History of merchant shipping and ancient commerce, Volume 3 (of 4)

by W. S. Lindsay

CHAPTER XVI.

Recent legislation relating to the loss of life and property at sea in British vessels—Committee on shipwrecks, 1836—Estimated loss of life at sea between 1818 and 1836—Recommendations of the Committee—Committee of 1843, loss of lives and ships at that period—First official return of wrecks, 1856—Loss of lives and ships, 1862 and 1873—Further recommendations—Various laws for the protection of seamen, 1846 to 1854—Agitation about “unseaworthy ships,” 1855—Further provisions for the benefit of seamen, 1867-69-70—Mr. Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.—His first resolution, 1870—Introduces a Bill, 1871—Government measure of that year—Mr. Plimsoll publishes a book, ‘Our Seamen,’ 1873—An extension of the principle applied to testing chain-cables strongly urged—Mr. Plimsoll moves an Address for a Commission of Inquiry, which was unanimously granted—Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships 1873-74—Its members—Their order of reference—And mode of thorough investigation—Their reports—Load-line—Deck loads—Government survey—Its extension undesirable—Shipowners already harassed by over-legislation—Mode of inquiry into losses at sea, examined and condemned—Recommendations—Examination of masters and mates, and shipping officers approved—Power of masters—Scheme for training boys for sea—Marine Insurances—Report as a whole most valuable.

Recent legislation relating to the loss of life and property at sea in British vessels.

Committee on shipwrecks of 1836.

Great Britain having by her example shown to other nations the advantages to be derived from free navigation and unfettered commerce, and having relieved her shipowners from nearly all the burdens of which protection was the origin, directed her attention in a more special manner than had hitherto been done to the safety of life and property at sea. No doubt she had been ever mindful of her seamen and, from the earliest records of her history, a just pride has been felt in those who protect her sea-girt homes; but it is only in recent years that any organised system has been adopted to reduce the disasters of a naturally hazardous profession, or that the Legislature has seriously devoted itself to the provision of measures whereby the proverbial dangers of the sea may be lessened. Very little attention, indeed, had been paid to this important subject until 1836, when a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into shipwrecks, the result being that certain facts were, for the first time, brought prominently under public notice in a practical manner. These facts are interesting and instructive, especially when viewed by the light of subsequent experience.

There being then, however, no reliable statistics of the extent of the loss of life and property at sea, the Committee were obliged to depend on information from other than official sources; hence, it was only from the records of Lloyd’s, supplemented by estimates of their own, that they were able to compare the casualties of 1816-18 with those of 1833-35, the three years previous to their inquiry. Nor was this comparison complete. To make it so, it would have been necessary to compare, not merely the actual amounts of loss at the two periods, but the proportion the amounts bore relatively to the amount of life and property exposed to danger. There were, however, then no means of obtaining these with accuracy, as the returns were imperfect as regards the number of vessels, their sizes, and the number of persons they carried, an imperfection arising, in a great measure, from the fact that many vessels, which in 1816 had ceased to exist, were still retained on the registry. Though the entries and clearances of British ships engaged in trade between the United Kingdom and her colonies, and foreign countries, could at both periods be obtained with accuracy, there were no certain returns of the amount of tonnage and of the number of men engaged in the Coasting trade, as the Customs did not take any notice of vessels sailing in ballast or with cargoes of a certain description. Nor do we even now know the actual amount of the shipping and men engaged in this particular trade with anything like perfect accuracy.

Estimated loss of life at sea between 1818 and 1836.

Thus it was impossible to arrive at a correct comparative estimate of the increase, or otherwise, of the loss of life at sea at any given periods previous to 1835. I may, however, state that the Committee, with the best information they could obtain, arrived at the conclusion that while the loss of life for the three years previous to 1818 had averaged 763 persons per annum, it had increased to 894 per annum for the three years previous to 1835, though the tonnage of vessels belonging to the United Kingdom was actually less at the latter than it had been at the former period.[239]

The amount of tonnage, however, in itself, even when correct, is an imperfect criterion; indeed, to obtain anything like accuracy we ought to have before us, not merely the number of entries and clearances,[240] but the actual number of persons conveyed by sea; for, without such data, we cannot hope to ascertain the comparative loss of life.

Recommendations of the Committee.

The Committee of 1836 had, nevertheless, sufficient information before them to arrive at certain sound conclusions; the more important of these being that the increase of disasters at sea arose, in a great measure, from the imperfect classification of ships which had existed up to 1834 (when the improved Society of Lloyd’s Register was instituted) depending, as it had, almost exclusively on the age of the vessel; from the bad forms of vessels, arising from the defective system of admeasurement for tonnage dues, and from the shallow harbours where ships lay aground and were strained. The Committee likewise attributed the losses to the incompetency of masters and officers, and to their habits of intemperance, as well as to that of the crews; to the system of marine insurance; to the want of harbours of refuge; to the imperfection of charts;[241] and, strange to add, to the “competition with foreign shipowners, who, from the many advantages enjoyed by them in the superior cheapness of their materials for building, equipping, and provisioning their vessels, and in the lower rate of wages paid to their crews, were enabled to realise profits on terms of freight which would not even cover the expenses of British ships.”

Committee of 1843—loss of lives and ships at that period.

The next Committee appointed to inquire into shipwrecks commenced their investigation in 1843, and the returns made up from the evidence before them show that in the previous three years the annual average loss of vessels was 611, of 128,678 tons, and 766 lives, out of 22,977 ships, of 2,908,737 tons belonging to the United Kingdom, and of 37,380 of such ships, of 6,730,242 tons entered and cleared in the foreign trade of this country, so that, while the intercourse with other countries had very materially increased, the loss of life had been only a fraction more than it was in the three years previously to 1818.

