a. Introduction
Article II 4 (b) of Control Council Law No. 10 states that—“The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation.” The defendants argued, however, that superior orders freed them from criminal responsibility entirely. They also argued that superior orders to engage in the conduct alleged as criminal constitute a mitigating circumstance.
Extracts from the closing statement of the prosecution on the same point appears on pages 957 to 958. A summation of the evidence on this point by the defense has been taken from the final pleas on behalf of the defendants Brack and Fischer. It appears below on pages 959 to 970. This argumentation is followed by two sections from the testimony of defendants on pages 970 to 974, extracts from the examination of defendant Karl Brandt by Judge Sebring, and an extract from the cross-examination of defendant Rose.
b. Selection from the Argumentation of the Prosecution
EXTRACTS FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE
PROSECUTION[[149]]
The defense of Handloser is a general denial. He says in effect that: I was a soldier. I was in charge of the medical administration of the Wehrmacht, but had no power and no right to issue orders, and that whatever may have happened, I am not responsible for it. It is interesting to note that this defense is very similar to that put forward by Field Marshal Keitel[[150]] in this courtroom approximately a year ago. He was represented by the same defense counsel. Keitel also said that he could not issue orders. We have already discussed in some detail the position of Handloser, and it has been established beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was the supreme authority in the military medical services. We need not stop to consider the practical difference between an order and a directive. We have pointed out that the opportunity and power to control the participation of the military medical services in these crimes was his. The evidence shows that Handloser was connected with a number of criminal medical experiments including the typhus and other vaccine experiments both in Buchenwald and Natzweiler, and the freezing, sulfanilamide, jaundice, gas, and the gas oedema experiments, among others.
Rudolf Brandt also pleads superior orders in mitigation. There is no evidence that Himmler ordered Brandt to participate in any crime. Brandt did so willfully. There is no evidence that Brandt retained his position out of fear. He flourished in it. Nothing would have been easier for him than to be replaced by request or feigned inefficiency. Brandt was not a soldier on the field of battle. His activities were far removed from the confusion of the front lines. He did not act in the spontaneous heat of passion; he had full time to consider and reflect upon his course of action. He continued in his position from 1933 until his arrest by the Allies in 1945, no less than 12 years. This fact alone removes any basis for mitigation. Moreover, assuming that Brandt was ordered to commit the criminal acts which are the subject of this trial, when there is no fear of reprisal for disobedience, obedience represents a voluntary participation in the crime. Such is the case with Rudolf Brandt. Finally the doctrine of superior orders cannot be considered in mitigation where such malignant and numerous crimes have been continuously and ruthlessly committed over a period of many years.
What has been said with respect to Brandt applies equally to the defendant Fischer who also pleads superior orders. He knew at the time he performed these experiments that he was committing a crime. He knew the pain, disfigurement, disability, and risk of death to which his experimental victims would be subjected. He could have refused to participate in the experiments without any fear of consequences. This he admitted in saying, “It was not fear of a death sentence or anything like that, but the choice confronting me was to be obedient or disobedient during war, and thereby set an example, an example of disobedience.” (Tr. p. 4374.) Such an admission removes any basis for mitigation. A soldier is always faced with the alternative of obeying or disobeying an order. If he knows the order is criminal, it is surely a hollow excuse to say it must be obeyed for the sake of obedience alone.
c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
BRACK[[151]]
The treatment of the question of responsibility for euthanasia in this room encounters great difficulties insofar as there is not only considerable ignorance of certain peculiarities of the German position in constitutional matters, but above all a great difference between the thinking of continental European and of transatlantic jurists on matters of constitutional statutory law. Law and morals have for centuries been sharply differentiated on the European continent in juristic and above all in legislative thinking in contrast to the states across the ocean. This historical fact must be taken into consideration, for only then can the realization be reached that in a question of German constitutional law only that development can be decisive which legal training has had in Germany in deviations from the constitutional law of the Weimar Republic, since the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933 and the Head of the State Law of 1 August 1934.
With these laws Hitler was given all authority as head of the state and chief of the government, in full recognition of the Fuehrer principle which had been in operation for over a year, with approval by the plebiscite of 19 August 1934.
