History of merchant shipping and ancient commerce, Volume 3 (of 4)

by W. S. Lindsay

CHAPTER XVII.

Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and other matters—“Coffin ships”—Great improvement of our ships and officers in recent years—Duties of the Board of Trade with regard to wrecks—Return of lives lost and saved between 1855 and 1873, note—Wreck chart; but the extent of loss not sufficiently examined—Danger of too much Government interference—Loss of life in proportion to vessels afloat—Causes of loss—More details required—Improvement in lighthouses, buoys, and beacons—Harbours of Refuge—Extraordinary scene in the House of Commons on the withdrawal of the Merchant Shipping Bill, 1875—Another Bill introduced by Government—Its conditions—Unusual personal power granted to Surveyors—Propriety or not, of further legislation considered—Compulsory load-line—Mr. J. W. A. Harper’s evidence—Mr. W. J. Lamport and others—Opinion of the Commissioners—Voluntary load-line—Its value questionable—All ships should be certified as seaworthy—How can this be accomplished?—Opinion of Mr. Charles McIver, note—Registration Associations—Lloyd’s Register, its great importance—Improvement of seamen by better education—Evil effects of advance notes, confirmed by the opinion of the Commissioners—Over-insurance—Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer—Evidence of other witnesses—Opinion of the Commissioners—Too much legislation already—The necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code, and more prompt punishment in criminal cases—Concluding remarks on the extraordinary progress of British shipping, and the dangers of over-legislation.

Loose statements with regard to the loss of life at sea, and other matters.

Although one or two of the more important questions with which the Commissioners had to deal, cannot be materially advanced without an arrangement with other nations, there are others entirely within our own power. To retrace our steps, therefore, with regard to some of these is as worthy of consideration as to devise any new enactments. But these subjects can only be properly dealt with in a calm and impartial spirit. So many exaggerated statements have been recently made, in and out of Parliament, with reference to the extent of the loss of life caused by men being sent to sea in “coffin ships,”[267] as if such occurrences had no existence except in our own time, and were the creation of a prevailing eagerness to be rich too soon, that it is, above all things, necessary to adhere strictly to facts, in considering further legislation, should such be necessary, and to regulate any measures to be enforced on this subject by such facts alone. Nothing can be more dangerous than legislation founded on sentimental or sensational reports.

“Coffin ships.”

Great improvement of our ships and officers in recent years.

But if “coffin ships” still exist, and I fear they do, this cannot arise from lack of legislative enactments. Indeed, the wisdom of Parliament has, for the last quarter of a century, been seriously directed every Session to the improvement of our ships and of their crews.[268] Nor have individual efforts of the most effective and laudable description been wanting to prevent the construction of vessels of an unseaworthy character:[269] while it is not the case, as has been alleged, that, either our ships or the officers by whom they are navigated have deteriorated. On the contrary, they have, within the last quarter of a century, vastly improved in almost every respect. If any of my readers have any doubts on this question, let them refer to the answers to Mr. Murray’s circular of 1843,[270] and to those sent by our consuls abroad to Mr. J. G. Shaw Lefevre’s circular of 1872.[271] It may be that our seamen do not “hand, reef, and steer,” with the same alacrity as they did in the days of our forefathers, simply because such duties are less required now than they were then; but our masters and mates are infinitely superior to what they were a short time since, and in our regular lines of steamers and packet-ships, there are to be found a class of seamen much more sober and steady than could be found in any merchant service twenty-five years ago. Men now exist, who are quite as competent for the duties required of them, as any seamen of the days of Duncan or Nelson, and far more to be depended on for the performance of their duties on board of merchant ships than was the case in my own boyhood, although there are, still, far too many who are inefficient, drunken, and worthless. There are likewise still many ships lost which ought not to be lost, but the assertions which have been made with regard to an increase in the amount of loss during recent years have been greatly exaggerated, as I shall now endeavour to show.

Duties of the Board of Trade with regard to wrecks.

Among the multifarious duties imposed on the Board of Trade, not the least important is that connected with wrecks, casualties, and collisions of ships at home and abroad. For many years, a sort of record had been kept of those casualties, but it is not until 1855, when the duty devolved on the Board of Trade, that we have any reliable statistics.[272]

Of course the number of wrecks, casualties, and collisions reported for any one year, increases or diminishes according to the prevalence or absence of gales of remarkable violence and duration. These sometimes tell in an appalling manner, in the greatly increased loss of life which occurs in one year over another. A Table,[273] copied from the wreck returns of the Board of Trade of 1874, classifies the reports so far as regards the loss of life, showing how far one year has been more disastrous than another; for instance, in 1859-60, the number of lives lost was five times greater than in the previous year, and three times more than in the year following, arising, in a great measure, from the disastrous gale in October 1859 in which 343 lives were lost in the Royal Charter, wrecked on the Anglesea Coast. Again, in 1867-68, nearly double the number of lives were lost than during any year either before or since: in fact, no less than 326 vessels were lost or damaged, and 319 lives sacrificed by tempest, between the 1st and 3rd December inclusive of the former year.

But, though between 1855 and 1873, 13,466 lives were lost on the coasts of the United Kingdom, more than 71,000 lives were saved,[276] during the same period, from the shipwrecked vessels; and, though the duty of a seafaring man is proverbially a dangerous one, and the navigation of our coasts is attended with greater perils than those in any other parts of the world, it is astonishing how small is the percentage of loss either of life or property, when compared with the amount of shipping frequenting our shores.

Wreck chart; but the extent of loss not sufficiently examined.

In the [frontispiece] to this volume will be found a wreck chart of the British Islands, prepared from the last Board of Trade Returns for the year 1873-4. A red dot signifies a case of total loss; a blue dot signifies a case of partial damage. The first glance of this chart is very appalling; but it becomes less so when we consider the enormous number of vessels annually frequenting our coasts. Many hundreds of vessels at times leave the northern coal ports, alone, in one day; and I estimate that, in the year to which this chart refers, no less than 500,000 vessels of 90,000,000 tons! including their repeated voyages, frequented the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.[277]

But, however startling these figures as a measure of the immense number of vessels frequenting our coasts, they affect the mind much less than a glance at the actual facts, the fleets themselves. Until I made a course from the Thames to the Tyne, and saw the sea covered with ships, steamers, and fishing boats, of all kinds and sizes, and saw what an industry even the fishing alone employed, I never had clearly in my own mind a notion of what our mercantile marine really was. Let anyone survey from the fort of Tynemouth and ancient churchyard adjoining—a favourite walk of mine when I represented that borough in Parliament—and see from 200 to 300 ships going out at one tide, or watch the passing ships from Flamborough Head or from the cliffs of Dover, or let him steam through the endless crowd of herring boats off the Scotch coast, and he will have a stronger impression of the magnitude of the mercantile marine of Great Britain than can be derived from the most careful study of all our Blue Books on the subject.

In dealing with this question, it becomes our duty to consider carefully such realities as these. We should not be led astray by a mere glance at the wrecks and casualties which appear on the face of the chart—a chart which has too frequently been used as a picture to alarm the public mind, and induce people, who will not take the trouble to inquire for themselves, to believe that the question of the loss of life and property at sea has not received that consideration from Government or Parliament which its great importance demands.

