CHAPTER X.
Rival Claims to the St. John River.
The St. John river region may be said to have been in dispute from the moment the treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713 until the taking of Quebec in 1759. By the treaty of Utrecht all Nova Scotia, or Acadia, comprehended within its ancient boundaries, was ceded to Great Britain, and the English at once claimed possession of the territory bordering on the St. John. To this the French offered strong objection, claiming that Nova Scotia, or Acadia, comprised merely the peninsula south of the Bay of Fundy—a claim which, as already stated in these pages, was strangely at variance with their former contention that the western boundary of Acadia was the River Kennebec.[24] For many years the dispute was confined to remonstrances on the side of either party, the French meanwhile using their savage allies to repel the advance of any English adventurers who might feel disposed to make settlements on the St. John, and encouraging the Acadians to settle there, while the English authorities endeavored, with but indifferent success, to gain the friendship of the Indians and compel the Acadians to take the oath of allegiance to the British crown. The dispute over the limits of Acadia at times waxed warm. There were protests and counter-protests. Letters frequently passed between the English government at Annapolis and the missionaries on the St. John—Loyard, Danielou, and Germain, who were in close touch with the civil authorities of their nation, and were in some measure the political agents of the Marquise de Vaudreuil and other French governors of Canada.
It is possible that the Marquis de Vaudreuil felt special interest in the St. John river country, owing to the fact that his wife Louise Elizabeth Joibert, was born at Fort Jemseg while her father, the Sieur de Soulanges, was governor of Acadia. At any rate the marquis stoutly asserted the right of the French to the sovereignty of that region and he wrote to the Lieut. Governor of Nova Scotia in 1718, “I pray you not to permit your English vessels to go into the river St. John, which is always of the French dominion.” He also encouraged the Acadians of the peninsula to withdraw to the river St. John so as not to be under British domination, pledging them his support and stating that Father Loyard, the Jesuit missionary, should have authority to grant them lands agreeably to their wishes.
Lieut. Governor Doucett, of Nova Scotia, complained of the aggressive policy of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, asserting that he was entirely mistaken as to the ownership of the St. John river, for it was “about the centre of Nova Scotia;” he was satisfied, nevertheless, that the Acadians believed it would never be taken possession of by the British, and if the proceedings of the French were not stopped they would presently claim everything within cannon short of his fort at Annapolis.
The policy of the French in employing their Indian allies to deter the English from any advance towards the St. John region was attended with such success that the infant colony of Nova Scotia was kept in a constant state of alarm by the threats and unfriendly attitude of the Micmacs and Maliseets. There were, however, occasional periods in which there were no actual hostilities, and it may be said that the peace made at Boston in 1725, and ratified by the St. John river tribe in May, 1728, was fairly observed by the Indians until war was declared between England and France in 1744.
During this war the St. John river was much used as a means of communication between Quebec and the French settlements of Acadia, smart young Indians with light birch canoes being employed to carry express messages, and on various occasions large parties of French and Indians travelled by this route from the St. Lawrence to the Bay of Fundy. The Indian villages of Medoctec and Aukpaque afforded convenient stopping places.
In the year 1746 a great war party, including the Abenakis of Quebec as well as their kinsmen of the upper St. John, arrived at Aukpaque. Thence they took their way in company with the missionary Germain to Chignecto. They had choice of two routes of travel, one by way of the Kennebecasis and Anagance to the Petitcodiac, the other by way of the Washademoak lake and the Canaan to the same river. As the war proceeded the Maliseets actively supported their old allies the French. Some of them took part in the midwinter night attack, under Coulon de Villiers, on Colonel Noble’s post at Grand Pre. The English on this occasion were taken utterly by surprise; Noble himself fell fighting in his shirt, and his entire party were killed, wounded or made prisoners. From the military point of view this was one of the most brilliant exploits in the annals of Acadia, and, what is better, the victors behaved with great humanity to the vanquished.
The missionaries le Loutre and Germain were naturally very desirous of seeing French supremacy restored in Acadia and the latter proposed an expedition against Annapolis. With that end in view he proceeded to Quebec and returned with a supply of powder, lead and ball for his Maliseet warriors. However, in October, 1748, the peace of Aix la Chapelle put a stop to open hostilities.
