Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 18

by Various

Afternoon Session

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before the noon recess I was discussing the fact that units of the Navy were not subordinate to the Naval Operations Staff in matters affecting warfare on land.

This channel of orders for territorial questions also explains the complete ignorance of Admiral Dönitz and of his colleagues in the Naval Operations Staff about the delivery to the SD of the crew of the Norwegian motor torpedo boat MTB 345 after its capture by units under Admiral Von Schrader. As the testimony of witnesses and the records of the Oslo War Crimes Court show, the Naval Operations Staff only received an operational report about the capture of the boat and the number of prisoners. All other details, the discovery on board of material for sabotage, of civilian suits and sabotage orders, and the treatment of the crew as saboteurs according to the Commando Order were regarded as territorial matters, and as such dealt with by Admiral Von Schrader and the Armed Forces commander in Norway. The decision regarding the fate of the crew came from the Führer’s headquarters in reply to an inquiry from Gauleiter Terboven. Not only is there no proof that the Naval Operations Staff took part in those territorial questions, but this must in fact be considered refuted on the basis of the evidence submitted and the chain of command as explained.

I regard as the second attempt of the Prosecution to establish a participation in the alleged conspiracy to commit war crimes the submission of Admiral Wagner’s minutes on the question of withdrawal from the Geneva Convention in the spring of 1945. The details are contained in Wagner’s testimony, according to which the Führer pointed out in a conference on 17 February that the enemy propaganda about the good treatment of prisoners of war was clearly having an influence on the units fighting on the Western Front, and that many cases of desertion to the enemy were being reported. He ordered that the question of a withdrawal from the Geneva Convention be investigated. In this way he wanted to convince his own soldiers that they could no longer rely upon receiving good treatment as prisoners of war, and thus create a countereffect against enemy propaganda. Two days later Hitler returned to this idea, although he then put forward another reason as the main one. He termed enemy warfare in the East and the bomb attacks on the German civilian population an outright renunciation of international law by the enemy, and he, for his part, also desired to free himself from all obligations by withdrawing from the Geneva Convention. Once more he asked for the opinion of the Armed Forces in this matter and addressed himself directly to Grossadmiral Dönitz, who did not answer. The attitude of the military leaders on this matter was unanimously negative.

On the next day, just before the daily conference on the situation, a 10-minute conversation took place between Grossadmiral Dönitz, Generaloberst Jodl, and Ambassador Hewel; in the course of this conversation Dönitz expressed his negative attitude. According to the notes of Admiral Wagner he said that “it would be better to take the measures considered necessary without previous announcement and, at any rate, to save face before the world.” The Prosecution sees in this a readiness and a design to expose hundreds of thousands of Allied prisoners of war to arbitrary murder.

Admiral Dönitz himself has no recollection of this sentence. That is not surprising, as this is not a record, but a summary of a lengthy conversation in four sentences, the summary being worded on the day after the conversation by Admiral Wagner. This summary admits that the Grossadmiral disapproved of any “wild measures” which would put us in the wrong from the beginning, and considered justifiable only measures actually warranted by the conduct of the enemy in each case. Since Wagner himself, as the author of the transcript, should know best what he meant thereby, I personally cannot add anything to this statement. The interpretation of the Prosecution is equally little supported by other circumstances. There was no question at all of keeping any measures secret; they had to be made known, regardless of whether they were meant to deter our own deserters or as reprisals. But Wagner’s note does not mention any kind of concrete measures to be taken, and all witnesses present at this situation conference in Hitler’s headquarters state that not a word was spoken on that subject. The idea of killing prisoners of war could not, therefore, have been present in the minds of any of the participants in this discussion which Wagner noted down.

Now it has come to light here, through the statements of the Defendants Ribbentrop and Fritzsche, that apart from the action for which he was preparing the ground during the discussion with the generals, Hitler had evidently at the same time planned a second action, in which only Goebbels and Himmler were to participate, and which by chance also came to Ribbentrop’s knowledge. In this action the shooting of thousands of prisoners of war seems to have been contemplated as a reprisal against the air attack on Dresden. Hitler, very wisely, did not give the slightest indication of such a plan to the generals. This plan was not followed up and no reprisals were taken.

And now I return to the facts. It is a fact that Admiral Dönitz disapproved of the withdrawal from the Geneva Convention, and that Hitler, in view of the attitude of all military leaders who clearly opposed it did not follow up the idea any further. It is also a fact that no measures in violation of international law were taken by the Germans as a result of this remark which the Prosecution has criticized, and finally it is a fact that enemy sailors who were captured were sent to a prisoner-of-war camp of the Navy where they were treated in an exemplary way up to the last day of the war.

Whoever, in his own sphere, behaved as Admiral Dönitz did with regard to the prisoners of war of the Navy, cannot reasonably be charged with having thrown overboard all standards of law and ethics applying to prisoners of war. A British commander has certified that when the prisoner-of-war camp of the Navy was taken over by British troops, all prisoners without exception said that they had been treated with fairness and consideration. The Tribunal will, no doubt, appreciate such unanimous expression of views, especially after what has come to light elsewhere in these proceedings with regard to the breakdown not only by Germans in the proper treatment of prisoners of war.

I shall now deal with the conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity, and I should like first of all to point out that Admiral Dönitz is not accused, under Count Four of the Indictment, of direct commission of Crimes against Humanity. Not even participation in the conspiracy to commit Crimes Against Humanity was contended in the detailed charges. That, I would say, is an admission that there was in fact no relation, between his activity and the Crimes against Humanity of which the Prosecution has brought evidence. Nevertheless the Prosecution presented some documents which are apparently meant to prove his participation in the responsibility for certain Crimes against Humanity.

In judging these documents the most important question always is: What did Admiral Dönitz know of those alleged crimes? On this subject I should like to make one point clear. During the entire war he resided and lived at his staff headquarters, first on the North Sea coast, after 1940 in France, in 1943 for a short time in Berlin, and then in the Camp Koralle near Berlin. When he was at the Führer’s headquarters, he stayed with the naval staff there. Even outside his duty, his time was thus spent almost exclusively with naval officers. This may have been a weakness, but it is a fact which gives an additional explanation of his lack of knowledge of many events.

The fact that the defendant forwarded a proposal by the Ministry for Armaments to employ 12,000 men from concentration camps as workers in the shipyards proves, according to the Prosecution, that Admiral Dönitz knew and approved of the arrest of countless innocent people and their ill-treatment and extermination in concentration camps.

He actually knew, of course, that concentration camps existed and he also knew that, apart from the professional criminals, people arrested for political reasons were kept there. As has already been explained here, the protective custody of political adversaries for reasons of safety is a measure adopted by all states, at any rate in an emergency, and knowledge of such a measure can therefore incriminate no one. However, an unusually high number of political prisoners—out of proportion to the number of the population—may stamp a regime as a regime of terror, but taking into account a population of 80 million in the fifth year of a grim war, even twice or three times the number of 12,000 men, which is the number mentioned by Admiral Dönitz, would not indicate a regime of terror, and the Prosecution will hardly claim that.

Admiral Dönitz stated here that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as his collaborators and the overwhelming part of the German people, did not know of the abuses and killings that occurred in the concentration camps. All that the Prosecution has put forward against this are assumptions, but no proofs.

On this point, therefore, I will only refer to the statement of the then Minister for Armaments, Speer, according to which the inmates of concentration camps were much better off in industrial work than in camp, and that they tried with all means to obtain employment in such work. The proposal forwarded therefore did not imply anything inhuman, but rather the opposite.

The same request also contains a suggestion to take energetic measures against sabotage in Norwegian and Danish shipyards, where seven out of eight vessels under construction had been destroyed. If need be, the personnel should be entirely or in part employed as “KZ workers” because, so it says, sabotage of such dimensions can only occur if all the workers silently condone it. This therefore amounts to a proposition for security measures to consist in keeping the workers who actively or passively participated in sabotage in a camp close to the shipyard, so that their connections with sabotage agents would be cut off. I do not believe that juridical objections can be raised against such measures of security. According to the practice of all occupation troops even measures of collective punishment would be justified in such cases.[^[37]]

Actually the measures proposed were never carried out and the Prosecution presumably presents them only to accuse Admiral Dönitz quite generally of a brutal attitude toward the inhabitants of occupied territories. For this same purpose it even refers to a statement of the Führer at a conference on the military situation in the summer of 1944, according to which terror in Denmark must be fought with counterterror. Admiral Dönitz’s only connection with this statement was that he heard it and that his companion, Admiral Wagner, wrote it down. The Navy had no part in this statement, nor did it take any measures as a result of it.

In contrast to this line of evidence of the Prosecution, I should like to emphasize the attitude which Admiral Dönitz actually showed toward the population of the occupied territories. There is before the Tribunal a survey of the administration of justice by the naval courts in protecting the inhabitants of the occupied territories against excesses by members of the Navy. The survey is based on an examination of about 2,000 files on delicts and some of the judgments given are quoted with the facts and the reasons of the verdicts. Judging from that survey, one can fairly say that the naval courts protected the inhabitants in the West and in the East with justice and severity, including their lives as well as their property and the honor of their women. This administration of justice was constantly supervised by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy as the Chief Court Administrator. Under terms of legal procedure it was his duty to confirm death penalties imposed on German soldiers.

The time at my disposal does not permit a more detailed discussion of some of these judgments. A phrase expressed in one of them may be taken to apply to all: All soldiers must know that in occupied territory as well the life and property of others will be fully safeguarded. This was the general attitude in the Navy, and the severity of the penalties inflicted proves how seriously it was taken.

I need only say a few words about the order issued in the spring of 1945, in which a German prisoner of war, a noncommissioned officer, was cited as an example, because he had unobtrusively and systematically done away with some Communists who were attracting attention to themselves in their prison camp. As Admiral Wagner recalled, it was actually an informer who was liquidated. But the facts were camouflaged as described in order to avoid giving enemy intelligence a clue to the camp and the person of the noncommissioned officer. There cannot be any doubt that this order in its true background could be justified in view of the enormous number of political murders which have been committed with the connivance or assistance of governments engaged in the war, the perpetrators being today extolled as heroes. I cannot, however, consider as serious the argument that the unfortunately camouflaged wording could be proof of a general plan to liquidate Communists. A court judgment for the protection of Communists will reveal the true circumstances. A sergeant had stolen hospital blankets which were intended for Soviet prisoners of war and had extracted a dead prisoner’s gold teeth. This sergeant was sentenced to death by a naval court and executed after the sentence had been confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief.

