Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 18

by Various

Afternoon Session

DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, I had concluded with the consideration of the probative value of the statements made here by the witnesses Severing and Gisevius.

Now, on concluding the evaluation of Schacht’s conduct up to about 1935 and entering the period from 1935 to 1937, I would emphasize once more that in order to save time I will not repeat the arguments which were presented to the Tribunal in detail during the cross-examination, as for instance the nonparticipation of Schacht in the legislation which led to the total disregard for international law, because this took place before his entry into the Cabinet. The decisive event for the stabilization of Hitler’s power, the merging of the offices of the Reich President and of the Chancellor of the Reich in the person of Hitler, also lay outside his co-operation and responsibility. By this decree the Army took its oath to Hitler. The Chancellor of the Reich not only had police authority as heretofore but also authority over the Army. It is not my task to investigate who bears the political responsibility and thus the historic guilt for this law; in any case, it is not Schacht.

All the basic anti-Jewish laws were also enacted before he entered into office as a minister. He was completely surprised by the subsequent Nuremberg Laws. The decree dealing with the exclusion of the Jews from German economic life dated 12 November 1938 and the ordinance concerning the use of Jewish property and possessions of 3 December 1938 were issued after he had left his post as Minister of Economics and thus without his active collaboration. The same applies to the decree excluding Jews from the Reich Labor Service, which moreover probably hardly inconvenienced them. The law providing for the death penalty for secret reserves of foreign exchange, the so-called Law of Betrayal of the People, was not directed specifically against the Jews but solely against big industry and high finance; also it was not evolved by Schacht but by the Minister of Finance. Schacht did not want to effect a breach of relations on account of such laws because he believed it was his duty to perform a more important task. In any case, this can hardly be regarded as important, for in the Jewish question Schacht, by his public speeches and his reports to Hitler, showed such a favorable attitude toward the Jews that it would be unjust to disqualify him politically and morally for such a reason, much less from the angle of criminal law. As examples I would remind you of the Reichsbank speech after the anti-Jewish pogrom in November 1938, the speech at Königsberg, the memoranda of the year 1935, and so forth. In the Third Reich Schacht was considered the most courageous and active protector of the Jews. I only remind you of the letter of the Frankfurt businessman, Merton, which was submitted to the Court, and of the illuminating statement of the witness Hayler. According to the latter, when Hayler reproached Himmler for the events of November 1938, he replied that after all it had been the fault of the economic administration that matters had reached such a point. Of a man like Herr Schacht one could not expect anything better than that he should exercise a constant restraining influence in the Jewish question and be opposed to the will of the Party.

In response to my further inquiry Justice Jackson defined this specific charge of the Prosecution as follows: Schacht is not being charged with anti-Semitism, but for activities which have a causal connection with the atrocities committed against the Jews within the framework of the planned war of aggression. Thus it follows that a denial of guilt as to a war of aggression leads with compelling logic to the denial of any guilt as to the atrocities which were committed against the Jews during the war. Justice Jackson made some phases of the legislation in respect to the Jews during Schacht’s term as Minister the subject of his cross-examination. I shall refrain from this part of the cross-examination; going into the questions put to Schacht and answered by him is irrelevant according to the Charter and the previously mentioned authentic interpretation of this part of the Indictment by Justice Jackson. The anti-Semitic legislation of the Third Reich and the personal attitude of an individual defendant toward it are, according to the Charter, relevant in these proceedings only insofar as they are connected with other crimes which are subject to punishment according to the Charter, as for example the conspiracy to wage war, mass extermination, and so forth. According to the Charter they cannot constitute an offense in themselves, not even one against humanity. Only those defendants are punishable for their deeds who can be proved to have participated in the planning of a war of aggression with its resulting inhuman consequences for the Jews. A prerequisite for their conviction on this account, however, is that they recognized and desired this goal and its result. There exists no purely objective liability for the outcome in criminal law. According to the Charter, he who desired the war and thus also the inhuman actions connected with it is punishable; but the incriminating activity must always have occurred in the course of the execution of such a plan. This purely legal consideration in itself excludes the conviction of Schacht on the grounds of atrocities against the Jews.

Another discrepancy between the Prosecution, especially with regard to the statements of Justice Jackson, and myself must likewise be clarified at this point, otherwise we will be talking at cross purposes. During the cross-examination Justice Jackson repeatedly pointed out that the defendant is not being charged with anti-Semitism as such, that he is not being charged with his opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, that he is not being charged with his ideas and statements on the so-called Lebensraum problem as representing the food problem of the central European nations, that he is not being charged with his colonial aspirations; but that he is being charged with all this only to the extent that it served, with his knowledge and desire, for the preparation of a war of aggression. By this objection Justice Jackson meant to preclude certain questions and discussions. This would have been justified and I too could now forego such arguments, were not the Prosecution taking away with one hand what it is giving with the other, because in the course of argumentation all this, namely, Schacht’s alleged anti-Semitism, et cetera, is used as indirect proof, that is, as circumstantial evidence that Schacht had prepared and desired this war of aggression. The Prosecution of course does not count all that as a criminal fact in itself, but as indirect proof, as circumstantial evidence. Therefore in evaluating the evidence, I must also treat these problems. I think I have finished dealing with the Jewish question. With regard to the problem of Lebensraum, in order to save time, I can probably refer to what Schacht has stated here during his interrogation in justification of his statements and activities in this respect. The colonial problem was the subject of cross-examination by Justice Jackson insofar as he tried to prove that colonial activity by Germany was impossible without world domination, or at least the military domination of the seas. Further development of this train of thought would result in the Defendant Schacht being charged with the fact that his striving for colonies logically depended on the planning of a war of aggression. That is a false conclusion. I think that Justice Jackson’s conception of colonial policy is too imperialistic. Anyone desiring colonies for his country without attendant domination of the world or the sea bases his colonial activity on a lasting state of peace with the stronger maritime powers. He must necessarily believe in peace with these powers. Germany also possessed colonies from 1884 until the first World War; her merchant marine carried on the necessary traffic with these colonies. Her merchant marine before this war would also have been sufficient. Aviation, in reply to Justice Jackson’s question, would not have been essential. Nothing supports the presumption that in his desire for colonies Schacht would have striven to eliminate foreign naval supremacy by means of war. In view of his general conduct one can hardly credit him with being as foolish as all that. France and Holland likewise possess colonies, the sea routes of which they certainly do not control.

This charge of the Prosecution is therefore inconclusive. Moreover, the Tribunal knows that during the years before the war nearly all the statesmen of the victorious powers were sympathetic to these colonial aspirations of Germany, as is shown in many of their public speeches.

I now come to the subject of rearmament, that is, to the activity of Schacht in his capacity as President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics until 1937, in other words, up to the time when he changed from a loyal servant of Adolf Hitler to a traitor against him and took to the dark ways of artifice and dissimulation while making preparations for an attempt on his life.

The Prosecution considers the violation of the Versailles Treaty, the Locarno Pact, and other treaties as indirect proof, that is, as circumstantial evidence, of his criminal intention to wage a war of aggression. This involves first the question of whether any treaty violations took place and, if so, whether these treaty violations must be judged as indications of an intent to wage a war of aggression on the part of members of the Reich Government, Schacht included. It is impossible, and also unnecessary, to discuss exhaustively in this plea the problem of whether actual treaty violations were committed and to what extent. My colleague Dr. Horn has already touched upon this question. A short remark can serve to show at least the problematical nature of this question. This again is important for a proper evaluation. There are no lasting treaties, neither in the domain of civil jurisdiction nor, still less, in the domain of international law. The clausula rebus sic stantibus often plays a much more important role in the domain of international law affecting the political intercourse between nations than in private dealings between individuals. One must be very careful not to apply, offhand, the relatively narrow principles of civil law to the breadth and depth of international law. International law has its own dynamics. The highly political intercourse between nations is subject to other juridical aspects than the commercial and personal relations between individuals. The most striking proof of the correctness of this thesis is the juridical basis of the Indictment, particularly insofar as it deals with the sentence nulla poena sine lege poenale and demands, instead of sanctions, the individual punishment of the leading statesmen of an aggressor nation. Whoever upholds the conception of the Prosecution in this respect, acknowledges the dynamics of international law and the fact that international law develops according to a process of its own.

History has taught us that treaties based on international law do not usually come to an end by a formal repeal but succumb to the development of events. They inevitably sink into oblivion. In specific instances opinions may differ as to whether this is the case or not; but that does not affect the basic truth of this statement. The militarization of the Rhineland and the introduction of general conscription, the extent of rearmament which Schacht approved of and strived for, the voluntary “Anschluss” of Austria to Germany, which was also basically desired by Schacht, all of these certainly are offenses against the meaning and text of the above-mentioned pacts, particularly the Versailles Treaty. If, however, such violations are only answered by formal protestations, and otherwise very friendly relations continue to exist and honors are even conferred upon the offending nation, and if agreements are concluded which alter the basic stipulations of such a treaty, as for instance the Naval Pact with Great Britain, the view is fully justified that because of all this such a treaty is gradually reaching a state of obsolescence and extinction, or at least there is cause for such a subjective point of view.