Immediately after the declaration of peace, Captain Gorham, with his rangers and a detachment of auxiliaries, proceeded in two ships to the River St. John and ordered the French inhabitants to send deputies to Annapolis to give an account of their conduct during the war.
Count de la Galissonniere strongly protested against Gorham’s interference with the Acadians on the St. John, which he described as “a river situated on the Continent of Canada, and much on this side of the Kennebec, where by common consent the bounds of New England have been placed.” This utterance of the French governor marks another stage in the controversy concerning the limits of Acadia. He stoutly contended that Gorham and all other British officers must be forbidden to interfere with the French on the St. John river, or to engage them to make submissions contrary to the allegiance due to the King of France “who,” he says, “is their master as well as mine, and has not ceded this territory by any treaty.”
The governors of Massachusetts and of Nova Scotia replied at some length to the communication of Count de la Galissonniere, claiming the territory in dispute for the king of Great Britain, and showing that the French living on the St. John had some years before taken the oath of allegiance to the English monarch.
The Acadians on the St. John, whose allegiance was in dispute, were a mere handful of settlers. The Abbe le Loutre wrote in 1748: “There are fifteen or twenty French families on this river, the rest of the inhabitants are savages called Marichites (Maliseets) who have for their missionary the Jesuit father Germain.” His statement as to the number of Acadian settlers is corroborated by Mascarene, who notified the British authorities that thirty leagues up the river were seated twenty families of French inhabitants, sprung originally from the Nova Scotia side of the bay, most of them since his memory, who, many years ago, came to Annapolis and took the oath of fidelity. He adds, “the whole river up to its head, with all the northern coast of the Bay of Fundy, was always reckoned dependent on this government.”
Both Mascarene and Shirley strongly urged upon the British ministry the necessity of settling the limits of Acadia, and a little later commissioners were appointed, two on each side, to determine the matter. They spent four fruitless years over the question, and it remained undecided until settled by the arbitrament of the sword. Shirley was one of the commissioners, as was also the Marquis de la Galissonniere, and it is not to be wondered at that with two such determined men on opposite sides and differing so widely in their views, there should have been no solution of the difficulty.
The period now under consideration is really a very extraordinary one. Ostensibly it was a time of peace. By the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 England gave back Cape Breton (or Isle Royale) to France and France restored Madras to England, but there remained no clear understanding as to the boundaries between the possessions of the rival powers in America.
So far as the French and English colonies were concerned the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle scarcely deserved the name of a truce. It was merely a breathing time in which preparations were being made for the final struggle. The treaty was so indefinite that a vast amount of territory was claimed by both parties. The English were naturally the most aggressive for the population of the English colonies was 1,200,000 while Canada had but 60,000 people.
Count de la Galissonniere, the governor-general of Canada, though diminutive in stature and slightly deformed, was resolute and energetic; moreover he was a statesman, and had his policy been followed it might have been better for France. He advised the government to send out ten thousand peasants from the rural districts and settle them along the frontiers of the disputed territory, but the French court thought it unadvisable to depopulate France in order to people the wilds of Canada. Failing in this design, the Count determined vigorously to assert the sovereignty of France over the immense territory in dispute. Accordingly he claimed for his royal master the country north of the Bay of Fundy and west to the Kennebec, and his officers established fortified posts on the River St. John and at the Isthmus of Chignecto. He at the same time stirred up the Indians to 96 hostilities in order to render the position of the English in Nova Scotia and New England as uncomfortable as possible, and further to strengthen his hands he endeavored to get the Acadians in the peninsula of Nova Scotia to remove to the St. John river and other parts of “the debatable territory.” His policy led to a counter policy on the part of Shirley and Lawrence (governors respectively of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia) namely, that the Acadians should not be allowed to go where they liked and to do as they pleased but must remain on their lands and take the oath of allegiance to the English sovereign or be removed to situations where they could do no harm to the interests of the British colonies in the then critical condition of affairs.