First official return of wrecks, 1856.

But as we have no accurate and continuous official record, even of the wrecks happening on our own coasts, till 1856, when the Board of Trade for the first time published its return, and, as there is no official record of the wrecks of British ships in other parts of the world until 1865, little reliance, beyond an approximate comparison, can be placed on the full extent of the casualties at sea till that period. In some measure they were guess work, and, as numerous vessels were no doubt lost of which no record of any kind had been kept until about the year 1836, the probabilities are that the loss of life was greater than the estimates of it made out by the Committees of 1836 or even of 1843.

Loss of life and ships, 1862

We have, however, a return[242] for the three years previously to 1863 much more complete and accurate than any earlier ones, on which reliance may be placed, showing that, on an average in each of these years, 1004 ships, of 251,000 tons, belonging to the British Empire, and 1316 lives were lost. The average number of ships on the register in these years belonging to the whole Empire was 38,932, of 5,882,565 tons, and the British ships entered and cleared in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom were 56,997, of 15,094,105 tons.

and 1873.

Percentage of loss of life, 1833 to 1873.

The last return,[243] made for 1871-3 inclusive shows that the average number of ships lost in each of these three years was 1095, of 319,790 tons, and of lives was 1952; the number of ships belonging to the British Empire being then 37,086, of 7,168,618 tons, and the entries and clearances of vessels engaged in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom being 73,783 vessels, of 27,275,339 tons. No doubt this return shows a sacrifice of life which every humane or right-minded person must wish to mitigate, as to desire to save life has now happily become one of the highest objects of ambition among nations who are truly civilised, but, considering the number of vessels afloat, and the enormous increase in the entries and clearances, it, at the same time, shows a very considerable comparative reduction on the losses of previous years so far as they can be ascertained or estimated, more especially when we consider that previous returns included only the vessels belonging to the United Kingdom, whereas the later ones embrace the tonnage of the whole of the British Empire then greatly increased, and that, too, by steam vessels, increasing the risk of disaster to a serious extent by the rapidity of their movements.

Further recommendations.

But to this important question I shall more fully refer hereafter. In the meantime I may state that, among the various other recommendations offered by the Committee of 1836, may be mentioned the formation of a Mercantile Marine Board; the compilation and consolidation of a Code of Mercantile Marine Laws; the improved classification of ships; nautical schools; courts of inquiry into shipwrecks; tribunals for the settlement of disputes; savings-banks for seamen, and asylums for them in old age or when unfit for duty; and, above all, “discouragement of drinking on board,” while attention was called “to the vast superiority in officers, crews, and equipments, and to the consequent superior success and growth of American shipping.”

To remedy many of these evils various Acts of Parliament were passed, to most of which I have already referred, and, presently, I shall refer at length to the great changes for the better made since then in the classification of our ships by Lloyd’s Register and other private associations; but some years elapsed before the more important of these recommendations were carried into effect. In the meantime, the new organisation in connection with the classification of ships, which had been established in 1834, stirred up, no doubt, by the report of the Committee, was laying the foundation for that career of success which has since attended its efforts. Other similar associations followed; one in Liverpool, which was afterwards amalgamated with Lloyd’s Register, and the Veritas, a foreign association, still carrying on its useful work in this country, though to a limited extent, but largely in Canada, as well as on the Continent and in the United States of America.

The Committee of 1843, confirming the recommendations of its predecessor in 1836, added to them the survey of passenger ships; amendments in the law of pilotage, the establishment of signals by sound at the principal lighthouses, and of rocket and mortar apparatuses for the saving of life on different parts of the coast; the supply of life-buoys and belts in case of shipwreck; the carrying of life-boats in all passenger vessels; a revision of the laws and administration for the protection from plunder of wrecked property; international regulations for vessels meeting at sea, and a code of laws for the guidance and protection of seamen. All of these recommendations, and many others for the protection of life and property at sea, have since been carried into effect.

Various laws for the protection of seamen, 1846 to 1854.

In 1846, and again in 1848, further Acts were passed having the same laudable object in view, and these, with all the other Acts, including the important Act of 1850, to which I have already referred at length,[244] were carefully revised and improved by the great Act of 1854, and by subsequent measures. Nor have the health and interests of seamen, as well as the preservation of their lives from shipwreck, been overlooked in this mass of legislation. In 1835, a register office for seamen and apprentices was established, but the system, not answering the objects in view, was abolished in 1853. By the Acts of 1844[245] and 1845[246] seamen were enabled to recover their wages summarily, and they were, for the first time, protected from imposition at the hands of crimps. By these laws, all merchant ships were required to carry a sufficient supply of medicine, as also of lime-juice for the use of the crew; and, by the Act of 1854, the proceedings for the recovery of wages were made still more summary, so that, under our present maritime laws, seamen have special remedies for the recovery of their wages, together with a lien on the ship not granted to any other class of the community. Beyond the advantages of savings-banks and money-order offices, specially for their use, a system has been established, through the medium of the shipping offices and the consulates abroad, under which, seamen, when paid off, can remit their wages without expense to their relatives at any port in the United Kingdom.[247]

Agitation about “unseaworthy ships,” 1855.

