The Maryland Line in the Confederate States Army.

by W. W. Goldsborough

CHAPTER VIII.

Soon after the return of the army under Early from Maryland, that General determined to send McCausland on an expedition into Pennsylvania, with his own and General Johnson’s brigades, for what purpose will be seen by the following extract from his “Memoirs of the Last Year of the War for Independence:”

“On the 26th of July, we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry going to the Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed in destroying the railroad, it having been repaired since we passed over it at the beginning of the month. While at Martinsburg it was ascertained, beyond all doubt, that Hunter had been again indulging in his favorite mode of warfare, and that, after his return to the Valley, while we were near Washington, among other outrages, the private residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia Senate, Mr. Alexander R. Boteler, an ex-member of the Confederate Congress, as well as of the United States Congress, and Edmund I. Lee, a distant relative of General Lee, all in Jefferson county, with their contents, had been burned by his orders, only time enough being given for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns in the South, as well as private country houses, had been burned by the Federal troops, and the accounts had been heralded forth in some of the Northern papers in terms of exultation, and gloated over by their readers, while they were received with apathy by others.

“I now came to the conclusion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to its enormity, by an example in the way of retaliation. I did not select the cases mentioned, as having more merit or greater claims for retaliation than others, but because they had occurred within the limits of the country covered by my command, and were brought more immediately to my attention.

“The town of Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, was selected as the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCausland was ordered to proceed with his brigade and that of Johnson, and a battery of artillery, to that place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold, or $500,000 in United States currency, as a compensation for the destruction of the houses named and their contents, and, in default of payment, to lay the town in ashes, in retaliation for the burning of those houses and others in Virginia, as well as for the towns which had been burned in other Southern States. A written demand to that effect was sent to the municipal authorities, and they were informed what would be the result of a failure or refusal to comply with it. I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town, by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped that the payment of such a sum would have the desired effect, and open the eyes of the people of other towns at the North, to the necessity of urging upon their government the adoption of a different policy. McCausland was also directed to proceed from Chambersburg towards Cumberland, Md., and levy contributions in money upon that and other towns able to bear them, and if possible destroy the machinery at the coal pits near Cumberland, and the machine shops, depots, and bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, as far as practicable.

“On the 29th, McCausland crossed the Potomac, near Clear Spring, above Williamsport, and I moved with Rhodes’ and Ramseur’s divisions and Vaughan’s cavalry to the latter place, while Imboden demonstrated with his and Jackson’s cavalry towards Harper’s Ferry, in order to withdraw attention from McCausland. Breckinridge remained at Martinsburg, and continued the destruction of the railroad. Vaughan drove a force of cavalry from Williamsport, and went into Hagerstown, where he captured and destroyed a train of cars loaded with supplies. One of Rhodes’ brigades was crossed over at Williamsport, and subsequently withdrawn.

“On the 30th, McCausland being well underway, I moved back to Martinsburg; and on the 31st, the whole infantry force was moved to Bunker Hill, where we remained on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August.

“On the 4th, in order to enable McCausland to retire from Pennsylvania and Maryland, and to keep Hunter, who had been reinforced by the 6th and 19th corps, and had been oscillating between Harper’s Ferry and Monocacy Junction, in a state of uncertainty, I again moved to the Potomac, with the infantry and Vaughan’s and Jackson’s cavalry, while Imboden demonstrated towards Harper’s Ferry.

“On the 5th, Rhodes’ and Ramseur’s divisions crossed at Williamsport, and took position near St. James’ College, and Vaughan’s cavalry went into Hagerstown. Breckinridge, with his command and Jackson’s cavalry, crossed at Shepherdstown, and took position at Sharpsburg. This position is in full view from Maryland Heights, and a cavalry force was sent out by the enemy to reconnoitre, which after skirmishing with Jackson’s cavalry, was driven off by the sharpshooters of Gordon’s division.

“On the 6th, the whole force recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and moved towards Martinsburg; and on the 7th, we returned to Bunker Hill.

