Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 18

by Various

Afternoon Session

DR. SERVATIUS: I was speaking of the terminology of “deportation” in the Russian text. I pointed out the distinction between the word uvod meaning only transportation, and ssylka meaning a deportation as a form of punishment. From that one may conclude that deportation from the occupied territories for the purpose of work can only be regarded as a war crime, while it becomes a crime against humanity when assuming the penal character of a transportation of prisoners.

However, the question arises whether, beyond this, according to the Charter any removal of the population is punishable as a war crime, regardless of whether it occurs for allocation of labor or for other reasons. According to the text of the Charter, the latter seems at first sight to be the case, since it renders punishable “removal for slave labor, or for any other purposes.” Upon closer examination, however, it becomes evident that this rule cannot be meant in such a sense, as there are cases in which a removal is not only consistent with international law but even becomes imperative.

Accordingly, the Charter could only be understood to mean that the punishable act does not consist of plain “removal” but comprises the composite concept “removal for slave labor” and “removal for any other purpose.” The clause, “or for any other purpose,” should be understood so as to mean only that an illegal purpose equivalent to slave labor exists. If removal of any kind was to have been made punishable, then the qualifying addition “for slave labor or for any other purpose” would be contradictory to common sense. This definition is important for the Defendant Sauckel, as otherwise proof of deportation classified as a war crime would be evident from the acts admitted by him.

Just as for the various kinds of deportation, the difference between the kinds of slave labor, according to the Charter, must be clarified. Here, too, a clue to the interpretation is provided by the terminology of the different languages, though not because of their clarity and consistency but by the very opposite:

The English version speaks of “slave labor” as a war crime and of “enslavement” as a crime against humanity; the French version states travaux forcés and réduction en esclavage, the Russian version accordingly rabstvo (slavery) and poraboshtshenie (enslavement). It is not discernible how the terms chosen differentiate in re. Basing upon the fact that labor inconsistent with laws of humanity must be carried out under more severe conditions than other labor and assuming “slave labor” to be the severest forms of labor, it will be seen that no definition can be derived from this terminology of the Charter and that more of an ethical discrimination and stigmatization is intended.

Accordingly an objective division of the kinds of labor should be carried out independent of the terminology by considering exclusively the degree of severity of labor conditions. If one tries to analyze the terminology used, one finds the designation “enslavement,” esclavage, and poraboshtshenie for the inhuman form of labor, whereas the labor not inconsistent with laws of humanity is called “forced labor,” travaux forcés, and prinudidjenaja rabota. Slave labor (“slave labor,” travaux forcés, and rabstvo) consequently is the general term comprising both kinds.

What does this definition mean for the defense of the Defendant Sauckel? He admits having negotiated “compulsory labor” in the form of obligatory labor which, as stated before, has been termed “slave labor” in general. He denies, however, having demanded “slave labor,” which might be looked upon as inhuman labor, in other words, enslavement. A different standard applies, just as for deportation, to these two categories; “obligatory labor” is only a war crime and must be judged according to the rules of war; crimes against humanity, as I already stated above in connection with deportation as a crime against humanity, bear the additional characteristics of being connected with war crimes or crimes against peace. If it can be proven that the mobilization of manpower as ordered by the Defendant Sauckel was permitted by the rules of war, then the same act cannot be held to be a crime against humanity.

The Indictment, too, has made a difference as to the kinds of labor. It has treated, under Paragraph 3, Section VIII (H), as a separate war crime under the title of “Conscription of Civilian Labor,” the mobilization of manpower as directed by the Defendant Sauckel, which I shall call “regulated labor mobilization,” and mentions only “forced labor.” The French version speaks here of travaux forcés and uses terms such as les obligèrent à travailler and mis en obligation; the Russian version follows this and also speaks only of “compulsory labor” as prinuditjelnaja rabota but does not refer to this as being slave labor.

The Defendant Sauckel does not deny the facts taken here as a basis, but I shall submit the legal reasons which justify this mobilization of labor, and I shall prove that it does not involve any war crime that would break international law.

The rules of international law are authoritative in determining the question whether “regulated labor mobilization” is a war crime. The Charter cannot prohibit what international law permits in wartime. Such precepts of international law are laid down in the agreements on the rules of war and in the general legal principles and usages as applied by all states.

The Prosecution bases its opinion that labor mobilization is a war crime on the definitions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, as well as on the agreements and rules of war and the criminal codes of the countries concerned. If it is shown that labor mobilization is permitted by international law, then a judicial inquiry into the penal regulations is, of course, not necessary.

The Hague Convention on Land Warfare can be considered as a basis for the laws of warfare with which we are concerned here. Whether it was recognized by all the states involved here is, from a practical point of view, of little importance, for inasmuch as it was not recognized or cannot be directly applied, it is a case of a shortcoming in international law which is filled as a matter of course according to the principles of the belligerent’s needs and his duty to respect the laws of humanity. The principles of international law as established in the Hague Convention on Land Warfare are in all cases an important guide.

The Prosecution quotes, in the first place, Article 46 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which is designed to safeguard the fundamental rights of the population. It is typical for labor mobilization that it does restrict liberty, whereas this particular basic right is not protected by this article.

If the Hague Convention on Land Warfare is examined for a definite rule concerning deportation and forced labor, it will be realized that no such regulation exists. Just as in the sphere of air warfare and the use of new weapons, the Hague Convention on Land Warfare could not deal with questions which, at the time of its drafting, were far from the mind of the contracting parties. The first World War was still fought between two armies with already prepared material, and after it was used up the fight would be ended. The idea of a long war consuming huge amounts of material and requiring a continuous production with all available labor was for the Hague Convention on Land Warfare not yet a problem ripe for discussion.

Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which deals with the right to requisition, touches on the matter; but it can be seen that the rules deal only with purely local requirements of an army which appears fully equipped and has only supplementary local requirements. It is characteristic for the purely local meaning that the requisitioning authority is entrusted to the local commanders, in contrast to Article 51 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare which permits only an independent commanding general to impose compulsory contributions. The literature about the right to requisition in international law accordingly quotes only examples of local significance.

Although Article 52 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare can accordingly not be directly applied, its basic principles are nevertheless binding on the belligerents. The basic idea is that an army can demand practically everything necessary for the satisfaction of its requirements. There are only two limitations: It may not take more than it needs and not more than is compatible with the resources of the country.

The idea of a local obligation to furnish services will have to be adapted to modern warfare. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare envisaged the employment of smiths and wheelwrights necessary for the maintenance of the equipment of the army; work within the home country of the occupying power was, in view of undeveloped transportation conditions, impracticable and remained unconsidered.

Today the necessary work will no longer be done in the vicinity of the front-lines but must be carried out in the belligerents’ own countries, so that it must be possible to demand that labor should be available at the only place where it can be done and where it is necessary. It must also be possible to demand such labor for modern war requirements of mass production for current replacements. What is necessary at any given time can be asked for, the amount depending on prevailing conditions. If in earlier times, according to the principle “the war feeds the war,” an army far removed from its homeland was even to a large extent equipped in occupied territory, it must surely be possible today to supply the army by moving the workers to the factories in the belligerent’s own country. The evolution of the laws of warfare is influenced by the requirements which these laws have to serve.

With the basic idea of the obligation to furnish services the basic idea on limitations will have to be accepted, too. These limitations must also be interpreted to apply to the changed conditions. While the obligation to furnish services is justified, no more work may be demanded than the occupying power requires of its own people at home. The intensity of the war as total war must be taken into consideration. The obligation to work may thereby assume considerable proportions.

The meaning and the purpose of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare is certainly not to place the nationals of a defeated state in a better position than those of the victorious state which occupied the country. This, however, would be the result if the Hague Convention on Land Warfare were interpreted according to its original wording. If this is maintained, then France, which had surrendered unconditionally together with all the other occupied countries, would have been able to look on in security while Germany, strangled by the blockade, was exhausting herself in an indefatigable struggle by sacrifices of life and property. Can one really demand that the prisoner in a besieged fortress should live more comfortably than the defender of the fortress? If Germany today could live according to the romantic concepts of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, this would certainly be preferable to the burden of the peace treaty to be expected.

Actually, the Hague Convention on Land Warfare has not been adhered to even in its original interpretation, if it is true that already before the conclusion of the armistice the Soviet Union as occupying power transferred the population on a large scale from the eastern parts of Germany for the purpose of performing labor outside Germany. The Tribunal could obtain official information about this through an inquiry with the Control Council. I also have information that German civilian internees are used for work in France today. Here too the Tribunal could obtain official information.

The second limitation of the obligation to work is embodied in the rule that no participation in war operations against the home country of the worker may be demanded. Any work done for the occupying power indirectly benefits its war effort; the prohibition is therefore restricted to direct participation in operations of the fighting force. The literature on international law contrasts the participation in military operations with the permissible participation in preparations. Participation in war operations in this sense was not asked of any worker; on the contrary, the purpose was to employ workers away from these operations and without disturbance by the war.

Consequently only such activity as is directed against the workers’ own country is forbidden, thus taking the feelings of the individual into consideration. No protection of the enemy state is thereby intended. Wherever, therefore, the individual renounces his country and in a struggle of ideologies opposes the government of his country, such a restriction no longer applies. In connection with this I wish to point to the vast number of foreigners who adopted such an attitude and who, in part, still live in Germany today.

The same applies when the state to which the worker belongs has ceased fighting. This question is of special importance with regard to the obligation to work in the armament industry. The rules of the Geneva Convention with regard to the work to be done by prisoners of war are known. The basic notion, that no one may be forced to make weapons against his own brothers, must apply to civilian workers also.

The fact, however, that one’s country is no longer in a legal state of war is one of the reasons that nullify this restriction. The need for protection also ceases to exist when a country, though legally still participating in war, to all intents and purposes no longer possesses any fighting forces and has thus ceased to exist as a military object of attack. The fact, that this country may have allies who fight for it cannot arbitrarily extend this limitation beyond the terms of the Geneva Convention; nor is it the duty of a subject of a given state to protect allies fighting for it and to participate in the policies of his government.

Puppet governments cannot change reality. Recognition cannot be granted to them unless they reappear as independent combatants under a command of their own and are recognized as such. This applies to all states defeated by Germany.

At the time of the mobilization of labor only Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union were active combatants against Germany. British and American subjects were not affected by this mobilization, although citizens of the Soviet Union were in part used in armament production.

The legal position of citizens of the Soviet Union is however fundamentally different. Under Document Number EC-338, USSR-356, the Prosecution has submitted a decree by the People’s Commissars dated 1 July 1941. This decree deals with the utilization of prisoners of war for labor purposes; but it also, however, refers to the employment of interned civilians. According to the wording, armament production is not forbidden for either category of workers; and only two limitations are specified in the decree, namely, work in the combat zone and services required of an orderly.