Danger of too much Government interference.

I have frequently remarked, in the course of this work, that, however great our exertions have been to save human life, more might still be done, but, without all the facts, further legislation, based on general impressions, and still more so on popular clamour (valuable in itself, though but too often deplorable in its results), will prove of the most mischievous character. We must, also, remember that every act fettering free navigation, renders our Shipowners less able to compete with those of other countries, and, if it does not forward the main object in view—the safety of life—must be a clear national loss, because it renders us less able to make our ships a source of profit, a result which, if not carefully watched, might easily be carried to such an extent as to discourage investments in British shipping.[278]

Now if we take the total disasters on our coasts, including trivial accidents, it does not amount to anything like one-half per cent. per annum, and to not three out of every thousand of the vessels frequenting these shores; indeed, when we consider the dangerous character of these shores, the rocks and shoals with which they are surrounded, the storms with which we are visited, the frequency and uncertainty of these storms, and the dense fogs which often prevail, we may, so far from being startled by the sight of the wreck chart, be surprised that the casualties are not far greater. But, to arrive at the true bearing of the case, it is desirable to analyse the disasters. Besides the red and blue dots on the chart, indicative of total loss or partial damage to vessels, I have indicated by similar dots, with a cross above, the number of disasters in the course of the year, which were attended with loss of life. When my readers examine these, they will be still more agreeably surprised. From the Frith of Forth to Spurnhead, a distance of somewhere about 150 miles of the most rugged, unprotected, and dangerous coast in the world, where numerous fleets of vessels are constantly wending their way, and in every description of weather, there were only seven vessels wrecked with loss of life during 1873-4, and two of these were partial losses. In calling attention to this fact, I must remind my readers that, on the part of our coast in question, the most inferior description of vessels, and the most deeply laden, carry on their hazardous trade. If we next cast our eye over the line of coast extending from London to the Lizard Point, and embracing the whole coast of the English Channel, a distance of somewhere about 400 miles, we will see that during the whole of the same year there were only fifteen wrecks with loss of life, and seven of these were partial. Nor is the proportion greater on any other portion of the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

Loss of life in proportion to vessels afloat.

Causes of loss.

But we should do well to inquire still further, and not merely compare the present number of disasters with those of former years, but likewise their extent and character; and, as far as is practicable, the different causes of loss, so as to endeavour to apply, to the best advantage, any further remedies that may be necessary. I have shown[279] that the average loss of life during the three years ending 1835 was 894 per annum, when we owned 2,780,000 tons of shipping; but the loss of life for the year 1873-4, when our Merchant Shipping had increased to 7,294,230 tons, of which no less than 1,825,738 tons consisted of steamers, in which the risk of navigating our coasts is greatly increased, amounted only to 506, of whom 103 were lost in foreign vessels. Many of the remaining 403 were lost on fishing boats, and other vessels not registered under the Merchant Shipping Act.[280] Very material progress towards the saving of life on our coasts has, therefore, been made during the last forty years—a progress which will appear the more striking when I direct attention to the fact, that, while the entrances and clearances of British ships engaged in the foreign trade were, in 1835, not much more than 4,000,000 tons, they had increased to more than 26,000,000 tons in 1873-4.[281] Of the 506 lives lost, 61 were lost in vessels that foundered; 76 through vessels in collision; 200 in vessels that stranded or were cast ashore derelict; and 101 in missing vessels. The remaining 68 lives were lost from various causes, such as by being washed overboard and by other accidents on board. The whole of the above lives were lost in 130 vessels, 87 of which were laden, and 40 in ballast. It is not known whether the remaining three were laden or light.

If we take the last five years from 1869 to 1873-4 inclusive, we find the total number of wrecks and casualties of vessels of every kind, arising from all causes and including collisions, amounted to 8952, giving an annual average of 1791; the average loss of life in these vessels during the five and a half years, including the disastrous half-year 1873, being 755 per annum. Although no return is kept in minute detail of the approximate cause of these disasters, we learn from the wreck register, that in the year 1873-4, 381 were from collisions, and 1422 from wrecks and casualties other than collisions; 346 were wrecks, &c., resulting in total loss; and 1076 partial damage more or less serious. Of the total losses, 128 happened when the wind was at “force 9 or upwards” (a strong gale), and they are classed as having been caused by stress of weather; 93 from inattention, carelessness, or neglect; 30 from defects in the ship or equipments (and of these thirty, 19 appear to have foundered from unseaworthiness); the remainder seem to have arisen from various other causes. Of the 1070 casualties, 525 arose from stress of weather; 180 from carelessness; and 91 from defects in equipments; and the remainder from various other causes. In 1873-4, there were, on or near the coasts of the United Kingdom, 165 wrecks and casualties to smacks and other fishing vessels, which are included in the above returns, and in these, 76 lives were lost, while 195 lives were lost in vessels of the collier class.

More details required.

These returns are, no doubt, very valuable as far as they go, and have become more so since they were extended to the loss of all British ships, and, where practicable, to the cause of the loss. But the class of the vessel, whether built of wood or iron, and the draught of water when she left her last port, might be added to advantage. Nor should we omit the familiar S.S. to distinguish steam from sailing ships. However, they amply show that no charge can be justly made against either the Government or the Legislature of any dereliction of duty in their endeavours to save the life of all persons who “go down to the sea in ships.” Nor can we charge the people of this country with any callousness or want of sympathy for the seafaring portion of the population. The number of Acts of Parliament passed in recent years, and the grants of public money voted for the purpose of saving life, are an answer to all such charges; while noble private institutions, like the Shipwrecked Mariners’ Society, the Lifeboat Establishments, the Royal Alfred Asylum, besides various other charitable associations for the benefit of seamen, testify in this respect to the liberality of the public.[282]

Improvement in lighthouses, buoys, and beacons.

Harbours of Refuge.

Nor have the lights, beacons, and buoys on our coast, all tending materially, as they do, to save life, been neglected. On the contrary, while we have greatly reduced the charges, we have increased the number and highly improved the quality of our lights. By the Act passed in 1836,[283] a number of lighthouses, which formed part of the hereditary estate of the Crown and had been allowed to get into the hands of private persons, were transferred to the Trinity House, provision being made for reducing the exorbitant tolls previously levied. By an Act of 1853,[284] the expenditure of the Trinity House on lighthouses, and that of the Scotch and Irish lighthouse boards, was subjected to the control of the Board of Trade, and, since then, the reduction on the charges for lights, buoys, beacons, &c., has been fully 75 per cent. Nor has the question of Harbours of Refuge been overlooked; for, besides the construction of various national harbours, large sums of public money have been advanced at a low rate of interest for the improvement of local harbours, expressly for the benefit of merchant ships and seamen, and these, while facilitating commerce, have, in no small degree, tended to the safety of life and property.

