The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus

by W. A. Oldfather; H. V. Canter

FOOTNOTES

[1] Augustus und seine Zeit, Leipzig, 1891, I, p. 1069.

[2] Röm. Gesch., V. p. 24 (6th ed. 1909); cf. Die germanische Politik des Augustus (originally in Im Neuen Reich, 1871, pp. 537-556), p. 14: “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens, kräftig begonnen, und sieben Jahre hindurch beharrlich ... geführt.” Other representative expressions of opinion among recent writers may be found: R. von Poehlmann (in Pflugk-Harttung’s Weltgeschichte, 1910, I, p. 516); E. Kornemann (in Gercke-Norden’s Einleitung in die Altertumsw., 1912, III, p. 208); E. Kornemann, “Zu dem Germanenkriege unter Augustus,” Klio, IX (1909), p. 449. On the basis of Tiberius’ campaigns (4-6 A. D.) he speaks also of “die gewaltigen Anstrengungen Roms zur Unterwerfung Germaniens”; H. F. Pelham, Outlines of Roman History, 1905, p. 460; H. Stuart Jones, The Roman Empire, 1913, p. 34; C. H. Hayes, Sources Relating to the Germanic Invasions, 1909, p. 64.

[3] Ibid., p. 28. So J. Beloch, Griech. Gesch.², I, 1 (1912), Einleit., p. 14, says that not only was the attempt made but that Germany was actually subjugated: “Denn Augustus hat diese Eroberung ja versucht trotz der Verfassung, die er dem Reiche gegeben hatte, und er hatte die Eroberung des Landes bis an die Elbe vollendet, als in der Teutoburger Schlacht alles Errungene zusammenbrach.”

[4] Ibid., p. 40.

[5] Ibid., p. 50.

[6] See the chapter “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens durch die Römer” in his Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Berlin, 2nd edit., 1909, II, p. 47 f.

[7] Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit, Gotha, 1883, p. 221 f.

[8] Röm. Herrschaft in Westeuropa, Berlin, 1890, p. 110.

[9] Die Römer in Deutschland (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XXII), 1912, p. 8. Fischer (Armin und die Römer, Halle a. S., 1893, p. 4) is entirely correct in saying that Julius Caesar’s conflicts with the Germans were intended merely “die Germanen von Einfällen in Gallien abzuschrecken,” i. e. to frighten them and to flatter Roman pride. However, inconsistently enough, he adds that Augustus saw a hope of expansion in this direction, “und demgemäss sah er, als Adoptivsohn Cäsars, die Unterwerfung Germaniens als eine ihm vermachte heilige Pflicht an” (p. 25).

[10] See Kaiser Augustus (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XVII), 1902, p. 111: “bedrängte Drusus vom Unterrhein her die freien Germanen, und hatte sie bis zur Elbe unterworfen ... Tiberius ... vollendete dann in den beiden folgenden Jahren die Eroberung und ordnete die Verwaltung der neuen Provinz.”

[11] See also Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, 31 f.; Schiller, op. cit., p. 222. Riese (Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit, Frankfurt am Main, 1889, p. 11), while believing that subjugation was made, shows that no province was established; cf. pp. 6, 7, 12. Mommsen’s statement that proof of such organization is seen in the fact that, when Drusus consecrated for Gaul the altar of Augustus at Lyons, the Ubii were not included, but a similar altar was erected for the German cantons, is answered by Riese, who points out that the emperor’s worship was by no means confined to a single place in a province. For proofs of this statement see examples given by Riese, p. 7 f.; also by Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung², I, p. 504. Ferrero (Characters and Events of Roman History, New York, 1909, p. 165) reaches the conclusion that, owing to the absence of Tiberius at Rhodes, Germany was not organized into a province; that the Germans were not bound to pay tribute, but were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws.

[12] Armin der Befreier Deutschland, Berlin, 1909, p. 6 f.

[13] Die Feldzüge der Römer in Deutschland, Halle, 1872, p. 49.

[14] Zur Gesch. der germanischen u. pannonischen Kriege unter Augustus, Berlin, 1875, p. 7.