Finally, the Prosecution also established a connection with the Jewish question through a remark in which Grossadmiral Dönitz speaks of the “creeping poison of Jewry.” On this point I should like to add some comments. Dönitz knew as little of the plan for the destruction of the Jews as he did of its execution. He did know of the resettlement in the Government General of Jews living in Germany. I do not think that a resettlement of this sort can be condemned at a time when expulsions of Germans on a much larger scale are taking place before the eyes of a silent world. Here, too, I refer to a sentence of long penitentiary terms against two German sailors who, together with some Frenchmen, had robbed French Jews. From the findings of the court I again quote a sentence which characterizes the general attitude: “That the crimes were committed against Jews does not excuse the defendants in any way.”

Similarly, it seems to me that the efforts of the Prosecution to include Admiral Dönitz in its construction of the conspiracy by terming him a fanatical Nazi have failed. He was neither a member of the Party nor was he ever politically prominent before his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The assertion of the Prosecution that he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy because of his political attitude lacks all foundation. As a professional officer, to whom every political activity was forbidden by the Reich Defense Law, he had no reason for dealing with National Socialism in any way. However, he, too, like millions of other Germans, recognized the unique success of Hitler’s leadership in social and economic fields and, of course, also the liberation from the obligations of Versailles which Hitler had brought about and which particularly concerned Admiral Dönitz as a soldier. Therefore, at the time of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, he was politically in no way active, although loyal to the National Socialist State.

This appointment introduced two new elements into his relations with National Socialism. There was first of all his personal contact with Adolf Hitler. Like almost everyone else who had personal dealings with this man, he too was most deeply impressed by him. The respect for the head of the State and loyalty to the Supreme Commander inherent in the professional officer were complemented by admiration for the statesman and strategist. It is difficult fully to appreciate such an attitude in view of the information which has come to light in the course of this Trial. I feel neither called upon nor able to judge a personality like Adolf Hitler. But one thing seems to me certain, namely, that with a consummate art of camouflage he skillfully concealed the repulsive traits of his character from those of his collaborators to whom he did not dare reveal this part of his nature. The Hitler with whom the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy became acquainted at that time, and whom he admired, was therefore an entirely different man from the one which the world—rightly or wrongly—pictures today.

The second new element in the relations between Grossadmiral Dönitz and National Socialism was that in the performance of his military duties he necessarily came into contact with the political authorities of the Reich. Whether he needed more men, more ships, or more arms, in the end he always had to discuss these matters with the political authorities, and in order to be successful in his demands, he had to make sure that any political mistrust was eliminated from the very start. This he deliberately did, and he demanded the same of his subordinates. To him the Party was not an ideological factor, but rather the actual exponent of political power. He was linked with it in the common aim to win the war, and for the achievement of this aim he considered it his ally. But to obtain the advantages which one expects of an ally, one must be willing to make certain sacrifices, especially sacrifices in overlooking faults and in ignoring conflicting issues.

However, his connection with the Führer and his contact with the Party, which were concomitants of his position and of his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, never led him to participate in anything for which he could not assume responsibility before his conscience. Some points of the Prosecution even go to prove this. The Führer demanded action against shipwrecked crews; Admiral Dönitz rejected it. The Führer asked for withdrawal from the Geneva Convention; Admiral Dönitz rejected it. He stubbornly and successfully resisted the Party’s influence upon the Armed Forces. Thanks to his resistance the National Socialist Führungsoffiziere did not become political commissars, but were, as genuine officers, merely advisers to their commander, who retained the sole responsibility for the leadership of his unit. The transfer of proceedings against soldiers on political grounds from the military courts to the People’s Courts, which had been advocated by the Party, was prevented by Grossadmiral Dönitz until the winter of 1944-45, and a Führer order to this effect issued at that time was never carried out in the Navy. Thus he never identified himself with the Party and can therefore surely not be held responsible for its ideological endeavors or its excesses, just as in foreign politics a government would not be ready to assume responsibility for such things if they had been done by an ally.

I do not by any means want to give the impression that Admiral Dönitz was not a National Socialist. On the contrary, I just want to use him as an example to disprove the theory that every National Socialist as such must be a criminal. This Tribunal is the sole instance in which authoritative personalities of the great Allied Powers are dealing directly and in detail with the last 12 years of the German past. It is, therefore, the only hope of very many Germans for the removal of a fatal error which is causing the weaker elements of our nation to become hypocrites and is thus proving a decisive obstacle on the road to political recovery.

And now I should like to deal with the charge that in February 1945 Admiral Dönitz protracted the inevitable surrender out of political fanaticism, and I wish to do so for a particular reason. This charge, which seems hardly to have anything to do with the Indictment before an International Tribunal, weighs particularly heavily in the eyes of the German people, for this nation truly knows what destruction and losses it endured in those last months from February until May 1945. I have submitted declarations of Darlan, Chamberlain, and Churchill from the year 1940 in which those statesmen, in a critical hour for their countries, called for desperate resistance, for the defense of every village and of every house. Nobody will conclude from this that these men were fanatical National Socialists. The question of unconditional surrender is indeed of such colossal import to a nation, that in fact it is not possible until after the event to judge whether a statesman who had to face this question did or did not do the right thing. Admiral Dönitz, however, was not a statesman in February 1945, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Should he have asked his subordinates to lay down their arms at a time when the political authority of the State still considered military resistance as opportune and necessary? Nobody will seriously demand that.

Much more difficult seems to me the question of whether, in view of the high esteem Hitler had for him, he should not have considered it his duty to point out clearly to Hitler the hopelessness of prolonged resistance.

Personally, I would have affirmed this to be his duty toward his nation, if Admiral Dönitz himself at that time had considered that surrender was justified. He did not consider it justified, and he gave his reasons: Surrender implied a halt of the armies and of the population; the German Army on the Eastern Front—still numbering more than 2 million men in February 1945—and the entire civilian population of the German eastern provinces would thereby have fallen into the hands of the Soviet armies, and in a bitterly cold winter month, too. Admiral Dönitz, therefore, was of the opinion, shared by Generaloberst Jodl, that the losses in men suffered in that way would be far greater than the losses which would necessarily be caused if the capitulation were postponed until the warmer season. Only in future years, when more exact data regarding casualties of the Army and of the civilian population both before and after the surrender in the East and in the West are available, will it be possible to view this opinion objectively. But it may already be said today that such considerations arose entirely from a full sense of responsibility for the life of German men and women.

The same sense of responsibility caused him, when he became head of the State on 1 May 1945, to cease hostilities against the West, but to protract the surrender in the East for a few days, days in which hundreds of thousands were able to escape to the West. From the moment when—to his own complete surprise—he was given a political task, he calmly and intelligently averted a threatening chaos, prevented desperate mass action without a leader, and assumed responsibility before the German people for the gravest action which any statesman can take at all.

Thus, to revert to the beginning of the Indictment, he did nothing to start this war, but he took the decisive steps to end it.

Since that moment the German nation has learned of many things which it did not expect, and more than once it has been referred to the unconditional surrender which the last head of the State carried through. It is for this Tribunal to decide whether in the future this nation will be reminded of the binding value of the signature of a man who is being outlawed as a criminal before the whole world by his partners in the agreement.

At the beginning of my speech I mentioned the doubts which any trial of war criminals is bound to call forth in the mind and heart of any lawyer. They must weigh upon all who bear any responsibility in such a trial. I could not more fittingly describe the task of all the responsible persons than in the words of a British attorney speaking of the trials before the German Supreme Court in the year 1921. I quote:

“The war criminals’ trials were demanded by an angry public rather than by statesmen or the fighting services. Had public opinion in 1919 had its way, the trials might have presented a grim spectacle, of which future generations would have been ashamed. But thanks to the statesmen and the lawyers, a public yearning for revenge was converted into a real demonstration of the majesty of right and the power of law.”[^[38]]

May the verdict of this Tribunal stand in a similar way before the judgment of history.

THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Siemers for the Defendant Raeder.

DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in my final speech for the Defendant Grossadmiral Dr. Raeder, I should like to keep to the order I chose for my document books and for the whole presentation of my evidence. I think a survey of the whole case will thus be made easier.

Raeder, who has just turned 70 years of age, has been exclusively a soldier, body and soul, ever since the age of 18, that is to say, for nigh on half a century covering an eventful period. Although he was never concerned with anything but his duties as a soldier, the Prosecution has accused him, in this great Trial against National Socialism, not only as a soldier, namely, as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, but, a singular and decisive point, as a politician, as a political conspirator, and as a member of the Government, three things which in truth he never was.

I am, therefore, faced with the singular task of defending Raeder as a politician, although it was precisely, as I shall demonstrate, his life principle as an officer to keep aloof from politics, and to command an officers’ corps and a Navy likewise committed to remain entirely free from politics.

If the Prosecution levels such manifold and grave accusations against Raeder, this is primarily because it has conceived a notion entirely foreign to the German Armed Forces, namely the notion of an admiral being responsible for foreign policy and for the outbreak of a war.

I shall disprove this conception and show that it was unjustified and unfounded even in Hitler’s National Socialist State. True, Hitler again and again placed politics in the forefront of the nation and endeavored to give the nation a one-track political education. Foreign countries knew this, and they may well therefore be all the more surprised by the fact that Hitler refrained from such political shaping in one single instance. Every administration, every organization, and every police institution was directed by Hitler on political principles, with the single exception of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces, and the Navy in particular, remained for a long time and far into the war absolutely unpolitical. And not only did Hitler give Raeder an assurance to this effect, but he had also given the same assurance to Hindenburg as Reich President. This explains the fact, which has also been made clear in this Trial, that up to 1944 no officer could be a member of the Party, and if he was, then his membership was suspended.

After these preliminary reflections it will be understood why Raeder, as his interrogation showed, was disconcerted and amazed at these accusations which amount to a political charge. A man who is nothing but a soldier cannot understand why he should suddenly and without any relation to his military duties be made responsible for things which at no time came within the compass of his activity.

I shall naturally also discuss the military accusations, with the exception of submarine warfare, which, for the sake of uniformity, has already been dealt with by Dr. Kranzbühler on behalf of Raeder, too.

It will be seen from other military accusations, as for instance in the cases of Norway and Greece, that again and again there arises this discrepancy between the political and the military aspects: Raeder acted as Commander-in-Chief on the basis of military considerations, whereas the Prosecution now calls him to account on the basis of political considerations, by evaluating the military actions as political ones.

The first instance of this discrepancy already lies in the accusations raised against Raeder with regard to the period before 1933, that is, before National Socialism. In connection with these accusations it must not be overlooked that Hitler, the head of the alleged conspiracy for the waging of wars of aggression, did not rule Germany at that time, and yet already at that time there is supposed to have existed a common conspiracy between Hitler and a part of the defendants.