From this time on Hitler incorporated the will of the people, and the resulting functions. He had thus become the Supreme Legislator of the Reich. A concluding resolution of the Reichstag was only the confirmation of his primary declaration of his will.
Among the independent promulgations of laws, which were represented as direct emanations of his authority, the declarations of Hitler’s will which were at first called “decrees” and later uniformly “Fuehrer decrees” assumed the most important role. In them the distinction, still customary under the Weimar constitution, between legislative and executive is overcome, as Hitler proclaimed in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1937 in the words: “There is only one legislative power and one executive.”
Therefore the decrees united material law with organizational measures and administrative directives, especially insofar as they were addressed only to a group of persons gathered together in a certain community. Proclamation in the Reich Law Gazette [Reichsgesetzblatt], countersigned by the competent departmental minister, and later the competent chancellery chief, no longer played a decisive role in 1937. The Fuehrer principle was already in full operation at this time. It no longer tolerated the dependence of the authority to promulgate original laws which was granted to the Fuehrer by the plebiscite of 1934 on the observance of formal regulations. The only decisive thing that remained was the fact of the proclamation of the will of the Fuehrer, not its form. Hitler’s Decree of 1 September 1939 concerning euthanasia, addressed to Brandt and Bouhler, was therefore in form a legally quite acceptable act of government of the head of the state.
My conclusions from the examination of the development in legal history of the Fuehrer principle in the Third Reich agrees with the testimony of the witnesses Lammers,[[152]] Engert, and Best. This testimony is underlined by the standpoint of the Reich Minister of Justice Guertner and by Schlegelberger as representatives of supreme Reich authorities, as transmitted to us by Lammers and Engert. Finally, it is affirmed by University Professor Dr. Hermann Jahrreiss, who a few days ago dealt with the questions arising in this connection in great detail and exhaustively in the Justice Case before Military Tribunal III.[[153]] I may ask the Tribunal in judging this legal question to consider these statements.
Brack was convinced of the legality of this decree on the basis not only of juridical but also other effective indications of much more significant independent steps taken by Hitler in domestic and foreign policy.
Brack’s conviction, that of a nonjurist, of the legality of the Fuehrer Decree, based on the explanations and information of his juristic associates and the concurring or at least nondissenting statements of the highest representatives of the Reich justice authorities at the meeting of General Public Prosecutors on 23 April 1941, can therefore not be doubted. (Brack 36, Brack Ex. 36.)
Even if one denies the legal validity to the Hitler Decree, though I regard it as valid, Brack committed a legal error at least as far as the particular legal position of Hitler within the state is concerned, under which decree otherwise illegal activities are to be excused. This legal error is sufficient to abolish his guilt or at least the grave guilt of deliberate intent. According to the German law valid at the time, at any rate, this is the case. According to that, a so-called error outside of criminal law—which is indeed the error about the legal validity of the decree of 1 September 1939—excludes the unlawful character which is an essential of the term “deliberate intent”.
EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
FISCHER[[154]]
Acts committed under orders and in relation to a specific military position
The defendant Fischer participated in the experiments for testing the effect of sulfanilamide upon orders of his medical and military superior Karl Gebhardt. It is recognized in the penal code of all civilized nations that action upon orders represents a reason of exemption from guilt, even if the order itself is contrary to law, but binding for the subordinate. In examining this legal question, one proceeds from the principle that the court disregards the reasons of justification and exemption from guilt put forward by me in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt and considers that both the order given to the defendant Karl Gebhardt himself, as also the passing on of this order to the defendant Fritz Fischer, are contrary to law.
The adherence to a binding order, even though it be contrary to law, on the part of the subordinate creates for him a reason of exemption from guilt and, therefore, renders him also exempt from punishment. This question is disputed only insofar as some consider the action of the subordinate not only excused but even “justified.” Further examination of this question at issue seems, however, not necessary in these proceedings, since the result is the same in both cases, namely, the perpetrator’s exemption from punishment.
The decisive question in the case on hand therefore is whether and to what extent the “order” for the sulfanilamide experiments was binding for the persons carrying it out.
