear anything before 1938 that Hitler had intended to solve the Sudeten problem by force or even to attack Czechoslovakia?

DIECKHOFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Hitler was in full agreement until November 1937 with the peaceful policy which Herr Von Neurath pursued with regard to both Austria and Czechoslovakia and also with regard to the other European countries?

DIECKHOFF: Until Herr Von Neurath’s resignation in February 1938, I always presumed that Hitler agreed with the peaceful policy pursued by Herr Von Neurath; and I never heard or learned anything to the contrary.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know what the thoughts, the considerations of Herr Von Neurath in 1935 were regarding the question of rearmament, that is to say, the re-establishment of Germany’s military sovereignty?

DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath held the view that Germany, by the declaration of the Western Powers on 11 December 1932, had been granted equality of rights; and he considered her to have the indisputable right to rearm after all disarmament efforts had failed.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put the same question to you, with regard to the considerations and attitude of Herr Von Neurath, with reference to the remilitarization of the demilitarized Rhineland.

DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath was aware of the seriousness of this problem, for he knew that the problem of the remilitarization of the Rhineland was interconnected with the Locarno Pact; but I know that he saw a breach of the Locarno Pact in the Franco-Russian Agreement of Mutual Assistance concluded in May 1935 and that as a result of the ratification of this pact, or its going into effect, he firmly believed that Germany had the right to re-establish military sovereignty in the Rhineland.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the general political situation in those days? Taking it into consideration, was it not justified to assume that sooner or later a peaceful solution of this Rhineland problem would be arrived at in any case?

DIECKHOFF: At any rate, the actual development after 7 March 1936 showed that the Western Powers, though they did not agree to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, nevertheless very quickly acquiesced in the fait accompli.

I was at that time, during the second half of March 1936, for 2 weeks in London on behalf of the Reich Government; and I had the opportunity to discuss this matter with many Englishmen; and the view I found in the widest circles was that as Germany had been granted equality of rights one could not deny her the right to remilitarize the Rhineland. In some circles I even found the view that it was a relief that the remilitarization of the Rhineland, which was due sooner or later in any case, was carried out so quickly and comparatively painlessly.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And now one last question. What do you know about Herr Von Neurath’s resignation from the position of Reich Foreign Minister in February 1938?

DIECKHOFF: I was Ambassador to Washington at that time and I was completely surprised by Foreign Minister Von Neurath’s sudden departure. I did know that there were many things he did not agree with and that he had asked several times to be allowed to resign. I also knew that he was ill; he suffered from a neurotic heart. I also knew that he had passed his sixty-fifth birthday, which gave him the right to retire. But I was surprised all the same, particularly as I did not know the details at that time. I regretted the resignation of the Foreign Minister, in whose peace policy I had confidence, very much. I remember that the official circles in Washington also regretted the departure of Herr Von Neurath very much, for Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles approached me a few days after this event and told me that the American Government regretted the departure of this man who had pursued a moderate policy.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask him any questions?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: One single question, Witness. You said that if Von Neurath assumed the office of Foreign Minister, you had expected that he would continue Stresemann’s and Brüning’s policy. According to your knowledge did he actually continue this policy of Brüning’s after he became Foreign Minister?

DIECKHOFF: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on the same basis I intimated with regard to the last witness, the Prosecution do not desire to take up time by asking any questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I then have your permission to call my third and last witness, Dr. Völkers, into the witness stand.

[The witness Völkers took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

HANS HERMANN VÖLKERS (Witness): Hans Hermann Völkers.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, you were twice the personal adviser to Herr Von Neurath; first in his position as Foreign Minister and later in his position as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; is that correct?

VÖLKERS: Yes; since 1920 I was a member of the Foreign Office, and I spent all my time abroad. Under Stresemann I spent 4 years in Geneva as Consul General and as the permanent German representative to the League of Nations; and in 1932 I was called to the Foreign Office and became personal adviser to the newly, appointed Foreign Minister, Herr Von Neurath. I remained in that position for a year; and then, upon my own request, I was sent to Madrid as Embassy Counsellor, and later I became Minister to Havana. In 1939 I was called back to the Foreign Office to act as personal adviser with the title of chief of the office of Herr Von Neurath, who in the meantime had been appointed Reich Protector in Prague.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did this appointment as personal adviser to Herr Von Neurath in Prague take place on the basis of any personal relations or merely for professional reasons?

VÖLKERS: Only for professional reasons. Until I was his attaché in Berlin I did not know Herr Von Neurath.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the attitude of the officials of the Foreign Ministry toward Herr Von Neurath’s appointment as Foreign Minister?

VÖLKERS: I had the impression that the officials of the Foreign Office were generally most satisfied that in view of the difficult internal political situation an old professional diplomat and expert minister took over the direction of the Foreign Ministry, because they saw in that a guarantee for a steady foreign political course; all the more so as it was known that Herr Von Neurath had the special confidence of Reich President Von Hindenburg and because he enjoyed, due to his entire personality and his equanimity, the special recognition and veneration of all the officials of the Foreign Office.

When Hitler came to power I had the impression that he was skeptical and reserved toward him. He did not belong to the circle of the closer associates of Hitler, and during the time I was with him he never attended these evening conferences which Hitler held in the Reich Chancellery in those days.

Gradually, however, the pressure on the Foreign Office increased more and more. The Auslands-Organisation was created and the office of Ribbentrop started a competitive enterprise into which were called all sorts of people who had been abroad. They made all sorts of reports which went directly to the Führer without being controlled by the Foreign Office. And then later on the head of the Auslands-Organisation was installed as commissioner in the Foreign Office while Prince Waldeck was transferred into the personnel department of the Foreign Office. At that stage the pressure became so strong that finally one could not fight against it any more.