[15] Cf. Koepp, op. cit., p. 9: “der Wunsch, eine solche Grenze zu verkürzen, den einspringenden Winkel zum Reiche zu ziehen, erscheint fast selbstverständlich. Das bedeutete aber die Eroberung Germaniens bis zur Elbe”; Idem, Westfalen, I (1909), p. 35: “Dieses Ziel hat nun Augustus ohne Zweifel erstrebt.” See also Schiller, op. cit., p. 214: “Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt, von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberungen zu mehren, abzugehen und für Gallien die Grenze nach der Elbe, für Italien und Macedonien nach der Donau vorzuschieben und auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen, welche leichter zu verteidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”

[16] Op. cit., p. 460.

[17] History of Roman Political Institutions, Boston, 1910, p. 282.

[18] The Greatness and Decline of Rome, New York, 1909, V, p. 142 f.

[19] So Mommsen, Die germanische Politik des Augustus, p. 9: “Caesar Augustus wollte womöglich, und insbesondere in dem ersten Drittel seiner Herrschaft, den Frieden.”

[20] Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheorie, Halle, 1910, p. 444.

[21] Ibid., p. 471.

[22] Niese, Grundriss der röm. Gesch. (4th ed. 1910), p. 299: “Eine Wiedereroberung des Verlorenen ward nicht versucht. Mit Ausnahme der Küstenvölker, Bataver, Friesen, und Chauken, gingen die Eroberungen in Germanien verloren, und an Stelle der Elbe ward der Rhein Grenze.... Das römische Germanien beschränkte sich in Zukunft auf die dem Rhein benachbarten Gegenden”; Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. 1910, p. 2: “And though, on the first attack they [the Germans] seemed to yield to the weight of the Roman power, they soon, by a signal act of despair, regained their independence, and reminded Augustus of the vicissitudes of fortune.”

[23] Op. cit., p. 117. Cf. von Ranke, Weltgeschichte, III, 1, Leipzig, 1883, p. 28: “Und auch die Geschichte muss bestätigen, dass dem Ereigniss eine allgemeine und auf immer nachwirkende Bedeutung zukommt.”

[24] Op. cit., I, p. 1202 f.

[25] See F. Knoke, Armin der Befreier Deutschlands, 1909, p. 80: “Dass uns die Eigenart erhalten blieb, dass wir unsere Sprache retteten, dass wir ein freies Volk geblieben seien, dass wir eine Geschichte erleben durften, dies alles haben wir Armin zu verdanken ... ja selbst fremde Völker hätten alle Ursache mit uns zusammen ihn zu ehren. Gäbe es doch, um vom anderen zu schweigen, ohne seine Taten weder ein Volk der Franzosen, noch der Engländer, selbst nicht der Amerikaner in den Vereinigten Staaten. Ihnen allen hat er die Möglichkeit ihres Volkstums erst geschaffen. Das wird ihnen freilich schwerlich zum Bewusstsein kommen. Um so mehr wollen wir ihn feiern, als den Befreier Deutschlands, als den ersten Helden unseres Vaterlandes”; Felix Dahn, Armin der Cherusker, München, 1909, p. 43: “ohne ihn [Arminius] und sein Meisterstück der Kriegskunst wären wir Germanen eben romanisiert worden wie die Kelten in Gallien.... Wir danken für Kant und Schiller und für Erhaltung unseres deutschen Art und Sprach Armin und der Varus-Schlacht.”

[26] See Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 53: “wir stehen hier an einem Wendepunkt der Völkergeschichte. Auch die Geschichte hat ihre Fluth und ihre Ebbe; hier tritt nach der Hochfluth des römischen Weltregiments die Ebbe ein”; Idem, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 19: “Die Katastrophe ist ... von den weitgreifendsten Folgen geworden, ja man kann sagen ein Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte.”

[27] “Die Varusschlacht in Geschichte und Forschung,” Westfalen, I (1909), p. 34.

[28] History of the Later Roman Commonwealth, London, 1845, II, p. 317.

[29] The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, London, 1859, pp. 179, 195: “Had Arminius been supine or unsuccessful our Germanic ancestors would have been enslaved or exterminated in their original seats along the Eyder and the Elbe. This island would never have borne the name of England.... Never was victory more decisive, never was liberation of an oppressed people more instantaneous and complete ... within a few weeks after Varus had fallen the German soil was freed from the foot of the invader.”

[30] Rome: Its Rise and Fall, Boston, 1901, p. 323: “The victory of Arminius ... was an event of the greatest significance in the history of European civilization ... the Teutonic tribes were on the point of being completely subjugated and put in the way of being Romanized, as the Celts of Gaul had already been. Had this occurred, the entire history of Europe would have been changed. Had Rome succeeded in exterminating or enslaving them Britain, as Creasy says, might never have received the name of England, and the great English nation might never have had an existence.”