In view of the fact that, in principle, the law in force at the time is applicable, as the defendants lived under this law and it was binding for them, the question is, therefore, to be examined within the framework of Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code. According to this provision, a subordinate who obeys is liable to be “punished as an accessory if it is known to him that the order given by the superior concerned an act which has for its purpose to commit a general or military crime or offense.”
However, it is not correct, as is sometimes accepted, that Article 47 of the German Military Code itself settles the question in how far military orders are either binding or not binding. This is a question of public and administrative law. But it must always concern an “order regarding service matters,” the same as in other military conditions, that is to say, something which “pertains to military service.” These assumptions are immediately present both in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt and in that of the defendant Fritz Fischer. Both were medical officers of the Waffen SS, therefore a unit of the German Wehrmacht in which especially the principle of obedience was strongly pronounced. Karl Gebhardt was Fritz Fischer’s immediate superior; in matters of duty, his order to assist with the medical experiments to be undertaken was a binding order for the young medical officer Fischer.
In the investigation of the legal questions resulting from these circumstances, we will separate the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, where the “order” was issued from a very high authority, namely, from the Head of the State and the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, from the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer, in which there is a question of an especially close relationship to his immediate military superior. Later, I will return especially to the general questions of public law concerning the command of the Fuehrer.
The evidence has shown that the order for testing the effectiveness of sulfanilamide emanated from the highest authority, namely, from the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht personally. The reasons of justification of the probable acceptance of the wartime state of emergency and the balancing of interests, as discussed fully already in the investigation of the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, gain importance independently first in the person of the defendant Fritz Fischer. But they have influence, of course, on the legality or illegality of the order. The investigation of this question has shown that the given order as such was legal. Even if one would not want to take this for granted, however, for a subordinate even an illegal order of a binding nature is of moment.
Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code, as already observed, lets the punishment of the subordinate stand, if “it was known” to the latter that the order of the superior “concerned an act which had for its purpose to commit a general or military crime or offense.” In all other cases the punishment touches only the commanding superior.
Just as in most military courts of other armies, the judicial practice concerning Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code also shows the tendency to a vast limitation of the penal responsibility of the subordinate. That this tendency has grown from the purpose “of guaranteeing the performance of the duty of obedience obligatory to the subordinate, in the interest of military discipline and the Wehrmacht’s constant readiness for battle,” changes nothing in the fact as such. Here it is a matter of evaluating the legal position at the time the act was committed.
Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code establishes a penal responsibility on the part of the subordinate only if it was known to him that the order concerned an act the purpose of which was a crime or an offense. German judicial practice demands in addition a definite knowledge on the part of the acting subordinate; accordingly, cases of mere doubt (conditional intent) or mere obligation to know (negligence) are expressly excluded. Neither is the idea satisfactory that the performance of the order resulted objectively in the committing of a crime or an offense. On the contrary, the superior must have intended this and this fact must have been known to the subordinate.
In applying these principles, there cannot be any doubt that these suppositions were not fulfilled either in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, or in the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer—to say nothing at all of the defendant Herta Oberheuser. Both of these defendants regarded the order given them by the Head of the State as a measure of war which was conditioned by special circumstances caused by the war itself, and by means of which a question should be answered which was of decisive importance not only for the wounded, but beyond that, should furnish a contribution in the struggle for the foundations of life of the German people and for the existence of the Reich. Both defendants were convinced at that time that the order given them should have any other purpose but the committing of a punishable act.
Then, in regard to the particular position of the defendant Fritz Fischer, the meaning of an order of the immediate military superior is to be investigated. At the beginning of the experiments, the defendant Fritz Fischer had the rank of a first lieutenant. He took part in the experiments at the direct command of his military and medical superior who held the rank of general. In view of the surpassing authority of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, as surgeon and Chief of the Hohenlychen Clinic and in view of his high military position, a refusal was completely out of the question.