But the fact that the Foreign Office had isolated itself for so long and that it was still evading the pressure of the Party, that, I think, is certainly the merit of the then Foreign Minister and his State Secretary Von Bülow. When the Jewish laws were then introduced into the Foreign Office, too, I know that Herr Von Neurath protected, as far as that was possible, his officials. I was in Stockholm during the last 2 years of the war and met there two former colleagues of mine with whom I am close friends. One is Ministerial Director Richard Meier who used to be in charge of the Eastern department and who had to leave quite soon and who often told me in Stockholm how grateful he was to Herr Von Neurath for not only having enabled him to take with him his family and his furniture and everything when he went abroad but also that Herr Von Neurath, until the collapse, continued to pay him his monthly pensions in Swedish kroner.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your position and your activity in Prague in the Government of the Protectorate?

VÖLKERS: My position in Prague with the Government of the Protectorate was approximately the same as the one I had 7 years earlier when I had been personal adviser to the Foreign Minister in the Foreign Office in Berlin, with the exception that in the Foreign Office there is a special protocol department and a chief of protocol, whereas in Prague I was also in charge of all protocols and ceremonial affairs, and that was really my chief occupation. I was head of the so-called Office of the Reich Protector, not to be confused with the principal authority, with which I had nothing to do. When I came to Prague in the summer of 1939 the office already had been functioning for several months. My predecessor was one Legation Counsellor Von Kessel from the Foreign Office. Apart from myself two other officials from the Foreign Office, who were subordinated to me, belonged to the Office of the Reich Protector, also one Count Waldburg, whose mother was a Czech and who was engaged by the Reich Protector because he was hoping to establish, especially through him, good relations with the Czechs.

The office was responsible, apart from the general and usual routine matters, for dealing with the private correspondence and the handling of personal petitions. In the course of time we had to set up a special department, because later on, when the many arrests took place, we received so many petitions, most of which were addressed to the Reich Protector personally...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, surely this is very remote from anything we have got to consider, and all the previous evidence this witness has given has been cumulative evidence which has not been cross-examined upon before; and now what he is saying is all very remote to anything we have to consider.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In fact, I have already come to an end, Mr. President. I merely wanted to show that he is in a position to answer the following questions from his own knowledge.

[Turning to the witness.] What can you tell us from your own observations and experiences about the attitude of Herr Von Neurath toward the Czechs?

VÖLKERS: I can give you only general impressions. As I have already told you, I had nothing to do with the actual activities of the office but was attached to Herr Von Neurath personally only for his private affairs and all ceremonial matters. But I do know, and he told me, that when he took over his position as Reich Protector, he did so with the intention of treating the Czech population as justly and decently as possible in order to create, by smoothing out the differences, a healthy basis for a peaceful living, side by side, of the two nations. He told me frequently that he was appointed Reich Protector, that is, protector of the Czechs; and we knew that the last German Ambassador in Prague, Dr. Eisenlohr, had often reported that the last Czechoslovakian Government, for their part, had been prepared to effect an Anschluss with Germany. He was an opponent of using military measures, and Herr Von Neurath told me when I came to Prague—I think it was in September 1938—that he had expressed himself very strongly against their use and that he together with Göring had visited Hitler in Munich in order to dissuade him from that.

In my office I experienced again and again that Herr Von Neurath—shall I go on—was very open-handed toward the Czechs with regard to petitions. He had a lot of sympathy and understanding; he examined each individual case, and that was very well known among the Czechs. And as we in this office had the possibility of submitting each single request and petition of Czech individuals directly to the highest chief, the Czech petitioners very frequently and gladly used this channel because the prospects for a positive action on their private requests and petitions through the highest local chief promised to be much more favorable than if they were quickly processed by the authorities concerned in the Government. Particularly this practice brought us in conflict with the State Secretary...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this witness is simply making speeches, you know. You are not asking him any questions at all. He is simply going on...

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, what do you know about the personal and official relationship between Von Neurath and the President of State Hacha?

VÖLKERS: According to my observations, the personal and official relationship between the Reich Protector and the President of State Hacha was excellent; and I believe that this was not merely a matter of form, but I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath really and sincerely liked the President of State because he considered him a very decent and upright man who, under the existing circumstances...

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you see your counsel has heard enough of your answer, surely you can stop...

VÖLKERS: Very well.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the relationship between Herr Von Neurath and the State Secretary attached to him, Frank?

VÖLKERS: That was a very bad one. Herr Von Neurath told me already at the time when I assumed my office that he had had considerable difficulties with him because of his definite anti-Czech attitude, as a Sudeten German—an attitude which a Reich German could not easily understand. He had always hoped, however, that Frank, who was not a civil servant but an outsider, would gradually follow his policy and adapt himself to the civil service staff. But unfortunately this was not possible. I do not know when...

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you describe to us briefly what the actual official powers of Herr Von Neurath and Frank were in relation to each other?

VÖLKERS: Herr Von Neurath was the superior of the State Secretary. The State Secretary was in charge of the entire internal administration, which was a very large one. Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who I think has been examined already before this High Tribunal, worked under him. Besides being State Secretary, Frank was also the Higher Police and SS Leader.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, did Herr Von Neurath have a certain influence on this part of Frank’s activities, that is to say, in his capacity as Higher SS and Police Leader?

VÖLKERS: The way conditions were he had practically no influence. I do not know whether in the beginning the matter had already been legally settled. In practice, however, the Police and the State Secretary were completely independent from Herr Von Neurath regarding police measures. This had some connection with the situation in the Reich, where Himmler, too, led the entire Police and SS, having taken the police powers away from the Ministry of the Interior. As far as I can remember, the matter was legally settled in the autumn of 1939 to the effect that the Police was independent and that Herr Von Neurath was to be informed afterward of all measures taken.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You mean by that the decree regarding the organization of the administration and the German Security Police in the Protectorate, under date of 1 September 1939?

VÖLKERS: Yes, I think that is the one. The first part referred to the administration and the second part to the Police.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I remind you that the wording of this decree is contained in my document book under Number Neurath-149.

THE PRESIDENT: It has been submitted as evidence?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I merely wanted to remind you that I have presented it.

[Turning to the witness.] Was Herr Von Neurath at least informed afterward, in accordance with the instructions, of the police actions which Frank carried out independently?