Indeed, so anxious has Government been to rectify any shortcomings in legislation, which might tend to the loss of life, or inflict a hardship on seamen, that the Bill of Mr. Fortescue (now Lord Carlingford), passed in 1873,[285] contained not merely clauses about “load-lines” and “clear sides,” but a provision giving seamen a claim for compensation when, having been detained on a charge of desertion, the ship, upon survey, was shown to be unseaworthy. This Act further contains a provision, strengthening the power of the Board of Trade to detain unseaworthy ships, whereby that “Board are enabled to act of their own accord, and without complaint from without,” the result of which has been that, up to the last return,[286] out of the 474 vessels detained and surveyed by the Board of Trade under this Act, 435 have been on the report of their own officers, and 39 only on complaints made ab extra.[287] To these facts I may add, as having a very important bearing on the opinions I have hitherto ventured to express, that only 24 out of the 474 vessels were detained because they were overladen; and that, out of these, not a single vessel detained was alleged to be overladen on information given by the crews, notwithstanding the encouragement they had to become informers against their employers. This power to detain is extended to cases of overloading and improper stowage or imperfect loading, and the conditional orders of release are of a very elaborate character, while the provisions concerning payment of expenses, and the mode of appeal, are made far more full and explicit.

This Act further gives power to vary the requirements contained in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 with regard to boats—requirements, I may add, which it had been found practically impossible to comply with. It likewise contains a clause, which ought to have been the law long since, making it criminal (though the dictates of humanity, it had been thought, were in themselves sufficient), in a master, after collision with another vessel, not to stand by and render assistance. In the same statute, a code of signals of distress has been adopted and very properly enforced, as well as a general code of pilot signals.

Many losses having occurred from spontaneous combustion of coal on board ship, Government, in 1874, appointed, on the recommendation of Lloyd’s Committee, a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Childers, to inquire into this subject, but this Commission has not yet concluded its labours.

Extraordinary scene in the House of Commons on the withdrawal of the Merchant Shipping Bill, 1875.

Early in the Session of 1875, the Government introduced another Merchant Shipping Bill, containing various amendments of the then existing law, and among them a special clause which had for its object the abolition of all advance notes. This Bill met with very considerable opposition (partly of a frivolous character), rendering its progress through the House so slow, that Government found it desirable to withdraw it, more especially as the Bill had been materially altered and curtailed in the course of various divisions, especially in the clauses referring to the advance notes and other matters of importance.

When Government intimated its intention of withdrawing the Bill of which they could no longer approve, and which they had not time to pass, a scene arose[289] happily of rare occurrence in the debates of the British Parliament. It was closed, however, with great dignity by the Prime Minister and leader of the Commons. He had introduced such a measure as he no doubt, after grave consultation with his Cabinet, considered necessary and sufficient. The House, and more especially those members of it who were more immediately interested in maritime affairs, and who either approved or opposed the views of Mr. Plimsoll had so mutilated the Government measure, that Mr. Disraeli would no longer be responsible for it. To use his own words, he “declined to deal with the subject in that fragmentary manner,” and no man of prudence or common sense can blame him for the course he adopted under these circumstances.[290]

Another Bill introduced by Government.

Unfortunately, however, the popular outcry was so great against the course he had adopted, aroused as this had been for the moment by the well-meaning but rhapsodical protests of Mr. Plimsoll, backed, as they no doubt were, by many really benevolent men, that Mr. Disraeli, in the end, considered it expedient to introduce another Bill, embodying a portion of his own views together with those of the philanthropists. Although this Act contains some necessary and useful provisions, it is not a wise measure, nor can the Government have considered it perfect, as it was hurriedly passed so late in the Session as the 6th of September, and is only to remain in force until the 1st of October 1876.[291]

Its conditions.

Unusual personal power granted to Surveyors.

This Act confirms the powers previously given to persons, specially appointed by the Board of Trade, to detain what they consider unseaworthy ships, without previous orders from the Board, an addition which, however necessary, ought not to have been conceded to any individuals without much further consideration and discussion than it received. This addition opens the door to corruption in its most pernicious and dangerous forms, by giving, as it does, to each one of a great number of subordinate officers, personal authority to detain “unseaworthy vessels,” thus transferring to a single person a power the Board of Trade alone possessed under the Act of 1873, and laying down a principle contrary to all good government, while relieving that Board of its administrative responsibility. Otherwise the Bill contains some useful provisions, and none more so than where it prohibits the carriage of a cargo of which more than one-third consists of grain, &c., unless the grain is secured from shifting by suitable boards or otherwise. But, while this clause may be necessary or right in itself, its meaning may be misconstrued, and it may lead to further and more detailed legislation, making its vague language specific, and calling on Government officers in Foreign ports to enforce its provisions.[292]

The Act also amends the clause in the Act of 1871, which makes the sending an unseaworthy ship to sea a misdemeanour, by providing—

(a.) That criminal liability shall attach to any one who attempts, or is party to an attempt, to send such a ship to sea, and to a master who knowingly takes such a ship to sea.

(b.) That every ship shall have a registered managing owner, and that if she is sent to sea from any port in the United Kingdom in an unseaworthy state he shall be liable, unless he proves that he has done all he can to prevent it.

The Act further provides that every British ship shall be marked permanently with lines on her sides showing the position of her decks.

It also provides that the owner of every foreign-going British ship shall, before clearance outwards from any port in the United Kingdom, mark upon her sides a maximum load-line, and shall insert the distance between this and the deck marks in the entry outwards at the Custom House and in the agreement with the crew.

The Act further stipulates that every contract with a seaman shall imply an obligation on the part of the owner and his agents to use all reasonable efforts to make and keep[293] the ship seaworthy. The effect of this clause is to give the seaman or his family a remedy against the owner. But it does not extend to damage or loss of life caused by the act of a fellow seaman other than the master.

Happily it is not necessary, in reviewing the recent changes in our Mercantile Marine Laws, to notice those personal matters which have unfortunately been raised in the course of their discussion, except to express regret that Mr. Plimsoll in dealing with a subject of such great public importance should have made grave assertions and charges alike against Government and private individuals, too many of which he has not merely entirely failed to prove, but has neglected to withdraw.

Had Government been persistently neglectful of its duty in its endeavours to mitigate the loss of life and property at sea, there might have been an excuse for some of these charges, especially if it had neglected necessary legislative enactments.[294] But such has not been the case. On the contrary, Parliament of late years, while producing some excellent measures, has interfered far too much with the details of the affairs of individuals connected with Merchant Shipping: and, though yielding for the moment to a popular cry, Mr. Disraeli may well have had reasonable doubts whether further legislation might not, so far from lessening, tend to increase those dangers and disasters which must ever attend the navigation of the ocean.

Propriety or not, of further legislation considered.

Having, however, officially announced his intention to review the whole subject, and to consider it in all its bearings, I venture to invite the attention of my readers to the more important points now pending. They are: a compulsory load-line, and the production of an official certificate of seaworthiness by all ships before they are cleared at the Custom House.

Compulsory load-line.

Mr. J. W. A. Harper’s evidence.

So far as regards the proposed compulsory load-line, a very competent and intelligent witness who gave his evidence before the Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, says,[296] “I think nothing could be more serviceable and nothing more excellent than to obtain and, if it were possible, enforce a load-line; but I also think there is nothing more impossible. A load-line, do what you may, is the opinion of an expert. How can you, by authority, enforce the opinion of an expert? I have had before me,” he continues, “a great many proposals for ascertaining load-lines for ships. Some of them are very ingenious. By the best of them you may get, with considerable accuracy, the cubical displacement of the empty ship, the displacement of the cargo, and so you may arrive at the cubical space left in the ship available for floating. And getting that you get a valuable and useful fact for some objects. But the supreme difficulty remains untouched, viz., What ought the floating capacity to be? I cannot imagine it possible to enforce by any Government intervention a rule which must depend in every individual case upon the opinion of an expert.”