I beg you to consider that the prerequisite for the conclusion of an armament pact, as for instance the Naval Pact with Great Britain, is the military sovereignty of both nations. The denial of such sovereignty to Germany was, however, one of the main aspects of the Versailles Treaty. I do not wish to speak here about the justice or injustice of this treaty. I know the Court’s wish, or rather prohibition, in regard to this matter, and of course I shall observe it. But I must speak about the legal possibility and therefore the innocence, criminally speaking, of Schacht’s personal opinions on the question of treaty violation. Even if, therefore, one still wished to defend the point of view that the said treaties have not become obsolete, one cannot, at least as far as its inherent honesty is concerned, doubt the justification of an opinion to the contrary. But if this is recognized, these treaty violations no longer provide any proof of the criminal intention of a war of aggression. And that is all that matters. For the violation of treaties in itself is not considered a punishable act by the Charter. Here, too, Schacht can justify his good faith by referring to the same or similar views on the part of leading foreign statesmen, in whom it is therefore logically impossible to assume the existence of a suspicion as to a desire for aggression on the part of Germany. Here again I must limit myself to a few instances, since a complete enumeration would exceed the time limit of this plea.

The first of the violations of the Versailles Treaty is supposedly the reintroduction of general conscription. With regard to this measure, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, with a statesman’s far-sighted objectivity, gave the following reply, which was universally made known in reports by the press and radio and which therefore is valid as legal evidence:

“There is no doubt that an agreed reduction of the armaments of other big nations was to follow upon the forced disarmament of Germany.”

This remark contains a confirmation of the juridical point of view I developed a while ago, in spite of the criticism of Hitler’s action that follows. The same applies to the fact that the visit of Sir John Simon and Mr. Anthony Eden to Berlin took place 8 days after this so-called treaty violation, namely, on 24 March 1935. It would not have taken place if this measure of Hitler’s had been considered abroad as militarily aggressive. I will just mention in passing the history of the treatment of this question by the Council of the League of Nations, which is well known. Should Schacht, as a German and a German Minister, judge it in a manner different from that of the foreign Governments?

A second treaty violation by Hitler was the occupation of the Rhineland, also in March 1935. This action did not only violate the Versailles Treaty ...

THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] The date of the occupation of the Rhineland was not March 1935, but March 1936.

DR. DIX: I cannot ascertain that at the moment.

The point in question is that this action took place, namely, the occupation of the Rhineland. This action was not only a breach of the Treaty of Versailles but also of the Locarno Pact, that is, of an undoubtedly voluntarily contracted treaty. Two days later Mr. Baldwin stated in the House of Commons, in a speech made public and therefore valid as legal evidence, that, while Germany’s conduct could not be excused, there was no reason to assume that this action contained a threat of hostilities. Was Schacht, a German and a German Minister, to take a different and more skeptical attitude in regard to the aggressive significance of the act than foreign statesmen? And particularly when he was forced to note the fact, which is now history and is universally known, that 10 days after this breach of treaty the Locarno Powers, except Germany, submitted to the Council of the League of Nations a memorandum which proposed the reduction of the number of German troops in the Rhineland to 36,500 men and only endeavored to avoid the strengthening of the SA and SS in the Rhineland and the erection of fortifications and airfields. Should not this memorandum be interpreted as a ratification of an alleged breach of the treaty?

A third breach of the treaty was the fortification of Helgoland, which was hardly observed by the contracting parties, and merely called forth from Mr. Eden, in the now famous public speech before the House of Commons on 29 July 1936, the remark that it was not considered favorable to increase the difficulties of the proceedings by individual questions like the one under discussion. Was the German Minister Schacht to take another and more rigorous attitude?

And what about the terroristic annexation of Austria in March 1938 when, moreover, Schacht was no longer Reich Minister for Economics? If foreign countries had gathered from this action the conviction that Hitler was preparing a war of aggression, they would not have abstained from threatening to use force. Was the German Minister Schacht to hold a different and stricter opinion? He did, in fact, have a different opinion at the time and was already eagerly at work with Witzleben and others to eliminate Adolf Hitler and his regime by means of a Putsch; an effort on the part of these patriotic conspirators which was frustrated, as the unequivocal testimony of the witness Gisevius has shown, because Hitler was able to record one success after another in foreign politics.

I merely remind you of the unequivocal evidence of Gisevius regarding the effects of the Munich Agreement on the influence of the opposition group of which Schacht was a leader; I remind you of the evidence of Gisevius regarding the warnings and hints in this connection sent across the German frontiers to responsible personalities of foreign countries. Is it fair to require from the German Minister Schacht a more critical attitude to those political developments than that adopted by foreign countries whose interests had been injured? As we know from Gisevius, from Vocke, and from all the affidavits submitted, he did have this critical attitude from 1937 on, in which year he took to the dark ways of a conspirator. I remind you of his first contact with the then General Von Kluge. I could give many examples such as those just mentioned. I do not criticize this attitude of foreign countries; that is not for me to do, quite apart from the fact that I have complete understanding for the pacifist attitude it reveals, which is fully aware of its responsibilities. It is, however, my duty to point out that no warlike intention can be imputed to Schacht on account of his opinions and attitude, when the same opinions and the same attitude can be identified as belonging to the foreign countries whose interests had been injured. If foreign countries could entertain the hope of maintaining further friendly relations with Hitler, the same right must be conceded to Schacht as far as he claims it. He does not, however, claim it for himself, at least not after the Fritsch crisis of 1938.

After that time he, in contrast to the foreign countries, had a very clear idea of the danger, which fact, according to the evidence of Gisevius, is undeniable, and he personally risked his life and liberty to maintain peace by attempting to overthrow Hitler. The fact that all these Putsch actions before the war and after the outbreak of war were unsuccessful cannot, according to the evidence submitted, be considered his fault. The responsibility for the failure of this German resistance movement does not lie with the latter but elsewhere, within and without the German frontiers. I shall return to this later.

There remains, therefore, the fact of rearmament as such. Here, too, I can refer essentially to the statements Schacht made in justifying himself during his cross-examination. This was exhaustive, and a repetition would be superfluous. It is therefore also completely superfluous to enter into an academic discussion as to whether Schacht’s views were right; that is to say, whether it is correct that a certain amount of military force sufficient for defensive purposes is necessary for any country and was particularly necessary for Germany, and whether he was correct in his opinion that the nonfulfillment by the parties to the Versailles Treaty of the obligation to disarm justified the rearmament of Germany. The sole point in question is whether these opinions and motives of Schacht’s were honest, or whether he pursued secret aggressive intentions under cover of this defensive armament. But these proceedings have established absolutely nothing to disprove the honesty of these opinions and motives. Of course, one can question the fact whether the quotation “si vis pacem, para bellum” has absolute validity; or whether objectively any pronounced rearmament does not carry an inherent danger of war, since good armies with competent officers naturally strive for a chance for real action. Of course, one can defend the thesis that moral strength is stronger than any armed strength. The cohesion of the British Empire and the world-wide influence of the Vatican’s foreign policy could perhaps be cited as proof of this. All these questions carry a certain relativity in themselves; at any rate, one thing is certain: Even today in all large countries of the world the warning is constantly repeated that one must be militarily strong in order to preserve peace. Nations whose individualism and love of liberty rejected general conscription and a strong standing army now act to the contrary and honestly believe that they thereby serve peace. Let us take as an example a nation whose love of peace absolutely no one in the world, even the most mistrustful, can question, namely, Switzerland. Yet this peace-loving nation has always taken pride in maintaining the defense capacity of its people with the very intention of protecting its freedom and independence in a peaceful manner. One may academically call this idea of discouraging foreign aggression by the maintenance of a sufficiently strong defensive army imperialistic. It is, at any rate, honestly entertained by peaceful and liberty-loving nations and perhaps serves the cause of peace more effectively than many so-called antimilitaristic and pacifist doctrines. This sound point of view has really nothing to do with militarism. Whoever today recognizes this viewpoint as justified for great and small nations cannot contest the honesty of this view on the part of Schacht in the years 1935 to 1938. I have no more to say about this.

I also need not give a wearisome enumeration of figures and make specialized technical statements to the effect that this part of rearmament which Schacht first financed with 9,000 million, and then reluctantly with a further 3,000 million Reichsmark, was by no means sufficient for a war of aggression, in fact, not even for an effective defense of the German frontiers. The answers that the witnesses Keitel, Bodenschatz, Milch, General Thomas, Kesselring, et cetera, have given to this in their depositions and affidavits are available and have been submitted to, or officially brought to the attention of, the Tribunal. In this respect they are unanimously agreed that even at the outbreak of war—that is, 18 months later—Germany was not sufficiently armed for an aggressive war; that therefore, when Hitler led this nation into a war of aggression in August 1939, it was not only a crime against humanity but also against his own people, the people with whose leadership he was entrusted.

Therefore I also consider it superfluous to go into long discussions as to whether Blomberg’s statement that Schacht was aware of the progress of rearmament is correct, or the statement of Schacht and Vocke that this was not so. I accept without further discussion the sincerity of Blomberg’s statement. But since he had more to do with the technical side of rearmament than the Reichsbank had, general experience would seem to indicate that the memory of Schacht and Vocke is more reliable on this point than Blomberg’s, to whom this report to the Reichsbank was a matter of secondary importance for his department. For the Reichsbank the desire to be informed about the technical progress of the armament as well as about the financial expenditure was a very important matter. One remembers such facts better than unimportant secondary matters. In any case it is established that until the budget year 1937-38 only 21,000 millions were spent on armament, of which 12,000 millions were financed by credits of the Reichsbank, and that, according to Generaloberst Jodl’s statement of 5 June, on 1 April 1938 only 27 or 28 divisions were ready, whereas in 1939 there were already 73 or 75 divisions.

It needs no expert to show that this volume of expenditure and armament on 1 April 1938 was entirely insufficient for a war of aggression. Indeed Hitler was of the same opinion when in his memorandum of August 1936, which has been submitted to the Court, and which was handed to Speer in 1944, he pointed out, along with many derogatory remarks about Schacht’s conduct of economic affairs, that 4 precious years had gone by, that we had had time enough in these 4 years to determine what we could not do, and that he hereby gave orders that the German Army must be ready for action in 4 years, that is, in the course of the year 1940.