VÖLKERS: The Chief of the Police was an SS man by the name of Böhme. He used to report to the Reich Protector several times each week. I do not believe that he informed him in advance of intended police actions. We never heard anything like that. Whether he reported such actions afterward and in their entirety is something which I cannot say. The rule was that the Reich Protector sent to him, for comment, the various petitions from the next of kin of Czechs who had been arrested and that Böhme would bring them along when he came to report. That was generally the way the Reich Protector was afterward informed.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well then, when Herr Von Neurath was later on informed of such police measures, no matter in which way, did he make attempts for the suspension of arrests or for any limitation and mitigation of such police measures?

VÖLKERS: As I have already told you, we had set up in the small office of the Reich Protector a special department for the purpose of receiving such applications. This department, which of course was directly under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector, did everything possible in order to reassure the next of kin and to bring about the releases of the detained persons. The work was particularly difficult because these local departments, the local police chief and also State Secretary Frank, usually took a negative attitude. Again and again the Reich Protector would then appeal directly to Himmler and very often to the Führer himself. I know and remember that there was a very excited correspondence with Himmler and that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly complained to the Führer about this.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you judge, or can you tell us how far Herr Von Neurath, as Reich Protector, apart from the Police and police measures, was free and independent in his political and economic measures and orders, or how far he was depending on Berlin when giving those?

VÖLKERS: When I came to Prague there were all sorts of other offices beside that of the Reich Protector. For instance, there was a Reich Commissioner for Economy who, as far as I can remember and as I heard at the time, had already begun to exercise his functions when the Office of the Reich Protector had not yet been established. Then there was a Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and there was the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary who had a large staff. Even the Party agencies were not centrally organized. Prague and the north belonged to the Sudetengau under Gauleiter Henlein; the whole of Moravia belonged to the Niederdonau Gau, under Gauleiter Dr. Jury; and the west belonged to a third Gau. All these Gauleiter tried, in turn, on their part...

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, this is all detail, is it not, and quite unnecessary detail?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude toward numerous plans of germanizing the Czechs?

VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that. I remember only that, right at the beginning of the war, Herr Von Neurath told me that the whole structure of the Protectorate was regarded by him as a temporary solution and that the peace would have to decide the ultimate fate of Czechoslovakia.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well, then, as you probably remember, in the autumn of 1939 there were the first demonstrations in Prague on the occasion of the Independence Day of Czechoslovakia, on 28 October 1939.

VÖLKERS: Well, I cannot remember the details. There were demonstrations on a Czech national holiday in October. As far as I can remember, they took place on the Wenzel Platz, and the Národni-ulice. I, personally, did...

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the consequences of new demonstrations particularly on the part of the students at Prague when a wounded student died and was buried on 15 November? What do you know about these demonstrations and what happened immediately in the wake of these demonstrations?

VÖLKERS: Previous to the second demonstration, as far as I remember, the instruction was given to exercise restraint. The demonstrations were generally, as I was told later, not particularly alarming. In spite of this, Frank had reported to Berlin about it. At any rate, the Reich Protector and Frank and General Friderici were called to Berlin for a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery. I accompanied the Reich Protector at the time. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Minister in Berlin, was also invited. I was present when Hitler, in a very excited and rude manner, reproached the Minister because of the events, for which he was holding the Czech Government responsible. Whether the closing of universities was discussed on that occasion, I cannot remember, nor can I remember having heard him threaten the shooting or arrest of students. The manner in which Hitler treated the Minister was most embarrassing to us. The Minister then left the room without saying a single further word. As far as I can remember, the subject was then mentioned no further. We had lunch, and when saying goodby, Hitler said to Frank that he wanted to talk with him some more.

Herr Von Neurath was not asked to stay and I remember that while walking home with him he was very angry about it. On the following day, I traveled back with Herr Von Neurath while Frank had already left the same night for Prague. I remember that when I came into the office in Prague, I saw a red poster declaring that because of the demonstrations, the shooting of the leaders and the arrest of students and the closing of universities had been ordered; that poster carried Neurath’s signature. As I did not know what had happened in Prague in the meantime, I was utterly surprised, because I had heard nothing about these measures in Berlin; and I suspected an intrigue on Frank’s part and went to report the matter to Neurath. I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath was deeply upset and just as unpleasantly surprised as I was and that he had known nothing at all about this previously. Soon afterward Frank passed through my room going into Neurath’s room, carrying that red poster under his arm. I do not know whether Von Neurath had sent for him or whether he came on his own initiative.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath afterwards, at least after this unfortunate matter had occurred, use his influence for the release of these students who had been arrested?

VÖLKERS: Yes. He immediately used his influence, but he did not even succeed in getting hold of the list of names of the arrested students. Only after urging the Czechs for a long time did we receive from the Czech Government an incomplete list of names. In spite of this, Herr Von Neurath immediately worked for their release; and he did, in fact, have excellent results in that connection as time went by.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about what was done to accommodate or employ those students who, on account of these demonstrations and the subsequent closing of the universities, had more or less become idle?

VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that, and I had nothing to do with that matter.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know whether Herr Von Neurath repeatedly urged Hitler to reopen the universities?

VÖLKERS: Yes, I remember that the chancellor, named Rosny, of the Czech University, whom I knew well, had asked me once for that and I reported it to Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Neurath again made efforts at the time; but as far as I know, as long as we were in Prague the universities were not reopened.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember a Czech Fascist organization, Vlayka? I do not know whether I pronounce the name correctly.

VÖLKERS: Yes, I do, but I know very little about it. I only know that we received in the office a number of pledges of loyalty sent to us by members of the movement, and I also know that we had been informed by Czech sources that these people were partly criminal and generally not worth much. Herr Von Neurath adopted quite generally the view that this was an internal affair of the Czechs and that, after all, these were people who wanted to work together with us. But he, on his part, refused any collaboration; and such letters and pledges were never answered, I believe, by our office. But I know...