Mr. W. J. Lamport and others.

Opinion of the Commissioners.

Such, also, was the purport of the evidence of the great majority, if not of all the witnesses examined before the Commission; but I quote that of Mr. Harper, because he is not merely thoroughly competent to offer an opinion on the subject, but is altogether disinterested. Indeed, from the appointment he holds, it would be to his interest to recommend a compulsory load-line, and he would no doubt have done so, had he not thought that any such legislative measure would be likely to aggravate the evils sought to be remedied. In fact, the whole tenor of the evidence is that a fixed load-line would do more harm than good.[297] And such was the opinion of the Commissioners, who state, “that any rule of freeboard founded on surplus buoyancy gives to a vessel of light scantling an advantage over a stronger vessel. Thus the inferior ship would by law be allowed to carry the heavier cargo. Such an enactment would not contribute to the safety of life at sea. From all the evidence we have collected on this subject, we are of opinion that an Act of Parliament enforcing any scale of freeboard would be mischievous.”... “A law presenting such a rule would therefore enhance the perils of a seafaring life.”

Nor can impartial persons who have studied this question arrive at any other conclusion, for as the Commissioners justly add, “There is no general agreement as to a rule by which the requisite amount of reserve buoyancy could be determined, and it appears that, except under definite circumstances, it is not a determinable problem. The proper load-line in each particular case depends not only upon the principal dimensions of the ship, but also upon her form and structural strength, the nature of her cargo, the voyage, and the season of the year.”

Voluntary load-line.

The Commissioners, consequently, limited their recommendation so far as regards freeboard to the extent that “every merchant ship should have marked upon each of her sides amidships, a vertical scale of feet downwards from the edge of her main-deck,” and that a note of her draught of water “should be entered in the log after the vessel has received her full load, immediately before the time of her starting on her voyage, which should, wherever practicable, be left with the officer of Customs or with the British Consul, by whom it should be recorded.”

Its value questionable.

This recommendation was proposed to be carried out in the Government Bill which was withdrawn, but, in the Act now temporarily in force, the provisions are somewhat different. The advantages of either system are problematical. Shipowners will continue, as they have hitherto done, to load their vessels to such draught as they consider prudent, and if one of their vessels is lost, and other persons remark that she was too heavily laden, the answer will either be that the draught was as usual, or that safety in proportion to depth is a matter of opinion depending on many varying circumstances. The mere fact of publicly recording the draught of water would, it is to be feared, have little effect on unprincipled or avaricious Shipowners, against whom alone the law is aimed. Practically, I think the system of marking now in force will be of little or no avail, and that the result will not be as the framers of the law intended. A Shipowner being now required by law to mark upon the sides of the vessel amidships a circular disc 12 inches in diameter, to be so placed that “the centre of the disc shall indicate the maximum load-line in salt water to which the owner intends to load the ship for that voyage,” will perceive that to place the disc only slightly above the usual line of load draught would, on the one hand, fetter him to some extent; while, on the other hand, he would incur no disadvantage by placing it so much higher as to ensure its being well clear of the water under any circumstances of loading. A maximum load-line will, therefore, in practice mean the line down to which the ship will certainly not be loaded. Indeed, from the information I have gained on the subject, the practice with some Shipowners seems already to be that the discs are placed one, two, and in some cases, three and even four feet above the water-line. The mere marking it would, therefore, appear in a great measure worthless, as surveyors will still require to wait until a ship has her cargo on board and is ready for sea, before they can form any opinion as to her safety. Whether it is wise, on the part of Shipowners, to place the disc so far above the vessel’s ordinary water-line as to make it meaningless has been doubted by many, but the fact remains that it is so placed in very many instances. It would, certainly, have been better to have omitted from the clause of the Act I have just quoted the word “maximum,” as few Shipowners would have placed their discs too high if, by doing so, this indicated an intention on their part to overload their vessels.

However, if it can be shown that this new mode of marking the sides of a ship tends in any degree towards the greater safety of life and property at sea, the shipping community, generally, will not complain of the expense and trouble. In all good governments there is a pervading principle to which all classes submit, that the interests of the few must be made subservient to the good of the many, and that, especially where life is at stake, no reasonable trouble or expense should be spared to preserve it. But if, on the other hand, it is found that this system of marking or registering the draught of water is useless, or even injurious, Shipowners will have great cause of complaint against Government for an unnecessary interference with their business, provided they can show that they have made an earnest endeavour to apply the provisions of the Act fairly and in the spirit in which they were framed.[298]

The other important point on which Mr. Plimsoll insisted is of a different character. But to carry it out in the way suggested, or as it was argued in the House of Commons and before the Royal Commission, would be impracticable, and even if practicable, it would be most mischievous: the Commissioners in their Report state the question as follows:—“With the view of providing for the greater safety of life at sea, it has been suggested that the Board of Trade shall superintend the construction, the periodical inspection, the repair, and the loading of all British Merchant Ships.” Considering the extent of our mercantile marine and the mode in which business must, necessarily, be conducted if we desire to maintain our present high position as a maritime nation, any such suggestion is simply absurd and, if carried into effect, would be most ruinous. That we have already too much legislation in matters of detail the Commissioners themselves admit. Referring to the pernicious effects of inquiry into such matters by Government surveyors on Emigrant ships, they say, and from the evidence before them they would have been justified in expressing their opinion in still stronger terms, “We consider it to be a question worthy of serious consideration, whether, in the case of passenger ships, the certificate of the Board of Trade, so far as regards specific approval, should not be expressly confined to the number of passengers to be allowed, and to the accommodation for their health, comfort, and general security; all questions of unseaworthiness of hull, machinery, and equipment being left to the owners, subject only to a general power of interference in case of danger, sufficiently apparent to justify special intervention.”

How this can be accomplished.

I have been unable to ascertain who made the extraordinary proposal, that every ship from the time her keel was laid until she was loaded and ready for sea should be under the superintendence of officers appointed by the Board of Trade. In justice to Mr. Plimsoll I must state that, though I have read his book, and nearly all his speeches, I cannot trace any recommendation that the merchant ships of this country should be placed, either as regards construction, inspection, or repair, altogether, under the control of the Board of Trade or of any other Government department.[299] What Mr. Plimsoll mentions seems to me, to be a matter to which I have often referred in the course of this work, that we do not utilise to anything like the extent we might the vast private resources within ourselves, and that we might do so to advantage, so far as regards the survey of our merchant ships, not one of which he suggests should be allowed to go to sea unless she is seaworthy. Now this is a suggestion which few men would be bold enough to decline to consider, and Mr. Plimsoll points out how this may be secured by means already at our disposal. Perhaps in the way he puts it, the difficulties with which it is surrounded could not be overcome; but the maxim cannot be ignored, as it is sound in principle.