I should like to remind the Court that after Schacht’s withdrawal as President of the Reichsbank, 31,500 millions were spent on armament during the two budget years 1938-39 and 1939-40. The issuing and expenditure of money on armament therefore continued without Schacht, and indeed to a considerably greater extent. Schacht had once written to Blomberg that he was not a money-making machine.

He exercised constant pressure on Blomberg along this line. I refer only to his letter to Blomberg on 21 December 1935, which has been submitted to the Tribunal. He exercised a restraining influence by means of explanatory lectures to officers of the War Ministry and of the Armed Forces Academy. He refused the railway loan of 1936 requested by the Minister of Communications, which was indirectly in the interest of armament; and he stopped the credits of the Reichsbank as early as the beginning of 1937, concluding them by compromising on a final grant of 3,000 millions. He refused the credit which the Reich Minister of Finance requested from him in December 1938.

He created an automatic brake for armament expenditure through the mefo bills, which from the technical and financial point of view was a somewhat bold measure, although legally tenable. These served at first to finance the armament expenditure but restricted further armament expenditure after their expiration on 1 April 1939 because the Reich was obligated to redeem them. Schacht’s foresight proved true. The increase in employment brought such a rise in the state revenues that it would not have been difficult to liquidate the mefo bills at their expiration 5 years later. Keitel’s statement has proved that during the budget year beginning 1 April 1938, 5,000 million marks more were spent for armament than during the preceding year, although as from 1 April 1938 the Reichsbank credits had completely ceased. Half of the 5,000 millions would have sufficed to redeem the mefo bills which matured during the budget year beginning 1 April 1939. The use of this money for further rearmament would have been avoided; but this was exactly what Schacht intended. From the beginning he had limited the validity of the mefo bills to 5 years; he stopped the credit assistance of the Reichsbank on 1 April 1939 in order to limit armament. It was impossible for Schacht to foresee that Hitler would simply break a strict credit obligation and not redeem the bills. These facts in themselves show that his attempts to resign could have had no other reason than opposition to any further armament, and the refusal to accept responsibility for it. In this sense the assertion of the Prosecution that he wanted to evade responsibility is completely correct.

Nothing indicates that any other motives than those which are obvious from the facts just mentioned caused him to make this attempt to relinquish his duties. If the Prosecution maintains that the reason was his antagonism to Göring, this is also correct insofar as Schacht was an opponent of the Four Year Plan, of which Göring was the chief. That the reason was rivalry of power is a pure supposition, an interpretation of actual events which justifies the quotation: “Interpret to your heart’s content; should you fail to explain, you will at least insinuate.”

The Reichsbank memorandum of November 1938, which led to the dismissal of Schacht and most of his collaborators including Vocke, is also unequivocally and forcibly opposed to armament. It naturally had to contain reasons for this which were derived from the departmental jurisdiction of the Reichsbank. Its aim was obvious. Hence Hitler’s remark, “This is mutiny.” The memorandum ends with the demand for control of the capital and loan market as well as the management of taxation by the Reichsbank. Compliance with this demand would have deprived Hitler of every possibility of raising money for further armament, and therefore this demand was unacceptable to him. Schacht and his colleagues knew this. Accordingly, they deliberately sought a break by this step. Schacht now bore no further responsibility. From now on he could devote himself exclusively to the plans for a coup d’état by the conspiracy group to which he belonged. He became a traitor to Hitler. By remaining Minister without Portfolio, he hoped to learn more about what went on than if he resigned altogether; this was vital for the aims of his conspiracy group. I shall return to this point later.

The fact of armament, as such, therefore, proves absolutely nothing for the assertion of the Prosecution that Schacht deliberately contributed to the preparation of a war of aggression. Simultaneous economic armament, however, belongs of necessity to armament in the modern sense. On the German side this was already recognized for the first time at the beginning of the first World War by two very important German Jews, the founder of the Hamburg-America Line, Albert Ballin, and the great German industrialist, Rathenau. This is the same Rathenau who made the wonderful speech on peace during the Genoa Conference, which was received with wild applause by the delegates of those very powers which had opposed his country but 4 years previously as enemies, and who, as German Foreign Minister, was the victim of an anti-Semitic outrage in the early twenties. I probably can assume that the personality of Albert Ballin is known to the Court. Both men recognized, at the very outbreak of the first World War, the error of omitting economic mobilization. Rathenau then organized the so-called War Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry. The first Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, for this is what he really was, was thus ideologically a pacifist; and certainly since that time there is probably no mobilization plan by any nation which does not provide for the purely military armament to be accompanied by a corresponding economic preparation for war. Therefore, the designation of a Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, even if he had taken up his duties, which as the evidence demonstrates most convincingly he never did but remained a dummy, does not show anything in the way of proof that the intention to wage a war of aggression existed. This post is equally necessary when arming for defense. The same applies to the institution of the Reich Defense Council, the Reich Defense Committee, et cetera. As such they are the same harmless, matter-of-course factors. They have no incriminating value. Only their misuse for the purpose of a war of aggression would be incriminating. However, Schacht’s criminal intention in this respect has not been established, nor has anything else been found. I therefore refrain from going into details on this subject.

In conclusion, the Prosecution sees something incriminating in the so-called maintenance of secrecy regarding certain mobilization measures and mobilization arrangements, as for example the second Reich Defense Law. Here, too, a natural and worldly-wise way of thinking deprives these findings of any incriminating character. All nations are accustomed to treat mobilization and armament measures as secret. Upon further consideration and after closer observation this practice can, of course, be recognized as a very superfluous routine matter. Only plans and technical details can be really kept secret. The fact of rearmament as such can never be kept secret. The same applies to the existence of a large body which is to serve the purpose of this rearmament. Either it becomes known because it starts to function, or, like the ominous Defense Council, it remains hidden and secret only because it does not function.

In the memoirs of a Czarist officer regarding his experiences in the Russo-Japanese war I found the following humorous observation:

“If I, as a member of the General Staff, wished an incident to become known, I had it classified as ‘secret’ and my wish was fulfilled. If I wished to keep something secret, which was almost an impossibility, I unobtrusively gave it free circulation and occasionally my wish was fulfilled.”

One should not quibble in a vacuum; but if one wishes to find the truth, one must take into account the teachings of experience based on hard facts.

Thus, the fact of the military activation of Germany after the seizure of power by Hitler and the subsequent rearmament was never a secret to the world. The main proceedings have produced a great deal of evidence to this effect. We know the report of Consul General Messersmith; we know his sworn testimony of 30 August 1945, submitted by the Prosecution under Number 2385-PS, according to which the armament program—he speaks of a giant armament program immediately following the seizure of power—and the rapid development of the air program had been apparent to everybody; it had been impossible to move in the streets of Berlin or in any other city of importance in Germany without seeing pilots or aviators in training. He expressly states, on Page 8 of his testimony, that this giant German rearmament program was never a secret and was quite publicly announced in the spring of 1935.

I would like to remind you, amongst a great deal of other evidence, of the remark of Ambassador Dodd, who contends that he pointed out to Schacht that the German Government had bought high-grade airplanes from American airplane manufacturers for 1 million dollars and had paid for them in gold. Even if Ambassador Dodd perhaps made a mistake in this detail, yet all this still proves that German rearmament—the extent of which was surely even overestimated abroad at that time—must have been, at the very best, an open secret.

Therefore it is not even necessary to refer to the mutual visits of the Chiefs of General Staffs, to which Milch and Bodenschatz testified, the visits of the Chief of the British Intelligence Service, Courtney, the permanent presence in Berlin of military attachés of nearly all countries, in order to recognize that the so-called secret rearmament was quite public and only safeguarded a few technical secrets, as did rearmament in every state. The outside world knew of the existence of this rearmament and, in any case, considered it to be compatible with world peace longer than Schacht himself did.

It is not for me to criticize the attitude of the outside world, nor is it my intention to do so. Each part on the stage of life has its own rules of tact, including the part played by the defendant and his defense counsel. Their task is to establish a defense, and not to bring charges and make an attack. In connection therewith I expressly wish to guard against a possible misunderstanding to the effect that I want to appear as an accuser, a critic, or a know-it-all in any way. I present all this only from the aspect of my submission that the indirect circumstantial evidence submitted by the Prosecution is not conclusive.

Furthermore, the Prosecution argues that Schacht was a member of the Reich Cabinet, at least as Minister without Portfolio from the time of his dismissal in January 1938, as Minister of Economics, until January 1943. The Prosecution makes the Reich Cabinet responsible—criminally responsible—for the belligerent invasions of Hitler. This argumentation has an attractively convincing power for somebody who starts with the normal concept of a Reich Cabinet. The effect disappears once it has been ascertained that the so-called Reich Cabinet was not a cabinet in the usual sense applying to a constitutional state.

Judgments should not, however, be based on outward appearances and form—not on fiction, but only on actually established conditions. This makes it necessary to penetrate sociologically the nature of the Hitler regime and to examine whether a member of the Reich Cabinet, hence of the Reich Government as such, must in this capacity bear the same criminal responsibility as if he were in any other normal state set-up, be it a democratic republic or a democratic monarchy or a constitutional monarchy or a monarchy which, although absolute, was nevertheless founded on law, or some other constitutionally based set-up which bears the character of a somehow lawful state based on a constitution. We are thus obliged to investigate the actual sociological structure of the Hitler regime. We have heard an account on the Führer Order (Führerbefehl) in this connection by Professor Jahrreiss. Here, too, I want to avoid repetition and would only state the following in abbreviated form:

I want to say first of all, in order to avoid once more the danger of a misunderstanding, that when I speak of the Hitler regime here I do so without referring in any way to the persons sitting in the dock; naturally with the exception of Schacht. For the latter, I do so in the negative sense, for he did not belong to the regime as such, in spite of the fact that he was a member of the Reich Government and President of the Reichsbank. I leave the question completely open as to whether any of the other defendants should be considered a member or supporter of the regime. That question is subject only to the judgment of the Tribunal and the evaluation of the defense counsel for each case.