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also, besides being Reich Protector, president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Did you, since you partly handled his correspondence of a more personal nature, notice anything indicating that Herr Von Neurath became active in this capacity as president of the Secret Cabinet Council?

VÖLKERS: No. As long as I was in Prague, Herr Von Neurath was never active. On the contrary, on one occasion he told me that Hitler, when he appointed him, had told him that he should not think that he would ever call a meeting of the Cabinet Council.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also a member of the so-called Defense Council. Did he ever have anything to do in this capacity in Prague?

VÖLKERS: No, I did not know that he was a member of the Defense Council. The fundamental decrees from Berlin concerning the Protectorate were frequently signed by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich—I believe that was the name—but Neurath had never signed or countersigned them.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was appointed, as is well known, an honorary Gruppenführer of the SS and later, honorary Obergruppenführer of the SS. Did Herr Von Neurath at that time, when he was in Prague, ever wear that uniform?

VÖLKERS: As a rule, he wore his Reich Minister uniform. A portrait was also once made of him in that uniform. He used to wear civilian clothes a great deal. It may be that he once wore the black uniform of the SS, on the occasion of a parade of the SS; but I do not know for certain now. Otherwise, he never wore it.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the circumstances and reasons concerning Herr Von Neurath’s departure from Prague in September 1941?

VÖLKERS: When Herr Von Neurath was ordered to come to headquarters that September, he was accompanied by his military adjutant. I met him at the airfield; and in the car he told me that Hitler had been furious because of the acts of sabotage in the Protectorate and wanted to send Heydrich to do some exemplary punishing. He, Neurath, had stated that he did not want to have anything to do with that and had asked for his release. Hitler then had ordered that he should first of all go on leave, and so he did. He departed on one of the following days.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.

Mr. President, may I make one request at the end of my case. I have not yet been able to submit all documents because I have not yet received all the translations. May I reserve myself the right to submit the few remaining documents, perhaps at the end of the case of my colleague, Dr. Fritz?

THE PRESIDENT: You need not wait for the translation. You can offer the documents in evidence now. Put in a list with the numbers.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have not got them with me, I am afraid. Perhaps, if I may, I could do so tomorrow or the day after when Dr. Fritz is finished.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?

[There was no response.]

Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution do not wish to cross-examine, on the same basis.

My Lord, may I refer to one collection of documents that are in our Document Book 12b, the collection of the anti-Jewish decrees in the Protectorate. They are all from the Verordnungsblatt for the Protectorate, and the Prosecution ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them as being an official publication. The collection is merely for convenience and access of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

Then that closes your case for the present, Dr. Lüdinghausen. The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Fritzsche.

DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Mr. President, I intend to present the case of the Defendant Fritzsche as follows:

First, I should like to call the Defendant Fritzsche to the witness stand and then the witness Von Schirmeister. In the course of these two examinations I intend to present to the Tribunal a few affidavits and to refer to these and to the rest of the contents of my two document books.

In its decision of 8 March 1946 the Tribunal granted as witnesses for my case: First, Herr Von Schirmeister, second Dr. Krieg; and as documents: The text of all radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche from 1932 to 1945 and the archives of Deutscher Schnelldienst (fast official news service) of the Propaganda Ministry. Of all the evidence, in spite of the efforts of the General Secretary, unfortunately only the witness Von Schirmeister could be brought here. Therefore, I had to rearrange my case and ask for the indulgence of the Tribunal if I go into a somewhat greater detail than originally intended in examining the Defendant Fritzsche and the witness Von Schirmeister.

With the approval of the Tribunal I shall now call the Defendant Fritzsche to the witness stand.

[The Defendant Fritzsche took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

HANS FRITZSCHE (Defendant): Hans Fritzsche.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[The defendant repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. FRITZ: Herr Fritzsche, will you please describe briefly your career up to the year 1933?

FRITZSCHE: As to that, may I refer to my affidavit, Document 3469-PS, Points 1 and 3 to 8? In addition I can limit myself now to a broad outline.

DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I should like to remark at the beginning of the examination that my document books, of which I have two, have not yet been completely translated. This affidavit, which the defendant has just mentioned, is also contained in the document book for the Prosecution. I do not know whether the Tribunal now has this document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on.

FRITZSCHE: I was born on 21 April 1900. My father was a civil servant. I attended the gymnasium to study classics. Then I was a soldier in the first World War, returned to school, and afterward, studied philosophy, history, and national economics at various universities.

After the first World War my life and my work were determined by the distress of my people. We called this distress “Versailles.” Enough has been said here as to the Versailles Treaty. I need add nothing to what has already been said.

DR. FRITZ: You were striving then in your journalistic work before 1933 for a change of the Versailles Treaty?

FRITZSCHE: Yes, of course.

DR. FRITZ: Did you seek this change through war?

FRITZSCHE: No, I sought it through the means of law, of politics, and economic common sense, which were at that time all on the German side. Along with this, certain restoration of the power of the German Reich would have been desirable because I saw in the weakness of the Reich a potential danger of war. But to change the Treaty of Versailles by means of war did not seem to me to be possible, expedient, nor desirable. The same sentiment prevailed later under the Hitler Government.

Adolf Hitler gave two assurances on just this point which, for me and for millions of other Germans, were especially impressive. The first was the assurance: “I myself was a simple soldier and therefore know what war means.” The second was the statement: “In all the bloody wars of the last thousand years not even the victors gained as much as they had sacrificed in the war.” These two assurances sounded to German ears like holy and binding oaths. Whatever in Hitler’s policy should have violated these two assurances was a betrayal of the German people.

DR. FRITZ: When, how, and why did you come to the NSDAP?

FRITZSCHE: After my entry into the Propaganda Ministry I joined the Party. I refer again to my affidavit, 3469-PS, to Points 9 to 13.

I did not join the NSDAP on account of the Party program, nor through Hitler’s book Mein Kampf; nor did I join because of the personality of Hitler, whose suggestive power, which has frequently been mentioned here, escaped me entirely. I rejected the harsh radicalism of the methods of the Party. This harsh radicalism was contrary to the habits of my whole life and my personal principles. Due to this coarse practice I even came into a conflict with the Party in 1932.