To leave the survey of our ships to any one private institution, not on a sufficiently broad basis, such as Lloyd’s Register, might create as many evils as a general Government survey, and, besides creating jealousy on the part of other somewhat similar institutions or associations, might be considered contrary to the rules of sound government. But these institutions could be enrolled and licensed, as various other associations now are, and empowered to grant certificates of seaworthiness, which every ship above a certain tonnage would require to produce before she was cleared at the Custom House. Or they might be welded into one great national institution directly controlled by all the various branches of the shipping community in harmony with their sentiments, and alive to the wants and necessities always arising through the growth and development of trade and commerce.

Individuals may do wrong, and, though it may be for their interests to have a good sound ship, there is no denying the fact that ships are sent to sea which are not seaworthy; but corporations and associations cannot do wrong with the same impunity. If they did, they would be deprived of their licence, and there would be a check, one against the other, which is not the case with individuals. Or, on the other hand, a great representative institution would be efficiently checked and influenced by public opinion, and the voice of those immediately concerned. Were Government to require these associations to classify ships, then I agree with the Commissioners, that it is not its province “to ascertain whether a ship is fit for the conveyance of dry and perishable goods,” but, from the debates in Parliament, and numerous articles in the public press, it is clear that many persons are of opinion, that it is the duty of Government to be reasonably satisfied that a ship is seaworthy before she proceeds to sea. We exercise this duty in the case of railways, mines, and manufactures of various kinds, and events have shown, however much we may have already done to save life and property at sea, that the exercise of a similar duty, if practicable, is at least worthy of consideration in the case of ships.

As the great bulk of the vessels belonging to the United Kingdom are already classed, the certificate of classification they now hold would suffice as a certificate of seaworthiness. Those which are not now classed in Lloyd’s Register, or in any other association, but which belong to the great steam companies, or to very large shipowners, are so well known for their good qualities as not to require classification, and for this reason classification, or, at least, survey for seaworthiness, even if compulsory, could not be a serious hardship to them.

Practically the number of vessels now unclassed is confined to the very good or to the very bad ships. With the owners of the former I should think there would be no difficulty in dealing; they do not class their ships either because they do not care to incur the expense (underwriters being ready to insure them at the lowest current premiums), or because they think they can construct ships, in their own way, superior to those which are built to rules for classification. But such men, while they might protest, and justly so, against being interfered with in a business they more thoroughly understand than any government or private surveyor, and in which they take a laudable pride (for such men are the pillars of our maritime greatness), would, I doubt not, have no objection to an authorised surveyor inspecting their ships, and would readily pay the moderate fee required to cover the cost of a certificate of seaworthiness.[300]

For the information of the general public I may state that there is a very great difference between the highest grades of vessels and those which any surveyor who knew anything about his business would pronounce to be unseaworthy. In the case of classed ships, the certificate of classification would suffice; but, from the owners of ships who do not class, many intelligent persons are of opinion that a certificate of seaworthiness should be required. They argue, and with great force, that those persons who do not class their ships, because they will not bear inspection, have no right to imperil the lives of others for their own gain. Life is not a thing of price; if it were, the rich would live, and the poor would die. And when a Shipowner declines to bear the expense of making his vessel seaworthy, he places in jeopardy the life of the sailor to benefit himself.

Registration Associations.

Lloyd’s Register, its great importance.

There are very easy means of ascertaining the seaworthiness of a ship, when first sent afloat, already at our disposal, as those of my readers, who are not conversant with this subject, will find by referring to the Appendix,[301] where a history of Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping will be found. That association has a well-organised and extensive staff of surveyors, through whom, at a very small cost, this fact could be ascertained. My readers will also there see the immense advantage that association has afforded in the improvement of our ships and the power it possesses of rendering still greater public service. But while rivalry amongst associations for classification is unquestionably injurious,[302] it may not be considered advisable that Lloyd’s Register alone should issue certificates of seaworthiness. There are other similar associations whose certificates would answer the object in view equally well, and it is for Government to decide (should an attempt be made to carry this principle into practice) what associations shall be empowered to issue the requisite certificates.

But while I cannot ignore the principle that no unseaworthy vessel should be allowed to leave our ports, I cannot hide from myself the fact that there would be numerous difficulties (but far from insurmountable) in the way of carrying it fully into practice. It might be argued that if the Board of Trade enrolled the associations named, and, more especially, if it took them under its immediate control, they would in a few years, instead of being private Institutions, be mere servants of the Board, and, through the Board, of a sensational House of Commons. But that argument may be met by the Shipowners saying to the Board of Trade, “We do not wish to be under your immediate control at all. Why should we not be allowed to manage our own affairs, as all other branches of the community now do,—subject, in our case, as in that of all others, to such enactments only as may be necessary for the public safety? We ought to know our own business a great deal better than any of your surveyors can teach us; and, if we think proper to form ourselves into an association, or associations, to manage our own affairs, and if we do what the country requires, why should we be interfered with by the Government as to the manner in which we think proper to build, equip, and navigate our ships, any more than other traders in the management of their affairs? Enrol us, if we think proper to associate, as you do joint-stock concerns or other associations; let us form a board with members elected by the persons interested, such, for instance, as the Metropolitan Board of Works, to manage our own concerns, with specific rules for the protection of the public, which, if we violate, you will punish us as you would do any other class of the community.”

Now, arguments such as these are really unanswerable. Statesmen and others, who have to encounter the harassing difficulties of official life, and who know that all executive power must be exercised by a minister, or by individuals responsible to him, and, through him, to the public, might say, “How are we, unless all ships are under our immediate control, to meet questions put to us in the House of Commons, such as, ‘Whether such and such a society licensed by Government had the folly and audacity to allow of spring safety-valves, or of boats not fitted with Clifford’s Patent?’ or how could we justify a licence granted to an association which showed such flagrant disregard of modern inventions and of seamen’s lives?” But the reply to all this is that it is not the province of Government to legislate on such details as these, any more than it would be to dictate by Act of Parliament, how the details of any other branch of trade or manufacture are to be carried out. The duties of Government have long since been defined, and it is because Government, of recent years, has gone far beyond its duties in the case of Shipowners, that Shipowners complain, and justly complain, against Government for a “meddling and muddling” in matters alike beyond its province and its knowledge.

Reverting to the principle which so many persons now say should be enforced by legislative enactment, the seaworthiness of every ship, there would be great difficulty in carrying that out by Government, as seaworthiness is not definable. That is to say, though a vessel may be seaworthy, when launched, (even then it would depend upon the trade in which she was to be employed), she might not be so at the end of her first voyage, or she might be so for one trade in summer, but not in winter, or with one description of cargo, but not with another; or, in fact, with the same cargo if properly stowed,[303] but not otherwise, and so forth. The details are so numerous that it would be impossible to enter upon them within my limits, and for the same reasons, if the principle is to be carried out, it can only be by the association of competent individuals with the necessary staff under their control, possessing that knowledge which long experience alone can give. I mention these points in case the Legislature consider it necessary to enforce this principle; for, if it is to be carried out, it should be in such a manner as will satisfy the public with the least possible interference with the duties of the Shipowner.[304]

Improvement of seamen by better education.