Ostensibly there was peace from the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle until war was declared between the rival powers in 1756. But in the meantime there was a collision between them on the Ohio river, where the French built Fort Duquesne on the site now occupied by Pittsburg. The governors of the English colonies held a conference and decided on rather a startling programme for a time of peace. Gen. Braddock was to march on Fort Duquesne and drive the French from the Ohio valley; Shirley, of Massachusetts, was to lead an expedition against Niagara; William Johnson, was to take Crown Point and secure control of Lake Champlain; while, in Acadia, Colonel Monckton was to attack the French position at Fort Beausejour. In every instance the English were the aggressors but they justified their action on the ground that the places to be attacked were on British territory. This the French as emphatically denied. Braddock’s attempt resulted in a most disastrous failure, Shirley’s expedition was abandoned, William Johnson won a brilliant victory at Lake George and Colonel Monckton captured Beausejour.
The course of events on the River St. John and in other parts of Acadia harmonizes with the general situation of affairs in America at this time.
As the period under consideration is one of which comparatively little has been written, it may be well to make use of the information contained in the voluminous correspondence of the French ministers and their subordinates in America.
Early in the summer of 1749 the Count de la Galissonniere sent the Sieur de Boishebert to the lower part of the River St. John with a small detachment to secure the French inhabitants against the threats of Capt. Gorham, who had been sent by the Governor of Nova Scotia to make the inhabitants renew the oath of allegiance to the English sovereign, which de la Galissonniere says “they ought never to have taken.” The Count expresses his views on the situation with terseness and vigor: “The River St. John is not the only place the English wish to invade. They claim the entire coast, from that river to Beaubassin, and from Canso to Gaspe, in order to render themselves sovereigns of all the territory of the Abenakis, Catholics and subjects of the king, a nation that has never acknowledged nor wishes to acknowledge their domination and which is the most faithful to us in Canada. If we abandon to England this land, which comprises more than 180 leagues of seacoast, that is to say almost as much as from Bayonne to Dunkirk, we must renounce all communication by land from Canada with Acadia and Isle Royal, together with the means of succoring the one and retaking the other.” 97 The Count further argues that to renounce the territory in dispute will deprive the Acadians of all hope of a place of refuge on French soil and reduce them to despair, and he apprehends that the English, having no reason to care for them, will suffer them to have no missionaries and will destroy at their leisure their religion. “It is very easy,” he adds, “to hinder the English establishing themselves on these lands. They will have to proceed through the woods and along narrow rivers, and as long as the French are masters of the Abenakis and the Acadians are provided with arms and supplies from France the English will not expose themselves to their attacks.”
Both sides began to consider the advisability of taking forcible possession of the disputed territory, but the French were the first to take action. In June, 1749, Mascarene reported two French officers with twenty or thirty men from Canada and a number of Indians had come to erect a fort and make a settlement at the mouth of the river, and that two vessels with stores and materials were coming to them from Quebec. On receipt of this information, Cornwallis, who had just arrived at Halifax, sent Captain Rous in the sloop “Albany” to St. John to ascertain what works were in course of erection by the French, and to demand the authority for their action. He also issued a proclamation in French prohibiting the Acadians from making a settlement on the St. John.
When the “Albany” arrived no one was found at the old fort and for some time no inhabitants, either French or Indian, were seen. At last a French schooner entered the harbor, laden with provisions. Captain Rous took her, but offered to release her provided the master would go up the river and bring down the French officers. The master accordingly went up the river in a canoe, and the next day a French officer with thirty men and 150 Indians came down and took position, with their colors flying, at a point on the shore within musket shot of the “Albany.” The commander of the French was Pierre Boishebert. He had fixed his headquarters ten miles up the river at the place now known as Woodman’s Point, just above the mouth of the Nerepis, where in Governor Villebon’s time there had been an Indian fortress.