At the very beginning of my argument I indicated that, even for a person who lived in Germany during the Hitler regime, it is difficult to differentiate between the ostensible distribution of power and the actual underlying influence, since this requires a great deal of political intuition; it is bound to be impossible to judge for people who lived outside Germany and can only be arrived at through the findings resulting from the presentation of evidence before this Tribunal. We have established here that the Reich Cabinet, whom Hitler termed a club of defeatists, was convened for the last time in 1938 and that it met then only to receive a communication from Hitler. For actual deliberation and the passing of a resolution it had last been convened in 1937. We have also established that Hitler deliberately kept all news of political importance from the Reich Cabinet, as is proved quite unequivocally by the so-called Hossbach minutes of 10 November. During this meeting the Führer called the attention of the chiefs of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Foreign Minister, who were present—Schacht, of course, was not present and did not learn about the Hossbach minutes until he came here—to the fact that the subject for deliberation was of such great importance that it would result in full Cabinet meetings in other countries but that, just because of its great significance, he had decided not to discuss the matter with the Reich Cabinet.

Thus, at least after 1937, the members of the Reich Cabinet can no longer be considered the architects and supporters of the political aspirations of the Reich. The same holds true for the members of the Reich Defense Council, which as such was nothing but a bureaucratic and routine affair. Accordingly Hitler, in the spring of 1939, explicitly excluded the Reich Defense Council also from further war preparations, saying: “Preparations will be made on the basis of peacetime legislation.”

Despotism and tyranny showed themselves in unadulterated form as from 1938. It is a characteristic quality of the Fascist as well as the National Socialist regime, to have the political will concentrated in the head of the Party, who with the help of this Party subjugates and becomes master of the State and the nation. Justice Jackson also recognized this when he stated, on 28 February 1946, that the apex of power rested with a power group outside the State and the Constitution.

To speak, in the case of such a regime, of a responsible Reich Government and of free citizens who, through some organizations or others, could exert influence on the formation of the political will, would be to proceed from entirely wrong hypotheses. Intangible elements devoid of all sense of responsibility usually gain influence on the head of the State and Party in such regimes. The formation of the political will can be recognized in its crystallized form only in the head of the State himself; all around him is shrouded in a haze. It is another characteristic of such a regime—and this again belongs to its inner untruthfulness—that beneath the surface of seemingly absolute harmony and union several power groups fight against each other. Hitler not only tolerated such opposing groups, he even encouraged them and made use of them as a basis for his power.

One of the defendants spoke here of the unity of the German people during this war in contrast with the first World War, but I must stress in reply that hardly at any time during its history was the German nation so torn internally as it was during the Third Reich. The apparent unity was merely the quiet of a churchyard, enforced through terror. The conflicts between the individual high functionaries of the German people, which we have ascertained here, reflect the inner strife-torn condition of the German nation, carefully concealed through the terror wielded by the Gestapo.

To give only a few examples: We were confronted here with the conflicts between Himmler and Frank, between Himmler and Keitel, between Sauckel and Seldte, between Schellenberg and Canaris, between Bormann and Lammers, between SA and SS, between Wehrmacht and SS, between SD and Justice, between Ribbentrop and Neurath, and so on and so forth. The list could be continued ad libitum.

Even ideologically the Party in itself was divided into pronounced oppositional groups, which was shown already at the very beginning of the presentation of evidence by Göring’s testimony. These oppositions were fundamental, and they were not bridged by Hitler but rather deepened. They were the instrument from which he elicited his power. The ministers were not responsible governing persons, as in any other state where law is the foundation; they were nothing but employees with specialized training who had to obey orders. And if a departmental minister, as in the case of Schacht, did not wish to submit to this, it resulted in conflict and resignation from his post.

For this very reason no minister could in the long run take full responsibility for his department, because he was not exclusively competent for it. A minister, in accordance with constitutional law, must first of all have access to the head of State; and he must have the right to report to him in person. He must be in a position to reject interference and influences coming from irresponsible sources. None of the characteristics applicable to a minister apply to the so-called ministers of Adolf Hitler. The Four Year Plan came as a surprise to Schacht. Similarly, the Minister of Justice was surprised by so extremely important a law as the Nuremberg Decrees. Ministers were not in a position to appoint their staffs independently. The appointment of every civil service employee required the consent of the Party Chancellery. The intervention and influence of all possible agencies and persons of the various Chancelleries—Chancellery of the Führer, Party Chancellery, et cetera—asserted themselves. They, however, were agencies placed above the ministries and they could not be controlled. Special delegates governed over the heads of the departmental chiefs. Ministers, even the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, as we have heard from Lammers, might wait for months for an audience, while Herr Bormann and Herr Himmler had free access to Hitler.

The anticamera and camarilla, indispensable accessories of all absolutism, have at all times been difficult to fathom as to the personal responsibility of the individual circles of which they are composed. The irresponsible influences exerted over and affecting Hitler were absolutely intangible.

Generaloberst Jodl described to us here how Hitler’s sudden actions, caused by some urge and attended by the most serious consequences, could be traced back to influences of an entirely obscure and unknown sort, such as pure chance, conversations at a tea party, or the like. For the objective facts this bears out what I already mentioned in the beginning. And so this state of affairs precludes even the possibility of the planning of a crime such as a war of aggression within a clearly defined circle of persons, much less within the so-called Reich Government. But where no planning is possible, there can be no plot, no conspiracy either, the most striking characteristic of which is this very common planning, even though the participants have different and varied roles. Let us assume the broadest conceivable interpretation of the ostensible exterior characteristics of the conspiracy. I am following Justice Jackson’s line of reasoning. He who takes part in a counterfeiters’ plot is guilty of conspiracy, even through he may have written only a letter or acted as bearer of the letter. He who participates in a plot for robbing a bank is guilty of murder if, in the course of the execution, not he but a third party in the group of planners commits murder. At all times, however, the prerequisite is a body of persons capable of evolving a common plan. Such a thing was not possible for Adolf Hitler’s ministers; it was not possible at all under Hitler. From this it follows that no conspirator could participate in Hitler’s crime of having forced upon his own people and the world a war of aggression, except those who served Hitler as assistants.

The forces at work in the Third Reich as depicted thus permit in thesis only the assumption that there existed a punishable complicity or punishable assistance, not, however, a punishable group offense such as a conspiracy. Whether such complicity or such punishable aid in the crime of a war of aggression committed by Hitler exists for individual defendants personally can only be investigated and decided in each individual case. It is my task to investigate this only in the case of Schacht.

A collective crime such as conspiracy is, however, excluded as inconceivable and impossible in the light of the actual conditions as already established. But even if this were not the case, the subjective aspect of the deed is completely lacking in the case of Schacht. Even if the objective facts of a conspiracy were to exist for a certain circle of the accused and even with the most liberal interpretation of the concept of conspiracy, it is still essential that the conspirator should include the plan of conspiracy and the aims of the conspiracy within his will, at least in the form of dolus eventualis.

The strict facts constituting a conspiracy can best be illustrated by comparison with a pirate ship. In reality every crew member of the pirate ship, even a subordinate, is guilty and an outlaw. But a person who did not even know that he was on a pirate ship but believed himself to be on a peaceful merchant vessel, is not guilty of piracy. He is equally innocent if, after realizing the pirate character of the ship, he has done everything he could to prevent any piracy, as well as to leave the pirate ship. Schacht did both.

As far as that is concerned, research on conspiracy also recognizes that a person is not guilty who has withdrawn from the conspiracy by a positive act before attainment of the goal of the conspiracy, even if he did co-operate previously in the preparation of the plan for conspiracy, which was not the case with Schacht. In this connection, I also consider as being in my favor Mr. Justice Jackson’s answer when I put up for discussion, during Schacht’s interrogation, the question whether the persecution of the Jews is also charged to Schacht. Mr. Justice Jackson said, yes, if Schacht had helped prepare the war of aggression before he withdrew from this plan for aggression and its group of conspirators and went over unreservedly to the opposition group, that is, to the conspiracy against Hitler. This desertion would then be the positive act which I have mentioned whereby a person at first participating in a conspiracy would separate himself from it.

This legal problem does not even enter into consideration as far as Schacht is concerned, because the evidence has shown that he never desired to participate in the preparation for a war of aggression.

As already stated, this accusation of the subjective fact of the conspiracy has not been proved either by direct or by indirect evidence. For the events up to the year 1938 I can point to the statements made previously. It has been proved that from 1938 on, at the latest, Schacht fought the bitterest struggle imaginable against any possibility of war in such a form that he attempted to overthrow the person responsible for this risk of war and this will for aggression and, thereby, the regime.

Your Lordship, I have now arrived at the end of a section, if Your Lordship would care to announce a recess now.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for being late, but I was detained at the entrance.

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I have arrived at the discussion of the beginning of the opposition by means of the various Putsch actions.