On principle, no other points of view but those already discussed apply here either. Whether the order is a direct or an indirect one offers no reason for difference. In the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer, however, the following is still to be considered: whether it was known, etc., to the subordinate is always to be especially examined according to the special circumstances of the moment. At the same time, of course, a decisive part is played by the fact that the order for these experiments was given to the defendant Fritz Fischer, not by a military superior who would not have been in a position or duly qualified to give an expert decision of this question, but by a person who not only occupied a high military rank, but beyond that had just that particular experience in the sphere in which the experiments were to be carried out. The defendant Karl Gebhardt was not only a recognized and leading German surgeon, but he had also as consulting surgeon to the Waffen SS and as chief of a surgical reserve combat unit acquired special experience in the sphere of combat surgery and in the treatment of the bacteriological infection of wounds. The reason for this order given to the defendant Fritz Fischer by his chief must have affected him all the more convincingly, as it coincided exactly with the experience which the defendant Fritz Fischer himself had gained as medical officer with the First SS Armored Division in Russia.
In addition, there was the special framework in which all this took place. Fritz Fischer had been released from the combat unit on account of serious illness and had been ordered to the Hohenlychen Clinic. He was under the immediate impression of hard experience at the front. In Hohenlychen he found himself in a clinic which operated in peacetime conditions under the energetic direction of a man extraordinarily gifted in organizational and scientific matters. Every building, every installation of this recognized model institute, the numerous clinical innovations and modern methods of treatment, every one of the many successful treatments of Hohenlychen was inseparably bound up with the name of the chief physician Karl Gebhardt and gave unconditional and unlimited value to his word and his authority in his entire environment.
For all these reasons, the defendant Fritz Fischer could have had no doubt at all but that the performance of the order given him was from the medical standpoint a requisite and permissible war measure. Precisely the open carrying-out of the individual experimental measures, with the exclusion of every duty of secrecy, as well as the report of the results which was provided for in advance and also executed before a critical forum of the highest military physicians, were especially suited to nip in the bud any distrust of the justification of these experiments in the mind of the defendant Fritz Fischer.
As Fritz Fischer strictly adhered to the part-orders given to him and did not show any initiative of his own, it excludes him moreover from any responsibility concerning questions which were outside his sphere of action. It is impossible to make Fritz Fischer responsible for questions connected with the legal and medical preparation of the directives for the experiments and the cosmetic after-treatment. Apart from this viewpoint, the special conditions of public law which existed in Germany at the time of the action ought to be mentioned. They were explained by Professor Jahrreiss in his opening speech before the International Military Tribunal in the proceedings against Hermann Goering and others.[[155]] Professor Jahrreiss thereby represented the following point of view:
“State orders, whether they lay down rules or decide individual cases, can always be measured against the existing written and unwritten law, but also against the rules of international law, morals, and religion. Someone, even if only the conscience of the person giving the orders, is always asking: Has the person giving the order ordered something which he had no right to order? Or has he formed and published his order by an inadmissible procedure? But an unavoidable problem for all governmental systems lies in this: Should or can it grant the members of its hierarchy, its officials and officers, the right—or even impose on them the duty—to examine at any time any order which demands obedience from them, to determine whether it is lawful, and to decide accordingly whether to obey or refuse? No governmental system which has appeared in history to date has given an affirmative answer to this question. Only certain members of the hierarchy were ever granted this right; and they were not granted it without limits. This was also the case, for instance, under the extremely democratic constitution of the German Reich during the Weimar Republic and is so today under the occupation rule of the four great powers over Germany.
“In as far as such a right of examinations is not granted to members of the hierarchy, the order has legal force for them.
“All constitutional law, that of modern states as well, knows acts of state which must be respected by the authorities even when they are defective. Certain acts of laying down rules, certain decisions on individual cases which have received legal force, are valid even when the person giving the order has exceeded his competence or has made a mistake in form.
“If only because the process of going back to a still higher order must finally come to an end, orders must exist under every government that are binding on the members of the hierarchy under all circumstances and are therefore law where the officials are concerned, even if outsiders may see that they are defective as regard content or form * * *.
“* * * The result of the development in the Reich of Hitler was at any rate that Hitler became the supreme legislator as well as the supreme author of individual orders. It was not least of all under the impression of the surprising successes, or what were considered successes in Germany and abroad, above all during the course of this war, that he became this. Perhaps the German people are—even though with great differences between north and south, west and east—particularly easily subjected to actual power, particularly easily led by orders, particularly used to the idea of a superior. Thus the whole process may have been made easier.