Captain Rous ordered the French to strike their colors; their commander demurred, and asked to be allowed to march back with his colors flying, promising to return the next day without them. Rous ordered the colors to be struck immediately, which being done, the officers were invited on board the “Albany.” They showed their instructions from the governor of Canada, Count de la Galissonniere, by which it appeared they had at first been ordered to establish a fortified post, but afterwards the order had been countermanded and they were required merely to prevent the English from establishing themselves till the right of possession should be settled between the two crowns.
The letter of Captain Rous to Boishebert, upon the arrival of the former at St. John harbor, is rather quaint reading. The original is in French.
From the River St. John, 3 July, 1749.
Sir,—I am directed by the King, my master, to look into and examine the various ports, harbors and rivers of His Majesty’s province of Nova Scotia, and am now here for that intent. Being informed that you are upon this river with a 98 detachment of soldiers of the King of France. I should be pleased to know by what authority and with what intention your are engaged in a similar procedure. It would afford me much pleasure if I could have the honor of a personal interview in order to convince you of the rights of the King, my master.
I shall be delighted to see some of the Indian chiefs in order to inform them of the peace and of the harmony that prevails between the two crowns, also to confer with them.
Until I shall have the honor, as I hope, of seeing you,
I am very truly, etc.
In the subsequent interview with the savages, Father Germain and Captain Edward How acted as interpreters, and the missionary wrote an account of the interview to the governor of Quebec, in which he mentions the fact that Cornwallis, the governor of Nova Scotia, claimed jurisdiction over the St. John river region and beyond it to Passamaquoddy, deeming it a part of Acadia according to its ancient limits. Boishebert, in his letter to the Count de la Galissonniere, says that one of the best reasons the English had for laying claim to the territory north of the Bay of Fundy was that the commission of Subercase, the last French governor who resided at Annapolis Royal, fixed his jurisdiction as far west as the River Kennebec. In the spirit of a true soldier, Boishebert wishes that war might speedily recommence, and that France might be more fortunate as to the conquest of Acadia than in the last war. Meanwhile he had arranged with Capt. Rous to remain undisturbed on the River St. John until the next spring, on the understanding that he was to erect no fortification.
The St. John Indians having made peace with the governor of Nova Scotia at Halifax, it was decided that a present of 1,000 bushels of corn should be sent “to confirm their allegiance”; and it seems their allegiance needed confirmation, for a little later Father Germain warned Captain How that an Indian attack was impending. Nor was it by any means a false alarm, for on the 8th of December about 300 Micmacs and Maliseets surprised and captured an English officer and eighteen men and attacked the fort at Minas.
Father Germain evidently was a warrior priest and had used his powers of observation to some purpose; he strongly recommended the erection of a fort for the defence of the river at the narrows (“detroit”) about a league and a half above where the river enters the sea. The English, he says, could not pass it with 600 men if there were but 60 or 80 men to oppose them.
The Marquis de la Jonquiere, who succeeded as governor general this year, at once displayed anxiety in regard to the St. John river region—“Being the key of this country,” he says, “it is essential to retain it.” He confides his policy to the minister at Versailles, in his letter of October 9, 1749. “It is desirable,” he writes, “that the savages should unite in opposing the English even at Chibuctou (Halifax).... The savages must act alone without co-operation of soldier or inhabitant and without it appearing that I have knowledge of it. It is very necessary also, as I wrote the Sieur de Boishebert, to observe much caution in his proceedings and to act very secretly in order that the English may not be able to perceive we are supplying the needs of the said savages. It will be the missionaries who will attend to all the negotiations and who will direct the proceedings of the said savages. They 99 are in very good hands, the Rev. Father Germain and the Abbe Le Loutre being well aware how to act to the best advantage and to draw out all the assistance they can give on our side. They will manage the intrigue in such a way that it will not be known. They will concert in every instance with the Sieurs de la Corne and de Boishebert. If all turns out as I hope it will follow,—first that we will hold our lands and the English will not be able to establish any settlements before the boundaries have been determined by the two crowns, and second that we shall be able to assist and gradually to withdraw from the hands of the English the French of Acadia.”