Thus, from the point of view of reciprocity, no objection can be raised against the employment of Soviet citizens in armament production. In his examination before the Tribunal the witness General Paulus stated that prisoners of war were employed in factories of the Soviet Union, which means that in a state with a directed economy they were employed during the war in the armament industry. According to the decree it must be assumed then that these workers were also employed in the production of weapons.

The significance of such a violation of the principle that armament production shall be forbidden lies in the serious consequence that no formation of a generally recognized rule of international law in this new field of utilization of manpower can thereby be proven. Under these circumstances therefore Germany was likewise free to employ workers of the Soviet Union and workers of all other states in armament production.

The Hague Convention on Land Warfare thus does not forbid the regulated utilization of manpower, but there are also further international aspects permitting such a utilization of manpower. The assent of the government of the occupied state is of primary consideration. This assent was given by France. The objection that Marshal Pétain’s Government was not a constitutional government is invalid, for it was the legitimate successor to the provisional armistice Government. That it represented the French State with foreign governments is of decisive consideration in international relations. This authority of representation was confirmed by the United States by its keeping an ambassador in Vichy even after its own entry into the war. Great Britain also negotiated the terms of an armistice with a general of the Vichy Government in Syria in 1941.

This Government once recognized could not be deprived of its legality by the simple declaration of an oppositional government, even though the latter might have been recognized by the Allies. A government loses its international position only if it is forced to transfer its actual power to the oppositional government. Up to that moment it retains authority within its sphere of influence.

The other objection that the Government of Marshal Pétain was not free to act as it wished and that consequently agreements with Germany in the field of utilization of manpower were reached by coercive measures and are therefore invalid, is not justified from the point of view of international law. Armistice and peace treaties are always concluded under great pressure. That this does not curtail the validity of such treaties is an obvious point of international law. This has constantly been emphasized when refusing German demands for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles.

Agreements which are reached in periods between the armistice and the peace treaty are subject to the same conditions. This also applies to the agreement with France with respect to the utilization of manpower. Thus, if—contrary to the statement of the Defendant Sauckel—negotiations about the utilization of manpower were conducted in the form of an ultimatum, there could from the point of view of international law still be no reason for an objection. Besides, Sauckel’s influence surely cannot have been so great that he could have exerted an excessive amount of pressure.

The validity of such agreements is open to doubt only under very special conditions, such as would mean that excessive obligations were to be assumed which obviously violate principles of humanity; for instance, if the agreements contain a clause stating that work must be performed under slave-like conditions.

The motive for these agreements was, however, to offer, especially to the French workers, favorable working conditions and salaries for their obligatory labor in Germany, thus to attract the workers.

Military reasons too can command the evacuation of an occupied territory by part of the population and thereby cause a displacement of manpower. This may happen when the population participates in partisan warfare or is active in resistance groups and thus endangers security instead of behaving obediently and peacefully. It even suffices for the population in the so-called partisan territories to be drawn upon even against its will for the support of the partisans. That such conditions were organized by Germany’s enemies as combat measures in an increasing degree, first in the East and later in the West, is today looked upon as a patriotic achievement. In view of this one must not forget that the resulting displacement of workers was precisely the consequence of their activities and that such action was permitted by international law. Evacuation had to be carried out in the interest of security, and assignment of labor elsewhere was necessary if only to maintain order. It is the privilege of the occupying power to utilize this labor within a regulated state economy in the manner deemed most appropriate under the prevailing conditions. Similar measures might also be imposed in areas of retreat after it had been ascertained that the male population illegally took part in hostilities during the retreat, as it had been called upon to do by the enemy, sometimes even being supplied with weapons.

Evacuation measures for the security of combat troops are equally permissible under international law. To engage persons evacuated from the combat zone in new work is not only legal but is actually the duty of the occupation administration. The state which calls upon its subjects to fight and thereby intensifies combat, bears the guilt for such evacuation. The necessary retaliatory measures therefore must be legal.

Whenever such evacuations become necessary, they must be carried out without undue suffering for the population. For this preparatory measures, which alone can avoid unnecessary hardships, are necessary. That is the duty of administration as laid down in Article 43 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. Thereto appertain the proposals made by Sauckel for the evacuation of territories of retreat in France in the event of invasion (Document 1289-PS). These proposals did not materialize and cannot therefore incriminate the Defendant Sauckel.

This administrative duty may also call for a displacement of labor in order to avoid unemployment and famine. This, for example, occurred when the industrial areas of the Soviet Union were occupied, where there were no more working possibilities after the population became unemployed following the scorched earth policy adopted by the Soviet Union, and supplies failed to arrive because of transport difficulties.

These military and administrative points of view of international law can invalidate a number of reproaches; but they do not answer the basic question, namely, whether the enlistment of workers is also permitted outside the Hague Convention on Land Warfare for the very purpose of intensified labor to enable the state to carry on the war through increase of production and to allow it to release its own workers for service at the front.

A purely military emergency would provide no excuse for disregarding international law. Victory jeopardized must not be sought by breaking the law when in distress, because the laws of warfare are intended to govern that very combat, which is of necessity connected with distress. International law inclines differently where it is a case of a measure to be taken to safeguard the existence of the state. That is a law of self-preservation which every state is entitled to because higher institutions are lacking which could protect it from destruction.

It has repeatedly been stressed by all concerned that in this war our existence was at stake. This became evident for Germany after the fatal battles on the Eastern Front in the winter 1941-42. Whereas up to that time no wholesale employment of foreign labor had been necessary, new equipment now had to be produced immediately. The German labor reserves, were depleted due to the drafting of 2 million workers for service at the front. The employment of unskilled women and young people could not immediately relieve the situation. During the later stages of the war, especially through aerial warfare, armament demands increased to such an extent that, in spite of the increased employment of women and young people, the level could no longer be maintained. The means were exhausted.

The official figures which the Defendant Sauckel made public in his speech in Posen in February 1943 (see Document 1739-PS) proved that already in 1939, at the beginning of the second World War, more than twice as many women were being employed than at the end of the first World War and that their number at the end of the second World War had increased by another 2 million to a total of over 10 million. This figure exceeds the entire number of male and female workers in the armament industry at the end of the first World War. Yet in spite of that there was a shortage of labor. This has been confirmed by the witness Rohland for Codefendant Speer in Document Speer-56, according to which Speer also declared that foreign labor was needed under all circumstances.

The crux of the matter did not concern the problem of female labor, where by introducing additional home labor the limit was attained, but that of procuring specialists and men for heavy labor. Among the 10 million German women who were at work, there were also the wives of front-line officers and others from similar classes of society.

The notion that in Britain the women were conscripted for work in a higher degree than in Germany is wrong. In Germany the women had to work up to 45 and later 50 years of age, and they actually worked in factories and did not have fake jobs of a social kind. Even schoolchildren beginning with the age of 10 were required to work, and from 16 years onward they were switched to regular labor or occupied in other services. Families were disrupted; schools and universities were closed; pupils and students worked in the armament industry, and even the wounded could not continue their studies. A grim fight was waged over every person capable of work. Speer’s reserve of workers did not exist. What efforts were made in this sector is shown among others by Enclosure 2 of the Wartburg Document RF-810.

Another point of view illustrating the necessity of employing additional labor is the fact that the powers in possession of colonies brought labor from their colonies; France (see Document RF-22, Page 17), for instance, took in about 50,000 workers from North Africa and Indo-China, which were under the command and supervision of officers and noncommissioned officers. Since Germany, having been refused colonies and on account of the blockade, was unable to draw upon such reserves, she was entitled to some means, in her fight for existence, of procuring labor where it could be found inactive in occupied territories.

This is in outline the basis, with regard to international law, for judging the regulated mobilization of labor as a war crime. One may, with regard to certain points, differ in opinion; and it will generally be found that in international law a uniform interpretation will not be readily arrived at. The interests of individual members in the community of international law play an important part and are not always identical; legal principles are often not recognized because some state does not wish to place itself officially in contradiction with its former actions, or because it prefers to remain unbound for the future.

As counsel for the Defense, I am in a position to present my interpretation of law without such inhibitions. The significance of my statement for the Defense, apart from the objective side, lies in the fact that the Defendant Sauckel, subjectively, was for good reasons entitled to believe in the lawfulness of a regulated mobilization of labor and that to him his actions were not discernible as being in contradiction with international law. This was supported by the impression which the Defendant Sauckel could not but gain of the permissibility of a regulated mobilization of labor, as shown by the attitude of other superior offices. When Sauckel entered upon his office, foreign workers had already been enlisted by individual action; and he could take it for granted that the State would equally proceed in a legal manner. None of the highest offices has ever raised legal objections before Sauckel. These offices, both the competent Foreign Office and the highest civil and military offices in the occupied territories, accepted his orders as a matter of course; and no questions of doubt on international law were raised.

For the opinion of the Defendant Sauckel the attitude of the foreign agencies concerned was necessarily of special importance, notably the consent of the French and the Belgians, who came to Berlin personally for discussions. From this resulted the good co-operation with the local authorities in the occupied territories, as was the case before enemy propaganda intervened.

Whether cognizance of breaking a law is indispensable when committing a crime against international law may be a moot point; but to establish guilt leading to a conviction, cognizance of the realization of all the criminal facts is essential. This includes cognizance of the fact that the action performed was contrary to international law. The subjective aspect of the facts, involving criminal guilt of the Defendant Sauckel, cannot be proved in respect to application of the regulated mobilization of labor. It would be impossible to commit the Defendant Sauckel for yet another legal reason, even if the regulated mobilization of manpower really were a violation of international law. According to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, no individual responsibility exists. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare differentiates between two kinds of war crimes; those which can be committed by an individual, such as murder and ill-treatment, and those which can be committed only by parties in a war. The regulated utilization of manpower is a proceeding which can only be initiated by the state. While the individual action is punished according to the penal code of the different states, a special regulation was laid down for offenses committed by parties in a war in Article 3 of the introductory agreement to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. This specifies only a liability for damages on the part of the state. This passage of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare still applies today, since it cannot be rescinded by agreement among the Allies alone. The Charter, which specifies the immediate criminal responsibility of the state organs or its executors, is void insofar as it is contradictory to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare.

I do not have to refer to the fact that Germany, as one of the parties to the agreement, would have had to agree to the suspension of Article 3; there are other reasons which speak for a continuation of this stipulation. A modification of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare in the sense of the Charter might have resulted from the law of usage or general custom due to changing legal conceptions. The presupposition for this assumption would be, however, that the contracting powers relinquish their sovereignty, since only then would the punishment of the state organs be possible. However, such a renunciation of the rights of sovereignty has not, as far as I am aware, taken place to such an extent as would generally render such punishment permissible. With regard to this point, I refer to the general statements made by Professor Jahrreiss before the Tribunal.