I joined the Party when it had, without doubt, won over the majority of the German people. This Party had overcome, at the time, the disunion of the German people and brought it unity after Brüning’s great attempt at recovery on a democratic basis had failed on account of the foreign political opposition, not because of the resistance of the German people. After the cabinets also had failed to find a footing among the people, the appointment of Hitler, as Reich Chancellor, meant a return to democratic principles. Much has been said here about these matters. I ask for permission to cite one circumstance which, to my knowledge, has not yet been mentioned here and which does have a certain significance.

When I joined the NSDAP I did not believe I was really joining a party in the true sense of the word, for the NSDAP did not have a party theory similar to those of the Marxist parties which had a developed and mature theory; all theorists of the Party were disputed. The theoretical writings of Gottfried Feder had been prohibited. The theorist Rosenberg was disputed in the Party to the very end. The lack of a theory for the Party was so great that even the printing of the bare Party program was forbidden for the German papers. The German papers were even forbidden a few years after 1933 to quote arbitrarily any part of Hitler’s Mein Kampf.

At that time, then, I did not believe that I was joining a narrowly defined party but I thought I was joining a movement, a movement which united in itself contrasts such as those between Ley and Funk, between Rosenberg and the Reich bishop; a movement which was variable in its choice of methods; which at one time prohibited the labor of women and at some other time solicited this same labor of women. I believed I was joining such a movement because one group within the NSDAP saw in the swastika flag nothing but a new combination, a new form for the colors black, white, and red, while another group saw in this banner the red flag with a swastika. It is a fact that there were whole groups of the former German Nationalist Party in the NSDAP or of former Communists in the NSDAP. Thus, I hoped to find in this wide-flung Movement a forum for intellectual discussions which would no longer be carried on with the murderous animosity which had previously ruled in Germany but which could be carried on with a certain discipline dominated by nationalist and socialist conceptions.

For this reason and by making constant compromises, I put aside my own wishes, my own misgivings, my own political beliefs. In many conversations I advised my friends to do the same when they complained that they and their interests were not given proper consideration during the time of the Nazification. I came to the conviction that millions of Germans had joined the Party only for this reason and in this expectation. They thought they were serving a good cause. Out of pure idealism they were willing to sacrifice everything to this cause, everything except their honor. Meanwhile, I had to realize that the leader of this cause accepted the sacrifice of these idealists, that he squandered it, and that, besides, he stained their honor with a senseless and inhuman murder, unique in history—a murder which no war necessity could have justified, for which one could not even find any reason in any necessity of war.

DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution accuses you of having—and I quote, “...sworn the customary oath of unconditional loyalty to Hitler” in 1933. For whatever reason you did this, the fact that you took this oath is true, is it not?

FRITZSCHE: Yes, I also swore, twice, an oath to the Weimar Constitution, in 1933 and 1938. Let me add something. It was always and it still is my conviction that no oath relieves a man of his general duties to humanity. No one is made an irresponsible tool by an oath. My oath would never have made me carry out an order if I had recognized it to be criminal. Never in my life did I obey anyone blindly. For that reason, I do not refer for any of my actions to my duty to obey.

DR. FRITZ: Did you keep the oath which you took?

FRITZSCHE: Yes. No actions were expected of me which I could have considered criminal or a violation of written or unwritten laws. Moreover, I kept the oath which I took, not to Hitler, but to the German people.

DR. FRITZ: How long did you keep the oath?

FRITZSCHE: I kept it to the end. Then, it is true, I remained in Berlin, in violation of the order which I was given. When Hitler and his entourage took the way of suicide or fled toward the West, I was, to my knowledge, the only higher official to remain in Berlin. At that time I gathered together the employees of the highest Reich authorities, who had been left to their fate, in the ruins of my office. Hitler had left behind an order to fight on. The commander of Berlin could not be found. Therefore, as a civilian, I felt obliged to offer to the Russian Marshal Zhukov the capitulation. As I was sending off the emissaries who were to go across the battleline, the last military adjutant of Hitler appeared—General Burgdorf—and was going to shoot me in compliance with Hitler’s order. Nevertheless, we capitulated, even though it was signed by the commander, who had been found in the meantime. Thus, I believe I kept my oath, the oath which I had taken to the German people in the person of Hitler.

DR. FRITZ: Did you hold an office in the Party?

FRITZSCHE: No.

DR. FRITZ: Were you a political leader?

FRITZSCHE: No.

DR. FRITZ: Were you in the SA or the SS or any one of the other organizations which are accused here?

FRITZSCHE: No.

DR. FRITZ: Did you ever take part in a Party rally?

FRITZSCHE: No.

DR. FRITZ: In one of the celebrations of 9 November in Munich?

FRITZSCHE: No.

DR. FRITZ: Then, please describe briefly your position and your work from 1933 to 1945.

FRITZSCHE: Here, again, I may refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, that is, to the rest of the affidavit. Thus I may again limit myself to a very brief presentation to supplement what is said in the affidavit.

At the seizure of power by National Socialism, I remained what I had been previously, Chief Editor of Drahtloser Dienst. That was the name of the German radio news service. I held that position for 5 more years.

In May 1933 this wireless service, which had been a part of the Reich Radio Company, was incorporated into the press section of the Propaganda Ministry. As I was a specialist in journalistic news service, I soon was entrusted with the news agencies, first the smaller ones such as Transozean or Europapress or Eildienst. Later I was entrusted with the big Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (German news service).

At that time, I had no power to issue orders to the agencies, for I was still an employee of the Ministry and not yet an official. I also had no right to determine the contents of the news. I had only the organizational supervision, but I believe that my advice was respected at the time. In those days I also gave other advice of a journalistic nature. Then in December 1938 I became head of the German Press Section. I became Ministerial Director. As an official I still felt like the journalist I had been for decades previously. I continued to direct the German Press Section until the spring of 1942.