It is not necessary for us to criticize too harshly the policy of the French governor and his subordinates, but we need not be surprised that in the end it provoked resentment on the part of the governors of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts and was one of the causes of the Acadian expulsion. That it was in a measure successful is proved by the reply of Lawrence a few years later to the suggestion of the Lords of Trade, who had been urging upon him the importance of making settlements: “What can I do to encourage people to settle on frontier lands, where they run the risk of having their throats cut by inveterate enemies, who easily effect their escape from their knowledge of every creek and corner?”
Boishebert, prevented from immediately establishing a fortified post, seems to have moved freely up and down the river. At one time he writes from “Menacouche” at the mouth of the river, at another from “Ecoubac”—the Indian village of Aukpaque—at another he is at “Medoctec,” the upper Indian village. He organized the few Acadians on the river into a militia corps, the officers of which were commissioned by Count de la Galissonniere.
Meanwhile the Abbe Le Loutre was employing his energies to get the Acadians to leave their lands in the Nova Scotian peninsula and repair to the St. John river and other places north of the isthmus. To such a proceeding Cornwallis objected and Le Loutre then wrote to the French authorities an earnest letter in behalf of the Acadians, in which he says, “Justice pleads for them and as France is the resource of the unfortunate, I hope, Monseigneur, that you will try to take under your protection this forsaken people and obtain for them through his majesty liberty to depart from Acadia and the means to settle upon French soil and to transport their effects to the River St. John or some other territory that the authorities of Canada may take possession of.”
The French still cherished the project of establishing a fortified post at the mouth of the St. John and, as they had opportunity, sent thither munitions of war and garrison supplies. In the summer of the year 1750, the British warship “Hound,” Capt. Dove, was ordered to proceed to St. John in quest of a brigantine laden with provisions and stores from Quebec, and said to have on board 100 French soldiers. Before the arrival of the “Hound,” however, Capt. Cobb in the provincial sloop “York” got to St. John, where he found the brigantine anchored near the shore at the head of the harbor. She fired an alarm gun on sight of the “York.” The English captain brought his vessel to anchor under the lee of Partridge Island and sent a detachment of men in a whale boat to reconnoitre. They were fired upon by the French and Indians, and the French commander, Boishebert, insisted that Cobb should quit the harbor, as it belonged to the French king, and threatened to send his 100 Indians to destroy him and his crew. Nothing daunted, Cobb proceeded up the harbor in his sloop until he discovered “a small fortification by a little hill,” where the French were assembled and had their colors hoisted. Boishebert’s forces included fifty-six soldiers and 200 Indians. He summoned to his aid the inhabitants living on the river and they responded to the number of fifty or sixty. The governor of Canada had lately commissioned Joseph Bellefontaine, an old resident, to be “major of all the militia of the River St. John,”[25] and it is to the presumed he was active on this occasion. Cobb allowed himself to be enticed on shore under a flag of truce, and was made a prisoner and compelled to send an order to his vessel not to molest the French brigantine. His mate, however, pluckily declined to receive the order, and announced his determination to hold the French officers who had come with the message until Cobb should be released. This Boishebert was obliged to do and the commander of the “York,” by way of retaliation, took six prisoners from the French brigantine and brought them to Halifax.
Capt. Dove did not reach St. John with the “Hound” until after the “York” had left. He did not enter the harbor but sent his lieutenant in a whale boat to investigate the state of affairs. The lieutenant’s experience was similar to that of Cobb. He was induced by Boishebert to come on shore, was made a prisoner and only released on promising that the six prisoners carried off by Cobb should be set at liberty.
In the autumn of the year 1750 Captain Rous, while cruising in the “Albany,” fell in with a French man-of-war and a schooner off Cape Sable. The schooner had been sent from Quebec with provisions and warlike stores for the Indians on the River St. John. Rous fired several guns to bring the enemy to, but in response the ship cleared for action and when the “Albany” ran up alongside of her, poured in a broadside. A spirited engagement ensued, which resulted in the capture of the French ship, but the schooner got safely into St. John. One midshipman and two sailors were killed on board the “Albany,” and five men on board the Frenchman.
