OPERATIONS AND OCCURRENCES FROM THE DEATH OF SIR JOHN MOORE TO THE ARRIVAL OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.
Operations of the French.—General Friere murdered.—Defeat of the Spanish armies.—Siege of Zaragoza.—Operations in Catalonia.—Proceedings at Lisbon.—Arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley.—State of the allied army.—Soult’s dangerous position.
Under such unpromising circumstances, which we have described, intelligence reached Sir John Craddock, that three French armies were about to move on Portugal; Soult from Gallicia, Lapisse from Salamanca, and Victor from the Tagus. In the vicinity of the latter, Cuesta was endeavouring to organize anew his routed levies: but on his exertions little dependence could be placed—and when the alarm spread, the garrison of Almeida was withdrawn, the forts on the Tagus dismantled, and every preparation was made to embark the British at Lisbon, and abandon Portugal to her oppressors.
This panic was, however, checked by the preservation of Almeida and Rodrigo, by Sir Robert Wilson’s Portuguese, added to some advantages gained by Cuesta’s army over the French, under Victor. The British force in Lisbon had also been reinforced—twenty thousand Portuguese were taken into the pay of England—and all these things restored, in some degree, a partial confidence.
After the embarkation at Corunna, the French were for a short time inactive. Ney relieved Soult in Gallicia with seventeen thousand men, and enabled the latter to advance on Oporto with twenty-four thousand. After garrisoning Vigo and Tuy, he attempted to cross the Minho near its mouth—but, from imperfect means of transport, he was repulsed, and obliged to march up the river, and pass it by the bridge at Orense. This movement, though in the first instance unfavourable, had nearly ended in the destruction of Romana; who, being surprised and defeated, saved himself only by some happy accidents from total ruin.
On entering Portugal, the few and ill-disciplined remnants of the Spanish regiments fell back upon the mountain country, General Friere prudently adopting a defensive system, rather venture a combat, for which he knew well that his army was utterly unprepared. This determination of the Spanish general was unpopular. Unpractised in the field, without discipline or formation, and blind to the severe lessons taught them by their recent defeats, these raw levies were ardent for action, and clamorous to meet the enemy again. A number of irregulars, who had lately joined, excited this popular delusion—and they insisted that, contrary to his own judgment, that their general should fight. Friere prudently and steadily refused; and his mutinous soldiers—if such a mob deserve the name—broke into his quarters, treated him with every ignominy, and finally murdered himself and most of his staff.
They immediately elected a British employé, Baron Eben, who commanded a Lusitanian brigade, as their commander; and, he, unable to control their fancy for fighting, brought them fairly into action at Carvalho de Este. As might have been expected from such ruffians, they were completely routed. Like Falstaff, the Baron had brought his “scoundrels where they were well peppered,”—and many fell victims to their stupidity and presumption, in supposing for a moment, that they could encounter Soult’s veteran troops with the slightest prospect of success. Oporto was next besieged—and though the city was garrisoned by twenty thousand men, having two hundred guns mounted on the works, it was stormed on the third day. The usual scenes of military license, which the usage of war permits after a successful assault, were here fearfully enacted. Soult, however, checked the turbulence of the soldiery after the first burst of fury had subsided; and on the next day, order was generally restored.
Meanwhile the Spanish armies were undergoing a series of disasters—and Cuesta was driven from the southern frontier, after suffering a signal defeat. Victor following up his success, crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and threw himself on the Spanish army. The French charge was stoutly withstood—the cavalry driven back—and, in return, Victor’s left attacked, and forced for nearly two miles to retire. But it rallied—the Spanish horse, which had been pursuing, suddenly gave way; a panic seized the infantry—the whole broke—threw down their arms,—and endeavoured to save themselves by a precipitous flight. No quarter was given—upwards of nine thousand men were bayoneted and cut down—and the Spanish army was totally disorganized, and placed, for every useful purpose, completely hors de combat.
The army of La Mancha was not more fortunate in an engagement at Ciudad Real with Sebastiani. Broken at the first charge, they were hunted off the field, and pursued by the French cavalry to the very base of the Sierra Morena. Their guns and three thousand prisoners were the trophies of a complete déroute. The number of their killed and wounded was immense, for the French followed up their success with unscrupulous severity, cutting down or bayoneting every fugitive that could be overtaken. No wonder that the French marshals carried terror with their names; and that the overthrow of the Spanish legions alarmed their British allies at Lisbon. Means were adopted for defence, in the event of the French advancing—a corps was stationed at Abrantes—the main body at Leria—and the Portuguese under Beresford at Thomar.