I shall now deal with the utilization of manpower as a crime against humanity. If a regulated utilization of manpower appears permissible according to international law, there remains the problem of the method of its execution, namely, the question of up to what point this utilization of manpower can still be regarded as in order and when it will exceed the permissible limit.

The Charter fails to define the concept of humanity. As far as international law is concerned, the term can only be transposed from the practice of the nations. In endeavoring to establish the limit for actions permissible under international law, we must, for the sake of comparison, mention the bombing of large cities and the use of the atomic bomb, as well as deportations and evacuations as still in progress today. These are all incidents which have occurred before the eyes of the world and were regarded as permissible by the executing countries.

Once again we are confronted with the conception of necessity and find that it is being interpreted in a very flexible manner. This should be kept in mind when examining the mobilization of labor as to any violation of the principle of humanity involved. Its aim is not the sudden killing of hundreds of thousands; however, it naturally entails hardships and is certainly also subject to mistakes which arise unintentionally or are due to the shortcoming of individuals. An answer will be required to the question of whether deliberate killing does not always weigh heavier than the temporary infliction of other sufferings. Also, the Charter does not prescribe punishment for every violation of the principles of humanity but only when inhuman treatment occurred in the execution of, or in connection with, a crime for which the Tribunal is competent. However, the Tribunal is competent only for Crimes against Peace and for War Crimes. As for Crimes against Peace, inhuman treatment may be admissible in self-defense, while it is punishable when committed by an aggressor; or alternatively, it must be a case of a war crime.

This does not apply when compatriots are ill-treated, for they are not protected by the laws of warfare. Prosecution for an act against humanity committed toward them can only take place if a crime against peace is involved at the same time.

From an objective point of view labor commitment furthered the waging of the war which has been designated by the Prosecution as a war of aggression or as a war violating treaties. If this is established and if it is proved moreover that the mobilization of labor was carried out in an inhuman way, then the requirements of the Charter will have been met and a crime against humanity committed, regardless of whether the mobilization of labor was allowed or not allowed by the rules of war, since it was committed in connection with a crime against peace. But punishment can be inflicted only if the culprit himself knows that an unlawful war is being waged and that he is furthering it by his action. Since the Defendant Sauckel denies any such knowledge, it must be proved.

The other possibility of meeting the factual requirement occurs when the inhuman act serves to carry out a war crime or is connected with it. Of the examples given by the Charter for violation of the rules of war, the following in the main can be taken to apply to the mobilization of labor: murder, ill-treatment, and deportation of the civilian population. As shown by this enumeration, these war crimes are not, however serious they may be, in themselves crimes against humanity. Some aggravating circumstance making the act inhuman must be added. As shown by the examples of inhuman “extermination” and “enslavement,” the acts in question must be objectively of particular scope or cruelty. Subjectively, however, an inhuman disposition of the culprit and the knowledge of the inhuman character of the act, that is to say, knowledge of the scope of the measure or of the cruelty of its execution, is additionally required. How far these conditions apply to the Defendant Sauckel must be investigated later on. A “regulated mobilization of labor,” as allowed by international law can never in itself be a crime against humanity; but its execution may be carried out in such a way that it involves killings and ill-treatment, which for their part might be war crimes.

Such ill-treatment could result from regulations issued by the highest authority involved, who thereby would bear the responsibility. It may, however, also be committed by subordinate agencies acting on their own authority without the knowledge or intention of their superior authorities. In that case the head of the agency acting on its own accord bears the responsibility. Lastly, it may be a case of a purely individual act committed against the regulations in force. For such an act the individual is solely responsible.

It follows that the Defendant Sauckel is responsible, to begin with, only for such general orders and instructions which he has given, not however for independent acts by superior authorities in the occupied territories or by supreme Reich authorities, such as the Chief of SS and Police, which were not under his jurisdiction. The orders and directives of the Defendant Sauckel have been submitted, and they must show whether the mobilization of labor as ordered by him was in fact a regulated one or was tantamount to an “ill-treatment” of the population. Apart from the call for volunteers, mobilization of labor took place on the basis of a compulsory service decree, signed as a legal measure in accordance with Hitler’s instructions by the territorial commanders. The authority to issue such laws exceeded the powers of the Defendant Sauckel, nor could he ask that any such laws be issued. He did however approve of them and made them the basis for his work. The contents of these laws were consistent with the fundamental ideas of the German laws concerning compulsory labor service. These laws were coercive. The use of coercive measures is not called for as long as the legal authority of the occupying power is acknowledged by the population; they become necessary only when such authority fails.

In this connection the Defendant Sauckel has repeatedly asked for the maintenance of executive authority by operations in partisan-infested territories for overpowering the resistance movement (Document R-124). No legal objections can be raised against the fact that to this end he demanded the use of means provided by the State. He is wrongly incriminated only by the words “SS and Police,” which have been connected by the Prosecution with the conception of crime. Such an incrimination would only be justified if the criminal character of the Police had been proven and if the Defendant Sauckel at that time had had cognizance of such criminal activity.

That force may be used in case of resistance against orders of the occupation force cannot be disputed. The question is, where are the limits of force and whether or not there are legal and illegal, admissible and inadmissible, human and inhuman, measures of force.

If fundamental laws are no longer deemed to be valid when a state of siege is declared within a state, surely this will apply all the more to a power occupying another country in wartime. Anyone who refuses to carry out the orders of the occupying power knowingly participates in the fight to which he is not entitled and has to accept the consequences. Obedience is the primary duty toward the occupying power; and where patriotism and obedience are conflicting issues, the law decides against patriotism. The punishment meted out is, as such, not subject to any limitation; and the threats of punishment by an occupation power are, for purposes of intimidation, usually extremely severe. The question is whether there exists a limit, from the standpoint of humanity, which prohibits punishment in excess of the legitimate purpose which may be considered unwarranted. Orders like the burning of houses, which were issued independently by subordinate offices in connection with the recruitment of labor, must be examined from this point of view.

This question is not easy to answer, if one bears in mind the special underlying circumstances and realizes that it was a case here of an open struggle between the occupying power and the population, with official support from the enemy. In case of uprisings and organized general resistance one cannot disclaim the applicability of the military laws as practiced by the combat troops. Necessity alone must be the decisive factor in this case. International law has put only one limit to coercive measures in forbidding, in Article 50 of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, collective punishment of an entire population for the deeds of individuals for which the population cannot be held partially responsible. It is essential that such partial responsibility shall have been established by actual events and not construed through orders. It is not specified wherein collective punishment may consist. The limitations of humanity, as I already pointed out, must be respected, but in war this is a vague conception; necessity and practical value must always have preference.

Next to the manner of recruiting labor, the conditions of work may represent an ill-treatment which can be looked upon as a war crime. On principle, there can be no question of ill-treatment whenever the foreign workers are generally treated in the same way as the workers of the home country. Different treatment is only permissible when special circumstances justify it. Whereas generally foreign workers work on the same level as the Germans, the so-called, Eastern Workers were discriminated against. The most striking difference here was the limitation of freedom. If this had been arbitrary, that would be sufficient reason for declaring this to be ill-treatment. But the reasons for this limitation of freedom were not arbitrary; they were conditioned by the State’s need for security. During wartime the presence of an enemy alien in the country always represents a danger, and it is for that very reason that originally the bringing in of foreign workers had been dispensed with. Only when necessity demanded the utilization of foreign workers did the need of security have to be taken into account simultaneously. The measures to be taken will depend upon the danger, which will vary according to the attitude of the alien. Whereas police measures with regard to the French were almost imperceptible, the Eastern Workers were in the beginning kept under supervision in camps.

The natural interest of the state lies in attaining security by winning the aliens over inwardly because their collaboration is desired. This will never be achieved by depriving them of their freedom. As long as the attitude of the alien cannot be clearly assessed, especially if he be like the citizens of the Soviet Union, propagandistically trained, more stringent control may be necessary. However, it must not develop into permanent captivity, and should at most constitute a sort of quarantine. To deprive people without guilt of their liberty for an extended period is not admissible, because that would correspond to a forbidden collective punishment. The mere assumption of danger is not sufficient to justify such limitations; there must be certain acts which show that such foreign workers appear dangerous even under normal working conditions. The custody of Eastern Workers behind barbed wire and without permission to go out, as ordered by Himmler, must be regarded as ill-treatment if it is a permanent practice.

The Defendant Sauckel, guided by a feeling that in this matter the limits of the permissible had been overstepped, immediately took steps against this and in a tough fight against Himmler demanded and obtained the withdrawal of barbed wire and the prohibition to go out, as can be seen from the ensuing decrees, Document Number Sauckel-10, Exhibit USA-206.

Where in spite of later arrangements the old methods were still applied by the police, Sauckel always intervened whenever he heard of such occurrences. This has been confirmed repeatedly by witnesses. I refer particularly to Exhibit Sauckel-10, the statement by the witness Goetz.

Another controversial point was the identification by a badge “Ost,” which was maintained until 1944 and then replaced by a national insignia. This identification of the Eastern Workers, who were free to move among the population, was necessary for security reasons. This cannot be considered ill-treatment. The distaste for this sign shown by the Eastern Workers was chiefly due to the defamation of this badge by propaganda, and the Defendant Sauckel always tried to change this insignia and to replace it by a national insignia such as the other workers wore voluntarily. He finally prevailed here also against Himmler (Document RF-810, Page 12).

Equality must also exist between a nation’s own workers and foreign workers with regard to the rules concerning maintenance of discipline. With all belligerent states the war has raised the same problem as to how to deal with those workers who do not properly fulfill their work duties; that is to say, slackers, shirkers, and saboteurs. The practice of discharge, common in peacetime, is ineffective during war; on the other hand, deserters from work cannot be tolerated today by any belligerent. In cases amounting to sabotage, police and penal measures were called for, the principal one being a short term in a labor training camp; in certain extreme cases, imprisonment in a concentration camp was inflicted. Document 1063-PS, RF-345, shows the similarity in the execution of the regulations as applied to Germans and foreigners.

Such police measures, which are caused by disloyal conduct of the worker, are justified. The Wartburg Document RF-810 shows in the report of the expert Dr. Sturm that such measures were carried out on a very moderate scale and that only 0.1 to 0.2 per thousand were thus punished.

Hence it follows that the issue of regulations concerning the maintenance of discipline is not yet in itself an ill-treatment which might form the basis for a crime against humanity. Such ill-treatment, however, can consist of excesses such as did occur outside the competence of the Defendant Sauckel. He can only be held responsible for those if he himself was subjectively to blame in that he knew of such excesses and approved of them although he might have prevented them.