Further provisions for the benefit of seamen,

In 1855, a question arose very similar to that which has recently arisen regarding “unseaworthy ships,” as to whether seamen could be compelled to go to sea in them. The opinion of the law-officers of the Crown taken by the Board of Trade was given in favour of the seaman’s right to refuse to sail in such vessels, and this opinion, having been sent to the magistrates at the seaports, has ever since been acted on, though it has been frequently abused by unprincipled seamen, who have alleged unseaworthiness as an excuse for being relieved from their engagements, more especially in cases where they have received a payment of wages in advance, or where they have thought they could improve their position. Nor did the efforts of the Board of Trade, the permanent officers of which have been frequently charged with neglecting the interests of seamen, here end. In 1864, that Board, aware of the difficulty seamen accused of desertion might have in proving unseaworthiness, recommended the Home Office to inform the magistrates that, in all such cases, their surveyors would be at the disposal of the magisterial bench for the purposes of survey, so that seamen might have, at the expense of the community, what no other class is allowed, easy and ready means of inquiring into their complaints by officers remunerated by the Crown, and, consequently, an economical and prompt dispensation of justice.

1867,

In 1867, another Act was passed, specially for the benefit of seamen, known as the Health Act,[248] which made further provision for the inspection and safe custody of lime-juice or other anti-scorbutics, and for serving these out in proper quantities and with regularity to the crews of merchant ships. Provision was also made in this Bill, compelling shipowners to bear all expenses connected with a seaman’s illness, when not brought about by his own fault or misconduct, and for securing him increased and improved accommodation on board ship.

1869, 1870.

Nor did the good intention of the Government and its regard for the interests of seamen end even here. In the Merchant Shipping Code Consolidation Bill,[249] first introduced on the 9th August, 1869, by Mr. Lefevre, on behalf of Government, there is a provision (Clause 278) enabling seamen, charged with desertion or other crimes, to demand and obtain an official survey of the ship from which they have thought it expedient to quit without leave!—a provision so very liberal in their favour as to resemble, on the part of the Government, almost encouragement of the offence of desertion. In this Bill we have also a clause (334) which, for the first time in our legislation, requires every shipmaster to make an official record of the draught of water of the vessel under his charge when leaving port. And the Bill, when again introduced in 1870, repeated, with modifications still further in favour of seamen charged with desertion, their power to demand “impartial survey;” while it enables the officers of the Board of Trade to take and record the draught of water of any sea-going ship, and makes it a misdemeanour on the part of any shipowner who sends his ship to sea in an unseaworthy state, for which he may be criminally punished.

Mr. Samuel Plimsoll, M.P.

His first resolution, 1870.

It was in the Session of 1870 that Mr. Plimsoll[250] first submitted his views to Parliament respecting the loss of life and property at sea, by moving a resolution calling in general terms for legislation on this subject, as if no legislation had, up to that period, been even attempted, still more carried out. I cannot but commend the laudable objects he evidently had in view, but, on that occasion, they were, so far as I can judge from the Reports of ‘Hansard,’ somewhat vaguely expressed. Nor did he even then mention (as if ignoring or unaware of the fact) that, in that very Session, Government had introduced the stringent Bill to which I have just referred respecting unseaworthy ships. His resolution, requiring a compulsory load-line and the survey of all ships, was withdrawn.

The Government, however, spared no exertion to perfect the Shipping Code, which had twice been submitted to the consideration of Parliament; and having, during the recess, forwarded copies of it for approval and amendment to various Shipping and Seamen’s Associations throughout the kingdom, they again introduced it on the opening of the Session of 1871,[251] accompanied by a memorandum,[252] calling attention to the alterations which had been made in the existing laws. The Bill, as re-introduced in 1871, besides providing for the transfer of the supervision of emigrant ships to the Board of Trade, which was carried out in the following year, contained clauses for the compulsory marking the draught of water on the stem and stern of every ship, for recording the draught, for making it a crime to send unseaworthy vessels to sea, and for enabling seamen, charged with desertion, to obtain, with even greater facility than they had hitherto done, a survey of the ships in which they had engaged to serve. Indeed, it went still further, and, for the first time, gave the Board of Trade alone the power of preventing any ship from proceeding to sea if, in the opinion of its officers, there were defects in her hull liable to render her unseaworthy: a further provision was very properly added to prevent an owner changing the name of his ship without the consent of the Board of Trade.

Introduces a Bill, 1871.

Government measure of that year.

But in that year, 1871, Mr. Plimsoll, not satisfied with the course of legislation, introduced a Bill having the same objects in view as his resolution of the previous Session, which, however, was also withdrawn, Government agreeing to introduce a separate Bill, as they had been unable to pass their Merchant Shipping Code Bill, containing the clauses of the larger measure relating to draught of water and surveys. Accordingly, before the close of the Session a short Bill was introduced and passed[253] with these provisions, but with very little discussion, on account of the lateness of the Session. In this Bill the clause giving seamen charged with desertion a right to a survey, was justly modified by confining the right to cases where the complaint of unseaworthiness is made by one-fourth of the crew; or if they exceed twenty by not less than five, and to cases where a complaint of unseaworthiness had been made by them before quitting the ship. The power of ordering a survey was also given to naval courts abroad.

Mr. Plimsoll publishes a book, ‘Our Seamen,’ 1873.

