CHAPTER XII
CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT
Preceding chapters have shown how chemical warfare has now become a normal, technical, and increasingly important part of the science of war. Further, it has opened vast possibilities, the limits of which it is very difficult to fix.
The Treaty of Versailles.—Chemical warfare received definite attention in the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles. Lord Moulton, one of the few Allied representatives who realised the full importance of the matter, has drawn attention to its Treaty aspect in a recent speech. He lays emphasis on the fact that the full significance of the German dye industry was not realised during the war. Referring to its chameleon-like nature in peace and war, Lord Moulton says: "All this was imperfectly present to my mind throughout the war, and I was aware of the gravity of the matter, but until I learnt what had passed in Germany I could not appreciate it fully. I have spoken to you of the extent to which the Germans turned their chemical works into general works for supplying explosives. I have not touched the part in which they played the most deadly game against us, and that was where they used their chemical works to produce those toxic gases."
The same statement tells us, "The knowledge that I have gleaned as to what was going on in Germany during the war makes me feel that all my anticipa-tions of the importance of chemical industries in time of war, all the views that I expressed of that importance, did not nearly approach what has been proved to have gone on in the enemy's country during the war." He then proceeds to explain how a clause was inserted in the treaty—"whereby the Germans have to tell us all the secrets of their manufacture of explosives, all their methods of making toxic gases— in fact, all the military secrets that made them so terrible. This clause was a very just one. It is not fair that when we have gone through this agonising struggle, and when we are still suffering from the consequences of all the wealth of knowledge and ingenuity which they employed for their infamous purposes— it is not fair, I say, to allow them to keep these secrets to themselves, and I think you will agree with me it was in the highest degree consonant with justice that we should make them reveal them all to us." Small wonder that we missed this vital point, that we failed to fathom the force behind the German chemical war, if such an eminent authority was left groping for the truth. There was no time for mature reflection with the problems of war supply pressing forward in an endless stream. Lord Moulton was himself responsible for the brilliant solution of the most important, the problem of explosives supply.
The realisation of the facts in question led to the direct admission of their importance in the Treaty. Article 172, the one in question, states: "Within a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the German Government will disclose . . . the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the war, or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used."
German Information.—This clause should be fulfilled in detail. In any given period of the stage of intensive chemical warfare and at the end, the Germans, in addition to those devices in operation, must have had a large number of more telling and more novel ones in preparation. It is important to get as much information as possible on this development.
A striking fact emerges. The years 1915, 1916, and the early part of 1917 witnessed the actual manufacture of the war chemicals which were used by Germany on the front. All the research and other work which precedes chemical manufacture must have been completed much earlier. What surprises, then, had the German laboratories in store for us after 1917? Have these been revealed under authority of the Treaty?
Probably the most important point in the clause is its interpretation with regard to the Haber process. Its critical importance in the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use the Treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace. This process undoubtedly saved Germany in 1915 and is largely responsible for the three years of war agony which followed. It can only have missed specific reference in the Treaty on account of its claim to represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives industry. To yield to such views, however ideal the motives, is to threaten the greater ideal of world peace.
Limitation of Armament.—This clause, covering only war development, cannot be regarded as a serious safeguard for the future. It is rather the fruits of victory, the logical outcome of Allied success and the German breach of faith. But the Treaty of Versailles contains an admission of the importance of chemical warfare for the future. Article 171 states: "The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage, and the use of the same products or devices." What kind of guarantee is this? How far is it supported by other disarmament? It is very important to answer these questions. In a sense the full execution of the other relevant Treaty clauses would provide a partial answer. We deal with these in the next chapter.
Report of the Hartley Mission.—Chemical warfare is the point faible in world disarmament. Judging from the above clause of the Treaty, it is clear that this is not fully recognised. Once again our trust is invited in mere prohibition. The lesson of the war is not learnt. The chemical menace is not countered. Why should this be? There are two main reasons. In the first place, very few had any conception of the tremendous growth in this branch of warfare, for facts had rarely been disclosed, and those with no direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on impressions. The vivid recollection of the first German cloud attack, and of the introduction of mustard gas, have, for most people, obscured the solid facts of the case. The great importance of the projector, the high percentage of chemical shell used by the enemy artillery, and the tremendous undertaking involved in protecting an army of millions with a modern gas mask, have not been grasped. The Hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the German dye factories for chemical warfare production. But we have a shrewd idea that it left many of its official readers much better informed on production than on the use of the materials concerned, that is, on the military value of chemical warfare.