In summing up one can say that the “regulated mobilization of labor” is permissible in international law and that restrictions imposed on workers within the limits of necessities must be permitted for reasons of state security. On the other hand, excesses in carrying out the regulations must be looked upon as ill-treatment and may amount to crimes against humanity. Responsibility for those rests with whoever has instigated them or who, within the sphere of his competence, failed to prevent them in the performance of his duty. When measuring the grave charges brought against the Defendant Sauckel by the standards of the aforesaid legal considerations, it will be necessary first of all to single out those fields in which the evidence reveals him to be absolutely clear of any responsibility.

In the first place, it is not proved that the Defendant Sauckel can be connected with the biological extermination of the population. His whole interest, as has been shown, pointed toward the opposite direction, since his purpose was to obtain people as laborers. He had nothing to do with migration measures and any methods used in that respect.

Work in concentration camps was just as far removed from the Defendant Sauckel’s responsibility. Himmler’s speech in Posen in October 1943 (Document 1919-PS, Page 21) reveals that the SS had erected gigantic armament plants of their own. We know that Himmler covered his extensive labor requirements by despotic arbitrary arrests of persons in occupied territories. Inside Germany he had workers engaged in regular employment arrested on insignificant pretexts and brought to concentration camps, fraudulently using the regular labor offices. This is clearly shown in Document 1063-PS, containing a letter dated 17 December 1942 as well as a letter dated 25 June 1943, in which a requirement of 35,000 prisoners is signified. Moreover, no correspondence with reference to concentration camp labor ever passed through Sauckel’s offices. As an example, I refer to Document 1584-PS containing some correspondence with Himmler’s department. The Defendant Sauckel’s name is never mentioned with reference to a conscription of prisoners, and the witnesses have unanimously stated that the Defendant Sauckel had no connection with these matters. This is also confirmed by the statement of the Director of the armament ministry’s Labor Office, Schmelter, who received the prisoners required direct from Himmler.

Another field which must be eliminated is the conscription of Jews for labor. This formed a part of labor conscription of concentration camp prisoners; it was Himmler’s own personal secret sphere. This is revealed for instance by Document R-91, in which Himmler’s service orders the arrest of 45,000 Jews as concentration camp prisoners.

By the production of Document L-61 the Prosecution has attempted to convict Sauckel of a share of guilt in this field. This document is a letter, dated 26 November 1942, from Sauckel’s office to the presidents of the provincial labor offices, stating that by agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Jewish workers remaining in the plants must be withdrawn and evacuated to Poland. As a matter of fact, this letter actually confirms that Sauckel had nothing to do with Jewish labor in the concentration camps, since Jewish workers were withdrawn from his department under the very pretext of evacuation. The measure is indeed solely concerned with the purely technical matter of excluding the Jewish laborers and replacing them by Poles, an operation which could not have been carried out without the participation of Sauckel’s office.

This letter is in continuation of a correspondence which can be traced back to the period prior to Sauckel’s assumption of office, and Document L-156 subsequently deals with the same technical operation. The unimportant character of the matter is attested by the fact that these letters were not sent from the Defendant Sauckel’s head office in the Thüringerhaus, but from an auxiliary office in the Saarlandstrasse. The Defendant Sauckel disclaims knowledge of this correspondence and points out that the letters do not bear his original signature but were, according to the routine of his service, made out in his name just because they were of minor importance. The fact that the letters begin with the routine business term of “by agreement with,” instead of “by consent of,” the Chief of Police and SD does not mean that they refer to an agreement reached, but simply points to the agency in charge of the matter.

Next, reference has been made to “extermination by labor.” However, Documents 682-PS and 654-PS, dated September 1942, unmistakably show that this is a case of a secret maneuver of Himmler and Goebbels in co-operation with the Reich Minister of Justice, Thierack. The Defendant Sauckel is not involved.

Neither was the conscription of workers for the Organization Todt under Sauckel’s responsibility. The accusations proceeding from Document UK-56 in this respect, bearing upon labor conscription methods in the Channel Islands, do not therefore concern him. The documents do not show that the Defendant Sauckel was aware of these proceedings or that he could have prevented them. This separation between the Defendant Sauckel’s labor jurisdiction and the Organization Todt is confirmed in Document L-191, the report of the International Labor Office in Montreal.

The enlistment of labor by civil and military departments is another chapter. This was to a certain extent carried out as “pirate” mobilization and kept secret from the Defendant Sauckel, because he opposed these practices and endeavored to prevent them by all means. Occasionally he was by-passed by higher orders. In this category there is labor enlistment by the SS, the Reichsbahn, Air Force construction battalions, Speer’s transport and traffic units, fortification and engineering staffs, and other services.

The exclusion of these aspects from the scope of the Indictment should exonerate Sauckel all the more since in these cases his directives did not apply.

Document 204-PS illustrates in this respect the circumstances in which transport auxiliaries were produced in White Russia. Document 334-PS shows the same with regard to the execution of an independent drive for Air Force auxiliaries, which cannot be held against Sauckel. The commitment of adolescents, known as the Hay Action, according to Document 031-PS of 14 June 1944, remained outside Sauckel’s jurisdiction and activities, as becomes clear from the document itself. The 9th Army together with the Eastern Ministry were the originators.

A letter from the Codefendant Rosenberg to Reich Minister Lammers of 20 July 1944 (Document 345-PS) falsely refers to the “agreement” of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor; on the other hand it states that the Defendant Sauckel was not connected with an SS helper action and that he refused co-operation in this affair. According to this, as stated by Document 1137-PS of 19 October 1944, a special office in the Rosenberg Ministry with its own personnel attended to the seizure of juveniles. The Defendant Sauckel’s agency was by-passed and labor furnished directly to the armament industry.

In circumvention of the Defendant Sauckel’s agency certain measures also took place which Hitler caused by direct orders to the local offices of the Armed Forces and of the civil administration; this for instance applied to the labor commitment ordered in the occupied territories for the fortification of the Crimea (Document UK-68).

The enlistment of labor in Holland, which was carried out by the Armed Forces against the protest of the labor service offices, is another of these cases; this is shown in Document 3003-PS and is confirmed by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.

An important sector, which is beyond the Defendant Sauckel’s responsibility, embraces all the actions undertaken as punitive measures against partisans and resistance groups. These are independent police measures; I already spoke about their judicial evaluation. Whether they were admissible and could be approved depends on the circumstances. For example, measures against the resistance movement in France, as described in Document UK-78 (French Government Report), cannot be included under the direct responsibility of Defendant Sauckel. Thus the most incriminating occurrences enumerated in Count 3, Paragraph VIII of the Indictment under “Deportation,” which ended in concentration camps, are not within the responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel.

The deportations for political and racial reasons, which are also mentioned under VIII (B) of the Indictment, such as the deportation of French citizens to concentration camps, do not come within the responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel either. The resettlement of Slovenes and Yugoslavs described under (B) 2, must also be excluded.

According to the Indictment (under VIII, (H) 2) only part of the approximately 5 million Soviet citizens mentioned are stated to have been seized for labor commitment, the remainder being removed in other ways to which the regulations of the Defendant Sauckel did not apply. This is important not so much on account of the number of people involved, but because the alleged bad conditions might have applied in that very sector, since there the danger of improper treatment was unquestionably greater.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

[A recess was taken.]

DR. SERVATIUS: The prisoners of war are also exempted from the field of responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel. Such labor did not have to be enlisted but was only directed. This was done by means of special labor offices, which operated independently in connection with the prisoner-of-war camps and collaborated exclusively with the Armed Forces. Their task consisted only of employing prisoners of war where they were needed. The Defendant Sauckel could only request a transfer of prisoners of war. This is referred to in the Prosecution Document 1296-PS, of 27 July 1943, which mentions under Heading III the increase in the employment of prisoners of war in collaboration with the Army High Command.

The assignment of prisoners of war to plants took place under the supervision of the Armed Forces, who at the same time enforced observance of the Geneva Convention. Sauckel is in no way connected with the death of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war of the Soviet Union in 1941 of whom Himmler speaks in his Posen speech (Document 1919-PS) and for whose replacement workers had to be brought in.

By Document USSR-415, the official Soviet report about the Lamsdorf Camp, the Defendant Sauckel is connected with the alleged ill-treatment of prisoners; but this is done merely because the number of personnel in the camp was reported to him as a purely routine matter. The charge cannot be maintained. The document, moreover, is not chronologically substantiated after the year 1941.

The Defendant Sauckel, although personally not competent, intervened in excess of his official duties for the care of the prisoners of war, because he had an interest in their work morale. He issued general decrees; this Document Sauckel-36 shows that he demanded an adequate standard food supply, and Document Sauckel-39 shows that he demanded the same working hours as for German workers; he also stressed the fact that no disciplinary punishment could be inflicted by the plants.

Further discrimination among the accusations raised must be made according to the time of the incidents. The Defendant Sauckel did not take over his office until 21 March 1942. His measures, therefore, could only have had effect some time later. What conditions prevailed previous to that can be seen from some documents dating from 1941. In Document 1206-PS leading authorities advocated feeding the workers on horse and cat meat, and in Document USSR-177 the production of bread of very inferior quality is suggested. Just a short time before the Defendant Sauckel took office Himmler in a sharp decree ordered the confinement of the workers behind barbed wire. It is fair to say that an extremely low level in the treatment of the foreign workers at that time in the Reich had been reached. The conception which prevailed with regard to the powers of resistance and the working capacity of the Russians is tragic.

With the advent of the Defendant Sauckel a fundamental change took place, which led to a constantly increasing improvement of the situation. The credit for having effected a change here is, according to some documents I will cite, solely due to the Defendant Sauckel. This is shown in particular by Document EC-318, which is a record, dated 15 April 1942, of the first meeting between the Defendant Sauckel and Reich Minister Seldte and his specialist staff when taking office. It is recorded there that it was the Defendant Sauckel who made his assumption of office dependent on the condition that food supplies for foreigners must equal those for Germans, and that the granting of this request was guaranteed by Hitler, Göring, the Minister for Food, Darré, and his state secretary, Backe. It is also established there that the Defendant Sauckel demanded the removal of the barbed wire, and actually succeeded in this; and finally, that he immediately took steps against the low wages of the Eastern Workers. The execution of his fundamental demands was then also immediately followed through with tenacity by the Defendant Sauckel against the resistance of all authorities.

The program of the mobilization of labor of 20 April 1942, Document 016-PS, accordingly proceeds to inveigh against all acts of cruelty and chicanery and demands that foreign workers be correctly and humanely treated; a hope is even expressed that a propaganda effect in Germany’s favor ought to be achieved by the way in which labor allocation was carried out. This thought was frequently reiterated later. An economical allocation of workers was urged in order to counteract the waste indulged in by influential agencies.