At that time I did not agree, among other things, with the colored press reports of my superior, Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. For that reason, I became a soldier and went to the Eastern Front.

In the fall of 1942 I was called back by Dr. Goebbels. Dr. Goebbels approved my previous criticism, of which he knew. He offered me the direction of the Radio Section of his Ministry. I answered that I could return to the Propaganda Ministry only if I had the certainty that a termination of the war by political means would be sought and that total military victory would not be striven after, which from the first day of the war I had considered impossible. I told Dr. Goebbels at that time literally, “I am not going to participate as a propagandist in a fight of self—destruction such as was fought by the Goths at Mount Vesuvius.”

Dr. Goebbels answered that Hitler and he, also, were seeking a termination of the war by diplomatic means on the basis of reaching some sort of understanding. He promised me that he would inform me in time if he noticed that the Führer was changing these intentions. Dr. Goebbels repeated this promise at intervals of a few months, up to the end of the war; and each time that he repeated it, he always gave me substantiated indications about the political efforts in progress at the moment. Today I have the feeling that he broke his promise.

Well, at that time I took over the Radio Section of the Propaganda Ministry, and I became Ministerial Director.

DR. FRITZ: Those were your official positions. But they were less known to the public. Better known were your radio speeches. What about them?

FRITZSCHE: Since 1932 I spoke once a week, for 10 to 15 minutes, on some German stations and on the Deutschlandsender (radio station for foreign broadcasts). At the beginning of the war I spoke daily on all the stations, I believe for 3 or 4 months. Then I spoke three times a week, then twice a week, and finally once a week again. At first these radio speeches were just reviews of newspaper articles; that is, a collection of quotations from domestic and foreign newspapers. After the beginning of the war, however, these speeches, of course, became a polemic on the basis of quotations mostly from foreign papers and foreign radio stations.

DR. FRITZ: Did your speeches have an official character? The Prosecution says that they were, of course, under the control of the Propaganda Ministry.

FRITZSCHE: That is not correct in that form. The speeches were not official. At the beginning they were purely personal elaborations. Of course, I could not prevent, as time went on, the private speeches of a man holding a position in the Propaganda Ministry being no longer considered as personal, but semi-official.

DR. FRITZ: You just said “personal elaborations,” which was later considered “semi-official.” For clarification I ask, could one criticize these speeches, or was one arrested for so doing?

FRITZSCHE: Criticism was not only allowed, but actually it was done. I had an extensive correspondence with my critics, although only with those who signed their names. There were of course also anonymous critics, but I may add that the anonymous critics had only general complaints.

After the outbreak of the war a South German office of public prosecution and later the Ministry of Justice, offered me a certain protection for my publications, apparently on the assumption that they were official or semi-official. It was suggested to me to appear as co-plaintiff in possible libel actions. I categorically refused this, stating, as I have often done both privately and publicly, that people must be allowed to grumble about something. If they are forbidden to criticize the State and the Government, then they must be allowed at least to criticize the press, the radio, and me.

DR. FRITZ: How did you prepare these speeches? Were they put down in writing and censored beforehand?

FRITZSCHE: I always refused to let them be censored beforehand. The material was gathered very carefully. It was kept in the so-called “Archiv-Schnelldienst” which had been applied for and approved by the Tribunal to be brought here but which could not be found.

The material consisted of clippings from papers, reports of news agencies, and reports from foreign broadcasts. The investigation of doubtful matters was done by a special official. A rough draft of the speech was then dictated and then delivered freely. Therefore, this procedure was different to that of writing an article; not every sentence had to be polished, because in a written matter every word counts, whereas in a speech it is more the total impression which is decisive.

DR. FRITZ: Now, you worked in the Propaganda Ministry; Dr. Goebbels was the Minister. His name has been mentioned here frequently in connection with his various positions as Reich Minister for Propaganda, Reich Propaganda Director of the NSDAP, Delegate for Total War Effort, and Gauleiter of Berlin. In which of these capacities did you deal with Dr. Goebbels?

FRITZSCHE: Exclusively in his capacity as Propaganda Minister.

DR. FRITZ: Were you his representative there?

FRITZSCHE: No. In the last 2½ years I was his commissioner for radio broadcasting and, in addition, head of one of the 12 departments of his Ministry. Dr. Goebbels’ representatives were his state secretaries. The last one was Dr. Naumann who was his successor for one day.

DR. FRITZ: Was Dr. Goebbels your only and direct superior?

FRITZSCHE: No. There were many offices between him and me at first, and still a few later on. This is the first time, here in the dock, that I am without official superiors.

DR. FRITZ: By the way, whom of the defendants did you know or with whom did you have official or personal relations?

FRITZSCHE: I had two or three official conversations, shortly after 1933, with Funk, who was then State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry, mainly dealing with economic and organizational matters. I discussed with him the financial plans for the reorganization of the news service.

Then, I once had a talk with Grossadmiral Dönitz on a technical matter. I called on Seyss-Inquart in The Hague, and on Papen in Istanbul. I knew all the others only by sight and first made their personal acquaintance during the Trial.

DR. FRITZ: How about Hitler?

FRITZSCHE: I never had a conversation with him. In the course of 12 years, however, I saw him, of course, several times at the Reichstag on big occasions or receptions. Once I was at his headquarters and was invited to dinner with a large number of other people. Otherwise, I received instructions from Hitler only through Dr. Dietrich or his representative or through Dr. Goebbels and his various representatives.

DR. FRITZ: What were your relations with Dr. Goebbels? Were you on friendly terms with him? Did you meet with him frequently?

FRITZSCHE: One can by no means say that we were friends. The relationship was on an official basis, reserved and to a certain extent formal. I was personally even less frequently with him than other assistants of Dr. Goebbels of my rank. But I believed I observed that he treated me with more respect than any other of his co-workers. To that extent, I occupied a certain special position. I valued Dr. Goebbels’ intelligence and his ability, at least sometimes, to change his own opinion in favor of a better argument. I saw him about twice a year during the first 5 years. When I was head of a department I saw him perhaps once a month. After the outbreak of war I saw him daily in the course of a conference with 30 to 50 fellow employees; and in addition, about once a week I had a conference on special subjects with him.