“On the 30th of July, McCausland reached Chambersburg, and made the demand as directed, reading to such of the authorities as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The demand was not complied with, the people stating that they were not afraid of having their town burned, and that a Federal force was approaching. The policy pursued by our army on former occasions had been so lenient, that they did not suppose the threat was in earnest this time, and they hoped for speedy relief. McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out his orders, and the greater part of the town was laid in ashes.

“For this act I alone am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were simply executing my orders, and had no discretion left them. Notwithstanding the lapse of time which has occurred, and the result of the war, I am perfectly satisfied with my conduct on this occasion, and see no reason to regret it.

“McCausland then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but on approaching that town, he found it defended by a force under Kelly, too strong for him to attack, and he withdrew towards Hampshire county, in Virginia, and crossed the Potomac near the mouth of the South Branch, capturing the garrison at that place, and partially destroying the railroad bridge. He then invested the post on the railroad at New Creek, but finding it too strongly fortified to take by assault, he moved to Moorefield, in Hardy county, near which place he halted to rest and recruit his men and horses, as the command was now considered safe from pursuit. Averill, however, had been pursuing from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, and Johnson’s brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on the morning of the 7th of August, and routed by Averill’s force. This resulted also in the rout of McCausland’s brigade, and the loss of the artillery, (four pieces,) and about three hundred prisoners from the whole command. The balance of the command made its way to Mount Jackson in great disorder, and much weakened. This affair had a very damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the campaign.”

McCausland had not the manliness to take the responsibility of this surprise, which was brought about by his own neglect and incaution, but sought to throw the blame upon Johnson, who demanded a court of inquiry, but it was not allowed. McCausland was the commanding officer, and Johnson his subordinate. He had selected the camp and posted his pickets, and was of course bound to keep himself advised of the position and propinquity of the enemy, and to advise his subordinate of danger. He never did keep himself so informed; the only intimation he ever gave was a mere verbal one by a courier, at two o’clock at night, that Averill was at Romney, thirty miles off, the evening before, and to be ready and saddle up by daylight. The order conveyed no intimation of danger, and General McCausland had no such idea, for he slept three miles away from his camp, and was absent when his command was attacked.

Soon after the Moorefield affair Early’s army moved to Fisher’s Hill, when Gilmor (with whom the First Maryland was still serving) was ordered to scout in his front. Shortly after Sheridan retreated to Winchester, beyond which place Early pursued him. A series of severe encounters ensued with the enemy’s cavalry in the vicinity of Winchester, Martinsburg, Bunker Hill, Leetown and Charlestown, in which the First Maryland took a prominent part, losing heavily.

One of the heaviest of these fights I will here speak of at length, as it has been most strangely misrepresented by Colonel Gilmor in his “Four Years in the Saddle.” The fight at Bunker Hill is the one alluded to, where Colonel Gilmor says the First Maryland “refused to charge when ordered by him.” The facts are these:

On the morning of the 13th of August, 1864, a brigade of Lomax’s command (to which was attached the First Maryland and Gilmor’s cavalry, all under command of Gilmor,) had advanced and driven in the enemy’s pickets, and pushed back his cavalry several miles below Bunker Hill, where they halted for a while and then turned to retrace their steps. The enemy in the meanwhile had been heavily reinforced, and pressed hard upon the retreating column, of which the First Maryland formed the rear. The enemy became more and more pressing as they advanced, until a charge was ordered by Colonel Gilmor, which had the effect of checking them, and his vastly superior force only saved him from rout. These charges had to be repeated again and again, the First Maryland retiring excellent order at a walk. When the stream which crosses the pike at Bunker Hill was reached, Gilmor, who had been much delayed, of course, in making these charges, found himself entirely unsupported, all the other regiments of the brigade having retired to the shelter of the infantry, which was formed in line about a mile distant. At this juncture the head of the enemy’s column, immediately in the rear of the battalion, had entered the stream before the rear of the First Maryland had reached the opposite bank, two other of his columns meanwhile moving unopposed parallel to the pike, and were at least a mile in the rear of the little band battling with ten times their number. At this most critical period, right in the midst of the stream, the battalion wheeled and again charged, meeting the enemy midway, when a most desperate hand to hand fight ensued, the blood of both intermingling with its current. For some minutes they held the enemy in check, expecting reinforcements, but none were available, and under the desperate nature of the circumstances General Lomax ordered a battery, near the line of battle which the infantry was forming, to open on the struggling mass. The artillery officer remonstrated, as he was satisfied he would damage friend as well foe; but the order was repeated. The first few shots fell in the ranks of the enemy, and rendered material aid to the handful of heroes in such imminent peril, but unfortunately a shell at last struck right in their midst, when, of course, the battalion broke. The fire of a foe in front and a friend in rear was more than human nature could withstand; but even then they did not leave the field, but retired, stubbornly contesting every foot of ground, until they reached a house standing in a field near the pike, and midway between Bunker Hill and the infantry line, where some of the command formed on both sides, which they were obliged to do to confront the now rapidly advancing enemy. Here a stand was made, and the fight continued for sometime. On the side of the house next the pike was the color bearer of the battalion, Colonel Gilmor, Captain Ditty, Captain Raisin and some fifteen or twenty officers and men, and it becoming evident that they could no longer hold the enemy at bay, Colonel Gilmor turned to this handful and exclaimed, “We’ll go at them again,” but had not moved five steps, the battalion at his heels, before he dropped his pistol and wheeled around, the blood streaming from his neck, and galloped off, saying as he did so, “I’m killed.” Seeing the folly of remaining longer, the command retired upon the infantry, which easily repulsed the enemy’s cavalry. This was the last order to charge given that day, and most faithfully was it obeyed, even by twenty against a thousand.

This is a correct statement of the matter, and it is much to be regretted that Colonel Gilmor should be the only man who ever preferred such a charge or cast a reflection upon the fair fame of the First Maryland, every man of which was a hero of an hundred battles, and would follow where any man dared to lead.

In this desperate fight I have to record the death of the gallant Lieutenant Henry Blackiston, of company B, who fell while performing prodigies of valor. Poor fellow, he was universally beloved, and his death deeply regretted by his companions.

After this affair, great dissatisfaction was produced in the First Maryland by an order of General Early’s consolidating the command, then very much reduced, with Gilmor’s irregular cavalry, and placing the whole under that officer. The entire battalion remonstrated against what they conceived to be the injustice done them, and all the officers tendered their resignations except one, and that one acted upon the conviction that resignation was not the proper remedy of the wrong, which he condemned as fully as any one. None of the resignations were accepted, when the objection to the consolidation was urged at the Department in Richmond so earnestly that the order was revoked, and the command severed from the connection with Gilmor, and returned to its original status.

Soon after Captain G. W. Dorsey was assigned to the command of the battalion, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of the lamented Ridgely Brown. Major R. C. Smith, who had been permanently disabled in the fight at Greenland Gap, was retired, and the vacancy thus occasioned not afterwards filled.

After Colonel Dorsey’s accession to the command, the campaign was constantly active, and the enemy being nearly as strong in cavalry alone as General Early was in troops of all arms, his cavalry was compelled to contend with great odds. Fights and skirmishes of a greater or less magnitude were of daily and almost hourly occurrence, and with the picket duty to be performed, men and horses were, employed to the utmost limit of endurance. In most of these engagements the Confederates were successful, but in one of them, at Fisher’s Hill, on the 22d of September, the enemy gained considerable advantage by suddenly throwing a heavy force, consisting of two or three divisions, which he had moved up under cover of the North Mountains on Early’s left, upon the line of dismounted cavalry, which was all that General could spare to cover that point. Here, after they had broken the Confederate line, Colonel Dorsey ordered the First Maryland to charge, with the view to check the enemy, if possible, and gain time to bring up reinforcements, but it only availed to release some prisoners and to get the horses of the dismounted men out of the way. In the face of such odds, Dorsey was forced back with some loss, and although severely wounded himself, extricated his command, and made an orderly retreat.