New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament.—The second difficulty preventing a full understanding of the case lies in the fact that chemical disarmament involves certain conceptions which are remote from the normal military outlook. Let us examine the matter as simply as possible.
During the many discussions on disarmament in Paris, various principles were suggested as a basis. One which received recognition in the Treaty was the limitation of the number of projectors or guns, using the term "projector" in a general way to cover all projectile-throwing weapons. Thus, in the sense implied, rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns are projectors. Recent writers have termed gas a projectile, one which, on account of its fluid nature, ignores the limitations of explosive shell and multiplies their radius of action indefinitely. This is true—with one most important qualification. Gas has never entirely depended upon the usual form of projector, the gun, and with the limitation of the latter its dependence will decrease. New forms of chemical weapon will evolve. Now it is true that almost every form of warfare which one can conceive depends for success on some sort of projector, and it is also true that the manufacture of these projectors can be controlled, because it is usually so complicated. These remarks apply, for example, to the manufacture of a field or heavy gun. But there is one serious exception to the covering power of this method of limitation. You cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary projectors, but you can run a chemical campaign without them.
Facing the difficulties which are before any League of Nations or international body planning world disarmament, let us assume armament reduced to a police basis. In other words, the use of force is not entirely ruled out, but is limited to the minimum required for reducing local disorder, maintaining the peace, and contributing to any general scheme for preventing war. The nations, then, agree to limit their personnel and material within certain prescribed bounds. The work of the League of Nations, or central organisation, does not finish here. We cannot assume that permanent purity of national intentions, in other words, some check or guarantee must be instituted. This may take the simple form of systematic reporting by nations and their inspection by the League. Here we meet with considerable difficulty. Unless some simple covering principle for inspection can be determined upon, we shall end up with one-half the world inspecting the administration and organisation of the other. The matter becomes an absurdity.
Limitation, Mechanical and Chemical.—Considering the present trend of war development, we can divide the factors requiring limitation into three classes—the combatants, and weapons of a mechanical and chemical nature.
Tank Disarmament.—A little thought will show that the limitation of the number of projectile-throwing weapons covers the first two types, and is a matter which is not theoretically beyond the possibility of inspection. Periodic inspection could reasonably be regarded as a check against very big scale production beyond the normal scope of industry, for such weapons as rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns. If we consider the most important new mechanical war appliance, the tank, we find it no exception to the above remarks. Without projectors, that is, machine-guns, rifles, etc., it merely becomes a means of conveying troops and material from one place to another.
Two possibilities then arise. The number of tanks required might be so small that they could be suitably armed with light projectors without entering upon large-scale production. Secondly, the tank might become an offensive weapon without projectors, by the use of some chemical contrivance. This merely goes to prove that steps must be taken to limit the output of the tank itself. Are such steps possible? We assume that the modern tank is, and will increasingly become, a weapon practically as specific as a big gun, requiring a number of special parts which normal industry does not provide, and that the production concerned can be controlled by inspection with the same order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors. We now come to the third type requiring limitation under a disarmament scheme.
Chemical Limitation.—Can we limit chemical armament? Our review of production has shown the impossibility of doing so, unless we completely wipe out the organic chemical industry which is essential for world progress by its contribution of dyes, drugs, and other synthetic commodities. The factories of the organic chemical industries are more silently converted into arsenals than any other type. It is true that, under normal conditions of warfare, the decisive success of a chemical campaign might be restricted by the use of other weapons, such as artillery. But, under conditions where the latter are seriously limited, the chemical weapon becomes, relatively, of much greater importance. One of the main trends in chemical warfare was the development of devices which would give long-range chemical effects without a complicated form of projector, or with none at all. Having thus shown the independence of the chemical weapon, under conditions of limitation of armament, we are faced with an important question. What can be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical warfare?
Research.—In the first place, can any research results accrue under Treaty or League conditions? The chief poison gases used during the war owed their discovery, as individuals, to pre-war research which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive chemical. Phosgene was discovered in 1811 by J. Davy, while experimenting on the action of sunlight on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine. Guthrie, in 1860, trying to throw light on some theoretical aspects of organic chemistry, examining the nature of certain so-called radicles or groups of atoms, came across a family of compounds of which mustard gas, or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, was a member. This he found to be a dangerous substance, but the nearest members of the series were harmless.