Governor Cornwallis reported this as the second instance in which the governor of Canada had sent a vessel into a British port with arms, etc., for the Indian enemy. The governor of Canada, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, however, viewed the matter from a different standpoint and demanded of Cornwallis an explanation in regard to the vessel captured. He again asserted the right of the French king to the lands occupied by his troops, and by his orders four Boston schooners were seized at Louisbourg as a reprisal for the brigantine taken by the “Albany.”
The correspondence between the Governor of Quebec and the French colonial minister supplies some interesting details of the sea-fight in the Bay of Fundy in the autumn of 1750. It seems that Boishebert and the missionary Germain had sent an urgent request to the Quebec authorities for provisions for the women and children of the Indian families, during the absence of the men in their winter hunting, and for supplies needed by the French garrison on the St. John. Accordingly Bigot, the intendant, fitted out the St. Francis, a brigantine of 130 to 140 tons, to escort a schooner laden with the required articles to the mouth of the 101 St. John river. The St. Francis carried 10 guns and had a crew or 70 men, including 32 soldiers, under command of the sieur de Vergor.
On the 16th of October, as the brigantine and schooner were entering the Bay of Fundy, Captain Vergor noticed, at 11 in the morning, an English frigate, which put on all sail and came after him. A quarter of an hour afterwards the frigate fired a cannon shot and displayed her flag. Vergor immediately hoisted his own flag and responded with a cannon shot, continuing on his way. The English frigate continued the chase and a half hour later fired a second shot followed by a third, which went through the little top-mast of the St. Francis. Vergor then made preparations for the combat, the frigate continuing to approach and firing four cannon shots at his sails. When within speaking distance Vergor called through his trumpet that he was in command of a ship of the King of France carrying provisions and munitions to the troops of his majesty. The English captain in reply ordered him to lay to or he would sink him. Vergor repeated his announcement in English, but, for answer the frigate discharged a volley of all her guns damaging the ship and killing two of his men. He in turn now fell upon the frigate, discharging all his guns and musketry. The fight lasted nearly five hours, at the expiration of which the St. Francis was so crippled by the loss of her mainmast and injuries to her sails and rigging that Vergor was obliged to surrender. His long boat having been rendered unserviceable, the English captain sent his own to convey him on board. Vergor found the frigate to be the Albany, of 14 guns and 28 swivel guns and a crew of 120 men, commanded by Captain Rous. The Albany did not pursue the schooner, which proceeded to St. John, but sailed for Halifax with her prize, where she arrived three days later.
Vergor was sent on shore and confined to a room in the house of Governor Cornwallis. The governor treated him courteously, heard his version of the affair and called a council meeting the next day to inquire into the circumstances of the case.
Vergor’s official report conveys the idea that Cornwallis was rather doubtful as to whether Rous had acted in a legitimate manner. The council held five or six meetings without coming to any decision. Meanwhile, with the governor’s approval, Vergor had a new main-mast cut and drawn from the woods by the crew of the St. Francis and arrangements were made to repair the damaged sails and shrouds. However the matter was soon afterwards taken out of Cornwallis’ hands by Captain Rous, who brought the case before the Admiralty Court, where the St. Francis was confiscated for engaging in illicit commerce in the province of his Britannic Majesty.
The French authorities took up the matter and sent a spirited remonstrance to the British ambassador, claiming that the transaction was opposed to every kind of law and demanding the restoration of the captured vessel with exemplary punishment of Captain Rous and the admiralty officers at Halifax, as well as orders on the part of his Britannic Majesty to all officers in his ships and colonies to observe the peace and to undertake nothing contrary thereto. A demand was also made that the English should in no way hinder the migration of the Acadians from the peninsula of Nova Scotia to the mainland or elsewhere. 102 It is needless to say that the British government did not comply with these demands and here was one of the many grievances that led to a renewal of the war a little later.
The Sieur de Vergor and the crew of the St. Francis were sent to Louisbourg, and the brigantine retained at Halifax as a prize on the ground that she was engaged in furnishing warlike munitions to the Indian enemy and interfering with British rights on the River St. John.
