MILITARY TRIBUNAL I
Count I of the indictment in this case charges that the defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article 2. It is charged that the alleged crime was committed between September 1939 and April 1945.
It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of the International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. 10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against humanity as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any defendant upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense.
Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge of conspiracy, also alleges unlawful participation in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission of such crimes. We, therefore, cannot properly strike the whole of Count I from the indictment, but insofar as Count I charges the commission of the alleged crime of conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, distinct from any war crime or crime against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that charge.
This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or effect of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control Council Law No. 10, or as denying to either prosecution or defense the right to offer in evidence any facts or circumstances, occurring either before or after September 1939, if such facts or circumstances tend to prove or to disprove the commission by any defendant of war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10.
[30] Tr. pp. 10717-10718, 14 July 47.
X. FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT KARL BRANDT[[31]]
BY DR. SERVATIUS
Mr. President, your Honors:
I cannot comment on all the questions which the prosecution brought up this morning. I must limit myself to a few things and can refer to my closing brief where I have gone into considerable detail on all these questions.
This morning I heard the detailed legal arguments advanced by the prosecutor. I have commented particularly on these legal questions in my closing brief, and I will now merely make a few brief comments.
The prosecution assumes that Law No. 10 is an independent law. This is not correct, for it designates itself explicitly as a law for the execution of the London Charter and declares that Charter to be an integral part of the law.
Now, the sole purpose of the London Charter is to punish disturbances of international legal relations, and not what has happened or is happening somewhere within an individual state. Any other interpretation would put an end to the conception of sovereignty, and it would give right of intervention into the affairs of other states.
In the trial before Tribunal III, Case No. 3, against Flick et al.,[[32]] General Taylor referred to an alleged right of intervention, quoting a considerable amount of literature with regard to this right of intervention into the internal affairs of another country.
I have ventured to refer to the position taken concerning this by one of the four signatory powers of the London Charter, a signatory power which was itself the victim of intervention in the name of civilization, the Soviet Union. I have attached the said literature to part I of my closing brief.
The Soviet Union drew a clear inference from the intervention to which it had been exposed by the Entente at the end of the First World War and obtained an alteration in the text of the London Charter, under which intervention would have been possible, by insisting that the text, which was ambiguous in consequence of the punctuation, be altered by the insertion of a comma. This comma was so important that the representatives of the four signatory powers met on purpose to discuss it.
It results therefrom that the internal affairs of a country cannot be affected by the London Charter and, consequently, by Law No. 10. Punishment by this Tribunal of acts committed by Germans against Germans is therefore inadmissible.
The prosecution further discussed at length this morning another question, that is the question of conspiracy. I have also commented on that in my closing brief. I will merely make a brief reply here to the prosecution.
The point of view of the defense, that a charge of conspiracy as an independent offense is inadmissible, was confirmed by the Tribunal’s decision of today. In that way the leak in the dike, so to speak, was stopped, and one cannot let the ocean pour into the land from the other side by declaring the conception of conspiracy admissible under common law.
The conception of conspiracy is really only a technical expedient of the jurists. Its purpose is to effect, beyond the number of accomplices in the true sense of the word, other persons who are considered deserving of punishment, but who cannot be proved guilty of complicity.
This may be done where the law against conspiracy is common law. If, however, this law is introduced in Germany after the event and applied to facts which have occurred in the past, this would mean that by a detour of the law of procedure new conceptions of offense would be introduced into material law. This would amount to an ex post facto law and is, therefore, illegal according to legal principles generally recognized.
The purpose of enlarging the circle of participants cannot be attained under Law No. 10 by breaking up the conception of conspiracy into its component parts and introducing forms of complicity hitherto unknown in Germany.
Now, I shall read my statement proper:
In the closing statement against the defendant Karl Brandt the prosecution discussed very little the counter-evidence brought forward by the defense in the course of the proceedings. They relied to a large extent on evidence already advanced in the indictment.
The affidavits of the defendants themselves play a special part in support of the prosecution. For the defendant Karl Brandt they are important with respect to his position and consequent knowledge of the event referred to in the indictment.
If these affidavits contain imputations they can only be used, according to the Tribunal’s statement, against the affiants themselves. As far as they involve the defendant Karl Brandt, however, they have been clarified in respect to the decisive issues. But in spite of this correction the first statements may prejudice credibility unless good reasons justify such correction.
Here the result of interrogations made in the initial proceedings is in contradiction to the evidence given before the Tribunal. On the basis of practical experience, German law considers as valid evidence only the result of an interrogation made by a judge. The reason is the lack of impartiality which may be found, quite naturally, in the case of an interrogating official who is to conduct the prosecution. The capacity of the interrogator to elicit the truth impartially depends on his character, his training, and his professional experience.
The qualification of the interrogators has been attacked here by the defense, but the prosecution has made no effort to substantiate it.
In order to form a judgment it is also important to know the general lines on which the prosecution carries out its interrogations. Under German law the prosecutor also has to ascertain and put forward exculpating material when investigating a case personally or through assistants. As to American procedure, Justice Jackson clearly rejected this principle during the trial before the International Military Tribunal and said he could never serve two masters.
This critical view of the affidavits is confirmed by their contents, which frequently show the struggle between the interrogator and the interrogated person. He is no classical witness who says, “I believe,” “I presume,” “as far as I remember,” and so on, for he shows thereby that he can give no positive information. And such testimony becomes completely worthless if conclusions are drawn in the form of, “It would have been impossible for him,” “he might have known,” “perhaps he was the highest authority,” and so forth.
Not only individual words thus demonstrated that the testimony is composed of conclusions, but whole parts of the reports show the same character.
In view of all this, the defendants’ contentions are to be believed, that they raised objections but succumbed to the weight of the prepared record presented to them and signed, trusting that they would have an opportunity later to clarify deficiencies and to state their true opinion.
This criticism of the defendants’ affidavits is also called for in the case of the affidavits given by the witnesses for the prosecution. Facts are recorded therein which the witnesses did not know themselves, but which they had only heard about, and which they presumed after having been made to believe them by persuasion. The individual cases in which objections are to be raised on these lines have been dealt with in the closing brief.
The charges advanced against the defendant Karl Brandt include medical experiments on human beings and euthanasia. In both cases the defendant is charged with having committed crimes against humanity.
The press comments on the proceedings, anticipating the sentence and publishing articles about base characters and depravity. Pamphlets with striking titles appear.
On the other hand the Tribunal will make itself acquainted with the literature collected by the defense as evidence. If one reads this literature one loses one’s self-confidence and cannot conclude without admitting that these are problems which persons not considered criminals tried to solve before the defendants. These are problems of the community. The individual may make suggestions for their solution, but the decision is the task of the community and therefore of the state. The question is how great a sacrifice may the state demand in the interest of the community? This decision is for the state alone.
How the state decides depends on its free discretion, and finds its limit only in the rebellion of its citizens. In obeying the orders of his state, the defendant Karl Brandt did no wrong. If sentence is passed against him, it would be a political sentence against the state and the ideology it represents.
One can condemn the defendant Karl Brandt only by imposing on him the duty of rebellion and the duty of having a different ideology to his environment.
It is contended that the state finds its limits in the eternal basic elements of law, which are said to be so clear that anyone could discern their violation as a crime, and that loyalty to the state beyond these limits is therefore a crime. One forgets that eternal law, the law of nature, is but a guiding principle for the state and the legislator and not a counter-code of law which the subject might use as a support against the state. It is emphasized that no other state had made such decisions up to now. This is true only to a certain extent. It is no proof, however, that such decisions were not necessary and admissible now. There is no prohibition against daring to progress.
The progress of medical science opened up the problem of experiments on human beings already in the past century, and eventually made it ripe for decision. It is not the first time that a state has adopted a certain attitude with regard to euthanasia with a change of ideology.
Only the statesmen decide what is to be done in the interests of the community, and they have never hesitated to issue such a decision whenever they deemed it necessary in the interest of their people. Thereupon their rules and orders were carried through under the authority of the state, which is the basis of society.
Inquisition, witch trials, and revolutionary tribunals have existed in the name of the state and eternal justice, and the executive participants did not consider themselves criminals but servants of their community. They would have been killed if they had stood up against what was believed to be newly discovered eternal justice. What is the subject to do if the orders of the state exceed the customary limits which the individual himself took for inviolable according to tradition.
What did the airman think who dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima? Did he consider himself a criminal? What did the statesmen think who ordered this atomic bomb to be used. We know from the history of this event that the motive was patriotism, based on the harsh necessity of sacrificing hundreds of thousands to save their own soldiers’ lives. This motive was stronger than the prohibition of the Hague Convention, under which belligerents have no unlimited right in the choice of methods for inflicting damage on the enemy.
“My cause is just and my quarrel honorable,” says the king. And Shakespeare’s soldier answers him: “That’s more than we know.” Another soldier adds: “Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough if we know we are the king’s subjects; if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime out of us.”
It is the hard necessity of the state on which the defense for Karl Brandt is based against the charge of having performed criminal experiments on human beings.
Here also—in addition to the care for the population—the lives of soldiers were at stake, soldiers who had to be protected from death and epidemics. In Professor Bickenbach’s experiment, the issue was the lives of women and children who without 45 million gas masks would have been as unprotected against the expected gas attack as the Japanese were against the atomic bomb. Biological warfare was imminent, even praised abroad as cheaper and more effective than the atomic bomb.
Is it really against the law and all political morals if the state in such a situation provides for the expected emergency and orders the necessary medical experiments to be performed on its own citizens? As applied to foreigners such procedure is limited in principle. In my closing brief I have discussed the exceptions.
What is to be done is decided not by the physician but by the political leader. Even the expert Dr. Ivy had to grant him the fundamental authority.
The question is why, with the legal position so clear, a man like Keitel refused to have such experiments carried out in the Wehrmacht, and why some of the defendants themselves try to disprove any connection with the experiments. The answer is that a measure may be as unavoidable as war and yet be abhorred in the same way.
Unlike Professor Ivy, these men certainly considered these experiments an evil, and their desire was not to become involved in them personally, if possible, and not to allow troops to participate in them who should not be burdened with such questions and who had no insight into the necessity of the measures to be taken. In spite of everything, Germany was not yet so “communized” that all private feelings in the individual had disappeared.
The prosecution opposes to this necessity the condition of absolute voluntariness.
It was a surprise to hear from the expert Professor Ivy that in the penitentiaries many hundreds of volunteers were pressing for admission to experiments, and that more volunteered than could be used. I do not want to dispose of this phenomenon with irony and sarcasm. There may be people who realize that the community has the right to ask them for a sacrifice. Their feeling of justice may tell them that insistence on humanity has its limits. If humanity means the appeal to the strong not to forget the weak in the abundance of might and wealth, the weak should also make their contribution when all are in need.
But what if in the emergency of war the convicts, and those declared to be unworthy to serve in the armed forces, refuse to accept such a sacrifice voluntarily, and only prove an asocial burden to state and community and bring about the downfall of the community? Is not compulsion by the state then admissible as an additional expiation?
The prosecution says “No”. According to this human rights demand the downfall of human beings.
But there is a mixture of voluntariness and compulsory expiation, “purchased voluntariness.” Here the experimental subject does not make a sacrifice out of conviction for the good of the community but for his own good. The subject gives his consent because he is to receive money, cigarettes, a mitigation of punishment, etc. There may be isolated cases of this nature where the person is really a volunteer, but as a rule it is not so.