[31] Note 20.

[32] Op. cit., p. 325.

[33] Oskar Jäger (Deutsche Geschichte, München, 1909, I, p. 28) is correct in denying any significance to Arminius’ victory further than that it showed the Germans that the dreaded Roman legions were not invincible: “Aber weitere Erfolge hatte das Ereignis nicht. Es erwuchs keine dauernde Organisation aus diesem Erfolg, und im römischen Hauptquartier erholte man sich bald von dem Schrecken, den die Nachricht in Rom hervorgerufen hatte. Tiberius, der nach dem bedrohten Punkt geschickt wurde, fand keine geeinigte germanische Macht zu bekämpfen. Er konnte sich damit begnügen, wie einst Cäsar, über den Rhein zu gehen, um dem jenseitigen Lande zu beweisen, dass die Macht des Imperiums durch die Niederlage dreier Legionen nicht erschüttert sei. Es geschah nichts weiter; die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Cf. also Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 125: “Mais la victoire d’Arminius n’eut point d’autres résultats que de refouler les Italiens jusqu’au Rhin. Il ne put rien entreprendre de plus contre Rome, ni rien fonder en Germanie”; p. 127: “Les temps n’étaient donc point venus ni de la défaite pour l’Empire romain ni de l’unité pour la Germanie.”

[34] Ch. Gailly de Taurines, Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 312: “Grâce à Arminn, sept siècles plus tard, Charlemagne, conquérant latin, champion de la Rome nouvelle, retrouvera, sur le même sol, les tribus germaniques de l’interieur dans l’état même—ou peu s’en faut—ou les avait laissées Germanicus. De leur existence, durant ces sept siècles, elles n’avaient été capables de laisser à la postérité ni un monument, ni un souvenir, ni une inscription, ni une pierre.” Cf. also Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, Paris, 1891, II, p. 227: “Nous ne possédons aucun document de source germanique ... nous n’avons pas un livre, pas une inscription, pas une monnaie.”

[35] Delbrück, op. cit., p. 53: “Viel schlimmer ist der Geist der Literatur dieser Epoche, der ganz und gar von Rhetorik beherrscht ist. Diese Schriftsteller wollen nicht erzählen, wie es gewesen ist, oder wie sie möchten, dass die Leser glauben sollen, dass es gewesen sei, sondern sie wollen vor allem durch die Kunst ihrer Rede Empfindungen erwecken und Eindruck machen. Mir scheint, dass bei zahlreichen Untersuchungen, die den Schlachten des Arminius und Germanicus bisher gewidmet worden sind, diese Charakter-Eigenschaft unserer Quellen, wenn auch oft hervorgehoben, doch kritisch noch lange nicht stark genug in Rechnung gezogen worden ist.”

[36] For a glaring example of how history should not be written, as though all the labors of scholarship had been in vain, and Florus or Dionysius of Halicarnassus were models of historical style, one might cite the highly dramatic account of the battle as repeated by Leighton, History of Rome, New York, 1891, p. 436: “Without troubling about military measures he [Varus] travelled over the country, imposed taxes and pronounced decisions as if a praetor in the forum at Rome. Among the bold and turbulent Germans the spirit of freedom and independence only slumbered; it was not broken. The national hero Arminius raised the standard of revolt. Under this prince a confederacy of all the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser was formed to throw off the yoke of Rome. The governor collected three legions and advanced in 9 A.D. to quell the revolt. The Germans retired; but the Romans pushed on until they had advanced into the Teutoberger [sic] forest. Then Arminius turned and defeated them with tremendous slaughter. The defiles of the woods were covered far and wide with the corpses of the army, for nearly 40,000 soldiers perished. The eagles were lost and Varus perished with his own hand. The news of the disaster caused the utmost alarm in Rome. The Emperor himself was astounded. In his despair he dashed his head against the wall and exclaimed ‘Varus, Varus! give me back my legions.’”

[37] Creasy, op. cit., p. 182: “It is a great fallacy, though apparently sanctioned by great authorities, to suppose that the foreign policy of Augustus was pacific. He certainly recommended such a policy to his successors, either from timidity, or from jealousy of their fame outshining his own; but he himself, until Arminius broke his spirit, had followed a very different course.”