These substances will arise as a result of normal chemical research. We admit they may multiply much more quickly if work is specially directed towards their discovery, but it is practically impossible to control such work. The research worker's nearest confidante and laboratory companion might be unaware that he was developing some new vitally important chemical for warfare. No serious person can claim the possibility of a check upon such research. If, then, the Government of any country desires to provide its chemical factories with suitable subjects for chemical warfare production, these can be produced under ANY international arrangements, however prohibitive.
Production.—But what of production? Here, again, we have an entirely different problem compared with that of limiting the output of a gun. Let us assume that the production of some vitally important new organic compound involves four different steps, and that the last step produces the toxic substance. This is a fair assumption. Let us further assume the most favourable condition for detection, i.e. {t}he final product is a liquid or gas with obviously toxic properties. Given a big organic chemical industry, there is no possibility of detection by open methods of control. With regard to the first three steps, in practically every case they will be related to some new or existing dye, drug, photographic, or other commercial organic product. The products of these first reactions can either be stored, ready for the rapid realisation of the last reaction, in which case there is no possibility of detection, or the reaction can be completed and the materials passed without exposure through a standard type of plant to an easily concealed container. The only type of inspection which could possibly cope with such a problem would require to probe deeply into the technical and commercial secrets of the factories and plants, and could even then be misled owing to the constantly developing nature of the compounds produced. The inspectors would require to be numerous and as closely in touch with the plants and processes as the actual factory staffs.
Consider the Leverkusen works for a moment. They cover a very wide range of products, are admirably planned on a well thought out and rational scheme, and there is a reason for the position of every unit. Their methodical arrangement would be of more assistance to inspection in this than in any other large organic chemical works with which we are acquainted. Even under such favourable conditions satisfactory inspection would be most difficult. Each one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of plant, and is devoted to the production of primary, intermediate or finished materials. For the inspection of suspected poison gas production, an examination of the first two would be of no assistance, for the war and peace materials would be identical. Differentiation would occur in the dye and finished product blocks. Each one of these blocks may be producing as many as one hundred different compounds at the same time, and each one of these compounds may, itself, involve two, three, or four different stages. The members of one official mission, when asking to be shown the plant for the manufacture of p-amidophenol, an important dye and photographic chemical, were taken to a large building filled with assorted plant, and were told by the guides, "We have no special plant for the product you mention; we make it in this building with a great many other products, for it is our principle not to have plant which makes one product only, but is readily adaptable for making a variety." In many of the processes the materials do not appear to the naked eye after their introduction into the first plant unit, being fed by gravity or pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another. It would be absolutely essential for any inspection to conduct chemical tests at the different stages. The difficulty of inspection is incontestable. It could be done with a large staff, but we must remember that the Rhine plants are, themselves, but a small corner of the whole world of industry requiring inspection. Even under the most favourable conditions for detection, the chances are exceedingly small. But, in most cases, an enemy with a strong organic chemical industry need not undertake manufacture during peace. He could rely on the potentialities of his chemical industry, which would enable him to commence production in his existing plant immediately on the outbreak of war. The question of the use of the chemical then arises. If of an exceedingly novel and decisive nature, it could take its share of use in the limited number of guns available; on the other hand, it might be capable of use in one of the very simple weapons already devised for chemicals, or to be devised in the future.
Consider the Livens projector, by no means a favourable case. The latest German designs have a range well over a mile. This range maybe increased. Yet the Livens projector can be made without serious or obvious war modification of plant, in a tube works, where the bomb can also be produced. The very nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy is not required, and simplification of production of the gas projector follows naturally. We conclude from the above that whatever treaty or international arrangements exist for prohibiting chemical warfare, we can find no safeguard in practicable methods of control, and must find safety in some other measure.