Cornwallis evidently felt the difficulties of his position very keenly. Halifax was yet in its infancy and in a comparatively defenceless state; Louisbourg and Quebec were supporting the French on the St. John and he had neither the men nor the money to oppose their proceedings. It seems, too, that he had been called to account for the large expenditure he had made in Nova Scotia. In his letters to the Lords of Trade he expresses himself as distracted between his desire to lessen expenses and his fears of losing the province. He was doubtful if, with the forces at his disposal, he could prevent the French from fortifying St. John and Beausejour, and he observes, with some irritation, that it has been said, “What has he to contend with? Three or four hundred Indians: it is a time of peace and no other enemy to fear.” So far from this being an adequate representation of the situation, he claimed the facts were that the French had taken possession of all Nova Scotia north of the Bay of Fundy, and had obliged many of the Acadians of the peninsula to remove thither and swear allegiance to the king of France; that the governor of Canada, through his emissary le Loutre, had offered a premium for every prisoner, head, or scalp of an Englishman; that the French had sent a ship of thirty-six guns and 300 men to the Bay of Fundy and had not only incited the Indians to hostilities but had behaved as if there were open war.
The French at Quebec, in view of the difficulty of keeping in touch with their posts on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, endeavored to improve the route of communication via the River St. John. During the previous war they had made a road from Riviere du Loup to Lake Temisquata, but the woods were growing up again and deep holes began to render it impracticable. Bigot, the intendant, therefore spent 600 or 700 livres in improving it, and in consequence couriers were able to come to Quebec in ten or twelve days from Shediac, and in eight from the River St. John. For the convenience of travelers three magazines of supplies were established, one at Riviere du Loup, one at Temisquata and one at the head of Madawaska river. The Marquis de la Jonquiere anticipated great advantages from the overland route of communication. He says in a letter to France, dated May 1, 1751: “We have made a road and are going to make some flat-bottomed conveyances so that in winter we will be able to transport by hauling over the snow the things most needed for the River St. John, and in summer we shall be able to make the transport by means of carts and flat-bottomed batteaux. These arrangements will be very useful supposing that the English continue to stop the vessels we send there.”
“As the English have boasted that they are going to establish themselves at the River St. John,” continues the Marquis, “I have given orders to the Sieur de Boishebert, who commands there, to repair the old fort named Menacoche 103 (Menagoueche) at the mouth of the river and to make there a barrack for the officers and 100 men in garrison with necessary magazines. The whole will be built of logs and I have very expressly recommended Boishebert, to have it done without expense to the King, or at least very little, and to that end he is to employ the soldiers and militia.”
This fort stood in Carleton opposite Navy Island on the point at the foot of King street, still called “Old Fort.” The Marquis la Jonquiere says the terraces of the fort were about twenty-five feet high outside and twelve inside and the defences were such as would enable the garrison to withstand a lively attack.
It was intended to place four cannons of 8 L. to cannonade any ships that might attack it. The chief difficulty of the situation was the scarcity of water. The fort was quite indispensable for if the French were to abandon the lower part of the St. John river the English would immediately take possession. The savages were instructed to annoy the English on all occasions and to plunder any of their ships that landed on their shores. The Marquis even went so far as to suggest that some of the Acadians, dressed and painted like the savages, should join in the attacks upon the English in order that the savages might act with greater courage. He says he cannot avoid consenting to what the savages do in keeping the English busy and frustrating their advance since the French were restrained from open hostilities by the peace. “I beg you to be assured, Monseigneur,” the Marquis continues, “that I will manage everything so as not to compromise myself and that I will not give up an inch of land that belongs to the king. It is time the limits should be settled and that we should know positively what we are to hold, so as to put an end to all hostilities and to avoid the immense expense that is occasioned.”
La Jonquiere, in the month of February, sent on the ice a detachment of fifty Canadians to strengthen the garrison at the mouth of the River St. John, and as the services of Boishebert were required elsewhere, the Sieur de Gaspe,[26] lieutenant of infantry, was sent to replace him and remained two years and a half in command.