[38] Cf., e. g., the poem Hermann (in twelve books, 2nd ed., 1753) by Christopher Otto von Schönaich, beginning:

“Von dem Helden will ich singen, dessen Arm sein Volk beschützt,

Dessen Schwert auf Deutschlands Feinde für sein Vaterland geblitzt;

Der allein vermögend war, des Augustus Stolz zu brechen,

Und des Erdenkreises Schimpf in der Römer Schmach zu rächen.”

See also J. E. Riffert, “Die Hermannschlacht in der deutschen Literatur,” Herrigs Archiv, 63 (1880), pp. 129-76; 241-332; W. Creizenach, “Armin in Poesie und Literaturgeschichte,” Preussische Jahrbücher, 36, pp. 332-40.

[39] Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 24: “Mag dem Patrioten bei dem Namen die Brust schwellen: dem Geschichtsschreiber muss der Mut sinken beim Gedanken an so manche Bemühungen seiner Vorgänger um dieses Ereignis! Mit Beschämung gedenkt er der alten Kollegen, die es so ungenau, mit Beschämung vieler neuen, die es so genau erzählt haben, so mancher wohlgemeinten Schriftstellerleistung, der man kein besseres Motto geben könnte als Scheffels Vers: ‘In Westfalen trank er viel, drum aus Nationalgefühl hat er’s angefertigt.’” A good instance of blind adulation is that of Hertzberg, op. cit., p. 307: “Niemals wieder spiegelten sich die Adler der Legionen in den gelben Wellen der Weser oder in dem breiten Spiegel der Elbe. Und das ist das niemals welkende Verdienst des Armin gewesen ... das Bild des ersten grossen Mannes deutscher Nation ... die eherne Heldengestalt des Arminius.”

[40] Westfalen, I (1909), p. 34. How timely this warning by Koepp is may be seen from the following extraordinary burst of spirit, at a similar celebration, by T. Beneke, Siegfried und die Varusschlacht im Arnsberger Walde (Ein Beitrag zur neunzehnten Jahrhundertfeier), Leipzig—Gohlis, 1909, p. 84: “Sechsundzwanzig Jahre war Siegfried alt, als er diese Tat vollbrachte, die in ihren Folgen den grössten weltgeschichtlichen Ereignissen gleichzustellen ist, indem er dem Welteroberer eine Niederlage beibrachte, die fast einzig bis dahin in der sonst so ruhmreichen Kriegsgeschichte dieses Volkes dasteht ... Die Varusschlacht rettete mit der reinen Rasse alle ihre Vorzüge in leiblicher und geistiger Hinsicht, germanische Treue, Freiheit, Religiosität, Innigkeit, Gediegenheit, Schaffensfreudigkeit, Tüchtigkeit und Zähigkeit, kurz das, wodurch im Laufe der folgenden Jahrhunderte die Germanen in Civilization und Kultur an die Spitze der Völker des Erdkreises traten. Siegfrieds Tat ist der erste geschichtliche Beweis der Ueberlegenheit einer jungen tatkräftigen Rasse, von der eine Neubelebung der Welt ausgehen sollte.”

[41] Quoted by Gardthausen, op. cit., II, p. 793.

[42] Histoire des Institutions politiques, etc., II, p. 247: “Il y a une école historique en Allemagne qui aime à parler des anciens Germains, comme une école historique en France se plait à parler des anciens Gaulois. On ne connait pas mieux les uns que les autres; mais on se figure que le patriotisme éclaire ces ténèbres et qu’il decuple le peu de renseignements que l’on posséde.”

CHAPTER II
Sources

The only ancient accounts that have come down to us which throw light on the battle of the Teutoburg forest are: Cassius Dio, 56, 18-23; Velleius, II, 117-120; Florus, II, 30, 21-39; Tacitus, Annales, I, 60-62. These we must now compare with each other, with the purpose of determining their weight and credibility in the light of what we know of the authors, of the time and circumstances under which they wrote, and of the purpose had in view.[1]