In the meantime I must direct the attention of my readers to the unseaworthiness of too many of our seamen, which is of really greater national importance than the unseaworthiness of our ships. However desirable it may be to make certain, if we can, that no unseaworthy ships shall leave our ports, the incompetency, carelessness, and drunkenness of seamen demand much more seriously our attention; and, as all legislative enactments have hitherto failed to raise them to the requisite standard, we ought to direct our attention more earnestly than we have yet done to their education. If education is necessary on shore, it is still more so with seamen, and yet we have done, practically, nothing, as a Nation, to assist them in gaining knowledge, and, especially, that description of knowledge required in their calling. Indeed, we have not seriously attempted any great practical scheme for their education or for the amalgamation of the services of the Royal Navy and those of the mercantile marine, which, while invaluable to us as a nation, would tend so much to elevate the social position of that neglected portion of their class, who, not having the good fortune to be enrolled in the Navy or on the lists of the large Shipowners, must seek their daily bread at sea in any ship where employment can be found.

Evil effects of advance notes

On the contrary, we have, in some respects, pandered to their pernicious habits. For instance, when a clause in the first Government Bill of last Session (1875) was introduced to render advance notes illegal, the House of Commons rejected it. From my own experience I can have no hesitation in stating that the system of advance notes (I do not include the allotment notes, which are most useful) tends to lower the character of seamen, promotes intemperance and insubordination, and has been the indirect means of far more disasters at sea than either overladen or otherwise unseaworthy vessels.

Besides, any such system is unknown to any other class of the community. What should we think of a mechanic or house servant who could not enter our service unless we paid him a month’s wages in advance? We should have nothing to say to him—1st, because we should not care to trust our money to a person who, on some frivolous excuse, might decline to repay us by his faithful service; and (2ndly) because we should, naturally, consider anyone requiring such an advance an improvident if not a worthless person. These advances must, necessarily, discourage frugality and prudence; while, in the case of seamen, they most assuredly lead, directly, to intemperance and vice. Nor is there any real occasion for making advances in their case. The mechanic or the house servant may have been for some time out of employment, and, as his wages are paid weekly or monthly, he may not have laid by anything; but, in the case of seamen, their wages are paid at the end of the voyage, often in large sums, and by means of savings-banks and money-order offices, specially established for their use, they have every facility afforded them for retaining their earnings. But they do not. Why? Because the Legislature has encouraged their natural and proverbially improvident habits, by acknowledging a system of advance of wages unknown to any other class of workmen, on which advance they depend for an outfit, after too frequently squandering the wages they had earned on a previous voyage.

But I should prefer my readers considering carefully the Report of the Commissioners on this subject instead of my own views, and therefore I do not hesitate to give these conclusions at length,[305] as a large mass of evidence was brought before them. They, as statesmen and philanthropists, had no object in view beyond the national good, and, more especially, the welfare of the seafaring population.

confirmed by the opinion of the Commissioners.

“The evidence before us leads to the conclusion that the system of advance notes is one great obstacle to the amelioration of the condition of merchant seamen. All the witnesses whom we have examined admit that the system is most pernicious, but it is defended on the ground that, without this advance, the sailor could not pay for his lodging on shore, or procure the clothes requisite for him when he joins a ship.

“In practice it seems that the advance note is handed over to the lodging-house keeper, not usually in exchange for cash, but in discharge of debts which the sailor has been induced to incur. The lodging-house keeper charges a heavy discount, and the sailor is frequently brought on board half-clad and intoxicated.

“Shipowners and captains of merchant ships concur in stating that a large portion of the ship’s crew is very often brought or even lifted on board in a condition of helpless drunkenness, that the vessel must often be detained for twenty-four hours in order that the men may be so far recovered as to be able to get her under weigh, and that there is great risk of life and property at the commencement of the voyage from the consequent inefficiency of the seamen.

“The advance note is not payable until some days after the sailing of the ship; but if the ship then puts back or touches at another port, the seaman often takes the opportunity of making some complaint, in order to get free from his engagement, and will even incur a month’s imprisonment with this object, whilst the Shipowner or the person who has cashed the note loses the money which has been paid in advance.

“It is said that if there were no advance note, the crimp in a foreign or colonial port would not have the same inducement to entice the sailor to desert.

“After careful consideration of the numerous evils attending this mode of prepayment, we recommend that advance notes should be declared illegal, that no payment or order for payment made in advance for wages shall be a discharge for the payment of any portion of a seaman’s wages when due, and that no money paid by a Shipowner to or for a seaman shall be debited to the seaman, except wages already earned, the allotment notes, and the cost of such supplies as the seamen may receive after joining the ship.

“There will be some inconvenience felt at first from the abolition of the existing system of advance notes, and there will be perhaps considerable opposition to the change in the ports, and amongst the lodging-house keepers, who profit by these notes. We feel, however, convinced that unless this mischievous mode of payment be discontinued, the seamen will never be raised from their servile dependence on crimps, and taught to rely on their own industry and intelligence.”[306]

Over-insurance.

But there is a question of quite as great importance to which I shall again have occasion to refer when I review the history of our steam companies, and show the remarkably small amount of loss that some of them have sustained through the system and order prevailing on board their vessels. There we shall see how losses are prevented. In the meantime, we should do well to inquire how losses are encouraged by allowing policies of insurance to be effected for a greater amount than the value of the ship or the cargo she contains.

Views of Mr. T. H. Farrer.

A contract of marine insurance is in its essence a contract of indemnity, and the spirit of the contract is violated if the assured can make the occurrence of a loss the means of gain. But the law has allowed a very considerable deviation from this fundamental principle. Mr. T. H. Farrer, in his evidence, happily illustrates this in the case of a ship with a chartered freight, bound from London to Calcutta and back.[307] He supposes her to be lost on her outward passage in the Bay of Biscay. Presuming that the owner only insured her prudently and not exorbitantly, he would recover in this case not merely the value of the ship at the commencement of the voyage, but also the freight of the outward and homeward voyages, while he would be exempted from paying the seamen’s wages from the date of the disaster, the expenses necessary to carry his ship to Calcutta, to remain there, and to return on her homeward passage, so that he would be, actually, a very considerable gainer by the loss.[308] Nor is the matter less flagrant in the case of valued policies, when the value of the property is fixed by agreement beforehand between the assured and the underwriter. The effect of this, as the Commissioners justly remark,[309] is, “that unless the policy is altogether void, on account of fraud, or the concealment of a material fact, the assured can, in the case of a total loss, receive the value which has been stated in the policy, however much it may exceed the actual worth of his property.” In confirmation of their opinion, they add “that, in certain decided cases, the Shipowner has been allowed to recover 50 and even 100 per cent. more than the actual value of his vessel.”

Evidence of other witnesses.

Various witnesses recommended that, in case of a total loss, the underwriter should be allowed to question a valued policy, when he considered that the value had been overstated; but many Shipowners and underwriters objected to this proposal, contending that, where a value had been agreed on between the Shipowners and underwriter, subsequent interference would be mischievous or futile, as it might induce Shipowners to insure abroad. It was contended that the value of a ship might depend on a variety of circumstances; for instance, the loss of a steamer to a Shipowner, about to start a new line of steam communication, would be inadequately replaced by the cost of the vessel, though estimated values of this sort are very problematical.