The situation of the Acadians on the St. John at this time was a very unenviable one. Fort Boishebert, at the Nerepis, was a frail defence, and they were beginning to be straitened for supplies on account of the vigilance of the English cruisers. Father Germain wrote to the commandant at Annapolis Royal for leave to buy provisions there for the French living on the river, but the governor and council objected on the ground that French troops occupied the place and the Indians there were hostile. We gather some interesting information from a letter written at this time to the French minister by the Sieur de Gaspe, who was in command of the fort at the mouth of the Nerepis.[27]
Fort de Nerepice, 16th June, 1751.
Monseigneur: On my arrival at this post on the River St. John, to which I am sent by my general, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, to relieve M. de Boishebert, the commandant of the place, I found at anchor the frigate “Fidele,” commanded by M. Maccarti, who was landing the provisions and other supplies sent for this post. The coming of this ship, Monseigneur, convinces me that you wish to hold possession of this post.
I have only just arrived here. I learn that the English threaten to come and build a fort at the mouth of the river near that which the Marquis de la Jonquiere has caused to be begun and has ordered me to continue. I will do my best to carry out his orders so far as circumstances permit, and the governor will furnish you with an account of his intentions.
In order to fix ourselves here we must keep up communication by way of La Baie Francaise [the Bay of Fundy] so as to furnish provisions; for the place cannot be supplied by land, especially if we must afford subsistence to those families of Acadians who are obliged to seek refuge on the river, as has been stated to me. I will receive them, Monseigneur, in order to settle the country, which at present has only twenty-eight French inhabitants,[28] who can give no assistance in 105 providing for the support of others, not having as yet enough cultivated land for themselves.
M. Maccarti, commander of the frigate, has taken note of the harbor [at St. John] on the other side of the fort, and of the other advantages, or disadvantages, we must encounter in this place, where I will endeavor to maintain the rights that we have and to oppose the Englishman if he attempts to build here.
I am with very profound respect, Monseigneur,
Your humble and very obedient servant,
GASPE.
WOODMAN’S POINT. (The Star shows the site of Fort Boishebert.)
Resolute attempts continued to be made to withdraw the Acadians from the peninsula of Nova Scotia, both by threats and persuasions, and the Marquis de la Jonquiere issued a proclamation to those living within the bounds of what is now New Brunswick, declaring that all who did not within eight days take the oath of allegiance in the militia companies would be considered as rebels and driven from their lands. The companies of militia were ordered to drill on Sundays and Feast days and to hold themselves in readiness to defend themselves at any moment. A few months later the governor of Canada was able to report that all the Acadian inhabitants who were upon the lands of the king had taken the oath of fidelity. Twelve blank commissions were sent from Quebec to be issued to those most capable of fulfilling the duties of officers in the militia.
At Fort Menagoueche the work did not progress as fast as anticipated. The workmen had no tools except axes, and the Sieur de Gaspe complained that he had not been able to make the soldiers of the garrison work. He says “they are very bad subjects” and he dared not compel them to work apprehending their desertion. The fort was surrounded by four bastions and, in addition to the barracks and magazines, it was proposed to construct a building of logs, squared with the axe, to accommodate the chaplain and surgeon and to serve as a guard house.
Fort Boishebert, at Woodman’s Point on the Nerepis, was a difficult post to maintain owing to the insufficiency of the troops at de Gaspe’s disposal. He complains that the savages had broken in the door of the cellar and he thought it advisable to abandon it altogether. The Marquis de la Jonquiere ordered him to consult with Father Germain on the subject and meanwhile to double the guard. The missionary wrote he was of the same opinion as the Sieur de Gaspe, and permission was accordingly given to abandon the fort and to transport the supplies wherever they might be needed.
The Jesuit missionary at Penobscot, Father Gounon, proposed to spend the winter at “Nerepisse” with his Indians, but the governor of Canada did not at all approve of it, fearing that if the savages were to abandon their village the English would advance from the westward towards the River St. John. He apprehended that if only a small number of Indians remained at Penobscot, and these without a missionary, the enemy would win them to their side and, as a direful result, the English would presently establish themselves at Matsipigouattons, advancing to Peskadamokkanti (or Passamaquoddy) and so by degrees to the River St. John.