A year later, on 20 April 1943, the Defendant Sauckel again addressed a declaration of the procedure to be followed to all persons concerned with labor commitment. This is the repeatedly mentioned “Manifesto of Labor Allocation,” Document Number Sauckel-81, which was issued as a warning and a call to battle addressed to all agencies preparing to challenge the serious responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel. Goebbels opposed it by claiming that the title was too assuming, while the propaganda aspect went beyond the bounds of the matter. Other agencies simply disregarded the copies sent to them and did not forward them, whereupon Sauckel sent copies directly to the industries concerned. How this circular was dealt with by the various recalcitrant agencies is shown by its description as a “notorious manifesto,” as it was referred to unchallenged in a session of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944; Document R-124, Page 1779.

The Defendant Sauckel was reproached for having been over-zealous. I refer to a remark made by General Milch (who was interrogated before the Tribunal), in which he mentions the Central Planning Board, criticizing the allegedly too lenient treatment of loafers, and declaring that if anything was undertaken against them, agencies would immediately become interested in Germany which would protect the “poor fellow” and intercede for the human rights of others. This is Document R-124, Page 1913.

The attitude of Defendant Sauckel was generally known and has been confirmed by various documents. Thus all the agencies addressed themselves to him in case of complaints and deficiencies, not in order to make the Defendant Sauckel responsible for them, but to solicit his help, because everybody knew how eagerly he advocated improvements.

Thus Document 084-PS, which is a report by Dr. Gutkelch of the Central Agency for Eastern Nations of the Rosenberg Ministry, dated 30 September 1942, emphasized in various places the influence of the Defendant Sauckel and recommends getting into closer touch with him. His Codefendant Rosenberg also points to Sauckel’s strenuous efforts in Document 194-PS, Page 6, a letter of 14 December 1942 to Koch, Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine. The Codefendant Frank likewise on 21 November 1943 applied to the Defendant Sauckel—Document 908-PS—for a basic change in the legal position of Poles inside the Reich.

To what extent do real events correspond with that which has been stated? The first point to be dealt with is the mobilization, which is practically identical with the point of deportation. Then follows the examination of the treatment of workers as designated by the term “slave labor.”

The evidence has refuted the erroneous assumption that the Defendant Sauckel carried out the enlistment and mobilization of foreign workers on his own responsibility and through his own organization. It has been established that the supreme authorities in the occupied territories executed the laws regarding compulsory work as they had received them on Hitler’s orders. All these agencies had their own administrative system and guarded their departments against the intrusion of others.

A communication of the Rosenberg Ministry of the East to Koch, the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, dated 14 December 1942, Document 194-PS, Page 7, in which the Codefendant Rosenberg particularly refers to the right of sovereignty existing in questions of labor allocation, proves that this administrative system had not been infringed upon. These supreme authorities had their own labor offices which were organized in detail from each ministry down to the least important office. In reference I wish to cite Document 3012-PS, an ordinance of 6 February 1943, by the Supreme Command of the Army, dealing with compulsory work in the Eastern operational sector, and Document RF-15, an ordinance of 6 October 1942.

The Defendant Sauckel could merely place requests with these agencies for the number of workers he was ordered to bring to Germany, and give them the necessary instructions. These were his limitations, which he never exceeded. He respected the right of execution as opposed to the right of issuing instructions. For these tasks deputies were appointed for each territory who, in accordance with the ordinance of 30 September 1942, Exhibit USA-510, were directly subordinate to the Defendant Sauckel; they did not however belong to his agency, but to the territorial authorities. It was expressly confirmed by the witness Bail, called by the Codefendant Rosenberg, that this applied to the chief deputy in the East, State Counsellor Peuckert who belonged to the staff of the Eastern Ministry.

This State Counsellor Peuckert was at the same time consultant for the Economic Staff East for the rear army area which bordered on the territory under civil administration; here too he acted only in an accessory capacity as deputy of the Defendant Sauckel. This is proved by Document 3012-PS, which is a memorandum dealing with a conversation of 10 March 1943 concerning labor allocation, in which the position of Peuckert is noted on the attendance list. Through this arrangement with regard to Peuckert’s functions, created in the interest of the territorial authorities, all personal interference by the Defendant Sauckel was made impossible. In Document 018-PS, that is, in the letter to the Defendant Sauckel dated 21 December 1942, the Codefendant Rosenberg complains about the methods of labor mobilization in the East; but this must be considered as the complaint of a minister who is unable to assert himself against his subordinates and turns toward the presumable sources of the difficulties he is encountering.

It is true that these difficulties could have been removed immediately if the Defendant Sauckel had refrained from insisting on the fulfillment of his mission. But this fulfillment was the very task, specified in the decree of appointment as having to be effected under all circumstances.

The Defendant Sauckel had to fight against all obstacles due to weakness or departmental egotism, and had to see to it that local agencies did not out of a desire to let things ride fail to supply the required manpower, while other offices held it back out of selfish interests. “With all means” and “ruthlessly” are recurring expressions employed in combating these symptoms.

General Falkenhausen, the military commander in Belgium and northern France, during his hearing erroneously declared in Document RF-15 that the Defendant Sauckel forced him to mobilize labor and had carried this out by the aid of a special “organization” of his own. However, he had to admit that this was incorrect when the order signed by himself about the introduction of compulsory labor was put before him. This is also confirmed by the statements of the witnesses Timm and Stothfang.

In France workers were mobilized by the French administration. The superior German office was not the office of the Defendant Sauckel, but of the military commander in France, where Sauckel had only a deputy. The negotiations which the Defendant Sauckel conducted in Paris and which were the subject of the evidence lie outside of this activity; they are negotiations of a diplomatic nature between the German and French Governments in which Sauckel participated. They were held in the German Embassy.

Conditions and circumstances in the other territories were analogous. The recruiting commissions, which corresponded to the labor mobilization staffs in the rear army areas and the operational zones, were also by no means offices of the Defendant Sauckel, as the Codefendant Rosenberg assumes. These recruiting commissions were vaguely connected with the Defendant Sauckel only insofar as they were composed of experts who emanated from the German labor offices belonging to Sauckel’s department. They received directives only through their superior office, in order to guarantee uniform handling of all recruiting regulations. Regulation Number 4 in Document Number Sauckel-15 is very clear on this point. This advance appointment of the deputies as of 30 September 1942, which was already issued on 7 May 1942, provides for the sole responsibility of the military and civil authorities of the occupied territories. The deputies mentioned there as having been assigned the same functions, are the deputies with the German missions in friendly foreign countries.

This was misunderstood by the Prosecution, so that wrong conclusions were arrived at, to the disadvantage of the Defendant Sauckel, about the responsibility for recruiting and transport. The interpretation of the provision that all technical and administrative procedures of labor allocation were exclusively within the competence and responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel is also incorrect as far as occupied territory is concerned. This stipulation refers solely to the functions in the Reich and establishes the competence of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of the district labor offices, and the labor offices; this can be seen from Document 016-PS, last paragraph.

The Defendant Sauckel, therefore, is not directly responsible for the conscription of manpower. Indirectly, however, responsibility can be charged to him in that although he was aware of these unsatisfactory conditions and knew that they could not be stopped, he nevertheless demanded more workers.

It must be added that in the Defendant Rosenberg’s letter of 21 December 1942, Document 018-PS, the Defendant Sauckel learned for the first time of the recruiting methods which were described as mass deportation. At the meeting which followed in the beginning of January 1943, the Defendant Rosenberg declared that he was opposed to this and that he would not tolerate such procedures. This is also confirmed by his previous letter of 14 December 1942 addressed to Koch, Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Document 194-PS, in which he clearly calls the latter’s attention to his obligations to proceed legally.

Koch’s memorandum of 16 March 1943, Document Rosenberg-13, of which the Defendant Sauckel learned only here at the Trial, explains that these incidents are exaggerated individual cases, their justification being based on the necessity of carrying out measures for the restoration of the prestige of the occupation authority. It is expressly declared in this that the recruitment of workers was undertaken by legal means and that steps were being taken in the event of arbitrary measures, Document Number Rosenberg-13, Pages 11 and 12.

It was not altogether impossible that it might have been a matter of tricky propaganda exaggerations, as Koch specifically points out. In wartime such a possibility exists, and the propaganda tendency of the Molotov reports (Document USSR-151) goes to emphasize this.

The Defendant Sauckel was also supported in this idea by the result of an investigation into the details of a “manhunt” which was reported to him at Minsk by Field Marshal Kluge; it turned out to be a round-up of workers employed by a private firm at the time of the retreat.

The Katyn case shows how difficult it is to determine the truth of such events when they are made use of as effective weapons of propaganda. As the witnesses from the Defendant Sauckel’s office have confirmed, no other incidents involving such abuses have become known. The cases reported are to a certain extent obviously repetitions of the same happenings as communicated from various sources.

None of these reports, however, displays any desire to approve of such things; they are a sort of house alarm for the purpose of remedying and improving conditions.

Now, can one believe the Defendant Sauckel when he declares that he did not know about the conditions alleged by the Prosecution? What reached him through official channels is insufficient as proof of cognizance, and the witnesses confirm that the so-called “methods” were unknown. On the other hand we find here documents of the authorities of the occupied countries from which it appears that the Reich Commissioner in the Ukraine ordered the burning down of houses in retaliation for resisting the administration, and there are decrees providing for such measures. Reports made to the Eastern Ministry regarding such events do not lead to penal prosecution but to suspension of the proceedings, such as the Raab case (Document 254-PS) and the Müller case (Document 290-PS).

Any doubt must be countered with the following: The measures employed were not approved by the highest instances, and were only surreptitiously applied by the lower offices who therefore had every reason not to let them become known. From the files on the preliminary proceedings of the cases of Raab and Müller it definitely appears that the existing regulations were unknown at the ministry.

The Defendant Sauckel did travel through the Ukraine, but it is unlikely that his attention should have been called to matters which might have got the local offices into trouble. The views of the Defendant Sauckel were well known, while on the other hand there existed a violent quarrel between the offices of Reich Commissioner Koch and Reich Minister Rosenberg. When the documents from both offices such as have been submitted are read carefully, it can be seen from the file notes that in this struggle both sides were collecting arguments and that neither wished to commit itself. Since the Defendant Sauckel himself had no direct authority, it is understandable that actual conditions should have remained unknown to him. Still another point of view must be considered: various documents mention that a certain pressure would have to be applied in the procurement of workers, since the workers were to be obtained “under all circumstances.” Does this sanction all methods? It remains to be seen what was actually done in pursuance of these statements.

The OKH in one case thereupon ordered the increased mobilization of workers and permitted collective conscription, while prohibiting collective punishment. In this connection see Document 3012-PS, containing a telephone message from the Economy Staff East to General Stapf of 11 March 1943.

The best illustration can be found in that same Document 3012-PS by a file note concerning a discussion of 10 March 1943. Here General Nagel requests clear guiding principles and State Counsellor Peuckert asks for “reasonable” recruitment methods to be established by the OKH as the authorized agency. Document 2280-PS is also relevant here, which is the only personal statement made in Riga on 3 May 1943 on this question by the Defendant Sauckel. There he states that only “all permissible means” are allowed.