Some other operations of moment had occurred in Arragon and Catalonia. In Arragon the reduction of Zaragoza was the next attempt of the French after the fatal fight of Tudela; and there, a resistance was unexpectedly given by the inhabitants, that finds no parallel in the annals of war.[83] Every effort of art and labour was exhausted to render the city one huge fortress; the convent became a barrack; the church an hospital; woman forgot her fears; the monk left the shrine for the battery; every street was retrenched; every building secured by barricades; and when the external defences were destroyed, and the walls levelled by the besiegers, the contest had to be continued from street to street—and house after house was as obstinately defended, as if upon its occupation the fate of Zaragoza hung. Although hunger exhausted their energies, and pestilence swept the defenders away by thousands, the stern reply to every summons was “guerre a la cuchulo!” At last, when every street was ruined—when forty thousand of every sex and age had perished—twelve thousand wretched men, too much enfeebled to resist, and a ruined heap of shattered buildings, were the dear-earned trophies that fell to the conquerors of Europe.
In Catalonia, for a time, the progress of French conquest was interrupted. St. Cyr, however, advanced with twenty thousand men, and after a spirited resistance, obliged Rosas to surrender. Following up his success, the French general marched and attacked Vives, who had taken up a strong position defended by a number of guns. Although St. Cyr was unprovided with cannon—his mountain movement having obliged him to send his artillery to Figueras—he threw himself upon the Spanish lines, broke and dispersed them, with great slaughter, and the loss of the whole of their guns. Again, at Llobregat, he brought the Spanish general to action, and the battle terminated with results as ruinous. Vives was deposed from the command, and Reding succeeded him.
Reding, finding himself in command of thirty thousand men, decided on acting on the offensive, and moved forward with his army. This determination was unfortunate. St. Cyr, availing himself of the great extension of Reding’s force, threw himself upon its centre, severed the wings, and destroyed their communication. After vainly endeavouring, by reuniting a portion of his beaten troops to oppose Souham, Reding was overtaken by St. Cyr, near Tarragona—again defeated, his army dispersed, and himself mortally wounded.
Blake succeeded to the chief command on Reding’s death; and while a detachment of a thousand French was surprised on the river Cinca by Perena, the Spanish commandant engaged Suchet with credit, and drove him at night-fall from the field. This partial victory roused the drooping spirits of the Spaniards—and Blake moved into Arragon to recapture Zaragoza from the invaders.
These temporary successes held out little prospect of repelling invading armies, which were expecting an immense addition to their force. In fact, Portugal would have been soon at the mercy of the enemy, and Spain could have offered but a feeble resistance, when Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived to take the chief command—or, as many believed, to witness a second embarkation, and yield Portugal once more to the invaders.
These forebodings were unfounded—nothing was farther from the intention of Sir Arthur than an abandonment of the country. He instantly proceeded to adopt measures that should enable him to take the field, and the army was concentrated, with the exception of Mackenzie’s brigade, at Coimbra, and reviewed. The entire numbered twenty-six thousand men, of which six thousand formed the separate corps under Marshal Beresford. With the Germans, the English brigades mustered about seventeen thousand; the detached corps under Mackenzie, amounting to nearly three thousand, of which one half was cavalry; and a farther augmentation was effected by brigading one Portuguese, with every two of the British battalions.
A strong division—Mackenzie’s brigades—with Portuguese regiments amounting to twelve thousand men, were posted at Santarem and Abrantes. This corps was intended to secure Lisbon, should Victor prefer marching on the capital by Alentejo, rather than proceed with his army into Andalusia.
In the mean time Soult’s position became extremely dangerous.—A British army in his front—bands of guerillas in his rear; one flank hemmed in by Silviera at Amarante; and the ocean on the other. But that able marshal perceived the difficulties of his situation, and deciding at once to secure an open road in his rear, he despatched Delaborde and Loison to recover Amarante. The task was a tedious and doubtful operation; and for twelve days the place was assaulted and maintained.[84] At last, Soult in person came forward in strength—and Silviera was driven from the bridge over the Tamaga, with the loss of his cannon,—and the French retreat was for the present secured.
But two courses remained for the duke of Dalmatia to adopt—to move towards Victor, by circuitous marches on the Tagus—or, what was far more probable, retire from Portugal by the road leading through the Tras os Montes.