TRIAL OF DEBS.
On the 23d day of July, the day set for the trial of the officers of the American Railway Union,—Debs, Howard, Rodgers and Kelliher were on hand to answer to the charge of contempt.
The court room was densely packed, when Judges Wood of Indianapolis and Grosscup of Chicago entered and Judge Wood raised a serious objection to the crowded condition, saying that only those finding seats should be allowed to remain,—lawyers, and possibly reporters.
After signing and swearing to the answers, the defendants filed in at 11:40 and Judge Wood asked if the Santa Fe road was represented. Attorney Miller stepped forward and was asked if both proceedings could not be heard at the same time. Judge Wood favored this to save time, and it was finally agreed that if the Santa Fe cases be heard later the government testimony on this bearing be admitted. Attorney Gregory thereupon submitted the answers to the information filed before Judge Seaman in the contempt proceedings, and suggested that the trial for which the defendants had given bail be immediate and have precedence over the contempt proceedings. Judge Woods said that the court could decide upon a motion for delay, much more intelligently could they have the government information and the answers filed by the defendants. Attorney Milchrist then read the court the information.
As Attorney Gregory had previously moved that the information be dismissed and the defendants discharged on their sworn answers, Attorney Erwin followed by reading the answers.
At the conclusion of the reading he said that the defendants had made and filed a motion to quash, holding that the information was not sufficient. They now asked that the defendants be discharged, and also that the district attorney and government counsel to elect whether they should proceed under the indictment or under the contempt cases. No man could be tried twice for the same offense. Judge Wood said that the counsel for the government could proceed with either case. Attorney Walker elected to go ahead with the contempt proceedings.
Attorney Gregory in the opening made an eloquent appeal for a trial by jury instead of a criminal proceeding in a contempt case, as he held the present proceeding to be. He cited a number of authorities in support of his position. He argued that it was the rule that there could be no appeal from the decision of a federal court in a contempt case, and that consequently, where the question of a crime was involved, a sentence from the court would practically be a conviction on the original criminal charge without a trial by jury which is guaranteed by the constitution.
Mr. Gregory then took up the question of the motion to dismiss the bill on the grounds that the information did not set out in specific forms any violation of the specifications in the injunction granted by the United States court.
He held that the men had a right to combine, choose leaders to advise, and quit work if they wished to do so and persuade others to quit work, that the injunctions did not prohibit them from doing so. Judge Wood asked if he considered that the defendants had a right to ask men to tumble goods out of cars that were ready for transportation. Mr. Gregory replied that he did not consider that they had any such right, and claimed that there was nowhere in the information a distinct allegation that the defendants had counseled violence or infractions of the orders in the injunction. While he was willing to admit that violence had been done during the present strike, nothing was charged in the information that the violence was due to the acts of the defendants.
Attorney Walker for the government followed. He held that the defendants had no right to go into other states and persuade men to quit work for the purpose of paralyzing railroads, and that the issuance of these orders was a willful and vicious violation of the order of the court.
Mr. Walker said the telegrams were the strongest evidence in the hands of the state to show that this had been done. He spoke for three quarters of an hour and directed his remarks more to the general charge against the defendants for violation of the injunction, than to the legal points raised by Mr. Gregory.
It will be remembered that the answers filed by the attorneys for the defense, was a complete denial of the charges.
After hearing all the arguments, Judges Wood and Grosscup decided that the contempt proceedings against Mr. Debs and the others, were in the nature of proceedings in equity, and therefore the defendants could not be discharged on their denial of the charges under oath.
Mr. Walker gave as an excuse for wanting the case heard at once, that the defendants were liable to continue calling out the men unless they were restrained from so doing by the court.
"Then," said Mr. Gregory, "you wish the court to practically call the strike off."
Mr. Walker smiled and said that such an order would suit him all right.
Judge Wood then added that it was within the bounds of the injunction called, for him to insist that the strike be declared off.
Attorney Greeting, reviewing the information, raised the insufficiency of the allegations, he also raised the question of the bearing of the statutes under which the defendants were enjoined.
The following are the sections of acts under which the United States courts issued injunctions restraining the American Railway Union, its officers or agents, from interfering in any way with the interstate traffic on railroads.
"Section 1. Every contract combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both; said punishments at the discretion of the court.
"Section 2. Any person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or foreign powers shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished etc.