If one compares the actual risk with the advantage granted, one cannot admit the consent of these “voluntary prisoners” as legal, in spite of all the protective forms they have to sign, for these can only have been obtained by taking advantage of inexperience, imprudence, or distress.
Looking through medical literature, one cannot escape the growing conviction that the word “volunteer”, where it appears at all, is used only as a word of protection and camouflage; it is hardly ever missing since the struggle over this problem became acute.
I will touch only briefly on what I have explained in detail in my closing brief. No one will contend that human beings really allowed themselves to be infected voluntarily with venereal disease; this has nowhere been stated explicitly in literature. Cholera and plague are also not minor inconveniences one is likely to undergo voluntarily for a trifle in the interest of science. Above all, it is not customary to hand over children for experimental purposes, and I cannot believe that in the 13 experiments carried out on a total of 223 children, as stated in Document Karl Brandt 117, Karl Brandt Exhibit 103, the mothers gave their consent. Would not the mothers have deserved the praise of the scientist for the sacrifice they trustfully made in the interest of science, praise which is otherwise liberally granted to real volunteers in reports on experiments?
Is it not likely to have been similar to the experiments carried out by Professor McCance? (Karl Brandt 93, Karl Brandt Ex. 29.) The German authorities who condemn the defendants in a particularly violent form have no objection to raise here against the order to hand over weakling children to a research commission for experimental purposes. The questionnaires which the Tribunal approved for me in order to get further information about this matter have not been answered as the higher authorities did not give permission for such statements to be made. This silence says enough; it is proof of what is supposed to be legal today in the line of “voluntariness”.
It is repeatedly shown that the experiments for which no consent was given were permitted with the full knowledge of the government authorities. It is further shown that these experiments were published in professional literature without meeting any objection, and that they were even accepted by the public without concern as a normal phenomenon when reports about them appeared in popular magazines.
This happens at a time when the same press is stigmatizing as crimes against humanity the German experiments which were necessary in the interests of the state. Voluntariness is a fiction; the emergency of the state hard reality.
In all countries experiments on human beings have been performed by doctors, certainly not because they took pleasure in killing or tormenting, but only at the instigation and under the protection of their state, and in accordance with their own conviction of the necessity for these experiments in the struggle for the existence of the people.
The German doctor who acted in conformity with the German regulations can no more be punished than the American doctor who complied with the requests of his state in the way which is customary there.
Justice is indivisible.
To what extent is the defendant Karl Brandt implicated in the medical experiments?
The prosecution says he is implicated in almost all the experiments and refers to his position and his connections. They state that he was the highest Reich authority in the medical spheres; there, however, they are misled by an error in translation, for Karl Brandt only had the powers, regulated in a general way, of an “Oberste Reichsbehoerde” [Supreme Reich Authority], and the practice of those powers was restricted to special cases.
This is apparent from the three known decrees and from the explanation thereof given by witnesses. Moreover, Karl Brandt was not given these functions until 1944 when these experiments were practically finished, as is shown by the time schedule submitted to the Tribunal for comparison.
It has been proved that the defendant Karl Brandt himself, in a broadcast, publicly called his position as Reich Commissioner a “Differential”. In fact, Karl Brandt’s task was not to order but to adjust; it was a task designed to fit his character.
We have also learned from the presentation of evidence that the defendant Karl Brandt did not have the machinery at his disposal for issuing orders which was necessary for a supreme Reich authority; he lacked the staff and the means. No one who is acquainted with a government administration will think it possible that, under these circumstances, the defendant Karl Brandt might have been able to enforce his point of view against the resistance of the old agencies; no one will even think it probable that anything would have been done to facilitate such an attempt by the “new master”.
Consequently, Karl Brandt’s position was not such as to justify the conclusion drawn by the prosecution as to his general knowledge. There was no official channel by which everything was bound to come to his knowledge, for he was not the superior of other authorities.
It is true that the defendant Karl Brandt was supposed to be informed about fundamental matters, that he had the right to intervene, and so on. But these were only possibilities, not in conformity with conditions in practice. We have seen that Conti opposed him and that Himmler prohibited direct contact with Karl Brandt within his sphere.
Therefore Karl Brandt can be brought into connection only with the events in which he participated directly.
Here it is first of all striking that the defendant Karl Brandt, who is supposed to have been the highest authority, appears only very rarely.
There are three so-called troop experiments: the testing of drinking water, concentrated food, and an ointment for burns.
Further, three medical experiments are connected with the defendant Karl Brandt. The hepatitis experiments, which he is said to have suggested, were not carried out. While that research was continued during the following years, Karl Brandt, who is said to have sponsored it particularly, is mentioned by none of the numerous witnesses and experts, and his name is not mentioned in any document. Is it not, therefore, a plausible explanation that Grawitz confused the names?
The second case is the request to hand over 10 prisoners for two days for an experiment not named. This cannot refer to a real medical experiment, for such an experiment cannot be carried out in such a short time with the necessary tests and observations. The speedy return of the experimental subjects indicates that the experiment was not dangerous.
Finally, the defendant Karl Brandt is connected with the phosgene experiments by Bickenbach, which caused the death of four Germans sentenced to death. But precisely here Bickenbach’s affidavit shows that the defendant Karl Brandt was outside the whole framework of the experiment in Himmler’s sphere, and that he was merely approached to mediate. The order came from Himmler. The experiments must have seemed innocuous to the defendant Karl Brandt since Bickenbach wanted to carry them out on himself.
On the other hand, there was the state emergency and the enormous importance of the discovery that the taking of a few urotropin tablets might give the ardently desired protection to all against the expected gas attack and, as the result of the experiment shows, actually did so.
Now the prosecution endeavors to establish a connection of Karl Brandt with the other experiments via the Reich Research Council. It is true that one can establish such a connection theoretically on paper, but the links of the chain break when one examines them closely. Only the head of the specialized department decided on the so-called research assignments, and he only investigated whether the aim was necessary for war, not how the experiment was to be carried out. He could not inform others of matters about which he did not know himself.
The defendant Karl Brandt is further charged with not having protested in one case when he heard about deaths caused by experiments on persons sentenced to death in the well-known lecture on sulfanilamide. I must point out that even if this experiment had been inadmissible, silence would not be a crime, for assent after the act is without importance in criminal law, and one can only be connected with plans and enterprises as long as they have not been concluded.
Now the prosecution has introduced in its closing brief a new charge holding the defendant Karl Brandt responsible for negligence. In this respect I should like to point out that no indictment for negligence has been brought in, and that the concept of crime against humanity committed by negligence cannot exist.
Therefore, it will be sufficient to emphasize that the alleged negligence depends on the existence of a duty of supervision and the right to give orders through other agencies. In every state the spheres of competence are separated, and it is not possible for everyone to interfere in everything on the basis that everyone is responsible for everything.
The prosecution says that the defendant Karl Brandt ought to have used his influence and availed himself of his intimate relations with Hitler to stop the experiments. Even presuming that he was aware of the facts as crimes, his guilt would not be of a legal, but only of a political or moral nature. Until now nobody has been held criminally responsible for the conduct of a superior or a friend; the question of criminal law, however, is the only one the Tribunal has to consider. As a matter of fact this close relationship did not exist. The defendant Karl Brandt was the surgeon who had to be in attendance on Hitler; Dr. Morell, the latter’s personal physician, soon tried to undermine the confidence placed in Karl Brandt so that he was given commissions which removed him further and further from the sphere of his medical activity.
The alleged intimate relations were eventually crowned by the dictation of a death sentence against Karl Brandt without his having been granted even a hearing on the charges advanced against him.
If one sums up everything relating to the medical experiments and follows to a large extent the charges of the prosecution, it is an established fact that it is not shown that the defendant Karl Brandt participated in any way in experiments on prisoners of war and foreigners, or that he was cognizant of them. Therefore, no war crime or crime against humanity has been committed, and consequently punishment under Law No. 10 is excluded. I refer in this connection to the legal arguments in my closing brief.
The second problem is euthanasia.
The authorization of 1 September 1939 was issued before the period of the medical experiments, at a time when the defendant Karl Brandt was still closely attached to the Fuehrer’s headquarters and to Hitler as an accompanying physician.
In my closing brief I have explained in detail that the defendant Karl Brandt did not participate in the Action 14 f 13, with the “special treatment” of prisoners in concentration camps, occurrences which were given the name of euthanasia only here in the trial.
Neither did the defendant Karl Brandt take any part in the extermination of Jews in Auschwitz, which again has nothing in common with the idea of euthanasia.
I have further shown that the so-called “wild euthanasia”, which was carried out simultaneously with and immediately after legal euthanasia, was not instigated by Karl Brandt. The stopping of euthanasia in August 1941 has been proved, and therefore that was the end of the defendant Karl Brandt’s duties; for what would have been the meaning of this cessation if, after it, increased activity was to set in? The contacts of Karl Brandt after the cessation have been clarified as being the consequence of his activities connected with evacuation for air protection. Where the name of the defendant Karl Brandt is mentioned otherwise, it obviously serves only as means of information for uninformed people who never saw or heard anything of him themselves.
I shall deal here with euthanasia only to the extent that it is officially dealt with under the ordinance of 1 September 1939. Concerning the “Reich committee”, I refer to my closing brief.
The presentation of evidence has established that the defendant Karl Brandt actually had no “administrative and medical office” from which the whole organization might have been administered. On the contrary, it is a fact that Bouhler declared himself solely responsible for the procedure; this is testified to by unequivocal documents.
Nor has any regulation or instruction become known which was issued by Karl Brandt. Not a single document was signed by him. He made no speeches and conducted no discussions.
But what did he do and what was his duty?
His duty was not to carry out euthanasia; he was only to be informed in special cases in order to be able to report to Hitler. This was in conformity with the existing conditions—his presence at and simultaneous attachment to the Fuehrer’s headquarters, and to Hitler.
Only once was Karl Brandt seen active, and that is in the negotiations with Pastor von Bodelschwingh, which led to the result, amazing for us, that the defendant Karl Brandt won Bodelschwingh’s sympathy, and after the collapse the latter said in a radio interview that Brandt was an idealist but not a criminal.
But the defendant Karl Brandt took note of interrogation forms, he inspected a registrar’s office, and he co-signed the authority for physicians to execute euthanasia.
What could the defendant Karl Brandt learn from the forms?
The prosecution thinks that Jews and foreigners were to be affected in the first instance. The affidavit by the director of the Jewish lunatic asylum, in which all the insane Jews of Germany were concentrated, proves that this was not the case.
The prosecution says that all persons unfit for work were to be killed as “useless eaters”. But it is a fact that even work-houses were requested to give information only about cases of really grave insanity.
What did the defendant Karl Brandt know about the procedure?
He knew that the authorization which was issued was not an order given to the doctor, but only conferred on him the right to act on his own responsibility after the most careful consideration of the patient’s condition. This was a clause inserted in the ordinance of 1 September 1939 on Karl Brandt’s initiative.
The defendant Karl Brandt knew that the specialists, whom he did not know, were chosen by the Ministry of the Interior, and that the experts were eminent men in their special spheres.
The defendant Karl Brandt also knew that the authorities concerned saw no reason to object to the execution of the measure, and that even the chief jurists of the Reich declared the legal foundations to be irreproachable, after having been informed of the facts.
Within this framework the defendant Karl Brandt approved of official euthanasia and supported it.
But the prosecution even calls euthanasia a thousand-fold murder. In their opinion there was no formal law, and it is alleged that the expert Dr. Lammers confirmed this.