Although these amendments had, as I have shown, been for some years contemplated by Government, and had been, in fact, submitted for the consideration of Parliament before Mr. Plimsoll expressed any opinion on the subject, they did not satisfy his demands; and in order that his views might become more extensively known, he published in January, 1873, a curious book.[254] It is of that sensational class which at present, either in the shape of novels or other works of a more pretentious character, evidently commands a large circulation among the light-reading public. But, besides its sensational character, it contains a great deal of information new to the ordinary reader, who, if he does not understand its technicalities, which Mr. Plimsoll himself does not seem to have very well understood, will be struck by its illustrations of decayed timbers, worm-eaten planks, and corroded bolts. It begins with a facsimile of a policy of insurance with the names and amount of risk attached, and the underwriters’ “slip” on which the policy was based, with the signatures crossed out as they were subscribed to the policy. His object in giving the numerous names in detail, and the amount of the liability of each, was, as he states, “in order to show how the responsibility is so divided and spread as to leave no one individual a risk large enough to be worth fighting to escape, even if there were adequate grounds for disputing the subsequent claim,” and, from these premises, he arrives at the conclusion that the interest of each underwriter is so small, that where a claim is made, it is not sufficient “to induce any one to fight a lawsuit in order to escape it,” even when there is “more than a suspicion of its injustice.”

Unfortunately his statement, on this point, is at variance with fact; for, though the risk of each individual may be small, their interest, as a body, in resisting unjust claims, and resisting them frequently in the most strenuous manner, is too great to allow such claims to be settled unquestioned. Mr. Plimsoll might not, however, have been aware that the Underwriters of Lloyd’s are thoroughly organised for the purpose of grappling with such matters, having their agents at all the principal seaports of the world, with every facility for readily obtaining information respecting the cause of losses, and the nature and character of the claims made upon them; nor of the important fact that they not merely resist claims, as may be frequently seen in our courts of law, but are occasionally prosecutors in the case of fraudulent losses. So that it is altogether a mistake to describe the Underwriters of Lloyd’s, much less of the marine insurance companies, as a weak body of men, whom a shipowner can “bully” into an unjust settlement.[255] The photographs he supplied were, however, so curious in themselves, and so novel to the public, generally, and especially to many members of the House of Commons, and his statements, though sometimes hap-hazard, were given with such evidently honest intentions, that his book attracted unusual notice.

But, however well-disposed the House of Commons may have been to listen to him, and to the recommendations in his book, the Bill he introduced for its consideration could not possibly be entertained with any regard to the great maritime interests of this country, nor could they be adopted without full inquiry; indeed, they were little short of a transfer of the construction and management of the whole of the shipping of Great Britain from the owners to some department of the Government, which was to survey every ship built, and every ship sent to sea.

From his own showing, no such extraordinary and sweeping measure was necessary, for he admits, in a curious and very incidental manner, that only a very small proportion of the shipowners of this country require to be thus controlled; indeed he states,[256] “I have heard one shipowner say that, if a small number of well-known shipowners were put aboard one of their own vessels when she was ready for sea, we should, in the event of bad weather, see that with them had disappeared from our annals nine-tenths of the losses we all deplore!”

An extension of the principle applied to testing of chain cables strongly urged.

But Mr. Plimsoll, in his general statements, only repeated, though in a more sensational and striking manner, arguments which have for years been used in the House of Commons. There has long been a constant cry from a certain portion of the public for Government interference and control; and in Parliament there are always to be found well-meaning representatives of the people, who think that every evil in this wicked world can be remedied by legislative enactments, or Crown supervision. I may mention one instance out of many, viz.: the Act for testing chain cables and anchors, to which I have already referred,[257] which was forced upon the Board of Trade by the House of Commons. Returns, I am aware, can be produced to show that since this Testing Act came into operation, nine or ten years ago, there have been fewer disasters than before, as the result of inferior ground tackle. But figures can be arranged to prove almost anything; and I shall not stop to examine those which have been produced to prove that the chain and anchor manufacturers of this country required to be placed under the immediate control of the Board of Trade. It will be a dark day for the mechanics of Great Britain when this system prevails, and we may then abandon all hope of ever becoming, what we have long aimed to be, the workshop of the world. But what I cannot too strongly condemn is, the principle of appointing Government officials—too frequently underpaid—to superintend or inspect the work of the manufacturer and to regulate the standard of merit. If a manufacturer can produce an article which, by some means or other, is able to pass inspection, it is a matter, now, of far less consequence than formerly to make it of the best description, as, in the case of accident, he screens himself behind the official certificate of its merit. Besides, the test Government, originally, adopted too often destroyed in a great measure the elasticity of chain cables[258]—a quality of the utmost importance to a ship riding at anchor in a heavy sea-way. I quite admit that many vessels and too many lives have been lost through inferior anchors and cables; but a still larger number of vessels have been sacrificed by defective construction, decayed timbers, inferior spars, ropes, and sails, or insufficient stores; and, if the principle of Government interference is correct in the one case, it ought to be extended to the others.

But this system of Government supervision would not end here. An inspection of every chain and anchor manufactory falls far short of the demands of thousands of well-meaning people, who wish to see some potent Board of Trade testing-machines permanently established in every dockyard in the kingdom, as if our shipbuilders knew nothing whatever about the business, or had all arrived at the conclusion that honesty was no longer the best policy, and that the only sure road to riches was to cheat their customers. Nor would even that extension of Government control satisfy them. An estimable friend of mine, a Vice-Admiral in H.M.’s service and a man of learning and of great practical knowledge, asks me in a note I received from him not long since—

“Should there not be some more stringent provisions with respect to the inspection of sailing vessels? It is an old proverb, ‘Who ever saw a dead donkey?’ But who ever saw an old sailing-ship broken up? I am inclined to think that it is more to the interest of small owners to let an old tub go on shore than to bring her safe into port. This works two evils:—1, the danger to human life; 2, the greater rate of insurance on honest owners to make up an average for the dishonest. Should there not be a Board of Trade inspection as to seaworthiness: 1, of every ship once a year; 2, of every ship absent from Great Britain or Ireland over a year continuously, on her return; 3, of every ship where it appears, on her arrival in port, that she had been on shore or had suffered from heavy weather?”