DR. FRITZ: Now we come to the subject of propaganda. Can you sketch the propaganda system in the Third Reich?

FRITZSCHE: I shall try it. There were three types of propaganda. The first was the unorganized agitation of the radical fanatics in the Party. It was present in all fields, in the fields of religion, racial policy, art, general policy, and the conduct of the war. As time went by Martin Bormann became more and more the leader of this unorganized agitation.

The second type of propaganda was under the Reich Propaganda Directorate of the NSDAP. The head of this was Dr. Goebbels. It attempted to put the agitation of the radicals on a more presentable basis.

The third type was the state organization of the Reich Propaganda Ministry.

DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution contended at the beginning that you had been also head of the Radio Section of the Propaganda Directorate of the NSDAP. How about that?

FRITZSCHE: The Prosecution have withdrawn that assertion. They said that they had no proof. It would have been more correct to say that this statement has been proved to be false. I refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, Point 37. There I state that I was not—in contrast to all of my predecessors, as far as I know—head of the Radio Section of the Ministry and at the same time head of the Radio Section of the Party. Today I supplement this statement by saying that I held no office whatever in the Party.

DR. FRITZ: You have been accused of having helped Dr. Goebbels plunge the world into the blood-bath of aggressive war. Is that true? Did Dr. Goebbels ever speak with you about aggressive plans?

FRITZSCHE: No; I never heard of any intention to wage aggressive war, either from Dr. Goebbels or from anyone else.

DR. FRITZ: In the course of this Trial some conferences have been mentioned here several times at which, it was said, various aggressive plans were discussed; for example, before the attack on Czechoslovakia, before the attack on Poland, and on Norway, and on Russia. Did you participate in these conferences? Did you hear of them?

FRITZSCHE: I did not participate in a single one of these conferences. I heard of them for the first time here in the courtroom.

DR. FRITZ: Now, in case no plans for an attack were discussed in these conferences, was there any talk at all about war or the possibility of war?

FRITZSCHE: No; but the danger of war was mentioned as early as 1933—the danger of war due to the one-sided disarmament of one state in the midst of other states which were highly armed. This disproportion between armament and nonarmament had to be considered as enticing an attack.

German propaganda after 1933 underlined this consideration and this contention as one of the main reasons, first, for the demand for disarmament of the other powers and afterwards for the German demand for equality of armament. That seemed completely logical to me. But never was the danger of war mentioned without, at the same time, making a reference to the German will for peace. That seemed to me honest.

In the summer of 1939, when the danger of war became more and more imminent, I saw Dr. Goebbels more often than ever before. I gave Dr. Goebbels a number of little memoranda as, so to speak, a contribution from my field of work, the news service. They were analyses of public opinion in western countries, and they repeatedly indicated that England was determined to go to war in case of a conflict with Poland. I recall that Dr. Goebbels was deeply impressed when I once again gave him one of these memoranda. He expressed his concern and decided immediately to fly to Hitler. He said to me, literally, “Believe me, we did not work successfully for 6 years in order to risk everything in a war now.”

Furthermore, in the summer of 1939, I knew of some serious gaps in German armament which have already been mentioned in part here in the courtroom. Therefore I was convinced of the honesty of the peaceful intentions in Hitler’s policy.

If documents have been submitted during this Trial which indicate that Hitler secretly thought differently or acted differently, then I am at a loss to form a judgment, since the documents of the opposite side have not yet been published. But if it should be, as the documents submitted here say, I must state that I was deceived about the aims of German policy.

DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at the beginning of my case I had stated that we were unable to produce here the radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche. I tried to obtain them from German radio stations and succeeded in getting at least a small part from the years 1939 and 1940. I have selected a few of these speeches which I should like to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number Fritzsche-1.

To support what the defendant has just said, I should like to quote only one sentence from the radio speech of Fritzsche of 15 November 1939:

“The sole reason for war, which a nation that as a whole never longs for war, may have at all—the sole reason for war which is also morally justifiable is the threat to the existence, to the life of that nation.”

And this line emphasized by the Defendant Fritzsche at the beginning of the war, was adhered to by him during the war as well. As proof of this, I should like to quote another passage from the same document, from a radio speech of Fritzsche of 23 July 1940:

“We Germans have experienced in the course of our history, and especially 30 years ago, enough blood and tears and death to face things honestly now. We knew what war meant, and therefore we did not want war. And because the Führer knows it so well and had experienced it himself, he offered on 6 October and 19 July to make peace.”

DR. FRITZ: Did you in any way have anything to do with war preparations of an intellectual or organizational kind?

FRITZSCHE: Not directly, but perhaps indirectly. I demanded the disarmament of the others, and then equality of armament; and I advocated the arming (Wehrhaftmachung) of the German people. The expression “Wehrhaftmachung” is liable to be misunderstood, at any rate, to be easily misinterpreted. I should like to define it expressly as the ability to fight in self-defense. The German people were promised again and again, often by me, that the restoration of military sovereignty would be for defensive purposes only.

DR. FRITZ: How and where did you propagate this idea?

FRITZSCHE: In the modest sphere of my weekly radio speeches, while making casual remarks. I was a patriot; but I feel myself to be free from chauvinism, that is, exaggerated nationalism. To me, as a historian, it was at that time already clear that, especially in the narrow confines of Europe, the old nationalism was an anachronism and that it was incompatible with modern communications and weapons. At that time I believed I saw in Hitler’s doctrine also certain elements for a new type of mutual understanding among peoples. It was particularly the constantly repeated thesis that only the nationalism of one people can understand the nationalism of another people.

Only today have I realized ideologically—but particularly, of course materially—through the further development of arms, that the time of nationalism is past, if mankind does not want to commit suicide, and that the period of internationalism has come, for good or evil.

At that time, however, nationalism was not considered a crime. Everyone advocated it. It can be seen that it is still advocated today, and I also advocated it.

DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution points out that before every attack a press campaign was launched in Germany, the aim of which was to weaken the victim of a planned attack and to prepare the German people psychologically for the new drive. Although this is stated by the Prosecution without as yet actually referring to you personally and even though later no direct charge is made that you organized these press campaigns, the Prosecution, nevertheless, stress very strongly your connection with this practice.

Now, what facts do you have to state about your role in these journalistic polemics?

FRITZSCHE: First, I can only point out that I described the propagandistic actions in detail in my affidavit, Document Number 3469-PS, Points 23 to 33, starting with the Rhineland occupation up to the attack on the Soviet Union. These descriptions also contain information about the type and extent of my participation in these actions. Beyond that, I may emphasize that any reference is missing in the description made in my affidavit as to the question of the right in each case. All attempts at political justification are lacking. I should like to emphasize explicitly that in each case, in each action, I believed I represented a good and just cause. It would be leading too far if I were to explain that here for each case, inasmuch as many of these cases have already been discussed here. I assume, or rather I hope, that the Prosecution will ask questions on this subject for I assert that, no matter what the facts may have been in the individual cases, at every moment from the Anschluss of Austria on to the attack on Russia, information given to me and through me to the German public left no doubt of the legality or the urgent necessity of the German action; and I, as the only surviving informer of the German public, consider it my duty to be available here for any investigation of the correctness of this statement of mine, which is of especial importance for the German public.

DR. FRITZ: Some newspaper headlines are mentioned in your affidavit which are considered typical for the various states of tension prior to the individual action. What have you to say to that?

FRITZSCHE: The headlines are taken without exception from the Völkischer Beobachter. These headlines were submitted to me and, of course, I had to confirm their truth; but I may emphasize that the Völkischer Beobachter was not typical for the result of my press policy. The Völkischer Beobachter generally had its own direct connections to headquarters and to Hitler. Typical products of my press policy were papers such as the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, and the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, to name only a few.

DR. FRITZ: But the Prosecution is of the opinion that you also incited to war by your domestic propaganda insofar as you tried to arouse hostile feelings in the German people toward other peoples of Europe and the world. In Captain Sprecher’s trial brief it is said, for instance, that terms like “antagonism against the peoples of the Soviet Union” and “an atmosphere of senselessness and hatred” were created by you or that you had incited the Germans to blind hatred. Did you do that?

FRITZSCHE: No, I did not do that. Never did I attempt to arouse hatred against the English, French, Americans, or Russians, et cetera. There is not a single word of this type in perhaps a thousand speeches which I made before the microphone. I did speak strongly against governments, members of governments, governmental systems; but I never preached hatred generally or attempted to awaken it indirectly as was the case—and I ask your pardon for my taking an example from the courtroom—at the moment when a film was presented here and the words were spoken, “Here you see Germans laughing over hanged Yugoslavs.” Never did I try to awaken hatred in this general form and I may point out that for years many anti-National Socialist statements from certain countries, which were still neutral at that time, remained unanswered.

DR. FRITZ: Did your superiors demand that you mark your propaganda with the stamp of antagonism or to stimulate hatred?

FRITZSCHE: Yes, that happened frequently, but it was not demanded that antagonism or hatred should be stirred up against peoples. That was expressly forbidden because we wanted to win these peoples over to our side, but again and again I was requested to arouse hatred against individuals and against systems.

DR. FRITZ: Who requested you to do this?

FRITZSCHE: Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich, and both of them frequently on the direct orders of Adolf Hitler. The reproach was repeatedly made that the German press and the German radio did not arouse hatred at all against Roosevelt, Churchill, or Stalin but that they made these three personalities popular as efficient men. For that reason, for years the German press was forbidden to mention these three names at all unless, in an individual case, permission was given with exact instructions.

DR. FRITZ: Do you mean to say that you refused the request to change your propaganda to incite antagonism and to arouse hatred and did not carry it out?

FRITZSCHE: I should like to outline exactly what I did. When the reproaches of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Dietrich accumulated, I had all caricatures from the first and second World War collected—from England, the United States of America, France, and a few from Russia. In addition, I had all anti-German propaganda films which I could lay my hands on, collected. Then in five to six demonstrations of several hours each, I presented these caricatures and these films to German journalists and German radio speakers. I, myself, spoke only 2 or 3 minutes in introduction. It is quite possible that I created hatred through these showings, but I should like to leave the judgment of this means of producing hatred in the midst of war to the Tribunal. In any case, Dr. Goebbels said later that he was dissatisfied and we were “bunglers.”

I may add one statement. I would have had a means of carrying out my orders of arousing real hatred, that is, not one means but a whole group of methods; that would have been, to give only one example, a German edition of the last two volumes of the Tarzan series, an adventure series which was very popular in Germany at that time and of which the last two volumes were strongly anti-German. I need not describe them here. I never pointed out such early products of anti-German propaganda. I always deliberately ignored such methods.

DR. FRITZ: If you say that you dispensed with hatred and antagonism in your propaganda, what means did you use in your propaganda during the war?

FRITZSCHE: During the war I conducted the propaganda almost exclusively with the concept of the necessity and the obligation to fight. I repeatedly painted the results of defeat very dark and systematically I gave quotations from the press and the radio of the enemy countries. I quoted repeatedly the enemy demands for unconditional surrender. I used the expression of the “super-Versailles” frequently and did—I emphasize that—describe the consequences of a lost war very pessimistically. It does not behoove me today to make a comparison with reality.

DR. FRITZ: But could you not learn from the broadcasts of the enemy that the fight of the Allies was not directed against the German people but only against its leaders? Did you keep that from the German people?

FRITZSCHE: On the contrary, I did not keep it from them, but repeatedly quoted it. However, I called it “incredible.” For example, I once used the trick of quoting the wording of a medieval declaration of war in which it had already been said that a war was declared only on the King of France but that one wanted to bring freedom to the French people.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

[The Tribunal adjourned until 27 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH DAY
Thursday, 27 June 1946