“Finally the only thing that was not quite clear was Hitler’s relationship to the judiciary. For, even in Hitler-Germany, it was not possible to kill the idea that it was essential to allow justice to be exercised by independent courts, at least in matters which concern the wide masses in their everyday life. Up to the highest group of Party officials—this has been shown by some of the speeches of the Reich Justice Leader, the defendant Dr. Frank, which were submitted here—there was resistance, which was actually not very successful, when justice in civil and ordinary criminal cases was also to be forced into the “sic jubeo” of the one man. But, apart from the judiciary, which was actually also tottering, absolute monocracy was complete. The Reichstag’s pompous declaration about Hitler’s legal position, dated 26 April 1942, was actually only the statement of what had become practice long before.
“The Fuehrer’s orders were law already a considerable time before this Second World War.
“In this state order of his, the German Reich was treated as a partner by the other states, and this in the whole field of politics. In this connection I do not wish to stress the way (so impressive to the German people and so fatal to all opposition) in which this took place in 1936 at the Olympic Games, a show which Hitler could not order the delegations of foreign nations to attend, as he ordered Germans to the Nuernberg Party Rally in the case of his state-shows. I should like rather only to point out that the governments of the greatest nations in the world considered the word of this “almighty” man the final decision, incontestably valid for every German, and based their decisions on major questions on the fact that Hitler’s order was incontestably valid. To mention only the most striking cases, this fact was relied upon when the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, after the Munich Conference, displayed the famous peace paper when he landed at Croydon. This fact was adhered to when people went to war against the Reich as the barbarous despotism of this one man.
“No political system has yet pleased all people who live under it or who feel its effects abroad. The German political system in the Hitler era displeased a particularly large and ever-increasing number of people at home and abroad.
“But that does not in any way alter the fact that it existed, not lastly because of the recognition from abroad and because of its effectiveness, which caused a British Prime Minister to make the now world-famous statement at a critical period, that democracies need two years longer than the totalitarian governments to attain a certain goal. Only one who has lived as if expelled from among his own people, amidst blindly believing masses who idolized this man as infallible, knows how firmly Hitler’s power was anchored in the anonymous and innumerable following who believed him capable only of doing what was good and right. They did not know him personally, he was for them what propaganda made of him, but this he was so uncompromisingly that everybody who saw him from close-to and saw otherwise, knew clearly that resistance was absolutely useless and, in the eyes of other people, was not even martyrdom.
“Would it therefore not be a self-contradictory proceeding if both the following assertions were to be realized at the same time in the rules of this trial? * * *
“* * * The functionaries had neither the right nor the duty to examine the orders of the monocrat to determine their legality. For them these orders could not be illegal at all, with one exception which will be discussed later—an exception which, if carefully examined, is seen to be only an apparent one—namely with the exception of cases in which the monocrat placed himself, according to the indisputable values of our times, outside every human order, and in which a real question of right or wrong was not put at all and thus a real examination was not demanded.
“Hitler’s will was the ultimate authority for their considerations on what to do and what not to do. The Fuehrer’s order cut off every discussion. Therefore, a person who, as a functionary of the hierarchy refers to an order of the Fuehrer’s, is not trying to provide a ground for being exempted from punishment for an illegal action, but he denies the assertion that his conduct is illegal; for the order which he complied with was legally unassailable.
“Only a person who has understood this can have a conception of the difficult inner struggles which so many German officials had to fight out in these years in face of many a decree or resolution of Hitler’s. For them such cases were not a question of a conflict between right and wrong: Disputes about legality sank into insignificance. For them the problem was one of legitimacy; as time went on, human and divine law opposed each other ever more strongly and more frequently.
“Therefore, whatever the Charter understands by the orders which it sets aside as a ground for exemption from punishment, can the Fuehrer’s order be meant by this? Can it come within the meaning of this rule? Must one not accept this order for what it was according to the interior German constitution as it had developed, a constitution which had been explicitly or implicitly recognized by the community of states? * * *
“* * * The one supreme will became, quite simply, technically indispensable. It became the mechanical connecting link for the whole. A functionary who met with objections or even resistance to one of his orders from other functionaries only needed to refer to an order of the Fuehrer’s to get his way. For this reason many, very many, among those Germans who felt Hitler’s regime to be intolerable, who indeed hated him like the devil, looked ahead only with the greatest anxiety to the time when this man would disappear from the scene; for what would happen when this connecting link disappeared? It was a vicious circle.