Mechanical and Chemical Preparations for War.—There is a fundamental difference in preparation for the mechanical and chemical methods of war. This difference necessitates special consideration for the chemical method from the point of view of disarmament. All the modern mechanical types of war appliances are characterised by their great structural intricacy, witness the Lewis gun with its innumerable complicated parts, the heavy and field guns with their wonderful mechanism, and the future tank with its anti-gas, anti-water, and general anti devices. This characteristic of great structural development has certain concomitants which are of considerable military importance. It imposes certain conditions on production, involving special factories for special parts and other factories for the assembly of those parts. It implies large scale experimentation for the improvement of the appliance. All this brings control and inspection within the region of the theoretically possible, and militates against sudden surprise. The structural characteristic also imposes certain important conditions in military training. It takes a definite period of time to create a machine-gunner who will humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves. He must know the different jambs, and simple repairs. He must be trained. The same remarks apply to any other structurally intricate appliance, such as the tank. In other words, this characteristic is a distinct check on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from limited to war armament.
But consider the chemical method. The specific property of the chemical which gives it its military value is ultimately its influence on the human organism, which causes casualties or imposes heavy military handicaps on protected troops. There is, again, a question of structure, the chemical structure of the substance in question. This, however, does not involve the same aids to armament limitation as for the mechanical type, unless it be in a very restricted sense. In research, the discovery of the most effective chemical the world will ever see can occur by the use of a few beakers, pots and pans, and common chemicals, directed by a trained mind. Being atomic or molecular, the structure imposes no large scale conditions on the research. Nor is it fair to say that from the point of view of production there is a parallel between the complexity of the molecule and the plant required to make it. The chemically complicated Blue Cross arsenic compounds were produced by Germany in a plant which was simplicity itself when compared with the marvellous installation developed to produce oleum, a concentrated form of the relatively simple sulphuric acid, a fundamental substance in explosives production. Instead of manipulating a huge lathe, or forge, or exceedingly complicated multiple mechanical device, you manipulate temperatures and pressures and vary the reaction medium. Naturally, chemical engineering is very important, but its magnitude and complexity is in no sense parallel with the intricacy of the chemical molecule, whereas a distinct parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance. More than this, we believe that developments in both fields will exaggerate rather than diminish the difference. We see thus how, on general grounds, the chemical weapon tends to evade any normal condition of limitation which might be perfectly adequate for the mechanical type.
Recent Disarmament Proposals.—A superficial examination of recent disarmament speeches by prominent League of Nations advocates leaves one with the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a great ideal. But later reflection, in the cold light of reason, produces a critical, but not cynical, frame of mind. Disarmament depends for success on the way in which we tackle certain critical cases, The carrying out of the more commonly considered forms of disarmament will give immensely added importance to other forms of warfare which have already challenged supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere of the great world war. The outstanding example is the chemical arm, whose peculiar requirements in any scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely understood.
The great case and rapidity with which the German dye factories mobilised for poison gas production on a super-industrial scale has already been demonstrated. It took forty years and more to develop those factories. Yet forty days saw many of their plants producing huge tonnages of poison gas, and as many hours were sufficient for others. In some cases, indeed, they were already producing eventual munitions long before the outbreak of war. We must not remain insensible to the double-edged nature of this industrial weapon. When with one hand Germany withdrew life-giving drugs from America, with the other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly poison made in the same factories. Even when our textile industries were threatened through lack of indigo, from the very plants on which we had depended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas, each ounce of which threatened Allied limb and life. But how does this touch disarmament? Very simply. A few quotations from some recently published disarmament utterances will show that we are not pressing the point without need. But let us follow the matter through in a logical way.
The Covenant of the League;—Need for Guarantees.—We start from the sure ground of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8, recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, refers to the formulation and revision of plans for such reduction and states: "The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes." Here is the frank admission of the importance of such industries. But later exponents of the League express dissatisfaction with Article 8, claiming the wording to be vague. Thus, from Major David Davies, M.P.,[1] "The whole wording of Article 8 is vague. These proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of suspicion which has brought about so many wars. Nations who put their trust in the League are entitled to an assurance that the League will be able to enforce its decisions with promptitude. The proposals concerning armaments in Article 8 and elsewhere do not give this assurance. Something more definite is required," and he proceeds to lay down three aims which must be covered by an efficient disarmament scheme.
[1] The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy. Major David Davies, M.P.
"(a) Allow each nation an army sufficient to maintain internal order within its own boundaries, and sufficient also to furnish its quota for the League of Nations when required.
"(b) Ensure that the quota of any nation shall not be rendered useless by the employment of a new weapon of war by another nation.
"(c) Provide the League of Nations with an adequate force for immediate use.