This is all the more surprising because Raeder, as a naval officer and after 1928 as Chief of the Naval High Command, at that time had nothing, absolutely nothing at all, to do with National Socialism, and did not even know Hitler and his co-workers in the Party. The accusations concerning the violations of the Versailles Treaty are included by the Prosecution in the conspiracy, although the violations did not take place under Hitler’s leadership, but under the leadership or with the approval of the democratic governments in Germany at the time. This shows that the Prosecution does not only want to attack National Socialism through this Trial, as has been emphasized again and again during the war and after the collapse, but that the Indictment extends its scope to large circles in Germany which had nothing to do with National Socialism, some of whom were even direct enemies of National Socialism.

(1) For this very reason it seemed to me extremely important to clear up the question of the violation of the Treaty of Versailles in the course of the presentation of evidence in the Raeder case. I have endeavored to do so with the approval of the Tribunal, and I am firmly convinced that I have succeeded. I need not discuss each of the violations, which have been treated in detail and which the Prosecution has produced in Document C-32. It should be sufficient if I refer to the extensive evidence as well as to the following facts:

Every single point was either a mere trifle or else a military measure—such as for example the antiaircraft batteries—based exclusively on the notion of defense. Raeder has plainly admitted that treaty infractions did occur, but the trivial nature of the infractions showed that these measures could not possibly have been connected with an intention to wage wars of aggression.

Moreover, I need only point out that from the legal point of view a treaty violation cannot ipso jure be a crime. Certainly the violation of a treaty between nations is no more permissible than the violation of a contract between private firms in commercial law. Such a violation is, however, not a punishable action, much less a crime. Even on the basis of the argument of the Prosecution, such action would be punishable only if the violation had been undertaken with criminal intent, that is, if it had been aimed at a war of aggression in contradiction to the Kellogg Pact. However, not even the Prosecution will be able to maintain this, and it has already indirectly intimated as much by refraining from taking up these points during the cross-examination of witnesses.

(2) The position is somewhat different with regard to a charge which the Prosecution discussed in detail only during cross-examination, namely, the charge concerning the participation of the German Navy in U-boat constructions in Holland; in this connection the Prosecution has relied upon Document C-156, the book by Kapitän zur See Schüssler entitled, Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles, as well as on statements contained in the notes of the naval historian, Admiral Assmann, found in Document D-854.

These documents prove that the German Navy had a share in a U-boat designing office in Holland, the firm N. V. Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw. This participation occurred during the period before the Navy was under Raeder’s command. The Tribunal will recall that Raeder did not become Chief of the Naval Command until 1 October 1928, whereas participation in the designing office in Holland dates back to 1923 and the following years.

May I emphasize, however, that in not a single instance was a U-boat built for the German Navy, and that consequently no U-boats were obtained or put into commission by the German Navy. In this connection I refer to the Versailles Treaty, Exhibit Number Raeder-1; Article 188 et sequentes of the Treaty of Versailles contain the terms with regard to the Navy. According to Article 188, Germany was bound to deliver her U-boats to the Allied nations or to dismantle them. This obligation Germany fulfilled completely. Moreover, Article 191 stipulates the following; I quote: “The construction and purchase of all submarine vessels, even for commercial purposes, is forbidden in Germany.”

It appears from this clear treaty clause that participation in the Dutch firm was not a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. According to Article 191, Germany was only forbidden to construct or purchase U-boats, moreover, strictly speaking, only in Germany.

As a matter of fact, no U-boat was built in Germany in violation of the Treaty, and no U-boat was built for Germany abroad either. Participation in a foreign designing office was not forbidden, nor was this the purpose of the Treaty of Versailles. The point was merely that Germany should not create a U-boat force for herself. The Navy, however, was permitted to participate in a designing office so as to keep abreast of modern submarine construction, to gather information for the future, and to lay the foundation for an eventual construction of submarines, when permitted, by training technical experts (See Exhibit Number Raeder-2, Lohmann Affidavit). The afore-mentioned documents, submitted by the Prosecution, prove that the submarines designed by the Dutch firm and built abroad were put into service abroad, namely by Turkey and Finland.

Even if one were to take the view that designing work also was prohibited, then what was said under Figure (1) also applies. The designing was limited to only a few submarines, so that this small number in itself proves that there cannot have been any intention of waging wars of aggression.

(3) In case the High Tribunal should be unable to follow this train of thought as a sole argument, I may point out in addition that the lack of an aggressive intention is also evident from the fact that the trivial violations of the treaty were in a certain way compensated. I refer to the second affidavit of Admiral Lohmann, Exhibit Number Raeder-8, which shows that according to the Treaty of Versailles Germany was allowed to build 8 armored ships, whereas in fact she only built 3; it shows also that instead of 8 cruisers only 6 were built up to 1935, and that instead of 32 destroyers or torpedo boats, only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats were built. In fact, with regard to the really important weapons, and especially those which may be considered as offensive weapons, the Navy kept far below the maximum permitted by the Treaty of Versailles, and this indeed to such an extent that by comparison the trivial violations in naval matters hardly count.

(4) According to the Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919, Articles 47 and 50 (Exhibit Number Raeder-3), the President of the Reich had supreme command of all the Armed Forces. In order to be valid, the decrees of the Reich President required the countersignature of the Reich Chancellor or the Reich ministers concerned, in this case, the Minister of Defense. I quote: “Responsibility is assumed through the countersignature.” Thus, from the point of view of constitutional law it is absolutely clear that the responsibility rests with the Minister of Defense or the Reich Government and the President of the Reich. It is, of course, true that before 1928, that is, before Raeder became the responsible Chief of the Naval Command, the Navy took a number of measures without the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. But the evidence which I presented, especially the statement of the former Reich Minister Severing, shows that, contrary to the statements of the Prosecution, no secret measures were taken after Raeder became Chief of the Naval High Command. Severing has confirmed that the Müller-Stresemann-Severing Cabinet, in a Cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928, obtained a clear picture of the secret measures of the Armed Forces by interrogating Raeder as Chief of the Naval High Command and Heye as Chief of the Army Command.

Both Raeder and Heye, after they had given an explanation, were obliged and directed by the Cabinet, in conformity with the afore-mentioned paragraphs of the Reich Constitution, to take no future measures without the knowledge of the Minister of Defense or the Cabinet. At the same time the Cabinet established that the secret measures taken before Raeder’s time were only trifling matters, and expressly assumed responsibility for them. If the Cabinet, in conformity with the Constitution, assumed the responsibility, this amounted to a legally and constitutionally effective procedure which exonerated Raeder as Chief of the Naval High Command and relieved him of responsibility. It appears, therefore, to be inadmissible that the defendant, who no longer bears the responsibility, should be made responsible for actions for which the Cabinet assumed responsibility.

The attitude of the Cabinet in the Cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928 further shows that none of these actions can have had as their basis any criminal intent to wage a war of aggression, for even the Prosecution will not desire to assert that men like Stresemann, Müller, and Severing intended to wage wars of aggression, but instead will have to believe Severing when he says that Stresemann, Müller, and he himself assumed responsibility for these violations only because they were based purely on conceptions of defense. One will also have to believe Severing’s words that such conceptions of defense were justified, since in the twenties the danger that Germany might be attacked, for instance by Poland, was quite real, and she would then not have been in a position to defend herself with the small Armed Forces allowed her by the Versailles Treaty. This danger was particularly evident in connection with Polish border incidents in East Prussia and Silesia and during the occupation of Vilna, and it even increased when all attempts of Stresemann and Müller failed to achieve adherence to the promise to disarm which the other powers had given in the Versailles Treaty.

How difficult Germany’s position was and how justified measures of defense were, Justice Jackson himself admitted in his opening speech, when he said, I quote:

“It is quite possible that Germany in the twenties and thirties was confronted with desperately difficult tasks, tasks which would have justified the boldest measures, but not war.”

I shall not even go as far as Mr. Justice Jackson, but I believe that these measures taken by the Navy are certainly covered by his own concept of “boldest measures.”

The British prosecutor, Mr. Elwyn Jones, attempted during the cross-examination of Severing to prove that Raeder did not observe the obligations imposed on him in the Cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928, because Severing, according to his testimony, was not informed of the construction abroad of the small submarines for Turkey and Finland. In this connection, two things must be considered:

a. During his testimony Severing did not remember the details, but only the fundamental and decisive questions; with regard to the details, he naturally relied on the competent minister, in this case, the Reich Defense Minister.

b. According to Severing’s testimony it was an exception that the Chief of the Naval High Command appeared before the entire Cabinet on 18 October 1928. Raeder as Chief of the Naval High Command was not obliged to inform all the members of the Cabinet, but was, in accordance with the Constitution, merely obliged to inform the Reich Defense Minister, and that Raeder did. What the Reich Defense Minister then for his part submitted to the other members of the Cabinet and to the Reichstag was not only beyond Raeder’s knowledge, it was also outside Raeder’s responsibility, and solely within that of the Reich Defense Minister and the Cabinet.

In conclusion may I point out the following: If, despite all this, the Prosecution wishes to look upon these violations of the Treaty of Versailles on the part of the Navy as evidence of an intention to wage a war of aggression, then the Social Democrat or Democrat governments of that time bear the responsibility. Thereby the Indictment on this point collapses, for to take the governments of that time to task for the intention of waging wars of aggression would lead the Prosecution on this point to an ad absurdum.

(5) The treaty violations during the period from 1933 until the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 show the same factual and juridical picture. During these 2 years no important expansion of naval armament took place either. The only disputable accusation made by the Prosecution in this respect is contained in Document D-855, which was submitted during cross-examination. This is the report of Flottenintendant Thiele. According to this it was decided in March 1935, that is, a few months before the naval agreement, to prepare plans for the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau with a displacement of 27,000 tons, although the maximum of 10,000 tons fixed by the Treaty of Versailles was still formally in force at that time for another 3 months, in contrast to a maximum displacement of 35,000 tons provided for in the Naval Agreement of 1935.

Here it should be taken into consideration that in March 1935 Germany could already count on the speedy conclusion of an Anglo-German agreement, whereas the period between the planning and the completion of a battleship is a much longer one, which cannot be counted in months, but only in years. As a matter of fact, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were only commissioned in 1938 and 1939, 3 and 4 years respectively after the naval pact (see Exhibit Number Raeder-2, Lohmann Affidavit).

The other matters submitted by the Prosecution are again trifles; for instance, the selection (not the construction, as the Prosecution says) of four or five merchantmen (see C-166), or the construction of 5 E-boats of 40 tons each (see C-151), which for technical reasons were built in place of 12 torpedo boats of 200 tons each. The Prosecution cannot in all seriousness turn these facts into grave accusations, especially as the afore-mentioned deviations from the Versailles Treaty were known to foreign technical specialists or—as the witness Schulte-Mönting correctly put it—were an “open secret.”