Yes, but he also stated that even an informal ordinance was valid. Even an order issued by the Fuehrer had the force of law, as can be clearly seen from the indisputable effects of such orders, in particular in relation to foreigners.
But for the defendant Karl Brandt it is of no importance whether the ordinance of 1 September 1939 was actually valid or not; the only important thing is that he had reason to believe it was valid and that he could rely on this opinion.
German courts have already dealt with cases of the practice of euthanasia; but these cases occurred after the official procedure had been stopped, as at Hadamar, or after persons had been killed who could never have come under the powers conferred by the ordinance, or other crimes were committed.
It should be observed that these sentences always confirm the base motives of the offenders. On the other hand, these courts were concerned with the question of public law only to the extent that they confirm that no formal law was available. In one case the court restricted itself to information given by a member of the prosecution staff in the trial before the International Military Tribunal.
The real objections to euthanasia are not based on a formal point of view, but rather on the same reasons which are advanced against the admissibility of the medical experiments.
Even an insane person of the lowest grade may not be killed it is said. No human being may presume to kill another human being.
But the right to kill in war is accepted in international law, and public law allows the suppression of a revolt by violence.
What prevents the state from ordering killing in the sphere of euthanasia too?
The answer is that there is no motive which might justify an action of this kind.
The economic motive of eliminating “useless eaters” is certainly not sufficient for such measures. Such a motive was never upheld by the defendant Karl Brandt; it was apparently mentioned by others as an accompanying contingency and later taken up by counter propaganda.
The defendant Karl Brandt considered the motive of pity for the patient to be the decisive one. This motive is tacitly accepted for euthanasia on the deathbed, and doctors in all countries increasingly acknowledge it.
In former times the courts were repeatedly concerned with killings committed out of pity, and in sensational trials, juries found offenders not guilty who freed their nearest relatives from the torment of life.
Who would not have the desire to die while in good health rather than to be forced by all the resources of medical science to continue life degraded to an animal’s existence! Only misguided civilization keeps such beings alive; in the normal struggle for existence Nature is more charitable.
But the legislator has hitherto refrained from giving authority to kill in such cases. But he can solve the problem if he wants to. The reasons for his restraint are exactly those which led in this case to the disguising of those measures and to the secrecy observed. There is the fear of base intrigues concerning inheritance, the mental burden of the relatives, and so on. The individual does not want to bear this burden, nor is he able to do so. It can be taken over only by the state, which is independent of the desires of those concerned.
That such is the will of the great majority of those who really come into touch with these problems was shown by the result of the inquiry conducted by Professor Meltzer, which has been offered in evidence. It was carried out by him many years ago in order to obtain an argument against euthanasia and its principal supporters, Binding and Hoche. He obtained the reverse of what he had himself expected as an expert.
But I see a third motive which unconsciously plays an important part; it is the idea of sacrifice.
A lunatic may cause the mental and economic decay of a family and also ruin it morally.
If healthy human beings make great sacrifices for the community and lay down their lives by order of the state, the insane person, if he could arouse himself mentally and make a decision, would choose a similar sacrifice for himself.
Why should not the state be allowed to enact this sacrifice in his case and impose on him what he would want to do himself?
Is the state to be forbidden to carry out such euthanasia until the whole world is a hospital, while the creatures of nature keep unblemished through what is believed to be the brutality of Nature?
The decision as to whether such an order given by the state is admissible or not depends on the conception of the social life of mankind and is, therefore, a political decision.
Neither the defendant Karl Brandt nor anyone else who participated in legalized euthanasia would ever have killed a human being on his own authority, and in the German sentences passed the blameless former life of the persons stigmatized as mass-murderers is always emphasized.
This is a warning to be cautious. Did they really commit brutalities, or were they sentenced only because they were not in a position to swim against the tide of times and to oppose it with their own judgment?
A Christian believing in dogma will turn away in pity from this way of thinking. But if the order to use euthanasia to the desired limited extent was really in such contradiction to the commandment of God that everyone could realize it, then it is incomprehensible why Hitler, who never withdrew from the church, was not excommunicated.
This must remove the burden of guilt which one now wants to pile up. Then humanity would have clearly realized at the time that in this devilish struggle man cannot prevail for God stands for Justice.
If there are offenders there are many co-offenders, and one understands Pastor Niemoeller saying: “We are all guilty.”
This is a moral or a political guilt, but cannot be shifted to a single person as criminal guilt.
I have thus shown the fundamental lines along which the actions of the defendant Karl Brandt have to be judged.
The primary consideration for the judgment of this Tribunal is that no prisoners of war or foreigners were submitted to euthanasia with the knowledge or the desire of the defendant Karl Brandt.
Thus the defendant Karl Brandt cannot be punished under Law No. 10 on this count either. What happened between Germans is not subject to the decision of this Tribunal.
Finally, the defendant Karl Brandt is also charged with having been a member of the SS, an organization which has been declared criminal. Evidence to show that the defendant Karl Brandt knew of a criminal aim of this organization and approved of it must be brought by the prosecution. A reference to the general assertions in these proceedings is not sufficient proof, for precisely here the prosecution cannot prevail with their assertions in regard to Karl Brandt.
As to the details, I refer to the statements made in my closing brief.
The fact that the defendant Karl Brandt was the only member of the SS who at the same time retained his position as a medical officer in the army shows that his honorary rank in the SS was really only a formality, and that he was no true member of this organization.
When the defendant Karl Brandt testified here that he wore the uniform of the SS with pride, this only shows that he, like the majority of the SS men, knew nothing about the criminal aims. In judging the organization of the SS, the International Military Tribunal was aware only of a small part of the whole, looking, so to speak, through a keyhole into a dark corner.
Nor could the defendant Karl Brandt have any personal knowledge of Himmler’s secrets, for Himmler rejected him personally, as is shown by a number of affidavits. Since the defendant Karl Brandt could not obtain information even in his own sphere of medicine, how is he to have obtained knowledge of other matters?
I do not want to repeat the affidavits which give information about the basic attitude of the defendant Karl Brandt and show that he adopted an attitude which was incompatible with the mentality supposed to be typical of the SS. In this connection I merely refer to the statements made by Pastor Bodelschwingh, Dr. Gerstenmaier, Meyer-Bockhoff, Philipp Prince of Hesse, and others.
If I, as the defense counsel, consider Karl Brandt’s conduct as a whole and see the wounds he has received in the struggle of life, I must acknowledge that he is a man and not a criminal.
For the Tribunal’s decision, however, the only conclusive fact is that the defendant Karl Brandt did not disturb the circle of international law, for he committed no war crimes and consequently no crimes against humanity. I, therefore, ask that defendant Karl Brandt be acquitted.
[31] Final plea is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 14 July 47, pp. 10797-10817.
[32] United States vs. Friedrich Flick et al. See vol. VI.
XI. FINAL STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS,
19 JULY 1947
A. Final Statement of Defendant Karl Brandt[[33]]
There is a word which seems so simple—order; and how colossal are its implications. How immeasurable are the conflicts which hide behind the word obey. Both affected me, obey and order, and both imply responsibility. I am a doctor and on my conscience lies the responsibility of being responsible for men and for life. Quite dispassionately the prosecution has brought the charge of crime and murder and they have raised the question of my guilt. It would have no weight if friends and patients were to shield me and speak well of me, saying I had helped and I had healed. There would be many examples of my actions during danger and my readiness to help. All that is now useless. As far as I am concerned I shall not evade these charges. But the attempt to vindicate myself as a man is my duty towards all who believe in me personally, who trusted in me and who relied upon me as a man as well as a doctor and a superior.
No matter how I was faced with the problem, I have never regarded human experiments as a matter of course, not even when no danger was entailed. But I affirm the necessity for them on grounds of reason. I know that opposition will arise. I know things that disturb the conscience of a medical man, and I know the inner distress that afflicts one when ethics of every form are decided by an order or obedience.
It is immaterial for the experiment whether it is done with or against the will of the person concerned. For the individual the event seems senseless, just as senseless as my actions as a doctor seem when isolated. The sense lies much deeper than that. Can I, as an individual, detach myself from the community? Can I remain outside and do without it? Could I, as a part of this community, evade it by saying I want to live in this community, but I don’t want to make any sacrifices for it, either of body or soul? I want to keep a clear conscience. Let them see how they can get along. And yet we, that community and I, are somehow identical.
Thus I must suffer these contradictions and bear the consequences, even if they remain incomprehensible. I must bear them as my lot in life, which allocates to me its tasks. The meaning is the motive—devotion to the community. If on its account I am guilty, then on its account I will be answerable.
There was war. In war, efforts are all alike. Its sacrifices affect us all. They were incumbent upon me. But are those sacrifices my crime? Did I tread on the precepts of humanity and despise them? Did I pass over human beings and their lives as if they were nothing? Men will point at me and cry “euthanasia”, and falsely, “the useless”, “the incapable”, “the worthless”. But what actually happened? Did not Pastor Bodelschwingh, in the middle of his work at Bethel last year, say that I was an idealist and not a criminal? How could he say that?
Here I am, subject of the most frightful charges, as if I had not only been a doctor, but also a man without heart or conscience. Do you think that it was a pleasure to me to receive the order to permit euthanasia? For 15 years I had toiled at the sickbed and every patient was to me like a brother. I worried about every sick child as if it had been my own. My personal lot was a heavy one. Is that guilt?
Was it not my first thought to limit the scope of euthanasia? Did I not, the moment I was included, try to find a limit and demand a most searching report on the incurables? Were not the appointed professors of the universities there? Who could there be who was better qualified? But I do not want to speak of these questions and of their execution. I am defending myself against the charge of inhuman conduct and base intentions. In the face of these charges I fight for my right to humane treatment! I know how complicated this problem is. With the utmost fervor I have tortured myself again and again, but no philosophy or other wisdom helped me here. There was the decree and on it there was my name. It is no good saying that I could have feigned sickness. I do not live this life of mine in order to evade fate if I meet it. And thus I assented to euthanasia. I fully realize the problem; it is as old as mankind, but it is not a crime against man nor against humanity. It is pity for the incurable, literally. Here I cannot believe like a clergyman or think as a jurist. I am a doctor and I see the law of nature as being the law of reason. In my heart there is love of mankind, and so it is in my conscience. That is why I am a doctor!
When I talked at the time to Pastor Bodelschwingh, the only serious admonisher I knew personally, it seemed at first as if our thoughts were far apart; but the longer we talked and the more we came into the open, the closer and the greater became our mutual understanding. At that time we were not concerned with words. It was a struggle and a search far beyond the human sphere. When the old Pastor Bodelschwingh left me after many hours and we shook hands, his last words were: “That was the hardest struggle of my life.” For him as well as for me that struggle remained; and the problem remained too.
If I were to say today that I wish this problem had never come upon me with its convulsive drama, that would be nothing but superficiality in order to make me feel more comfortable in myself. But I am living in these times and I see that they are full of antitheses. Somewhere we all must make a stand. I am fully conscious that when I said “Yes” to euthanasia I did so with the deepest conviction, just as it is my conviction today, that it was right. Death can mean deliverance. Death is life—just as much as birth. It was never meant to be murder. I bear a burden, but it is not the burden of crime. I bear this burden of mine, though with a heavy heart, as my responsibility. I stand before it, and before my conscience, as a man and as a doctor.
B. Final Statement of Defendant Handloser[[34]]
During my first interrogations here in Nuernberg, in August 1946, the interrogator declared to me:
First, you have been the Chief of the Army Medical Service. Whether or not you knew of inadmissible experiments does not matter here. As the Chief, you are responsible for everything.