Cassius Dio (ca. 150-ca. 235 A. D.) is the only one of these ancient writers who has given us anything like a connected account of the catastrophe.[2] Although he wrote in Greek, Dio must be regarded as a Roman, being the son of a Roman senator, and himself filling the office of praetor and consul. His industry—he spent ten years (200-210 A. D.) in accumulating material for his history—and his various activities, as a practical soldier and politician, made his work much more than a mere compilation. While not remarkable for historical insight it represents what Dio sincerely believed to be the truth. Nevertheless, Dio was a product of the rhetorical schools and under the spell of their influence he wrote. His battle scenes are rhetorical exercises.[3] Noticeable also is his inclination toward a lively narration of events of a military character, a tendency which causes him to depart from the bare truth of his sources, and to ornament them with sensational descriptions after the rhetorical manner.[4] Delbrück notes that our sources for the wars of the Romans with the Germans are almost all from second, third, or fourth hand, and that Dio’s account was written at the very time when the rhetorical spirit most completely dominated literature. Dio, as well as our other sources for these years, is to be used with caution, since these writers regarded historical composition as preeminently an opus oratorium, and sought first of all to hold the reader’s attention by brilliant characterizations and striking descriptions.

To Velleius (ca. 19 B. C.-ca. 30 A. D.), the only contemporary author who tells of the Varus disaster, we are indebted for a brief account.[5] A loyal officer with a military record behind him, a dilettante with undeniable studium, Velleius, in the reign of Tiberius, turned to the writing of history. As prefect of horse he accompanied Tiberius to Germany, where he served “per annos continuos novem praefectus aut legatus.”[6] His fervid loyalty and extravagance cause him to magnify everything that concerns Tiberius to such a degree that he is scarcely more than a partisan memoir writer. In his hasty sketches of military campaigns in Germany and Pannonia, full of blunders and inconsistencies, it is clear that he is but little concerned with the exact establishment of facts. With no appreciation of the internal connection of things, and no ability to sift evidence, he centers his interest almost entirely upon individuals for purpose of praise or blame, and excels as a rhetorical anecdotist, and as a delineator of individual actors. His inflated style, his straining after effect by hyperbole, antithesis, epigram, and piquancies of all kinds, mark the degenerate taste of the Silver Age, of which he is the earliest representative.[7] His reflections and observations generally outweigh the information given. Velleius’ training, the occasion of his composition, the attempt to satisfy the taste of his age, all make him a source, which, because of distortions and overemphasis, cannot be accepted at full value.

L. Annaeus Florus, usually identified with the rhetorician and poet of Hadrian’s time, wrote (probably in 137 A. D.) an abridgement in two short books of Rome’s wars from the foundation of the city to the era of Augustus. As to Florus’ purpose in writing, and his rating as a rhetorician, scholars are agreed.[8] He composed solely from rhetorical motives[9], hence historical truth is frequently misrepresented, both intentionally and unintentionally, in a work full of errors, confusions, and contradictions.[10] Florus’ work is declamatory in tone, shows no traces of independent investigation, and little of the calm, even temper demanded of the historian. In his search for the surprising, the unusual, and the spirited, he is frequently led into exaggerations. He is given to the use of superlatives and enhancing epithets, as ingens, immensus, incredibilis, perpetuus, etc., and that he was himself conscious of exaggerations is clear from his free use of such words as quippe, seventy-five times, and quasi, more than a hundred times. In Florus each event is presented as a marvellous fact, and no better commentary on the poverty and unsatisfactoriness of our sources for the Varus disaster could be found than the fact that to Florus many writers have given the honor of being our chief authority.[11]