“I repeat: An order of the Fuehrer’s was binding—and indeed legally binding—on the person to whom it was given, even if the directive was contrary to international law or to other traditional values.”
So much for the statements of Professor Jahrreiss before the International Military Tribunal. The development presented here seems to be particularly relevant for the case of the defendant Fischer, since he himself in the witness box described his attitude towards the Fuehrer’s command in a way which, because of his very youth, his idealistic conception of life and duty and his manly confession, was particularly convincing.
It is true that in the face of all this, reference will be made to Article 8 of the Charter for the International Military Tribunal which reads: “The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”
Accordingly, Law No. 10 of the Control Council, Article II, paragraph 4 reads—
“(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the orders of his government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation.”
In the face of this objection the following is to be pointed out:
At the time of their actions the defendants were subject to German law according to which the degree of their responsibility was determined and, even today, must justly be referred back to that moment. The following should be emphasized, however, in case the Tribunal should not apply the legal provisions in force at the time of the act, but should base its judgment on Law No. 10 of the Control Council, though it represents a manifest violation of the prohibition of retroactive application of penal laws.
Even from the above-named provision of the Law of the Control Council, the principle cannot be derived that every command of a superior should, under the aspect of Penal Law, be irrelevant under all circumstances. This also applies to the problem of the exemption from responsibility and exemption from penalty. The provision only states that the existence of such a command in itself does not exempt one from the responsibility for a crime; it does not, however, preclude by any means that in connection with other facts it may be relevant for this problem as well.
The guiding legal aspect underlying these deliberations is contained in the concept of the so-called conflict of duties which has been repeatedly mentioned before. This aspect does not coincide eo ipso with the “objective” principle of balancing interests, as discussed in examining the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt. In addition one must insist on consideration of the “subjective” position of the person committing the act.
In other words, in order to arrive at a just appreciation of the case, the personal situation of the person committing the act at the moment of its being committed will have to be weighed up as well. This applies particularly to the personal situation into which the person committing the act has been put by reason of a higher command which is binding for him and influences him. Besides the general “objective” principles of balancing interests, such a special “subjective” state of coercion can and must therefore be considered in his favor also. A “command” can, therefore, according to the concrete situation, shift the boundaries of culpability further in his favor.
Reinhardt Frank, the great German criminologist, has with regard to the problem of the so-called conflict of duties established the maxim, “In as far as the conflict of duties has not been expressly regulated the maxim should prevail that the higher, the more significant, the more important duty is to be fulfilled at the expense of the less high one and that, therefore, omission to fulfill the latter one is not contrary to law.”
With good reason it has always been emphasized that in such a situation of conflict of diversified duties the decision is, in the end, not to be found in positive law, but it is of an ethical nature. That is why, in such a situation, a certain leeway must be left to the personal conscience; it is not possible here to arrive at everything through the coarse means of an outward penal provision. This completely “personal” character of genuine ethical conflicts has also been fully recognized and emphasized in the authoritative philosophical literature. Nicholai Hartmann, Ethics (2d Edition, 1935, pp. 421-422) says for instance, with regard to genuine conflicts of values:
“It is a fateful error to believe that such problems can be solved on principle in theory. There are border-line cases in which the conflict in conscience is grave enough to require a different solution according to the particular ethos of the person. For it lies in the very nature of such conflicts that values are balanced, and that it is not possible to emerge from them without becoming guilty. Accordingly, a man in this situation cannot help making a decision. A person faced with this serious conflict, incurring such a measure of responsibility, ought to decide this—
“To follow the dictates of his conscience to the best of his ability, that is, according to his own live sense of the level of values and accept the consequences.”
No further argument should be needed for demonstrating that just from an ethical point of view measuring of such personal decisions by standards of penal law is out of the question.
d. Evidence
| Testimony | |
| Page | |
| Extracts from the testimony of defendant Karl Brandt | [970] |
| Extract from the testimony of defendant Rose | [973] |
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT[[156]]
EXAMINATION
Judge Sebring: * * * Witness, for the sake of clarification, let us assume that it would have been highly important to the Wehrmacht to ascertain, as a matter of fact, how long a human being could withstand exposure to cold before succumbing to the effects of it. Do you understand that? Let’s assume secondly that human subjects were selected for such freezing experiments without their consent. Let’s assume thirdly that such involuntary human subjects were subjected to the experiments and died as a direct or indirect result thereof. Now, would you be good enough to inform the Tribunal what your view of such an experiment is—either from the legal or from the ethical point of view?