Secondly, do not make the excuse that among other nations the same or similar things have happened. We are not concerned with that here. The Germans are under indictment, not the others.
Thirdly, do not appeal to your witnesses. They, of course, will testify in your favor. We have our witnesses, and we rely upon them.
Those were the guiding principles of the prosecution up to the last day of these proceedings. They have remained incomprehensible to me, because I always believed a criminal to be a man who did wrong, and because I was of the opinion that even the prosecution endeavored to be objective, at least after the end of the presentation of evidence. The final plea by the prosecution, however, has shown me that I made a mistake. The speech by the prosecution did not take into account the material submitted in evidence, but it was a summarized repetition of one-sided statements by the prosecution without taking into account that which was submitted in the course of the presentation of evidence in my case.
I am quite convinced that the high Tribunal has gained a true impression of my activity and of my attitude. Just as I have tried throughout my entire life to fulfill the tasks allotted to me by fate according to the best of my capacity and in the full knowledge of my responsibility, so have I also tried to stand this most serious task before this Court with the aid of the strongest weapon which I possess—that is the truth.
If there is anything which could console me for the mental suffering of the last months, it is the consciousness of knowing that before this Court, before the German people, and before the people of the world, it has been made clear that the serious general charges of the prosecution against the Medical Corps of the German Armed Forces have been proved to be without any foundation.
It can be seen how unjust these charges were by the fact that no charges have been raised or any proceedings initiated against a single leading doctor of the German Armed Forces in combat or at home. As the last Medical Inspector of the Army, and as Chief of the Medical Service of the Armed Forces of Germany, I think with pride of all the medical officers to whose untiring devotion countless wounded and sick patients of this dreadful war owe their lives and cure and their possibilities of existence. Never and nowhere were the losses of an army medical corps greater than those among the medical officers of the German Armed Forces in carrying out their duties.
More than 150 years ago, the motto and guiding principle created for German military doctors and their successors was “Scientiae, Humanitati, Patriae” (For Science, Humanity, and Fatherland). Like the medical officers in their entirety I also have remained true to that guiding principle in thought and in deed. Realizing the outcome of the events of these recent times, may the joint endeavors of all the nations succeed in avoiding in future the immeasurable misfortune of war, the dreadful side of which nobody knows better than the military doctor.
C. Final Statement of Defendant Rostock[[35]]
I have nothing to add to the pertinent statements by my defense counsel, Dr. Pribilla, regarding the individual points of the indictment in this trial; but with regard to the general position of German medical science during this war, there are a few words, which I would like to say from this dock.
During my direct examination I have already stated why I, as the Chief of the so-called “Science and Research” department undertook to work for medical science as late as 1943 and 1944. At that time the problem was to avoid, or at least to minimize, the great and acute danger of teaching and research, and with that Germany’s universities, becoming completely destroyed. When this had been prevented at the very last moment, there arose the task and the duty of improving the means and the possibilities of basic research which had been more and more restricted in the course of the war, and through dwindling resources research in Germany would have come to a standstill. Due to the chaotic development of the last year of the war, success was comparatively small. There were, however, some results and there were a few things which were saved after the end of the war.
Today through the evidence produced in this trial, I know the reasons which paralyzed the work at the time. It was the striving for power on the part of certain organizations which used the effective support of certain executive departments of the Third Reich who held unrestricted power. It was the principle of totalitarianism which these organizations followed particularly in the case of what they called the “university science”. It was there, however, that we had founded the tradition of German science recognized the world over. In contrast to that, their aim, as shown in some of the testimonies given in this trial and some of the documents submitted, was to found a “politically directed science” of their own. That was the reason why my personal efforts and those of the health and medical services, which I have referred to in this trial, did not achieve complete success. Today, at the end of this trial, that is now clear to me. At that time, in the year 1944, we did not know of this masterly camouflaged and, therefore, so very dangerous opponent to that branch of science with which I myself had grown up.
Throughout my life I have never worked for one form of a state or another, or for any political party in Germany, but simply and solely for my patients and for medical science.
D. Final Statement of Defendant Schroeder[[36]]
It is very difficult for a defendant to find the right final words here. In methodical, detailed work throughout the last months, the defense has tried to rebut the charges of the prosecution.
When now the prosecution states in its final plea that details do not matter so much, but that the entire complex of questions has to be considered as a whole, that one has to look at matters as at a bundle of sticks, not as individual branches and twigs of the bundle. If, furthermore, the prosecution refers to a sentence pronounced in the Far East by an American Military Court, by which a Japanese general and military commander was sentenced only because, as a commander, he bore the responsibility for all the acts of his troops, regardless of whether he ordered them, knew of them, approved of them, or did not even know of them—if, gentlemen of the Tribunal, these principles are decisive for proceedings, then I have to ask, why bother at all to start proceedings of that kind, to prepare them, and to carry them out? Those decisions could be made much more quickly.
What can I, as a defendant, bring against these arguments? That can be said in a few words: myself, my work, my acts as a doctor and a soldier in 35 years of service. Not the craving for glory and honor was the purport of my life’s work, but the firm intention to put my entire capacity, my full knowledge, into the service of my beloved Fatherland; to help the soldier, as a physician, to heal the wounds caused by wartime and peacetime service, both as a physician for the individual, as well as a medical officer for the mass of troops which were in my care.
That was the aim and object of my work. I do not believe that I have deviated from that path. My eyes always looked towards the final goal: to help and to heal.
E. Final Statement of Defendant Genzken[[37]]
During my testimony I stated before the Tribunal that I took no part in the types of experiments of which I am accused. I have nothing to add to what my defense counsel Dr. Merkel has said. I have striven to lead a decent life as a doctor and as a soldier. If my fatherly concern for my 2,500 doctors and 30,000 men of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS was mentioned here in this courtroom, it is nevertheless my duty to speak from this place on behalf of those men who, in the majority, were decent and brave doctors and medical attendants. I am proud to have been their leader, a leader of those who sacrificed their lives and blood with unceasing fervor to help me in building up the organization of the Medical Service of the Waffen SS, and to overcome the tremendous losses among the ranks of our comrades at the front.
The soldiers of the Waffen SS have proved to history—in the focal points of uncounted battles during an uneven struggle—that they could rank among the finest troops on this earth as far as training, efficiency, readiness of sacrifice, soldierly valor, and contempt of death were concerned. Actions of modern warfare have presented to some extent a picture of murder and horror on both sides. Who dares to raise his head before God and gainsay that?
The men of the Waffen SS went as vanquished into captivity, out of unimaginable physical and mental war distress. That captivity was not free of bloodshed, ill-treatment and degradation of various kinds. To the men of the Waffen SS there was added to the weight of such captivity the frightful realization of the fact that their supreme commander, Himmler, had misused their cloak of honor and deceived them, that they had been cheated and then deserted by him. These decent men of the front Waffen SS certainly did not deserve that fate, the fate of being branded as members of a criminal organization.
My request and my wish is that our former opponents should realize the honest idealism of these victims, do justice to it, and give them back belief in justice.
F. Final Statement of Defendant Gebhardt[[38]]
I wish to thank the high Tribunal for having granted me an opportunity, in the witness box, to describe my personal position in 1942 in such detail.
The historical situation at that time placed me in a totalitarian state which, in turn, placed itself between the individual and the universe. Virtues in the service of the state were paramount virtues. Beyond that I do not know anywhere where the intellect was not debased as a tool for war. Everywhere, in some way values and solutions were put into the service of the war. And here again, in the intellectual field, the first step is the decisive one. I may be permitted to recall that in the war of nerves, it was propaganda with and for “medical preparations” which caused the first step, the order to examine the question of sulfanilamides.
In my final statement today may I be permitted to describe my entire attitude. In doing so, I may perhaps utilize the most important of the four American freedoms, that is to say the freedom of speech, until the very end in such a way that I will refrain from any denunciation or from incriminating others.
Without exaggerating the importance of my own person, a physician can only be measured according to his conception of medical science. Basically, I was neither a cold technical specialist nor a pure scientist. I believe that I have always tried, for example when carrying out surgical experiments, to see every disease as a human condition of suffering. I did not look on my task as something to serve my own advantage, or as a cheap gesture of theoretical pity, but as a personal active support to the trembling existence of the suffering patient. My goal as a physician was not so much purely technical therapy for the individual patient, as therapeutical care for the particularly underprivileged group of the poor, the children, the cripples, the neurotics.
I am anxious that it should be believed that it was not due to moral baseness nor to the selfish arrogance of the scientist that I came into contact with experiments on human beings. On the contrary, during the entire period in question I had experiments in my field of research carried out on animals. It was only because I was the competent responsible surgical expert that I was informed about the imminent experiments on human beings in my field of surgery, which had been ordered by the state authorities. After the order had been given, it was no longer a question of stopping these experiments, but the problem was the method of their execution.
My problems as an expert consisted of the following: For one, the experiments that had been ordered had to be of practical scientific value, for the purpose of testing immunization to protect thousands of injured and sick. On the other hand, I considered humane safety measures for the experimental subjects most important. The main point for me was never the purpose and the object of the experiments, but the manner in which they were carried out. To realize that in a humane way I did not remain aloof and restrict myself to theoretical instruction in the field of surgery, but I myself took part, with my clinic and with all its safety measures.
I hope that this will show that in carrying out experiments I tried with the best of intentions to act primarily in the interest of the experimental subjects. We did not take advantage of the unlimited opportunities given us by Himmler, that is to say, the surgical experiments were not followed by others. I believe that as far as was possible at that chaotic period I fulfilled my duty as an expert, because these experiments did not increase in the field of surgery in spite of the crescendo of the catastrophic policy. My desire was to help and not to give a bad example.
In seeing my responsibility in this way I, of course, made a decision for myself. I hope that hitherto I have always faced criticism, even from foreign countries, without any secrecy, but also without any feeling of guilt for my activities as an expert.
Through these activities, however, as a military physician, not through my own initiative, I was brought into contact with concentration camps. I can understand how heavily that deadly shadow must lie upon anyone who was ever active there. In the ghostly phenomenon of that sphere, which at that time was unknown to me as well, we can now in retrospect begin to realize the frightfulness of the negative ideology of extermination becoming combined secretly with the negative selection of the guards. Only from the documents of the international trial have we been able to see definitely that of the 35,000 guard troops, only 6,000 were SS men who were unfit for combat. The rest were scum, conscripts, foreigners, etc., who with the greatest injustice and to our bitter shame were given the same Waffen SS uniform as we wore at the front. As head of a well-known clinic, known for its measures of safety, in the interest of the experimental subjects, within the framework of my duty as an expert as I saw it, I got in touch with concentration camp doctors. As far as it was at all possible I tried to exclude that atmosphere from my sphere of work. That my counter-actions went beyond purely clinical safety measures for the experimental subjects may, I think, be seen from the following fact: Of the several thousand foreign inmates of this concentration camp—among whom, as we were told here, there were at least seven hundred Polish women—only 200 were turned over to the Red Cross at the end of the war. Of these two-hundred, however, sixty were my experimental subjects, as was proved.
Just as I have tried to clarify my actions as a doctor and to explain my good intentions and possibilities for influence, so my final thought should be devoted to self-criticism, above all as regards on my moral obligation.
In a parody on the words of Heinrich Heine we see today that: “Just to have been an SS man is fate in itself”. Although I believe and hope that in that terrible confusion between the decent Waffen SS and the executive organization, I did my duty as a specialist, an officer, and a human being, I still feel bound to make every form of reparation for this confusion. My possibilities for doing that of course are limited.