(6) And now I come to the decisive juridical aspect of all developments up to the summer of 1935. In the field of international law the same principle applies as in the field of internal commercial law: Breaches of agreement are considered adjusted and settled with the signing of a new agreement. In the present case the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 18 June 1935—Exhibit Number Raeder-11—represents the new agreement. This naval agreement deviates completely from the Versailles Treaty both with regard to high-tonnage vessels and with regard to U-boats. It is only on the basis of what is permitted Germany by this new agreement that the insignificance of earlier violations of the Versailles Treaty, not at the time covered by existing agreements, becomes apparent.

10,000-ton cruisers were replaced by 35,000-ton battleships, and the ban on the construction of U-boats was replaced by the acknowledgement of equal rights with regard to U-boat tonnage. Germany’s demands were not unreasonable; on the contrary, in the document mentioned, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom explicitly confirmed the German proposal to be “... an exceedingly important contribution to future limitation of naval armaments.”

This agreement between Britain and Germany concluded the debate on the Versailles Treaty both factually and juridically, as far as the Navy is concerned. This naval agreement was generally welcomed in Britain and Germany at that time, and it was supplemented by a new agreement on 17 June 1937 (see Exhibit Number Raeder-14). As proof of the fact that the Navy violated the naval agreement, too, with aggressive intentions, the Prosecution has raised two charges:

(1) In the Agreement of 1937 both contracting governments were bound to a mutual exchange of information, which was to take place annually, within the first 4 months of every calendar year, and was to contain details of the building program. According to Document C-23, the Navy violated this obligation insofar as it gave lower figures for the displacement and the draught of the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz which were being built at the beginning of 1938, namely, as 35,000 tons instead of 41,700 tons. That this violation of the treaty did occur is openly admitted by Raeder, but again it is not such a serious violation as the Prosecution contends, that is, it is not a violation which shows proof of criminal intent. That is clear from the detailed evidence I have presented and from the testimonies of witnesses which I need not repeat here; it will be sufficient if I refer to the absolutely convincing expert testimony of the ship-building director, Dr. Süchting, which I have submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-15. According to this, the increase in tonnage demanded by the Navy during the construction served a purely defensive idea, namely, that of increasing the armor plating of the battleships and of arranging the bulkheads in such a way that the battleships would be virtually unsinkable. This defensive idea, Dr. Süchting emphasizes, actually proved to be correct during the attack on and sinking of the battleship Bismarck. If it was only a question of a defensive idea, no aggressive intentions can be construed from this treaty violation.

With regard to the juridical aspect, it must be added that in the Naval Agreement of 1937, Articles 24, 25, and 26 conceded to the contracting governments the right to deviate, under certain circumstances, from the contracted agreements and especially from the tonnage limitation of battleships, if any other sea powers should build or acquire larger battleships. This case, stated in Article 25, had actually arisen, and so the violation of the agreement consisted in the fact that the Navy, although now entitled to build larger battleships, neglected to inform Britain of her desire to make use of that right. It was, therefore, only a violation of the obligation to exchange information. How meaningless this measure was is proved by the alteration of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement by virtue of the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, which I have submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-16.

Already on 31 March 1938, that is, only 6 weeks after the date of Document C-23, Britain on her part had stated, according to the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, that she must make use of the afore-mentioned right granted by Article 25, and therefore proposed that the battleship tonnage be increased from 35,000 to 45,000. This agreement was then signed by both countries on 30 June 1938, and thus the violation of the treaty evident from Document C-23, became illusory.

(2) The British prosecutor raised a second charge by submitting Document D-854 during cross-examination. It consists of notes made by Admiral Assmann for his historical writings; on Sheet 15 of these notes he writes that Germany abided by the terms of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement least of all in the sphere of U-boat building and that 55 U-boats were allowed by the treaty up to 1938, but 118 were actually completed or begun. These statements by Assmann are actually incorrect, and in reality Germany strictly followed all the stipulations of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with regard to U-boat building. Despite the assurance of equality of rights Germany by the Naval Agreement of 1935 voluntarily limited herself to 45 percent; but the right to increase this percentage at any time by friendly agreement with Britain was reserved for her. The presentation of evidence has shown (see the testimony of Raeder and Schulte-Mönting) that in December 1938 corresponding negotiations took place between the British Admiral Lord Cunningham and Grossadmiral Raeder, during which His Majesty’s Government approved the increase to 100 percent. It was not clear at the time when this evidence was presented, whether this approval had also been given in writing, as was to be assumed. Meanwhile I have been able to establish that such a document must have existed; I was able to gather this from the afore-mentioned Assmann Document D-854 in which on Page 169, in connection with Page 161, the letter in question dated 18 January 1939 is mentioned. In conclusion it remains to be said that the figure of 55 U-boats mentioned by Assmann corresponds to 45 percent, whereas the figure of 118 U-boats corresponds to 100 percent; accordingly Assmann, and therefore the Prosecution as well, are wrong. Actually there was no violation at all of the naval agreement with regard to U-boats.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to the allegation of the Prosecution that Grossadmiral Raeder took part in a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, and in particular supported Hitler and National Socialism despite his alleged knowledge that Hitler from the beginning had the intention of waging wars of aggression.

(1) How did Raeder establish contact with Hitler, and was he able, or even bound, at that time to realize an intention on the part of Hitler to wage wars of aggression?

As I have said, it is a fact that Raeder before 1933 had nothing to do with National Socialism and knew neither Hitler nor his Party collaborators; he met Hitler on 2 February 1933, when he and the other commanders were introduced to Hitler by Baron von Hammerstein. As Chief of the Naval High Command Raeder had only one superior, Reich President Von Hindenburg, who, according to the Constitution and the Defense Law,[^[39]] was the Supreme Commander of the whole Armed Forces. Hindenburg, as Reich President, had appointed Hitler Reich Chancellor, and thus a connection was of necessity created between Hitler and the Armed Forces. There was thus no question of any decision on the part of Raeder. As Hindenburg’s subordinate, he had as a soldier to submit to the political decision which Hindenburg had taken as President of the Reich. The constitutional basis with regard to the Armed Forces was in no way altered by the fact that Hitler came to power. As Chief of the Naval High Command Raeder took as little part in this political decision as he had done on previous occasions when Müller, who was a Social Democrat, or Brüning, who belonged to the Center Party, became Reich Chancellors.

Nor was there any cause for Raeder to resign his post on account of this internal political decision, for Hitler had explained to him and the other high officers at the first conference on 2 February 1933, and particularly also on the occasion of the first naval report in the same month, that nothing in the Armed Forces would be changed and that the Armed Forces must remain aloof from politics, as laid down in the Constitution and the Defense Law.

The testimony of Raeder and Schulte-Mönting proves that during the naval report Hitler explained his fundamental ideas in regard to a peaceful policy, in which connection, in spite of the amicable revision of the Versailles Treaty to which he aspired, it was essential to come to an understanding with England by means of a treaty providing for the development of the Navy within the general limitations of naval armament. During this conversation Hitler clearly indicated that he did not want a naval armament race and that the development of the Navy should take place only in friendly agreement with England. This principle was absolutely in line with the viewpoint of Raeder and the Navy, and it was therefore quite out of the question for Raeder to tell his superior, Hindenburg, that on account of Hitler he could no longer head the Navy.

Now the Prosecution maintains that the leading personalities in Germany at that time already knew Hitler’s true intentions from his book Mein Kampf, and has cited as proof several quotations, partly torn from their context, from Hitler’s propaganda book of 1924. This argument of the Prosecution does not seem to hold good, because Hitler wrote this book as a private individual belonging to an opposition party. In this Trial it has several times been pointed out that the statements of foreign private individuals are irrelevant even when these foreigners are well known, and subsequently—as in Hitler’s case—received a position in the government. Raeder could assume, as could anyone else, that as Reich Chancellor Hitler would not uphold all the Party doctrines which years before he had defended as a member of the opposition, particularly since the statements of Hitler on military matters contradicted these former Party ideas. Moreover, the Navy relations with England were always of foremost importance and in this connection Hitler himself had said in his book Mein Kampf, Page 154: “But for such a policy there was only one possible partner in Europe: England.” (Document Book 2, Document Number Raeder-20, Page 119.)

In rebuttal of the quotations submitted by the Prosecution it must also be said that they are all taken from the 1933 edition and that, in spite of great pains, the General Secretary’s office has been unable to procure an earlier edition, particularly the first edition of 1925 and 1927. It is a known fact that in later years Hitler himself made changes on many points in numerous places in his book, consequently the quotations from the 1933 edition cannot be taken as a basis on their face value.

Ought Raeder in the following years to have realized that Hitler desired to abandon the fundamental idea of an understanding with England, and is it possible to agree with the argument of the Prosecution that Raeder should have refused further collaboration at some time before 1939? I believe that this question must be answered in the negative for reasons which appear quite naturally from various facts which the Prosecution or the Defense submitted in evidence:

Hindenburg died on 2 August 1934, and the Prosecution reproaches Raeder because he thereupon took an oath in which he named the Führer in the place of the fatherland. (Record of 15 January 1946, Volume V, Page 262.) This point was sufficiently clarified in the presentation of evidence. Therefore I need only refer to the error which the Prosecution made in its assertion; the Prosecution itself produced Document D-481 which shows the oath of allegiance taken by the soldiers of the Armed Forces on Hitler’s orders. The document is a law signed by Hitler, Frick, and Blomberg and it shows that it was not Raeder who replaced the word “Vaterland” by “Hitler,” but that Hitler himself demanded that all soldiers should take the oath to him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Before Hitler demanded this oath, which he had cleverly devised and which proved so fateful in the future, Raeder had neither been informed nor had his advice been asked on the wording. He was simply summoned to the Reich Chancellery without knowing the reason. The question as to what kind of oath is to be taken by a soldier is again a political one, a question of legislation, upon which Raeder as a soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had no influence.

The Prosecution charges Raeder with having been informed of many political decisions and with having, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, made strategic plans and preparations on the occasions of such political measures. The Prosecution referred to the withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October 1933, the occupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, the incorporation of the Sudetenland in the autumn of 1938, and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939.[^[40]]

The documents in question are in the main those marked in the footnote, and I can refer to them jointly in this connection. There is one fact common to all of these decisions, namely, that Raeder did not politically take part in any of them. Raeder was never consulted beforehand and as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he had no authority to participate in such decisions. Raeder did nothing more than take note of these documents and reports, and then issue the orders necessary for precautionary military measures in case the country became involved in war. It seems quite incomprehensible that the commander-in-chief of a branch of the Armed Forces should be reproached for having made strategic preparations in the event of political complications. I imagine that it is customary all over the world that an admiral never takes part in political decisions, while at the same time he is obliged to make certain precautionary preparations depending upon such political decisions of the government. This is another example of the discrepancy I have already mentioned affecting the position of a military commander, which, although the Prosecution considers it to be a political one, is in reality purely military. There is hardly any doubt that the military commands of foreign countries involved in these political decisions or interested in them were also at the same time taking precautionary military measures.