Document 3010-PS, Economy Inspection South, may also be quoted, in which on 17 August 1943 the use of “all suitable means” is permitted.

Orders are issued which contain severe measures in case of noncompliance with the duty to work: deprivation of ration and clothing cards. Imprisonment of relatives is threatened, as well as the taking of hostages.

What is the position as to the admissibility of such measures?

The deprivation of food cards has today become a generally applied means of coercion based on the rationing system, which derives from present-day conditions. It is easily carried out and does not require any special executive force, while being extremely effective. Concerning the imprisonment of relatives, severe violations of personal custody can be recorded even today. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare offers protection only against collective punishment of the population, but it does not protect the members of the family who may be considered as sharing the responsibility in the case of a refusal to work. The French law of 11 June 1943, which was presented as Document RF-80, also provides for such imprisonment only in the case of deliberate co-operation.

There finally remains the shooting of a prefect, which the Defendant Sauckel demanded. Apart from the fact that this statement as such is irrelevant from the point of view of criminal law, because it was not actually carried out, its legal import is merely a request to apply the existing French law. This law has been submitted by the Prosecution as Document RF-25, a decree of 31 January 1943 by the military commander in France, Article 2 of which provides for the death penalty.

Equally misunderstood by the Prosecution is a statement uttered by the Defendant Sauckel according to which one should handcuff the workers in a polite way (Document RF-86, Page 10, negotiation by Sauckel in Paris on 27 August 1943). But as appears from the context, the point in question is merely a comparison between the clumsy manner of the Police and the obliging manner of the French; handcuffing was not thereby especially advocated as a method of mobilization: Clean, correct, and Prussian on the one hand while at the same time obliging and polite on the other; that is how the work was to have been done.

I also refer to the proposal for “shanghaiing” as described in Document R-124, Page 1770, which is known to the Tribunal from the proceedings. The statement which the Defendant Sauckel has made gives an understandable explanation; according to it, this was legally a preliminary recruitment intended to induce the workers to agree to the real enlistment later on in the official recruitment offices.

These various incidents—shooting of a prefect, handcuffing, and shanghaiing—may be explained in various ways, but one can reach a complete understanding of the subjective side only if one considers why these statements were made, and under what conditions. The underlying reason for all these statements is the struggle against resistance and sabotage which in France assumed ever greater proportions. Therefore it is not a question of brutality and cynicism; rather were these statements intended to counteract the indecision displayed by the authorities.

Another consideration which must be appended here is whether the Defendant Sauckel had not exhausted the manpower of the country by his measures to such an extent that more workers could only be obtained by inhuman methods and that the Defendant Sauckel must have known this. The important point here is the figure for the “quotas.” It has been established that they were high, but it has also been established that they were not fixed arbitrarily, but only after a careful study by the statistical department. Only a small percentage of the population was actually apprehended, and the decisive issue was not so much their inability to perform the work required as their will to offer resistance. In the occupied territories of the East were large reserves of manpower, especially among older adolescents, which were not effectively utilized. The German troops, their ranks greatly thinned, saw the densely populated villages during their retreat, and then felt the impact of the enemy thus reinforced shortly afterward.

In France there were likewise many forces which placed themselves under the protection of the Maquis or the “blocked factories.” This is confirmed not only by the French Government Report, Document Number RF-22, but is also apparent from a remark which Kehrl, a witness for the Codefendant Speer, made in the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944, Document R-124, Page 66. This witness states there that labor was available on an abundant scale in France.

Another conclusive contribution here is Document 1764-PS, Page 6, which is the report by Minister Hemmen of 15 February 1944, which deals with the “Reconstruction Program” of Marshal Pétain, and points out that the population was unscathed by war and was increasing by 300,000 young men every year.

If the number of workers mobilized is deemed to be of importance in this connection, it must be compared with the total population figures, while on the other hand it should be taken into consideration that Germany did not demand anything which she did not ask of herself to an even higher degree. The Defendant Sauckel was forced to the conclusion that the people, instead of being unable to work, did not want to do so. In order to influence the people the propaganda struggle intensified, and threats of punishment were proclaimed by both parties; this first engendered in the population of the occupied territories a conflict of feelings which was the undoing of many.

The Defendant Sauckel could with good reason refer to the results of the counterpropaganda and of the deteriorating war situation as necessitating coercion; he could not, however, on the basis of the information at his disposal become convinced that the exhaustion of the countries was so great that nothing more could be extracted from them without the use of inhuman methods. The Defendant Sauckel believed he could obtain his object by creating special working conditions rather than by using violence. As an example I refer to the promise which Sauckel himself gave on 3 May 1943 in Riga, Document 2228-PS.

Apart from all this there is one more field of labor procurement which must be put in a different category. That is the liberation of prisoners of war on condition that labor forces be made available for Germany by “relève” or “transformation.”

The French Government Report RF-22 declares both methods of procuring labor forces to be inadmissible. It is pointed out in the report that the exchange on the basis of “relève” amounted to the enslavement of a roughly threefold number of French workers. Against this it must be stated that the replacement workers came only for 6 months for voluntary work and in succession. At the end of 18 months all workers were free, while the prisoner was liberated immediately.

Coercion for the execution of the “relève” did not exist. From a legal point of view it was not assailable. Captivity can be terminated at any time; release may be made subject to a condition. The French report unduly stresses its moral indignation in quoting a phrase of the president of a news agency of the United States; this phrase speaks of the “abominable choice of either to work for the hereditary enemy or to deprive a son of one’s own country of a chance of release from captivity.”

To refute this, I refer to the healthy sentiment according to which in the older Russian literature such a change was applauded as a patriotic and magnanimous deed during the Nordic War. Neither the King of Sweden nor Peter the Great seems to have considered exchange as equal to replacement by a substitute slave.

The “transformation” (“Erleichtertes Statut”) is contained in Document Number Sauckel-101. This is the release of a Frenchman from captivity if he accepts other work, or under condition that an additional French worker should come to Germany according to the “relève” regulations. No prisoner of war was forced in this manner to change his legal status, but whole camps volunteered for it. If a prisoner made use of the possibility offered, he forfeited thereby the special legal protection of the Geneva Convention with regard to work; but this was done in agreement with his government, and thus does not constitute a violation of international law.

The home furlough connected with the change-over was discontinued because the men granted these furloughs did not return, even in the case of the first convoys. The French Report, RF-22, itself states on Page 69 that of the 8,000 men forming one leave convoy, 2,000 did not return. The report states that the “unfortunate people” were placed before the alternative: “Either you return, or your brothers die.” This consideration, however, did not impress them. Nor could their promise prevent them from immediately joining the Maquis.

The cancellation of these home furloughs does not therefore constitute an arbitrary act in slave labor. Perusal of the French report can only strengthen that impression.

It follows therefore that no conscription of workers, violating the laws of war or carried out in an inhuman manner, was effected by the Defendant Sauckel in this field either.

I now come to the question of the treatment of workers.

In order to facilitate proper judgment, a clear distinction must be made between the different bearers of responsibility. The works manager was responsible for general labor conditions in the works, while the general conditions of life outside the works were the competence of the German Labor Front.

These spheres of responsibility become clearly apparent through the fact that two exponents for them are mentioned in the Indictment, namely, Krupp and Dr. Ley. The Defendant Sauckel can be held responsible for what happened in these spheres only insofar as events were due to his decrees, or where, contrary to his duty, he failed to exercise direct supervision. The Defendant Sauckel was directly responsible for the wages. On assuming office he found a table of wages which he could not modify on his own responsibility; to do so he had to apply for permission to his superior office, which was the Four Year Plan, and for the consent of the competent Reich minister. The legal regulations compiled in the chapter on wages of my Document Book 2 show that the basic decrees were not issued by the Defendant Sauckel, but by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich (see Documents Sauckel-50, 17, and 58) and the Reich Minister of Economics (Document Sauckel-51) and the Reich Minister of Finance (Document Number Sauckel-52).

The Defendant Sauckel could schedule wages and fix wages for piece work only within the general outlines existing for him, and in so doing he had to consider the interests of the ministries in question. So far as it was at all possible for the Defendant Sauckel to do so, he worked for an amelioration; thus a series of his decrees show that he granted premiums such as bonuses, compensatory payments, and the like [see Document Numbers Sauckel-54 and 58(a)].

The Defendant Sauckel’s activity, however, could on the whole only aim at increasing wages by influencing the competent agency. This is shown in Document 021-PS of 2 April 1943. There we find as appendix a treatise with statistical material bearing on a proposal for a basic improvement of wages for Eastern Workers. From a study of wage sheets dating from different periods it will also be seen that the average wages of Eastern Workers were raised several times during the Defendant Sauckel’s term of office.

It was for the Defendant Sauckel to determine the working hours, but only within the framework of the superior competence of the Reich Minister of Labor Seldte. This is shown by Document Number Sauckel-67, where Seldte fixes the working hours for Eastern Workers in Paragraph 3 of the Decree of 25 January 1944. Generally speaking, the working hours were the same as for the German workers, depending upon the output in each factory. This is also admitted by the French Government Report, Document UK-783; the cases enumerated there, on Page 580, of excessive working hours are contrary to the orders of the Defendant Sauckel.

Since they do not specify any year, it cannot be ascertained if they deal only with temporary measures or with permanent conditions. The same lack of clarity obtains in the French Report RF-22, Page 101; there the minimum working time is given as 72 hours, which was liable to increase to 100 hours. This may refer to the work of concentration camp inmates. Working hours were then changed by Goebbels, who on the basis of his powers of plenipotentiary for the waging of total war introduced the 10-hour day for Germans and foreigners alike, although in practice this could not be applied generally. Unreasonably long working hours cannot be maintained and will lead to setbacks. I should like to add that Sauckel was responsible for the fact that these extra hours were paid for, or compensated, in the same manner as overtime work.

Special attention has been paid by the Prosecution to the regulation of the working hours of female domestic workers from the East, of whom, instead of the 400,000-500,000 girls originally demanded by Hitler; only 13,000 actually came to Germany. The Prosecution has presented the instructions for the employment of these female domestic workers as Document USSR-383. There it says under Number 9 that they shall not be entitled to take time off. The purpose of this was to leave the settlement of their time off to each household according to convenience. Any other interpretation of the regulation is hardly imaginable, because after all it was intended permanently to receive these female domestic workers into the families, and to give them the chance to remain in Germany. They had been selected as girls who were considered particularly dependable, and had all reported voluntarily for domestic work. In the light of new experiences the order was later modified by a subsequent decree (Document Number Sauckel-26), by which all remaining limitations were also canceled.