Now there is no doubt that the evils of which my friend complains do exist, and the remedy he proposes has been advocated by many persons besides himself. But would Government inspection, even if practicable, remove or materially tend to mitigate the evil? A very large proportion of the vessels owned in the United Kingdom are now classed either at Lloyd’s or elsewhere, and are periodically inspected; and to the possibility of extending this system, a much more feasible one than any extension of the principle of Government supervision, I shall hereafter refer. Unless a vessel is classed, an underwriter, as a rule, will not take a risk on her, and, unless she is fully insured, it is not the interest of the owner to lose her. In the case of clubs or mutual associations, it would be impossible to have a better watch kept on the vessels admitted, as each member and each person connected with these associations adopts, for his own interest, if for no higher motive, every possible precaution, as, in the event of loss, he becomes a sufferer.

However great the evil, and however lamentable the losses annually occurring on our shores, any very material extension of the legislation now in force, can do little to remedy them. The remedy is in the hands of those persons who are most deeply interested, in that they are certain to become the heaviest sufferers from every loss. It is true that no ship ought to be allowed to proceed to sea which is unseaworthy, but it is the business of all insurance associations to see that the vessels they insure are seaworthy; and no punishment Government could inflict for neglect, would be heavier than that which the owner of an uninsured ship sustains when she is lost, or than that which falls on members of clubs, who admit worthless vessels to their mutual-insurance associations. My experience (and it is not a short one now) teaches me that nearly all legislation in this direction, is unsound in principle; and, as a rule, pernicious in practice. I think, for instance, that we have already erred in the attempt before noticed to measure the standard of merit in the case of anchors and chains, although we may have improved in the mode of testing them.

Mr. Plimsoll moves an Address for a Commission of Inquiry, which was unanimously granted.

Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, 1873-4.

However, the House of Commons, ever ready to listen to the appeals of humanity, and with the most laudable desire to do what it could to save life and to mitigate the disasters incidental to seafaring pursuits, was fairly disposed to legislate even further in this direction, should it really appear that fresh legislation was necessary; hence, accepting in Mr. Plimsoll an earnest, if not a wise counsellor, of measures for the grandest of all objects—the saving of human life—the House, stimulated by his recent work, unanimously approved of his address to Her Majesty, who was graciously pleased not merely to grant the Commission he had prayed for, but to place upon it “her most dear son and counsellor Alfred Ernest Albert, Duke of Edinburgh,” who, himself a sailor, was fully competent to understand the nature of the inquiry, and had a fellow-feeling for the sailors of all classes, on whose behalf the appeal was made.

Its members.

No Commission in our time has consisted of more able and impartial members. Besides His Royal Highness, it had as chairman the Duke of Somerset, a nobleman of shrewd sense and of very sound judgment, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr. Liddell (now Lord Eslington), who represented a large maritime constituency, and had for years directed his attention with unwearied zeal to all seafaring questions; Mr. Milner Gibson, who had filled the office of President of the Board of Trade; Sir James Hope, an Admiral of great experience; Mr. Rothery, the Registrar of the Admiralty Court; Mr. Cohen, a well-known barrister-at-law; Mr. Denny, an eminent shipbuilder; Mr. George Duncan, an experienced Shipowner, and a member of the Committee of Lloyd’s Register; Mr. Edgell, of the Trinity House; and Mr. C. W. Merrifield, F.R.S. and late Principal of the Royal School of Naval Architecture.

Their order of reference

By such a Commission the most searching inquiry was to be instituted “with regard to the alleged unseaworthiness of British registered ships, whether arising form overloading, deck-loading, defective construction, form equipment, machinery, age, or improper stowage.” The Commission was also instructed “to inquire into the present system of marine insurance; the state of the law as to the liability of shipowners for injury to those whom they employ, and also the alleged practice of under-manning ships; they were likewise to suggest any amendments of the law which might remedy or lessen such evils as may be found to have arisen from the matters aforesaid.”

A careful analysis of Mr. Plimsoll’s statements showed that he attributed the causes of shipwreck to unseaworthiness, owing to want of repair; overloading, which includes the carriage of cargo on deck; under-manning; bad stowage; inadequate engine power; over-insurance; defective construction, and undue length; and, that a full half of the losses arose from two of these causes, first, that “a great number of ships are regularly sent to sea in such a rotten and otherwise ill-provided state that they can only reach their destination through fine weather;” and, secondly, that “a large number are so overloaded that it is nearly impossible for them also to reach their destination if the voyage is at all rough.”

As I have already endeavoured to show, the “Merchant Shipping Consolidated Act” of 1854, with its 548 clauses, was passed expressly for the purpose of remedying by law, as far as practicable, existing evils, and the amended Acts of 1855, 1862, 1871, and 1873 had the same object in view; so that there was in force, at the time when the Commission commenced its inquiry, a mass of legislation, which, in itself, ought to have been amply sufficient to prevent and punish the offences alleged to be committed. Indeed, conscientious Shipowners have been heard to say that they were appalled at the numerous instances in which they had found themselves law breakers, from the simple impossibility of bearing in mind, owing to the number of Acts in force, their legal duties. Yet, if Mr. Plimsoll’s recommendations had been carried into effect, the manifold legislation, then in force, would have been very much increased.

and mode of thorough investigation.

Happily, however, the Commission saw, after thoroughly examining the whole subject, that it was not by increase of legislation, that such evils could be remedied, but by a more effectual application of the law as it then stood. In their reports[259] they express an opinion, that much misapprehension appears to exist about what is meant by unseaworthiness, so, before offering any recommendation with the view of preserving human life at sea, they prefaced their observations with a few practical and sensible remarks on what constitutes unseaworthiness.