Defendant Karl Brandt: I must repeat once more, in order to make sure that I understood you correctly. When assigning the experiment the following things are assumed: highest military necessity, involuntary nature of the experiment, and the danger of the experiment with eventual fatality. In this case I am of the opinion that, when considering the circumstances of the situation of the war, this state institution which has laid down the importance in the interest of the state at the same time takes the responsibility away from the physician if such an experiment ends fatally and such a responsibility has to be taken by the state.
Q. Now, does it take away that responsibility from the physician, in your view, or does it share that responsibility jointly with the physician, in your view?
A. In my view, this responsibility is taken away from the physician because, from that moment on, the physician is merely an instrument maybe in the same sense as in the case of an officer who receives an order at the front and leads a group of three or four soldiers into a position where they are certain to meet death. That position, if I apply it to German conditions during the war, is in principle the same. I don’t believe that the physician as such, from his ethical and moral feelings, would carry out such an experiment without this assurance of the authoritarian state which gives him a formal and legal assurance on one side and, on the other side, gives him the order for the execution. Naturally, in this case, it is a theoretical question since I cannot survey the position in the case of the freezing experiment. I don’t know how this assurance was given and how the order was given. Basically, I want to differentiate between the order for an experiment which arises from medical needs as such and where, under the circumstances, the state only has a secondary interest on the basis of medical initiatives, and I would differentiate between the reverse state of affairs where the state uses medical activities.
Q. The Tribunal has one further question of interest.
In your view, would an order which authorized or directed a subordinate medical officer or subordinate medical group to carry on a certain medical experiment—let us assume for the moment this freezing experiment—we have then a general order, let us assume, directing a certain institute to carry on freezing experiments without delineating or specifying in detail the exact course of those experiments. Would you conceive that such an order would authorize the medical officer to whom the order was addressed to select subjects involuntarily and subject them to experiments, the execution of which that officer absolutely knew or should have known would likely result in death to the subject?
A. May I have your last sentence repeated, please? This question is extremely difficult to answer. The order given in such a case has to be taken into consideration. May I, perhaps, answer with an example of such an order. If Himmler gives an order to a Dr. “X” and tells him to carry out a certain experiment, then it is possible that Dr. “X” did not wish to comply with this order. In such a case, however, Dr. “X” will not have overlooked the importance of the experiment itself, the same way as the lieutenant who received a certain military order—and we are here concerned with a military order—does not overlook that he would have to hold out with a group of eight men at a bridgehead and that this would end in his death. In spite of that, this officer with his eight men to whom he passed this order on would meet their death at that position. So this physician “X” who received this order from Himmler would under the circumstances have to carry out an experiment without being able to judge the validity of the reasons which prompted a central agency.
If a physician had not carried out that experiment, he would have got into a position where he would be called to account if he had not carried out that experiment. In this case, and there we have to consider the authoritarian nature of our state, the personal feeling and the feeling of a special professional, ethical obligation has to subordinate itself to the totalitarian nature of the war.
I must say once more, these are theoretical assumptions which I am expressing here. At the same time I could express how difficult such decisions are if I refer to an example which recently was quoted here, and I mean the eight hundred inmates in a prison in America who were infected with malaria. I don’t want to refer to this example in order to justify the experiments which are under indictment here, but I want to express that the question of the importance of an experiment is, and remains, basically of decisive importance. Even there a certain number of fatalities had to be expected from the start when infecting eight hundred people with malaria.