It is apparent to the most superficial reader that the accounts given by our sources—especially those by Cassius Dio and Florus—are contradictory[12], notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to show that there is no conflict between them.[13] According to Dio, supported by Tacitus, the attack was made on Varus while he was on the march, whereas Florus says that Varus was seated in his camp quietly dispensing justice, when he was surprised by the German host.[14] Further, a detailed examination of the several accounts, sundry particulars of which we have no other means of testing, reveals so many inconsistencies and improbabilities that we are scarcely justified in accepting more than the bare defeat of Varus, the popular tradition of which was later incorporated into the studiously dramatic sketches of the rhetorical historians who serve as our sources. For example, Dio tells us[15] that the Germans craftily enticed Varus away from the Rhine and by conducting themselves in a peaceful and friendly manner lulled him into a feeling of security. This enticement is not mentioned by the other writers, and is in itself improbable[16], as Roman generals had frequently down to this time marched much further into the interior without any enticement whatsoever. It becomes doubly suspicious when we note the excellent rhetorical effect it produces by bringing into greater relief the setting of the disaster, and Varus’ sudden reversal of fortune. Again, Dio makes the statement that Varus and all his highest officers committed suicide.[17] If this remarkable event took place, it is almost wholly inconceivable that it should have found no mention in Velleius and Florus, the former of whom stood much nearer in time to the event. On the other hand, both of these writers relate that Varus’ body was treated with indignity by the savage foe, and according to Velleius, one prefect died honorably in battle, and one preferred to surrender, while Varus’ legate, Numonius Vala, treacherously deserted. Dio’s description of the battle, moreover, is in sharp contradiction to that revealed by Tacitus’ account of conditions in Varus’ camp, as discovered by Germanicus in the year 15 A. D. The first camp that he came upon was one which, by its wide circuit and the measurement of its headquarters, showed the work of three legions, i. e. of an undiminished army; then came a second camp, with half-fallen rampart and shallow trench, where the diminished remnant were understood to have sunken down, i. e. the camp was laid out after a day’s loss with heavy fighting. Finally, Germanicus found in the plain the whitening bones, scattered or accumulated, just as Varus’ men had fled or made their stand in the final catastrophe.[18] Tacitus’ description of a regular camp, the “wide circuit and headquarters” on a scale suitable for the whole force, is utterly inconsistent with the statement of Dio that the first camp was pitched “after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain.” And so is there contradiction in Tacitus’ statement that the legions suffered loss only after moving on from the first encampment. For according to Dio their greatest suffering and losses were on the first day’s march before their first encampment; on the second the loss, he tells us, was less because they had burned or abandoned the greater number of their wagons, and hence advanced in better order.

According to Florus it was while Varus was in his summer camp holding court that suddenly the Germans broke in upon him. Mommsen is undoubtedly correct in saying that this ridiculous representation does not reflect real tradition, but a picture of sheer fancy manufactured out of it. Doubtless it is nothing but a rhetorical exaggeration of the silly security into which Varus is represented as having been inveigled, and by which the disaster is dramatically brought about. It is past credibility that the Germans in such numbers could have broken into the Roman camp without arousing suspicion, or without having come into contact with the Roman sentries. And the more so if Varus had already been warned by Segestes of the enemy’s plans. Further, the storming of a single camp is out of harmony with the two camps mentioned by Tacitus, and clearly implied in Dio’s narrative. And it is difficult to believe that Varus would choose such a place for his summer camp—one shut in by forests, swamps, and untrodden ways. The entire description of the place where the battle was fought is far more in keeping with a camp pitched by an army on the march, than with a summer camp, in which Varus exercised the functions of a judicial office. Moreover, Florus’ account is contradicted by Velleius[19], who says that Ceionius, one of the prefects of Varus’ camp, wished to surrender to the enemy just at the time when a large part of the Roman army had fallen in battle. Now if this refers to the first camp, in which the Romans must have left a detachment (for which there is no direct evidence), then the main part of the army must have come out in orderly wise, and no unexpected surprise at the hands of the Germans could have occurred. Or, if it refers to the second camp, it was clearly not the summer camp, as Florus relates.

Florus’ account is by no means a bare narration of events, nor does he bring forward events in their sequence. His choice both of materials and the grouping of facts is with reference to the leading thought. The very words introducing the story of the Germanic wars show that they serve as the theme for the part that follows: “Germaniam quoque utinam vincere tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose adquisita.” The same is true of the words by which he passes on to the events under Varus’ rule: “sed difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere.”[20] Having assumed that Augustus conquered Germany, Florus seeks to maintain the thesis that the government of a province is a difficult undertaking; that Varus took the task all too lightly, and as a result Germany was ignominiously lost. It is significant that Florus is the only author who asserts that Augustus wished to conquer Germany. And the reason assigned for this conquest is as follows: “set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C. Caesarem bis transvectum ponte Rhenum quaesisse bellum, in illius honorem concupierat facere provinciam.”[21] It is absurd to believe that Augustus ever intended to make a province of Germany for so puerile a reason as merely to honor Julius Caesar, for the latter “had not charged the heirs of his dictatorial power with the extension of Roman territory on the north slope of the Alps and on the right banks of the Rhine so directly as with the conquest of Britain.”[22] If Augustus had desired to make a province in honor of his father, he would doubtless have conquered Britain instead, in accordance with Caesar’s supposed wish. Julius Caesar’s expeditions against the Germans were, as stated by Mommsen himself[23], merely forward movements of defense. And it seems reasonable to assume that Augustus did not, as Florus tells us, wish to conquer Germany, but was merely continuing in a more extensive manner the policy of his father.