It is quite irrelevant and of incidental importance to investigate whether the attempts at a Putsch, which occurred at shorter or longer intervals during the war, would have been instrumental in securing better peace terms for Germany. This is absolutely meaningless for the criminal evaluation of Schacht’s course of action. Doubtlessly, according to human reckoning, a successful prewar Putsch would have prevented the outbreak of war; and a successful Putsch after the outbreak of war would at least have shortened the duration of the war. Therefore such skeptical considerations about the political value of these Putsch attempts do not disprove the seriousness of the plans and intentions for a Putsch, and that is all that counts in a criminal legal evaluation. For it proves first of all that a person who has been pursuing them since 1938, and even since 1937, if one includes the attempt with Kluge, could not possibly previously have had warlike intentions. One does not try to overthrow a regime because it involves the danger of war, if previously one has oneself worked toward a war. One does so only if by all one’s actions, even that of financing armament, one wished to serve peace. For this reason these repeated Putsch attempts on the part of Schacht do not have any legal significance of a so-called active repentance for previous criminal behavior but constitute ex post proof that he cannot be accused even before 1938 of deliberately working for war, because it would be logically and psychologically incompatible with Schacht’s activity of conspiracy against Hitler.

These Putsche thus prove the credibility of Schacht in respect to his explanation of the reasons and intentions which caused him actively to enter the Hitler Government and to finance armament to the extent to which he did, namely, to the amount of 12,000 millions. They prove ex post the purely defensive character of this financing of armament; they prove the credibility of Schacht’s contention of having tactically achieved, in addition, a general limitation of armament. If one does believe this explanation of Schacht’s, and I think one must believe it, then one cannot speak of Schacht’s co-operation in instigating a war of aggression.

This credibility is also proved by another circumstance. Schacht originally contradicted the testimony of Gisevius and my questions following the same line, that he had admired Hitler at the beginning and had unreservedly considered him a brilliant statesman. He described this in his interrogation as an erroneous assumption. He said that he had recognized from the beginning many of Hitler’s weaknesses, especially the fact of his poor education, and had only hoped to be in a position to control the disadvantages and dangers resulting from them. By this contradiction Schacht made his defense more difficult; but he is wise enough to have recognized this. Thus what he deliberately forfeited from the point of view of evidence which would serve his defense, he gains with regard to his credibility upon objective evaluation of evidence based on psychological experience. For a person who serves the truth by contradiction deserves increased credibility, when the suggested untruth or the half-truth is more advantageous to him technically and tactically by way of evidence.

There should be no doubt about Schacht’s leading role in the activities of the various conspiracies about which Gisevius testified on the very basis of this credible testimony. During the cross-examination Mr. Justice Jackson confronted Schacht with photographs and films which superficially show a close connection with Hitler and his paladins. This can only have been done in order to throw doubt on the earnestness of his active opposition to Hitler. I must, therefore, deal briefly with this point of the photographs and films. Mr. Justice Jackson has coupled this accusation with another one by quoting speeches ostensibly expressing great devotion on the part of Schacht toward Adolf Hitler even during the Putsch period. This accusation is on the same level. I believe that this argument cannot stand up either before the experiences of life nor before what we can observe of history. History teaches us that conspirators, especially if they belong to the closer circle of dignitaries of the threatened head of state, show special devotion for purposes of camouflage. Nor has it ever been observed that such people impart their intentions to the prospective victim in a spirit of contradictory loyalty. One could cite many examples of this from history.

There exists an effective German drama by a certain Neumann which concerns itself with the murder of Czar Paul by his first Minister, Count Pahlen. The Czar believes to the very end in the ostentatious devotion of Count Pahlen, even while the latter is already sharpening his knife. And the historical documents in existence include a note by Count Pahlen to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, immediately before the assassination, in which Count Pahlen persists in speaking about “Notre auguste Empereur,” and so forth. Significantly, this drama bears the title The Patriot.

Thus, there is a higher patriotism than the merely formal loyalty of a servant of the nation. It would be closer to the psychological truth if this presumptive devotion, assumed for the sake of appearances, and the assurances of loyalty during this period were judged more in favor of the objective credibility of Schacht’s explanations than vice versa. As a conspirator, he had to camouflage himself especially well. To a certain degree this had to be done by practically everyone who lived under this regime in Germany. As far as the photographs are concerned, it is probably an inevitable consequence of every social and representative participation in a body that one becomes a victim of the camera along with the members of the body whether one likes it or not. A member of a Government cannot always avoid being photographed with these people on the occasion of their meetings. As a result we have pictures that show Schacht between Ley and Streicher and the scene in the film showing the reception of Hitler at the railroad station. Viewed ex post, these pictures give no pleasure to the observer, and certainly not to Schacht either. But they do not prove anything. In a natural evaluation belonging to a normal average experience of life, I consider these pictures without any value as evidence, either pro or contra.

Foreign countries, too, through their prominent representatives, had social intercourse with Adolf Hitler’s Government, and this not only through their diplomatic corps. I wish to assure you that the Defense is in a position to produce pictures of a much more grotesque sort which do not seem nearly as natural as Schacht being photographed together with men who, after all, were his fellow dignitaries in the Third Reich. To produce such pictures, however, might not be very tactful on the part of the Defense; yet should it be necessary to investigate the truth in all seriousness, a defense counsel might have to take upon himself the odium of indiscretion. I do not believe that there is any need for me to do so in this case, because the irrelevance and insignificance of such a presentation of evidence through pictures taken on state occasions of the Third Reich seems to me to be obvious.

The only incriminating point pressed by the Prosecution which is left for me to argue now appears to be that Schacht, after his retirement as Minister of Economics and even after his retirement as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939, remained Minister without Portfolio until 1943. Schacht declared that this had been stipulated by Hitler as a condition for his release from the Ministry of Economics. Hitler’s signature, as that of the head of the State, was necessary for his dismissal. Had Schacht refused to remain as Minister without Portfolio, he would surely have been arrested sooner or later as a political suspect and thus been deprived of all possibility of action against Hitler. The witness Gisevius has testified as to the discussions at that time between him and Schacht concerning the continuation of Schacht’s function as Minister without Portfolio. In these deliberations the idea was quite justly considered important that Schacht could be of more use to the group of conspirators as a scout or an outpost if he remained in this position, to outward appearances at least, within the Reich Government. Even as Minister without Portfolio, Schacht remained exposed to great danger, as is shown by his and Gisevius’ declarations and as becomes obvious from Ohlendorf’s statement that Schacht already in 1937 was on the black list of the State Police.

How much Hitler feared Schacht is proved by his subsequent remarks to Speer, which have been discussed here, particularly his remarks about Schacht after the attempted assassination on 20 July. I would also remind you once more of Hitler’s memorandum of 1936, which he gave to Speer in 1944 and which shows that he saw in Schacht a saboteur of his rearmament plans. It has been declared and proved by Lammers that Schacht tried later on to get rid even of this nominal position. Lammers and Schacht have proved furthermore that this position of Minister without Portfolio was without any special importance. Hence my reference to him as an officer with assimilated rank, that is, an officer without command authority, a sham officer. Schacht could not give up the position unless there was a row, and the same held true of his position as Reichsbank President. Schacht, therefore, had to maneuver in such a way that he would be thrown out. He succeeded in this, as I explained, as Reichsbank President through the well-known memorandum of the Directorate of the Reichsbank and the refusal of credits by the Reichsbank in November 1938 contained therein. As far as his position of Minister without Portfolio was concerned, he succeeded through his defeatist letter of November 1942. In the meantime he made use of the time for the attempted coup d’état in autumn 1938 and for the various other attempted coups d’état leading up to that of 20 July 1944, which finally caused him to be put in a concentration camp.

A criminal reproach can on no account be made against him in his position as Minister without Portfolio. For his proved conspiratorial activity against Hitler during all this time eliminates by force of logic the supposition that he had furthered Hitler’s war plans and war strategy during this time. In any event, we can only raise—and even that only in the vacuum of abstraction—a political reproach against the Schacht of the years 1933-37. But this, too, is fully compensated by the extraordinarily courageous attitude of Schacht after this period. To obtain its just evaluation, may I remind you of the interesting statement of Gisevius to the effect that he, who had at first looked with a certain skepticism upon Schacht’s original attitude, not in a criminal but in a political sense, had later become completely reconciled with Schacht by the extraordinary courage which Schacht displayed as opponent and conspirator against Hitler since 1938. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the fact that Schacht remained as Minister without Portfolio does not incriminate him either directly or indirectly, neither according to penal law, which is out of the question, nor morally, if one takes into consideration his behavior as a whole, his motives, and the accompanying circumstances and conditions.

If the Prosecution now finally argues, on the basis of the text of the afore-mentioned memorandum by the Directorate of the Reichsbank, that an opposition to war is not evident from the memorandum, but only technical reflections on finance and currency, then I have only to refer in this respect to my earlier statements and the testimony of Vocke. The presentation of facts by Schacht himself would not even be necessary to refute this argumentation. Vocke in his capacity as closest collaborator declared quite unequivocally that Schacht wished to limit and sabotage rearmament from the moment when he recognized that it was becoming a potential war danger. The sworn affidavit of Hülse and the sworn affidavits of all the collaborators of Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economics tally with the testimony of Vocke in this respect. I need not quote them individually. They are known to the Tribunal. The Tribunal does not need the commentary of a defense counsel on them; they speak for themselves. If the Prosecution now finally bases its argument on the text of the memorandum which, it is true, actually only deals with financial problems, then again I cannot suppress the remark that such an argumentation moves in a vacuum insofar as one does not take the experiences of history and the general experiences of life into consideration. Naturally, as I have already said, the Directorate of the Reichsbank could only bring up arguments from their department, particularly so in dealing with a Hitler. One says one thing while meaning another.