Without seeking sensation I offered to undergo an experiment on myself as proved, and that without any surgical safety measures, as soon as the first opportunity arose. My responsibility for the execution of the experiments carried out with good intention, and especially for those who were my subordinates, I have emphasized. I have a further criticism and responsibility, which I spoke of not only now in the dim light of my own defense but already in May 1945 on the day when Himmler released us from our oath and from our orders, and he himself left his post without reserve. It was my endeavor with others to prevent any illegal continuation of an SS conception, and for that purpose to take the burden off the shoulders of our credulous youth by making the SS generals responsible.
Today as a private individual I can only repeat what I am ready to do, at least as far as my former professional standing is concerned.
Where, in spite of my earnest endeavors, reproach and guilt seem to cloud the picture in the sphere for which I was responsible, may the consequences affect me in such a way that I may make the path easier for the younger men who, believing in me, also joined the SS as surgeons. I believe that this pile of rubble, Germany, with its wasted biological material, cannot afford to let these fine young doctors perish in camps and in other inactivity. Also I know every measure which would make the work easier for the old German universities and their respected teachers.
I have summarized my point of view in order to help avoid possible mistakes. From unwholesome social conditions it is a pathological and deceptive escape, then as well as today—here and everywhere, to unite and combine spiritual with economic and political concepts. It is a disastrous error to confuse the organized unanimity of voices with harmony. Destructive criticism only brings intolerant lack of cooperation, which interrupts all cohesion. The private as well as the public conscience cannot be subjugated to any official virtue, nor to any temporal moral principles. It can only find its place within a God-given order.
In the spirit of “earthly constructive pessimism”, as I wrote before the war, in this alone consideration for the painful reality of this social catastrophe seems to be found.
My last sentence is to express our personal gratitude to Dr. Seidl who has stood by the side of my colleagues and myself so conscientiously and with such human kindness.
G. Final Statement of Defendant Blome[[39]]
I have testified quite openly before this high Tribunal that particularly up to the outbreak of war I was a confirmed National Socialist and follower. I have also explained why I became a Party member in 1931, and that because political conditions in Germany at the time were moving with giant strides towards a final conflict between Communism and National Socialism, as a result of the economic chaos and the impotence of the German governments after 1919. I have said that I joined the National Socialist Party because I rejected the dictatorial form of the Communist system. In my book “The Doctor in the Struggle”, which was put to me by the prosecution here in cross-examination, I also explained why I went over to National Socialism. This book, however, which was published in 1941, at the time of Germany’s greatest victories, clearly shows my repudiation of the Second World War, to which I do not refer with a single word, not even a hint, although my experience in the First World War takes up considerable space in this book.
After the First World War, Germany was in great difficulties. The situation became progressively worse and more unbearable, when at the turn of the thirties the economic crisis spread throughout the world and even seized hold of the United States. At that time I realized that in such hard times a nation which is drifting toward despair seeks a leader and follows him in blind confidence as soon as he can show great successes.
That in the case of Hitler these were only sham successes or temporary successes the German people realized only gradually, only step by step, and only at a time when it was too late to shake off the dictatorship again by their own strength. For years the German people were deceived by the leaders as to the true situation. With deliberately lying propaganda, Hitler’s governmental system until the last moment kept proclaiming final victory to the German people, even in the winter of 1944, and even in the spring of 1945, when the Reich cabinet and the Party leaders long knew that a terrible collapse was imminent. This governmental system thus irresponsibly imposed on the exhausted body of the German nation still further useless losses of life and property.
Since the collapse, particularly since the International War Crimes Trial at Nuernberg, we see clearly that this frivolous method of betrayal of their own people was a fitting part of the systematical murder of foreign peoples and races by the millions.
I believe that there is no other example in history of the boundless confidence of a people in their leader being so boundlessly misused and disappointed.
The German people were blinded in their faith in their Fuehrer, in a leader who constantly pretended to them and the world a love of peace, a humane character, a selfless care for the people. Thus the German people became the victim of a political gambler. His unrestrained supreme power apparently knew only the choice between ruling and destroying. Hitler’s ambition, as I know and judge it today, had only one aim: At any price to go down in history as a great man. Hitler achieved this goal 100 percent. He went down in history as one of the greatest tyrants of all time, tremendous in his mania for ruling, tremendous in his brutality in the achievement of his ends, not hesitating even at the murder of his best friends, his oldest followers, if they were in his way.
Relying upon the blind confidence of his deceived people, Hitler created a system in which all individualism, all sentiment of freedom, all personal opinion of the citizens was nipped in the bud and turned into slavery.
He succeeded in this with the aid of a very small circle of closest associates, who had fallen under his hypnotic influence, in part perhaps themselves deceived by this man, but who became willing tools in his hand for the enslavement of the German people and the decimation of whole nations.
Under the fatal influence of a clever, deliberately lying propaganda, against which even other countries were as good as powerless, the German people and the German doctor, too, believed that they were following an honorable leader and serving a good cause; they all considered it the highest moral duty not to desert the Fatherland in times of emergency and particularly in wartime, but to do their duty to the very extreme, especially since in this war the life or death of the nation was at issue.
During the times of total warfare, the times of air raids, hunger, and the danger of epidemics, working conditions for the German doctor were terribly hard; so difficult that today one can hardly imagine what German doctors accomplished in those days for friend and foe alike. Whether we twenty doctors here in this dock are accused justly or unjustly, it is a great injustice in any case to defame German doctors in general in public, as is constantly being done. As former Deputy Reich Physicians’ Leader I know conditions in the German medical profession during the Hitler period, and I must say even today that in its totality the German medical profession was efficient, decent, industrious, and humane. Their willingness to work under the most difficult conditions that one can imagine, their unselfishness to the utmost, their courage and their helpfulness were exemplary. Beyond all praise were in particular the numerous old doctors who were already living in retirement and who, in spite of their great age, returned to the service of the sick, and those innumerable women doctors who, married, and often the mothers of many children, deserted their household duties for the difficult work of medical practice during wartime.
The whole German people knew this, in whose midst and under whose eyes the German medical professions spent the years of distress and fright, and who, therefore, will continue to place unlimited confidence in German doctors.
Of myself I can say that I have always, particularly during the Hitler period, devoted all my efforts to keeping the medical profession at a high scientific and ethical level and to developing it. And I found in this effort the full support of all German doctors, including the most famous scientists and chief physicians of medical institutions. Well-known scholars throughout the world supported this work, which was above [unintelligible] parties and enjoyed an international reputation.
But in the course of this trial it has become clearer to me day by day just how criminal the Hitler system was, to which I sacrificed in good faith many years of my life, and I am so deeply moved inside me that I must confess to myself: For years I held a responsible position in a system which today I must curse just as much as I curse all those who forced upon the German people such a tyranny of crime and debasement of man.
It was my mistake that I stayed in the post where fate had placed me and in which I had hoped to be able to do good for our people and my profession. It would often have been simpler to give up this post when I began to realize, step by step, the depravity of the Third Reich. If I did not do so, but stayed at my post until the bitter end, I did this because I considered it my duty, especially in the hard times of total war, and because again and again I succeeded either in protecting the medical profession from harm or in preventing crimes against humanity. Even today I would have to consider it cowardice if I had left my post in 1941 or 1942 only to bring myself to safety or to evade threatened responsibility.
I feel myself free of the guilt of ever having committed or furthered crimes against humanity.
H. Final Statement of Defendant Mrugowsky[[40]]
My attorney and I made every effort during my examination on the witness stand and by means of the considerable evidence which we submitted to refute the charges which have been raised against me, just as much as we tried to assist in ascertaining the truth.
The outcome of the trial and the evidence against me is in the hands of the Tribunal and the closing brief, and in the reply to comprehensive documentation of the prosecution. I am firmly confident on the basis of this trial that this high Tribunal will examine the evidence objectively and carefully. Thus in my final speech I merely would like to draw your attention to the fact that my life in its entirety was solely devoted to my profession and my science. It was my aim, not by any means to represent some political ideology, but to go to the university and to reach the position of a free and independent doctor and scientist.
The prosecution has charged us, the defendants, with destructive tendencies which were supposed to have been the causes of our actions. I know that I am free of such tendencies. They never occurred to my collaborators and myself at any time. In the Waffen SS too, the troops of which were among the bravest divisions of the German Armed Forces, such tendencies never played a part.
As far as my own concepts of the ethical duties of the doctor are concerned, they are contained in my book regarding medical ethics, and I believe always to have acted according to the principles of that book and lived according to them. My life, my actions, and my aims were clean. That is why now that at the end of this trial I can declare myself free of personal guilt.
I. Final Statement of Rudolf Brandt[[41]]
Now, after this trial has reached its final stage, my conscience is confronted with the question of whether I consider myself guilty or innocent. My responsibility, in my opinion, is to be tested by a threefold question:
First, did I participate in the experiments directly and actively?
Second, did I at least have any knowledge of the criminal character of the experiments on human beings?
Third, what, if I had known, could have been my attitude towards Himmler?
What my basic opinion is of crimes against humanity I did not only declare myself on the witness stand but this has also been testified to by a very competent foreign witness, a Swedish medical counsellor, Felix Koersten.
Before this Tribunal and in the full knowledge of what I say I confess that I abhor—and did abhor—any crime against humanity in the years past and during my activity as a so-called personal Referent of Himmler. But I also frankly declare that perhaps during the course of these last years my way of thinking was not always in my conscious mind as it is today. But I never participated in a crime against humanity knowingly, intentionally, or with premeditation when passing on the letters, orders, etc., which Himmler issued to third persons, and the result of which was the commission of cruelties on human beings.
I am confident that from the evidence and from the content of the various defense affidavits the Tribunal will be convinced that in truth my real sphere of power did in no way correspond to the face value of my official position. My real sphere of power was extremely small. It did not exceed that of a well-paid stenographer in the office of an influential man in Germany. If the Tribunal were to start from this fact, it would approach reality much closer than the prosecution did in its indictment.
I got into contact with Himmler when I was a young, immature man who came from a family in modest circumstances. Nothing else but my ability as a stenographer, which I had obtained through my industry, was the reason for that, and this was my position until the last days of the German collapse, in spite of promotions in rank. At that time I was only too glad to get that job because it enabled me to support my parents financially.
When I started work with Himmler, I got, without intermediate stages, into an agency, the chief of which was to combine, among other functions, the highest executive powers in his hands a short time afterwards.
I am convinced that I would not sit here under a grave indictment if I had had the opportunity to continue my education, if I had made a start in a subordinate agency, and had risen little by little into a higher position. Unfortunately, I have always been a lone wolf as long as I lived, and I never was fortunate enough to have an older friend who could have corrected my political inexperience and my gullibility.
If, however, through all those years, I represented Himmler’s ideology, I did so only because I did not know the criminal part of Himmler’s character. Since I lived, so to speak, divorced from the world around me and was only devoted to my more than plentiful work, I only learned after the collapse what stupendous crimes are to be booked on Himmler’s account.
The evidence has shown that I neither knew a concentration camp nor had anything to do with concentration camps in my official capacity; nor had any influence on the system of the concentration camps, their administration and management, nor on the treatment of prisoners. For this reason I didn’t know the measure of the tragedies which were enacted there.
Those matters, into which I had sufficient insight during my restless daily activities to permit me to distinguish between good and evil, were on a plane where they need not shun the light of sun.