Determination of working hours for children took place within the scope of the German labor protection legislation. This referred to children who, contrary to the decrees of the Defendant Sauckel, had come to Germany with their parents in an irregular manner. Their work can have concerned only rural occupations, since that applies equally to German children. In this context it may be pointed out that during the war schoolchildren in Germany as from 10 years of age could be employed for work in accordance with the decree of the Reich Youth Leader of 11 April 1942 [Document Number Sauckel-67(a)].

A general survey by Dr. Blumensaat in the complete Document Number Sauckel-89 provides full information about the entire complex of wages and working hours as finally established by laws.

This factor of immediate responsibility alone, however, cannot serve the Defendant Sauckel as an excuse, if he knew and tolerated those things which, according to the Prosecution’s assertion, characterized the transports and life in the camps and factories. It was his duty to superintend even where he was not directly responsible.

The accommodation and feeding of the workers was the responsibility of the industries. With regard to the installations of the camps for foreigners, the same regulations as for the camps for German workers applied by virtue of decrees by the Reich Minister of Labor, Seldte (Documents Number Sauckel-42, 43 and 44). It is indisputable that the accommodation suffered as a result of difficulties, in particular from the effects of air warfare. The deficiencies, however, were remedied as far as at all possible. The situation of the foreign workers was not different from that of the German civilian population.

The food supply suffered from the blockade and transportation difficulties. The established rations, contrary to the notorious statements on the feeding of the Russians, amounted to 2,540 calories for the Soviet prisoners of war, according to the table of 24 November 1941 in Document USSR-177. A further table has been submitted with the affidavit of the witness Hahn as Exhibit Number Sauckel-11. According to this rations in the Krupp works amounted to 2,156 calories for the ordinary Eastern Worker and 2,615 calories for those performing heavy work; supervision insured a proper distribution.

The Reich Ministry of Food was responsible for the supply of food. Grave accusations have been made by the Prosecution with regard to both points. These, however, can only apply where the existing regulations were not observed. It is quite likely that mistakes should have been made in this large sphere of activity in the course of years, but the general picture is not composed of mistakes, and judgment cannot be based thereon. The actual conditions have not been clarified in this procedure to the extent that one might contend that deficiencies were so general and obvious that the Defendant Sauckel must have known them, and did in fact know them.

In contrast to the vague statements of the witness Dr. Jäger we have the affidavit of the witness Hahn, which refutes the former to a large extent. The affidavits of the witnesses Scharmann and Dr. Voss (Exhibits Number Sauckel-17 and 18) confirm that no serious deficiencies existed in their spheres of activity.

In addition to the obligations on the part of the works managers, the German Labor Front had to look after the foreign workers (Document Number Sauckel-16). Its tasks included transports and the supervision of medical care, as well as general welfare activities. The extensive activity which this very large organization developed has not been described in these proceedings. The basic principles of the German Labor Front can be seen from Document Number Sauckel-27, which is the ordinance of the German Labor Front regarding the status of foreign workers at their working site. The aim is characterized as maintenance of morale by observing conditions of contracts, absolutely fair treatment, and comprehensive care and attention.

The German Labor Front was also responsible for transports, according to Regulation Number 4 (Document Number Sauckel-15), wherein Sauckel’s instructions are contained. This task included transport as far as the working site. The witnesses Timm, Stothfang, and Hildebrandt have testified about this and did not report anything about bad conditions. The description in the Molotov Report (USSR-51) cannot refer to transports carried out under orderly direction, but only to so-called “pirate” convoys. The same applies to convoys which, according to the Indictment, were heading for the concentration camps. The special attention which the Defendant Sauckel from the very beginning accorded to the transport problem, is shown particularly by Document 2241-PS, submitted by the Prosecution. It contains a decree where detailed directives to prevent the utilization of unsuitable trains are given.

However, mistakes did occur, especially the incident mentioned in Document 054-PS in connection with a return transport of workers. These had been brought into the Reich before Sauckel’s time in a manner contrary to his basic principles. The matter was an isolated incident, and the necessary steps were immediately taken. The return of sick persons unfit for travel was prohibited, and Bad Frankenhausen was placed at their disposal, Document 084-PS, Page 22. This was followed by the order specifying the attendance at such transports of male and female Red Cross nurses (Document Number Sauckel-99).

The carefully and thoroughly organized system of medical care, which operated in collaboration with the Association of Panel Doctors did not break down in the face of the greatest difficulties; rather is it a fact that no epidemics or serious diseases broke out.

The cases presented by the Prosecution from some camps among the total of 60 run by Krupp’s can only have arisen out of an unusual chain of circumstances. They cannot prove that bad conditions, of which these examples might have been typical, prevailed generally.

Another document, RF-91, has been presented, which contains the medical report of Dr. Février of the French Delegation of the German Labor Front, which was compiled after the beginning of the invasion on 15 June 1944. Besides deficiencies it is intended to correct, the report also points out favorable aspects. It speaks with particular acknowledgement of leaders of youth camps, of the systematic X-ray examinations, and of the support given by district administrations, and similar things. A genuine over-all picture of conditions could only be obtained by the study of the medical reports of the health offices of the German Labor Front existing everywhere.

For the defense of the Defendant Sauckel it may be said here that from his remote post he could not obtain a clear picture of unsatisfactory details. Any sanctioning of such bad conditions would have been in striking contrast to the actions and declarations of Sauckel. The Defendant Sauckel did not acquiesce when, for instance, one Gauleiter said: “If anybody is going to be cold, then first of all let it be the Russians.” He intervened and publicly proclaimed his views in his official Handbook on the Allocation of Labor (Document Number Sauckel-19). The Defendant Sauckel also made efforts to improve the food, although this was outside his competence. That has been confirmed by several witnesses, among others the witness Goetz (Exhibit Number Sauckel-10). It is also shown by the record of the Central Planning Board (Document R-124, Page 1783). The Defendant Sauckel did not let matters slide, but established a personal staff of his own, whose members traveled around the camps and corrected bad conditions on the spot. He also endeavored to obtain clothing, and put factories to work to a large extent for the purpose of supplying Eastern Workers. All the witnesses heard regarding this problem have again and again unanimously confirmed that the Defendant Sauckel basically took great interest in the welfare of workers.

I would also refer to the announcements and speeches of the Defendant Sauckel, which always advocate good treatment. I do not wish to enumerate the documents in detail, and shall only mention in particular the “manifesto” on the allocation of labor, Document Number Sauckel-84, in which he refers to his binding basic principles, and demands that these be constantly kept in mind. I also refer to the speeches to the presidents of the provincial labor offices of 24 August 1943 (Document Number Sauckel-86), and of 17 January 1944 (Document Number Sauckel-88). The Defendant Sauckel finally got even Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann to acknowledge his ideas as correct. That is shown by Document 205-PS of 5 May 1943, which is a memorandum regarding the general basic principles for the treatment of foreign workers. There the basic principles of a regulated mobilization of labor are accepted.

How do the statements of the Prosecution on ill-treatment of workers as slaves correspond with this? It will be necessary to examine closely whether the cases referred to involve real abuses affecting workers in the process of normal mobilization, or abuses incidental to the deportation of prisoners and to their work. Next, one should investigate exaggerations and distortions such as may be due to human weakness and foibles. In my opinion no adequate clarification of this subject has so far been obtained, and press reports have already begun to appear which are bound to increase doubts as to the accepted standard applying to the life of foreign workers.

The plan submitted as Exhibit Number Sauckel-3 displays the numerous offices for checking and inspection relative to the question of laborers. They did not report any particular abuses to the offices of the Defendant Sauckel. Perhaps the fact that these offices were so numerous constitutes a weakness: It is quite possible that each government department kept silent about whatever mistakes originated under its own jurisdiction and failed to bring them to the attention of the Defendant Sauckel, because as a rule the controlling agencies were on a higher level than the Defendant Sauckel. This should be considered particularly with regard to relations between the most important agency, the German Labor Front, under the leadership of Reichsleiter Dr. Ley, and Gauleiter Sauckel.

On closer examination of the document submitted as 1913-PS, an agreement on the creation of “central inspection offices for the care and welfare of foreign labor,” it appears to have been carefully designed as an instrument of defense against the Defendant Sauckel. The document was devised by Dr. Ley and signed on 2 June 1943, then submitted for his signature to the Defendant Sauckel who did not approve or publish it until 20 September 1943. It is quite possible that Dr. Ley did not wish to invite criticism. On the other hand, there is little likelihood that the abuses were general and manifested themselves openly. Otherwise they would obviously have become known to the Defendant Sauckel through his own control agencies.

In addition to his own staff, the Defendant Sauckel on 6 April 1942 appointed the Gauleiter as “Commissioners for the Mobilization of Labor,” impressing upon them as their foremost duty that of supervision with regard to the enforcement of his orders. This becomes apparent from Document Number Sauckel-9, Figure 5; the same applies to Document 633-PS of 14 March 1943. Several Gauleiter were examined by the Tribunal as witnesses, and they have confirmed the fact that the supervision was carried out as ordered and that Sauckel checked it through members of his staff. No abuses were reported.

After due consideration of the matter, whom should one believe? Are we concerned here with exaggerated complaints, or do findings to the contrary command credibility? There is no testimony by those Frenchmen who, according to Document UK-783, Draft III, were taken to the real slave centers; there is no testimony by those Russians, who, according to Document USSR-51, were sold at 10 or 15 Reichsmark.

In any case one fact clearly speaks in favor of the Defendant Sauckel, one which has always been confirmed by competent witnesses, namely, that the workers were willing and industrious and that when the collapse came no uprising occurred in which they would have given vent to their natural wrath against the slaveholders.

I have summarized actual happenings and appraised them juridically. All this, however, must appear to be juridical quibbling when a higher responsibility is involved. It has been stated here that it would not do to let the insignificant works managers take the blame, and that the moral responsibility must go to the highest Reich Government offices: On their own initiative they ought to have introduced corrections on a larger scale to cope with the difficulties inherent in the circumstances of that time. This might have applied to offices which had the power and the means to bring about improvement. The Defendant Sauckel and his small personal staff had merely been incorporated in a ministry already in existence, and he had no such means at his disposal. His authority consisted of a narrowly defined power to give directives on the mobilization of labor, and he untiringly made use of this authority.

The works managers in the armament industry formed an independent administration and were secure from so-called bureaucrats. The duty of self-maintenance results from such a privilege of self-administration. Consequently, if something was to be done to improve the security of foreign workers, or their situation in armaments works, it was up to these establishments and to the armaments ministry, under whose supervision they operated, to deal with the matter. It was not the duty of the office of the Defendant Sauckel to intervene in these matters, since it was under the armaments ministry. That is clearly evident from Document 4006-PS, containing the decree of 22 June 1944, and is also borne out by the most intimate personal relations between the armaments minister and Hitler, which made him the most influential man in the economic sphere. If higher responsibility existed for mistakes made in the factories, such responsibility can be placed only at the door of those who had knowledge of such conditions and the power to correct them.