If the Directorate of the Reichsbank, along with their President, Schacht, had revealed their true purpose in this memorandum, namely, to avert the danger of war and to combat Hitler’s will of aggression, then they would have deprived themselves of the effect of technical departmental influence. Hitler very well understood the purpose of this memorandum when he shouted, after reading it: “That is mutiny!” With this, Hitler recognized the only thing that can be said of Schacht as conspirator: He was never a mutineer and conspirator against world peace; but, insofar as he was a conspirator and mutineer, he was so only against Adolf Hitler and his regime.

Again in this case I must ask the High Tribunal to turn their attention to Appendix Number II, which I must insert at this moment, because the matter that is dealt with here did not reach me for translation until after I had submitted my final speech.

I said that Schacht, insofar as he was a conspirator, was so only against Hitler. As such, he was the subject of ironical belittling by Generaloberst Jodl and my colleague Nelte through the epithet, “frock-coat and drawing-room revolutionary.” Now history teaches that the quality of the tailor does not play any role in the case of the revolutionary. And as far as the drawing room is concerned, shacks have no revolutionary precedence over palaces. I would just recall the political drawing rooms of the great French Revolution or, for example, the elegant officers’ club of the select Preobrashensk regiment under many a Czar. Should the Gentlemen of the Tribunal be of the opinion that Schacht and his accomplices themselves should have done the shooting, then all I can say is that things were not as easy as all that. Schacht would have loved to do the shooting himself; he proclaimed that here emphatically. But it was not possible for him to do so without possessing the power to master the attendant confusion, thereby making the attempt a revolutionary success. Thus generals with troops were necessary. I do not wish to repay Generaloberst Jodl with the same coin and shall therefore refrain from saying “a necessary evil.”

The further reproach of the basic lack of working-class elements to strengthen the Putsche is contradicted by the social composition of the revolutionaries of 20 July. As I stated before, all this is irrelevant for the decision of the Tribunal. But my client is morally entitled to expect his defense counsel not to let this ironical thrust pass, especially since it was delivered in the limelight of public opinion.

In summing up I may say: After the elections in July 1932 it was certain that Hitler was able and bound to seize power. Previous to this Schacht had particularly warned the foreign countries of this development, and thus he had not contributed to it. After the seizure of power only two roads were open to him, as to every German: He either had to estrange himself or to enter the Movement actively. The decision at these crossroads was a purely political one without any criminal aspect. Just as we respect the reasons which caused the foreign countries to collaborate with Hitler much more intensively and in a more pro-German way than with the previous democratic Governments of Germany, we must recognize the good faith of all those Germans who believed themselves able to serve the country and humanity better by remaining in the Movement, that is, within the Party or the apparatus of officialdom, because of the greater possibilities of exerting their influence, than by grumbling and keeping aloof. To serve Hitler as minister and President of the Reichsbank was a political decision, about the political correctness of which one can argue ex post facto but one which certainly lacked any criminal character. Schacht has always remained loyal to the motivating reason for his decision, namely, to combat any radicalism from an influential position. Nowhere in the world, which knew his oppositional attitude, could he see any signs of warning or support. He saw only that the world trusted Hitler much longer than he himself did and permitted Adolf Hitler to gain honors and foreign political successes, which hampered Schacht’s work which had already for a long time been directed toward removing Adolf Hitler and his Government. He led this struggle against Adolf Hitler and his Government with a courage and determination which must make it appear a pure miracle that not until after 20 July 1944 did fate overtake him, when he was sent to a concentration camp and was in danger of losing his life either through the Peoples’ Court or through a spectacular act of the SS. He is sufficiently wise and self-critical to realize that from a purely political angle the picture of his character will be adjudged diversely in history, or at least in the immediate future, according to favor or hatred of the parties. He humbly resigns himself to the judgment of history, even if one historian or another will label his political line as incorrect. But with the pride of a good conscience he faces the judgment of this High Tribunal. He stands before his judges with clean hands. He also stands before this Tribunal with confidence, as he has already manifested in a letter which he addressed to this Tribunal before the beginning of the proceedings, in which he states that he is grateful to be able to expose before this Tribunal and before the whole world his actions and doings and their underlying reasons. He stands before this Tribunal with confidence because he knows that favor or hatred of the parties will have no effect on this Tribunal. While recognizing the relativity of all political actions in such difficult times, he remains sure of himself and full of confidence with regard to the criminal charges which have been raised against him. Whoever would be found guilty of being criminally responsible for this war and the atrocities and inhuman acts committed in it, Schacht, according to the evidence which has been given here with minute exactness, can confront that culprit with the words which Wilhelm Tell flings in the face of the emperor’s assassin, Parricida: “I raise my clean hands to Heaven, and curse you and your deed!”

I therefore request the findings to be established to the effect that Schacht is not guilty of the accusation which has been raised against him and that he be acquitted.

THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Kranzbühler for the Defendant Dönitz.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for the Defendant Dönitz): Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: “War is a cruel thing, and it brings in its train a multitude of injustices and misdeeds.”[^[2]] With these words of Plutarch’s, Hugo Grotius begins his examination of responsibility for war crimes; and they are as true today as they were 2,000 years ago. Acts constituting war crimes, or considered as such by the opponent, have at all times been committed by belligerents. But this fact was always held against the vanquished parties and never against the victors. The law which was applied here was necessarily always the law of the stronger.

While more or less stable rules have been governing land warfare for centuries, in naval warfare the conceptions of the belligerents with regard to international law have always clashed. No one knows better than the British statesmen to what extent these conceptions are dictated by national or economic interests. I refer in this respect to noted witnesses such as Lord Fisher and Lord Edward Grey.[^[3]] Therefore, if ever in history a naval power would have had the idea of prosecuting a defeated enemy admiral, based on its own conception of the rules of naval warfare, the sentence would have been a foregone conclusion from the very indictment.

At this trial two admirals are under indictment for a naval war which has been termed criminal. Thus the Tribunal is confronted with a decision regarding conceptions of law which are necessarily as divergent as the interests of a naval power and a land power. It is not only the fate of the two admirals which depends upon this decision. It is also a question of personal honor to hundreds of thousands of German seamen who believed they were serving a good cause, and who do not deserve to be branded by history as pirates and murderers. It is for these men, the living as well as the dead, that I feel bound by a moral obligation to reject the accusations raised against German naval warfare.

What are these accusations? They are divided into two main groups: Unlawful sinking of ships and deliberate killing of shipwrecked personnel. I shall deal first with the accusation of the illegal sinking of ships.

Two reports by Mr. Roger Allen, of the British Foreign Office, made in the autumn of 1940 and spring of 1941, form the nucleus of that accusation. I do not know to whom and for what purpose these reports were made. According to their form and content they appear to serve propaganda purposes, and for that reason alone I consider them to have little value as evidence. Even the Prosecution submitted only part of the accusations made therein. The reports trace only one-fifth of the total number of supposedly unlawful attacks back to submarines, whereas four-fifths are ascribed to mines, airplanes, or surface craft. The Prosecution omits these four-fifths, and this reticence may be explained by the fact that the use of these combat means on the British side differed in no way from that on the German side.

With regard to the use of submarines, however, there does seem to exist a difference between the principles followed in Germany’s conduct of the naval war and that of our enemies. At any rate, the public in enemy countries and in many neutral countries believed so during the war, and partly still believes it today. Propaganda dominated the field. At the same time the vast majority of all critics neither knew exactly what principles applied to German U-boat warfare, nor on what factual and legal foundations they were based. It shall be my task to attempt to clarify this.

The reports by Mr. Roger Allen culminate in the assertion that the German U-boats, beginning with the summer of 1940, torpedoed everything within range. Undoubtedly, the methods of submarine warfare gradually intensified under the pressure of the measures directed against Germany. This war, however, never degenerated into an orgy of shooting governed only by the law of expediency. Most of what might have been expedient for a U-boat was left undone to the last day of the war because it could only be regarded as legally inadmissible, and all measures of which Germany in her conduct of naval warfare is being accused today by the Prosecution were the result of a development in which both sides took part through measures and countermeasures, as occurs in the course of every war.

The London Protocol of 1936 formed the legal basis for German submarine warfare at the beginning of this war. These regulations were incorporated verbatim into Article 74 of the German Prize Ordinance, which even Mr. Roger Allen calls a reasonable and not inhuman instrument. This Prize Ordinance was sent in 1938 in draft form to the two U-boat flotillas and to the U-boat training school and served as a basis for the training of commanders. Stopping and examining merchant vessels was performed as a tactical task. In order to facilitate for the commander in economic warfare the quick and correct evaluation of his legal position towards ships and cargoes of the enemy and of neutral countries, the prize disc was constructed, which through simple manipulations indicated the articles of the Prize Ordinance to be applied. Thus, insofar as preparations had been made at all for economic warfare by submarines they were based exclusively on the German Prize Ordinance, and thus on the London Protocol.

The German High Command actually did adhere to this legal foundation in the initial stages of the war. The combat instructions for U-boats of 3 September 1939 contained clear orders to the effect that submarine warfare was to be carried on in accordance with the Prize Ordinance. Accordingly, sinkings were permissible only after stopping and examining the ship, unless it attempted to escape or offered resistance. Some examples were submitted to the Tribunal, from the abundance of available instances, showing the chivalrous spirit in which the German submarine commanders complied with instructions given. In particular, assistance afforded to the crews of ships lawfully sunk, after having been stopped and examined, occasionally reached a point where it could scarcely be justified on military grounds. Lifeboats were towed over long distances, whereby the few available U-boats were diverted from their combat mission. Enemy ships which might have been sunk lawfully were permitted to go free in order to send the crews of ships previously sunk to port aboard them. It is therefore only correct that Mr. Roger Allen stated that the German U-boats, during the first weeks of the war, adhered strictly to the London regulations.