"All the above essentials are incorporated in a scheme for an International Police Force. This scheme, which is given in the merest outline, is based on the assumption that our national security must always be absolutely safeguarded, and that before we decide on any relaxation of our armament policy we must be certain that the alternative offers complete protection." Other exponents emphasise this last essential. This reference to an International Police Force raises an important issue. Such a force must draw its personnel from the different nations. Without any doubt, one of the most important contributions from the nations is the fostering of organic chemical research and technical cadres which can only be maintained under true disarmament conditions by the redistributed organic chemical industries.
Viscount Grey—"Germany Must Disarm First."—Viscount Grey, at the public meeting in support of the League of Free Nations on October 10th, 1918, stated: "Germany must disarm first. She led the way up the hill in increasing expenditure on armaments. She must lead the way down the hill. That as a first condition, from our point of view, goes without saying. There can be no talk of disarmament until Germany, as the greater armer, is disarmed." One can only heartily agree with such expressions, but the denouement brings a sense of disappointment. There is a feeling that those who should be nearest are but groping for a solution. The peculiar significance of chemical warfare for the future is freely admitted in these utterances. Thus Major David Davies states: "If they had kept their intentions secret until they could utilise a thoroughly deadly gas in the general attack, it was more than possible that they would have completely broken the Allied line," and Lord Grey, "You cannot limit the amount of merchant ships or commercial aeroplanes, and the fewer the armaments, fighting aeroplanes, and ships of war, the more potential as weapons of war become the things which you use in commerce-ships, aeroplanes, chemicals of all kinds."
Left in this state the case is true but not complete. The essential point is that the new and telling types of armament will develop from these very peace industries. We are not merely concerned with their relative magnitude in a state of disarmament, but with the critical types which may develop from them.
So far, so good, but what steps are proposed to counter the menace? In reviewing what has been suggested by different responsible individuals, we find that the methods intended to cover armament limitation for the newer weapons fall into two classes.
Suggested Methods.—In the first place, it is suggested "that war's newest weapons—poison gas, aeroplanes, submarines, heavy artillery, and tanks, should be ceded to the League to form the Headquarter's Force, and that no state should be allowed to own them or to make use of any new invention for warlike purposes.
"There should be no delay in handing over the new arms before they can claim long traditions. Vested interests have not yet been created on a permanent footing. Great disturbance would not be caused at present by the suggestion of denationalisation."
This really claims the advisability of verbal prohibition, which is absolutely useless, unless supported by the second class of safeguard, periodic "inspection." Major Davies suggests "all arsenals and munition factories would be open to inspection by the General Staff, who would use them, when necessary, for arming the quota of a nation other than that in whose territory they were situated." We know of no practical method by which inspection could be relied upon to give satisfactory warning of the conversion of the plants of the I.G. for war purposes. A distinction must be made between those weapons whose production can and cannot be practically controlled by inspection. In attempting such a classification, Major Davies claims, "It is difficult to prevent the secret manufacture of rifles, but it is easy to prevent the manufacture of tanks, aeroplanes, gas, or submarines." No one having witnessed the large scale operations of assembling tanks and heavy guns, and aware, at the same time, of the German methods of producing mustard gas or Blue Cross compounds, could make such an elementary mistake in classification, and any international disarmament arrangements based on such an error can only produce a false security. *Gas is the outstanding case of a weapon whose manufacture it is difficult to prevent.
"Vested Interests."—With regard to the vested interests in the new method of warfare, the most striking example is again the I.G. We find Ludendorff consulting Krupp and the I.G. representative when formulating his plans for a vast munition programme. Few people have realised the existence of another Krupp in the I.G. It would, indeed, be a revelation to find Germany sharing in these schemes of disarmament to the extent of voluntarily abandoning her dye monopoly. For such a situation is the only one consistent with safety. While the sole big source of production of these substances exists in Germany or in any one country for that matter, no scheme of disarmament is on sure ground.
"Handing Over" Inventions.—Certain disarmament advocates have ingenuous ideas with regard to new war inventions, and their "handing over" to the League. How can an invention be handed over? If every country informed the League of its new scientific war developments, those countries would still be aware of them. It is possible, commercially, to hand over any invention by assigning a patent, but this is of no use for war purposes. What country would regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a valuable war invention? Secondly, the cession of an invention to the League depends entirely on the goodwill of the nation concerned. No country can be sufficiently inspected to root out its new inventions. Suppose a gas ten times more useful, from a military point of view, than mustard gas were discovered in the laboratories of the I.G. An inspector, or "Secret Service" agent, at the next bench in the laboratory might never know that the research was not aimed at the discovery of a new dye. World equilibrium may at this moment be threatened by the discoveries of some absorbed scientist working, say, in a greenhouse in St. John's Wood.