I do not deny that some of the documents submitted here by the prosecution went through my hands, but I do deny—and I pray the Tribunal may believe me—that I knew the contents of the documents particularly the reports and therefore the essential core of the human experiments.
I know that appearances are against me. Only these external appearances led the prosecution to indict me in this trial and to pass their comment on me during their closing speech, without penetrating to the bottom of matters. This way they arrived at a completely wrong appraisal which does not correspond to the facts and overrates my position and my activities.
These appearances which speak against me will be dispelled as soon as my real position will be considered in which I found myself as [administrative officer] so-called personal Referent of Himmler for many years. On the witness stand I testified to the truth, which has been confirmed by witnesses who knew the real facts from their own experience.
It does not run counter to experience that among thousands of incoming and outgoing items of mail—that is, hundreds of thousands during the course of the years—there should be an insignificantly small number of documents which a personal Referent on the orders of his chief, passes on to third persons without knowing their contents more closely, the more so if they concern matters which have nothing to do with the normal duties of the personal Referent.
I believe that an American tribunal will know how to appraise the foregoing, though I am rather afraid that the situation as it existed in Germany during the years before the collapse and prevailed in high government agencies will never really be brought home to American judges.
Therefore, I refuse to discuss again my position at that time and the ignorance of criminal experiments on human beings which was the consequence thereof. In this respect I agree with my defense counsel. Neither need I fear Professor Ivy’s statement who declared that even a layman must have been outraged by reading the reports of Rascher, because the fact that the layman should have read the passages of the reports wherefrom the obvious violation of human dignity is evident was, as a matter of fact, the natural prerequisite for Professor Ivy’s opinion, and that prerequisite did not exist in my case.
In accordance with the truth I repeat what I have said in the witness stand, that I had a general knowledge of experiments on human beings, I can no longer say when and on what particular opportunity I gained that knowledge. But this fact alone does not deserve death, because I never had the feeling that I had participated in such crimes by my activity in the personal Referat [administrative office].
Such a knowing participation demands that the personal Referent knows the contents and the import of Himmler’s letters, orders, etc., and passes them on in spite of this knowledge of the contents and their import. I just said that appearances are against me, but I believe I did prove that I did not possess that knowledge. I pray the Tribunal to follow the line of this evidence and, I think, this is not asking too much since the experience of everyday life speaks in my favor.
The various affidavits which I have submitted and which were the subject of excited argument have found their explanation. In some points I have erred and I have tried to correct my errors. I did not want to speak an untruth knowingly which might be detrimental or unfavorable to a third person. I ask the Tribunal not to forget that I was in a very low general condition when I signed these affidavits. Only a few months previously I weighed only forty-four kilograms; consequently my mental power was reduced to a minimum.
During my activities which stretched over many years I exclusively acted on the express orders of Himmler without ever making a decision on my own initiative. I may take it that this fact has fully been proved.
The question what attitude I should have assumed had I known the details of inhuman experiments I can only answer in a hypothetical way. Had I had an approximate knowledge, as I have it today, I would have struggled against passing on such an order by virtue of my general view on questions of humanity. Since, however, I did not have that knowledge it could not come to any opposition on my part. I ask that consideration be given to the fact that during all those years, I regarded matters which were in my field from my own point of view, and tried to live up to my own ideals. I saw my duty in carrying out my task faithfully and in the conduct of a clean, personal life. I always strove not to cause any damage to any human being, but to understand the situation of any person in need of help, and then to help him as I myself would have wished to be helped or treated had I been in his position. I remind you of the statement of the witness Meiner, on 21 March 1947.
The fact that my signatures are on the documents which have been submitted by the prosecution has moved me deeply because my entire view of humanity and the principles of humanity is quite opposed to that. What I understand by humanity, also begins to apply to the small details of life also for me.
In spite of my good intentions, and this I say in answer to a question put in the beginning—in spite of my good intentions I was drawn into a guilt, I see it as a guilt into which human beings can be involved by tragic circumstances without any intention on their part. But the recognition of this guilt was sufficient to shake severely my mental and moral balance.
J. Final Statement of Defendant Poppendick[[42]]
I joined the SS at a time not to commit crimes, but because a number of my friends whom I knew to be idealists were members of the SS. Their membership caused me to join. That I thereby became a member of a criminal organization was unimaginable for me at that time, just as it is incomprehensible for me today.
My activity in the Main Race and Settlement Office was devoted to the problem of the family, an activity which in view of the destructive tendencies during the period of the First World War seemed important to me. If my expectations as a physician were disappointed in more than one point, at least I considered myself justified to hope that in the end this activity would have positive results. The intentions were always toward a constructive policy for the good of the family. Never did I have anything to do with negative population policies, such as the sterilization program of the state. The assertion of the prosecution that positive and negative population policies belong together as the two sides of one and the same program, is erroneous.
Then there were purely organizational reasons which brought about my direct subordination under the office of that man whose name today has such an inhuman sound—I mean Grawitz. The impression which the prosecution has rendered of my activity and position in Grawitz’ office is not in accordance with the facts, in spite of some features which seem to support the assertions made by the prosecution.
As for medical experiments on inmates—experiments on human beings were nothing surprising to me, nor anything new. I knew that experiments were carried out in clinics. I knew that the modern achievements of medical science had not been brought about without sacrifices. However, I do not recall that in experiments in clinics the voluntariness of the person to be experimented on was an absolute requirement, which now seems to be taken as a matter of fact, according to the discussions in this trial. I knew furthermore, that some scientific problems can only be solved by experiments in series with conditions remaining constant, and that therefore soldiers and particularly soldiers in camps are used for experiments in all countries. Under these circumstances it did not appear surprising to me that during the war, scientists also carried out experiments in series in concentration camps. I did not have the least cause to assume that these scientists in the camps would go beyond the scope of that which otherwise everywhere in the world of science was customary. What I knew about medical experiments in the SS was, in my opinion, as little connected with criminal matters as those experiments of which I knew from my clinical experience before 1933.
In March of this year a young doctor, Dr. Mitscherlich, in a very one-sided way, published material for an indictment under the already prejudiced title, “The Dictates of Contempt for Human Life”. Of the problematic there was little in this book. The basis for a judgment and a conviction were clearly given. During the very last days, however, the chief of Dr. Mitscherlich, a well-known Professor from Heidelberg, Weizsaecker, published a study on the fundamental questions belonging to this subject under the title “Euthanasia and Experiments on Human Beings”, which he submitted to the defendants. But here now fortunately we find an entirely different language. The problem itself becomes obvious. If one reads this booklet then the extent of the problem with its complications becomes clear.
The oath of Hippocrates, according to Weizsaecker, has nothing to do with the problem. Weizsaecker applies entirely different ethical norms. Rightly, medicine of today as a whole is studied, not only the German medicine under Hitler. It shows that experts who consider themselves competent even today are only in the middle of their endeavor to clarify the problems at the basis, that being the first requirement for their solution.
Before this trial all of these matters were no problems for me. I did not know of any transgressions. Moreover, I was always convinced that anything which came to my knowledge about experiments on human beings in clinics of the state before 1933, and within the scope of the SS in later years, were conscientious efforts of serious scientists to the good of mankind.
The ethical foundation of these matters also seemed to be there until this trial. Therefore, after sincere examination of my conscience, I cannot find any feelings of guilt and expect with a clear and peaceful conscience the verdict of the Tribunal.
K. Final Statement of Defendant Sievers[[43]]
Your Honors, in his opening plea, my defense counsel already stated quite openly and frankly that all events were going to be presented with which I was in any way connected, and in this hour which is so important to me, I can state to the best of my conscience that when I furnished my defense counsel with information, and during my own examination on the witness stand, I always spoke the full truth.
I have, in fact, had the satisfaction to hear my testimony confirmed by a witness for the prosecution. During my examination as a witness on the stand, I said quite truthfully that the experimental subjects to whom I had talked in connection with the last experiment in Natzweiler had confirmed to me that they were voluntary subjects. Witness Nales, witness for the prosecution, confirmed my testimony during his examination on the 30th of June in this courtroom.
With regard to the charge of participation in the malaria experiments, I have stated that I had nothing to do with malaria experiments. Witness Vieweg, called by the prosecution, confirmed this testimony of mine, as also did witness Stoehr.
I testified that the two experimented subjects whom I met in connection with the altitude experiments, in reply to a question by me, confirmed specifically that they had volunteered. Witness Neff of the prosecution confirmed this voluntary status of the witnesses. Likewise Dr. Romberg during his direct examination stated on the strength of his own knowledge that my testimony was correct. The only experimental subject whom I met in connection with the typhus experiments upon my definite question regarding the voluntariness of his testimony, confirmed that this was so. My testimony was also confirmed through the affidavit of a former prisoner, and witness, Grunzenhuber, contained in my second document book.
The prosecution believed that they had to charge me with having placed myself at the disposal of the IMT on the behalf of the SS. This was rather a peculiar statement considering my own defense in this trial. I explained when I was on the stand that without my own initiative, in fact against my own will, the defense counsel for the SS called me in order to use me as a witness. Attorney Pelckmann, then defense counsel of the SS, has confirmed the correctness of my statements in an affidavit. According to that, I immediately informed Pelckmann at the time in writing regarding my former membership in the resistance movement against the National Socialist regime and told him I was not a suitable witness. At the same time I presented attorney Pelckmann with a copy of my letter, in which I placed myself at the disposal of the International Military Tribunal as a witness as early as 20 December 1945, as the IMT record shows. I have stated my regrets on this same witness stand, that my preparedness to aid justice and to help in prosecuting past crimes was not accepted and that considerable evidence was thus destroyed.
As early as August last year, I furnished the prosecution with a report about my activities in the resistance movement, indicating again my willingness. This was passed over, however, when I stated that I was not prepared to sign affidavits which were not completely true. I openly and frankly stated at that point that I did not understand this action. I had to do this, and I could do it because I had been looking for truth and right at the risk of my life, undaunted, even during the time of tyranny. Was one now to be a collaborator in methods which I thought had passed with the National Socialist regime; and which, as remains my firm conviction, would never lead to a true pacification of this world such as we all desire? I am mentioning this with regret and only because I have always claimed that I myself, and my statements, in responsible situations, deserve to be believed. The prosecution did not only feel in a position to doubt my credibility, but they even consented to call me a liar during their argument, against their better knowledge and their better conscience. Consequently, I had to draw your attention to the testimony of various witnesses which confirmed, in full, my testimony on the stand in these complicated matters. I can truly be satisfied that it was not up to me, but to the prosecution’s own witnesses, to contradict the incorrect statements made against me. History will honor such action, and judge the persistent attempt to stick to preconceived ideas. There is no blessing connected with it. I am only sorry for those who are misguided by false ideas. My firm conviction that this high Tribunal will fully believe my testimony during my defense is based on these facts.
In this connection, with reference to the experiences which I have just described, I am forced to say how on the other hand it calmed and strengthened me, and gave me confidence to see with what wisdom, calm, and patience this high Tribunal stood above matters and disclosed a conduct of trial in which one could feel sheltered; all my friends, who fought in the secret resistance movement with me and repeatedly attended this trial in the audience, share these sentiments with me.