How untrustworthy Florus is as an authority may be seen from the following: “quippe Germani victi magis quam domiti erant moresque nostros magis quam arma sub imperatore Druso suspiciebant; postquam ille defunctus est, Vari Quintilli libidinem ac superbiam haut secus quam saevitiam odisse coeperunt.”[24] That is, according to Florus, Varus follows Drusus directly as commander in Germany, in spite of the fact that there intervene between them three commanders, and a long series of important events.[25] The reason for this statement is Florus’ indifference to mere facts, and his desire to harp on the theme “difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere,” and hence to bring into sharp contrast the man who won that territory and the man who was directly responsible for its loss.[26] Florus’ method is observable elsewhere. According to Velleius the Germans purposely introduced a series of fictitious lawsuits and legal contests to throw Varus off his guard. It suits Florus’ purpose, however, to represent them as having recourse to arms at once, as soon as they saw the toga, and felt that laws were more cruel than arms. He thus illustrates in a rhetorical way the sudden and unexpected perils which beset one who attempts the difficult task of maintaining authority over a province. Further evidence of Florus’ inaccuracy is found in his statement that “to this day the barbarians are in possession of the two eagles.” They had as a matter of fact been recovered long before the time at which he wrote, two in the time of Tiberius[27], and the third during the reign of Claudius.[28] With this fact established, Florus’ story to the effect that one of the standards was saved at the time of the disaster is seen to be without any basis of truth. Finally, attention may be called to Florus’ concluding statement: “hac clade factum est ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” This has no value save that of a glittering rhetorical antithesis, but like other statements in the account, has exercised far more than due influence upon writers who discuss the effect of Varus’ defeat upon Rome’s imperial policy.

Velleius’ undisguised flattery of Tiberius warns us that even a contemporary source must be used with caution. His account shows that his one great purpose is to praise Tiberius, and place him in a favorable light. To shed the greater luster on his hero he reveals a marked animus against Varus, whose command in Germany immediately preceded Tiberius’ second term of service there. Note the depreciatory tone in which Varus is spoken of, a man who in his stupidity imagined that the inhabitants of Germany were not human beings save in voice and body, and that men who could not be subdued by the sword might be civilized by law; likewise the persistent malice which runs through his account of the loss of Varus’ legions, a dreadful calamity brought about by the incompetence and indolence of the leader; an army unrivalled in bravery, the flower of Roman troops in discipline, vigor, and experience, some of whom were severely punished by their general for using Roman arms with Roman spirit, chastised by a general who showed some courage in dying though none in fighting. Immediately following this is a sketch of the mighty deeds in Germany done by Tiberius, the constant patron of the Roman empire, who undertook its cause as usual. And the next chapter relates that the same courage and good fortune which had animated Tiberius at the beginning of his command still continued with him.

Certain disagreements between Tacitus’ account of the Varus disaster and that of our other sources have already been cited.[29] But of even more importance for our discussion is Tacitus’ warm personal eulogy of Arminius at the notice of his death.[30] There can be no doubt that this tribute has done much to perpetuate the traditional view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat. The observation has often been made that Tacitus’ sympathies were strongly inclined toward the aristocratic Republic;[31] that notwithstanding his conviction that the Republic had become impossible and the monarchy necessary[32], the terrors and indignities of Domitian’s reign embittered his whole thought;[33] that although he felt that the beneficent rule of Nerva and Trajan offered to the Roman state the best possible combination of liberty and authority[34], “those happy and glorious times when men were able to think what they would and say what they thought”[35], the dark colors, the severe and uncompromising judgment found in Tacitus’ representation of the whole imperial period covered by the Annals owe not a little of their gloom to the sense that the acts of the early emperors were in anticipation of, even a direct preparation for, the wretchedness and bitter degradation which Tacitus himself felt at the hands of Domitian.[36] Having at best little or no sympathy with the early emperors, and living in a time of great imperial expansion, Tacitus has only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus.[37] He regards it as a weakness of all the emperors[38] that down to the days of Nerva and Trajan they took no pains to extend the empire. But for the two generals in whom he discovered some inclination to renew the traditions of conquest he has warm admiration. Observe the complacency with which he dwells upon the campaigns of Germanicus and Corbulo, and upon these alone, in his history of the early empire. These two characters he treats with sympathy and admiration bordering on affection.[39] And just as Tacitus is hearty in his praise of those features of German social life which reflect obliquely on the life of the Roman aristocracy[40], so he regards as a hero the energetic and martial Arminius, who destroyed three legions of the conservative Augustus, led by the supine and incompetent Varus.