A military commander could not judge whether these political decisions of Hitler were crimes or even violations of international law, all the less since he was never summoned to the consultations. Neither the withdrawal from the League of Nations, as a result of the failure of all endeavors to induce the other countries to disarm in the spirit of the Versailles Treaty, nor the occupation of the Sudetenland or the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, can be regarded as criminal activities, in the sense of the Indictment, of a disinterested commander-in-chief. They were certainly deviations from the Versailles Treaty, but even the British Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, declared on 4 December 1945 in this courtroom that “many objections against Versailles were possibly justified.”[^[41]] And even Justice Jackson, as quoted above, said that the boldest measures would have been justified for the purpose of revising this treaty, but not a war.

All these measures taken by Germany were in fact carried out without a war, and therefore come under the heading of measures which Justice Jackson considers justified, all the more so since they were all silently condoned by foreign countries, or even agreed upon by treaty, as for instance in the case of the incorporation of the Sudetenland by the Munich Agreement of September 1938, or, as in the case of Austria, by agreement with that country.

In the cases of Austria and of the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the Prosecution quite justifiably, looking at these cases objectively and retrospectively, points out that Hitler employed extremely dubious and possibly criminal means to achieve his aims; however, this can have no significance as far as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is concerned, since it has been firmly established that he was not informed of these activities, much less of the means employed therein. It has been established in particular that Raeder was neither informed of the details of the Austrian Anschluss nor of the kind of conference which ultimately led to an agreement with President Hacha. He was not told of the discussions with Hacha, nor of the threat of a bombardment of Prague, which was made in the course of these discussions; I refer in this connection to the testimony of the witnesses Raeder and Schulte-Mönting. In the eyes of Raeder, therefore, these constituted measures permissible under international law, or else agreements which gave him no cause to interfere or to question Hitler, quite apart from the fact that as a military commander he had no right whatsoever to do so.

Moreover, had military complications arisen, land operations only would have been involved, as is quite obvious from the location of the countries concerned. It would have amounted to an impossible situation if the disinterested Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had seen fit to concern himself with these things although hardly any naval preparations were required. In the case of Czechoslovakia, for example, Document 388-PS lays down, as far as the Navy was concerned, only that it was to participate in possible Army operations by commitment of the Danube flotilla which for this purpose was placed under the orders of the High Command of the Army; this flotilla consisted of very small ships, a few gunboats, if I remember correctly.

In this connection I also quote Sir Hartley Shawcross when on 4 December 1945 he spoke of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934: “By entering into it”—Hitler—“persuaded many people that his intentions were genuinely pacific ...”[^[42]]

Accordingly, Raeder too had reason to be convinced. It is true that Raeder belonged to the Secret Cabinet Council created in February 1938. But it is also true, and has been proved in the meantime, that the Secret Cabinet Council was just a farce. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with this point which the Prosecution originally considered so important.

The claim of the Prosecution that Raeder was a member of the Government and a Reich minister has been refuted in the same way. This assertion of the Prosecution has from the outset been somewhat incomprehensible. Document 2098-PS, presented by the Prosecution, only states with absolute clarity that Von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, held—I quote—“a rank equivalent to that of a Reich minister.” This proves that he was not a minister, although for reasons of etiquette he held a rank equal to that of a Reich minister, and it follows that this decree of Hitler did not assign a political task to Raeder, as the Prosecution would like to have it.

Moreover, this decree does not even give him the right to participate in Cabinet sessions at his own will, but only, as Hitler says in the above-mentioned document, “upon my order.” This simply means that Raeder might have been called upon by Hitler to participate in a Cabinet session when technical naval problems were being discussed. In reality this hypothetical and politically insignificant case never arose.

Nor can membership in the Reich Defense Council—Document 2194-PS[^[43]]—be considered incriminating. In the first place the council was concerned, as the text says, only with “preparatory measures for the defense of the Reich,” that is, neither with political activities nor with activities connected in any political sense with aggressive war. Furthermore, according to Document 2018-PS, a later Führer decree of 13 August 1939, and contrary to the claim of the Prosecution, Raeder never belonged to the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich set up at that time, for the simple reason that he was not a minister. Actually other countries, too, possess institutions like a defense council or defense committee. I call attention to the fact that already long before the first World War the British Government had a defense committee which was of much greater importance[^[44]] than the equivalent institution in Germany.

As the final matter in this connection, I wish to point out that the claim of the Prosecution that Raeder was a Party member has also proved untenable. It is true that Raeder received the gold insignia of honor from Hitler; but this was only a decoration; it could not mean anything else, because a soldier could not be a member of the Party. That is clear beyond all doubt from Paragraph 36 of the Reich Defense Law, which forbids soldiers to engage in politics and to be members of a political organization.[^[45]]

I also refer to the evidence, which proved amply that Raeder never had connections with the Party, that indeed he more than once had arguments with Party circles and that he was unpopular with typical National Socialists because of his political and particularly his religious attitude. Goebbels, for instance, positively detested him, and this was not surprising, because on the one hand he always prevented the Party from gaining any sort of influence on the officers’ corps of the Navy, while on the other, in contrast to the Party, he supported the Church to the greatest extent, and saw to it that the morale of the Navy was founded on a Christian basis. I refer in this connection to the typical National Socialist phrase of Bormann:

“National Socialist and Christian concepts are incompatible.”[^[46]] In the same document Bormann, as he so often did, expressed views devoid of all civilized standards and attacked Christianity so strongly, and so violently advocated the elimination of all Christian ideas, that this attitude by the Party is sufficient proof that Raeder, as a devout Christian, could never have entertained relations with the Party.[^[47]]

I have already stated that in 1933 Hitler said that it would be one of the fundamentals of his policy to make Germany sound and strong by peaceful means, and that for such peaceful development it was absolutely necessary to acknowledge British hegemony and come to an agreement with Britain about the size of the German fleet—if possible, even to come to an alliance. These ideas coincided with Raeder’s fundamental attitude, which he explained in detail during his examination here. As far as my defense is concerned, it may remain an open question whether and when Hitler abandoned that basic thought. In any case, Hitler always emphasized this basic thought to Raeder and actually supported it with deeds; this ever-recurring thought can be traced through all the years up to the outbreak of war, and it was in the pursuit of this basic principle that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was concluded in 1935 and the second Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1937, that an agreement on submarines was reached with Lord Cunningham in 1938, and that the London protocol on the subject of battleships was signed on 30 June 1938. Thus, throughout the years of the reconstruction of the German Navy the same idea was always predominant, namely, of achieving agreement with Britain, of acknowledging Britain’s supremacy and of avoiding any difference which might lead to a break with Britain.

Looking back now in cognizance of all the documents and all the facts proved during this Trial, Hitler may be assumed at some time, probably in 1938, to have become unfaithful to his own principles and thereby guilty of bringing about the tragic fate of Germany. However, in judging the accusations made against Raeder, the decisive issue is not what must subsequently, in the light of all known facts, be acknowledged as objectively true; the real issue is only whether Raeder realized, or was even able to realize, Hitler’s deviation from his own ideas, and the answer to that is “no.” Raeder could not have guessed, much less have known, that Hitler at some time became untrue to his own political ideas which he had repeatedly stressed and demonstrated, and thus guilty of kindling the frightful conflagration of World War II.

Raeder could not have suspected or known that during the period immediately preceding the war Hitler spoke to him, too, in words which were at variance with his thoughts and also different from his actions. As far as the Navy in particular was concerned, the relatively slow rebuilding of the German fleet showed that Hitler proposed to remain faithful to the ideas which I described. There was no indication at all of a change of mind on Hitler’s part in this field, for a change of mind would surely have resulted in a naval rebuilding program bigger than the one which Hitler actually carried out. At the very least he would then have made full use of possibilities offered by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. According to the Naval Agreement, the German fleet was allowed a total tonnage of 420,595 tons,[^[48]] yet actually this maximum was never utilized. Even with regard to battleships, Germany remained short of the Naval Agreement, with the result that the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz were not available in the first year of the war, and thus could not take part in the occupation of Norway; the Bismarck was completed only in August 1940, and the Tirpitz in 1941.

According to the Naval Agreement, Germany was allowed the same tonnage in submarines as England. In reality, however, U-boat construction was so slow that at the beginning of the war in 1939, as the evidence has proved, Germany had only the small number of 26 U-boats available for Atlantic service. And further, according to Document L-79, known as the “Little Schmundt,” it was laid down as late as the end of May 1939 that—I quote—“no change will be made in the ship-building program.”

All this must have firmly convinced the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from his personal point of view and his sphere of work that Hitler wanted to stand by his much-stressed basic principle of avoiding war.

Raeder’s firm conviction in this respect—this seems to be an important consideration—was to a large extent confirmed by the attitude of foreign countries. Winston Churchill, in his book Great Contemporaries, wrote in 1935:

“It is not possible to form a just judgment of a public figure who has attained the enormous dimensions of Adolf Hitler, until his lifework as a whole is before us ... We cannot tell whether Hitler will be the man who will once again let loose upon the world another war in which civilization will irretrievably succumb, or whether he will go down in history as the man who has restored honor and peace of mind to the great Germanic nation, and brought it back serene, helpful, and strong to the forefront of the European family circle.”

One year later, at the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936, the representatives of the foreign countries appeared in a body and greeted Hitler in a manner which, in its approval bordering on enthusiasm, appeared incomprehensible to many skeptically inclined Germans. Subsequently, the foremost politicians and members of various governments visited Hitler and reached complete understanding with him, and finally, in the autumn of 1938, agreement was again reached under Chamberlain and Lord Halifax; an agreement which strengthened Hitler immeasurably, and by which he sought to prove to the Germans how expedient all his actions had been, since they were thus approved by foreign countries. The joint declaration, which Chamberlain and Hitler issued in Munich on 30 September 1938, can never be overestimated in its importance. I would, therefore, like to quote the first two decisive sentences from it:

“We have had a further discussion today, and are agreed that the question of Anglo-German relations is of primary importance for both countries and for Europe.

“We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty as symbolic of the desire of our two nations never again to wage war against each other.”

I think that these references are sufficient. Now, can one demand of a German admiral, who has never been a politician, but always only a soldier, that in judging Hitler he should have looked farther ahead than the great British statesmen, Chamberlain and Churchill? Surely the very question indicates that the answer is “no.”