Why was this practice not kept up? Because the conduct of the enemy made such a procedure militarily impossible, and at the same time created the legal prerequisites for its modification.

I shall consider the military side first. From the very first day of the war, U-boat reports reached the Flag Officer of U-boats and the Naval Operations Staff stating that hardly an enemy ship submitted voluntarily to being stopped and examined. The merchant vessels were not content with attempting to escape through flight or by changing their course and bearing directly down upon the U-boat in order to force it to dive. Every U-boat sighted was at once reported by radio; and subsequently, in the shortest space of time, attacked by enemy airplanes or naval forces. However, it was the arming of all enemy merchant vessels that settled the matter. As early as 6 September 1939 a German U-boat was shelled by the British steamship Manaar, and that was the starting signal for the great struggle which took place between the U-boats, on the one hand, and the armed merchant vessels equipped with guns and depth charges, on the other hand, as equal military opponents.

In order to show the effect of all the measures taken by the adversary, I have presented to the Tribunal some examples which I do not wish to repeat. They show unequivocally that further action against enemy merchant ships in accordance with the Prize Ordinance was no longer feasible from the military standpoint and meant suicide for the submarine. Nevertheless, the German command for weeks on end continued to act according to the regulations governing the Prize Ordinance. Only after it was established that action on the part of enemy merchant ships—especially armed action—no longer took the form of individual measures but of general instructions, was the order given on 4 October 1939 to attack all armed enemy merchant ships without warning.

The Prosecution will perhaps take the standpoint that, in lieu of this, submarine warfare against armed merchant vessels should have been discontinued. In the last war the most terrible weapons of warfare were ruthlessly employed by both sides on land and in the air. In view of this experience the thesis can hardly be upheld today that in naval warfare one of the parties waging war should be expected to give up using an effective weapon after the adversary has taken measures making the use of it impossible in its previous form. In any case such a renunciation could only be considered if the novel utilization of the weapon were undeniably illegal. But this is not the case for the utilization of German submarines against enemy merchant shipping, because the measures taken by the enemy changed not only the military but also the legal situation.

According to German legal opinion a ship which is equipped and utilized for battle does not come under the provisions granting protection against sinking without warning as laid down by the London Protocol for merchant ships. I wish to stress the fact that the right of the merchant ship to carry weapons and to fight is not thereby contested. The conclusion drawn from this fact is reflected in the well-known formula: “He who resorts to weapons must expect to be answered by weapons.”

During cross-examination the Prosecution referred to this interpretation of the London Protocol as fraudulent. It admits only the closest literal interpretation and considers the sinking of a merchant ship as admissible only if the latter has offered active resistance. It is not the first time that fundamental differences of opinion exist between contracting parties with respect to the interpretation of a treaty, and the extremely divergent interpretations of the meaning of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 provide a recent example. Diversity of conception, therefore, does not permit the conclusion that the one or the other party acted fraudulently during the signing or the subsequent interpretation of a treaty. I will endeavor to show how unjustified this charge is particularly in regard to the German interpretation of the London Submarine Protocol.

There are two terms on which the German interpretation hinges, namely, that of “merchant vessel” and “active resistance.” If I now consider some legal questions, this will in no way represent a comprehensive exposition. I can only touch on the problems and due to lack of time must limit myself also when dealing with research on the subject. I shall primarily refer to American sources, because the interests of naval strategy of that nation were not as firmly established as those of the European nations and its research literature can thus claim greater objectivity.

The text of the London Protocol of 1936 is based, of course, on a declaration which was signed at the London Naval Conference of 1930. The committee of jurists appointed at that time expressed its opinion concerning the greatly disputed definition of a merchant vessel in the report of 3 April 1930:

“The committee wishes to place on record that the expression ‘merchant vessel’ where it is employed in the declaration is not to be understood as including a merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel.”

This definition clarifies at least one thing, namely, that by no means every vessel flying a merchant flag may lay claim to being treated as a merchant vessel in the sense of the London Agreement. Beyond this, the explanation has few positive aspects because the question through what kind of participation in hostilities a vessel loses her right to the immunity of a merchant vessel is again subject to the interpretation of the contracting parties. The London Conference, as far as I can see, did not consider this ticklish question any further, and one is probably entitled to assume that this remarkable reserve is based on experiences which the same powers had accumulated in Washington 8 years before.

The Washington Conference of 1922 was held under the impression of the first World War; and therefore it is no wonder that Great Britain, the naval power which during the World War had suffered most from German submarine warfare, now tried to outlaw and abolish altogether by international law submarine warfare against merchant shipping. The resolution, named after the American chief delegate, Root, which in its first part substantially corresponded to the London text of 1930, served that aim. But in the second part the Root Resolution goes further and stipulates that any commander who, no matter whether he acted with or without higher orders, violated the rules established for the sinking of merchant vessels should be punished as a war criminal like a pirate. Finally it was recognized that under the conditions stipulated in the resolution submarine warfare against merchant shipping was impossible, and such warfare was therefore renounced altogether by the contracting powers. The Root Resolution designates these principles as an established part of international law. While it was accepted as such by the delegates, none of the five participating naval powers, U.S.A., Britain, France, Japan, and Italy ratified it.

In connection with the Root Resolution, however, another question was discussed which is of the greatest importance for the interpretation of the London Protocol, namely, the definition of the term “merchantman.” Here the two conflicting views in the entire U-boat question became clearly evident. On the one side there stood Britain, on the other France[^[4]], Italy, and Japan, while the United States took the position of a mediator. According to the minutes of the Washington Conference, the Italian delegate, Senator Schanzer, opened the offensive of the weaker naval powers by expressly emphasizing that a merchantman, when regularly armed, might be attacked by a submarine without preliminaries. In a later session Schanzer repeated his statement that the Italian delegation applied the term of “merchantman” in the resolution only to unarmed merchant vessels. He declared this to be in explicit accordance with the existing rules of international law.[^[5]]

The French delegate, M. Sarraut, at that time received instructions from his Foreign Minister, M. Briand, to second the reservations of the Italian delegate.[^[6]] He thereupon moved to have the Italian reservations included in the minutes of the session.

The Japanese delegate, Hanihara, supported this trend with the statement that he thought it was clear that merchant vessels engaged in giving military assistance to the enemy ceased in fact to be merchant vessels.[^[7]] It can therefore be seen that in 1922, three of the five powers represented expressed the opinion that armed merchant vessels were not to be regarded as merchant vessels in the sense of the Agreement.

Since the whole resolution threatened to collapse because of this difference of opinion, a way out was found which is typical of conferences of this kind. Root closed the debate with the statement that in his opinion the resolution held good for all merchant ships as long as the ship remained a merchant vessel.[^[8]] With this compromise a formula was created which, while representing a momentary political success, would not however carry any weight in the case of war, for it was left to every participating power to decide whether or not it would grant the armed merchant vessels the protection of the resolution in case of war.

I have described these events of the year 1922 a little more in detail because the powers which took part in them were the same as those which participated in the London Naval Conference of 1930. The London Conference was the continuation of the Washington Conference, and the subjects that had been discussed and included in the minutes of the first conference were of great importance for the second conference. Experts too—and by no means only German but above all American and French experts—based their examinations on the close connection of both conferences, and it was precisely for that reason that they declared the result achieved in the question of submarines to be ambiguous and unsatisfactory. Here I merely wish to point to Wilson’s summarizing report on the London Naval Treaty.[^[9]]

This report, besides the ambiguity of the concept “merchant vessel,” also stresses the uncertainty connected with the words “active resistance”; and it is with these very words that an exception from the protection of the merchantman is connected, an exception which likewise is not contained in the actual text of the London Agreement but which nevertheless is generally recognized. I am referring to merchantmen in an enemy convoy. If the London Agreement were interpreted literally, it would be understood that even merchantmen in an enemy convoy must not be attacked without warning but that an attacking warship would have to put the escort vessels out of action first and then stop and search the merchantmen. However, this suggestion, which is impossible from a military point of view, evidently is not made even by the Prosecution. In the report of the British Foreign Office, which has been mentioned several times, it says:

“Ships sailing in enemy convoys are usually deemed to be guilty of forcible resistance and therefore liable to be sunk forthwith.”

Here even the Prosecution accepts an interpretation of the words “active resistance,” an interpretation which results in no way from the treaty itself but is simply a consequence of military necessity and thus dictated by common sense.

And this very same common sense demands also that the armed merchantman be held just as guilty of forcible resistance as the convoyed ship. Let us take an extreme instance in order to make the matter quite clear. An unarmed merchant ship of 20,000 tons and a speed of 20 knots, which is convoyed by a trawler with, let us say, 2 guns and a speed of 15 knots, may be sunk without warning, because it has placed itself under the protection of the trawler and thereby made itself guilty of active resistance. If, however, this same merchant ship does not have the protection of the trawler and instead the 2 guns, or even 4 or 6 of them, are placed on its decks, thus enabling it to use its full speed, should it in this case not be deemed just as guilty of offering active resistance as before? Such a deduction really seems to me against all common sense. In the opinion of the Prosecution the submarine would first have to give the merchant ship, which is far superior to it in fighting power, the order to stop and then wait until the merchant ship fires its first broadside at the submarine. Only then would it have the right to use its own weapons. Since, however, a single artillery hit is nearly always fatal to a submarine but as a rule does very little harm to a merchant ship, the result would be the almost certain destruction of the submarine.