The voluntary attitude which an inmate adopts and with which an inmate makes himself available is a relatively voluntary agreement. I don’t think it would be the same if one were to receive a voluntary agreement from people who are present here. One has to consider the nature of the voluntary agreement. In my opinion, this round figure of eight hundred speaks against the voluntary agreement of all. I would assume that if it was seven hundred and thirty-five or seven hundred and forty, it would be different, but the round figure of eight hundred seems to indicate that there was a certain order for the experiment before the beginning of the experiment, and these experiments, too, were directed from the point of view of a superior state interest, and this superior state interest, at the same time, takes over the responsibility for the result of the experiment with reference to the experimental subject. For responsibility in a medical sense cannot be assumed at all since even a negative series of experiments speaks against the urgency and necessity of these experiments; and particularly when answering the question about voluntary or involuntary, dangerous or nondangerous natures, it is very difficult and almost impossible to say basically with reference to experiments that experiments on human beings, taking all these things into consideration, are a crime or are not a crime. The question can only be judged when over and above the expected result experiments are still continued. If a result has been established and further experiments on human beings are then carried out, they are not important, and the experiment which is not important is only a dilettante experiment. In that case I would from the start assume the word “criminal,” but when dealing with important experiments, it is necessary to take into consideration all the circumstances which played a part at that time; that is to say, the important experiments, from the moment a result is achieved, become unimportant. From that moment on, in my opinion, the experiment is criminal. Therefore, that when speaking about human experiments at all, one must put the results at the disposal of the state—not only to one state but internationally—so that experiments which are carried out in Russia and which had shown results would not be continued in other countries.
With reference to freezing experiments, I can only say that in a certain form, without saying “criminal” or “not criminal,” they showed their value. The indication for that is that the results in the American Air Force were considered as something extraordinary and helped the American Air Force to gain years, and I think that these experiments would also be of use in mines, where a number of fatalities occur because of freezing. If you consider the freezing experiments in that light, the victims in effect are tragic and are to be regretted, but with reference to subsequent periods these victims are a real sacrifice, for hundreds, or maybe thousands of people might save or prolong their lives because of it.
Q. Dr. Brandt, is it not true that in any military organization, even one of an authoritarian state, there comes a point beyond which the officer receiving an order subjects himself to individual responsibility, at least in the eyes of civilized society, for carrying out any military orders, particularly if the order is unlawful or transcends the limit of extreme military necessity?
A. There was a general law stating that an officer does not have to carry out an order which he realizes is a crime, but the question with reference to these various experiments is whether the man concerned can realize that what he is doing is a crime. If he can realize it, then, in my opinion, he cannot comply with the order.
EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT ROSE[[157]]
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Mr. McHaney: And you suggested and asked him [defendant Mrugowsky] to carry out experiments with Copenhagen vaccine in the typhus experiments in Buchenwald, didn’t you?
Defendant Rose: I was asking whether there was still a possibility of carrying out such a series of experiments. That is quite understandable, considering the situation, because one can see from my report of 29 May 1943, that this seemed to constitute a considerable advance on the experiments already made on animals. I knew that such experiments had been carried out earlier, although I basically objected to these experiments. This institution had been set up in Germany and was approved by the state and covered by the state. At that moment I was in a position which might correspond to that of a lawyer who is, perhaps, a basic opponent of capital punishment. On occasions when he is dealing with leading members of the government or with lawyers during public congresses or meetings, he will do everything in his power to maintain his opinion on the subject and have it put into effect. If, however, he does not succeed, he stays in his profession and in his environment in spite of this. Under certain circumstances he may perhaps even be forced to pronounce such a death sentence himself, although he is basically an opponent of the principle. Of course, it does not go as far as this in my case. I am only in touch with people of whom I assume that they somehow are included in the official channels of such an institution, which I disapprove of basically, and which I want to see removed.
Q. Professor, six persons died in this experiment with the Copenhagen vaccine, didn’t they?
A. Yes. They were six people who were furnished by the Reich Criminal Police Office through ordinary channels as determined by competent agencies.
[149] Closing statement is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July 1947, pp. 10718-10796.
[150] Defendant before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, Vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.
[151] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18 July 1947, pp. 11220-11244.
[152] Defendant in case of United States vs. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. See Vols. XII, XIII, XIV.
[153] United States vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al. See Vol. III.
[154] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 16 July 1947, pp. 10922-10941.
[155] Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XVII, pp. 458-494, Nuremberg, 1948.
[156] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Feb. 1947, pp. 2301-2661.
[157] Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 Apr. 1947, pp. 6081-6484.