I have explained to you, your Honors, for what reasons I was in immediate, direct contact with the NSDAP and the SS. I have told you how I always tried to prevent the Ahnenerbe from becoming involved in medical research. This attempt failed, due to the ambitious attitude of Himmler. Only on the strength of my own feelings had I to find an attitude with regard to this new question of experiments on human beings. I did not approve of them, and I attempted to take the consequence, which could only be that I immediately resigned from my post as the Reich manager of the Ahnenerbe. I think the testimony of the witness Hielscher, in this stand, and the affidavits from witness Deutelmoser, witness Dellmann, witness Schmitz, and others prove beyond doubt that I had the true intention of resigning from the Ahnenerbe. And these witnesses have also clearly testified why I didn’t do so, not because of personal ambition, not for reasons of comfort, or for what other low reasons might be attributed to me in this point. It was due to the persistent urging on the part of my political friends that I remained, in order to serve further the task which had taken me to the NSDAP and the SS. Inwardly I rejected contact with human experiments even as I refused to be a follower of the NSDAP and of the ideology they represented. Outwardly, I had to live up to the name of a National Socialist if I was to hold on to the political ideal to which I had devoted myself since 1929 and not endanger it. In his affidavit, witness Niebhausen, who was the most important member in the circle of the secret German resistance, and who has acted on behalf of Dr. Kempner too, and who is obviously a personality beyond reproach, says that his illegal activity which continued for five years would have been quite impossible without my assistance. I do not, indeed, know what the prosecution is prepared to recognize as being a resistance against the Nazi regime, if not even such activities as these. It is not necessary to relate again all the details which have been testified to in this courtroom.
That in true recognition of the consequences which might be daily expected for myself and my family I devoted myself to resistance, continued in it undaunted, and never abandoned it, is now the only reason why I find myself in this dock. For that reason, I look forward to the judgment of this Tribunal with confidence, due to my conviction that I have lived for a good cause and acted on it, on behalf of something which—then as today—filled me with true belief.
L. Final Statement of Defendant Rose[[44]]
Mr. President, may it please the Tribunal, the scientists who are among the defendants in this trial are confronted with a principal difficulty, the fact that purely scientific questions have been made political, ideological questions by the prosecution. In the opening speech by the Chief of Counsel, General Taylor, the political and ideological nature of the indictment has been expressed as clearly as possible.
A subject of the personal charges against myself is my attitude toward experiments on human beings ordered by the state and carried out by other German scientists in the field of typhus and malaria. Works of that nature have nothing to do with politics or with ideology, but they serve the good of humanity, and the same problems and necessities can be seen independently of any political ideology everywhere, where the same dangers of epidemics have to be combated.
Just as Claus Schilling, in his malaria research, had to make experiments with human beings, before him and after him malaria scientists of various nations had to carry out experiments on human beings. Just as Haagen, on his own initiative, but with the approval of competent authorities of the state, tested the value of a new, living typhus vaccine, before him that was done in the course of fighting plague by your great compatriot, Richard B. Strong, when he experimented on natives of the Philippines, who were not American citizens, with the approval of your government.
Just as Dr. Ding, on the instruction of the highest and decisive authorities of the German civilian health administration, tested the value of the typhus vaccine on humans in times of greatest typhus danger, others have done so before him in less pressing emergencies, sometimes in agreement with, sometimes upon the instruction of their governments.
From the witness stand I testified about the actual role which I played in regard to the charges of human experiments with malaria and typhus. And I have explained from the witness stand the legal evaluation of my actions, and they have been submitted to you by my defense counsel, Dr. Fritz. I need not add anything to it. But, as a matter of principle, I stated my attitude towards the experiments on human beings in medical research, not first of all in this courtroom, but also when the National Socialist German Government was at the height of its limitless power. At that time I was cut short by a man, Professor Schreiber, who about a year ago in this very courtroom, claimed to be a defender of medical ethics.
The fact is undoubted that human experiments, which were exactly the same as those, the participation in which I am unjustly charged with, have been carried out in other countries, above all, in the United States which has indicted me. That has led the prosecution to place the center of gravity of its charges upon the outside conditions of the persons put at my disposal for experiments by the German authorities. In that connection the question of whether they were voluntary was put into the foreground. I shall not discuss the question as to what extent the doctor who is charged with the experiments is responsible for these external, formal questions, at least a doctor who was so far removed from the experiments themselves as I was. But in connection with the principal question of subjects being volunteers, I have to make a few statements. A trial of this kind presents probably the most unsuitable atmosphere to discuss questions of medical ethics. But since these questions have been raised here, they have to be answered. Everyone who, as a scientist, has an insight into the history of dangerous medical experiments, knows with certainty the following fact. Aside from the self-experiments of doctors, which represent a very small minority of such experiments, the extent to which subjects are volunteers is often deceptive. At the very best they amount to self-deceit on the part of the physician who conducts the experiment, but very frequently to a deliberate misleading of the public. In the majority of such cases, if we ethically examine facts, we find an exploitation of the ignorance, the frivolity, the economic distress, or other emergency on the part of the experimental subjects. I may only refer to the example which was presented to the Tribunal by Dr. Ivy when he presented the forms for the American malaria experiments.
You yourselves, gentlemen of the Tribunal, are in a position to examine whether, on the basis of the information contained in these forms, individuals of the average education of an inmate of a prison can form a sufficiently clear opinion of the risks of an experiment made with pernicious malaria. These facts will be confirmed by any sincere and decent scientist in a personal conversation, though he would not like to make such a statement in public. That I myself am, on principle, an opponent of the idea of dangerous experiments on human beings is known to you gentlemen of the Tribunal.
The state, however, or any human community which, in the interest of the well-being of the entire community, did not want to forego the experiments on human beings, only bases itself on ethical principles as long as it openly assumes the full responsibility which arises therefrom, and imposes sacrifices on enemies of society to atone for their crimes and does not choose the method of apparent voluntary submission, which imposes the risk of the experiment on the experimental subjects, who are not in a position to foresee the possible consequences.
The prosecutor in his plea criticized the preponderance of affidavits during the presentation of evidence on the part of the defense. The difficulties which exist for a defendant in prison in the Germany of today to acquire other documents are almost prohibitive. In order to give a few examples: When the malaria experiments of Schilling were discussed, the prosecution, among other material, submitted to the Tribunal an excerpt from the well-known Dachau sentence concerning the statements contained therein about the number of victims in these experiments. I have stated in the witness box that I would rather sit here as a defendant than put my signature on the opinion which would confirm these statements. How right I was in making that statement can be seen from a letter by Professor Allenby of the University of London which, unfortunately, has only now been received by my defense counsel, in which he termed the statement that 300 experimental subjects had died, a grotesque untruth. My defense counsel in his final plea has quoted the passage of that letter.
The prosecution at that time when the excerpt of the Dachau sentence was submitted, promised that the entire files of the Dachau trial would be put at our disposal. Unfortunately, all my efforts to gain an insight in these files have been in vain.
When State Secretary Dr. Conti during the war was toying with the idea to commission Professor Schilling, who was at that time in Italy, with malaria research in Germany, I, at that time, Chief of the Tropical Medical Department of the Robert Koch Institute, was first of all assigned by the Reich Ministry of the Interior to give an opinion. In this opinion, for reasons which I have explained in the witness box, I rejected Schilling’s plan. Had one followed my advice, the experiments by Schilling in Dachau would never have taken place. In the course of these proceedings I made all efforts to come into the possession of that opinion but in this case also I was unsuccessful, although that opinion in two copies is in the hands of the military government, possibly even in this building.
Also, in vain, I attempted to get the file note, so important for my defense, which I dictated to the witness Block about my conferences with State Secretary Conti and President Gildemeister, after I had gained knowledge about the conduct of the typhus experiments in Buchenwald. What little correspondence I had with Professor Haagen is apparently entirely in the hands of the prosecution. In spite of that, it has been submitted only in part to you. That fact offered an opportunity to the prosecution to interpret passages taken out of the context incorrectly. Unfortunately, I have no opportunity to force anyone to submit the missing documents which would clarify matters in my favor.
To evaluate the work of Haagen, and my defense counsel has pointed that out already, the statement of an unbiased expert would have been of decisive importance. Therefore, I can only regret that the interrogation of the Frenchman Georges Blanc for whom I applied and who has the best knowledge in this field, did not take place, although he had volunteered to appear before this Tribunal as an expert.
Professor Lecrout, Director of the Institute Pasteur in Paris, was frequently in Nuernberg during this trial. After an interview, the prosecution refrained from calling him as an expert witness to clarify some difficult questions resulting from the work of Haagen. I ask the high Tribunal to draw its conclusions from these facts and to assure that the lack of these pieces of evidence should not result in a damage to my interests.
Prosecutor McHaney has explained in his plea that one still had to find that doctor among the defendants who would have subjected himself to such experiments as are covered by the indictment here. I do not feel that that concerns me. Not only from the statement which I have made here before you but also from my case history, which was available to the authorities of the prison long before indictment, it can be seen that not only did I repeatedly offer myself as an experimental subject to test vaccines but that frequently in my official capacity and in my research work I gave myself injections with cholera, typhus, malaria and hepatitis epidemica and that I am still suffering from the consequences.
Finally, Prosecutor McHaney has asserted in his plea that all of those indicted here are guilty of murder, and that includes me too. If the Tribunal were to look at the present problem from this point of view, I would regret having said a single word in my defense. However, if you believe me, that in all actions of mine which have been discussed here, I was only moved by sincere devotion to duty, then I put my fate with confidence into your hands.
M. Final Statement of Defendant Ruff[[45]]
May it please the Tribunal: As far as the written and oral statements of my defense counsel are concerned which deal with the points of the indictment, and as far as my activities as a doctor and scientist are concerned, I have nothing or hardly anything to add. I can only repeat today what I said at the end of my examination when I was on the stand. After detailed inquiry into my conscience, I still today hold the belief that I never sinned against my duty as a man and as a doctor.
N. Final Statement of Defendant Brack[[46]]
Your Honor, I cannot be described as one of the earliest followers of Hitler. In 1929, I joined the NSDAP when more than six million German voters were already backing Hitler. His later successes during the years of peaceful reconstruction consolidated my conviction that he had forever liberated Germany from the misery in which it seemed to have fallen. For all those years I had no reason to have any misgivings with regard to Hitler’s personality. Therefore I also believed in the legality of the euthanasia decree as it emanated directly from the head of the state. The state officials and doctors, competent for me at that time, told me that euthanasia had always been an endeavor of mankind and was morally as well as medically justified. Therefore, I never doubted the legal character of the euthanasia decree.
In this connection, however, I was assigned duties, the extent and importance of which I could not foresee. Neither my training nor my qualifications sufficed for this task. Nobody can deny, however, my good faith in its justification. I frankly admitted what I did in the framework of the euthanasia measures and tried to prove that my collaboration was merely of a subordinate nature and exclusively directed by human aspects. I cannot be made responsible for later actions carried out by other offices and without my knowledge. These were the measures which I deeply regretted, in which the prohibition of the inclusion of foreign nationals and Jews was infringed.
Through my activity in the Fuehrer’s Chancellery, I early became acquainted with the Gestapo terror. The testimonies of my witnesses prove how I fought against them and the concentration camp system. I did so because I felt that I was obliged to help those who suffered from arbitrariness and oppression. I did not do it because I already recognized in it at that time symptoms of a leadership that always and only knew arbitrariness and oppression.
But this is particularly the reason why I was so shocked about the misuse of some of the euthanasia institutions for the Action 14 f 13; this action affected particularly those persons whose detention I considered unjust, and which I therefore opposed. It was only in this courtroom, however, that I learned of this action.