We come back to the same point, that the crux of the situation lies in the possession of the means of production. There is hope of controlling this for a weapon like a tank, but it cannot be controlled for chemical warfare. If the League requires these weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from a monopoly source so complete as the I.G. Further, with or without a League the mere existence of this monopoly is a permanent menace to peace.
Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.—Let us face the facts. Our treatment of chemical industry during the Treaty negotiations and in the Treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon nature. We knew that the nitrogen plants at Oppau and Merseburg were the most menacing munition plants in existence. We knew the grave dangers of leaving Germany, a guilty country, in possession of the poison gas monopoly. Yet, deaf to such arguments, the Treaty opportunity was ignored. Even now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it vitally concerns.
Here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands research and large scale production. The former cannot be checked, and the latter cannot be destroyed or suitably controlled to prevent conversion for war purposes. Yet three distinct features of this weapon make the disarmament need imperative.
In the first place, everything points to "chemical disarmament" as a key measure to control the large scale use of all other weapons. The aggressive agent in war is the chemical. All weapons, except the bayonet, depend upon it.
In the second place, chemical warfare is itself so overwhelmingly important that it is farcical to con-template any disarmament scheme which does not, first and foremost, tackle this question.
Thirdly, no nation ever held a more complete monopoly for any weapon than did Germany for chemical warfare. Yet the levelling up process which occurred during the war, tending towards armament equilibrium, towards removal of enormous disparity, failed to touch the chemical arm. Germany through her guilty exercise of the new weapon, has still further increased her enormous manufacturing superiority for war.
This age has witnessed the growth of an industry critical for war and disarmament. Others will follow as science progresses. Without them, the possibility of sudden decisions, and therefore war incentive will be removed. Sir Oliver Lodge prophesies the war use of the newly controlled atomic energy. The fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical war industry whose nature it would be difficult to foretell. It is these critical industries which rational disarmament must harness. At present the chemical industry holds the field.
Surely the first and crying need is to effect a redistribution of these organic chemical forces. This, indeed, is the one solid chemical disarmament measure which can and must he brought about.
The certain establishment of these industries in the chief countries outside Germany must be fixed far beyond the hazard of local politics and the reach of organised German attack. True, it is essential that no such support should in any way drug the will, weaken the initiative and impoverish the service of the fostered industries. This must depend upon wise organisation and control in the country concerned.
I claim, however, that it is one of the main duties of any League of Nations or other organisation dealing with disarmament to proceed two steps beyond the paragraph in Article 8 of the Covenant. This runs as follows: "The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programmes, and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes." Such an exchange of information must be used, first, to isolate that industry which is of a vital or key nature to the armament of the period, either on account of its value as a universal check, or because it fosters some particularly deadly new type of weapon or aggressive agent. The chemical industry at present fulfils both conditions, for without it, all weapons except the bayonet become silent, and it includes the organic chemical industry which fosters the deadly weapon of the period.
Secondly, rational disarmament must prevent the existence of monopoly in this critical industry. It may be objected that we are interfering with the play of ordinary economic laws. But we must face the possibility that the war of the future can never be averted without such interference. Indeed, if we accept the reports of the American Alien Property Custodian, this very monopoly which now threatens us was established by methods open to the same objections. It is indeed an interesting question whether the German dye monopoly resulted from forces which directly opposed the play of economic law. Further, the question is not so simple as it appears, for, in the industries which disarmament most concerns, governing technical changes are constantly occurring, and the normal home for the production of a whole range of chemical products may be shifted by a change of process which demands new raw materials or new types of energy and power. We must be ready, in certain critical cases, to regard disarmament as the paramount need. International agreement, through the League or otherwise, must find a suitable method to control the critical industry and prevent its use against world peace.
To be the ardent possessor of an ideal, to be its official guardian, does not allow us to ignore the technical aspect of an international and national issue. After our gigantic praiseworthy, but wasteful, attempts at chemical armament, let us at least disarm on rational lines.