The Prosecution can seriously confront these numerous aspects only with a few documents which might indicate Raeder’s knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive plans. The Prosecution has indeed presented innumerable documents of which Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff or the High Command of the Navy were stated to have received copies, but in a considerable number of instances the Prosecution could not say anything beyond the fact that Raeder received a copy of the documents; for the most part no real connection existed, nor was it alleged by the Prosecution. Naturally, it is not surprising that for the sake of uniformity military documents went to all branches of the Armed Forces, even if in certain cases one branch of the Armed Forces was not at all, or only vaguely, concerned with them. Of all these documents which have been submitted in the case of Raeder, only the four documents which, because of their importance, the Prosecution described as key documents, could be really incriminating. These are Hitler’s four speeches to the Commanders-in-Chief of 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August 1939, and 23 November 1939.[^[49]]

The Prosecution claims that these speeches prove participation in the conspiracy, and that it is clearly evident from them that Hitler wanted to wage wars of aggression. I would therefore like to deal with these documents individually and in detail, and in doing so, show why they cannot modify the general picture I have presented.

Undoubtedly these key documents are of the utmost importance for the subsequent historical findings on what trains of thought motivated Hitler; they are important because they are expressions of Hitler’s opinion and because, in spite of the tremendous amount of captured documentary material, there are hardly any written notes of Hitler. One is tempted, of course, to accept the conclusion that the contents of these documents must be true because they are statements made before a small circle, where Hitler would naturally express himself more openly than in his public speeches. Even though I by no means fail to recognize their value, I nevertheless believe that the Prosecution overestimates the importance of these four documents by far. Certainly, they are to some extent key documents, since they provide the key to an understanding of Hitler’s mind and methods, but they are not a key to the real intentions of Hitler, and more particularly they do not provide a scale for any conclusions which those who listened to the speeches must, in the opinion of the Prosecution, needs draw from them.

Therefore, in order fully to explain the value of the documents, I would like first of all to mention several general points which apply generally to each of these four documents and limit their evidential value, which the Prosecution has overestimated. None of these speeches was taken down in shorthand, so that the actual text of the speeches is not available. Accordingly, in the record of the address of 5 November 1937, Hossbach correctly chose the indirect form of speech, and Generaladmiral Böhm in his record of the speech of 22 August 1939[^[50]] did the same. Surprisingly and not quite correctly, Schmundt chose the direct form of speech in his record of 23 May 1939, although it was not a verbatim record; however, he was at least careful to state at the beginning that Hitler’s words were being reproduced “in essence.”

The feeblest documents, that is to say, the two versions of the speech of 22 August 1939 which the Prosecution has submitted, are written in the direct form of speech, and the authors of these documents, whose names are unknown, have not even deemed it necessary to add some sort of note as Schmundt did. However this may be, in considering the documents it must be kept in mind that they were not reproduced word by word and that therefore the reliability of the reproduction depends on the manner of work and attitude of the author of the document, especially on whether and to what extent he made notes during the speech, and when he prepared his record. In this connection it is important to note that, as Document 386-PS shows, Adjutant Hossbach wrote the record a full 5 days later, namely on 10 November, though the speech itself had already been made on 5 November. In the case of Schmundt, the date of the record is missing altogether, and in the two Prosecution documents on the speech of 22 August 1939 there is also no date. The last two documents also lack any signature, so that in this case it is not even possible to say who bears the responsibility for the record. The same applies to the document on the speech of 23 November 1939. All these formal deficiencies allow considerable doubt concerning evidential value and reliability of the documents to be entertained.

It is different in the case of the Böhm document, who in his affidavit certifies that he wrote down Hitler’s speech as it was being made, that he noted down the exact text of particularly important passages, and that he edited the final draft, submitted here, on the same evening. Since in all these documents the true text is not available, it is obvious how important it is if one can at least establish that the record was made simultaneously with the speech, or at least on the same day and not, as in the case of Hossbach, 5 days later. Even with the best of memories the best adjutant, who has to handle many new matters every day, cannot possibly after 5 days give an absolutely reliable reproduction of a speech.

The second point is just as important, namely, that unlike other military documents these are not official documents with a distribution list, that is, they are not documents which were subsequently sent to those concerned. That the documents were not sent to Raeder was established in the evidence by him and by the witness Schulte-Mönting, apart from the fact that it is already apparent from the lack of a distribution list on the document. This point, in particular, seems to me of great importance. Listening to a speech once—and it will be recalled that Hitler spoke extremely quickly—does not induce the listener to draw conclusions in a way which the reading of the record might, since the record allows for a check and recheck of the contents of the speech. We who have come to know these speeches in the proceedings in their written form and have again and again checked their wording, naturally invest certain words and phrases with more importance than we would have done if we had heard them as part of a quickly delivered address. In addition, all of us are readily inclined to lend more importance to the various phrases, because from our present standpoint and in view of our more extensive knowledge we can now survey everything much more easily; for we have not only one speech on which to base our opinions, but all of them and in addition all the many other documents showing the historical development. In discussing these documents it must always be borne in mind that listeners are inclined to react to the spoken word quite differently, and that often, even after only a few hours, the reports of various listeners differ from one another.

The Prosecution considers these speeches of Hitler to be the basis of the conspiracy, and says that on these occasions Hitler consulted with the commanders, reached a certain decision, and concluded a certain plan of conspiracy with them. The Prosecution is bound to maintain this, because one can only speak of a conspiracy when something is being planned in common. In reality, the assertion of the Prosecution that an influential group of Nazis assembled to examine the situation and make decisions is incorrect; the occasion took the form of an address by Hitler alone, and no discussion and no consultation took place. Nor was any decision reached, either; Hitler just spoke quite generally about—I quote—“possibilities of development.”[^[51]] If one can speak of decisions at all, it was a decision solely on the part of Hitler. All this contradicts the existence of a real conspiracy. Altogether I have the impression that, in its conception of a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, the Prosecution has conceived an entirely false picture of the real distribution of power within the National Socialist State. In my opinion the Prosecution fails to recognize the characteristics of a dictatorship, and indeed it may be very difficult to understand the immeasurable dictatorial power of Hitler if one has not personally lived through all of those 12 years in Germany, in particular the growth of Hitler’s power from its first beginnings until it finally developed into a dictatorship wielding the most cruel and horrible terror. A dictator like Hitler, who moreover quite obviously exercised immense powers of suggestion and fascination, is not a president of a parliamentary government. I have the impression that in judging the situation as a whole the Prosecution has never completely relinquished the idea of a parliamentary government nor taken the uncompromising ways of a dictator into account.

The idea of a conspiracy between him and the members of the Cabinet or between him and the commanders was quite contrary to Hitler’s own nature, as the testimony of several witnesses showed in the course of the Trial. This was proved with particular emphasis by the testimony of the Swedish industrialist, Dahlerus, who by reason of his excellent and extensive connections both with Britain and Germany was in the course of time able to obtain an objective picture of both countries, and who during his negotiations with Chamberlain and Halifax on the one hand, and Hitler and Göring on the other, was best able to recognize the difference between the parliamentary British Government and the German dictatorship of Hitler. The account of Dahlerus proves convincingly that the difference was irreconcilable. After he had spoken with Chamberlain and Halifax, a discussion with the Cabinet naturally took place before a final decision was taken. On the other hand, when in the night of 26 to 27 August 1939[^[52]] Dahlerus had a discussion of decisive importance with Hitler, at which only Göring was present, Hitler at once made six propositions, without saying a word to any of the Cabinet members or any of the military commanders, without even consulting Göring who sat by silently; proposals, moreover, which did not exactly tally with what he himself had told Sir Nevile Henderson a short time before. A stronger argument against a conspiracy with commanders or members of the Cabinet can hardly exist, unless it be the equally important fact which the witness Dahlerus added, namely, that during the entire 2½ hours Göring did not dare say a single word, and that it was humiliating to see the degree of servility which Hitler demanded even of Göring, his closest associate.[^[53]]

All these Hitler speeches are full of contradictions. Such contradictions naturally impair clarity of thought, and they rob individual ideas of their importance. When reading the documents in their entirety, the number of contradictions becomes evident, as the witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting correctly pointed out during his examination and cross-examination. It is just because of such contradictions and often illogical thinking that the evidential value of the documents is diminished. Naturally it is difficult for a military adjutant like Hossbach or Schmundt to record unclear and contradictory trains of thought; and it is also easy to understand that a military adjutant will be inclined to introduce as clear a line of thought as possible, and will in consequence be misled into applying to certain ideas which have become clear to him more stress than they were actually given in the speech itself. To this can be added a remark of Raeder, who not only points to the contradictions, but especially to Hitler’s overactive imagination, and very appropriately calls him a “master of bluff.”[^[54]]

Moreover, in every speech of that type Hitler followed a very definite tendency. He had a definite purpose in view, namely, to bring about the desired impression on all or some of his hearers, either by intentional exaggeration or by making things appear deliberately harmless. While he spoke, Hitler followed the intuition of the moment; as Schulte-Mönting termed it, he wandered from his notes. He thought aloud and wished to carry his hearers away, but he did not want to be taken at his word.[^[55]] Everyone will agree with me that such practices and such purposefully designed speeches give no clear indication at all of Hitler’s true views at the time. In addition, there is this to be said about all these documents in general:

Following his address of 23 May 1939—known as the “Little Schmundt”—Raeder had an interview with Hitler alone in which he called Hitler’s attention to contradictions in his address and also to the contradiction arising out of Hitler’s assurance to Raeder personally that he, Hitler, would under all circumstances settle the case of Poland equally peacefully. Hitler thereupon put Raeder’s mind completely at rest and told him that he had a firm hold on matters, politically. This was stated by the witness Schulte-Mönting[^[56]] who added that Hitler allayed Raeder’s misgivings about the contradiction between the speech of 23 May 1939 and his other statements by telling him that for him, Hitler, there were three grades of keeping matters secret: Firstly, by private conversation with one partner; secondly, the thoughts he kept to himself; and thirdly, some ideas which he himself did not fully think out.

I believe this way of thinking as explained by Hitler himself illustrates most strikingly how little reliance could ultimately be placed on statements which he made before a small or a large group of people. It seems to me quite plausible, therefore, that Raeder based his deliberations neither on Hitler’s general speeches nor on the address before the commanders which was discussed here, but went solely by what Hitler told him in private discussion. In this respect, the statements of Sehulte-Mönting, Böhm, and Albrecht[^[57]] all prove that as late as 1939 Hitler was still, in private conversation, repeatedly giving Raeder the explicit assurance that there would be no war; and he did this whenever for some reason or other Raeder was particularly anxious and drew Hitler’s attention to the dangers ahead.

In conclusion, therefore, I believe it may be said that the so-called key documents are extremely interesting in assessing Hitler from a psychological point of view, but that their evidential value as regards Hitler’s real intentions is very limited and slight. One cannot reproach Raeder for not letting himself be guided by the tendentious and deliberate speeches which Hitler made before his commanders on the spur of the moment, and preferring to rely on assurances which Hitler himself gave him and on the fact that until the summer of 1939, until the very outbreak of the war, these assurances were in perfect accord with the facts and with Hitler’s actions, that is, with the four naval agreements and the Munich Pact.