As regards insurance of freight, it was further suggested that the Shipowner should not, in case of total loss, be entitled to recover his freight, without deducting the expense saved to him by reason of the loss of the vessel. On the other hand, it was alleged that the necessity of estimating these uninsured expenses would give rise to doubt, difficulty, and litigation, and that, if the suggestion were adopted, the Shipowner would be to a great extent deprived of the legitimate advantage he now enjoys of being able to obtain with facility an advance on his freight.

Opinion of the Commissioners.

After carefully considering all these matters, the Commissioners arrived at the conclusion that they ought not to recommend any alteration of the law with regard to valued policies in cases of total loss, as there were weighty reasons against any interference on the part of the Legislature with contracts made by persons capable of taking care of their own interests, without carefully ascertaining the effect this interference was likely to produce on the entire system of law relating to such contracts. But they were of opinion that the “whole system of insurance law requires complete revision, for not only does it allow the assured, in some cases, to recover more than the amount of the loss actually sustained by him, but it also, on the other hand, deprives him of an indemnity in cases in which he ought to be protected by his insurance.”

The Commissioners, however, with great force, remark, that “a complete and thorough revision of our laws relating to marine insurance is a task of equal importance, difficulty, and delicacy, requiring evidence of an extensive character, and necessitating a very lengthy and careful investigation, and it touches directly on so many subjects unconnected with the security of life at sea, on which it has only an indirect and somewhat remote bearing, that we do not think it properly falls within the scope of our commission. We should also have been reluctant to undertake the complete revision of our system of marine insurance law, because, for many reasons, it appears to us to be important that, before such a task is undertaken, an attempt should be made to induce foreign nations to concur with us in framing and adopting a general code of insurance law. To alter the English law of marine insurance to any considerable extent, might have the effect of throwing the business of insurance into the hands of foreigners, and there is so much insurance of foreign property in England, as well as of English property abroad, that it is most desirable that the law of insurance should, as far as possible, be the same among all commercial nations. An examination of the foreign codes leads us to hope that there would be found no insuperable difficulty in the way of attaining this important object.”

Although the Commissioners do not at present recommend any alteration to be made in the law relating to valued policies, they think that the Shipowner should not be able to recover his insurance, whether under a time or voyage policy, in cases where it is shown that he or his agent had not done everything reasonably within their power to make and maintain the ship in a seaworthy condition, where that unseaworthiness occasioned the loss. They further consider that the Shipowner’s liability for damage to property or person should be unlimited in cases involving the death of the seaman or the damage to person or property. They are also of opinion that the present system by which insurance cases are tried before a judge and jury is altogether unsatisfactory, as a single judge and two assessors would constitute a far better tribunal. In conclusion, they recommend that the Marine Department of the Board should be revised and strengthened by having a legal adviser exclusively attached to it (a recommendation which has been since carried out). “It will,” they remark, “be the duty of the Board of Trade to check the negligent and to punish the culpable shipowner, but it is desirable that these functions should be performed without harassing the great body of Shipowners, who, by their ability and indefatigable energy, have contributed to the prosperity of the empire.”

I have now endeavoured to give as succinct an account of the whole course of the maritime legislation of the British Empire and its effects upon ships, seamen, and commerce as my space will permit, from the earliest period up to the close of the year 1875. Although it is not the province of an historian to enter upon controversial questions, much less to dive into the future, yet history is of little value unless we can gain knowledge from the past which can be made useful hereafter. I may therefore be permitted to close this volume with a few remarks on the subject of further maritime legislation, especially as the subject is one to which an unusual amount of public attention has been devoted during the last two or three years, and as it has been, officially, announced that it will be again dealt with by Government in the ensuing Session of Parliament.

Too much legislation already.

Shipowners say that there is far too much legislation already, and I certainly agree with them; but when they charge the Government as they do, and especially the Board of Trade, or rather Mr. T. H. Farrer, as its permanent Secretary, with forcing all this over-legislation upon them, I must remind them of the facts. What Government did, and did wisely and well, as I have endeavoured to show, was to frame such mercantile marine laws as had become essential after the repeal of the Navigation Laws. The laws then passed have, unquestionably, been of great service, not merely to the nation, but to Shipowners themselves. Having completed all that was considered necessary, Government directed its attention to the amendment, as cases for its necessity arose, and to the consolidation of existing laws; and I can, of my own knowledge, state that Mr. Farrer has, since then, opposed all further legislation which had for its object the interference with the details of a Shipowner’s duty. But the House of Commons would not allow Government to rest with its good work. “Independent members” of that House, actuated by various motives, some of them not very clearly defined, commenced to “amend” (?) in their own way, these laws (see Hansard’s ‘Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings’), by proposing numerous fresh clauses and fresh Bills which, if Government had not resisted, would most likely have doubled the existing number of the mercantile marine statutes. They next commenced to introduce Bills of their own, to teach Shipowners how to construct and equip their vessels. Among the first of these measures was the Act to test chains and anchors, introduced by Sir J. D. H. Elphinstone and the late Mr. John Laird. So far from that Bill receiving the approval of Government, when I moved its rejection,[310] was strongly supported by Mr. Milner Gibson, the then President of the Board of Trade. We were, however, defeated, and the Bill passed and became law.

Encouraged by this success, other independent members followed, and, since then, most of the measures connected with the mercantile marine of this country have been forced upon Government either by Bills introduced by individual members, or by questions asked, or by deputations from interested constituencies, or “philanthropists,” who, however good in their intentions, are, too frequently, mischievously ignorant of the subjects they force upon the attention of Parliament. No one of my readers conversant with these matters can say that the Bills of the last three or four years, except so far as necessary amendments, were Government measures. They were nearly all forced upon the executive, while the only real and valuable measure of Government, the consolidation and codification of existing laws, has been, Session after Session, rejected, or, at least, “shunted” aside by the House of Commons.

For more than two centuries we attempted to regulate our maritime commerce by means of the Navigation Laws and their innumerable additions and amendments, the fallacy of which I have endeavoured in these volumes to expose; yet we are now following the same course our forefathers adopted by attempting, by means of a library of Mercantile Marine Laws, to regulate the details of the business of our Shipowners. Commerce, in all its branches, flourishes most when left alone. Leave our Shipowners alone, except when they do wrong. Leave them to manage their own affairs in such a manner as they consider most conducive to their own interests, and we may rest assured that, if they have a fair and free field and no special favours, they will maintain, against all nations, the maritime supremacy of England.

Necessity of a Mercantile Marine Code,

My advice, therefore, to the House of Commons, if an old member may venture to give it, would be to do nothing next Session in the way of fresh legislation, but to confine itself to necessary amendments, and to the codification of existing laws, so that Shipowners may have one law for their guidance; at present they are bewildered by the numerous fragmentary laws now in force. But, in addition to whatever reorganisation and changes may be found necessary, increased facilities would still seem requisite for the immediate payment of seamen’s wages on their discharge; and, though the mode of inquiry into the causes of the loss of life and property at sea has already been altered, greater rigour is still demanded for such inquiries, and more prompt means of detecting and punishing persons who ignorantly or negligently lose the vessels in which they serve. In cases of wilful loss, which I hope and believe are of rare occurrence, the law cannot be too prompt, too stringent, nor too severe. A man who wilfully loses his ship, I rank without hesitation with the “villain and the murderer.”

and of more prompt punishment in criminal cases.