The safety of a ship at sea, they remark, with great force, cannot be secured by any one precaution or set of precautions, but requires the unceasing application of skill, care, and vigilance, from her first design to her unloading at the port of destination. To be seaworthy, she must be well designed, well constructed, well equipped, well stowed, and, above all, well manned and well navigated; otherwise, “all precautions as to her construction and her stowage will be unavailing.” While public opinion had been abundantly directed to these precautions, they considered that other sources of danger had been altogether unnoticed, and they showed, from a summary of official inquiries, that from the year 1856 to 1872, inclusive, while only 60 ships were known to have been lost from defects in the vessels or their stowage, no less than 711 were lost from neglect and bad navigation.

Their reports.

As these returns[260] too clearly showed, that by far the largest proportion of losses and other casualties were due to preventible causes, other than faulty construction, insufficient repair, or overloading, the Commissioners directed their attention to a rigid examination of these causes and to the most effectual means of finding a remedy for the evil. With regard to the vexed question of a fixed load-line, which Mr. Plimsoll had recommended as a means of lessening, if not of removing altogether, the losses occasioned by overloading, they were unable to recommend any enactment for establishing a fixed line, founded on the proportion of freeboard to the depth of the hold of the vessel, remarking that the information they had obtained led “to the conclusion that the settlement of a load-line should be mainly guided by the consideration of the reserved buoyancy, that is to say, of the proportion which the capacity of the water-tight and solidly constructed part of the ship which is above water bears to the capacity of the part immersed.”

Load-line.

Analysing various schemes prepared for their consideration, they remarked that the rough rule of three inches of freeboard to every foot of hold, hitherto considered as the measure of safety, while practically convenient, was not adapted for regulating the loading of all vessels, and, consequently, could not be recommended as a law to be enforced. The model of the ship, the character of her cargo, the method in which it is stowed, the nature and length of the proposed voyage, and the season of the year when engaged, were all matters requiring consideration, and which it would be quite impossible to embrace by any fixed rule applicable to every ship, whatever might be her form or the nature of her employment. Indeed, they remark with great force, “These circumstances must continually vary, and, under a charter, this mode of marking would have the dangerous tendency of inducing the charterer to insist on the vessels being laden up to the line of deepest immersion, and thus imperilling the safety of the ship; while the suggestion, from various instances, that there should be an elasticity in the law to be left to the discretion of the surveyor only shows the inexpediency of legislating either to secure freeboard in proportion to the depth of hold, or to provide some fixed percentage of spare buoyancy in every description of vessel.”

Under all these circumstances, the Commission considered it desirable to leave the discretion as to the proper loading of his ship to the Shipowner himself, holding him responsible, as the law has ever done, for sending his ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition, instead of lessening his responsibility by transferring a duty, which properly rests on himself, to any official surveyor. But to render the responsibility of the Shipowner more complete, they recommended that a vertical scale of feet should be marked on each side of the vessel, and that, immediately before the time of her leaving or starting on her voyage, this measure should be entered in her log-book and should, wherever practicable, be left with the officer of Customs or with the British Consul, by whom the draught of water should also be recorded.

Deck-loads.

Having offered a few suggestions with regard to deck loads and other matters of minor importance, the Commissioners next investigated with great care the practicability of instituting a survey of all British merchant ships. In their opinion, the policy of having a Government survey for the purpose of securing the seaworthiness of ships was more than questionable. Any such measure, while tending to remove responsibility from those on whom it ought to rest, would render Government nominally responsible for the form, the materials, and the whole construction of our merchant ships, and, consequently, could not be seriously entertained.

Government survey.

As there is now an official survey of emigrant and passenger ships, a few witnesses proposed that a similar survey should be extended to all merchant vessels. Others went so far as to recommend that the Board of Trade, already overburdened with work, should also superintend the construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the loading of the vessels. But the Commissioners very properly repudiated all such recommendations.

There are great complaints, the Commissioners remark, against the interference of Government, whose surveyors are now not unfrequently accused of forcing on Shipowners and marine engineers special views of their own which are not always in accordance with the best judgment of the two professions, and that to extend the power of such men would produce “mischievous consequences to the future progress of shipbuilding, and would be actually calamitous.” “Ships,” they add, “would be built and repaired so as to pass the examination of the official surveyor, and any additional outlay beyond what was indispensable to secure a certificate would be rejected as useless. Under the present enactments, Shipowners justly complain that their business is seriously inconvenienced, and that foreign ships are already gaining the trade which the British Shipowners are being compelled to relinquish.”[261]

Its extension undesirable.

By the Merchant Shipping Act of 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. cap. 85), the Board of Trade are empowered, at their discretion, to detain any British vessel “which they have reason to believe is by the defective condition of her hull, equipment, or machinery, or by reason of overloading or improper loading, unfit to proceed to sea without serious danger to human life.” By this Act, power is also given to the Board of Trade to detain any ship for the purpose of survey, to impose conditions as to her repair, and to enforce alterations in loading. The Commissioners do not consider it necessary or desirable to extend these already stringent and arbitrary powers, in order to prevent unseaworthy vessels from leaving any port in the United Kingdom. On the contrary, they suggest certain modifications of those powers, so as to make their action more prompt than it is at present, in which all differences must be referred to the Board of Trade in the case of detention, the owner having power of appeal in England to any court having Admiralty jurisdiction, and in Scotland to the Sheriffs’ Court; they further recommend that the master or owner of the vessel thus detained may be permitted to appeal to the shipping master or collector of customs, who should be vested with authority, when necessary, to appoint two or more competent shipmasters, to constitute a court whose decision should be final.[262] They at the same time express the hope, that, when these modifications are adopted, “the detention of vessels notoriously overladen or otherwise unseaworthy will gradually compel negligent Shipowners to be more attentive or to abandon the trade; worthless ships will be broken up, and the eventual weeding out of such ships will not only add to the safety of a seafaring life, but will be a benefit to the careful Shipowner, who will find his business increase, while the premium to be paid for insurance will be reduced.”