That I did not hate the Jews has been proved by numerous documents. Without hatred of the Jews, however, participation in the extermination of Jews is unthinkable. The measures of suppression to which the Jews were subjected forced me to give them the same assistance within my competence as I accorded to the political persecutees. Thus during the course of the years I helped hundreds of thousands of persons by my activity. Thus only could the sterilization suggestions come into existence. They were nothing but an attempt to prevent the extermination of innumerable Jews.
In spite of all the efforts of my defense counsel, it was impossible to procure the witnesses who could testify to this effect. They preferred to evade their responsibility of serving the truth. I am utterly alone. I must leave it to this high Tribunal to ascertain on the basis of the presented expert scientific opinions that all my proposals were actually so formulated as to show my convictions of their harmlessness, and the impossibility of realizing them.
I must also leave it to the Tribunal to judge whether a man who intended the extermination of the Jews would apply for service with the army, just at the moment when the aim which he is alleged to have pursued was achieved, and the extermination measures had started. Or does it not appear paradoxical to assume that one and the same man should give his approval of the extermination of the Jews, and in fact aid such a program, and, at the same time, save Jews he has never known, such as Georgii, Passow, Meyer, Warburg, and others, from these measures?
I can only emphasize that particularly the sterilization suggestions to Himmler appeared to me to be the last possibility to take any action to save Jewry. Had I been indifferent to the Jewish fate, I would not be accused today. But I also tried in this respect, as was my habit, to give assistance and I am still convinced, that it had at least delaying, if not preventative effect. It is certain that many Jews were in this way saved from destruction. The realization that such proposals should never have been made by me on the strength of my medical knowledge, my capacities, or my position at the time, even to the best of my intention, is something I could not reach until this trial was in progress. My good intention, which was the basis of these proposals, and my good will to help by means of them cannot be denied by anybody, and can in no event be understood as my conscious cooperation in the extermination of the Jews.
O. Final Statement of Defendant Romberg[[47]]
In the course of this trial, I have had full opportunity to speak in my defense. With special gratitude we realize the great opportunity offered to us, of which we took advantage, which was given by the possibility of individually questioning Professor Ivy in this trial. I have seen how the Tribunal itself, by a precise questioning, clarified the facts, and to the statements made by my defense counsel I have nothing to add, because they are the truth.
P. Final Statement of Defendant Becker-Freyseng[[48]]
Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I also was given opportunity to submit all the statements and the evidence required to refute the charges of the indictment. For that I have to thank the Tribunal and my defense counsel, Dr. Tipp. But I have nothing to add to it. For all the irrelevant, spiteful talk with which outside circles believed they had to twist around the objectivity of these proceedings like thorn bushes, the verdict of this Tribunal must be and will be the appropriate answer. I look forward to it with the firm conviction that I never failed in my duty to mankind as a physician and scientist, and as a soldier to my Fatherland.
Q. Final Statement of Defendant Weltz[[49]]
I have nothing to add to the statement made by my defense counsel. I thank Dr. Wille for his efforts made in my defense.
R. Final Statement of Defendant Schaefer[[50]]
May it please the Tribunal, since I consider myself entirely innocent, I have nothing more to add. I ask to be acquitted, if possible, even before the verdict.
S. Final Statement of Defendant Hoven[[51]]
I have nothing to add to Dr. Gawlik’s plea of yesterday. I would at this point like to thank my defense counsel for the considerable help he has given me.
T. Final Statement of Defendant Beiglboeck[[52]]
May it please the Tribunal, the experiments which I conducted, I did not carry out on my own initiative, neither according to the plans of my own, nor spontaneously. The medical part was played with the knowledge and approval of my clinical teacher, and civilian superior for more than ten years, I was a disciple of Eppinger. During those ten years I had come to know and respect his ways of thought and his superior knowledge. My relations to him were based on deep personal gratitude and awe-inspired devotion. If there was anything which he considered right and important, then for psychological reasons alone, it would have been difficult for me to believe the contrary.
The experiments were to solve the problem of saving human life and that had to be approved. It was a military order which compelled me to carry them out in the atmosphere of a concentration camp. I struggled against it, and was inwardly opposed to it, and tried to avoid the task, but I was not successful. So I had to carry it out.
May it please the Tribunal, in your evaluation of this fact, please do not fail to consider that this did not happen in times of peace, nor in a country which granted its citizens individual freedom of decision in all matters, personal and professional, but during the bitter days of a most horrible war. What I carried out, I did in accordance with a plan previously determined and specified. I did not overstep the limits of my task. I had to require of my experimental subjects to undergo hardships; they suffered from thirst with all of its unpleasant sensations, with its physical and mental characteristics. It was in the nature of the experiments, and this could not be avoided. I did not, however, do this without first informing myself by an experiment on my own system of what I expected them to undergo, nor did I expect it of anyone else, unless I was firmly convinced that he undertook it voluntarily. It is not true to say that I might have forced anybody to do it, neither psychologically, by reprisals, nor by threat, nor by force of arms. Many eyewitnesses have agreed that my conduct was never brutal or inhuman towards any of the experimental subjects under my care. Among these witnesses are even some who were brought here to testify against me.
At last, in the final stage of this trial, one experimental subject could be found who thought it appropriate to introduce a dramatic note in an atmosphere artificially created. You will decide how much credibility you will attribute to this witness. Based on a layman’s misinterpretation of nondangerous, indeed harmless medical procedures, combined with the uncertain recollection emotionally presented by more or less distorting and misconstruing my motives, the attempt was made to lend an impression to my experiments and to my own personality.
In contradiction to that, a few others who came from the concentration camp and who loved the truth have painted another picture which reveals that my behavior in the medical sense, as well as from the human point of view, was correct, to say the least. By my experiments, no human life was sacrificed, nor did they result in any lasting damage to their health. I also believe, I have proved that I intervened for the inmates, as far as that was within my power and that I did not consider my experimental subjects as individuals of an inferior type whom I could well afford to ill-treat, for ideological reasons, as has been charged.
For over 15 years as a physician, I always felt the strongest responsibility for those entrusted to my care. Thousands who were my patients will confirm it. My assistants and colleagues have testified to it. I was never directed by any sentiment other than that of a human being and of a physician. The experiments as they were actually conducted never went beyond what can be justified by the physician. I consider myself free of guilt as a physician and as a human being.
U. Final Statement of Defendant Pokorny[[53]]
Your Honors, during this trial I have often asked myself what I should have done at the time in order to record my true motive for the letter I had written to Himmler. But I believe that at the time when I dispatched this letter, I could not do anything else but to talk to the people in whom I had confidence and who I knew would not betray me, and confide in them my true reasons.
If today, this letter, which is against me, may seem objective, then this is a fact with which I must bear, although to the end I must say in correspondence with the truth that selfish reasons were not the cause of my writing this letter, but that letter was written because at the time I had heard facts about Himmler’s plans, and, because at that time in my position, standing lonely and slandered because of my family implications in a small town in Czechoslovakia, I felt that I was able to take the action described.
I retain the hope that you, my judges, will draw your conclusions from my conduct and the situation in which I found myself at the time, and will come to the conviction that the true motive was a different one than that which is objectively shown by this letter, and that you will not sentence me but will believe me in what I have not only told you, my judges, but others previously during my interrogations and what I have told my friends, at a time when this present situation had not arisen, in order to clarify my motives as being true.
With this hope I am looking forward to your judgment, and in that connection I am thinking of my children who, for years now, have lived under the protection of an allied power, and who will not believe that their father, after everything that he has suffered, could possibly have acted as an enemy to human rights.
V. Final Statement of Defendant Oberheuser[[54]]
I have nothing to add to the statements I have made from the witness box under oath. In administering therapeutical care, following established medical principles, as a woman in a difficult position, I did the best I could. Moreover, I fully agree with the statements made by my defense counsel and will refrain, at this late stage of the trial, from making any further statements.
W. Final Statement of Defendant Fischer[[55]]
Your Honors, when this war began I was a young doctor, 27 years of age. My attitude towards my people and my Fatherland took me to the front line as an army doctor. I there joined an armored division, where I remained until I was incapacitated due to the loss of an arm. For only a very brief period, during these years of war, I worked as a medical officer in a military hospital back home. There too, my conception of my duties was directed by the wish to serve my country. During this time of my work at home, I received the order, the execution of which made me a subject of the indictment of this trial.
The order for my participation in the experiments originated from my highest medical and military superior and was passed on to me, as the assistant and first lieutenant, through Professor Gebhardt. Professor Gebhardt was the famous surgeon and much honored creator of Hohenlychen. He was a scientific authority whom I looked up to with reverence and confidence. As a general of the Waffen SS he was my unconditional military superior. I believed him, that I had been earmarked by him to assist in the solution of an urgent medical problem which was to bring help and salvation to hundreds of thousands of wounded soldiers, and which was to be a cure for them; and I believed that this problem would mean a question of life and death to my people who were fighting for their existence. I believed unconditionally that this order had come to me from the head of the state, and that its execution was a necessity for the state. I considered myself first as bound by this order, as were the thousands of soldiers whom I had seen walk to their deaths during my years at the front, following an order by the state. This moving impression from the front bound me doubly, particularly since I had had the privilege during that time of working in a hospital at home. I considered myself, particularly at home, doubly bound like every soldier at the front to obey the order of my Fatherland unconditionally.
What this order demanded from me had been introduced as a method of modern medicine in all civilized countries. I was only concerned in the clinical part of it, and that was taking place just as a course of treatment in the institute of Hohenlychen, or any other clinic. What I did was what was ordered, and I did nothing beyond that order. I believed that I, as a simple citizen, did not have the right to criticize the measures of the state, particularly not at a time in which my country was engaged in a struggle for life and death.
I hope that through my unconditional service at the front and through my two wounds, I have shown that I did not only expect others to make sacrifices at this time, but that I was prepared at any time to sacrifice myself with my life and my health. Within the scope of the order given to me I did what I could, in my limited position as an assistant doctor, for the life of the experimental subjects and for an exact and proper clinical development of the experiment. I never could expect and foresee that deaths would occur. When such fatalities did occur, contrary to all expectation, I was as shaken by that event as I was by the death of a patient in our clinic. After that, the experiments were immediately discontinued, and I went back to the front.
Together with Professor Gebhardt, I reported about these experiments to the German public. Like many other Germans, there are many things which, in retrospect, I see more clearly today and in another light than in the past years. In my young life I have tried to be a faithful son of my people, and that brought me into this present miserable position. I only wanted what was good. In my life I have never followed egotistical aims, and I was never motivated by base instincts. For that reason, I feel free of any guilt inside me. I have acted as a soldier, and as a soldier I am ready to bear the consequences. However, that I was born a German, that is something about which I do not want to complain.
[33] Tr. pp. 11311-11314.
[34] Tr. pp. 11315-11316.
[35] Tr. pp. 11316-11317.
[36] Tr. p. 11318.
[37] Tr. pp. 11318-11319.
[38] Tr. pp. 11319-11324.
[39] Tr. pp. 11325-11328.
[40] Tr. pp. 11328-11329.
[41] Tr. pp. 11330-11335.
[42] Tr. pp. 11335-11338.
[43] Tr. pp. 11338-11342.
[44] Tr. pp. 11342-11347.
[45] Tr. pp. 11347-11348.
[46] Tr. pp. 11348-11351.
[47] Tr. p. 11351.
[48] Tr. p. 11352.
[49] Tr. p. 11352.
[50] Tr. p. 11352.
[51] Tr. p. 11352.
[52] Tr. pp. 11352-11355.
[53] Tr. pp. 11355-11356.
[54] Tr. p. 11356.
[55] Tr. pp. 11356-11358.