It is understandable that Raeder did not permit this basic attitude to be shaken by these speeches to the commanders-in-chief, though they were undoubtedly of a questionable nature, but that he held steadfastly to his belief that Hitler would not deceive him. The fact that we now subsequently realize that Hitler did after all deceive Raeder in his private conversations with him, and also by his special second and third grade of secrecy, does not indicate any guilt on Raeder’s part, but solely on Hitler’s. The vast amount of material in this connection does not indicate that in 1938 and 1939 Raeder planned a war of aggression in violation of international law, but reveals only that Hitler planned a war of aggression in violation of international law.

This completes my general treatment of the key documents and I now ask the Tribunal’s permission to add a few points on each individual document, since the Prosecution again and again stressed these documents as the basis for the charge of conspiracy.

Hossbach Document, discussion of 5 November 1937 in the Reich Chancellery:

The crucial passages of this document are obvious, and the Prosecution has cited them often enough. But in dealing with this document it should be taken into consideration that both Göring and Raeder stated here that Hitler announced in advance his intention of following a certain trend or purpose in his speech. Hitler was dissatisfied with the measures taken by Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and especially by Generaloberst Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and felt that progress in the rearmament of the Army was too slow. Hitler therefore intentionally exaggerated, and since this was known only to Göring and Raeder, it is natural that the impression which the speech made on Neurath, who had no idea of this intention, was entirely different and considerably alarming.

It is interesting to note that apparently Hitler did not fully get what he wanted, because the last two paragraphs of the document indicate that to some extent Blomberg and Fritsch saw through Hitler’s scheme, and that his exaggerations did not deceive them. Though Hitler did not permit discussion on such occasions, Blomberg and Fritsch intervened in this instance and pointed to the need for preventing Britain and France from becoming Germany’s adversaries. Blomberg explained the reasons for his protest, and in the penultimate paragraph of the document Fritsch showed unmistakably that he was skeptical of Hitler’s words by remarking that under such circumstances he would not be able to take his planned vacation abroad scheduled to begin on 10 November. It is also significant that Hitler thereupon came round and, in contrast to his earlier statements, said that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and that consequently he did not believe in military action against Germany on the part of France either.

That Hitler’s ideas in this document are quite impossible is also evident from the fact that he based his statements on a truly fantastic notion, namely, an Italian-French-British war or, equally fantastic, a civil war in France. In contradictory terms Hitler spoke in his speech on the one hand of an application of force, on the other of an attack by Poland against East Prussia, which could only refer to a defensive aspect—and in regard to Czechoslovakia he said that in all probability Britain and France had already privately written that country off. This reference is an indication that Hitler was prepared to negotiate, which was borne out by actual developments. He said that Austria and Czechoslovakia would be brought to their knees, but nevertheless in the following year, in March and September 1938, he carried on negotiations and settled both questions without war. This fact in particular seems significant, because it proved to Raeder in the course of later events that he was right in not ascribing undue importance to Hitler’s strong words of 5 November 1937, for in spite of these words Hitler in reality did carry on negotiations at a later date.

During his interrogation Raeder also rightly pointed out that the second extensive naval pact had been concluded with England only a few months earlier and that as a result he could not seriously expect Hitler to abandon a line of policy which he himself had initiated.

And finally, there is this point: The whole document deals with political questions on the one hand, and with possible land operations on the other. Raeder had nothing to do with political questions because he is no politician, while Neurath as Foreign Minister naturally had reason to give Hitler’s political attitude more consideration. It is also significant that Neurath testified here that as a result of this speech he too asked Hitler about his personal attitude, and that he refused to remain Foreign Minister because Hitler told him that those were his true intentions. To me it seems typical of Hitler to tell one person, Neurath, that perhaps he would go to war, and to tell another, Raeder, that he would under no circumstances wage war. This divergence in explaining his position was obviously caused by the fact that at that time he no longer relished Neurath as Foreign Minister, because he realized that with regard to the foreign policy which he proposed to follow, Neurath would not be as submissive as the successor whom he had in view, Ribbentrop. On the other hand at that time he still wanted at all events to retain Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. This is another instance of how Hitler’s actions were determined by a certain ultimate purpose, and how he always and without the slightest inhibition followed the principle that the end justifies the means.

Hitler’s speech of 23 May 1939, the so-called “Little Schmundt,” USA-27: Here again Hitler expressed himself in a highly questionable fashion; he speaks of a program of attack, of the preparation of a systematic attack, and of the decision to attack Poland. I fail in no way to recognize that there is good reason for the Prosecution to consider this document as particularly good evidence. I believe, however, that taking into account the numerous aspects which I pointed out, the value of this document as evidence in the case of Raeder is very much smaller than the Prosecution maintains, and very much smaller than a first glance at the wording of the Schmundt version might warrant. Schmundt obviously made an endeavor to formulate Hitler’s contradictory, fantastic, and incongruous statements in a clear way in accordance with his own precise military manner of thinking. This gives the document a clarity which does not correspond to Hitler’s speech. We do not know when Schmundt prepared the document, and he neglected to show the record he had made to the other participants.

During his examination and cross-examination the witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting pointed to the contradictions in this particular document, which I need not repeat here. Paramount importance must however be given to the contradiction between these words and the words which Hitler at the same time again and again used in conversation with Raeder, and which always followed the same line, namely, that he did not intend to wage war and that he would not make excessive demands.

Raeder was shocked by this speech, and was only calmed by the private conversation which he had with Hitler directly after the speech, when Hitler assured him that he would under all circumstances settle the case of Poland in a peaceful manner, too. Raeder believed him, and he had every right to assume that Hitler was telling him the truth in answer to his very precise question. I draw attention to the very exact statements made on this document during the examination of Raeder and the examination of the witness Schulte-Mönting.[^[58]] I especially refer to the statement of Schulte-Mönting that Hitler used the comparison that nobody would go to court if he had received 99 pfennig when claiming one mark, and added that in the same way he had obtained what he had demanded politically, and that consequently there could be no question of war on account of this last political question, that of the Polish Corridor. That Raeder himself was absolutely opposed to a war of aggression, and that in this respect he relied on Hitler’s assurances, is proved by the statements of all witnesses, not least by the deposition by Dönitz that on the occasion of the U-boat maneuvers in the Baltic Sea in July 1939 Raeder, expressed his firm conviction that there would be no war. Raeder, furthermore, knew that the Navy was absolutely unfit for a war at sea against Britain; he had explained that to Hitler again and again. But he was confident that in the Polish question Hitler, as he had said, would again negotiate; the testimony of the witness Dahlerus shows that negotiations did in fact take place, and they were even successful at the beginning. The reason why nevertheless the attempt finally failed and the second World War began, was explained in detail by the witness Dahlerus who illustrated the terrible tragedy of this event.

It seems to me important that up to August 1939 not only the witness Dahlerus, but also Chamberlain still believed in Hitler’s good will. It must be said again therefore that one cannot expect Raeder as a soldier to have been more farseeing and to have recognized Hitler’s dangerous ideas, if men like Chamberlain, Halifax, and Dahlerus did not even at that time see through Hitler.

I have myself referred to the seriousness and the incriminating character of this document, but I ask the Tribunal to take into consideration that the incriminating material in this document, just as in the document of 5 November 1937, is of a political nature. As defense counsel for the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I have to judge the facts not from a political but from a military point of view. From a military point of view, however, it is absolutely impossible to follow the arguments of the Prosecution, because military leaders are not authorized to take part in decisions about war and peace, but merely obliged to carry out such military preparations as the political leaders consider necessary. In no country of the world does an admiral have to give his opinion on whether some future war, for which he has to make plans, will be a war of aggression or a defensive war. In no country of the world does the decision of the question whether war will be waged rest with the military, but on the contrary it is always left to the political leaders, or to the legislative bodies.

Accordingly, Article 45 of the German Constitution stipulates that the Reich President shall represent the Reich in international relations and continues: “The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace are decreed by a law of the State.”

Therefore, the question whether a war was to be waged against Poland rested with the Reichstag, not with the military leaders. Professor Jahrreiss has already explained that in view of the constitutional development of the National Socialist State this decision rested in the last analysis exclusively with Hitler. For the case of Raeder it is of no consequence whether Hitler could be regarded as constitutionally authorized to start a war on his own decision, as he actually did in the autumn of 1939. The decisive factor is only that at all events the military leaders were not authorized, either in practice or constitutionally, to participate in this decision. The Prosecution cannot possibly maintain that every act of military planning on the part of Germany was a crime; for the military leaders, who merely receive the order to work out a certain plan, are neither authorized nor obliged to determine whether the execution of their plans will later on lead to an aggressive or a defensive war. It is well known that the Allied military leaders rightly hold the same view. No admiral or general of the Allied armed forces would understand a charge being brought against him on the basis of the military plans which were made on the Allied side, too, a long time before the war. I do not have to elaborate this point; I believe it will suffice if I refer to Document Number Ribbentrop-221. This is a secret document, which, according to the title, deals with the “Second Phase of the Anglo-French General Staff Conferences.” This document shows that exact plans, regarding the Allied forces, were worked out for a war embracing many countries; plans which, according to this document, include a war in Europe and a war in the Far East. The document expressly says that the French and British commanders-in-chief in the Far East—I quote—“worked out a joint plan of operations,” and it expressly speaks about the importance of possessing Belgian and Dutch territories as a starting point for the offensive against Germany. The decisive point about this parallel military case seems to me to be the fact that this document bears a date from the same month as Hitler’s much-discussed speech to his commanders-in-chief, namely, May 1939. The document bears the caption: “London, 5 May 1939.”

I now come to the address of Hitler to the commanders-ih-chief on 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg.[^[59]] Regarding the evidential value of Documents 1014-PS and 798-PS submitted by the Prosecution, I should like first of all for the sake of brevity to refer to the statements which I made to this Tribunal in connection with the formal application to withdraw Document 1014-PS. Although the Tribunal denied this application, I still maintain that the evidential value attached to these documents, and particularly to Document 1014-PS, is infinitesimal. The American Prosecution, in presenting these documents pointed out at the time[^[60]] that the Tribunal should take into consideration any more accurate version of this speech which the Defense might be able to submit. I therefore submitted Exhibit Number Raeder-27,[^[61]] the version of the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, and I believe that when I submitted it, I showed convincingly that it is in fact a more accurate version than those provided by the Prosecution documents. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe then put in two documents where Böhm’s version is very scrupulously compared with the versions 1014-PS and 798-PS; in this way he considerably facilitated the comparison of these documents for all of us. So as on my part to assist the Tribunal and the Prosecution in making this comparison, I requested Generaladmiral Böhm in the meantime to compare these versions himself and in doing so to use the compilation of the British Prosecution which I mentioned just now. The result is contained in Böhm’s affidavit.