“When you see a rattlesnake rearing its head, you do not wait until it jumps at you but you destroy it before it gets the chance.”

These are Roosevelt’s words, in which he justified his order to the United States naval forces to attack German submarines. This reason seemed sufficient to him to order the immediate use of arms even without the existence of a state of war. It is a unique instance in the history of warfare, however, to grant one of two armed opponents the right to fire the first shot and to make the other wait to be hit first. Such an interpretation is contradictory to all military reason. It is no wonder, therefore, if in view of such divergent opinions, the experts on international law, even after the London Treaty and the signing of the London Protocol of 1936, consider the treatment of armed merchant vessels in naval warfare to be an unsolved question. Here too I should like to refer to only one source of research, which enjoys especially high authority. It is the draft of an agreement on the rights and duties of neutrals in naval warfare, an agreement which leading American professors of international law, such as Jessup, Borchard, and Charles Warren, published in the American Journal of International Law of July 1939 and which includes arguments which furnish an excellent idea of the latest trend of opinion. Article 54 of this draft corresponds word for word to the text of the London Agreement of 1936, with one notable exception: The term “merchant vessel” is replaced by “unarmed vessel.” The next article then continues:

“In their action with regard to enemy armed merchant vessels, belligerent warships, whether surface or submarine, and belligerent military aircraft are governed by the rules applicable to their action with regard to enemy warships.”

This opinion is first of all explained by historical development. During the time when it was customary to arm merchant vessels, that is, until the end of the last century, there was no question of any protection for the merchant vessel against immediate attack by an enemy warship. With the introduction of armor plating the warship became so superior to the armed merchant vessel that any resistance on the part of the latter was rendered futile, and the arming of merchant ships therefore gradually ceased. Only this defenselessness against warships, and this alone, granted merchant vessels the privilege of not being attacked without warning by the enemy: “As merchantmen lost effective fighting power they acquired a legal immunity from attack without warning.”

This immunity was never conceded to the merchant vessel as such but only to the defenseless and harmless merchant vessel. In regard to this the American expert on international law, Hyde,[^[10]] stated in 1922, that is, after the Washington Conference and the afore-mentioned Root Resolution on U-boat warfare:

“Maritime states have never acquiesced in a principle that a merchant vessel so armed as to be capable of destroying a vessel of war of any kind should enjoy immunity from attack at sight, at least when encountering an enemy cruiser of inferior defensive strength.”

Legal as well as practical considerations, therefore, led the above-mentioned American authorities, after the signing of the London Agreement and shortly before the outbreak of this war, to form the opinion that armed merchant ships do not enjoy protection from attacks without warning.

Here the old discrimination between defensive and offensive armaments is also rejected as inapplicable. It is a well-known fact that the American Secretary of State, Lansing, in his note to the Allies on 18 January 1916, took the point of view that any kind of armament aboard a merchant vessel will make its fighting power superior to that of a submarine and that such armament is therefore of an offensive nature.[^[11]]

In the later course of the first World War, the United States changed its opinion and declared that mounting guns on the stern could be taken as proof of the defensive character of the armaments. This standpoint was adopted in some international agreements and drafts, as well as by British jurists in particular. It does not do justice to the practice of naval warfare.

First of all, in this war the guns on many vessels were mounted from the very start in the bows, for instance, regularly on fishing trawlers. Furthermore, the antiaircraft weapons of the merchant vessel, which were especially dangerous for the submarine, were frequently placed on the bridge, and could therefore be used in all directions. Besides, there can be no differentiation between defensive and offensive armaments as to the way the weapons are placed.

In this respect orders alone and the way in which these weapons are meant to be employed are the decisive factors. Soon after the war had started the orders of the British Admiralty had already fallen into German hands. A decision of the Tribunal has made it possible for me to submit them. They are contained partly in the Confidential Fleet Orders, chiefly, however, in the Defense of Merchant Shipping Handbook. They were issued in 1938. They do not therefore deal with countermeasures against illicit German actions but, on the contrary, were already issued at a time when warfare in accordance with the London Agreement was the only form of submarine warfare taken into consideration in Germany.

The instructions further show that all British merchant vessels acted, from the first day of the war, according to orders received from the British Admiralty. These involved the following points with respect to submarine warfare:

(1) Reporting of submarines by radio telegraphy.

(2) The use of naval artillery.

(3) The use of depth charges.

These instructions were supplemented on 1 October 1939, when a call was transmitted over the radio to ram all German submarines.

It might seem unnecessary after this survey to make any mention at all of the defensive and offensive character of such orders. The orders on the use of artillery by merchant vessels, however, do make such differentiation; that is, guns are to be used for defense only, as long as the enemy on his part adheres to the regulations of international law, and for the offensive only when he no longer does. The orders covering the practical execution of these directives reveal, however, that there is no difference at all between defensive and offensive use. Admiral Dönitz explained this in detail when he was heard in Court, and I do not want to repeat it. Actually, from the very beginning of the war merchant vessels were under orders to fire on every occasion on every submarine which came within range of their guns. And that is what the captains of British merchant vessels did. The reason for this offensive action can certainly not be found in the conduct of German submarines during the first weeks of the war, for even the Foreign Office report admits that this conduct was correct. On the other hand, British propaganda may have had great influence, since in connection with the unintentional sinking of the Athenia on 3 September 1939, it disseminated through Reuters on 9 September the assertion that unrestricted submarine warfare was in progress and upheld this assertion notwithstanding the fact that the conduct of German submarines during the first weeks of the war refuted this accusation. Together with the announcement of the British Admiralty’s ramming orders of 1 October 1939, the merchant navy was again officially informed that the German U-boats had ceased to respect the rules of naval warfare and that merchant vessels were to adjust their conduct accordingly. It seems to me of no importance that a corresponding written supplement to Admiralty orders was not issued until the spring of 1940, because nowadays a naval war is not directed by letters but by wireless. But according to the latter, the British captains, as from 9 September or 1 October 1939 at the latest, were directed to use their guns offensively against the German U-boats in accordance with the Admiralty’s instructions as contained in its handbook. The German order to attack armed enemy merchant vessels without warning was issued only on 4 October. Thus it was justified in any case, even if one did acknowledge a difference in treatment for vessels with defensive and offensive armament.

The guns on the merchant vessels and the orders concerning their use were, however, only a part of a comprehensive system of the use of merchant vessels for military purposes. Since the end of September 1939 the fastest vessels, that is, those ships that were the least endangered by submarines but, on the other hand, were especially suited for chasing U-boats, received depth charge chutes, that is, armaments which call for location of a submerged submarine and thus may be judged as typical weapons for the offensive.

However, another factor of greater general importance, and also of greater danger to the submarines, was the order to report every enemy ship on sight, giving its type and location. This report was destined, so said the order, to facilitate taking advantage of an opportunity, which might never recur, to destroy the enemy by naval or air forces. This is an unequivocal utilization of all merchant vessels for military intelligence service with intent directly to injure the enemy. If one considers the fact that according to the hospital ship agreement even the immunity of hospital ships ceases, if they relay military information of this type, then one need have no doubts about the consequences of such behavior on the part of a commercial vessel. Any craft putting out to sea with the order and intention of using every opportunity that occurs to send military reports about the enemy to its own naval and air forces is taking part in hostilities during the entire course of its voyage and, according to the afore-mentioned report of 1930 of the committee of jurists, has no right to be considered a merchant vessel. Any different conception would not do justice to the immediate danger which a wireless report involves for the vessel reported and which subjects it, often within a few minutes, to attack by enemy aircraft.

All of the Admiralty’s directives, taken together, show that British merchant vessels, from the very first day of the war, closely co-operated with the British Navy in combating the enemy’s naval forces. They were part of the military communications network of the British naval and air forces and their armament of guns and depth charges, the practical training in manipulation of the weapons, and the orders relative to their use, were actions taken by the British Navy.

We consider it out of the question that a merchant fleet in this manner destined and utilized for combat should count among the vessels entitled to the protection of the London Protocol against sinking without warning. On the basis of this conception and in connection with the arming of all enemy merchant vessels, which was rapidly being completed, an order was issued on 17 October 1939 to attack all enemy merchant ships without warning.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, we may as well break off now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry to detain the Tribunal, but I promised to tell the Tribunal about the two affidavits put forward for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. We have no objection to them. I promised to tell Your Lordship today. I am sorry to have to detain you.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 16 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]

NOTES

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[2] De jure pacis ac belli, Book II, Chapter XXIV, Paragraph 10.

[3] Lord Edward Grey: “Twenty-five Years of Politics 1892-1916.” (Retranslated into English from the German edition published by Bruckmann, Munich 1926). “International Law has always been very flexible.... A belligerent possessing an over-powerful navy has at all times been in search of an interpretation of International Law which would justify a maximum of intervention in respect of merchandise liable to reach the enemy. This attitude was naturally adopted by Great Britain and the Allies owing to their supremacy at sea. The British position on this subject had not always been the same. When we figured among the neutrals, we naturally contested the right to maximum intervention claimed by the belligerents.”

[4] Yamato Ichihalie, The Washington Conference and After, Stanford University Press, Cal., 1928, Page 80, “The chief reason for the British plea was the apprehension of the craft in the hands of the French navy.”

[5] Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922, Pages 606, 688, 692.

[6] French Yellow Book, La Conférence de Washington, Page 93.

[7] Protocol Pages 693, 702.

[8] Protocol Page 704.

[9] American Journal of International Law, 1931, Page 307.

[10] Hyde, International Law, 1922, Vol. II, Page 469.

[11] U.S. Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement Page 147.

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ONE HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY-NINTH DAY
Tuesday, 16 July 1946