It is worth while to notice the basis for Tacitus’ generalization, “liberator haud dubie Germaniae.” Does Tacitus here summarize correctly the facts as given by him of Rome’s conflict with Germany under the leadership of Varus and his successors?[41] Did Arminius become a liberator by virtue of the defeat of Varus? Or by the defeat of Varus’ successors? Is it correct to infer that Arminius was oftentimes victorious, when only one instance is cited of a clear defeat for the Romans? An examination of Tacitus’ narrative forces a negative to each of these inquiries. His first mention of Arminius is as a leader of one of the German parties—Segestes was leader of the rival faction—against whom Germanicus was operating in the campaign of 15 A. D.[42] In this year Germanicus fell suddenly upon the Chatti, many of whom were captured or killed, while others abandoned their villages and fled to the woods. Their capital, Mattium, was burned, and their country ravaged before Germanicus marched back to the Rhine.[43] Then acting on an appeal from Segestes for relief against the violence of Arminius, Germanicus marched back and fought off the besiegers of Segestes, who was rescued, together with his followers and relatives, among them his daughter, the wife of Arminius.[44] Next, after Arminius had aroused the Cherusci and bordering tribes, Germanicus, having dispatched a part of his army under lieutenants, who utterly defeated the Bructeri[45], himself pursued Arminius until he retired into pathless wastes.[46] The Germans, after engaging and harassing the Romans in the swamps, were finally overpowered and the slaughter continued as long as daylight lasted.[47] Tacitus adds that although the Romans were distressed by want of provisions and wounds, yet in their great victory they found everything, vigor, health, and abundance.

With the year 16 A. D. Germanicus, supported by the ardent enthusiasm of his soldiers, sought further engagements with the Germans, remembering that they were always worsted in a regular battle and on ground adapted to fighting.[48] The Chatti, who at this time were besieging a Roman stronghold on the river Lippe, stole away and disappeared at the report of the Roman approach. Finally, however, the Germans dared to meet the Romans in the plain of Idistaviso, near the river Weser, Tacitus, after giving a detailed account of the dreadful slaughter which here befell the Germans[49], says that it was a great victory for the Romans and without loss on their part. Not less disastrous to the Germans was a succeeding Roman victory on grounds chosen by the Germans.[50] But after the losses by storm that overtook the Roman legions on their return by fleet to winter quarters[51], the Germans were encouraged to renew their attacks. Again Germanicus marched against the Chatti and the Marsi, who either did not dare to engage, or wherever they did engage were instantly defeated, exclaiming that the Romans were invincible and superior to any misfortune.[52] Tacitus tells us that at the conclusion of the conflict the Roman army was led back into winter quarters full of joy that this expedition had compensated for their misfortune at sea. Significant are his concluding words: “nor was it doubted that the enemy were tottering to their fall and concerting means for obtaining peace, and that if another summer were added the war could be brought to completion.”[53] Immediately following this we read of Germanicus’ recall by Tiberius to celebrate his triumph, and to enter on a second consulship, no further operations being conducted against the Germans. Tacitus hints that this step was taken by Tiberius through envy of Germanicus. But whether for this reason or for the far more probable one, assigned by Tiberius himself[54], it is evident to any one following the story as told by Tacitus that Arminius was not a liberator of Germany, either by his defeat of Varus or through the conflict that he waged against Varus’ successors. Tacitus’ account shows on the one hand that the Romans were not concerned about securing permanent possessions in Germany, and on the other that with but one exception the Romans were victorious throughout the conflict. But in tracing the biography of Arminius further Tacitus recounts that on the departure of the Romans the German tribes, the Suebi led by Maroboduus, who had assumed the title of king, and the Cherusci, led by Arminius, the champion of the people, turned their swords against each other;[55] that, however, after the defeat of Maroboduus, Arminius aiming at royalty became antagonistic to the liberty of his countrymen, and fell by the treachery of his own kinsmen.[56] The opportunity here for a rhetorical antithesis between Arminius the foe of his country’s liberty and Arminius its erstwhile champion, Tacitus could not resist. Hence, “liberator haud dubie Germaniae,” notwithstanding the fact that this bold assertion has no basis in what has gone before. A Roman historian under the spell of rhetoric did not as a rule hesitate to adjust his conclusions in the interest of dramatic portrayal of character.