There is still another legal question to be considered with regard to the Indictment; namely, whether the position of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor is determined by Article 7 or Article 8, in other words, whether the Defendant Sauckel was an independent government official or whether he acted on orders. The requests for labor were placed from time to time on Hitler’s special orders, in the form of a general program, and only the subsequent distribution was left to Sauckel. This is also confirmed by the fact that the Defendant Sauckel always refers to Hitler’s “orders and instructions,” as in the manifestos of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (Document Number Sauckel-84, in circulars to the Gauleiter, Figure 7, Document Number Sauckel-83 and others). From this also derives the fact that the Defendant Sauckel in every case specifically reports execution of the orders, as well as the beginning and end of his official journeys (Document 556-PS of 10 January 1944 and 28 July 1943).

Another argument against his working independently is that according to the nomination decree the Defendant Sauckel was immediately subordinate to the Four Year Plan and attached to the Reich Ministry for Labor, which had been preserved with its state secretaries; only two departments were placed at his disposal. If the form of responsibility is to be determined, it can thus only be within the limits of Article 8 of the Charter.

Herewith I conclude my exposition regarding the special field of labor allocation.

The Defendant Sauckel is accused on all Counts of the Indictment, in addition to labor mobilization; specific acts however are not charged against him. A closer characterization of the accusation has been effected in the course of the proceedings only with regard to the concentration camps. In this connection, however, it has been proved by a sworn statement by the witness Falkenhorst (Exhibit Number 23) and an affidavit by the witness Dieter Sauckel (Exhibit Number 9) that no order for the evacuation of the Buchenwald Camp upon the approach of American troops was given. Knowledge and approval of conditions at the camp cannot be deduced from two visits of the camp before 1939, because the excesses submitted by the Prosecution had not yet occurred. Nor did the geographical proximity of the camp to the Gauleitung of the Defendant Sauckel bring about any close connection with the SS staff, as they had their seat in Kassel and Magdeburg. Finally it must be remembered that the human convictions of the Defendant Sauckel, which were based on his earlier career, were irreconcilable with Himmler’s point of view.

What part can the Defendant Sauckel have played in the conspiracy? He was Gauleiter in Thuringia and did not rise above the rest of the Gauleiter. His activities and his aims can be deduced from his fighting speeches, which have been submitted as Document Number Sauckel-95. They consistently show the fight for “liberty and bread,” and a desire for real peace.

During his activity, extending over many years in the Party, the Party program was authoritative for the Defendant Sauckel; the aims and plans contained therein required neither war nor the extermination of the Jews. The practical realization of the program alone could disclose the reality. For every convinced Party exponent, however, the official explanation of events was authoritative and met with no doubts. Up to his nomination as the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor in March 1942, the Defendant Sauckel did not belong to the narrow circle of those who had access to Hitler’s plans. He had to rely upon the press and the broadcasts like everybody else. He had no contact with the leading men. This is demonstrated somewhat tragically by his action, so often ridiculed, of boarding a submarine as an ordinary seaman for some mission. That is no way to participate in conspiracies.

As a faithful follower of Hitler, the Defendant Sauckel remained isolated in the circle of the initiated. It is understandable that the extremists should have shunned him owing to his well-known opinions. He was not initiated into the secrets of people who aspired to be Hitler’s friends and murderers at the same time, nor was he kept informed by the group of people who were Hitler’s enemies, but who kept their knowledge secret with a novel kind of courage. A believer to the end, the Defendant Sauckel cannot to this day understand what has happened. Must he, like a heretic, recant his error in order to find mercy? He lacks the contact with reality, which would make understanding possible.

Does his sentence depend on his having unknowingly served a good or a bad cause? Nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. One thing, however, is always and under all circumstances good, and that is a good intention. This good intention was shown by the Defendant Sauckel. Therefore, I ask that he be acquitted.

THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Exner for the Defendant Jodl.

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): May it please the Tribunal, in this unique Trial the discovery of the truth is faced with difficulties of an exceptional nature. At a time when the wounds of the war are still bleeding, when the excitement of the events of the last few years is still felt, at a time when the archives of one side are still closed, it is asked that a just verdict be given with dispassionate neutrality. Material for the Trial has been spread out before us covering a quarter of a century of world history and events from the four corners of the globe.

On the grounds of this tremendous amount of material we see 22 men being accused simultaneously. That makes it immensely difficult to gain a clear picture of the guilt and responsibility of each individual, for inhumanities of an almost unimaginable vastness have come to light here, and there exists a danger that the deep shadow which falls upon some of the defendants may also darken the others. Some of them, I fear, appear in a different light because of the company in which they now sit than they would if they were alone in the dock.

The Prosecution has promoted this danger by repeatedly making joint accusations, thereby mixing legal and moral reproaches. They have said that all the defendants had enriched themselves from the occupied territories, that there was not one who did not shout, “Perish, Judah!” and so forth. No attempt to prove this in the case of any single individual was made, but the statement in itself creates an atmosphere hostile toward all of them.

Another fact brought about by the Prosecution which renders elucidation of the question of individual guilt still more difficult is that the Defendants Keitel and Jodl are treated as inseparable twins: One common plea against them by the British prosecutor, one common trial brief by the French Prosecution; the Russian Prosecution indeed spoke very little about the individual defendants but preferred to heap reproach after reproach upon all of them.

All of this is presumably intended to shorten the Trial, but it hardly serves to clear up the question of individual responsibility. Indeed, the Indictment goes still further. It reaches beyond these 22 defendants and affects the fate of millions through a prosecution of certain organizations, which, taken in conjunction with Law Number 10, leads to the result that one can be punished for the guilt of other persons.

Something that is more important at the moment is a further form of summary treatment of the defendants. The Prosecution is bringing in the conception of a “conspiracy” in order once more to obtain the result that persons may be made individually responsible for some wrong that others committed. I must deal with this point in greater detail, since it also concerns my client.

It is actually clear, I think, from the previous speakers’ statements that a conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace and the laws of war and humanity did not in fact exist. Therefore, I shall demonstrate only that, if such a conspiracy did actually exist, Jodl at least did not belong to it.

The Prosecution has admitted that Jodl’s participation in the conspiracy before 1933 could not be proved. In fact, anyone whose attitude toward the whole National Socialist movement was so full of distrust and who spoke with such skepticism about its seizure of power did not conspire to help Hitler take over the reins of Government. But the Prosecution seems to think that Jodl joined the alleged conspiracy in the period before 1939. In truth, during this time, too, nothing essential changed as far as he was concerned. True, his attitude toward Hitler was now an entirely loyal one. But it was Jodl’s respected Field Marshal Von Hindenburg who had called Hitler into the Government, and the German people had confirmed this decision with more than 90 percent of its votes. Added to this was the fact that in Jodl’s eyes—and not only in his—Hitler’s authority was bound to rise by leaps and bounds in view of his remarkable successes at home and abroad, which now followed one after another in quick succession; yet personally Jodl remained without any connection with Hitler. He did not participate in any of the big meetings at which Hitler developed his program. He had only read extracts of Hitler’s book Mein Kampf, the bible of National Socialism. Jodl remained just an unpolitical man, quite in line with his personal inclinations, which were far removed from Party politics and in accordance with the traditions of the old family of officers from which he sprang. Of liberal leanings, he had little sympathy for National Socialism; as an officer he was forbidden to belong to the Party, and he had no right to vote or be politically active.

If, as the Prosecution says, the Party held the conspiracy together and was the “instrument of cohesion” between the defendants, then one asks with wonder what cohesion actually existed between Jodl and, let us say, Sauckel, or between Jodl and Streicher. Of all the defendants, the only one he knew before the war, outside of the officers, was Frick, from one or two official conferences in the Ministry of the Interior. He kept clear of the NSDAP, and his attitude toward its organizations was even in a certain sense inimical. His greatest worry during these years, right up to the end, was the danger of Party influence in the Armed Forces.

Jodl did what lay in his power to prevent the SS from being puffed up into a subsidiary Wehrmacht, to prevent the transfer of the customs frontier guards to Himmler, and he notes triumphantly in his diary that after the withdrawal of General Von Fritsch, Hitler did not, as had been feared, make General Von Reichenau, who had Party ties, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but the unpolitical General Von Brauchitsch, and so forth. If Jodl had conspired for National Socialism in any way, his attitude would have been the opposite on every one of these points.

Nor was Jodl present at any of the so-called meetings of the conspirators, as on 5 November 1937—Hitler’s testament was unknown to him—at Obersalzberg in February 1938, and at the meetings on 23 May 1939 and 22 August 1939.

No wonder; for Jodl was after all at that time still much too insignificant to be permitted to participate in conferences and meetings which were of such decisive importance to the State. People do not conspire with lieutenant colonels or colonels of the General Staff. They simply tell them what to do, and that settles the matter.

However, the most incontrovertible proof of the fact that Jodl can have belonged to no conspiracy to wage aggressive war is his absence for 10 months just before the beginning of the war. Jodl had left the OKW in October 1938 and was sent to Vienna as artillery commander. At that time there was in his mind so little probability of war that before leaving Berlin he drafted, on his own initiative, a plan of deployment in all directions for security purposes. In this he disposed the bulk of the German forces in the center of the Reich because he could not see any definite opponent against whom a deployment plan might have to be prepared.

Exactly a year before the beginning of the attack, this alleged conspirator for aggressive wars drew up a purely defensive General Staff plan, and, although he knew definitely that in case of war he would have to return to Berlin, this possibility seemed so remote that he moved to Vienna, taking along all his furniture.

Besides, since he wished to get away from office work again, he arranged to have the mountain division at Reichenhall promised him for 1 October 1939. Lastly, as late as July he obtained passage on a sea cruise planned to last several weeks, which was to have started in September—so sure was he of peaceful developments during these 10 months.

Up to the time he was called to Berlin shortly before the outbreak of the war, Jodl had no official or private connections with the OKW. The only letter he got from them at that time was the one which promised him his transfer to Reichenhall on 1 October.

Note that at the most critical time when the alleged conspirators were discussing and working out the Polish plan, Jodl was for 10 months out of all contact with the authoritative persons and knew no more of what was happening than one of his second lieutenants.

When the Führer came to Vienna during the summer, it did not even seem worth while to Keitel to introduce Jodl to him, although Jodl, as the Supreme Commander’s strategic adviser, was called upon in the event of war to carry out the allegedly common aggressive plan.

One can imagine how astonished Jodl was to read in the Indictment that he had been a member of the conspiracy to launch the war.

Mr. President, I have reached the end of a paragraph, and this perhaps might be an opportune moment to recess.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 19 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.

An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.

[The end of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 18, by Various.]