When surveying all this material, it becomes clear that Document 1014-PS is extremely incomplete and inaccurate, all the more so as, apart from its formal deficiencies, it covers only one and a half pages, and for this reason alone cannot be an adequate reproduction of a 2½ hour speech.

Document 798-PS is no doubt more satisfactory, but it also contains numerous errors, as Böhm’s affidavit shows. Not every sentence may be of importance, but the point is that some of the most important passages from which a charge against the commanders-in-chief might at best be deduced were actually, according to Böhm’s sworn statement, never spoken at all. According to Böhm’s affidavit, it is not true that Hitler said that he had decided as early as the spring of 1939 to attack the West first and the East later. Nor did he use the words: “I only fear lest at the last moment some swine will come to me with an offer of mediation; our political aims reach further.” And, most important of all, the following words were never used either: “Annihilation of Poland ranks foremost; the aim is to liquidate the living forces, not to reach a certain line;” Hitler only spoke of the breaking-up of the military forces.

These differences in individual words and phrases are very important, because they concern the sharp phrases to which the Prosecution has frequently drawn attention, and from which the intention of a war violating international law, and even the intention to murder civilians, can be derived. If these phrases had been spoken, one could justly accuse the commanders-in-chief who were present of having waged the war and carried out Hitler’s orders in spite of the criminal end in view. However, if these sentences were not used but, as Böhm testified under oath, other sentences referring merely to military aims, then the Prosecution cannot reproach any of the commanders-in-chief present for having remained at their posts. No one can in earnest demand of an admiral that he should resign his post a few days before the outbreak of a war, and thus shake the military power of his own country. I am quite aware of the fact that the most serious reproaches can be made against Hitler’s attitude following the time of the Munich Agreement until the outbreak of the war in Poland, although, and this is decisive for the Raeder case, not against the military command, but exclusively against the political leader. We know that Hitler himself realized this and for that reason evaded all responsibility by his suicide without, either during or at the end of the war, showing the slightest regard for the life and the welfare of the German people.

I come now to Hitler’s speech to the commanders-in-chief on 23 November 1939.[^[62]] I shall deal with it quite briefly, and if you will permit me, Mr. President, I should like to do this now before the Tribunal adjourns, because the subject which follows is rather longer.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: I think I can be relatively brief with regard to this last key document, which again fails to give the date on which the record was made and lacks a signature; we do not therefore know the author of this document. It is not an official transcript; and it again pursues a special objective. Early in November 1939 a serious difference had arisen between Hitler and the generals because Hitler wanted to start the offensive in the West immediately, whereas the generals were of a different opinion, and apparently hoped that the outbreak of a real World War might still be avoided. Hitler’s dissatisfaction and annoyance with his generals are clearly evident. In consequence, by repeating, as usual, his past deeds, he strives to show what he has accomplished, and also to show that he has always been right. It is an absolutely typical Hitler speech reminiscent of his public speeches, in which he also loved to boast and to glorify himself as a genius. Hitler, after all, belonged to those people who always believe themselves to be right, and avail themselves of every opportunity to prove it. He also took the opportunity of using threats in order to nip in the bud the resistance in high military circles which had become known to him, thus strengthening his dictatorship. It is absolutely typical when he says in this document, literally: “I shall not shrink from anything and I shall destroy anyone who is against me.” This was recognized by foreign military leaders, too. I draw attention for example to General Marshall’s official report,[^[63]] which speaks about the “lack of far-reaching military planning” and about the fact that the German High Command did not have an all-embracing strategic plan, and points out in this connection that “Hitler’s prestige reached the stage at which one no longer dared to oppose his views.”

Finally it remains to be mentioned that this last key document dates from a time when the war was already in progress, and that the military leaders cannot be blamed if in all their plannings during a war they strove to attain victory. The Allies too were planning at the same time. I refer to Documents Number Ribbentrop-222 and Exhibit Number Raeder-34; the former dates from 1 September 1939 and is a secret letter from General Gamelin to Daladier containing the basic idea that it was necessary to invade Belgium in order to wage the war outside the French frontier. The other document also deals with military plans; it is a secret letter from General Gamelin to General Lelong, Military Attaché to the French Embassy in London, dated 13 November 1939, and also concerns the operation which the Allies had planned in Holland and Belgium.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 17 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]

NOTES

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[12] Vanselow, Völkerrecht, Berlin, 1931, Figure 226 i.

[13] In 1935, the American Senator Ney demanded the prohibition of operational areas. In 1937 Charles Warren made a request for discussion of the subject in the Society for International Law. And also the afore-mentioned draft of a convention by American jurists of 1939 deals with this question.

[14] Théories stratégiques IV, Page 323: “Même en zone de guerre n’aura-t-on pas contre sol le damné article 22 du traité de Londres?”

[15] Bauer, Das U-Boot, 1931, Report on it by Captain G. P. Thomson, R.N. in The Journal of the Royal News Instruction 1931, Page 511.

[16] Sperrgebiete im Seekrieg, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Volume VIII, 1938, Page 671.

[17] French Yellow Book, La Conférence de Washington, Page 88.

[18] Report of 8 October 1940, Page 3: “One thing is certain, namely, apart from vessels in declared war zones, destruction of a merchant vessel is envisaged if even only after capture.”

[19] Commander Russel Grenfell, R.N., The Art of the Admiral, London, 1937, Page 80. “The neutral merchants, however, are not likely to relinquish a highly lucrative trade without a struggle and thus there arises the acrimonious wrangle between belligerents and neutrals which is a regular feature of maritime warfare, the rules for which are dignified by the name of international law.”

[20] De jure pacis ac belli, Book III, Chapter I, Paragraph 6, citation Augustin: “One may conceal the truth wisely,” and Cicero: “Dissimulation is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, especially for those to whom the care of the state is entrusted.”

[21] Admiral King, Report of the American High Command.

[22] John Chamberlain, “The man who pushed Pearl Harbor,” Life, of 1 April 1946.

[23] Manual for Courts Martial U.S. Army, 1928, Page 10.

[24] In this connection I mention the extensive literature dealing with the right of self-preservation in cases of urgent necessity. The surprise attack on the Danish fleet, 1807, as well as the hunger blockade against Germany are based on that.

[25] Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven, Völkerrechtliche Neubildungen im Kriege, Hamburg 1941, Page 5.

[26] Quoted from “Neue Auslese,” 1946, Number 1, Page 16.

[27] Not always acknowledged by English authors. Compare for instance A. C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany, et cetera, London, 1937, Page 213: “The assertion that civilians and the Armed Forces have been treated only since 1914 as a uniform belligerent body is one of the most ridiculous ever made.”

[28] Grenfell, The Art of the Admiral, London, 1937, Page 45: “By the early part of 1918, the civil population of Germany was in a state of semistarvation, and it has been calculated that, as a result of the blockade, over 700,000 Germans died of malnutrition.”

[29] See also protest of the Soviet Government to the British Ambassador of 25 October 1939, printed as Number 44 in “Urkunden zum Seekriegsrecht,” Volume I, edited by the High Command of the Navy.

[30] See for instance Wheaton’s International Law, 5th Edition, Page 727, Liddell Hart, “The Revolution in Naval Warfare,” Observer of 14 April 1946.

[31] Oppenheim, Die Stellung des Kauffahrteischiffes im Seekrieg, Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, 1914, Page 165.

[32] Concerning the execution of these orders in the first World War, Vidaud, in “Les navires de commerce armés pour leur défense,” Paris, 1936, Pages 63-64 says as follows: “Les équipages eux-mêmes sont militarisés et soumis à la discipline militaire, ainsi que le capitaine Alfred Sheldon, appartenant à la réserve de la Marine Royale, a été condamné, le 8 Septembre 1915 par le conseil de guerre de Devonport, pour n’avoir pas attaqué un sousmarin allemand.”

[33] Compare for instance “Submarines in the Atomic Era” in the New York Herald Tribune, European Edition, of 27 April 1946, Page 2.

[34] A. C. Bell, Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defense, A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War 1914-1918—The introduction contains the remark: “This history is confidential and for official use only.” (Quoted from the German edition by Böhmert, Die englische Hunger-blockade im Weltkrieg, Essen, 1943).

[35] Hugo Grotius, De jure pacis ac belli, Book II, Chapter XXI.

[36] Hugo Grotius, De jure pacis ac belli, Book II, Chapter XXVI. Paragraph 4, “He can believe that in a matter of doubt he must obey his superior.”

[37] See Wheaton’s International Law, 5th Edition, Pages 543-5.

[38] Claud Mullins, The Leipzig Trials, London, 1921.

[39] See Document Book 1, Documents Numbers Raeder-3 and 4, Page 9 et sequentes.

[40] Especially the following documents are concerned:

C-140, USA-51 of 25 October 1933; C-159, USA-54 of 2 March 1936; C-194, USA-55 of 6 March 1936; C-175, USA-69 of 24 June 1937; 388-PS, USA-26 of 20 May 1938; C-136, USA-104 of 21 October 1938.

[41] Record of 4 December 1945, Volume III, Page 95.

[42] Record of 4 December 1945, Volume III, Page 110.

[43] Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938.

[44] For instance under Balfour and Churchill.

[45] Document Book 1, Document Number Raeder-4, Page 12.

[46] Document Book 6, Document Number Raeder-121, Page 524.

[47] Refer also to Ronneberger Affidavit, Document Book 6, Document Number Raeder-126, Page 543 et sequentes which point to the same subjects, especially to the strong Christian belief of Raeder and to the pronounced opposition to Christianity and Church by Bormann.

[48] Second Lohmann Affidavit, Document Number Raeder-8, Document Book 1, Page 41.

[49] Refer to Documents 386-PS, USA-25; L-79, USA-27; 798-PS, USA-29; 1014-PS, USA-30; 769-PS, USA-23.

[50] Document Book 2, Document Number Raeder-27, Page 144 et sequentes.

[51] See Hossbach Document.

[52] Record of 19 March 1946, Volume IX, Page 463.

[53] Record of 19 March 1946, Volume IX, page 481.

[54] Record of 16 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 35.

[55] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 314.

[56] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 306.

[57] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 306.

Affidavit Generaladmiral Böhm, Document Number Raeder-129.

Affidavit Generaladmiral Albrecht, Document Number Raeder-128.

[58] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 306.

[59] See Documents Numbers 798-PS, USA-29; 1014-PS, USA-30, Document Book 2. Page 144, Document Number Raeder-77.

[60] Record of 26 November 1945, Volume II, Page 292.

[61] Raeder Document Book 2, Page 144.

[62] See Document 789-PS, USA-93.

[63] Document Book 2, Pages 116-117, Document Number Raeder-19.

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ONE HUNDRED
AND EIGHTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 17 July 1946