Nor should I have much more mercy on the Shipowner who recklessly loses his ship, or who is accessory to her loss; and I should subject to punishment, though in a different and more modified form, any Shipowner who, either ignorantly or negligently, sends his ship to sea in an unseaworthy state. In these matters, the law is still open to improvement, both as regards greater facilities for the discovery of crime and its prompt punishment, arising, as this does, in no small degree, from its too complex character.

Although the Shipowner is now made liable for criminal neglect, and cannot, by contract, relieve himself from this liability, such neglect is difficult of proof, and a jury deciding against a Shipowner on a question of damages, may, often, hesitate to make him criminally responsible. If it were possible to enforce this liability in all cases where guilty; if every Shipowner were made to feel that the proper construction, equipment, loading, manning, and navigation of his ship were matters to which it was his duty to attend, and if these duties were enforced, it would produce much more salutary effects in the way of saving life and property at sea than any Government surveys with a legion of inspectors at their back: each one of these relieves the Shipowner from a duty which belongs to him alone, and relieves, or, at the least, might relieve, him from a part of his responsibility; for if, as in the case of compulsory pilotage, a Shipowner is relieved from responsibility in case of accident, he cannot, in common justice, be held criminally liable when he has acted in conformity with such laws as have been passed for his guidance and control.

Whether it would be possible, as has been recommended, to establish by positive enactment an absolute and indefeasible obligation on the part of every Shipowner to his shippers, passengers, and underwriters, that he and the agents to whom he trusts his ships, shall do all in their power to make and keep his ship seaworthy, is a problem I am not, at present, prepared to solve; moreover, it raises numerous questions of great difficulty and delicacy.

Some amendments may be, also, required in the tonnage and measurement law, which, though, as I have already explained, now a vast improvement on any previous law, still presents features of hardship alike on Shipowners and seamen, as, in the case of the latter, frequent instances occur where the law is evaded by the stowage of cargo or stores in spaces appointed by the present Act for the accommodation of the crew.

Such are the leading measures which may still require the attention of the Legislature; but, before closing my remarks, I desire my readers to recollect the existence of a Merchant Shipping Code, which has not yet become law. It embraces all the laws relating to Merchant Shipping, and if the First Minister would take up this Bill and amend it in detail, he would not merely confer a boon on the largest shipping community the world has ever seen, but one by which his name would be long remembered.

If the Legislature did nothing else during the ensuing Session, it would be a Session well spent: ten clear sittings[311] would, however, suffice, if there was a determination on both sides of the House to allow no party spirit to interfere. Nor should any such feeling be displayed, for the questions now to be considered are almost wholly of an executive and not of a political character; while all the materials are now ready, the lengthened inquiries and discussions to which almost every point except insurance (and on this there must be further inquiry before there is any legislation) has been already subjected, render further discussion, in a great measure, unnecessary.

Concluding remarks on the extraordinary progress of British shipping.

I have endeavoured to show how much progress has been made during the last quarter of a century—a progress eminently due to the repeal of our Navigation Laws and to many of the earlier measures of the Board of Trade, in confirmation of which I may point to the magnificent ships now produced, to the enormous extent of our mercantile fleets,[312] as compared with those of all other nations, and to the superiority of our officers to what they were before the repeal of the Navigation Laws.

There is, nevertheless, a wide and noble field in which the statesman might employ his power and genius to great advantage, and earn for himself an imperishable name. The means are now in a great measure at his disposal. But he must decide between two principles. He must not, on the one hand, give way to the question of sentiment or to the popular cry that merchant ships and their cargoes shall be under Government survey, and, at the same time, hold Shipowners responsible for acts which legislation has placed beyond their control. If he adopts the former course, he must double or treble the existing staff of officials; but I venture to warn him that, in so doing, he will place a canker-worm at the root of our maritime greatness, which will as surely destroy the mighty fabric we have raised by individual genius, energy, and skill, as ever did the “dry rot” in our wooden ships of war and commerce.

Seeing what our Shipowners have already accomplished, he might to advantage afford them facilities for self-government. The means, as I have shown, are already at his disposal. We have Lloyd’s Register, with its large staff of competent surveyors ready to aid, at our disposal, as also a similar association in Liverpool. We have mercantile marine boards, elected by popular constituencies, at all the leading seaports in the kingdom, under whose supervision the shipping officers are now placed, as well as the examination of all masters and mates. Leave them as they are; but, as I understand that these boards are not overburdened by the duties now devolving on them, could not their duties in relation to the crews be extended and some arrangement be made whereby these different institutions, formed into one, two, or more central and district boards, might perform all the work of detail now required by Parliament? By some such amalgamation everything the country requires could be done more economically and efficiently than at present.

Lloyd’s Registry now tests all anchors and chains as required by Parliament, without any disturbance of their functions or the work for which they were originally constituted, the voluntary classification of ships. Why should we not place in their hands such duties connected with the ship herself as the regulation of load-lines, certification of seaworthiness, if found expedient, and the supervision of all matters of detail which Parliament may consider necessary, in the construction, equipment, loading, and navigation of our ships? All these matters would be much better done by a popularly elected board chosen from merchant Shipowners and underwriters than by any Department of the Government. In their hands might be safely placed the appointment of surveyors: one Department of this new Board attending to the hull of the ship, the other to her navigation, as at present; all these matters being subject, of course, to such regulations as Parliament might consider it expedient to impose, and represented in Parliament by the President of the Board of Trade, or, in lieu thereof, by a Secretary of State for Commerce, should that be desirable.

I merely throw out these remarks for consideration, being aware that many obstacles, though few real difficulties, would require to be overcome in carrying out some such re-organisation as I venture to suggest. But whatever changes Ministers may consider most expedient to adopt, they must not lightly tamper with the merchant fleets which the skill and genius of our people have created, or with the position they have achieved since relieved from those legislative enactments, by which they were bound for more than two centuries. These fleets are now the largest, and unquestionably the finest, in the world, and instead of foreigners overstocking our own ports as was prophesied, we now conduct the greater portion of the maritime commerce of foreign nations.[313] It is, therefore, no idle boast to say, that while the sun never sets on the dominions of our Queen, there is no ocean, no sea, and, I might add, were it not for the exclusive policy of the United States and of France, with a few other insignificant exceptions, no lake, no river, where the British flag is not unfurled, and where it does not shed its civilising and beneficial influence, over many peoples of varied tongues, who might otherwise still be living in darkness, if not in barbarism.

It behoves, therefore, our Statesmen to take care how they deal with this great interest—made great by the freedom of our laws and by the energy of our people; and, whatever further legislation may be necessary, it is seriously to be hoped that Government will confine its measures to their legitimate object; viz. the clear definition of the legal duties and responsibilities of Shipowners, the maintenance of lighthouses, buoys and beacons on our coasts, the general regulations necessary for the proper conduct of maritime commerce, the investigation into the true cause of all accidents at sea, and the prompt punishment of all persons who wrongfully and wilfully violate the law.