"Section 3. Every contract combination in form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy in restraint of commerce or trade in any territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such territory and another, or between any such territory or territories and any state or states or the District of Columbia or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any other state or states or foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be declared guilty of a misdemeanor and punished as in the case of Sections 1 and 2.
"Section 8. The word person or persons wherever used shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under, or authorized by, the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the territories, the laws of any state or the laws of any foreign country."
"This law was never intended to cover the case of these defendants," said Mr. Greeting. "It is clearly directed at the trusts and combinations which conspire to rob such people as the defendants. It seems to me that the district attorney would have been acting more within the spirit of the law if he had charged the railroads and the Pullman Palace Car Co., with conspiracy to monopolize interstate commerce, as it is a well known fact that the railroads have contracted with Pullman to haul none but his cars."
A sickly smile spread over the features of the railroad attorneys present. It was evident that the words of Mr. Greeting sunk deeper than some of them would care to acknowledge.
District Attorney Milchrist argued that the court had perfect jurisdiction in these cases, he held that the government derived revenue from postal service and interstate commerce. It had suffered in a pecuniary way hence the bill of information filed had a proper place in court.
In regard to the information and answers, Mr. Milchrist said: "Either the counsel for the government deserved to be disbarred for willful misconduct for filing it, or the defendants in their sworn answer embodying a sweeping denial of the charge in the information had been guilty of rank perjury."
Attorney Erwin then proceeded, prefacing his remarks with the statement that this was a court of equity. When these defendants denied under oath before the court, the allegations made in the bill, equity shut its doors. There was a remedy at law. The men could be punished for perjury in swearing falsely in their answers. No court of equity could hear such a case. Mr. Erwin held that the information was filed in equity and that the answer filed by the defendants was final and the remedy then was at law in a charge of perjury.
"Is it any indication of the power of a court," interrupted Judge Wood, "to hold a man convicted on a charge of perjury?"
Attorney Erwin said that the perjury charge could purge the defendants in the case of contempt.
"You say in your answer," said Judge Wood, "that the defendants deny ordering strikes because it was not in their power to do so. Is it not enough to deny that you ordered the men out without going further and denying that you advised them in this matter."
"We say," answered Mr. Erwin "that every strike was voted on by a majority of the American Railway Union men upon each road upon which there had been a strike. The defendants deny the power to order or coerce the members of the American Railway Union."
When questioned as to the answers denying the telegrams Mr. Erwin said the denials were sweeping. They had covered every point and purged themselves of any desire to disregard the orders of the court and the proceedings should be dismissed. He said: "Had Special Counsel Walker who set before the grand jury made his charges more specific, and not sought to prejudice the minds of the court by holding his averments for the attachment proceedings, and making them in vague and declamatory charges."
Judge Wood said if the defendants had asked for more specific charges he thought the court would have granted it.
Attorney Erwin here remarked that they would prefer to make a motion to quash, which Judge Wood announced could not be done in this case unless the bill was wholly defective.
Mr. Erwin said that Attorney Walker had drawn the bill up hastily, and it was signed only by himself and the district attorney, who verified it merely by belief. He urged that the court should not add the information by continuing the consideration of the imperfectly drawn and inadequate bill. The court should not be a detective to ferret out the alleged truths of certain charges the evidence of which should have been collected by the government officers before a rule against the defendants was issued.
Mr. Bancroft for the Santa Fe followed Mr. Erwin. He vigorously defended the information filed, and proceeded to color the telegrams admitted by the defendants, to suit the purposes of the government.
After a legal tilt between the counsel on both sides, Judge Wood overruled the motion of defendant's counsel to quash the information, and postponed the case until September 5.
In conclusion he said that from what he had heard, he thought it necessary for the court to have its hand on the matter. It was evident, he said, that the defense intended to attempt to put forward a quantity of irrelevant matter as to the allegations regarding a combination on the part of the railroads. He said that while it was irrelevant he would hear it as a matter of curiosity and for public disclosure.
The above synopsis of the proceedings of the trial, will give a fair idea of the course the government—on behalf of the railroads—pursued in conducting the prosecution of the officers of the American Railway Union.
After a conference with their counsel—although opposed to it on principle—the officers of the American Railway Union decided to give bail.
This decision was due to the fact that matters of an important nature demanded their immediate attention. They were placed under $7,000 bonds each, signed by Wm. Skakel and Wm. Fitzgerald, these gentlemen qualifying to the extent of $50,000 and $250,000 respectively.
For the time being the officers of the American Railway Union were free men.