Shipowners already harassed by over-legislation.

Parliament having, for many years, been engaged in attempting to regulate minute details about shipping, it is not surprising that Shipowners should have complained of being harassed in their business by well-intended but ill-contrived legislation, and that they should, when further legislation of this sort was injudiciously proposed, have resisted it to the utmost of their power. Indeed, the Board of Trade itself had, for some time, seen the absurdity as well as the danger of a public department, imperfectly acquainted with the science of shipbuilding and with the interests of the commercial marine, attempting to dictate to shipbuilders and owners of vast experience the best mode of conducting their business; and, in the evidence before the Commission, Mr. Gray, Assistant-Secretary Marine Department, admitted that many enactments designed to secure safety of life at sea had been mischievous, and ought to be modified or repealed.

For instance, the obligation by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1844 to carry a certain number of boats in proportion to a ship’s tonnage, was found to be impracticable, and, consequently, the Board of Trade, by the amended Act of 1873, took upon itself a discretionary power in this matter. But discretionary powers in this case, as in many other instances, did not work well in practice; surveyors differed in their views as to the number of boats necessary, and the number of boats sanctioned at one port was frequently disallowed at another. Similar objections arose in the case of lights, and, as no coloured lamps could be found on trial until very recently, equal to the requirements of the Statute, Shipowners were subjected to similar capricious decisions of surveyors.

Mode of inquiry into losses at sea

It would weary my readers were I to enter into all these details, such as bulkheads, sea-cocks, hatchways, stoke-holes, compasses, safety valves, and innumerable other matters which Government has attempted to regulate by Act of Parliament, as I have, already, in more than one instance, alluded to these matters during the course of this work. But I must not omit directing attention to the large amount of evidence received regarding the system of inquiring into losses and casualties at sea, and to the powers given to the Board of Trade, by the Act of 1854, to institute such inquiries. It would appear from this evidence that the officers of the Board of Trade and the solicitors who act for it, as well as the Shipowners, have all a serious objection to the present mode of conducting such inquiries, and that the tribunal constituted by the Act does not command general confidence, while the mode of procedure is dilatory and expensive (perhaps, necessarily so, where much evidence has to be collected), and the power of the court is so ill-defined that, in too many cases, it cannot be enforced.

The inquiry frequently assumes the shape of a criminal proceeding against the captain, rather than of a careful investigation into the cause of disaster, the chief point at issue being whether the captain is to be acquitted, or punished by having his certificate cancelled or suspended; and, inasmuch as he is on his trial, he may if he pleases volunteer a statement, but cannot be examined. Nor has the court any power over the Shipowner, who, however culpable, is altogether beyond its jurisdiction.

examined and condemned.

The Commissioners recommended that these inquiries, made purely in the public interest with a view to the preservation of human life, should be conducted in such a manner as would best disclose the nature and cause of the disaster, whether, for instance, this was owing to the faulty construction of the vessel, to bad stowage, to circumstances connected with the navigation, to the incompetency of officers, or to the neglect and misconduct of the master or crew.

Recommendations.

With this object in view, they recommended that the preliminary inquiry now made by the receiver of wrecks should be limited in the first place to such a narrative statement as would enable the Board of Trade, with the aid of their legal advisers, to decide on the propriety of an official inquiry, and that, if such were found necessary, there should be a complete severance between that inquiry and any proceedings of a penal character, power being reserved to the Board of Trade to prosecute the Shipowner or to proceed criminally against the master, mate, or any member of the crew whose neglect of duty may have occasioned the disaster. They further suggest that the 11th Section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1871, “should be amended and be made expressly to extend to the master of the vessel; for it is very important to avoid any doubt that the master who, without justifiable excuse, leaves port with his vessel in an unseaworthy condition, renders himself amenable to the criminal law.”[263]

The Commissioners very properly attached great importance to these inquiries, as affording the best means of ascertaining on whom the culpability rests; hence, they, incidentally, remark that, in comparing the accidents occurring at sea with those taking place on land, especially on railways, they were struck by the fact that, whereas, in the latter case, it is usual to prosecute those servants whose negligence has occasioned loss of life, there was scarcely a single instance of the prosecution of a master or mate, or of a man on the look-out or at the helm of a vessel, although cases have, undoubtedly, been numerous in which vessels have been lost either by the negligence of the master or of the crew.

They further recommend that the present system under which the certificate of a master or other officer is suspended, very frequently only for an error of judgment, should be entirely discontinued, and that neither the Court of Inquiry nor the Board of Trade should have the power of dealing with such certificates; but that, in cases to be provided for by express enactment, the tribunal alone before which the officer is tried should have the power of cancelling either all his certificates, or, at its discretion, his higher certificates, leaving him in these cases the chance of finding employment in a lower grade.[264]

Examination of masters and mates, shipping offices, &c., &c., approved.

The examination of masters and mates, the regulation of space for crews, the insertion of the scale of food in the articles, the means of remitting wages, the allotment note, the establishment of seamen’s savings-banks, and various other important measures, all indicating as they do the earnest wish of the Legislature to secure the welfare of the sailor, received the most careful consideration by the Commissioners, with a view to their amendment where necessary. But, though some Shipowners were of opinion that the system did not work well, and that they should be allowed to engage seamen, as other employers engage their workmen, without the presence of a shipping master, the Commissioners were of opinion that the shipping offices had been of great value and ought to be maintained, tersely remarking that if the captain of a merchant ship would take trouble to seek out eligible men he could arrange to meet them at the shipping offices, indeed, could engage them on board or elsewhere under a special application.

The anxiety of Parliament to protect the seaman and, more especially, to treat him as incompetent to take care of himself, and as requiring the special interference of the Legislature, had exercised a prejudicial influence on his character, tending to destroy, as it did, the confidence which should ever exist between the master and his crew, and had frequently promoted insubordination at a time when good discipline was most essential to the safety of the vessel and all on board; moreover, the rule requiring misconduct on the part of a seaman to be entered in the log and immediately read to the offender was a contrivance so ill-calculated to promote good behaviour that masters frequently left offences unnoticed rather than resort to such a proceeding; the Commissioners recommended, therefore, that this plan should be materially modified (they do not state how), and that, to secure fair treatment for the seaman, without destroying discipline or weakening the authority of the master, should be the object of the Legislature.

Indeed, when it is considered that the safety of a merchant ship, as well as of the lives of the passengers and crew, are entrusted to the skill and judgment of the master, it is essential that his authority should be upheld, as any interference tending to impair his authority and to lower his position adds seriously to the dangers of navigation.

Power of masters.

As a ship at sea is in herself a little kingdom, the power of the master should be paramount and all but unquestioned; hence, while held strictly amenable to the law for any acts of tyranny and cruelty, the Legislature was bound to take care not to deprive him of the control necessary for the security of his vessel. Now, as the law as it at present stands, gives him very little power of punishing a sailor for anything but mutinous conduct, and as the sailor may be guilty with virtual impunity of many gross derelictions of duty, such as drunkenness, sleeping on the look-out, disobedience, and insubordination, the Commissioners recommend that some remedies, less cumbrous than those now existing, should be applied and more direct penalties inflicted.

Scheme for training boys for the sea.

As most of my readers are aware, a system of compulsory apprenticeship was established in the year 1844, but was abolished by the repeal of the Navigation Laws in 1849, and, though some Shipowners, subsequently, desired to restore this system, the Government could not, with any regard to principle, meet their views. The object of training boys for the sea service having been to secure a supply of seamen for the Royal Navy as well as for the Merchant Service, it would have been unjust to compel Shipowners to train boys for the public service after they had been deprived of the special privileges, supposed to be advantageous, conferred on them by the Navigation Laws. But, as an impression prevailed that our seamen had deteriorated, both in number and quality, since the Compulsory Apprenticeship Act was abolished—though I think this is to be attributed to other and different causes—the Commissioners suggested a scheme to meet the existing evil. They proposed that every vessel above 100 tons register, whether propelled by sail or steam, should be required to carry a certain number of apprentices in proportion to her tonnage, or to pay a small contribution annually (such as 6d. per ton), to be applied towards the maintenance of training ships in all the principal ports in the kingdom. They recommended that the apprentices should be indentured at or about the age of fourteen to the master of the training ship for five years; that, after serving in this ship for one or two years, the indenture should be transferred to any Shipowner who would be willing to take the apprentice, and with whom the apprentice might be willing to serve, until the completion of his term, and that these school ships should be inspected and receive grants from the State according to their efficiency.

No doubt the system of apprenticeship affords the best means of training boys for a service in which fitness can only be acquired during early life. But the success of the system of training boys for the Royal Navy, recommended by the Commission on Manning the Navy in 1859 (of which I had the honour to be a member) is so far questionable that I think some other mode of obtaining the requisite supply of seamen for the navy might have been adopted which would have been more efficacious and much less expensive.

For instance, “a self-supporting pension fund for the benefit of seamen, as suggested by the Manning Commission of 1859 might,” they said, “prove of great value in creating a tie to bind the British seaman to the Merchant Service of his own country,”[265] and would, I venture to suggest, if properly organised have been a more effective mode of training and maintaining the requisite number of seamen for the Royal Navy as well as the Merchant Service. The Commissioners were also of opinion that, though not strictly within the scope of their inquiry, a self-supporting pension fund “well deserved the attention of Government.”[266]

The desertion of seamen in foreign ports was a matter which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, “deserved the serious attention of the Government, inasmuch as British ships are now often obliged to sail on their return voyage, when heavily laden, with insufficient or incompetent crews,” and they recommended entering into arrangements with foreign governments for some international conventions which should have for their object the prevention of desertion and the enforcement of better discipline in our ships when abroad.

Marine Insurance.

The question also of marine insurance was one which received most careful consideration. The Commissioners felt that while the system protects Shipowners against losses which would otherwise be ruinous, it tends to render them less careful in the management of their ships, and they were, evidently, alive to the fact that it relieved the Shipowner from all loss, when his ship foundered at sea, and frequently enabled him to derive a pecuniary profit from shipwreck. But to this difficult and important question I shall fully refer hereafter, as also to the system of advance notes inquired into by the Commission.

Report, as a whole, most valuable.

Considered as a whole the Report of the Commissioners is one of the ablest documents I have ever examined, and, from the mass of valuable evidence they have taken, and the care with which it has been analysed, most of their recommendations are eminently qualified to effect the great object in view—to reduce to the lowest possible extent the loss of life and property at sea.